Philosiphy

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John Locke

when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever

is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is

which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and

I could not avoid frequently using it.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are

such ideas in men’s minds: every one is conscious of

them in himself; and men’s words and actions will sat-

isfy him that they are in others.

Our first inquiry then shall be,—how they come into

the mind.

BOOK I Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate

Chapter I No Innate Speculative Principles

1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge,

sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an established

opinion amongst some men, that there are in the un-

derstanding certain innate principles; some primary no-

tions, koinai ennoiai, characters, as it were stamped upon

the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very

first being, and brings into the world with it. It would

be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the

falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I

hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse)

how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties,

may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the

help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at cer-

tainty, without any such original notions or principles.

For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be

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impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a

creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to

receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no

less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths

to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when

we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as

easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were origi-

nally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure

to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when

they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I

shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the

truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I

be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who,

with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever

they find it.

2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing

more commonly taken for granted than that there are

certain principles, both speculative and practical, (for

they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all man-

kind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the

constant impressions which the souls of men receive in

their first beings, and which they bring into the world

with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of

their inherent faculties.

3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argu-

ment, drawn from universal consent, has this misfor-

tune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that

there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed,

it would not prove them innate, if there can be any

other way shown how men may come to that universal

agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I

presume may be done.

4. “What is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing

to be and not to be,” not universally assented to. But,

which is worse, this argument of universal consent,

which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems

to me a demonstration that there are none such: be-

cause there are none to which all mankind give an uni-

versal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and

instance in those magnified principles of demonstration,

“Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same

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John Locke

thing to be and not to be”; which, of all others, I think

have the most allowed title to innate. These have so

settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that

it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should

seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that

these propositions are so far from having an universal

assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom

they are not so much as known.

5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not

known to children, idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident,

that all children and idiots have not the least apprehen-

sion or thought of them. And the want of that is enough

to destroy that universal assent which must needs be

the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seem-

ing to me near a contradiction to say, that there are

truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or un-

derstands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being

nothing else but the making certain truths to be per-

ceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without

the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.

If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds,

with those impressions upon them, they must unavoid-

ably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to

these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that

there are no such impressions. For if they are not no-

tions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and

if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown?

To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the

same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and

never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression

nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind

which it never yet knew, which it was never yet con-

scious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason,

all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable

ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and

to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in

the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only

because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of

all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be

imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall

know; for a man may live long, and die at last in igno-

rance of many truths which his mind was capable of

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knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capac-

ity of knowing be the natural impression contended for,

all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this

account, be every one of them innate; and this great

point will amount to no more, but only to a very im-

proper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to

assert the contrary, says nothing different from those

who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever

denied that the mind was capable of knowing several

truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge

acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain

innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the un-

derstanding without being perceived, I can see no dif-

ference there can be between any truths the mind is

capable of knowing in respect of their original: they

must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a

man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that

talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if

he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such

truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived,

and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words “to be

in the understanding” have any propriety, they signify

to be understood. So that to be in the understanding,

and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never

to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is

not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these

two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impos-

sible for the same thing to be and not to be,” are by

nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them:

infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have

them in their understandings, know the truth of them,

and assent to it.

6. That men know them when they come to the use of

reason, answered. To avoid this, it is usually answered,

that all men know and assent to them, when they come

to the use of reason; and this is enough to prove them

innate. I answer:

7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any significa-

tion, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepos-

sessed, take not the pains to examine even what they

themselves say. For, to apply this answer with any toler-

able sense to our present purpose, it must signify one

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of these two things: either that as soon as men come to

the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come

to be known and observed by them; or else, that the use

and exercise of men’s reason, assists them in the discov-

ery of these principles, and certainly makes them known

to them.

8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove

them innate. If they mean, that by the use of reason

men may discover these principles, and that this is suf-

ficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will

stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can cer-

tainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those

are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that uni-

versal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts

to no more but this,—that by the use of reason we are

capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to

them; and, by this means, there will be no difference

between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theo-

rems they deduce from them: all must be equally al-

lowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use

of reason, and truths that a rational creature may cer-

tainty come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly

that way.

9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can

these men think the use of reason necessary to discover

principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we

may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of

deducing unknown truths from principles or proposi-

tions that are already known? That certainly can never

be thought innate which we have need of reason to

discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the

certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate.

We may as well think the use of reason necessary to

make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there

should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to

make the understanding see what is originally engraven

on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be

perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those

truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason

discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men

have those innate impressed truths originally, and be-

fore the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of

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them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect

to say, that men know and know them not at the same

time.

10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these

two maxims. It will here perhaps be said that math-

ematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not

innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein

they are distinguished from these maxims and other in-

nate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent

upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I

shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these

maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this

different: that the one have need of reason, using of

proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent; but

the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the

least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal

beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of

this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason for

the discovery of these general truths: since it must be

confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of

reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer

will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this

maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be

and not to be,” is a deduction of our reason. For this

would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so

fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those prin-

ciples to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all

reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains

and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense

be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the

foundation and guide of our reason, should need the

use of reason to discover it?

11. And if there were, this would prove them not in-

nate. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a

little attention on the operations of the understanding,

will find that this ready assent of the mind to some

truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or

the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite

distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter.

Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring

our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that “men

know and assent to them, when they come to the use of

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John Locke

reason,” be meant, that the use of reason assists us in

the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and

were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

12. The coming to the use of reason not the time we

come to know these maxims. If by knowing and assent-

ing to them “when we come to the use of reason,” be

meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken

notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children

come to the use of reason, they come also to know and

assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous.

First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims are

not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and there-

fore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned

as the time of their discovery. How many instances of

the use of reason may we observe in children, a long

time before they have any knowledge of this maxim,

“That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not

to be?” And a great part of illiterate people and savages

pass many years, even of their rational age, without

ever thinking on this and the like general propositions.

I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these gen-

eral and more abstract truths, which are thought in-

nate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor

then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come

to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are

not framed in the mind, about which those general

maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles,

but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced

and brought into the mind by the same way, and dis-

covered by the same steps, as several other proposi-

tions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to sup-

pose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of

this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men

should come to the use of reason before they get the

knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men’s

coming to the use of reason is the time of their discov-

ery.

13. By this they are not distinguished from other know-

able truths. In the mean time it is observable, that this

saying, that men know and assent to these maxims “when

they come to the use of reason,” amounts in reality of

fact to no more but this,—that they are never known

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nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may

possibly be assented to some time after, during a man’s

life; but when is uncertain. And so may all other know-

able truths, as well as these; which therefore have no

advantage nor distinction from others by this note of

being known when we come to the use of reason; nor

are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of

their discovery it would not prove them innate. But,

secondly, were it true that the precise time of their

being known and assented to were, when men come to

the use of reason; neither would that prove them in-

nate. This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposi-

tion itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it ap-

pear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted

in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes

first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of

the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to

exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of

speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims

are first assented to, (which it may be with as much

truth as the time when men come to the use of reason,)

would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to

say they are innate because men assent to them when

they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these

men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of

these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till

it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the

coming to the use of reason is the precise time when

they are first taken notice of, and if that were the pre-

cise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All

that can with any truth be meant by this proposition,

that men “assent to them when they come to the use of

reason,” is no more but this,—that the making of gen-

eral abstract ideas, and the understanding of general

names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and

growing up with it, children commonly get not those

general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them,

till, having for a good while exercised their reason about

familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their

ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowl-

edged to be capable of rational conversation. If assent-

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ing to these maxims, when men come to the use of

reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may

be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it

proves them innate.

15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths.

The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish

the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees grow-

ing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the

memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind

proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns

the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes

to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials

about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the

use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these mate-

rials that give it employment increase. But though the

having of general ideas and the use of general words and

reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any

way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths,

I confess, is very early in the mind but in a way that

shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we

shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but ac-

quired; it being about those first which are imprinted

by external things, with which infants have earliest to

do, which make the most frequent impressions on their

senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some

agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any

use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and per-

ceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this

is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words;

or comes to that which we commonly call “the use of

reason.” For a child knows as certainly before it can

speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bit-

ter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards

(when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugar-

plums are not the same thing.

16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on hav-

ing clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean,

and not on their innateness. A child knows not that

three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be

able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of

equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he

presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of

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that proposition. But neither does he then readily as-

sent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent

wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason;

but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has

settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these

names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that

proposition upon the same grounds and by the same

means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are

not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also

that he may come to know afterwards “That it is impos-

sible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as shall be

more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before

any one comes to have those general ideas about which

those maxims are; or to know the signification of those

general terms that stand for them; or to put together in

his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be

before he comes to assent to those maxims;—whose

terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more

innate than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till

time and observation have acquainted him with them;

and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of

these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make

him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe

whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed

in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man

knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-

seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and

two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so

soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason,

but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen,

and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those

which are signified by one, two, and three.

17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood,

proves them not innate. This evasion therefore of gen-

eral assent when men come to the use of reason, failing

as it does, and leaving no difference between those sup-

pose innate and other truths that are afterwards ac-

quired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an

universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying,

they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and

the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all

men, even children, as soon as they hear and under-

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stand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think

it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never

fail after they have once understood the words, to ac-

knowledge them for undoubted truths, they would in-

fer, that certainly these proposit ions were first lodged

in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the

mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with

and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then “that

one and two are equal to three, that sweetness is not

bitterness,” and a thousand the like, must be innate. In

answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to

a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the

terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be

not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of

them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must

then allow all such propositions to be innate which are

generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they

will find themselves plentifully stored with innate prin-

ciples. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first

hearing and understanding the terms, that men would

have those maxims pass for innate, they must also ad-

mit several propositions about numbers to be innate;

and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two

and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the

like propositions in numbers, that everybody assents to

at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have

a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the

prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made

about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and

all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure

to meet with assent as soon as they are understood.

That “two bodies cannot be in the same place” is a truth

that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims,

that “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to

be,” that “white is not black,” that “a square is not a

circle,” that “bitterness is not sweetness.” These and a

million of such other propositions, as many at least as

we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first

hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must

necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their

own rule, and have assent at first hearing and under-

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standing the terms to be a mark of innate, they must

allow not only as many innate propositions as men have

distinct ideas, but as many as men can make proposi-

tions wherein different ideas are denied one of another.

Since every proposition wherein one different idea is

denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first

hearing and understanding the terms as this general

one, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not

to be,” or that which is the foundation of it, and is the

easier understood of the two, “The same is not differ-

ent”; by which account they will have legions of innate

propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any

other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless

the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to

suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure,

&c., innate, than which there cannot be anything more

opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready

assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I

grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, de-

pending not on innate impressions, but on something

else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several

propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to

pretend to be innate.

19. Such less general propositions known before these

universal maxims. Nor let it be said, that those more

particular self-evident propositions, which are assented

to at first hearing, as that “one and two are equal to

three,” that “green is not red,” &c., are received as the

consequences of those more universal propositions which

are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who

will but take the pains to observe what passes in the

understanding, will certainly find that these, and the

like less general propositions, are certainly known, and

firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of

those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the

mind than those (as they are called) first principles,

cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are re-

ceived at first hearing.

20. “One and one equal to Two, &c., not general nor

useful,” answered. If it be said, that these propositions,

viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “red is not blue,”

&c., are not general maxims, nor of any great use, I

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answer, that makes nothing to the argument of univer-

sal assent upon hearing and understanding. For, if that

be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can

be found that receives general assent as soon as heard

and understood, that must be admitted for an innate

proposition, as well as this maxim, “That it is impossible

for the same thing to be and not to be,” they being

upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of

being more general, that makes this maxim more remote

from being innate; those general and abstract ideas be-

ing more strangers to our first apprehensions than those

of more particular self-evident propositions; and there-

fore it is longer before they are admitted and assented

to by the growing understanding. And as to the useful-

ness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not

be found so great as is generally conceived, when it

comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

21. These maxims not being known sometimes till pro-

posed, proves them not innate. But we have not yet

done with “assenting to propositions at first hearing

and understanding their terms.” It is fit we first take

notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are

innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that

several, who understand and know other things, are

ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to

them; and that one may be unacquainted with these

truths till he hears them from others. For, if they were

innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining

assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural

and original impression, (if there were any such,) they

could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing

them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If

so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows

them better after he has been thus taught them than

he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles

may be made more evident to us by others’ teaching

than nature has made them by impression: which will ill

agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give

but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes

them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowl-

edge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be de-

nied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these

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self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is

clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he

then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not

before, and which from thenceforth he never questions;

not because it was innate, but because the consider-

ation of the nature of the things contained in those

words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or

whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if

whatever is assented to at first hearing and understand-

ing the terms must pass for an innate principle, every

well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into

a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain

that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on

these observations, and reduce them into general propo-

sitions: not innate, but collected from a preceding ac-

quaintance and reflection on particular instances. These,

when observing men have made them, unobserving men,

when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their

assent to.

22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that

the mind is capable of understanding them, or else sig-

nifies nothing. If it be said, the understanding hath an

implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an ex-

plicit, before this first hearing (as they must who will

say “that they are in the understanding before they are

known,”) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a

principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly,

unless it be this,—that the mind is capable of under-

standing and assenting firmly to such propositions. And

thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first

principles, must be received as native impressions on

the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be,

who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than

assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathemati-

cians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams

they have drawn were but copies of those innate char-

acters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

23. The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon

a false supposition of no precedent teaching. There is, I

fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument,

which would persuade us that therefore those maxims

are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hear-

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ing; because they assent to propositions which they are

not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argu-

ment or demonstration, but a bare explication or un-

derstanding of the terms. Under which there seems to

me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be

taught nor to learn anything de novo; when, in truth,

they are taught, and do learn something they were ig-

norant of before. For, first, it is evident that they have

learned the terms, and their signification; neither of

which was born with them. But this is not all the ac-

quired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about

which the proposition is, are not born with them, no

more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in

all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the

terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas,

and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being nei-

ther of them innate, I would fain know what there is

remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would

gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms

or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get

ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion

one with another; and then to propositions made in

such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and

wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive

in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first

hearing assent; though to other propositions, in them-

selves as certain and evident, but which are concerning

ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same

time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child

quickly assents to this proposition, “That an apple is

not fire,” when by familiar acquaintance he has got the

ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted

on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and

fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, per-

haps, before the same child will assent to this proposi-

tion, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and

not to be”; because that, though perhaps the words are

as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being

more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the

names annexed to those sensible things the child hath

to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise

meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in

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Human Understanding

his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be

done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child as-

sent to a proposition made up of such general terms;

but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned

their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as

the other of the forementioned propositions: and with

both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas

he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the

words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of

another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought

to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in

his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true

or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dis-

sent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds,

any further than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot

but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we

have, but no further than that. But the showing by

what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds;

and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the

business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to

have only touched on it here, as one reason that made

me doubt of those innate principles.

24. Not innate, because not universally assented to. To

conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree

with these defenders of innate principles,—that if they

are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For

that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to,

is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth

and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by

these men’s own confession, they cannot be innate; since

they are not assented to by those who understand not

the terms; nor by a great part of those who do under-

stand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of

those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of

mankind. But were the number far less, it would be

enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show

these propositions not to be innate, if children alone

were ignorant of them.

25. These maxims not the first known. But that I may

not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants,

which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what

passes in their understandings before they express it; I

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John Locke

say next, that these two general propositions are not the

truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are

antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions: which,

if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can

determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time

when children begin to think, and their words and actions

do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are

capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it ratio-

nally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions

that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be

imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they per-

ceive the impressions from things without, and be at the

same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself

has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and as-

sent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which

are supposed woven into the very principles of their being,

and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foun-

dation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and fu-

ture reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains

to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its charac-

ters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things

very well: and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts

of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which

are not first known, and without which the undoubted

knowledge of several other things may be had. The child

certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the

cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of: that the

wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it

cries for: this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of:

but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, “That

it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,”

that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its

knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehen-

sion of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain,

it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, chil-

dren join in these general abstract speculations with their

sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with jus-

tice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his

opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.

26. And so not innate. Though therefore there be sev-

eral general propositions that meet with constant and

ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up,

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Human Understanding

who have attained the use of more general and abstract

ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being

to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless

know other things, they cannot pretend to universal

assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be

supposed innate;—it being impossible that any truth

which is innate (if there were any such) should be un-

known, at least to any one who knows anything else.

Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate

thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that

it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there

by any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first

of any thought on; the first that appear.

27. Not innate, because they appear least where what is

innate shows itself clearest. That the general maxims we

are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and

a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently

proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal

assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this fur-

ther argument in it against their being innate: that these

characters, if they were native and original impressions,

should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom

yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion,

a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they

are least known to those in whom, if they were innate,

they must needs exert themselves with most force and

vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people,

being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or bor-

rowed opinions; learning and education having not cast

their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by super-

inducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those

fair characters nature had written there; one might rea-

sonably imagine that in their minds these innate notions

should lie open fairly to every one’s view, as it is certain

the thoughts of children do. It might very well be ex-

pected that these principles should be perfectly known to

naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul,

(as these men suppose,) can have no dependence on the

constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed

difference between them and others. One would think,

according to these men’s principles, that all these native

beams of light (were there any such) should, in those

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John Locke

who have no reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out

in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their

being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and

abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots,

savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims

are to be found? What universal principles of knowledge?

Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from

those objects they have had most to do with, and which

have made upon their senses the frequentest and stron-

gest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle,

and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced

age; and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with

love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe.

But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant

of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and re-

puted principles of science, will, I fear, find himself mis-

taken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom men-

tioned in the huts of Indians: much less are they to be

found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of

them on the minds of naturals. They are the language

and business of the schools and academies of learned na-

tions, accustomed to that sort of conversation or learn-

ing, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being

suited to artificial argumentation and useful for convic-

tion, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth

or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for

the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion to

speak more at large, 1. 4, c. 7.

28. Recapitulation. I know not how absurd this may

seem to the masters of demonstration. And probably it

will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I

must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the

forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the

sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to

better judgments. And since I impartially search after

truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have

been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we

are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed

our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to

think these two speculative Maxims innate: since they

are not universally assented to; and the assent they so

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Human Understanding

generally find is no other than what several proposi-

tions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with

them: and since the assent that is given them is pro-

duced another way, and comes not from natural inscrip-

tion, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following

Discourse. And if these “first principles” of knowledge

and science are found not to be innate, no other specu-

lative maxims can (I suppose), with better right pre-

tend to be so.

Chapter II No Innate Practical Principles

1. No moral principles so clear and so generally received

as the forementioned speculative maxims. If those specu-

lative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing

chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all

mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible

concerning practical Principles, that they come short of

an universal reception: and I think it will be hard to

instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so

general and ready an assent as, “What is, is”; or to be so

manifest a truth as this, that “It is impossible for the

same thing to be and not to be.” Whereby it is evident

that they are further removed from a title to be innate;

and the doubt of their being native impressions on the

mind is stronger against those moral principles than the

other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question.

They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those

speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them:

but moral principles require reasoning and discourse,

and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty

of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters

engraven on the mind; which, if any such were, they

must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own

light be certain and known to everybody. But this is no

derogation to their truth and certainty; no more than

it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a

triangle being equal to two right ones: because it is not

so evident as “the whole is bigger than a part,” nor so

apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice that

these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and there-