Philosiphy

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in things existing, which, in their abstract natures, have

no known necessary union or repugnancy.

2. A threefold knowledge of existence. But, leaving the

nature of propositions, and different ways of predica-

tion to be considered more at large in another place, let

us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of

the existence of things, and how we come by it. I say,

then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence

by intuition; of the existence of God by demonstration;

and of other things by sensation.

3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As

for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly and so

certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any

proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our

own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and

pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my

own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very

doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will

not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain,

it is evident I have as certain perception of my own

existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I

know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the exist-

ence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I

call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have

an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an

internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of

sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to

ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come

not short of the highest degree of certainty.

Chapter X Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a

God. Though God has given us no innate ideas of him-

self; though he has stamped no original characters on

our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having

furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed

with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we

have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a

clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about

us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this

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great point; since he has so plentifully provided us with

the means to discover and know him; so far as is neces-

sary to the end of our being, and the great concern-

ment of our happiness. But, though this be the most

obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its

evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical

certainty: yet it requires thought and attention; and

the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it

from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we

shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other

propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear

demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable

of knowing, i.e. being certain that there is a God, and

how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go

no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowl-

edge we have of our own existence.

2. For man knows that he himself exists. I think it is

beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own

being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is some-

thing. He that can doubt whether he be anything or

no, I speak not to; no more than I would argue with

pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that

it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical

as to deny his own existence, (for really to doubt of it is

manifestly impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved

happiness of being nothing, until hunger or some other

pain convince him of the contrary. This, then, I think I

may take for a truth, which every one’s certain knowl-

edge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting,

viz. that he is something that actually exists.

3 He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being;

therefore something must have existed from eternity.

In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty,

that bare nothing can no more produce any real being,

than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows

not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, cannot

be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should

know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know

there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot

produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration,

that from eternity there has been something; since what

was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a

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beginning must be produced by something else.

4. And that eternal Being must be most powerful. Next,

it is evident, that what had its being and beginning

from another, must also have all that which is in and

belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it

has must be owing to and received from the same source.

This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the

source and original of all power; and so this eternal

Being must be also the most powerful.

5. And most knowing. Again, a man finds in himself

perception and knowledge. We have then got one step

further; and we are certain now that there is not only

some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the

world. There was a time, then, when there was no know-

ing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else

there has been also a knowing being from eternity. If it

be said, there was a time when no being had any knowl-

edge, when that eternal being was void of all under-

standing; I reply, that then it was impossible there should

ever have been any knowledge: it being as impossible

that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating

blindly, and without any perception, should produce a

knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should

make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For

it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it

should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge,

as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should

put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

6. And therefore God. Thus, from the consideration of

ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own con-

stitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this

certain and evident truth,—That there is an eternal,

most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether

any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing

is evident; and from this idea duly considered, will eas-

ily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought

to ascribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any

one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to sup-

pose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product

of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of

the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall

leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke

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of Tully (I. ii. De Leg.), to be considered at his leisure:

“What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming,

than for a man to think that he has a mind and under-

standing in him, but yet in all the universe beside there

is no such thing? Or that those things, which with the

utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend,

should be moved and managed without any reason at

all?” Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere

tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem

putet inesse, in caelo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quae

vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione

moveri putet?

From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a

more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than

of anything our senses have not immediately discovered

to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly

know that there is a God, than that there is anything

else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is

such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot

miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to

several other inquiries.

7. Our idea of a most perfect Being, not the sole proof

of a God. How far the idea of a most perfect being,

which a man may frame in his mind, does or does not

prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine.

For in the different make of men’s tempers and applica-

tion of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on

one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the

same truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an

ill way of establishing this truth, and silencing atheists,

to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this

upon that sole foundation: and take some men’s having

that idea of God in their minds, (for it is evident some

men have none, and some worse than none, and the

most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and

out of an over fondness of that darling invention, cash-

ier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other argu-

ments; and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as be-

ing weak or fallacious, which our own existence, and

the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and

cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for

a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as

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certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered,

that “the invisible things of God are clearly seen from

the creation of the world, being understood by the things

that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.”

Though our own being furnishes us, as I have shown,

with an evident and incontestable proof of a Deity; and

I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will

but as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstra-

tion of so many parts: yet this being so fundamental a

truth, and of that consequence, that all religion and

genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I

shall be forgiven by my reader if I go over some parts of

this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

8. Recapitulation—something from eternity. There is

no truth more evident than that something must be

from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreason-

able, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction,

as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This be-

ing of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure

nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings,

should ever produce any real existence.

It being, then, unavoidable for all rational creatures

to conclude, that something has existed from eternity;

let us next see what kind of thing that must be.

9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative. There

are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows

or conceives. First, such as are purely material, without

sense, perception, or thought, as the clippings of our

beards, and parings of our nails. Secondly, sensible, think-

ing, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be.

Which, if you please, we will hereafter call cogitative

and incogitative beings; which to our present purpose,

if for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than mate-

rial and immaterial.

10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative be-

ing. If, then, there must be something eternal, let us

see what sort of being it must be. And to that it is very

obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogita-

tive being. For it is as impossible to conceive that ever

bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking in-

telligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce

matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal,

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great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce

nothing. For example: let us suppose the matter of the

next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and

the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other

being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a

dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add

motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce any-

thing? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot pro-

duce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has

must also be from eternity, or else be produced, and

added to matter by some other being more powerful

than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to

produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eter-

nal too: yet matter, incogitative matter and motion,

whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk,

could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as

far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce,

as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity

to produce. And I appeal to every one’s own thoughts,

whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced

by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter,

when, before, there was no such thing as thought or an

intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as many

parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of

spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary

the figure and motion of it as much as you please—a

globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters

are but 100,000th part of a gry, will operate no other-

wise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than

those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as ratio-

nally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge,

by putting together, in a certain figure and motion,

gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very

minutest that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel,

and resist one another, just as the greater do; and that

is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose nothing

first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we

suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion

can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and

motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be.

For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with

or without motion, could have, originally, in and from

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itself, sense, perception, and knowledge; as is evident

from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowl-

edge, must be a property eternally inseparable from

matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that, though

our general or specific conception of matter makes us

speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one

individual thing, neither is there any such thing exist-

ing as one material being, or one single body that we

know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were the

eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one

eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite num-

ber of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one

of another, of limited force, and distinct thoughts, which

could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty

which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore, what-

soever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogi-

tative; and whatsoever is first of all things must neces-

sarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the

perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever

give to another any perfection that it hath not either

actually in itself, or, at least, in a higher degree; it nec-

essarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be

matter.

11. Therefore, there has been an eternal cogitative Be-

ing. If, therefore, it be evident, that something neces-

sarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident, that

that something must necessarily be a cogitative being:

for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should

produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the ne-

gation of all being, should produce a positive being or

matter.

12. The attributes of the eternal cogitative Being.

Though this discovery of the necessary existence of an

eternal Mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowl-

edge of God; since it will hence follow, that all other

knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on

him, and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of

power than what he gives them; and therefore, if he

made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this

universe,—all inanimate beings, whereby his omni-

science, power, and providence will be established, and

all his other attributes necessarily follow: yet, to clear

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up this a little further, we will see what doubts can be

raised against it.

13. Whether the eternal Mind may he also material or

no. First, Perhaps it will be said, that, though it be as

clear as demonstration can make it, that there must be

an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing:

yet it does not follow but that thinking Being may also

be material. Let it be so, it equally still follows that

there is a God. For if there be an eternal, omniscient,

omnipotent Being, it is certain that there is a God,

whether you imagine that Being to be material or no.

But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of that

supposition:—there being no way to avoid the demon-

stration, that there is an eternal knowing Being, men,

devoted to matter, would willingly have it granted, that

this knowing Being is material; and then, letting slide

out of their minds, or the discourse, the demonstration

whereby an eternal knowing Being was proved neces-

sarily to exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny

a God, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they

are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own

hypothesis. For, if there can be, in their opinion, eter-

nal matter, without any eternal cogitative Being, they

manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose

no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and

so establish the necessity of an eternal Spirit, but not of

matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal

cogitative Being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if

thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal ex-

istence of matter will not follow from the eternal exist-

ence of a cogitative Being, and they suppose it to no

purpose.

14. Not material: first, because each particle of matter

is not cogitative. But now let us see how they can sat-

isfy themselves, or others, that this eternal thinking

Being is material.

I. I would ask them, whether they imagine that all

matter, every particle of matter, thinks? This, I sup-

pose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as

many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of

matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet, if they will

not allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of

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matter, to be as well cogitative as extended, they will

have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a

cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an ex-

tended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.

15. II. Secondly, because one particle alone of matter

cannot be cogitative. If all matter does not think, I next

ask, Whether it be only one atom that does so? This has

as many absurdities as the other; for then this atom of

matter must be alone eternal or not. If this alone be

eternal, then this alone, by its powerful thought or will,

made all the rest of matter. And so we have the creation

of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the

materialists stick at; for if they suppose one single think-

ing atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they

cannot ascribe that pre-eminency to it upon any other

account than that of its thinking, the only supposed

difference. But allow it to be by some other way which

is above our conception, it must still be creation; and

these men must give up their great maxim, Ex nihilo nil

fit. If it be said, that all the rest of matter is equally

eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to say anything

at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For to suppose all

matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge

and power infinitely above all the rest, is without any

the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis.

Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the

same figures and motions of any other; and I challenge

any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one

above another.

16. III. Thirdly, because a system of incogitative matter

cannot be cogitative. If then neither one peculiar atom

alone can be this eternal thinking being; nor all matter,

as matter, i.e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only

remains, that it is some certain system of matter, duly

put together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is

that which, I imagine, is that notion which men are

aptest to have of God; who would have him a material

being, as most readily suggested to them by the ordi-

nary conceit they have of themselves and other men,

which they take to be material thinking beings. But

this imagination, however more natural, is no less ab-

surd than the other: for to suppose the eternal think-

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ing Being to be nothing else but a composition of par-

ticles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to as-

cribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal Be-

ing only to the juxta-position of parts; than which noth-

ing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of

matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby

added to them, but a new relation of position, which it

is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

17. And that whether this corporeal system is in mo-

tion or at rest. But further: this corporeal system either

has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the

parts wherein its thinking consists. If it be perfectly at

rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges

above one atom.

If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking

depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably

accidental and limited; since all the particles that by

motion cause thought, being each of them in itself with-

out any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much

less be regulated by the thought of the whole; since

that thought is not the cause of motion, (for then it

must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the

consequence of it; whereby freedom, power, choice, and

all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite

taken away: so that such a thinking being will be no

better nor wiser than pure blind matter; since to re-

solve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind

matter, or into thought depending on unguided mo-

tions of blind matter, is the same thing: not to mention

the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that

must depend on the motion of such parts. But there

needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and im-

possibilities in this hypothesis (however full of them it

be) than that before mentioned; since, let this thinking

system be all or a part of the matter of the universe, it

is impossible that any one particle should either know

its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the

whole know the motion of every particle; and so regu-

late its own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any

thought resulting from such motion.

18. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. Sec-

ondly, Others would have Matter to be eternal, not-

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withstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative,

immaterial Being. This, though it take not away the

being of a God, yet, since it denies one and the first

great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us con-

sider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why?

because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of

nothing: why do you not also think yourself eternal?

You will answer, perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty

years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that

you is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me.

The matter whereof you are made began not then to be:

for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put

together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your

body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes

not that thinking thing you are; (for I have now to do

with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking

Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;)

therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If

it did never begin to be, then have you always been a

thinking thing from eternity; the absurdity whereof I

need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of

understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow

a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all

things that are not eternal must be,) why also can you

not allow it possible for a material being to be made out

of nothing by an equal power, but that you have the

experience of the one in view, and not of the other?

Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will

be found to require no less power than the creation of

matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves

from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as

they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things,

we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming con-

ception how matter might at first be made, and begin to

exist, by the power of that eternal first Being: but to

give beginning and being to a spirit would be found a

more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this

being what would perhaps lead us too far from the no-

tions on which the philosophy now in the world is built,

it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them;

or to inquire, so far as grammar itself would authorize,

if the common settled opinion opposes it: especially in

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this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough

to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that

the creation or beginning of any one substance out of

nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other

but the Creator himself, may, with the same ease, be

supposed.

19. Objection: “Creation out of nothing.” But you will

say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making any-

thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive

it? I answer, No. Because it is not reasonable to deny the

power of an infinite being, because we cannot compre-

hend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon

this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the

manner of their production. We cannot conceive how

anything but impulse of body can move body; and yet

that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it pos-

sible, against the constant experience we have of it in

ourselves, in all our voluntary motions; which are pro-

duced in us only by the free action or thought of our

own minds, and are not, nor can be, the effects of the

impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter

in or upon our own bodies; for then it could not be in

our power or choice to alter it. For example: my right

hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: What causes

rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my

will,—a thought of my mind; my thought only chang-

ing, the right hand rests, and the left hand moves. This

is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this

and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be

to understand creation. For the giving a new determi-

nation to the motion of the animal spirits (which some

make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the

difficulty one jot. To alter the determination of motion,

being in this case no easier nor less, than to give motion

itself: since the new determination given to the animal

spirits must be either immediately by thought, or by

some other body put in their way by thought which

was not in their way before, and so must owe its motion

to thought: either of which leaves voluntary motion as

unintelligible as it was before. In the meantime, it is an

overvaluing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow mea-

sure of our capacities, and to conclude all things impos-

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sible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our

comprehension. This is to make our comprehension in-

finite, or God finite, when what He can do is limited to

what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand

the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking

thing within you, do not deem it strange that you can-

not comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite

Mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the

heaven of heavens cannot contain.

Chapter XI Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things

1. Knowledge of the existence of other finite beings is

to be had only by actual sensation. The knowledge of

our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a

God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been

shown.

The knowledge of the existence of any other thing we

can have only by sensation: for there being no neces-

sary connexion of real existence with any idea a man

hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that

of God with the existence of any particular man: no

particular man can know the existence of any other

being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it

makes itself perceived by him. For, the having the idea

of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence

of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his

being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby

a true history.

2. Instance: whiteness of this paper. It is therefore the

actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice

of the existence of other things, and makes us know,

that something doth exist at that time without us, which

causes that idea in us; though perhaps we neither know

nor consider how it does it. For it takes not from the

certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by

them, that we know not the manner wherein they are

produced: v.g. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper

affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which,

whatever object causes, I call white; by which I know

that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance