Philosiphy

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whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall

have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts

which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as

heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that

great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those re-

mote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it

stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or re-

flection have offered for its contemplation.

25. In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding

is for the most part passive. In this part the under-

standing is merely passive; and whether or no it will

have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowl-

edge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our

senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas

upon our minds whether we will or not; and the opera-

tions of our minds will not let us be without, at least,

some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly

ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple

ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can

no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are im-

printed, nor blot them out and make new ones itself,

than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images

or ideas which the objects set before it do therein pro-

duce. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect

our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impres-

sions; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas

that are annexed to them.

Chapter II Of Simple Ideas

1. Uncompounded appearances. The better to under-

stand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge,

one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the

ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple

and some complex.

Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the

things themselves, so united and blended, that there is

no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain,

the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses

simple and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch

often take in from the same object, at the same time,

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different ideas;—as a man sees at once motion and colour;

the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of

wax: yet the simple ideas thus united in the same sub-

ject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by

different senses. The coldness and hardness which a man

feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind

as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of

sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be

plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception

he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself

uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform

appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not dis-

tinguishable into different ideas.

2. The mind can neither make nor destroy them. These

simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are sug-

gested and furnished to the mind only by those two

ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection.

When the understanding is once stored with these simple

ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite

them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can

make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the

power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understand-

ing, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent

or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in

by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the

understanding destroy those that are there. The domin-

ion of man, in this little world of his own understanding

being muchwhat the same as it is in the great world of

visible things; wherein his power, however managed by

art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and

divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can

do nothing towards the making the least particle of new

matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in

being. The same inability will every one find in himself,

who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one

simple idea, not received in by his senses from external

objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own

mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy

any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame

the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can

do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas

of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

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3. Only the qualities that affect the senses are imagin-

able. This is the reason why—though we cannot believe

it impossible to God to make a creature with other or-

gans, and more ways to convey into the understanding

the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are

usually counted, which he has given to man—yet I think

it is not possible for any man to imagine any other quali-

ties in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can

be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible

and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but

with four senses, the qualities then which are the objects

of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagi-

nation, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth,

seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be;—which, whether

yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast

and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great

presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly

at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity

of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in

this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do

with, may be apt to think that, in other mansions of it,

there may be other and different intelligent beings, of

whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehen-

sion as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of

the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and

excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the

Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man’s

having but five senses; though, perhaps, there may be

justly counted more;—but either supposition serves

equally to my present purpose.

Chapter III Of Simple Ideas of Sense

1. Division of simple ideas. The better to conceive the

ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for

us to consider them, in reference to the different ways

whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and

make themselves perceivable by us. First, then, There

are some which come into our minds by one sense only.

Secondly, There are others that convey themselves

into the mind by more senses than one.

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Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way,

and are suggested to the mind by all the ways of sensa-

tion and reflection.

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.

Ideas of one sense. There are some ideas which have

admittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly

adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white,

red, yellow, blue; with their several degrees or shades and

mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the

rest, come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds,

and tones, only by the ears. The several tastes and smells,

by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves

which are the conduits to convey them from without to

their audience in the brain,—the mind’s presence-room

(as I may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not

to perform their functions, they have no postern to be

admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view,

and be perceived by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch,

are heat and cold, and solidity: all the rest, consisting

almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth

and rough; or else, more or less firm adhesion of the

parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious

enough.

2. Few simple ideas have names. I think it will be need-

less to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belong-

ing to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would;

there being a great many more of them belonging to

most of the senses than we have names for. The

variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more,

than species of bodies in the world, do most of them

want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our

turn for these ideas, which in effect is little more than

to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of

a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct

ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by our palates

we receive ideas of, much better provided with names.

Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the

epithets we have to denominate that numberless vari-

ety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only

in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different

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parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may

be said of colours and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the

account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself

to set down only such as are most material to our present

purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice

of though they are very frequently the ingredients of

our complex ideas; amongst which, I think, I may well

account solidity, which therefore I shall treat of in the

next chapter.

Chapter IV Idea of Solidity

1. We receive this idea from touch. The idea of solidity

we receive by our touch: and it arises from the resis-

tance which we find in body to the entrance of any

other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it.

There is no idea which we receive more constantly from

sensation than solidity. Whether we move or rest, in

what posture soever we are, we always feel something

under us that support us, and hinders our further sink-

ing downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle

make us perceive that, whilst they remain between them,

they do, by an insurmountable force, hinder the ap-

proach of the parts of our hands that press them. That

which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when

they are moved one towards another, I call solidity. I

will not dispute whether this acceptation of the word

solid be nearer to its original signification than that

which mathematicians use it in. It suffices that I think

the common notion of solidity will allow, if not justify,

this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it

impenetrability, he has my consent. Only I have thought

the term solidity the more proper to express this idea,

not only because of its vulgar use in that sense, but also

because it carries something more of positive in it than

impenetrability; which is negative, and is perhaps more

a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself. This, of all

other, seems the idea most intimately connected with,

and essential to body; so as nowhere else to be found or

imagined, but only in matter. And though our senses

take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk

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sufficient to cause a sensation in us: yet the mind, hav-

ing once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies,

traces it further, and considers it, as well as figure, in

the minutest particle of matter that can exist; and finds

it inseparably inherent in body, wherever or however

modified.

2. Solidity fills space. This is the idea which belongs to

body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. The idea of

which filling of space is,—that where we imagine any

space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to

possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances;

and will for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move

towards one another in a straight line, from coming to

touch one another, unless it removes from between them

in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This

idea of it, th e bodies whichwe ordinarily handle suffi-

ciently furnish us with.

3. Distinct from space. This resistance, whereby it keeps

other bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so

great, that no force, how great soever, can surmount it.

All the bodies in the world, pressing a drop of water on

all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance

which it will make, soft as it is, to their approaching

one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby

our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space,

which is capable neither of resistance nor motion; and

from the ordinary idea of hardness. For a man may con-

ceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach

one another, without touching or displacing any solid

thing, till their superficies come to meet; whereby, I

think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity.

For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular

body) I ask, whether a man cannot have the idea of the

motion of one single body alone, without any other suc-

ceeding immediately into its place? I think it is evident

he can: the idea of motion in one body no more includ-

ing the idea of motion in another, than the idea of a

square figure in one body includes the idea of a square

figure in another. I do not ask, whether bodies do so

exist, that the motion of one body cannot really be

without the motion of another. To determine this either

way, is to beg the question for or against a vacuum. But

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my question is,—whether one cannot have the idea of

one body moved, whilst others are at rest? And I think

this no one will deny. If so, then the place it deserted

gives us the idea of pure space without solidity; whereinto

any other body may enter, without either resistance or

protrusion of anything. When the sucker in a pump is

drawn, the space it filled in the tube is certainly the

same whether any other body follows the motion of the

sucker or not: nor does it imply a contradiction that,

upon the motion of one body, another that is only con-

tiguous to it should not follow it. The necessity of such

a motion is built only on the supposition that the world

is full; but not on the distinct ideas of space and solid-

ity, which are as different as resistance and not resis-

tance, protrusion and not protrusion. And that men

have ideas of space without a body, their very disputes

about a vacuum plainly demonstrate, as is shown in

another place.

4. From hardness. Solidity is hereby also differenced

from hardness, in that solidity consists in repletion, and

so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it

possesses: but hardness, in a firm cohesion of the parts

of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that

the whole does not easily change its figure. And indeed,

hard and soft are names that we give to things only in

relation to the constitutions of our own bodies; that

being generally called hard by us, which will put us to

pain sooner than change figure by the pressure of any

part of our bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which

changes the situation of its parts upon an easy and

unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the situation of the

sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of

the whole, gives no more solidity to the hardest body in

the world than to the softest; nor is an adamant one jot

more solid than water. For, though the two flat sides of

two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other,

between which there is nothing but water or air, than if

there be a diamond between them; yet it is not that the

parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water,

or resist more; but because the parts of water, being

more easily separable from each other, they will, by a

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side motion, be more easily removed, and give way to

the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they

could be kept from making place by that side motion,

they would eternally hinder the approach of these two

pieces of marble, as much as the diamond; and it would

be as impossible by any force to surmount their resis-

tance, as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a

diamond. The softest body in the world will as invinci-

bly resist the coming together of any other two bodies,

if it be not put out of the way, but remain between

them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He

that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water,

will quickly find its resistance. And he that thinks that

nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands

from approaching one another, may be pleased to make

a trial, with the air inclosed in a football. The experi-

ment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a

hollow globe of gold filled with water, and exactly closed;

which further shows the solidity of so soft a body as

water. For the golden globe thus filled, being put into a

press, which was driven by the extreme force of screws,

the water made itself way through the pores of that

very close metal, and finding no room for a nearer ap-

proach of its particles within, got to the outside, where

it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of

the globe could be made to yield to the violent compres-

sion of the engine that squeezed it.

5. On solidity depend impulse, resistance, and protru-

sion. By this idea of solidity is the extension of body

distinguished from the extension of space:—the exten-

sion of body being nothing but the cohesion or continu-

ity of solid, separable, movable parts; and the extension

of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and im-

movable parts. Upon the solidity of bodies also depend

their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion. Of pure

space then, and solidity, there are several (amongst which

I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have

clear and distinct ideas; and that they can think on space,

without anything in it that resists or is protruded by

body. This is the idea of pure space, which they think

they have as clear as any idea they can have of the exten-

sion of body: the idea of the distance between the oppo-

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site parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear

without as with the idea of any solid parts between: and

on the other side, they persuade themselves that they

have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of some-

thing that fills space, that can be protruded by the im-

pulse of other bodies, or resist their motion. If there be

others that have not these two ideas distinct, but con-

found them, and make but one of them, I know not

how men, who have the same idea under different names,

or different ideas under the same name, can in that case

talk with one another; any more than a man who, not

being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of the colour of

scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse con-

cerning scarlet colour with the blind man I mentioned

in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet

was like the sound of a trumpet.

6. What solidity is. If any one ask me, What this solid-

ity is, I send him to his senses to inform him. Let him

put a flint or a football between his hands, and then

endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks

this not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is,

and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him what it is,

and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking

is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what exten-

sion or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier.

The simple ideas we have, are such as experience teaches

them us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to

make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no

better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of

a blind man’s mind by talking; and to discourse into him

the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall

show in another place.

Chapter V Of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses

Ideas received both by seeing and touching. The ideas we

get by more than one sense are, of space or extension,

figure, rest, and motion. For these make perceivable im-

pressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we can re-

ceive and convey into our minds the ideas of the exten-

sion, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing