

## B. Personal Identity

READING 22

### Of Identity and Diversity

John Locke

A biography of John Locke appears on p. 155.

Our selection is from "Of Identity and Diversity," which first appeared as Chapter XXVII of Book II of the second edition of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1694). Given the obvious fact that people are constantly changing, Locke asks what makes someone the same individual from one moment to the next. He distinguishes two kinds of identity: being the same *human being* ("man" in his terminology) and being the same *person*. "Human being" refers to the physical organization of a human animal, not to the soul or mind. To support this claim, Locke points out that someone with a human body who is irrational is still considered a human being, but a creature without a human body would not be considered a human being even if it had rationality (a rational parrot, for example, would still be a parrot). The criterion for the identity of a human being is the same as that for all other animals: "a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body." A human being, then, is the same human being if the same life animates his or her constantly changing body.

By the term "person," Locke means "a thinking intelligent being." Locke argues that since consciousness is what makes a thinking being a "self" and distinguishes it from all other "selves," consciousness constitutes personal identity. Having the same consciousness means being the same person, and personal identity extends as far back as one's consciousness (memory) of past experiences. Locke points out, however, that being the same person is not equivalent to being the same *substance*, since the same consciousness (the criterion for personal identity) could exist in a succession of different substances.

6.<sup>1</sup> . . . The identity of the same *man* consists . . . in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body taken in any one instant and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man by any supposition that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia to be the same man. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible

<sup>1</sup>The section numbers vary from edition to edition. The numbering here follows the edition of Peter H. Nidditch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975; 2nd ed., 1979). [D. C. ABEL]

that those men, living in distant ages and of different tempers, may have been the same man—which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word *man*, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration<sup>2</sup> and are of opinion that the souls of men may, for their miscarriages,<sup>3</sup> be detruded<sup>4</sup> into the bodies of beasts as fit habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus. . . .

8. An animal is a living organized body, and consequently the same animal . . . is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenious<sup>5</sup> observation puts it past doubt that the idea in our minds, of which the sound “man” in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form. Since I think I may be confident that whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say [that] the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot. . . .

9. This being premised, to find wherein *personal identity* consists, we must consider what *person* stands for—which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to me, essential to it; it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls *self*—it not being considered, in this case, whether the same self be continued in the same or divers<sup>6</sup> substances. For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity—that is, the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. It is the same self now it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

10. But it is further inquired whether it be the same identical *substance*. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking

<sup>2</sup>*transmigration*: the passage of the soul, at death, from one body to another. [D. C. ABEL.]

<sup>3</sup>*miscarriages*: misdeeds. [D. C. ABEL.]

<sup>4</sup>*detruded*: forced down. [D. C. ABEL.]

<sup>5</sup>*ingenious*: displaying intelligence. [D. C. ABEL.]

<sup>6</sup>*divers*: various. [D. C. ABEL.]

thing would be always consciously present and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes (and that the greatest part of our lives) not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts—I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, that is, the same *substance* or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not *personal* identity at all—[this] question being what makes the same person, and not whether it be the same identical substance which always thinks in the same person, which in this case matters not at all. Different substances by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) [are] united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life. For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only—whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come, and would be, by distance of time or change of substance, no more two persons than a man be two men by wearing other clothes today than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep between—the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to their production.

11. That this is so, we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies, all whose particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touched and are affected by, and conscious of, good or harm that happens to them, as a part of ourselves—that is, our thinking conscious self. Thus, the limbs of his body are to everyone a part of himself; he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand and thereby separate it from that consciousness he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus we see the substance whereof personal self consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity—there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off. . . .

15. And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection [of the dead], though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here—the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to anyone but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the

same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same *person* with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions. But who would say it was the same *man*? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man. But he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the *same person* and the *same man* stand for one and the same thing. And indeed everyone will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

16. But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same *man*; yet it is plain [that] consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended (should it be to ages past) unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same *person*, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the [River] Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self (place that self in what substance you please) than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—I being as much concerned and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

17. Self is that conscious thinking thing (whatever substance made up of, whether spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) which is sensible<sup>7</sup> or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends. Thus everyone finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person and constitutes this inseparable self; so it is in reference to substances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself makes the same

<sup>7</sup>sensible: aware. [D. C. ABEL]

person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further—as everyone who reflects will perceive.

18. In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment—happiness and misery being that for which everyone is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to or affected with that consciousness. For, as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions or have any of them imputed to him.

19. This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queinborough agree, they are the same person. If the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right than to punish one twin for what his brother twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished (for such twins have been seen).

20. But yet possibly it will still be objected: "Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again. Yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them?" To which I answer that we must here take notice what the word "I" is applied to—which, in this case, is the *man* only. And the same *man* being presumed to be the same *person*, "I" is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons. Which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did; thereby making them two persons. Which is somewhat<sup>8</sup> explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such a one is "not himself," or is "beside himself"—in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now (or at least first) used them, thought that self was changed: The selfsame person was no longer in that man. . . .

23. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person. The identity of substance will not do it, for whatever substance there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no person. . . .

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting<sup>9</sup> the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other

<sup>8</sup> *somewhat*: something. [D. C. ABEL]

<sup>9</sup> *acting*: actuating, moving to action. [D. C. ABEL]

side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies; [then] I ask, in the first case, whether the day- and the night-man would not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato; and whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor is it at all material<sup>10</sup> to say that this same and this distinct consciousness, in the cases above mentioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those bodies—which, whether true or no, alters not the case, since it is evident the personal identity would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no. For, granting that the thinking substance in man must be necessarily supposed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness and be restored to it again; as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions; and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness which it had lost for twenty years together. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit, as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body. So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of; but only by identity of consciousness.

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<sup>10</sup>*material*: pertinent. [D. C. ABEL]