dis

5 The Social Construction of Gender Judith Lorber

Until the eighteenth century, Western philosophers and scientists ll1ought that there was one sex and that women's internal genitalia were the inverse of men's ex­ ternal genitalia: the womb and vagina were the penis and scrotum turned inside out {Laqueur 1990). Current Western thinking sees women and men as so differ­ ent physically as to sometimes seem two species. The bodies, which have been mapped inside and out for hundreds of years, have not changed. What has changed are the justifications for gender inequality. When the social position of all human beings was believed lo be set by natural law or was considered Cod-given, biology was irrelevant; women and men of different classes all had thei r assigned places. \Vhen sc1ent1sts began to question l11e d1vme baSIS of social order and re­ placed fail11 will1 empirical knowledge, what they saw was that women were very different from men m that they had wombs and menstruated. Such anatomical dif­ ferences destmed them for an entirely different social life from men.

In actuality, the basic bodily material is the same for females an<l males, and except for procreative hormones aml organs, female and male human beings have similar bodies (Naftolin and Butz 1981 ). Furthermore, as has been known since the middle of the nmeteentlr century, male and female genitalia develop from the same fetal tissue, and so infants can be born with ambiguous genitalia (Money and Ehrhardt 1972). When they are, biology is used quilc arbitrarily in sex assignment. Suzanne Kessler ( 1990) interviewed six medical specialists in pediatric intersexual­ ity and found that whether an infant wil11 XY chromosomes and anomalous geni­ talia was categorized as a boy or a girl depended on the size of ll1e penis-if a penis was very small, the child was categorized as a girl, and sex-change surgery was used to make an artificial vagina. In the late nineteenth century, ll1e presence or absence of ovaries was the determining criterion of gender assignment for her­ maphrodites because a woman who could not procreate was not a complete woman (Kessler 1990, 20).

From Judith Lorber, Tht 1992 Cheryl Miller Lecture. Copyright© 1992 by Judith Lorber. Repnnted by perm1ss1on of Sage Publications, Inc.

47

1

48 The Social Construction of Difference: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

Yet in Western societies, we see two discrete sexes and two distinguishable genders because our society is built on two classes of people, "women" and "men." Once the gender category is given, the attributes of the person are also gendered: Whatever a "woman" is has to be "female"; whatever a "man" is has to be "male." Analyzing the social processes that construct the categories we call "fe­ male and male," "women and men," and "homosexual and heterosexual" uncov­ ers the ideology and power differentials congealed in these categories (Foucault 1978). This article will use a familia r area of social life -sports- to show how myriad physiological differences are transformed into similar-appearing, gendered social bodies. My perspective goes beyond accepted feminist views that gender is a cultural overlay that modifies physiological sex differences. That perspective as­ sumes either that there are two fairly similar sexes distorted by social practices into two genders with purposefully different characteristics or that there are two sexes whose essential differences are rendered unequal by social practices. I am arguing that bodies differ in many ways physiologically, but they are completely transformed by social practices to fit into the salient categories of a society, the most pervasive of which are "female" and "male" and "women" and "men."

Neither sex nor gender arc pure categories. Combinations of incongruous genes, genitalia, and hormonal input are ignored in sex categorization, just as comhinations of incongruous physiology, identity, sexuality, appearance, and be­ havior arc ignored in the soc ial construction of gender statuses. Menstruation, lac­ tation, and gestation <lo not demarcate women from men. Only some women arc pregnant and then only some of the hme; some women do not have a uterus or ovaries. Some women have stopped menstruating temporarily, other~ have reached menopause, and some have had hysterectomies. Some women breastfeed some of the time, hut some men lactate (Jaggar 1983, l 65fn}. Menstruation , lactation , and gestation are individual experiences of womanhood (Levesque-Lopman 1988), but not determinants of the social category "woman," or even "female." Similarly, "men are not always sperm-producers, and in fact, not all sperm producers are men. A male-to-female transsexual, prior to surgery, can be socially a woman, though still potentially (or actually) capable of spermatogenesis" (Kessler and

McKenna !1978] 1985 , 2). When gender assignment is contested in sports, where the categories of com-

petitors are rigidly divided into women and men, chromosomes are now used lo determme in which category the athlete is to compete. However, an anomaly com­ mon enough to be found in several women at every major international sports competition arc XY chromosomes that have nol produced male anatomy or physi­ ology because of a genetic defect. Because these women arc women in every way sigmficant for sports competition, the prestigious International Amateur Athletic Federation has urged that sex be determined by simple genital mspection (Kolata 1992). Transsexuals would pass this test, but it look a lawsuit fo r Renee Richards, a male-to-female transsexual, to be able to play tournament tennis as a woman, despite his male sex chromosomes (Richards 198 3). Oddly, neither basis for gen-

Lorber I The Social Construction of Gender 49

der categorization-chromosomes nor genitalia - has anything to do with sports prowess (Birrell and Cole 1990).

In the Olympics, in cases of chromosomal ambiguity, women must undergo "a battery of gynecological and physical exams to sec if she is 'female enough' lo com­ pete. Men are not tested" (Carlson 199 1, 26). The purpose is not to categorize women and men accurately, but to make sure men don' t enter women's competi­ tions, where, it is felt, they will have the advantage of size and strength. This prac­ tice sounds fair only because it is assumed that all men are similar in size and strength and different from all women. Yet in Olympics boxing and wrestling matches, men are matched witl1in weight classes. Some women might similarly successfully compete with some men in many sports. Women did not run in marathons until about twenty years ago. In twenty years of marathon competition, women have reduced their finish times by more tl1an one-and-one-half hours; they are expected to run as fast as men in that race by 1998 and might catch up with men's running limes in races of other lengths within the next fifty years because they are increasing their fastest speeds more rapidly than are men (Fausto-Sterling 1985, 213-18).

The reliance on only two sex and gender categories in the biological and social sciences is as epistemologically spurious as the reliance on chromosomal or genital tests to group athletes. Most research designs do not investigate whether physical skills or physical abilities are really more or less common in women and men (Epstein 1988) They start out with two social categories ("women," "men"}, as­ sume they are b1ologically different ("female," "male"}, look for similarities within tl1em and differences between them, and attribute what they have found for the so­ cial categories to sex differences (Gelman, Collman, and Maccoby 1986). These designs rarely question tl1e categorization of their subjects into two and only two groups, even though they often find more significant witl1in-group differences than between-group differences (Hyde 1990). The social construction perspective on sex and gender suggests that instead of starting witl1 the two presumed dichotomies in each category-female, male; woman, man-it might be more useful in gender studies to group patterns of behavior and only then look for identifying markers of the people likely lo enact such behaviors.

What Sports Illustrate

Competitive sports have become, for boys and men, as players and as spectators, a way of constructing a masculine identity, a legitimated outlet fo r violence and ag­ gression, and an avenue for upward mobility (Dunning 1986; Kemper 1990, 167-206; Messner 1992). For men in Western societies, physical competence is an important marker of masculinity (Fine 1987; Glassner 1992; Majors 1990). In pro­ fessional and collegiate sports, physiological differences are invoked to justify women's secondary status, despite the clear evidence tl1at gender status overrides

50 The Social Con.1tructror1 of Difference: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

physiological capabilities. Assumptions about women's physiology have influenced rules of competition; subsequent sports performances then validate how women and men are treated in sports competitions.

Gymnastic equipment is geared to slim, wiry, prepubescent girls and not to mature women; conversely, men's gymnastic equipment is tailored fo r muscular, mature men, not slim, wiry prepubescent boys. Boys could compete with girls, but are not allowed to; women gymnasts are left out entirely. Girl gymnasts are just that-little girls who will be disqualified as soon as they grow up (Vecsey 1990). Men gymnasts have men's status. In women's basketball, the size of the ball and rules for handling thc ball change the style of play lo "a slower, less intense, an<l less exciting mo<lificahon of the 'regular' or men's game" (Watson 1987, 441 ). In the 1992 Winter Olympics, men figure skaters were required to complete three triple jumps in their required program; women figure skaters were forbidden to <lo more than one. These rules penalized artistic men skaters an<l athletic women skaters (Janofsky 1992). For the most part, Western sports are built on physically trained men's bodies:

Speed, size, and strength seem lo be the essence of sports. Women are naturally in­ ferior at "sports" so conceived.

But if women had been the h1sloncally dominant sex, our concept of spoil would no doubt have evolved differently Cornpelihons emphasiting flex1b1hty , bal­ ance, strength, li111ing, and small Sile might dommale Sunday afternoon television and offer salaries in six figures. (English 1982, 266, emphasis in ongi11al)

Organized sports are big businesses and, thus, "ho has access and at what level is a distribullve or equity issue. The overall status of women an<l men athletes is an eco11omic, political, an<l i<leological issue that has less to do with individual physi­ ological capabilities than with their cultural an<l social meaning and who defines an<l profits from them (Messner and Sabo 1990; Slatton an<l Birrell 1984). T wenty years after the passage of Title IX of the U.S. Civil Rights Act, which forbade gen­ der inequality in any school receiving federal funds, Lhe goal for collegiate sports in the next five years is 60 percent men, 40 percent women in sports participation, scholarsh ips, and funding (Moran 1992).

I low access and distribution of rewards (prestigious and financial) are 1ustified is an ideological, even moral, issue (Birrell 1988, 473-76; Hargreaves 1982). One way is that men atl1leles are glorified and women athletes ignored in the mass media. Messner and his colleagues found that in 1989, in 1V sports news in the United Stales, men's sports got 92 percent of the coverage and women's sports 5 percent, with the rest mixe<l or gender-neutral (Messner, Duncan, and Jensen 1993). In 1990, in four of the top-selling newspapers in the United Stales, stories on men's sporl~ outnumbered tl10se on women's sports 23 to I. Messner and his colleagues also found an implicit hierarchy in naming, witl1 women athletes most likely lo be called by first names, followed by Black men athletes, and only white men athletes routinely referred lo by their last names. Similarly, women's collegiate sports teams

Lorber I The Social Construction of Gender 51

are named or marked in ways that symbolically feminize and trivialize them-tl1e men's team is called Tigers, the women's Kittens (E itzen and Baca Zinn 1989).

Assumptions about men's and women's bodies and their capacities are crafted in ways that make unequal access and distribution of rewards acceptable (Hudson 1978; Messner 1988). Media images of modem men atl1letes glorify their strength and power, even their violence (Hargreaves 1986). Media images of modem women athletes lend to focus on feminine beauty and grace (so they a rc not really athletes) or on their thin, small, wiry androgy11ous bodies (so they are nol really women ). In coverage of the Olympics,

loving a11d detailed attention is paid lo p1x1e-like gymnasts; special and extended coverage is given lo graceful and dazzling figure skaters; the camera painstakingly records the fluid movements of swimmers and divers. And then, in a blinding flash of fragmented images, viewers see a few minutes of volleyball, basketball, speed skating, track and field, and alpine skiing, as television gives its nod to the mere ex­ istence of these events. (Boutilier and SanGiovanni 1983, 190)

Extraordinary feats by women athletes who were presented as mature adults might force sports organizers and audiences to rethink their stereotypes of women's capa­ bilities, tl1e way elves, mermaids, and ice queens do not. Sports, therefore, con­ struct men's bodies to be powerful; women's bodies to be sexual. As Connell says,

The meanings in the bodily sense of masculinity concern, above all else, the supcri­ onty of men lo women, a11d the exaltation of hegemonic masculinity over other g1oups of men which 1s essential for the domination of women. (1987, 85)

In the late 1970s, as women entered more and more athletic competitions, supposedly guo<l scientific studies showe<l that women who exercised intensely would cease menstruating because tl1ey would not have enough body fat tu sustain ovulation (Brozan 1978). When one set of researchers did a yearlong study that compared 66 women-21 who were training fo r a marathon, 22 who ran more than an hom a week, and 23 who di<l less than an hour of aerobic exercise a week- they discovered tl1at only 20 percent of the women in any of these groups ha<l "normal" menstrual cycles every month (Prior et al. 1990). The dangers of in­ tensive trainmg for women's fertility therefore were exaggerated as women began tu compete successfully in arenas formerly closed to them.

Given the association of sports with masculinity in the United States, women athletes have to manage a contradictory status. One stu<ly of women college bas­ ketball players found tl1at alU1ough they "did athlete" on tl1e court- "p11shmg, shoving, fouling, hard running, fast breaks, defense, obscenities and sweat" (Watson 1987, 441), they "did woman" off the court, using the locker room as their staging area:

While it typically took fifteen minutes lo prepare for the game, 1t took approxi­ mately fifteen minutes after the game to shower and remove the sweat of an athlete,

52 The Social Construction of Difference: Race, Class, Cender, and Se:ruality

and it took another thirty minutes to dress, apply make-up and style hair. It did not seem to matter whether the players were going out into the public or getting on a van for a long ride home. Average dressing time and rituals did not change.

(Watson 1987, 443)

Another way women manage these status dilemmas is to redefine the activity or its result as feminine or womanly (Mangan and Park 1987). Thus women body­ builders claim that "flex appeal is sex appeal" (Duff and Hong 1984, 378).

Such a redefinition of women·s physicality affirms the ideological subtext of sports that physical strength is men's prerogative and justifies men's physical and sexual domination of women (Hargreaves 1986; Messner 1992, 164- 72; Olson 1990; ·n1eberge 1987; Willis 1982). When women demonstrate physical strength ,

they arc labeled unfeminine:

H's threatening to one's takeability, one's rapeabil ity, one's femininity, to be strong and physically self-possessed. To be able to remt rape, not to communicate rapeabilrty with one's body, to ho!d one's body for uses and meanings other than that can transform what lximg a woman means. (MacKinnon 1987, 122, emphasis

in origmal)

Resistance lo that transformation , ironically, was evident in the policies of American women physical education professionals throughout most of the twenti­ eth century. The} m1mmized exertion, maximized a femmme appearance and mauner, and left orgamzed sports competition to men (Birrell 1988, 461-62; Mangan and Park 1987).

. . . Social Bodies and the Bathroom Problem

People of the same racial ethmc group and social class arc roughly the same size and shape-but there are many varieties of bodies. People have different genitalia, different secondary sex characteristics, different contributions to procreation, dif­ ferent orgasmic experiences, different patterns of illness and agmg. Each of m ex­ periences our bodies differently, and these experiences change as we grow, age, sicken, and die. l11e bodies of pregnant and nonpregnant women, short and tall people, those with intact and functioning limbs and those whose bodies are physi­ cally challenged arc all different. But the salient categories of a society group these attributes i11 ways that ride roughshod over individual expcrie11ces and more mean­

ingful clusters of people. I am not saying that physical differences between male and female bodies don't

exist, but that these differences are socially meaningless until social practices trans­ form them into social facts. West Point Military Academy's curriculum is designed to produce leaders, and physical competence is used as a significant measure of

Lorber /The Social Construction o(G€nder 53

leadership abi lity (Yoder 1989). W11en women were accepted as West Point cadets, it became clear that the tests of physical competence, such as rapidly scaling an eight-foot wall, had been constructed for male physiques- pulling oneself up and over using upper-body strength. Rather than devise tests of physical competence for women, West Point provided boosters that mostly women used-but that lost them test points-in the case of the wall, a platform. Finally, the women themselves fig­ ured out how lo use their bodies successfully. Janice Yoder describes this situation:

I was observing this obstacle one day, when a woman approached the wall in the old prescribed way, got her fingertips grip, and did an unusual thing: she walked her dangling legs up the wall until she was in a position where both her hands and feet were atop the wall. She then simply pulled up her saggmg boltom and went over. She solved the problem by capitalizing 011 one of women's physical assets: lower-body strength. (1989, 530)

In short, if West Point is going to measure leadership capability by physical strength, women's pelvises will do 1ust as well as men's shoulders.

The social transformation of female and male physiology into a condition of in­ equality is well illustrated by the bathroom problem. Most buildings that have gcndcr­ segregatcd bathrooms have an equal number for women and for men. Where there are crowds, there arc always long lines in front of women's bathrooms but rarely in front of men's bathrooms. The cultural, ph)siological, and demographic combina­ tions of clothing, frequency of urination, menstruation, and child care add up tu gen­ erally greater bathroom use by women than men. l11us, alU1ough an equal number of bathrooms seems fair, equity would mean more women's bathrooms or allowing women to use men's bathrooms for a certain amount of time (Molotch 1988).

The bathroom problem is the outcome of the way gendered bodies are differen­ tially evaluated in Western cultures: Men's social bodies are the measure of what is "human." C ray's Anatomy, in use for 100 years, well into the twentieth century, pre­ sented the human body as male. The female body was shown only where it differed from the male (Laqueur 1990, 166-67). Denise Riley says that if we envisage women's bodies, men's bodies, and human bodies "as a triangle of identifications, then it is rarely an equilateral triangle in which both sexes are pitched at matching distances from the apex of the human" (1988, 197). Catharine MacKirmon also contends that m Western society, universal "humanness" is male because

virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively compensated in this society. Men's pliysiology defines most sports, their needs de­ fine auto and health insurance coverage, their socially defined biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and con­ cerns define qualil) in scholarsh ip, their experiences and obsessions define men!, their ob1ecuficallon of life defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other- their wars and rulerships - define history, their image defines god, and their genitals de­ fine sex. For each of their differences from women, what amounts to an affirmative

54 The Social Construction of Difference: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality

action plan is in effect, otherwise known as the structure and values of American so­ ciety. (1987, 36)

The Paradox of Human Nature

Gendered people do not emerge from physiology or hormones but from the exi­ gencies of the social order, mostly, from the need for a reliable division of the work of food production and the social (not physical) reproduction of new members. The moral imperatives of religion and cultural representations reinforce the boundary lines among genders and ensure that what is demanded, what is permit­ ted, and what is tabooed for the people in each gender is well known and followed by most. Political power, control of scarce resources, and, if necessary, violence up­ hold the gendered social order in the face of resistance and rebellion. Most people, however, voluntarily go along with their society's prescriptions for those of their gender status because the norms and expeclabons get built into their sense of worth and identity as a certain kind of human being and because they believe their society's way is the natural way. These beliefs emerge from the imagery that per­ vades the way we think, the way we see and hear and speak, the way we fan tasize, and the way we feel. There is no core or bedrock human nature below these end­ lessly looping processes of the social producllon of sex and gender, self and other, identity and psyche, each of which is a "complex cultural construction" (Butler 1990, 36). The paradox of "human nature" is tl1at it is always a manifestation of cultural meanings, social relationships, and power politics- "not biology, but cul­ ture, becomes destiny" (Butler 1990, 8).

Feminist inquiry has lung questioned the conventional categories of social sci­ ence, but much of the current work in feminist sociology has not gone beyond adding tl1e universal category "women" to the universal category "men." Our cur­ rent debates over the global assumptions of only two categories and the insistence that they must be nuanced lo include race and class are steps in the direction I would like to see feminist research go, but race and class are also global categories (Collms 1990; Spelman 1988). Deconstructing sex, sexuality, and gender reveals many possible categories embedded in the social experiences and social practices of what Dorothy Smith calls the "everyday/everynight world" (1990, 31-57). These emergent categories group some people together for comparison witl1 other people without prior assumptions about who is like whom. Categories can be broken up and people regrouped differently into new categories for comparison. This process of discovering categories from similarities and differences in people's behavior or responses can be more meaningful for feminist research than discovering similari­ ties and differences between "females" and "males" or "women" and "men" be­ cause the social construction of the conventional sex and gender categories already assumes differences between tl1em and similarities among them. When we rely only on the conventional categories of sex and gender, we end up finding what we

Lorber /The Social Construction of Gender 55

looked for-we see what we believe, wheU1er it is tl1at "females" and "males" are essentially different or that "women" and "men" are essentially the same.

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