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The moral discourse of banks about money laundering: an analysis of the narrative from Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical perspective Michel Dion Faculté d’administration, Université de Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Canada

In this paper, we will use Ricoeur’s philosophy in order to present money laundering as a metaphor and a narrative. We will firstly analyze the corporate moral discourse of 10 banks about money laundering. We have selected 10 banks that have codes of ethics and a corporate moral discourse about money laundering. The banks come from six countries: United States (2), Canada (2), Switzerland (2), Spain (2), Germany (1), and Belgium (1). We will see how their moral discourse about money laundering contributes to deepen the understanding of money laundering as a narrative. Then, we will see to what extent Ricoeur’s philosophy could help us to better understand the moral discourse of banks. We will describe the main components of money laundering as a narrative.

Introduction

According to Ricoeur (1968: 120–123), communicat- ing means to speak (say something: the ideality of sense) about something (reference point: referring to the reality) to someone. Ricoeur (1972: 96) said that we must also take into account ‘what I am doing when I am talking’ (for instance, giving a command, expressing wish or hope, providing a strong warning). Language is then a mediation: we are expressing ourselves through the act of speaking. Language is basically a self-reference (Ricoeur 1972: 97). Whether it is a reference to the reality (to the world, to the realm of the ‘extra-linguistic’) or to the person who is speaking, the reference implies a self- transcendence of language (Ricoeur 1997: 97–98). The context in which the discourse arises is an inte-

gral part of a whole discourse that has been created throughout existential questions and answers (Ricoeur 1997: 101; Ricoeur 2004: 158). The meaning of words cannot be isolated from the abbre- viation of such holistic context (Ricoeur 1997: 102). As Ricoeur said, we are not focusing on the meaning of things but rather on the reference (Ricoeur 1997: 119). Discourses have the function of referring, that is, to make things interconnected (Ricoeur 1997: 159). Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy has been used to mirror the meaning of organizational meta- phors (Pesqueux 1999, Vickers 2008). However, it has not been used to unveil many aspects of financial crimes.

In this paper, we will use Ricoeur’s philosophy in order to present money laundering as a metaphor and a narrative. We will firstly analyze the corporate

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moral discourse of 10 banks about money launder- ing. We have selected 10 banks that have codes of ethics and a corporate moral discourse about money laundering. The banks come from six countries: United States (2), Canada (2), Switzerland (2), Spain (2), Germany (1), and Belgium (1). We will see how their moral discourse about money laundering con- tributes to deepen the understanding of money laun- dering as a narrative. Then, we will see to what extent Ricoeur’s philosophy could help us to better under- stand the moral discourse of banks. We will describe the main components of money laundering as a narrative.

The moral discourse of banks about money laundering as a narrative

The moral discourse of the 10 banks about money laundering is developed under four typical forms: the narrative about the nature of money laundering (descriptive narrative); the narrative focusing on legal compliance (repressive narrative); the narrative emphasizing the means to prevent illicit activities (preventive narrative); the narrative that deepens the understanding and strategic fight against money laundering (all-embracing narrative).

The descriptive narrative (Argenta, Bank of America)

The code of ethics of Argenta (Belgium) explained that all criminal practices are prohibited and that money laundering comes from criminal practices. Organizational members do not intervene in opera- tions that they know or perceive as being related to money laundering. The ‘know-your-customer’ (KYC) principle is strictly applied. Very few sen- tences about money laundering actually send a message about the way the bank understands money laundering and tries to fight against it. Silence is sometimes more revealing than any detailed descrip- tion of a given phenomenon. But silence could be interpreted in various ways. Most of the time, it is not strengthening the corporate image.

Bank of America (United States) is also focusing on the nature of money laundering: ‘money launder-

ing is disguising the proceeds of criminal activity through a series of otherwise legitimate transac- tions’. The KYC principle is strictly applied, although it is mentioned that organizational members ‘must make reasonable efforts to determine the true identity of all customers’. Realism is requir- ing such statement. However, how could the term ‘reasonable’ be interpreted? How could organiza- tional members actually know if their efforts were reasonable or not? If we do not give some criteria or parameters for ‘reasonable efforts’, how could we expect that organizational members will behave appropriately? On the other hand, the code said that organizational members should ‘report potentially suspicious or unusual activities’. Human activities could be suspicious or unusual. But how could they be ‘potentially’ suspicious or unusual? It is a self- contradiction since the suspicious or unusual char- acter of a given activity is rooted in one’s perception of reality. The perception is already an interpretation that such activity could be suspicious/unusual or not. Nothing could be potentially suspicious or poten- tially unusual. What we consider as suspicious or unusual could be a legitimate/legal activity. Our interpretation could be wrong. But it is not sus- pended as pure potentiality. Interpreting a phenom- enon is claiming that our perception is reflecting a given reality.

The repressive narrative (Zurich Financial Services, National Bank of Canada, JP Morgan Chase)

National Bank of Canada (Canada) focuses on legal compliance. Organizational members are required not to allow, facilitate, or participate in money laun- dering activities such as ‘accepting, transferring, con- verting or concealing money obtained from criminal activities or related to terrorist financing’. Such state- ment is quite clear. However, when it is said that organizational members comply with the corporate policy on money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities, the corporate intent becomes unclear. On the one hand, organizational members are required to respect the laws. On the other hand, the organizational policy about money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities seems some- thing all organizational members should be familiar

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with, although such policy is not summarized in the code of ethics. So such intertextuality is blurred. If the code of ethics does not summarize the organiza- tional policy about money laundering, does it mean that such policy covers issues that have no ethical import?

Zurich Financial Services (ZFS) (Switzerland) puts the emphasis on compliance with the laws (while not compromising organizational values). ZFS does not ‘engage in transactions that could be illegal or compromise our values’. So at first sight, ZFS is not only looking at legal compliance but also at the importance of safeguarding its organizational values (and thus, its organizational culture). ZFS seems to be committed to the fight against money laundering on the international scene. All economic and trade sanctions will be applied by ZFS. It is interesting to note that the KYC principle implies ‘to understand the sources of the funds customers bring to ZFS’. It is a very precise way to make the principle under- stood by all organizational members. Moreover, organizational members are expected not to be engaged ‘in any business with customers attempting to use ZFS products or services for illegal purposes, such as laundering funds derived from illegitimate sources or facilitating terrorism financing’. The pro- hibition is quite clear. However, when the code is referring to ‘laws and regulations that prohibit or restrict doing business with certain countries, entities or individuals’, we are not sure if all organizational members will easily know what it is all about. So even if there could be a form of intertextuality, it is quite hard, if not impossible, to identify the link between the code and those laws/regulations.

The code of JP Morgan Chase (United States) unveils the crucial importance of knowing the rules. It is explicitly said that organizational policies and internal controls have been designed to ensure full compliance with laws and regulations about money laundering and terrorist financing. Such intertextu- ality is self-evident since the code is referring to the Bank Secrecy Act (as amended by the US Patriot Act) and to economic sanctions imposed by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control. The code also refers to ‘similar laws and regulations in other coun- tries’. In that case, organizational members could find it very hard to identify such laws and regulations by themselves. However, the KYC principle is pro-

vided. But organizational members seem to have the responsibility ‘to get proper training if they are iden- tified as being in a job that requires a higher degree of knowledge of anti-money laundering, counter- terrorist financing, and sanctions rules’. Does this mean that JP Morgan Chase will not set up such training and that organizational members have to follow training sessions that they could consider as fruitful? Or does it mean that JP Morgan Chase will offer such training sessions and that organizational members are free to participate in such training pro- grams? We are not sure which kind of freedom JP Morgan Chase actually gives to its organizational members. In that code, organizational members have to report unusual or suspicious activities to some ‘designated persons, including their Compliance Officer or Risk Manager responsible for anti-money laundering and sanctions compliance’. So it is quite clear that the code of JP Morgan Chase focuses on legal compliance.

The preventive narrative (Deutsche Bank, BBVA, UBS)

The Deutsche Bank seems to be ‘an active participant in international efforts to combat fraud, corruption, money laundering and the funding of terrorist and criminal activities’. Indeed, such assertion is not really convincing. It says nothing about the bank’s concerns for money laundering processes. The Deut- sche Bank’s code of ethics refers to the anti-money laundering program as requiring some behaviors from organizational members. Such norms are nothing but minimal standards. But what does it mean? Does it mean that other existing standards that have not been defined in the code of ethics have to be kept in mind? Or does it mean that the Deutsche Bank is actually aware of its minimalistic standards so that the bank’s corporate image could be closely linked to any search for minimal ethical standards about money laundering? The focus is clearly put on preventing illicit activities ‘by knowing the customers we service (KYC), maintaining records as required, monitoring accounts and transactional activities’. It is interesting to note that organizational members must report ‘any suspicious activity’. What does it mean? Is the term ‘suspicious’ equivalent to a prob- ability or a possibility to observe an illegal behavior?

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A probability is obviously not synonymous with a possibility. So if we cannot define the term itself, how could reporting practices be possible and expected from organizational members?

BBVA (Spain) appears to be ‘socially committed to prevent money laundering and financing of terror- ist activities’. The bank even expects its customers to manage their financial activities in accordance with laws and regulations. BBVA requires the coopera- tion of its customers ‘to comply efficiently with its institutional and social commitment to prevent money laundering’. What does it mean? How could customers cooperate with BBVA in order to make its anti-money laundering program more efficient? Is the bank implicitly referring to whistle-blowing? If not, what is really at stake? Saying that the bank is cooperating with governmental bodies and interna- tional agencies in the fight against all forms of orga- nized crime is not very convincing. Moreover, the bank does not describe its ‘corporate criteria to prevent the risk of its products and services being utilized as a vehicle to commit criminal activities’.

UBS (Switzerland) is committed to assisting in the fight against money laundering, corruption, and terrorist financing. The bank refers to its ‘rigorous risk-based approach to its internal anti-money laun- dering process in an effort to prevent, detect and report any suspicion of money laundering’. The idea is to prevent, detect, and report any suspicion of money laundering. Basically, it is a risk-based approach. But how could it be more or less ‘rigor- ous’? Which are the parameters that serve to define the notion of rigor within a risk-based approach? It is interesting to note that the bank is involved in bank confidentiality so that the ‘know-your- customer’ (KYC) principle has an exception: ‘do not undermine customers’ legitimate right to privacy’. The fact that the bank is undertaking monitoring in order to identify suspicious activities is not a guar- antee that control systems will be efficient. Indeed, the code said that if some suspicious activities are discovered, then they will be ‘promptly escalated to management or control functions’. So, how could we ensure that there will be corporate right decisions in front of illegal activities? Of course, the code is quite clear about corruption: it is prohibited. But the final statement is amazing: ‘we ensure that our global sanctions policy is applied appropriately’. Why is it

necessary to say that sanctions policy will be applied to various circumstances? Are we saying that the principles behind such policy will vary from time to time? Are we saying that the sanctions could be unfairly applied?

The all-embracing narrative (Santander, Royal Bank of Canada)

In its corporate code of ethics, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) only refers to the legal compliance, including laws about corruption of foreign officers as well as anti-money laundering laws and laws dealing with the financing of terrorist activities. Organiza- tional members are expected to comply with all laws and regulations from every country in which RBC has financial operations. However, in a separate document, RBC defines its ‘Global Approach to Anti-Money Laundering’. It is a kind of document we should expect all banks to have since it describes the strategy in detail. RBC has a corporate program to detect and report suspected money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. It is based on an ‘appropriate risk-based scrutiny and monitoring measures to clients’. There seem to be some types of clients who are ‘known to be susceptible to criminal activity or who have been designated as high-risk for money laundering or terrorist activity financing’. So RBC is quite clear: monitoring measures imply iden- tifying different kinds of clients according to the risk they could be related to money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities. For that matter, RBC is trying to identify ‘client relationships that repre- sent an unacceptable risk’. RBC seems to be quite proactive as to money laundering activities. The bank sets up systems and processes that detect and assess transactions for suspicious activities or even transactions that must be reported to regulators. RBC annually offers anti-money laundering training for all organizational members, including senior executives. And such training sessions are ‘manda- tory’ so that the message is self-evident (nobody is expected to ignore the norms, policies, and internal controls about money laundering).

RBC’s organizational policies and procedures are designed to ensure that, first, ‘RBC does business only with those whose identities, activities and funds can reasonably be established to be legitimate and

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who have been screened against applicable govern- ment and regulators’ lists of designated people, enti- ties or countries’: the term ‘reasonable’ can be interpreted in various ways; even the term ‘legitimate’ is not very clear (is it equivalent to legally accepted practices? Or does it cover socially accepted behav- iors, although they could be unethical?). Second, ‘RBC’s directors, officers, and employees do not knowingly enter into transactions with or provide or assist in providing, directly or indirectly, financial services to, or for the benefit of, states, entities, and individuals targeted by applicable Economic Sanc- tions, Canadian and other anti-terrorism measures staff and others required by legislation are trained to recognize and react appropriately to unusual or potential money-laundering activity, unusual or potential terrorist financing activity, or activity that is potentially in violation of applicable Economic Sanctions and understand their legal obligations to block or report activity and transactions/attempted transactions as applicable and required by law required regulatory reporting is completed’: the meaning and extent of so-called ‘applicable economic sanctions’ cannot easily be understood since we do not know which kind of organizations could impose them. Third, ‘With respect to the identification of unusual activities and transactions, RBC’s Policies require that our businesses establish processes to identify unusual activities and transactions in each jurisdiction in which they operate, to ensure timely reporting of activities deemed to be reasonably sus- picious of money laundering or terrorist activity financing is completed as required in accordance with applicable legislation’: what is ‘reasonably suspi- cious’? The term implies that sometimes, given activi- ties are unreasonably perceived as being suspicious. We could easily accept the limitations of the way we could perceive reality as such. However, if organiza- tional members do not have access to any parameters or criteria, how could they know if their perception of suspicious activities is reasonable or not? Finally, it is interesting to observe that the board of directors is responsible for ensuring that ‘RBC maintains an anti-money laundering program that both meets regulatory expectations and effectively manages RBC’s AML risk’. It is an important message that is sent to shareholders. Any suspicion about money laundering activities will be scrutinized.

From the list of 10 banks we took as samples, Santander (Spain) has the best corporate written strategies about money laundering. The bank clearly addresses all relevant issues while providing many details about what is required or expected from orga- nizational members. The code of conduct only says that organizational members must observe the regu- lations ‘contemplated in the Manual for the Preven- tion of Money Laundering’. At least it would have been expected to present some principles related to its anti-money laundering policy. The fact that the code of conduct only refers to the anti-money laundering policy actually shows that the bank does not consider money laundering as an ethical issue. However, in spite of such limitation, Santander’s policy about money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities remains a very good way to address such criminal issues. It is particularly relevant to see the bank asserting that the fight against money launder- ing and terrorism financing actually impacts basic aspects of social life. Such assertion unveils a deep understanding of such financial crimes. Santander sets up internal policies and procedures that ensure that, first, financial activities are led in accordance with strict ethical standards and existing laws/ regulations: what does ‘strict ethical standards’ actu- ally mean? Ethical standards have to be defined in order to be effective. The fact that the bank uses such a term reveals a political will to strengthen its ethical standards. However, when ethical standards are not described, it is hard to conclude that they are more or less ‘strict’. Second, codes of conduct and monitoring/ reporting systems are perceived as means to prevent its entities from being used for money laundering: codes of conduct can be tools for preventing illegal/ unethical behaviors only if they are (fairly) applied in the daily life. As such, codes of conduct have no power to change the reality. So it could be unrealistic to conclude that they could help to prevent money laundering practices. Their power to change the reality depends on the organizational culture. Third, all employees must observe KYC policies and proce- dures. Fourth, a strict compliance with all applicable anti-money laundering laws as well as the recommen- dations of the International Financial Action Task Force (for instance, the ‘49 Recommendations of the International Financial Action Task Force’, the 2005 Principles of the European Parliament, and Council

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Directive, concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering and the financ- ing of terrorist activities). Money laundering is defined as the ‘participation in any activity that seeks to acquire, possess, use, convert, transfer, conceal or disguise the true nature, origin, location, disposal, movement or ownership of assets, in the knowledge that such assets are derived from criminal activity or from participation in criminal activity’.

Santander makes a customer segmentation by risk. The bank even refuses some categories of customer: ‘(1) persons included in any of the official lists of sanctions; (2) persons about whom information is available indicating possible involvement in criminal activities; (3) persons with businesses that make it impossible to verify the legitimacy of their activities or the source of funds; (4) persons who refuse to provide the required information or documentation; (5) legal entities whose shareholder or control struc- ture cannot be determined; (6) casinos or gambling/ betting establishments that are not officially authorized; (7) financial institutions resident in coun- tries or territories without being physically present (also referred to as “shell banks”) and which do not belong to a regulated financial group’. Such a list says a lot about Santander’s political will to fight against money laundering. It unveils a moral courage to refuse such categories of customers. In the case of Santander, KYC is not only a principle. Above all, it is a real tool of management. For customer identifi- cation, Santander has defined very clear and relevant criteria, such as the following ones: ‘(i) in the case of individuals, an official identification document shall be required to confirm the individual’s identity; (ii) for corporations and other legal entities, the deed of incorporation must be presented, including informa- tion concerning the customer’s name, legal form, address, directors, and the corporate bylaws, powers of attorney, entry in the appropriate register or other reliable identifying information; (iii) neither anony- mous accounts nor accounts using fictitious names may be opened or maintained; (iv) in the case of legal entities, except for those listed on a regulated market, the individual who ultimately controls, directly or indirectly, a percentage exceeding 25% of its shares, rights or assets, shall be identified’.

The top management of Santander is responsible for hiring personnel and allocating resources to the

money laundering and terrorism financing preven- tion unit. The human resources department of each unit sets up ‘yearly training programmes and special courses for management and employees, and specifi- cally for personnel whose positions are suitable for detecting activity or transactions that may be related to money laundering or terrorism financing, and train these employees to detect suspicious activity and to understand the procedure in such cases’. It seems quite clear that Santander has emphasized the fight against money laundering so that it has become part of Santander’s organizational culture.

Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of rebuilding meaning

Hamilton (2006: 543) said that Ricoeur was focusing on experience as it is mediated by symbolic resources. Such symbolic resources include the stories told to us by others. In organizational set- tings, storytelling could take three basic forms. First, organizational stories: they are often connected with leaders’ lives. More specifically, they are reinforcing some traits of leaders (especially when they were the founders of their organizations) as if such traits could be or should be internalized by most organi- zational members (Deal & Kennedy 1984). So in that case, storytelling implies looking at the leader as a role model for organizational behavior. Second, organizational moral discourse: such discourse can be identified throughout the various documents of organizational culture and ethics, such as the code of ethics, the organizational policies, the corporate mission and vision, the values statement, the corpo- rate social responsibility (CSR)/sustainable develop- ment report. All those documents reflect a given corporate moral discourse. Through such moral dis- course, the organization is telling what it is or what it wants to be. Third, organizational strategic dis- course: such discourse is unveiled in annual financial reports as well as other documents related to strate- gic planning processes.

We could analyze those three types of storytelling as they are developed within a given organization. In doing so, we will find out the story the organization is actually telling to us. But we will not have made any attempt to understand the organizational narra-

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tive. As Funnell (1998: 151) said, narrative is not only a technique of storytelling, but above all, the means to generate meaning and to convince others. Storytelling implies a will to tell a story from our own perspective, while an epistemological viewpoint about narratives actually unveils the capacity to find out a meaning for events that constitute the core of the stories. The impact of an event, said Ricoeur (2000: 315), unveils the persistence of its effects when they are separated from their origin. Ricoeur was not really concerned with storytelling but rather with the human quest for meaning. Every narrative is a con- tinuous quest for meaning of our own existence. If searching is hoping to recover (Ricoeur 2000: 563), then what we will rediscover has been learned. But what has been learned is not the final answer to the human quest for meaning of our life but rather the process, the path leading to such meaning. Every narrative mirrors the fact that we are continuously searching for what it means to be. Storytelling is implicitly a reflection about the events that are reconstructed. There is no storytelling without taking distance toward the events we are reconstruct- ing (Ricoeur 1984: 115).

Money laundering is a metaphor. In contrast to dresses and coats, money cannot be laundered. According to Ricoeur (1997: 10), metaphors can describe again the reality. Metaphors actually create similarity. In the metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’, the simi- larity between human being and wolf is not preexis- tent. It is created by the metaphor itself (Ricoeur 1997: 113). The metaphor is transforming the origi- nal meaning we gave to both parts of the dyad. The wolf seems to be more human than we thought. And the human being looks more similar to an animal than we believed (Ricoeur 1997: 115). In the case of money laundering, the similarity is not between money and laundering. The metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’ implies an identity (the powerful influence of the ‘is’). It is not the case with the metaphor of money laundering since there is a presupposition behind the metaphor itself: money takes the place of clothes in order to create a new meaning. Walters- York (1996: 57) said that for Ricoeur, a metaphor actually gives a narrative model for reading the person-subject. A metaphor implies that the import of concrete reality is translated into an abstract reality. For instance, saying that ‘our company is a

family’, that ‘man is a wolf’, or that ‘money is laun- dered’ actually suggests that the concrete reality (family, wolf, money) is determining what the abstract reality means. The fact that I am using the notion of family in describing my company is reveal- ing that I am trying to use the import of family ties in order to develop and enhance relationships within my organization. When I am using the notion of wolf, I am saying that characteristics of such species actually manifest some basic traits in human behav- ior. The metaphor ‘Man is a wolf’ provides new meaning arising in a new context (Ricoeur 1972: 101). When I am saying that ‘Man is a wolf’, I am saying that I have discovered some links between human behavior and the wolf’s conduct. When I am talking about money laundering, I am unveiling some hidden links between money and the activity of laundering. So the new context that gives birth to the metaphor implies a new understanding of humanity. The metaphor is used to enlighten my intuition about the essence of human being. According to Ricoeur (1972: 94), there is no metaphor without a context. We cannot interpret the meaning of a given metaphor without deeply analyzing the literary context in which it has arisen.

Moreover, the act of speaking has impact on others who are listening to us (Ricoeur 1975: 205). The words we are using could provoke fear, compassion, hate, or jealousy. When we talk about the essence of discourse (such as the corporate moral discourse), we must acknowledge that it is the result of choices: some words and meanings have been chosen. For instance, in many corporate codes of ethics, we find out the values of courtesy and politeness. However, both values are discussed in the section that could be entitled ‘Relationships with suppliers’. Such values are rarely used to discuss the way we should develop relationships with foreign partners, or even between employees. Very often, courtesy and politeness are linked to the issue of gift-giving practices. In doing so, the meaning of such values is reduced to what it means for suppliers to have courteous and polite relationships with the organization. So those who have written such codes have chosen values of cour- tesy and politeness. They have also put some con- straints to the meaning of such values since there is no expectation that such values could influence relation- ships with foreign partners and employees.

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So it is self-evident that corporate moral discourse is the result of choices: choices of words and their meanings. When the corporate moral discourse is written, it constitutes a whole we could analyze and criticize. As Ricoeur (1972: 104) said, the text pre- supposes a determined arrangement of parts. It is self-evident that we must look at the corporate moral discourse as a whole including various texts that are more or less connected to the others. The explicit intertextuality could be observed in some cases (for instance, between the code of ethics and organiza- tional policies). But most of the time, there seems to be no conceptual/axiological unity between the various parts of the corporate moral discourse. When the corporate moral discourse is written, it is available to interpretation. The text is made autono- mous. Most of the time, we do not have a precise idea about the intent of the authors. The text is speaking by itself. So Ricoeur said that detachment is an inte- gral part of text as phenomenon. If we want to understand the texts that are conveying the corpo- rate moral discourse, then we must be aware that our understanding will be conditioned by such detach- ment of the text, that is, the fact that the text is not in a strict continuity with the authors’ intent. For instance, in the code of ethics of the National Bank of Canada, there is a provision prohibiting stealing. Employees should never steal from the bank. But if they steal from the bank and invest such money so that they make profits, the National Bank of Canada would claim the ownership of such profits. Although we could criticize such a way of dealing with stealing, it is quite clear that we have no idea about the reason why the authors of the code have decided to include such provision. So the original thought of the authors of the text cannot be circumscribed. The only thing we have is the text, and its impact on the corporate image of the bank. Moreover, the text is the mediation by which we are understanding our- selves, said Ricoeur (1975: 213).

Most Canadian banks publish annual reports of CSR. However, if we carefully read such reports, it is amazing to find out that one of their achievements is the fact that the banks have paid their income tax. Of course, it was a misunderstanding of the Canadian ‘Public Accountability Statement’ (SOR/2002-133). Such regulation requires banks to declare in their annual financial statements all income tax that has

been paid during the fiscal year. However, many Canadian banks unfortunately understood that they must include such information within their CSR report. Such Canadian regulation is not quoted in the CSR report so that most citizens will not under- stand why Canadian banks are saying they are proud to have paid their income tax. From citizens’ view- point, such provision cannot be understood since it is a legal requirement for both citizens and corpora- tions to pay their income tax. Such CSR reports are then questioning the situation of the citizens who must pay their income tax and are implicitly compar- ing it to the situation of Canadian banks (which are proud to have paid their income tax). Citizens who read such reports could be shocked by such amazing corporate discourse. They could even question them- selves about their real ‘duty’ to pay their income tax. So the text could have impact on the readers. It could provoke a new self-understanding. Readers of the text have to deepen their self-understanding before the text itself (Ricoeur 1977: 133). Greisch (1989: 541) considered that Ricoeur’s basic philosophical credo is the following one: there is no self- understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols and texts. According to Gisel (1974: 39), when Ricoeur asserted that symbols give us something to think about, he is revealing two basic moments of the interpretation: on the one hand, the fact that some- thing preexists, or is already present in a given reality; on the other hand, the initiative to deepen our reflection. Ricoeur (2009: 20–25) said that reflec- tion is the basic link between the understanding of signs and self-understanding. Through self- understanding, we appropriate the meaning of our desire to be or our effort to exist since existence is nothing but desire to be (dynamism) and effort to exist (something is lacking). Reflection makes it pos- sible to see the real function of interpretation in self- understanding (Ricoeur 2009: 323).

The written moral discourse of banks and business corporations implies that we do not have any idea about the initial intent of the authors of the text. In order to reach a deep understanding of the text, orga- nizational members as well as citizens would require some explanations. As Ricoeur (1977: 131) said, the discourse implies a first gap between what is thought and the sayings, a second gap between what is said and what is written, and other kinds of detachment

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throughout the various codifications of the text. Without such gaps, there would be no discourse. Gisel (1976: 101) asserted that any discourse is unveiling the world. Without any distance or communicational gap, there would be no sayings, and thus, no dis- course. So if organizational members and citizens do not have some explanations about the text, how could it be understandable? For instance, in the CSR report of the Royal Bank of Canada, we could find out an important element of sustainable development. However, it is not an integral part of its values state- ment. It can hardly be even identified within its cor- porate code of ethics. So if I have no explanation about this apparent contradiction, how could I understand the text itself? The text itself has to be interpreted, although we do not have access to any further explanation. As Schouwey said (1988: 78–80), every meaning has to be understood and interpreted. Everything is subjected to interpretation. The text is questioning ourselves. It requires our answer. It is an appeal to deepen our understanding of reality. Ricoeur (2009: 16–17) said that there is an interpreta- tion when there are multiple meanings. That is pre- cisely the situation with the moral discourse of banks.

Money laundering is not only a metaphor, but above all, a narrative. It tells us something about the perception we have of our own world. The main components of money laundering as narrative are the following ones. First, the social agents of money laundering: Agarwal & Agarwal (2004: 768) asserted that money laundering involves bankers, lawyers, accountants, and even real estate builders, who allow their businesses to be used for laundering the pro- ceeds of various criminal activities (such as the illegal drug trade, ‘protection money’, and different kinds of frauds). This is an important aspect of the narra- tive since such people are professionals. They must comply with their code of professional ethics, which is mandatory and has to be applied in every relevant situation. So the fact that social agents of money laundering could be professionals actually reveals a lot of things about the various networks of the launderers.

Second, the ‘fighters’: Favarel-Garrigues et al. (2008: 18) explained how close relations between the banking industry and the police could help banks to gain access to outside information so that it could be easier to develop their own prevention and control

systems. Police officers would also get information they would not have access to if there would be no ‘win–win situation’. But indeed, when we look more closely to the moral discourse of banks, their main partners in the fight against money laundering seem to come from international organizations and the financial industry as such.

Third, the dynamics between the microperspec- tive and the macroperspective: from the micro- perspective, one of the most fascinating components of money laundering is the phenomenon of ‘smurf- ing’. Smurfing is itself a metaphor since it is derived from ‘smurf’, the character created by Peyo (1928– 1992). Smurfing has given birth to many metaphors that are closely linked to given money laundering practices. As Tan said (2002: 278), smurfing implies breaking down a large sum of money into smaller sums, which will be deposited into bank accounts (by people known as ‘ants’). Those who are responsible for such money laundering schemes are called ‘Papa Smurf’ (Zagaris & MacDonald 1992). From the macroperspective, it is self-evident that offshore finance centers could be used for money laundering purposes (Hampton & Levi 1999: 650). Taylor (1992: 183) mentioned that drug barons transfer their dirty money (earned from the illegal drug trade) into off- shore finance centers. So what the narrative of money laundering actually unveils is the basic link between the microperspective and the macroperspec- tive in the globalized money laundering strategies.

Fourth, the effects of money laundering: Verhage & Ponsaers (2009) said that money laundering gives birth to legitimate economic (and even political) power and influence so that it reveals a ‘never-ending desire for power and influence’. Money laundering has other economic effects. The economic impact includes, at least, antitrust practices since those com- panies that used dirty money to lead their business have access to the economy of shadow (from laun- derers), while their competitors must follow the rules and the formal financing system.

Fifth, moral issues: some phenomena could give birth either to criminal or to legitimate practices so that it could be quite risky to provide a decisive/final moral judgment about them. We should note that money actually becomes ‘dirty money’ when money launderers try to introduce it into the legitimate economy. But this is the ‘a posteriori’ moment of

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transforming money into dirty money. The ‘a priori’ moment is nothing but the way money is exchanged for illegal drugs. So we should distinguish the ‘dirty- to-be’ nature of money (the ‘a priori’ moment of dirty money: money is exchanged for illegal drugs) and the actual nature of dirty money (the ‘a posteriori’ moment of dirty money: dirty money as it is put into the legal market).

Three examples will make the need for moral pru- dence very clear: first, the over-invoiced and under- invoiced import/export prices in international trade. De Boyrie et al. (2004) suggested that over-invoiced import transactions could be used for money laun- dering purposes. But such abnormal prices in inter- national trade could have other motives or grounds. Second, some ‘anomalies’ within the antiquity art market: Massy (2008: 733) asserted that money laundering operations could take place in the art market so that the final result could be a general rise in the market. Third: the ‘hawala systems’ (informal value transfer systems): hawala systems are used to send money to relatives who are living in poor coun- tries. What is actually ‘transferred’ is a value. What is indeed exchanged is a debt between hawaladars. Some authors (Shanmugam 2004, Dougherty 2006) distinguish ‘white hawala’ (legitimate transactions) and ‘black hawala’ (illegal transactions aiming at fraud, tax evasion, money laundering, financing of terrorist activities). But according to Perkel (2004: 184), most money that is transferred from informal value transfer systems (such as hawala systems) is ‘clean money’ and not dirty money (drawn from illegal activities). Van de Bunt (2008: 691) rightly said that hawala banking is not equivalent to money transfer systems, which are offered by nonbanking financial institutions (such as Western Union and MoneyGram) since hawala banking is not certified and supervised by governments. As Zagaris (2007: 159) said, informal value transfer systems are char- acterized by anonymity and a lack of official scru- tiny. Some researchers have revealed the historical origin of hawala systems, both in China (sixth to 10th centuries), India (11th century), and even through Arab traders along the silk trading route (Shehu 2003: 176–177, Shanmugam 2004: 37). There seems to be a decisive factor for explaining the growth of informal value transfer systems in poor countries: the formal financial sector is either absent

or quite weak (Ismail 2007, Keene 2007). Viles (2008: 27–29) said that hawala systems are flexible, cheap, and based on trust. Hawaladars are efficient and reliable and have a reputation for fair practice. The author is not willing to favor aggressive regula- tions of informal value transfer systems since such regulations could deeply affect vulnerable people. Hawala systems clearly satisfy some basic needs of people from the poorest nations of the world. So what is at stake is both to prevent the use of hawala systems for illegal purposes (such as money launder- ing) and to safeguard the ‘white hawala’ (legitimate transactions).

Money laundering is both a metaphor and a nar- rative. Its metaphoric import actually enlightens what is at stake in money laundering activities and what money launderers have in mind (the way they perceive reality). Money laundering as a narrative teaches us that the metaphor has become so powerful and influential that it has become an integral part of our society. It reveals how globalized crimes (such as money laundering) could tell us something about social organization.

Conclusion

So what could we learn from the notion of money laundering as a metaphor and a narrative? First, we have seen how Ricoeur’s hermeneutics could be useful for better understanding any metaphor we could observe in our society. The way financial crimes are referred to in metaphors actually reveals how the usual structure of language is unable to unveil the nature of such phenomena. Second, the way we look at money laundering as a narrative could have practical implications since the moral corporate discourse of banks about money launder- ing is itself closely linked to the structure of money laundering as a narrative. Money laundering as a narrative is thus a key to better understand the implicit components or ‘a priori’ beliefs that are enhanced or conveyed within the moral discourse of banks. Third, money laundering as metaphor and narrative actually undermines the sense of together- ness. Ricoeur (1960: 162) unveiled the frail nature of human being: our frailty is both the door that makes it possible for evil to enter into our existential

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condition and our capacity to undertake wrong actions. Moreover, Ricoeur believed that our action is always deeply connected with others’ action so that it could become very hard to hold someone responsible for a set of events. Acting is acting ‘with’ others (Ricoeur 1983: 110). In other words, although we say that money laundering is an immoral phenomenon, we should recognize that it is the result of interdependent facts and beings. If acting is acting with others, then we all are respon- sible for the present phenomenon of money laun- dering (a ‘collective responsibility’, Dostoyevsky and Sartre would say). Consumers, banks, business corporations, as well as governments, should acknowledge their moral responsibility in the way money laundering is a widespread reality. Money laundering as a narrative is explicitly unveiling such a multilateral responsibility.

Our action is muddled with social and physical life. So how could we distinguish a group action (such as money launderers) from an action for which every social agent is actually responsible? One thing is quite clear: when we do not accomplish our duties toward others, we are not respecting our per- sonal integrity. When we are lying, we are hating ourselves (Ricoeur 1990: 308). If we do not accom- plish our duties toward others, then we are influenc- ing ourselves through the history we are creating. Humanity is nothing but ‘a species with a history’ (Ricoeur 1985: 385, 389). So when launderers are living within the money laundering narrative, they are transforming history into a ‘history-with-a- reduced-personal-integrity’.

Future research could try to make a link between Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of language and Gadamer’s hermeneutics of understanding in order to enlighten the nature of money laundering and its historical expressions. Gadamer’s philosophy could put the money laundering narrative into the ‘horizon of the past’. Gadamer could help us to see to what extent prejudices could still be influential in the way we look at such phenomena (for instance, prejudices about the role of banks in the money laundering process). In doing so, an analysis of Gadamer’s philosophy could be useful for understanding the way money laundering is historically rooted. Ricoeur’s philoso- phy was rather useful to unveil the nature of money laundering as metaphor and narrative.

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