Discussion 4

AI Index: AFR 34/003/2005 Amnesty International September 2005

Contents

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1

AFTER THE PEACE AGREEMENT ................................................................ 2 Independent National Commission on Human Rights ......................................................................... 3

INCOMPLETE DEMOBILIZATION .................................................................. 4

ETHNIC TENSIONS MANIPULATED ............................................................. 5

THE SLOW PACE OF REFORM ..................................................................... 7 Armed forces ....................................................................................................................................... 8 Police ................................................................................................................................................... 9 The justice system .............................................................................................................................. 10 Prisons ............................................................................................................................................... 11

IMPUNITY PERSISTS ................................................................................... 11 Truth and Reconciliation Commission .............................................................................................. 11 No sign of war crime prosecutions .................................................................................................... 12 Pressure to bring Charles Taylor to trial ............................................................................................ 13

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ELECTION CANDIDATES ................................ 14

AI Index: AFR 34/003/2005 Amnesty International September 2005

Liberia Violence, discrimination and impunity

Introduction Sporadic outbreaks of violence continue to threaten the people of Liberia and their prospects

of peace. Former rebel fighters who should have been disarmed and demobilized following

the formal ending of internal conflict in 2003 have reacted with violence when they have not

received their benefits. Voter registration centres were the target of a series of attacks in May

2005 in which aid workers were attacked and beaten.

The peace remains fragile. Intercommunal discrimination and rivalries have erupted into

violence and rioting, resulting in deaths and severe injuries. Weapons still circulate illegally

throughout the country. Ex-combatants have been manipulated by local politicians which has

contributed to incidences of violence.

During the period of transition that has followed the conflict, insufficient funding and

resources for demobilization programmes have left former combatants without effective

vocational training or jobs. Those responsible for gross human rights violations during the

conflict have still not been held to account, and impunity persists for the forces responsible

for continuing violence in Liberia.

The asylum granted by Nigeria to former Liberian President Charles Taylor, despite a 17-

count indictment against him for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the Special

Court for Sierra Leone, flouts Nigeria’s international legal obligations. Charles Taylor is

accused of supporting armed rebels who committed massive human rights abuses in Sierra

Leone throughout the 1990s. There is as yet no appropriate international or national

mechanism for bringing to justice those responsible for the massive human rights abuses that

took place during the conflict in Liberia.

As Liberia approaches presidential and legislative elections on 11 October 2005, and the

prospect of a new government from January 2006, candidates of all political parties must

demonstrate that human rights are central to their vision for Liberia. 1 Voters need to know

where candidates stand on critical human rights issues if they are to hold the new government

to its promises. Candidates must show clear commitment to the establishment of, and respect

for, the rule of law; to the promotion of human rights; and to an end to impunity for human

rights abuses by all sides to the conflict.

The international community must give greater support to the work of the UN Mission in

Liberia (UNMIL), whose mandate comes up for review by the UN Security Council on 19

September 2005. More attention and resources are needed to address the central human rights

issues of continuing violence, discrimination on ethnic grounds and impunity, but also to

strengthen and reform the security forces and the justice system in Liberia.

1 On election day, Liberians will vote in three separate ballots for the President and Vice-President, for

64 members of the House of Representatives and for 30 members of the Senate.

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The peace agreement held out strong hopes for peace, for renewal after the devastation of

war, and for an end to impunity for the appalling crimes perpetrated during the conflict. The

last two years have seen great improvement in the security situation, but much remains to be

done to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law. 2

After the peace agreement The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the almost continuous internal conflict in

Liberia between 1990 and 2003, was signed on 18 August 2003 by the then government; the

two main armed opposition groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL); and by all political parties.

A transitional government was installed in October 2003 to lead the country into elections. A

76-member transitional legislative assembly was appointed by the transitional government

from among members of the former government, LURD, MODEL and civil society.

UNMIL was established by the UN Security Council in 2003 to supervise the ceasefire, to

provide security, to demobilize and disarm the combatants, and to assist the government in

preparing for elections. 3 By the time Amnesty International visited Liberia in May 2005,

UNMIL peacekeeping troops were at full strength and fully deployed in all 15 counties

throughout Liberia. The civilian component of the mission provides support to the

government, including on human rights, elections, the police, judiciary and prisons, and on

reforms in the security forces and the administration of justice. Its interventions have been

effective in increasing the accountability of officials at the local level.

In May 2005, the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section began formulating a five-

year National Human Rights Action Plan for Liberia in collaboration with: the Liberian

Ministries of Justice, of Foreign Affairs, and of Gender and Development; Liberian civil

society groups; the UN Development Programme (UNDP); and the international donor

community. It is also beginning an audit of Liberian national laws so that they can eventually

be brought into line with international human rights law and standards. In late 2004 Liberia

ratified key international human rights treaties planned for incorporation into domestic law. 4

2 For further information on progress since the 2003 peace agreement, see Liberia: One year after

Accra – Immense human rights challenges remain, 18 August 2004 (AI Index: AFR 34/012/2004). 3 Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003), on establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),

UN Doc. S/RES/1509 (2003), 19 September 2003. 4 Liberia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the UN Convention against Torture and Other

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture); the Optional

Protocol to the Convention against Torture; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Liberia also signed, but has not yet ratified, the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; the Optional Protocol

to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Optional

Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed

conflict; and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and

Members of their Families.

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Civil society organizations have played a critically important role throughout the transition

process, particularly in keeping the peace agreement on track, monitoring government

reforms and persistently highlighting pervasive corruption. They have raised concerns with

the transitional government through peaceful actions and legal channels, and worked closely

with the international community. During her July 2005 visit to Liberia, Louise Arbour, the

UN High Commissioner for Human Right, credited “recent achievements...to ECOWAS,

UNMIL, and for the most part to the Liberians themselves, who have demonstrated enormous

resilience in their determination to live in peace”. 5

Independent National Commission on Human Rights

The peace agreement provided for the establishment of institutions to address issues of

accountability for human rights violations and of reconciliation – the Independent National

Commission on Human Rights and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 6

The Independent National Commission on Human Rights was set up to “monitor

compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as

promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Liberian society, including

schools, the media, the police and the military”. 7

On 23 March 2005 the transitional government Chairman, Gyude Bryant, signed into law

an act establishing the Commission. 8 The UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section had

assisted in drafting it. The Act gives the Commission general competence to protect and

promote human rights in Liberia and important powers to subpoena witnesses. Some of the

key functions include :(Article IV sec. 6, 7, 8, 12, and 14):

 to draw the attention of the Government to human rights violations in any part of the country and make proposals for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, where

necessary to express an opinion on the actions of the government in response to such

violations.

 to promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the Republic of

Liberia is a State party, and their effective implementation.

 to encourage ratification of these instruments which the Republic of Liberia has not yet ratified, or accession to those instruments, and to promote their implementation by

the Government.

5 UNMIL Press release, “Institutional and attitudinal change key to Liberia’s development, says UN

High Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 July 2005. 6 See Impunity chapter below for further information about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

7 Article XII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

8 An Act to repeal the act of 1997 creating the Liberian Commission on Human Rights and to create the

Independent National Commission on Human Rights of Liberia, March 2005. For further information

on the establishment of the Commission, see Liberia: One year after Accra – Immense human rights

challenges remain (AI Index: AFR 34/012/2004), p. 18.

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 to publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular ethnic discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through

the dissemination of information and education and by making use of state and public

media organs.

 to assist in educating public opinion and promoting awareness and respect for human rights and international humanitarian laws, treaties, and protocols to which Liberia is

a party.

So far, the Commission has not been able to operate to its full potential. Despite efforts by

some of its leaders, it has not received financial support from the international community and

relies on a small budget allocated by government that covers only basic operating costs.

Continued support from the UN in the form of technical expertise and training is needed to

make the Commission a more viable institution.

Incomplete demobilization There have been regular outbreaks of violence and rioting in Monrovia and other parts of

Liberia during the transition period. Often the violence has arisen from repeated failures to

provide reintegration benefits to fighters demobilized from armed groups.

In one instance, former fighters launched missiles and disrupted voter registration in Ganta,

Nimba County, on 12 May 2005 when their reintegration and resettlement benefits were not

provided on time. Their benefits included vouchers for skills training and school fees. The

former fighters, chanting anti-government slogans, ransacked voter registration centres and

carried away electoral materials. They attacked and beat aid workers and UNMIL staff

members, and smashed humanitarian agency vehicles. This was the third outbreak of violence

in a month in Nimba County by former combatants protesting at not receiving benefits.

The violence is linked to a variety of factors. These include an unfinished process of

disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement (DDRR) that has neither

completely broken the command structures of the warring factions nor adequately provided

viable long-term employment or reintegration opportunities. Illegal arms trading continues to

take place in Monrovia and in border areas of the country, feeding the continuing conflict. In

addition, the transitional government has not adequately addressed the economic governance

and security issues that threaten human rights and hinder full implementation of the peace

agreement.

In June 2005 the UN Secretary-General reported that the most serious threat to the elections

and the safety of UNMIL personnel came from former combatants who were “open to

exploitation by manipulative political elements”. 9 His report also referred to “organized

9 Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1579 (2004)

regarding Liberia, 16 June 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/391 sec.19: “The most serious threat to stability

came from ex-combatants awaiting reintegration opportunities. Many of these ex-combatants held

violent demonstrations to demand reintegration benefits and opportunities. They also threatened to

disrupt the elections and to attack UNMIL personnel. Continued delays in providing these idle ex-

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Amnesty International September, 2005 AI Index: AFR 34/003/2005

groups of ex-combatants with links to influential members of the former factions…illegally

occupying the Guthrie rubber plantation”, highlighting the involvement of ex-combatants in

illegal mining and exploitation of natural resources. After UN peacekeepers conducted

searches for armed former fighters in Liberia, on 6 August 2005 the police announced that 23

people in Monrovia had been arrested for possession of illegal weapons. All 23 were reported

to be former members of the previous government’s militia.

Figures made public by the UN in February 2005 estimated the total number of fighters

who had been disarmed at close to 101,000, of whom 65,000 had not entered reintegration

programmes. 10

The 101,000 included members of the former government’s forces, and of

LURD and MODEL. The demobilization of members of the present government’s armed

forces started in July 2005 as a precursor to a restructuring of the whole force later in the year.

A figure as high as 101,000 had not been anticipated in the budget, and there was practically

no money available for rehabilitation and reintegration by the time disarmament and

demobilization had been concluded. An estimated US$39 million more is needed to ensure

successful rehabilitation and reintegration, including through the provision of meaningful

educational and vocational training. However, funds pledged by the USA, the European

Commission and Sweden have not yet been received.

Ethnic tensions manipulated During the internal armed conflict, the leaders of the various warring factions manipulated

ethnicity as a means to recruit fighters. The inter-ethnic hatreds that were nurtured during the

war have had a lasting impact, leading to large-scale violence that the authorities have had

difficulty in controlling. Few attempts have been made in the transitional period to address

this issue at its core. Amnesty International believes that the government must tackle it as a

priority, and that it should be a central focus of the work of the Independent National

Commission on Human Rights Commission – one of whose functions is to address

discrimination – and of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

In one instance of intercommunal violence in late 2004, violence broke out in Paynesville, a

suburb of Monrovia. A long-standing land dispute between two individual members of the

Mandingo and Lorma ethnic groups sparked four days of rioting. Between 28 October and 4

November 2004 at least 20 people were killed, 200 were injured, and numerous girls and

women were raped. Churches, mosques, homes and official buildings were damaged in

Monrovia and in neighbouring counties including Margibi and Grand Bassa. A national

emergency was declared and a curfew imposed. There were significant delays before the

authorities responded to the violence, which was eventually quelled by the police with the

support of the International Police Service of the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL). At least 157

combatants with reintegration opportunities leave them open to exploitation by manipulative political

elements, particularly during the electoral process.” 10

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1579 (2004) regarding

Liberia, 7 June 2005, UN Doc. S/2005/376, Sections 31 and 32: The numbers included 68,162 men,

22,370 women, 8,523 boys, and 2,440 girls; and 612 foreign nationals including 308 Guineans, 242

Sierra Leoneans, 50 Ivorians, seven Nigerians, four Malians, and one Ghanaian.

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people were arrested. Of these, six were subsequently charged with setting fire to the home of

the Minister of Justice, and were later released to await trial; the rest of the detainees were

released without charge.

There is widespread belief among local people in Paynesville in allegations that individuals

at the highest levels of the transitional government were personally involved in arming former

soldiers during a series of meetings just before the violence broke out. If true, such actions

would have been clearly illegal and in violation of the ceasefire and a UN arms embargo.

Local people told Amnesty International in May 2005 that “hate speech” was circulated

through mobile phone text messages and on the radio, inciting tensions and fomenting

violence as people in Margibi County heard what was taking place in Monrovia.

In January 2005 the transitional government appointed a commission of inquiry, made up

of 15 members of civil society, to look into the causes of the rioting. The commission

presented its findings to the government in June 2005. While it reported no evidence of

planning, it did identify ethnic discrimination against the Mandingo ethnic group as the most

significant cause of the violence. The report stated:

“Of all the causes, both immediate and remote, the single most important cause of the

October rioting was the negative attitude of many Liberians against Mandingo…

Violence manifested itself through these tensions which played out through attacks on

individuals, hate speech, rioting, the burning and destruction of mosques and churches

and violence in communities.”

The findings of investigations into the cause of the rioting by the International Police

Service have not been made public. In a report of June 2005 the UN Secretary-General

acknowledged that ethnic clashes posed a threat to security, and cited instances of violence

between the Gio and Krahn ethnic groups and between the Lorma and Mandingo

communities over land. 11

Discrimination against the Mandingo community is rife, members of the community told

Amnesty International in meetings in May 2005 with civil society organizations in Bong and

Montserrado counties. They complained of being subjected to discrimination during the

registration of voters for the October elections because of their names, appearance, speech or

clothes. They said they had to produce more evidence that they were of Liberian nationality

than other ethnic groups in Liberia. Voter registration guidelines require two people already

registered to vote to vouch that the applicant is Liberian and a member of the community.

Members of the Mandingo community told Amnesty International that they had asked for a

meeting with officials of the National Elections Commission but had received no response.

Some local media organizations and non-governmental organizations reported similar

allegations. However, government officials – including from the National Elections

Commission – and some UN staff told Amnesty International that there had been only

11

Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in Liberia, UN Doc.

S/2005/391, 16 June 2005, Para.23.

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isolated instances of discrimination or denial of voter registration to Mandingo people, and

that it was not a widespread problem.

Such differing perceptions are of concern. Amnesty International believes that, if officials

are widely believed to have discriminated against a sector of the population, the government

should make public its opposition to such discrimination on ethnic grounds, and should take

action to investigate allegations of discrimination during voter registration and to prevent it

during the October vote, for example by the deployment of monitors at ballot stations.

The slow pace of reform

The transitional government’s lack of transparency and accountability on economic

governance and security issues has threatened the transition process, concluded the

governments and intergovernmental organizations at a donor meeting in Copenhagen in May

2005. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), and the International Contact Group on Liberia, a grouping of

states formed in 2002. These governments and organizations proposed an anti-corruption

plan largely aimed at limiting the powers of the transitional government. It restricted the

government’s power to grant contracts and its control of key sources of revenue; placed

international supervisors in key ministries; and required the appointment of additional judges

to strengthen the judicial system. After negotiations with the transitional government, an

Economic and Governance Assistance Program was presented for the government’s approval

in August 2005 with the clear message that failure to accept it might put future funding at risk.

Additional pressure on the transitional government came with the renewal of international

sanctions on Liberia’s export of diamonds and timber by the UN Security Council in June

2005. 12

The renewal of sanctions was largely linked to the Security Council’s concern that

few of the reforms that have been imposed by the transitional government have met

conditions sufficiently enough for proper resource management. The Security Council also

noted serious concern about “the increase in unlicensed mining and illegal exports of

diamonds and the National Transitional Government of Liberia’s agreement to and lack of

transparency in, granting exclusive mining rights to a single company “. 13

Liberian people have been strongly critical of the transition process. They had hoped to see

faster improvement in their quality of life but have been severely affected by the rising prices

of rice, fuel and cement. The late payment of salaries has resulted in several demonstrations

and strikes. Vigilantism has increased because of the general lack of faith in the police and in

response to the slow pace of reforms in the administration of justice. Criminal suspects have

been assaulted or killed sometimes when there have been suspicions that the police have not

fully investigated a case or courts have made unfair rulings or have been influenced by

corruption. Civil society needs to play a greater role in reforms of the police and justice

12

Resolution 1607 (2005) adopted on 21 June 2005, UN Doc. SC Resolution 1607 (2005) 13

Ibid sec.1

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system so as to discourage vigilantism, to encourage respect for the rule of law, and to

increase public awareness of the need for an effective, community-based police service.

The painfully slow pace of long-term reforms has impeded progress in addressing the

threats of violence and impunity. The armed forces, police, judiciary and prison services all

suffer from insufficient resources and training, lack of qualified personnel, and low levels of

professionalism. Historically, the executive branch of government has threatened to deny

these institutions independence from interference. More attention needs to be dedicated to

their reform and restructuring so that they have the capacity, resources and security to address

a deeply entrenched climate of impunity.

UNMIL has a mandate to focus on security reforms and support for the peace process. It

works with the transitional government to monitor and restructure the police and to

restructure the military. On the justice and prison systems, UNMIL is authorized to assist in

developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal

framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

In a June 2005 report, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that the transitional

government must be held accountable for the lack of attention and support given to the

prisons, courts and the police. According to the report: 14

Many of the re-opened courts are not complying with legal standards and are failing

to observe fair trial of victims and suspects. Prisoners are detained in poor conditions,

including in overcrowded prisons, and the rights of prisoners to due process, speedy trials

and legal counsel are undermined by the poor operation or non-existence of courts. The

only operational juvenile court is in Monrovia. A large number of cases are not tried,

resulting in impunity for offenders. A lack of accountability, which is compounded by the

failure of the Government to provide adequate logistical support to the courts and the

police, has encouraged corruption and hampered the state’s capacity to uphold the rights

of victims and suspects.”

Armed forces

Under the peace agreement, UNMIL is in charge of the country’s security while the armed

forces are restructured. 15

All irregular forces were to be disbanded, and the new government

forces to have a new command structure. The new armed forces were to be drawn from the

ranks of the former government forces, the LURD and MODEL armed groups, as well as

civilians with appropriate experience. The UN, ECOWAS, African Union and states in the

International Contact Group on Liberia were requested to provide advisory staff, equipment,

logistics and experienced trainers.

The restructuring process was originally intended to start in early 2005. The United States

who did the initial assessment of the new army, recommended that the new army be 6,000

14

Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN mission in Liberia, UN Doc.

S/2005/391, 16 June 2005, Para 59. 15

Article VII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

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strong, and be selected after vetting of former soldiers and rebel fighters. However, support

from the US government was dependent on the Liberian government’s capacity to pay

salaries and other costs in the long term, and the number of proposed troops was subsequently

reduced to 2,000.

Funding shortfalls continue to contribute to delays in the restructuring. The peace

agreement did not provide for the demobilization and payment of pensions to former

members of the transitional government’s armed forces, and the government is having

difficulty in providing all the funding. It has been agreed that the restructuring cannot start

until full demobilization has taken place. The restructuring is scheduled to take two years in

its entirety, and will be overseen by the US Department of Defense and carried out by private

training companies, Dyn Corps International and Pacific Architects and Engineers. These

companies will be under contract to the US government and therefore bound by US laws.

Police

Under the peace agreement, UNMIL assists the transitional government in monitoring and

restructuring the police in a way that is consistent with democratic policing; developing a

civilian police training programme; and assisting in police training in cooperation with

ECOWAS, international organizations and interested states. 16

The deployment of an interim

police force, composed of former police officers, began in late 2003. However, it has been

unable to function effectively because of shortages of basic equipment such as vehicles,

handcuffs and firearms. The International Police Service has been providing support on

routine arrests, and UN Formed Police Units are rapid response units which are equipped with

vehicles and firearms to provide backup in cases of large-scale violence or rioting.

The training of new police officers began in 2004 at the police academy. At the time of

Amnesty International’s visit to Liberia in May 2005, many of the new recruits had completed

their theoretical training and were doing practical field work. The strategy, supported by the

International Police Service, is for newly trained recruits to form the new service and for the

interim police eventually to become redundant. Members of the interim force can apply to go

through the vetting, recruitment and training process to join the new service.

By May 2005 the police should have been fully deployed throughout the country. However,

human rights groups reported that in some rural areas, especially in the southeast, there was

no police presence at all. In Bong, Margibi, Montserrado and Grand Bassa counties, Amnesty

International saw interim and new police officers still working side by side. Visible tensions

between officers were attributed by observers to differences over old and new ways of

operating.

The selection and the vetting of police recruits is being carried out by the International

Police Service in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and with support from the UNMIL

Human Rights and Protection Section. The initial part of the screening process is the

submission of names to the Ministry of Justice to determine if there is any record of criminal

activity or internal disciplinary concerns. Secondly, checks are made with the Special Court

16

Article VIII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

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for Sierra Leone and others in the international community to find out if there have been any

charges or accusations of war crimes or human rights violations. Lastly, the Liberian public is

solicited for their input on each candidate, although many civil society organizations seem

unaware of this opportunity of involvement in the vetting process. 17

The justice system

UNMIL’s mandate includes assisting the transitional government to develop, in cooperation

with judicial institutions, a strategy for consolidating a national legal framework. The

objective is to develop and implement pragmatic solutions for the problems and challenges

facing Liberia’s justice system – including re-establishment of the Law School – with the

overall aim of restoring the rule of law. The Legal and Judicial Division of UNMIL, present

since early 2004, has made assessments of the system, as have other UN agencies, the US

Department of Justice, and international non governmental organizations such as the Open

Society Justice Initiative. Despite the many assessments undertaken so far only the Legal and

Judicial Division has provided support through technical expertise.

The assessments highlight the lack of sufficiently qualified personnel and a low level of

professionalism, resources and incentives for judges, prosecutors, lawyers and others in the

judicial system. There has been little oversight of their work in the past, contributing

substantially to the lack of capacity in this sector. Few people in Liberia have access to the

justice system. Prisons and police detention facilities are overcrowded, and most of the

inmates are detained without charge or trial. Hardly any detainees and defendants can afford

lawyers, and there are not enough lawyers to provide free legal counsel in such cases.

During her visit in July 2005, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stressed the

importance of an independent and professional judiciary, and said the dysfunctional judicial

system was having a severe impact on the creation of a human rights environment in Liberia.

In May 2005, local observers were concerned at the slow progress in addressing the lack of

qualified personnel and that recruitment, vetting and training of judicial personnel was not

taking place. On the 28 June the transitional government commissioned eleven circuit court

judges and six specialized court judges. The judges will serve in criminal and specialized

courts in Montserrado County and in circuit and specialized courts in eight other counties.

Prior to the commissioning of these judges there had only been 11 circuit court judges in the

country yet there had been 21 posts to fill. At least 7 of them had been of retirement age or in

17

According to the policy of the International Police Service Commissioner, “The Public Contract

Office will be established to allow for any member of the public to make written complaints or

objections on any person who is published in the local newspaper as a potential candidate for the LNP

[Liberian National Police]. The PCO will forward any such complaints or objections to the Vetting

Unit. If any complaints or objections are found such a candidate will be disqualified immediately.”

UNMIL CIVPOL IPS Commissioner’s Policy, 2004 Registration, Vetting, Authorization and

Deactivation of officers with police powers in Liberia – assessing eligibility, conduct and capacity of

individual officers in security agencies or security units in Liberia. [July 2004]

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poor health. 18

Funding has been promised by the US Department of State, although it is

unclear when it will be available.

Prisons

Prison conditions were severely affected by the war. Until the end of 2004, the only

functioning prison was in Monrovia. Quick impact projects, with funds made available by

UNMIL, have since rehabilitated more prisons. Overall, however, all of the prisons are

categorized as uninhabitable, failing to meet UN standards such as the Standard Minimum

Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, and

the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty.

So far 28 corrections officers have gone through a vetting and training process, and have

been deployed throughout the country. The UN corrections team is working with national

corrections officers to provide strategic advisory support. It cooperates with the International

Committee of the Red Cross, the World Food Programme and other partners to ensure

prisoners are provided with meals, blankets and mattresses. It provides training of corrections

officers with the International Police Service, but independent funding is still needed to

provide the infrastructure and resources that will enable staff to work effectively.

Impunity persists The impunity enjoyed by both the perpetrators of serious human rights abuses during the war

and by those instigating large-scale acts of violence threatens peace and human rights.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a non-judicial mechanism to address impunity

for past crimes. However, there has been little progress in creating an adequate mechanism for

prosecution before the domestic courts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. One of the

biggest challenges of the post-election period will be to find the most appropriate mechanism

to bring those responsible to justice.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The peace agreement provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation

Commission to “promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation” 19

The Commission is mandated to investigate gross human rights violations, violations of

international humanitarian law and human rights abuses that occurred between January 1979

and 14 October 2003. The violations that come under the mandate of the Commission include,

but are not limited to, massacres, sexual violations, murder, extrajudicial killings and

“economic crimes, such as the exploitation of natural or public resources to perpetuate armed

conflict”. 20

18

|UN Press release: Rule of law extended in Liberia through the Commissioning of 17 New Judges 05

July 2005 19

Article XIII, Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 20

Ibid

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On 12 May 2005 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act was passed by the

transitional legislative assembly, after a long process of consultation with civil society

organized by the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section, the UNDP and the

Transitional Justice Working Group, a coalition of national non governmental organizations

in Liberia. Under the Act, the Commission will be composed of nine commissioners,

including at least four women, appointed by the Liberian head of state. The Act provides for

commissioners already appointed by the transitional government to be vetted by a selection

panel of seven national and international members (Sections 9 and 11). Vetting will be

conducted by a “process of public scrutiny based on individual nominations and other

petitions from the general public, institutions, and organisations”. If, as a result of this process,

any of the appointed commissioners are not confirmed in their role, the selection panel will

shortlist 15 new vetted candidates from nominations by remaining Commission members, to

be appointed by the head of state. After appointment, the commissioners will be subject to

confirmation hearings before the legislative assembly.

Consultative meetings with members of civil society in Gbarnga and Monrovia revealed

high levels of support for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The fear that perpetuates

a culture of silence remained a real impediment in addressing impunity. One human rights

worker said “Everyone is afraid all the time – so we just keep out mouth shut”, and this

sentiment was often repeated. Although people are interested in justice in the long term and

recognize the importance of breaking the cycle of impunity, many felt strongly that it would

take some time. They saw the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a first step towards

criminal prosecutions at a later date, when the country was more settled.

No sign of war crime prosecutions

There has been little public discussion about addressing past war crimes and crimes against

humanity. The national judicial system is unlikely to be equipped to address international

crimes in the near future. Progress is further hampered because many of the people suspected

of responsibility for human rights abuses are ministers in the government or members of the

legislative assembly. The continued presence of these individuals in powerful positions

contributes to a culture of silence and hinders the fight against impunity.

The vetting process, to prevent those responsible for human rights abuses from entering the

police, armed forces or prisons services, involves the provision of information about suspect

individuals being passed to the major crimes unit of the Liberian police. This unit was

established with the support of the International Police Service. However, it is unclear how

the information on suspects passed to the police will be used in the future.

Civil society groups told the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in July 2005 that

Liberians expect a mechanism to be created to prosecute those responsible for war crimes and

crimes against humanity during the war. This will need to be addressed in the post-election

period if Liberia is to be successful in fighting impunity and encouraging respect for the rule

of law.

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Pressure to bring Charles Taylor to trial

By 11 August 2005, former Liberian head of state Charles Taylor had reached the second

anniversary of his asylum in Nigeria. Despite a 17-count indictment for war crimes and

crimes against humanity before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, he continues to be

sheltered from prosecution by the Nigerian government.

Nigeria has come under pressure from African civil society organizations and governments,

the UN, the US Congress and the European Parliament to surrender Charles Taylor to the

Special Court for Sierra Leone. On 30 June 2005, 300 civil society organizations from

thirteen countries across Africa joined with international human rights organizations in a

coalition – the Campaign against Impunity – to urge the African Union to take the lead in

ensuring that Charles Taylor faces prosecution. In response, Nigerian President Olusegun

Obasanjo, currently Chair of the African Union, reiterated that he would not turn over Charles

Taylor to the Court but said that the matter would be brought before the African Union and

ECOWAS.

Further pressure came from West African countries on 3 July 2005, when the Liberian

Minister of Justice, Kabineh Ja’neh, demanded that Nigeria provide a copy of the agreement

under which Charles Taylor was allowed to leave Liberia and seek asylum in Nigeria. On 28

July, the leadership of the Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone)

signed a communiqué in Freetown, Sierra Leone, stating that some of Charles Taylor’s

activities in Nigeria were in breach of the terms of his asylum.

In February 2005 the European Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution urging

Nigeria to hand Charles Taylor over to the Special Court. In May 2005 the US Congress, in a

resolution introduced and adopted by the House of Representatives and later endorsed by the

Senate, made the same appeal. The UN High Commissioner for Human Right, while visiting

several West African countries in July 2005, publicly stated that Charles Taylor should be

surrendered to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. However, the UN Security Council failed

to agree a resolution on 24 May 2005 to compel Nigeria to take this action.

14 Liberia: Violence, discrimination and impunity

Amnesty International September 2005 AI Index: AFR34/003/2005

Recommendations to election candidates Amnesty International urges all candidates of all political parties taking part in the October

2005 elections to make public commitments to:

Be an advocate for human rights

 stand up for reforms, laws and practices that will respect, protect and fulfil the political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights for all in Liberia

 back the National Human Rights Action Plan and the development of a human rights culture in Liberia

 support the strengthening of the independence, impartiality and funding of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights Commission so that it can

vigorously pursue human rights concerns, including ethnic discrimination, and

facilitate bringing Liberian law in line with international human rights law. In

particular, press for the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection section to provide

technical expertise and training to the Commission

Protect civilians from continuing violence

 speak out against violence by former combatants and their exploitation by political leaders in the continuing violence. Support work with the international community to

ensure that reintegration of former combatants is appropriately funded

 promote the rule of law in Liberia, and call for all those who have committed human rights abuses to be brought to justice

 oppose the resort to vigilantism as the answer to crime, and demand a system of policing and justice that will provide everyone in Liberia with safety and security

 take every opportunity to speak out against ethnic discrimination and intercommunal violence. Advocate measures by the Independent National Commission on Human

Rights Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and within

communities to confront inter-ethnic hatred

 support action to end illegal arm transfers, which violate the ceasefire agreement and the UN arms embargo, and to bring to justice those responsible for them

Encourage the involvement of civil society

 recognize the important contribution that civil society plays in the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. Invite the electorate to support you in your role of

monitoring all branches of government to ensure that they fulfil their duties and act

for the benefit of all in Liberia

Liberia: Violence, discrimination and impunity 15

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 engage leading members of civil society and the broader public in debates about the reform of the security forces and the justice system, to encourage respect for the rule

of law and public support for effective police and judicial services

Support the transitional reforms

 pledge support for the on-going reforms in the security sector and the administration of justice, in particular:

 back the vetting process for police, armed forces and prisons personnel, and recognize that institutions which perpetuated conflict or were responsible for human rights

violations must be transformed to ensure their integrity and the respect of the

electorate

 full demobilization of the armed forces

 reform and restructuring of the armed forces through vigilant vetting, recruitment and human rights training

 reform and restructuring of the police in a manner that respects human rights and the rule of law

 ensuring public awareness of the role of communities in the vetting process of the new police service

 a greater emphasis on community policing to encourage respect for the rule of law and public support for effective policing

 the creation of a professional, independent and credible judicial system through rigorous vetting, recruitment and human rights training

 immediate measures to ensure that detainees in police facilities are held in conditions and for periods of time that comply with the human rights provisions of the Liberian

Constitution.

 reform the prisons to ensure that prisoners’ basic human rights under the Constitution are fulfilled.

End impunity

 pledge the surrender of Charles Taylor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone where he faces a 17-count indictment for crimes against humanity and war crimes against the

Sierra Leonean people

 pledge to take the lead on a consultative process with civil society and the international community on a mechanism to prosecute those suspected of war crimes

and crimes against humanity in Liberia that guarantees fair trials and does not resort

to the death penalty