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The Liberal Media Myth Revisited: An Examination of Factors Influencing

Perceptions of Media Bias

Tien-Tsung Lee

Despite research to the contrary, the general public and a significant number of politicians are convinced the U.S. news media have a liberal and pro-Democratic bias. To understand why many people believe the media have such biases, this study tested whether such a perception is re- lated to an observer’s own partisan and ideological positions. Findings based on two large national surveys suggest that audiences’ ideologies and partisanships affect how they view the media. Strong conservatives and Republicans are more likely to distrust the news media, whereas the best predictor of a media bias perception is political cynicism.

Whether the news media have a liberal bias has interested politicians, journalists, scholars, and the public. Many seem to believe that a political bias exists. According to a recent survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2002), 47% of those who answered a question on media bias believed news organizations in general are politically biased in their reporting. In comparison, 35% of respondents disagreed.

Conservative critics believe that most journalists are liberal and Democrats and that news coverage reflects reporters’ political leanings (Corry, 1996; Goldberg, 2001; R. Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986; Limbaugh, 1993; Maddoux, 1990; Maitre, 1994; Olasky, 1988; Rusher, 1988; Sowell, 1992). According to these observers, the news media and reporters are pro abortion, racial quotas, and gay rights, and they are anti business, capitalism, the military, Christianity, and the Republican party.

A different group of critics argues the opposite. In their eyes, conservative voices dominate the mainstream media, and news organizations—most of which they see as controlled by the government and large corporations—are “agents of power” that promote and maintain the conservative status quo (Alterman, 2003; Altschull, 1995, 1996; Bagdikian, 1997; Cohen, 1990; Cohen & Solomon, 1993; Croteau & Hoynes,

© 2005 Broadcast Education Association Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 49(1), 2005, pp. 43–64

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Tien-Tsung Lee (Ph.D., University of Oregon) is an Assistant Professor in the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication at Washington State University. His research interests include values, ideologies, and atti- tudes in the context of mass and political communication.

The Life Style surveys are proprietary and commercially sensitive, and the author thanks DDB Worldwide for sharing its 1997 data set. The interpretations, opinions, and conclusions drawn from the Life Style and the Na- tional Election Studies surveys are solely the author’s. The author also thanks Joe Ayres of Washington State University and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

1994; Croteau, Hoynes, & Carragee, 1996; Gitlin, 1980; Hanson, 1992; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; M. A. Lee & Solomon, 1990; McChesney, 1997; Murdock, 1982; Parenti, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1996).

To investigate whether the media have an ideological (liberal–conservative or left–right) or partisan (Democratic–Republican) bias, media scholars have tried sev- eral approaches. First, surveys show that journalists tend to vote for Democrats and to take liberal stands on political issues (Dennis, 1996, 1997; T. Lee, 2001; R. Lichter et al., 1986; S. R. Lichter & Rothman, 1981; Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996). Probably due to such factors as journalistic objectivity and management pressure, however, a link be- tween reporters’ political beliefs and news coverage has never been convincingly es- tablished (Black, Steele, & Barney, 1999; Dennis, 1996, 1997; Dreier, 1983; Epstein, 1973; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979, 1985, 2003; Goodwin & Smith, 1994; Knowlton & Parsons, 1994; T. Lee, 2001; Merrill, 1997; “Public Television Study Disproves Lib- eral Bias Theory,” 1993; Schudson, 1978, 1997; Tuchman, 1978). Second, research- ers have examined news content and found no significant or consistent partisan or is- sue favoritism (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998; Dennis, 1996, 1997; Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Fedler, Meeske, & Hall, 1979; Fico, Ku, & Soffin, 1994; Graber, 1971; Hofstetter, 1976, 1978; Merrill, 1965; Niven, 2002; Patterson, 1994; Severin & Tankard, 1992; Stempel, 1961, 1969; Stempel & Windhauser, 1984).

If social-scientific evidence does not support the claim that the U.S. media have a liberal bias, why are such accusations made? Media critic Michael Parenti (1996) of- fers several explanations for conservatives’ consistent accusations. First, most U.S. media are owned and controlled by large corporations, and consequently conserva- tive voices are dominant and can repeat their complaints with greater frequency than liberal critics. Second, conservative politicians and commentators habitually attack the media to put them on the defensive. As a result, liberal opinions often are self-cen- sored by journalists because “anything short of unanimous support for a rightist agenda is treated as evidence of liberal bias” (Parenti, 1996, p. 103). Third, social re- alities reported in the news, such as wrongdoings in the government and large corpo- rations, or poverty and pollution, appear liberal or even radical to conservatives.

Parenti’s (1996) reasons are echoed by other media observers (e.g., Alterman, 2003) and complemented by the findings of media researchers. These scholars argue that conservative and Republican elites’ strategic and frequent complaints have con- vinced both the media and the public about the existence of such a bias, although news content does not support this claim (Domke et al., 1999; Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999). These researchers suggest that journalists, political elites, and the public all tend to believe the media have a liberal and pro-Democratic bias.

The present study was not designed to analyze whether there is an ideological or partisan bias in terms of journalists’ stance or news content. Instead, the perception of bias among media audiences was the focus of this investigation. In an interesting twist to other research on media biases, “hostile media” studies suggest that supporters of an issue or a group tend to believe the media favor their opponents (Gunther, 1992; Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001; Perloff, 1989;

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Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). The present research uses hostile media tenets to test the assumption that observers’ characteristics, including ideological and partisan po- sitions, contribute to their perception that the news media do not report news fairly and therefore cannot be trusted. Specifically, the study analyzed two large national surveys to examine the connection between partisan and ideological positions and media distrust. The fundamental research question is whether strong liberals and con- servatives, and strong Republicans and Democrats, are more likely to distrust the me- dia than moderates and independents. Such differences are expected to emerge be- cause an observer’s standpoint could determine what one sees. The literature backing these expectations is reviewed in the next section of this article.

Bias Perception and Hostile Media Research

The American Heritage Dictionary defines bias as “a preference or an inclination” that “inhibits impartial judgment,” or “an act or policy stemming from prejudice” (Pickett et al., 2002, p. 138). In the context of news reporting, a bias is the opposite of accuracy, balance, and fairness (Fico et al., 1994; Fico & Soffin, 1995, Lacy, Fico, & Simon, 1991; Simon, Fico, & Lacy, 1989; Streckfuss, 1990). According to these schol- ars, accuracy means not going beyond the facts of the matter, and balance plays out through giving roughly equal amount of coverage to all involved parties. Fairness is achieved when all involved parties’ perspectives are represented, and no more favor- able treatment of any side—either qualitatively or quantitatively—exists. Therefore, fairness reveals itself as a form of balance. For the purpose of this study, a bias in the news media is defined as any form of preferential and unbalanced treatment, or favor- itism, toward a political or social issue (e.g., pro-choice or pro-life) or political party (Democratic or Republican). Bias, theoretically, can be prevented by remaining im- partial and unprejudiced, which is the norm in the journalism profession in the United States (Black et al., 1999; Goodwin & Smith, 1994; Knowlton & Parsons, 1994; Merrill, 1997; Mindich, 1998).

A number of scholars have taken an innovative approach—hostile media percep- tion research—to investigate why audiences perceive media bias. These researchers have discovered that supporters of political groups or issues perceive the media as be- ing unfair or even hostile to their own cause while favoring their opponents (Beck, 1991; Dalton et al., 1998; Gunther, 1992; Gunther & Chia, 2001; Mason & Nass, 1989; Perloff, 1989). Most studies in this line of research have one thing in common: two groups surrounding a single issue—such as Middle East conflicts, primate re- search, or a UPS strike—tend to believe the media unfairly favor the other side (Chris- ten, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 1998; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Gunther et al., 2001; Hastorf & Cantril, 1954; Perloff, 1989; Vallone et al., 1985). Not surprisingly, participants in these studies think the media unfairly favor their opponents. A related study testing the third-person effect also reported that respondents believed that bi- ased media coverage may sway neutral observers toward the other side (Perloff,

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1989). Another characteristic of hostile media research, as pointed out by Gunther (1988, 1992), is that the level of observers’ self-involvement with an issue or group is likely to determine their views on whether media coverage is credible or biased. In other words, attitude extremity affects trust in media.

The horizon was expanded again in a study by Gunther (1992). His large-scale na- tional survey determined that members of various groups (e.g., Republicans, Demo- crats, Catholics, born-again Christians) thought that media coverage of their own groups was significantly more negative. A 1998 study conducted by Dalton et al. was another milestone. These researchers first analyzed media content, then polled public opinion on media coverage to compare whether there was a connection between news content and perceived media bias. Their content analysis reported no partisan bias. A large portion of the respondents did not perceive the newspapers or television news programs they saw as biased toward a political candidate. Certain citizens’ own partisan views, however, colored their perceptions of media fairness. Even an objec- tively fair and balanced news story could look unfair and unbalanced if an observer has a bias. For example, people with strong attachments to the GOP were more likely than Democrats to see their daily newspapers as leaning toward Clinton in the 1992 presidential election. Strong supporters of the Democrats were more likely than Re- publicans to believe that newspapers favored Bush. Their perception of media bias had little to do with political news coverage (Dalton et al., 1998).

Drawing on previous research, especially Gunther’s (1988) study in which political ideologies were an independent variable, this study applies the approach of hostile media perception in a different way. Previous research investigated whether support- ers or members of a group or a cause tend to believe the news media favor their oppo- nents or cover their own side unfairly. Therefore, perceived biases in these studies were issue or group specific. In comparison, this study examines whether liberals and conservatives and Democrats and Republicans are more likely to distrust the news media than their centrist and independent counterparts. Although issue and partisan positions and attitude extremity are still independent variables, this study has a differ- ent dependent variable: the perception of media bias in general.

At least two distinctions should be drawn between the perceptions of general ver- sus specific biases. First, specific bias deals with news treatment of a particular group or issue, whereas general bias concerns coverage patterns of a series of political and social issues. Second, the perception of an issue- or group-specific bias may lead the audience to question the competence of an individual journalist who happens to cover that issue or group, or the professionalism of a news organization in which the reporters works. In comparison, a general bias perception would encourage media consumers to question the credibility of the institution of the news media and to dis- trust media coverage of all issues. In addition, with the notable exception of Gunther’s (1988) research, the liberal–conservative ideological distinction has not been widely employed in hostile media perception research. If the research question is whether the media have a liberal or conservative bias, such ideologies are a reasonable vari- able to be included.

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Distrust and Cynicism

Much existing literature treats distrust and cynicism as similar or even identical constructs (e.g., Cappella, 2002; Koch, 1998; Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). Skepticism, although closely related to cynicism, is conceptualized differently. Skepticism means being open to additional information, whereas cynicism implies an “all knowing” mindset closed to new information (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002; Wilkins, 2000). Considering available variables in existing data, for the purpose of this study only distrust and cynicism are used, and they are used inter- changeably.

The dependent variable of this study can be understood as the audience’s trust, or the lack thereof, in the media’s coverage of political issues and parties. Therefore, it is logical to include three aspects of distrust in the investigation: interpersonal or social, political, and media.

Scholars interested in political cynicism have recognized the importance of per- sonal cynicism (e.g., Cappella, 2002; Moy & Scheufele, 2000). A distrusting and cyni- cal person, who does not find others trustworthy, may not trust the government or pol- iticians. As suggested by Cappella (2002), Cappella and Jamieson (1997), and Gunther (1992), general trust and media trust could be related as well. For example, S. E. Bennett, Rhine, and Flickinger (2001) found that misanthropy (“negative opinion of other people’s trustworthiness”) led to media distrust (p. 172). In addition, individu- als who do not feel that most people or the political system can be trusted may not trust the media to cover issues or political parties fairly. Between the dimensions in this trust construct, political cynicism can be generally defined as “a lack of confi- dence in and a feeling of distrust toward the political system” (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001, p. 324; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman, 1998). General or personal cynicism, on the other hand, is defined as “showing little or no faith in human nature,” or being “distrustful or contemptuous of others’ motives” (Eisinger, 2000, p. 55). Following these definitions, the opposite of personal and political trust becomes personal and political distrust, that is, cynicism. In addition, it is expected that political cynicism may have a stronger association with media bias perception because a perceived lib- eral or pro-Democratic bias is political in nature.

Hypotheses

Based on this review of literature, this study explores the proposition that the more extreme an individual is in terms of ideology and partisanship, the more likely he or she perceives the news media to be biased. In addition, because accusations of a lib- eral bias are prominent in society, conservatives and Republicans could be more likely than liberals and Democrats to believe the media are biased. Further, whereas both personal and political cynicism could affect one’s distrust of the media, political cynicism may be a stronger predictor of a bias perception because audiences may

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think about news coverage of political issues or candidates when they decide whether they trust the media. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H1: The stronger media consumers’ ideologies are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H2: The more conservative (versus liberal) media consumers are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H3: The stronger consumers’ partisanships are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H4: The more consumers lean toward the Republican (versus Democratic) party, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H5: The more distrusting and cynical consumers are at a personal level, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H6: The more distrusting and cynical consumers are at a political level, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias.

H7: Political cynicism is a stronger predictor of a perceived media bias than personal cynicism.

Method

Data

This study employed two sets of large survey data: the 1996 National Election Studies (NES) and the 1997 Life Style survey. One of the most utilized political data sets, the NES is conducted every other year by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Employing person-to-person and telephone interviews, the NES surveys a national quota sample of persons who are 18 years or older and reside in the United States (Asher, 1992; Flanigan & Zingale, 2002). The sample size of the 1996 survey was 1,714 respondents. The survey consists of hundreds of questions about political facts, knowledge, and elections. It also covers respondents’ attitudes toward political parties, issues, and various candidates, their partisanships and ideol- ogies, political interests, news media usage for campaign information, and a measure of trust in the news media. Only variables relevant to the present study were utilized. Descriptions of independent and dependent variables used in the present study are presented in the next section.

The 1997 Life Style survey data were provided by a leading advertising agency, DDB Worldwide. This survey is conducted annually by mail. Each year, about 5,000 surveys are sent out to a national quota sample of adult consumers, and the response rate is consistently between 70% and 80% (Cafferata, Horn, & Wells, 1997). The 1997 data set has a sample size of 3,462 respondents. Because this survey is designed by and for an advertising agency, the majority of the 500 or so questions are about re- spondents’ consumption behaviors, attitudes toward various commercial products and services, and daily activities such as exercise and reading (Cafferata et al., 1997). There are also a number of questions about respondents’ stands on social issues as

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well as two items about news media usage and trust of the news media. Like the NES data, only certain variables were analyzed in the present study.

Ideally, both data sets used in this study should be from the same year. Because no NES survey was conducted in 1997, its 1996 data set was downloaded from the Internet for analysis (http://www.umich.edu/~nes).

Survey respondents may feel more strongly about media bias when thinking about news coverage of their favorite candidates. Therefore, the perception of a media bias of NES respondents may be inflated. To study a media perception in general, I decided to examine media distrust in election and nonelection settings. Thus, both data sets were employed in the present study. If both data sets yield the same results, the con- clusion about a bias perception would be more convincing and generalizable.

Dependent Variables

The perception of media bias is operationalized by this question from the 1997 Life Style survey: “You really can’t trust the news media to cover events and issues fairly” Using a 6-point scale, responses ranged from 1(I definitely disagree) to 6 (I definitely agree). In the 1996 NES, media bias is measured by this question: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to report the news fairly?” Using a 5-point scale, responses ranged from 1 (just about always) to 5 (none of the time).

Independent Variables for Life Style

Four demographic variables from the 1997 Life Style survey were used: age, educa- tion, sex (dummy coded), and income. Additional independent variables are media usage/dependency, political interest, personal cynicism, political cynicism, and lib- eral–conservative ideology. No variable for partisanship is available in this survey.

In addition to typical demographic factors, media usage/dependency and political interest are controlled because they may influence the perception of a media bias. For example, a politically interested person may pay more attention to the media or feel more strongly about a candidate or issue. Consequently this person may think news coverage is biased.

An ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression procedure was performed, with demographic variables entered first, followed by media usage/dependency and politi- cal interest. These are control variables and variables expected to produce less impact on the dependent variable. Two ideological variables were entered next. The first is a 5-point ideology scale, from 1 (liberal) to 5 (conservative). The second is a “folded” scale, where 0 means middle-of-the-road, 1 means somewhat liberal or conservative, and 2 means very liberal or conservative. Both personal and political cynicism were en- tered last. A final “clean” model was achieved by gradually removing all variables with nonsignificant standardized beta coefficients (p < .01). Considering the large sample (N = 3,187) in this survey, the cutoff point for significance was .01 instead of .05.

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Independent Variables for NES

To be consistent, independent variables similar to those in Life Style were included in this part of the analysis. However, because of its political nature, NES contains addi- tional variables not included in Life Style, such as separate measures of media attention and usage, political efficacy, and partisanship. NES variables tested include age, educa- tion, sex (dummy coded as female), income, media usage, media attention, political in- terest, political efficacy, ideology (liberal–moderate–conservative on one scale), ideo- logical strength (a folded scale of ideology), partisanship (a continuum ranging from Democratic to Independent to Republican; apolitical respondents and members of other parties were excluded), partisan strength (a folded scale of partisanship), and po- litical and personal cynicism. Political interest and efficacy, along with media attention and usage, are control variables in this study because they all may affect one’s cynicism and perception of media bias (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001; Pinkleton et al., 1998). Mea- suring both media usage and attention also may be beneficial (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986). See the Appendix for exact wordings of the variables in Life Style and NES.

In an OLS multiple regression procedure, demographic variables (age, education, sex, and income) were entered first, followed by media attention and usage, political interest, political efficacy, ideology and partisanship (both positions and strength), personal cynicism, and finally, political cynicism. A final clean model was produced after gradually excluding nonsignificant standardized beta coefficients (p > .01).

I decided to investigate both ideological and partisan positions and their “absolute strength” (folded scales). The factor of issue or group involvement in existing hostile media literature generally concerns positions. As pointed out by Gunther (1988), however, attitude extremity also matters. To measure extremity, the strength or abso- lute values of positions were included for analysis.

Findings

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the stronger media consumers’ ideologies are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. This hypothesis was not supported by either the Life Style (β = .04, p > .05) or NES (β = .04, p > .05) data. Strength of ideology does not matter in one’s perception of a media bias.

Hypothesis 2 states that the more conservative (versus liberal) media consumers are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. Contrary to the first hypothesis, this hypothesis was supported in both Life Style (β = .12, p < .001) and NES (β = .14, p < .001). The more conservative people are, the more likely they are to think that the media are biased.

Hypothesis 3 is that the stronger consumers’ partisanships are, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. These data indicate that partisanship extremity affects one’s media bias perception (β = .08, p < .01). Therefore, the third hypothesis was supported.

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Hypothesis 4 predicts that the more consumers lean toward the Republican (versus Democratic) party, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. NES data show that being a strong Republican predicts one’s perception of a media bias (β = .13, p < .01). This hypothesis was supported.

Hypothesis 5 is that the more distrusting and cynical consumers are at a personal level, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. This hypothesis was sup- ported by Life Style but was not supported in the NES data. The Life Style regression models show that level of personal cynicism predicts media distrust (β = .08, p < .001). That is, the more one thinks that most people are dishonest, the more likely he or she is to perceive a media bias. In contrast, the beta related to personal cynicism in the NES data was not statistically significant (β = .01, p > .05).

Hypothesis 6 states that the more distrusting and cynical consumers are at a political level, the more likely they are to perceive a media bias. Contrary to the fifth hypothesis, this hypothesis was supported by both Life Style (β = .23, p < .001) and NES (β = .31, p < .001) data. Political cynicism predicts individuals’ perception of a media bias.

Hypothesis 7 predicts that political cynicism is a stronger predictor of a perceived media bias than personal cynicism. The findings regarding the fifth and sixth hypothe- ses supported this hypothesis. Political cynicism, thanks to its greater beta coeffi- cients, as shown in both Tables 1 and 2, is a better predictor of media distrust than per- sonal cynicism.

In summary, Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 were supported, and Hypothesis 5 was partially supported. According to the Life Style data, media distrust can be predicted by sex, ideological positions, personal cynicism, and political cynicism. People are

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Table 1 Factors Affecting Distrust of the News Media (Life Style Data)

Dependent Variables Model 1

β Model 2

β Model 3 (“Clean”)

β

Age .01 .03 Education –.05** –.03 Sex (female) –.09*** –.07*** –.07*** Income –.00 .02 News dependency –.03 Interest in politics .04* Liberal/conservative .10*** .12*** Ideological strength .04 Personal cynicism .09*** .08*** Political cynicism .23*** .23***

R2 .10 .09 .09

Note: N = 3,187. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

more likely to believe that the media cannot be trusted if they are male and conserva- tive, disagree that most people are honest, but believe that honest people cannot be elected to high office. Cynicism at both the personal and political levels is the stron- gest predictor of a media bias perception, according to the Life Style data (see Table 1). Further, according to the NES data, media distrust is predicted by being conserva- tive and Republican, partisanship extremity, and political cynicism (see Table 2 for a summary of these findings).

Additional Analyses

The relationships between media bias perception, ideology, and partisanship were plotted (see Figure 1 and Table 3). Both the figure and means demonstrate that conser- vatives and strong Republicans have the highest level of media distrust. In compari- son, liberals and strong Democrats tend to trust the news media to report news fairly. It is no wonder, as pointed out by existing literature, that conservatives and Republi- cans are more vocal about a media bias than other groups. As predicted by the hostile media theory, they perceive a liberal and pro-Democratic bias in the news media.

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Table 2 Factors Affecting Distrust of the News Media

(National Elections Studies Data)

Dependent Variables Model 1

β Model 2

β Model 3 (“Clean”)

β

Age –.00 .01 Education –.02 .00 Sex (female) .01 .02 Income .05 .02 Media use –.01 Media attention –.08 Interest in politics .04 Political efficacy –.02 Liberal/conservative .13** .14** Ideological strength .04 Democrat/Republican .13** .13** Partisanship strength .07* .08** Personal cynicism .01 Political cynicism .30*** .31***

R2 .00 .17 .17

Note: N = 830. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

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Figure 1 Media Distrust Versus Ideology and Party (1996 National Election Studies Data)

Table 3 Means of Media Distrust by Ideological and Partisan Positions

(National Election Studies Data)

Ideology M SD Ideological Strength M SD

1. Extreme liberal 2.24 0.94 1. Middle of the road 2.63 0.73 2. Liberal 2.50 0.75 2. Weak liberal/

conservative 2.68 0.71

3. Weak liberal 2.60 0.65 4. Moderate 2.63 0.73 3. Liberal/conservative 2.80 0.79 5. Weak conservative 2.73 0.75 4. Extreme liberal/

conservative 2.96 0.98

6. Conservative 2.96 0.76 7. Extreme conservative 2.72 0.84

F(6, 1241) = 14.17, p < .01 F(3, 1244) = 10.03, p < .01

Party M SD Partisan Strength M SD

1. Strong Democrats 2.50 0.74 1. Independent 2.79 0.78 2. Weak Democrats 2.53 0.72 2. Independent-leaning

Democrat/Republican 2.70 0.74

3. Independent-leaning Democrats

2.61 0.76 3. Weak Democrat/

Republican 2.64 0.72

4. Independents 2.79 0.78 5. Independent-leaning

Republicans 2.83 0.70 4. Strong Democrat/

Republican 2.72 0.79

6. Weak Republicans 2.77 0.70 7. Strong Republicans 3.05 0.75

F(6, 1502) = 15.63, p < .01 F(3, 1505) = 1.86, p > .05

Are conservatives and Republicans really more cynical in general than liberals and Democrats? Bivariate correlations were run between political cynicism and each of the following variables: personal cynicism (r = .27, p < .01), partisanship (r = .11, p < .01), partisanship strength (r = –.21, p < .01), liberal–conservative ideol- ogy (r = .10, p < .01), and ideological strength (r = –.03, p < .05). NES respondents are more politically cynical if they are more personally cynical, more conservative, stronger Republican, and less partisan. The last item suggests that independents are more politically cynical. A possible explanation is that U.S. politics is dominated by both major parties. Therefore, citizens who dislike this system are less likely to join either party.

A set of correlations was run between ideology and a number of life style prefer- ences. Conservatives are more likely to agree with the following statements: “I have old fashioned tastes” (r = .24, p < .001); “I don’t like to take chances” (r = .17, p < .001); “Changes in routine disturb me” (r = .11, p < .001); “Everything is changing too fast today” (r = .17, p < .001); “I would be content to live in the same town the rest of my life” (r = .13, p < .001); “I would feel lost in a foreign country” (r = .14, p < .001). They are less likely to agree with the following: “I want to look different from others” (r = –.13, p < .001); “I would try anything once” (r = –.15, p < .001); “I like to buy new and different things” (r = –.09, p < .001); “I am usually among the first to try new prod- ucts” (r = –.13, p < .001); “I am interested in other cultures” (r = –.13, p < .001). Con- servatives are found to be less venturesome and have a conformist mentality and a preference for tradition. They dislike changes or new entities in general.

An additional path model was proposed due to the conflicting results regarding Hy- potheses 5 and 6. It is theorized that a generally distrusting personality trait contrib- utes to political cynicism, which then contributes to media distrust. Therefore, per- sonal cynicism is a weaker predictor, or a more distant antecedent, of media distrust than political cynicism. The path coefficients in Figure 2 support this suspicion. Politi- cal cynicism appears to have a stronger effect than personal cynicism on media dis- trust in this path model, which strengthens Hypothesis 7.

Discussion

The findings reveal who distrusts the media to report news fairly and why. This study tested whether media bias perception could be predicted by ideology, partisan- ship, and cynicism. In general, the data show that these variables are useful predictors of perceived media biases. In particular, the results indicate that the perception of a media bias is predicted by liberal–conservative ideology and Democratic–Republi- can partisanship. These findings echo the conclusions of previous “hostile media per- ception” studies but offer broader insight into the perceptions of a liberal media bias.

Instead of investigating biased content in the media, this study explored the percep- tion of media biases—specifically why some individuals perceive a media bias. The research tackled a broader sense of perceived bias (i.e., whether the media can be

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trusted to cover issues and events fairly) than did most previous work, which dealt with group- or issue-specific biases. This study found that conservatives and Republi- cans are more likely than their ideological and partisan counterparts to perceive a me- dia bias. This research also revealed that cynicism and distrust in other people and politics predict the perception of media biases. Therefore, cynical and distrusting citi- zens—who tend to be conservatives and Republicans—are more likely to perceive media biases favoring their ideological and partisan opponents.

Explanations

This study offers an alternative approach to the endless debate about whether the news media have a bias, especially a liberal and pro-Democratic one. I propose the following speculations about why conservatives and Republicans are more cynical in general and distrust the media more than their ideological and partisan counterparts. It is important to note that the following explanations are not value judgments, nor do

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Figure 2 Path Models of Cynicism and Media Distrust

***p < .001.

they imply that conservatives and Republicans are inherently less objective in their evaluation of the news. The following external factors, I believe, influence their views on the media’s trustworthiness.

First, according to Domke and his colleagues (Domke et al., 1999; Watts et al., 1999), conservative and Republican elites repeatedly encourage their followers to distrust the media. Specifically, certain politicians and political commentators like to remind their supporters that journalists tend to be liberal and pro-Democratic. Even though reporters’ news coverage does not necessary reflect their political views, con- servative and Republican masses are convinced that the news media cannot be trusted.

Second, as suggested by Parenti (1996), reported social realities such as poverty and environmental pollution are perceived as liberal in nature. It is the journalistic norm to report such problems because of the watchdog role of the press. Conservative audiences consequently perceive a consistent liberal agenda in the news, whether or not a news story is neutral or balanced.

The third explanation is both psychological and sociological. This study’s findings suggest that conservatives tend to be uneasy about new and unfamiliar situations at a personal level. They prefer things to remain unchanged and traditional. It is therefore logical to expect conservatives to harbor a similar attitude toward societal changes. Over a decade ago, Smith (1990) concluded that the U.S. society has gradually be- come more liberal. Social phenomena such as growing numbers of women and racial minorities in politics and interracial marriages indicate a continuous liberal progress. Naturally some conservatives might develop negative feelings toward such changes, which could in turn develop into a general cynical attitude. In addition, liberal trends are no doubt reflected in both news and entertainment media, which would make conservatives dislike and distrust the media even more. For example, female charac- ters on television shows such as Murphy Brown choose to have and raise children alone (Calvo, 2001). In addition, popular television shows such as Will & Grace and Queer Eye for the Straight Guy feature gay characters (Atkinson, 2003). The New York Times and an increasing number of newspapers print same-sex union announce- ments in their wedding or celebration pages (Jurkowitz, 2002). As a result, conserva- tives may see the media, including the news media, as the enemy in a “cultural war” (S. E. Bennett et al., 2001; W. J. Bennett, 1992; Bork, 1996; Calvo, 2001; Keen, 1995).

The fourth factor is a situational one. Both surveys were conducted during the Clinton administration. Conservatives and Republicans likely were not content dur- ing that time. Scandals involving President Clinton may have contributed to more po- litical cynicism among those observers as well.

Methodological Limitations

Considering the close relationship between ideology and partisanship in U.S. poli- tics (liberals tend to be Democrats, and conservatives tend to be Republicans), a cor-

56 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/March 2005

relation test was run between these two variables in the NES data, which turned out to be .57 (p < .001). The Pearson correlation between both strength variables is .27 (p < .001). As a result, multicollinearity between ideology and partisanship (in both posi- tions and strength) was not a problem because the variance inflation factors of all vari- ables were smaller than 2.

Not surprisingly, discrepancies were found between data sets. Some identical variables turned out to be significant in one data set but not in the other (i.e., sex and personal distrust). There are several possible reasons for this phenomenon. First, discrepancies in question wording and scales may invite different reactions from participants. Second, the nature of the data sets is different. One is political and the other concerns advertising and consumer behavior. Respondents of both surveys may have been in a different mindset while answering the respective ques- tions. Third, the timing of both surveys was different. One was conducted during a presidential campaign season, whereas the other was in a nonelection year. One may assume that citizens are more likely to perceive a media bias when they watch much of the campaign coverage of the candidates they support and oppose. Survey respondents also could have been more politically cynical in 1996 because of the intensive campaign coverage and negative political ads. Fourth, many variables, such as political cynicism, are single-item measures in Life Style but constructed scales in NES. Therefore, their predictive power may vary.

A closer look at the discrepancies between the two sets of regression models re- veals that variables significant in only one data set tend to have a rather small stan- dardized beta coefficient, including sex (β = –.07) and personal cynicism (β = .08) in Life Style. Political cynicism, on the other hand, has the largest beta coefficients in both data sets (β = .23 in Life Style and β = .31 in NES). Liberal–conservative ide- ology’s beta is .12 in Life Style and .14 in NES. Despite the discrepancies in the findings based on two different surveys, common findings between both data sets could be more generalizable.

Another limitation to be acknowledged is the small R-squares in the regression models. Cynics and conservatives tend to believe the media are biased, but much of perceived biases may be accounted for by other factors.

Conclusions

Any conclusions must be considered tentative until future research confirms them using different participants and methods, such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, and surveys conducted during both Republican and Democratic administrations. With secondary data analyses, researchers are limited to variables included in the original data. Some key variables may be single-item measures, and others may have unsatisfactory wordings. Using primary data would solve such problems. Future re- searchers should conduct more in-depth investigations of the construct of distrust or cynicism. Such surveys should ask specifically about whether respondents think the

Lee/THE LIBERAL MEDIA MYTH 57

media have a general partisan and ideological bias in addition to whether the media cover issues fairly. Exploring why conservatives and Republicans are more cynical also would offer an interesting avenue for further investigation.

Considering gender differences in communication patterns and political decisions (e.g., Lippa, 2002; Tannen, 1990; Thomas & Wilcox, 1998; Wilkins, 1995), it is rather surprising that sex was not a significant predictor in the NES data. One possibility is that the regression models based on NES data have more variables than those with Life Style data. Therefore, the predictive power of gender was diluted when additional factors were controlled. The relationship between personal, political, and media dis- trust between sexes would be a worthwhile topic for further investigation. Finally, multiple regression models reveal how a series of variables work together as predic- tors of media distrust. Researchers interested in the causal relationships between those independent variables should consider path models. This approach could con- tribute to a better understanding of the connection between cynicism and media bias perception.

It is possible to identify liberal or pro-Democratic treatments in the news. Finding incidents supporting the opposite is not difficult either. However, systematic research has found no consistent partisan or ideological favoritism in news content despite fre- quent complaints of biases. Overall, this study’s findings suggest, if one claims that a media bias exists, the complainant is likely to lean toward the far right on partisan and ideological scales. These extreme positions, along with a cynical attitude, affect one’s evaluation of the news media. As a result, the perception that the media are biased is likely grounded in an observer’s own stance rather than in manifest media content.

If conservative and Republican masses are more likely to distrust the media even if news content is balanced in general, does it mean that these consumers are less ob- jective in their evaluation of the media than liberals and Democrats? The circum- stances discussed previously, especially constant attacks on the media by conserva- tive elites, are likely responsible for such distrust. It is human nature to seek guidance from their leaders. Therefore, conservative and Republican masses are not necessarily less objective. Finally, in no way does this study’s findings imply that journalists are exempt from any responsibility. Reporters should always strive for accuracy and fair- ness to win and maintain trust from the audience.

Appendix

Life Style Variables

Dependent variable: “You really can’t trust the news media to cover events and issues fairly” (1–6 points, from I definitely disagree to I definitely agree).

Demographic variables: Exact age, education, sex (female), and income. Other independent variables: 1 to 6 points:

Media usage/dependency: “I need to get the news [world, national, sports, etc.] everyday.”

58 Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media/March 2005

Political interest: “I am interested in politics.” Liberal–conservative ideology (1 = very conservative and 5 = very liberal; reversed to reflect

the common left–right distribution of ideologies). Personal cynicism: “Most people are honest” (reversed). Political cynicism: “An honest man cannot get elected to high office.”

NES Variables

Dependent variable: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to report the news fairly?” (1–5 points, from just about always to none of the time).

Demographic variables: Exact age, education, sex (female), and income. Other independent variables:

Media usage/dependency: This index was constructed by adding up the following variables (r = .53, p < .001) then dividing by two: “How many days in the past week did you watch the national news on TV?” and “How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news, for example, ‘Eyewitness News’ or ‘Action News’?” (both 0–7 points). Televi- sion news usage was treated as a proxy of media usage because most Americans receive their news on television (Nimmo & Combs, 1983; Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2000). Also, adding newspaper and radio usage to the scale would greatly reduce its sample size and alpha.

Media attention: This scale was constructed using the following five items: (a) “How much attention did you pay to news on national news shows about the campaign for Presi- dent?” (1–4 points, reversed); (b) “How much attention did you pay to news on local news shows about the campaign for President?” (1–4 points, reversed); (c) “If watched programs about the campaigns on TV, would you say you watched a good many, several, or just one or two?” (1–5 points, reversed); (d) “In general, how much attention did you pay to news about the campaign for President” (1–5 points, reserved); and (e) “In general, how much attention did you pay to news about the campaigns for election to Congress” (1–5 points, reversed). Both 4-point scales were first converted to 5-point scales. All 5-point scales were summed into an additive index, and then divided by 5 to produce a new 5-point “media attention” scale. The alpha of this scale is .75. All other similar scales in the study were constructed in the same fashion.

Political interest: This scale was constructed with two items (r = .57, p < .001): how often re- spondents “follow what’s going on in government and public affairs” (1–4 points, re- versed), and their level of interest in “following the campaigns this year” (1–5 points). This scale conceptually differs from variables regarding attention to media for informa- tion on the presidential campaign. The latter is about a specific event and focuses on mass media.

Political efficacy: This index was constructed using the following variables: (a) “Public offi- cials don’t care much what people like me think” (1–5 points); (b) “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does” (1–5 points); and (c) “Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on” (1–5 points). Cronbach’s α = .63.

Self-reported ideologies: 1 to 7 points, from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Ideological strength: A folded 0- to 3-point scale based on ideologies (0 = moderate, 1 =

weak liberal/conservative, 2 = liberal/conservatives, and 3 = extremely liberal/conser- vative).

Partisanship: 0 to 6 points, from strong Democratic to Independents to strong Republican, excluding apolitical respondents and members of other parties.

Partisan strength: A folded scale based on partisanship (0 = moderate and 3 = extremely par- tisan).

Lee/THE LIBERAL MEDIA MYTH 59

Personal cynicism: Constructed with two items: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (1–5 points); and “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?” (1–5 points, reversed) (r = .54, p < .001).

Political cynicism: This scale was constructed by combining the following 11 items: (a) “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?” (recoded into 1–5 points); (b) “Do you think the people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes?” (1–5 points, reversed); (c) “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people” (1–5 points, reversed); (d) “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked?” (1– points, reversed); (e) “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think?” (1–5 points); (f) “Over the years, how much attention do you feel the gov- ernment pays to what people think when it decides what to do?” (1–5 points); (g) “On the whole, are you satisfied with the way democracy works … in the United States?” (recoded into 1–5 points); (h) “Thinking of the last election in the United States, where would you place it on this scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means that the last election was con- ducted fairly and 5 means that the last election was conducted unfairly?” (1–5 points); (i) “… Some people say that members of Congress know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of Congress don’t know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale in the booklet … where would you place yourself?” (1–5 points); (j) “… Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn’t make a differ- ence who is in power. Using the scale in the booklet … where would you place yourself?” (1–5 points); and (k) “… Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won’t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale in the booklet … where would you place yourself?” (1–5 points, reversed). Cronbach’s α = .73.

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