TWENTY LESSONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY

SECOND EDITION

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New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Environmental Movements in the Global South

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Protesting against the introduction of genetically modified corn, Porto Alegre, Brazil. Photo by Ken Gould.

The term "environmentalist" means different things to different people. In North America, someone who recycles and buys "green" products might call himself or herself an environmentalist, as might someone who is concerned with the environmental effects of overpopulation,

while another environmentalist argues that capitalism destroys nature. In the North American tradition, environmentalism has been strongly associated with membership in environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the Nature Conservancy. Environmentalists in the Global South (lower-income countries of Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia) also cover a broad range of beliefs and practices and do not fit neatly into one single box. In the Global South, there is less emphasis on membership in environmental organizations as defining an "environmentalist." While there are overlapping concerns between environmentalists of the North and South, I begin by outlining some fundamental differences between environmentalists and environmental movements in the Global North and in the Global South.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE GLOBAL NORTH AND IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

In *Environmentalism: A Global History,* Ramachandra Guha (2000) asked readers to consider the differences between the "ecology of affluence" and "**environmentalism of the poor.**" Guha, and others writing from the perspective of the Global South, argued that there is a strong environmentalism in the Third World (now called the "Global South") that looks different from the environmental movement in the United States and other nations in the Global North (including Canada, Japan, Australia, and countries in Western Europe).

The first and most visible difference is simply in organizational structure and tactics. The U.S. movement is considered "professionalized" in that it is made up of formal organizations, with paid leaders and staffs, large budgets, lobbying arms, and extensive fundraising mechanisms. These **professionalized environmental organizations** differ from **collective action groups,** which use volunteer labor, have small to no budgets, and organize people to engage in direct action to preserve their local means of subsistence (the "environment").

The organizational differences are actually a result of different origins. Many Southern struggles are struggles in defense of economic livelihood. They arise from threats to people's economic survival. For instance, local "environmental" opposition forms when local economic resources are threatened. One of the most popular examples of this is the rubber tappers' movement in Brazil from the 1980s. The rubber tappers extracted rubber from trees in a sustainable manner to earn a living. When the rubber trees were threatened by cattle ranchers who wanted to clear the forests for ranching, the rubber tappers' union resisted the ranchers and fought for control of the land they had long used to make a living. They resisted environmental change because it threatened their economic well-being. Whether we classify this as an "economic" movement or an "environmental" movement is an

interesting question. Guha (2000) asked us to consider the relationship between "environmental" issues and livelihood struggles in general:

> Commercial forestry, oil drilling, and large dams all damage the environment, but they also, and to their victims more painfully, constitute a threat to rural livelihoods: by depriving tribals of fuelwood and small game, by destroying the crops of farmers, or by submerging wholesale the lands and homes of villagers who have the misfortune to be placed in their path. The opposition to these interventions is thus as much a defense of livelihood as an "environmental" movement in the narrow sense of the term. (p. 105)

These types of struggles contrast with popular campaigns of environmental groups in the Global North that call on members to "Save the Whales" (or elephants, or pandas, etc.). Many Northern campaigns solicit urban dwellers to contribute to causes that are disconnected from their immediate surroundings or their lived experiences.

This leads to the third big difference in environmentalism of the North and South: the understanding of how humans fit into nature. Guha argued that a major difference between environmentalism in the Global South and that in the Global North has been the South's view that the environmental struggle is inseparable from the struggle for social justice. Humans and nature are part of an interconnected and interdependent web. The **nature–society dichotomy** that is prevalent in Western thought is not as widespread in other cultures (see also Lesson 19). Therefore, movements in some other societies see humans as part of the environment, and thus the struggle for human rights is integrated into a movement to preserve the environment. When working to save the environment, these groups see that they are working to save themselves.

Environmentalism in North America was founded with the idea of preserving nature for nature's sake (what we might now call "biodiversity preservation") and for the good of humanity (see Lesson 16). John Muir, the first president of the Sierra Club (1892), argued for protecting undeveloped and undisturbed habitats, like national parks, so that the public could visit these areas for spiritual uplift and to enjoy recreational activities. Later, U.S. conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot (the chief of the U.S. Division of Forestry, 1898) would argue that we needed to conserve lands for future development and the "wise use" of resources (though still not viewing humans as "in" nature).

U.S. environmentalism is often stereotyped as an **"elitist" movement.** This stereotype has some validity if we look only to the history of land preservation and conservation. Muir, Pinchot, and others advocating for land protection were elite, well-educated white men. However, if we expand our historical lens and take a broader view of environmentalism in the early part of the 1900s, we see that there were movements in U.S. cities, often led by women, who were fighting for adequate sanitation and appropriate trash disposal. While they are not commonly thought of as part of the United States' "environmental" history, today we might call them "urban environmentalists." In the

United States, stereotypes of elitism in the environmental movement have also changed with the growth of the environmental justice movement (see Lesson 10). The environmental justice movement draws its constituents from a range of groups, including the working class and racial and ethnic minorities. Today, we have environmentalism within both wealthy and poor nations challenging the conventional wisdom that environmentalism is simply an elite movement.

Just as the charges of "elite" environmentalism are largely false in the United States, they are also false across the globe. Though affluence creates opportunities to participate in the movement, concern about the environment is not limited to elites. In fact, there are high degrees of concern about the environment in both North and South; in some cases, there is more concern in the Global South. Not only "elite" (rich) nations are environmentalist. Steven R. Brechin and Willett Kempton (1994) analyzed responses to public opinion data from around the world that show that richer nations do not have a higher level of environmental concern than poorer nations. In fact, in many cases, the opposite is true. For example, 77% of Mexicans surveyed perceive air pollution to be a serious problem and 81% perceive species loss as "very serious." By contrast, in the United States, the figures are 60% and 50%. In their analysis, they showed that individuals in wealthier nations are more willing to pay more for environmental protection. However, people in poorer nations are more willing to pay in time (a resource more available than money for many in these nations) than were the respondents in richer nations. Riley Dunlap and Richard York (2008) followed up on these results with international survey data through to 2001 and confirmed that citizens' concern for environmentalism does not depend on affluence. In sum, survey data from multiple surveys and multiple years suggest that environmental concern is not just a concern for the rich; the concern is global.

GRASSROOTS CASES FROM INDIA, NIGERIA, AND BOLIVIA

Three brief examples from three different continents will illustrate how environmental actions (variously called "movements," "campaigns," and "environmentalisms") in the Global South are intertwined with livelihood struggles and how they are closely tied to attempts to promote social justice. There are numerous examples to draw from; I have selected one case each from Asia (the Chipko movement in India), Africa (the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in Nigeria), and Latin America (the "water war" in Bolivia). While reading about these cases, keep in mind the environmental justice struggles going on in the United States (see Lesson 10). Some of these struggles take place in indigenous communities and others take place in industrial workplaces (see Lesson 17). They also occur in places where people live, especially in working-class and minority communities (see Lesson 10). So, while we make a distinction between environmentalism of the rich and environmentalism of the poor,

these are not just differences between rich and poor nations, for there is also diversity of movement types within nations. The three cases that I present are well-known, often-referenced, historically important cases.

Asia: The Chipko Movement in India

The Chipko Movement began in 1973 and is perhaps the first internationally recognized "ecology" movement from a developing country. It became well known because of its use of direct action and due to the participation of women in the struggle.

After years of coping with flooding and the need to travel long distances for fuel wood, problems caused by deforestation and soil erosion, peasants in the Himalayan village of Mandal decided to put a stop to logging in the state-owned forests around their village. The village activists, many of whom were women, literally placed their bodies between the loggers and the trees. The loggers stopped; they did not cut the trees. This practice spread to other areas—the Reni forests and other parts of the region. It was not a centralized movement; rather, disparate communities replicated the protest. Numerous slogans were repeated throughout the countryside, including the famous "What do the forests bear? Soil, water and pure air."

Though "chipko" literally means "to cling," the movement was popularized as the movement of "tree huggers." The action was within the Gandhian tradition of nonviolent direct action, and it was directed at the state. Because of women's participation, this movement has also been considered a feminist movement. However, in a thorough historical examination of the movement, Guha argued that in many ways the Chipko Movement was neither an environmental movement nor a feminist movement. Instead, he contended, it was simply a peasant movement against state attempts to control village life; in this case, to control their means of survival (the environment). Regardless of how we label Chipko, its interpretation as an "environmental," "feminist," and "peasant" movement serves to further demonstrate how Southern environmental movements represent a more integrated understanding of social justice and the relationship between social systems and ecosystems.

Chipko is just one of many cases from the vast continent of Asia; many others could have been highlighted. For instance, J. Peter Brosius (2001) has written extensively about the struggles of the Penan (an indigenous group), who reside on the island of Borneo in Malaysia. Their efforts to preserve the Sarawak rain forest were transformed into an international campaign for indigenous rights. In Asia, damming rivers for hydroelectric power has been a controversial issue, especially where it has caused the displacement of people. In India, the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River has drawn international attention, as has the damming of the Yangtze River by the Three Gorges Dam in China. As China continues its rapid development, we can expect to see growing problems related to industrial development, such as air and water pollution in cities and their associated environmental health problems.

Africa: The Ogoni Resistance in Nigeria

The Chipko Movement was essentially a battle between the people and the state. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) focused its attention on a transnational corporation (TNC): the Royal Dutch Shell Corporation. However, this was not simply a people-versus-TNC battle; in this showdown, the state played a complicating role because the military government sided with Shell. Why was that? Simple: in Nigeria, 80% of the state's revenues come from oil exports.

Shell had been drilling in the oil-rich regions of Nigeria since 1958. When they started, the people were promised "development." However, years and years passed and the promises were not delivered. In Ogoniland, half a million indigenous Ogoni lived in poverty and ecological devastation. Their villages were crossed by pipelines and surrounded by open gas flares. Oil spills polluted land and water, hurting fishing and farming. According to the *Ecologist* magazine, "From 1982 to 1992, 1.6 million gallons of oil were spilled from Shell's Nigerian fields in 27 separate incidents." The Ogoni were promised clean water, schools, and healthcare, but after over 30 years of drilling, they were much worse off. Both Shell and the Nigerian government benefited from the extraction within the Ogoni territories; the local Ogoni paid the costs.

MOSOP was founded in 1990 by author and outspoken Ogoni Ken Saro-Wiwa and others to oppose the environmental destruction created by Shell's oil production and because Shell did not compensate the Ogoni as it said it would. MOSOP attempted to bring international attention to the mess that Shell made on their lands. They demanded compensation and wanted Ogoni control of their environment. MOSOP was not just an environmental organization; it worked, and still works, for democracy, to protect the practices of the Ogoni, and for social and economic development. MOSOP called for an international boycott of Shell. Greenpeace and Amnesty International became involved in the case.

The military government did not like the problems that MOSOP was causing for Shell and for its revenues. The state used its power to quell resistance. There were violent conflicts in the region, with the police repressing demonstrations and torturing activists. In January 1993, the Year of Indigenous Peoples project brought 300,000 people to the region in protest. That same month Shell withdrew its staff from the area. The Nigerian government sent security forces to dispel dissent and make the area safe for Shell. They continued to torture, detain, and kill Ogoni activists.

In 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists were arrested. The government claimed that they had murdered Ogoni leaders. International observers did not believe they committed these crimes and called the military tribunal that found them guilty "unjust." In the end, the Nigerian government hung Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight activists. This brought more international attention to Nigeria and turned Ken Saro-Wiwa into a martyr.

Sadly, this case from Africa highlights the deadly course that fighting for environmental and human rights can take. The MOSOP case was exacerbated by the Nigerian government's entrenchment with Shell. The people wanted schools and hospitals; the TNC and state wanted profit. The state ruled by force to silence protest and ensure its revenues. Most believe that the Nigerian military and Shell worked hand in hand to ensure this. Though the state in Africa has a reputation for corruption, this rather blatant case of the state's reliance on growth for its own capital accumulation is simply the grossest manifestation of what happens when capital accumulation outweighs a state's need for political legitimacy. Also, lest we think that violent repression of environmental activists happens only somewhere else, I recommend the 1996 book by Andrew Rowell, *Green Backlash*, which highlights attacks against environmentalists fighting the growth coalition in many nations, including the United States. One example is Judy Bari, the Earth First! and labor activist whose car was bombed in 1990.

Latin America: The "Water War" in Cochabamba, Bolivia

The final case study is a more recent one. It came to a conclusion in 2000 and is heralded as a success for the people against the transnational giants of **neoliberalism**. I also discuss it because it illustrates an urban movement that intertwines environmentalism with radical democracy, and I expect that as more and more of the Global South moves to urban areas, these areas will be the sites of future environmentalisms.

Cochabamba, with a population of over 600,000, is the third largest city in Bolivia. Due to pressure from international financial institutions like the World Bank, the government of Bolivia began privatizing what had formerly been public resources. While the laws that started the trend dated back to the mid-1980s, the issue came to the fore in 1999/2000 when the state attempted to privatize water in Cochabamba. This was required by the International Development Bank as part of the conditions of a loan. At the time, half of Cochabambans were connected to a central water system and the rest used community water systems organized by neighborhood groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The government changed the laws so that the latter forms of water acquisition would be illegal. Instead, a company, Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of Bechtel, a TNC based in San Francisco, would run the water system.

The people protested. They saw access to water as a fundamental human right, and the common good was being sold so that a corporation would benefit. People refused to pay. Neighborhoods were organized. Demonstrations were held. Oscar Olivera, a union organizer in the shoe factory, and others formed the Coordinadora (the Coalition in Defense of Water and Life). The Cochabambans were not willing to give up the right to decide how their natural resources would be used, bought, and sold. In the end, through multiple mass demonstrations, the people won and retained the right to access

their water. This also reinvigorated Bolivian conceptions of democracy. Olivera (2004, p. 20) explains:

> What is happening more and more today is that *democracy is becoming confused with elections*. At one time democracy—at least to us—meant participation in the distribution of wealth; collective decision-making on issues that affect us all; and pressure and mobilization in order to influence state policies. Now the only acceptable meaning of "democracy" seems to be *competition in the electoral market*. (italics in original)

In 2005, Bolivia elected its first ever indigenous president, Evo Morales, who was part of the "water war." Bolivians are considering how to deal with their natural gas—how they will choose to use this resource and distribute its benefits. This movement, like the others discussed, is not just an environmental movement; it is about social justice, the environment, and the nature of globalization.

Latin America is rich with such cases of resistance. For example, the indigenous people of Ecuador's Amazon region took Texaco to court in New York for environmental damage. The globalization of the economy makes it more and more likely that actors in the Global South will fight agents in the Global North. In this David-and-Goliath fight, Cochabamba shows us that David can sometimes win.

CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION OF OTHER INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

From these examples, it might make sense to conclude simply that globalization (particularly economic) is bad for the environment. In the Bolivian and Nigerian cases, local populations responded to threats from TNCs that were aided in their quest for natural resources by national governments (**growth coalitions**). However, other aspects of globalization have been positive for the environment. For example, most organizations have been "greened" to some degree: states, international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and international financial institutions. In general, we are living in a historical era in which "the environment," as a concern, is taken seriously. This environmental moment does not show signs of ending anytime soon.

Take the following examples as evidence that the environment is an enduring concern. Over the past century, states around the globe have increasingly become more "green." A few ways this has been measured has been in the number of national environmental ministries, national laws requiring environmental impact statements, and national parks worldwide. At the international level, the number of NGOs and international governmental organizations dedicated to the environment continues to grow, year after year. International financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have enacted

environmental standards for their lending programs. United Nations (UN) conferences on the theme of the environment have created an international forum for environmentalism to be discussed globally. In 1972, the UN Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden. This was followed 20 years later by the UN Conference on Environment and Development (popularly termed the "Earth Summit") held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In 2002, this was followed by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, and in 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as Rio + 20), was again held in Rio.

There is a complicated relationship, then, between Southern environmentalism and globalization. For the environment, globalization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there is resistance to TNCs, the economic agents of globalization. On the other hand, people in the Global South are often aided by institutions that have been greened by globalization, such as international governmental organizations. In this sense, the idea of a "local" movement really does not make much sense. There are groups that are focused on specific geographical areas, but they are connected to the "global" world. Earlier, I mentioned the rubber tappers of Brazil and their struggle against local ranchers. This was a fight among Brazilians for the most part, but it drew on the "globalization of environmentalism."

The case of the rubber tappers is chronicled in at least two films, one a documentary and the second a dramatization (*The Killing of Chico Mendes* and *The Burning Season*). To make a long and very interesting story short, essentially what happened was that there was a conflict between rubber tappers and cattle ranchers in the Acre province of Brazil. Chico Mendes was a union organizer for the rubber tappers (*seringueros*). In the 1970s, he began organizing rubber tappers in Brazil against the cattle ranchers who were clearing lands for pasture. There were violent confrontations between the two groups. This local battle went international when the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) approved loans to build a road that would essentially open up the land for more clearing. Locals were not consulted in the process. Mendes worked with NGOs in the United States, notably the Environmental Defense Fund, and eventually came to Washington, D.C., to convince the U.S. Senate that it should not support the IADB loan. The Senate withdrew its support, the IADB suspended its loan payments, and the road was stopped. Mendes and the rubber tappers short-circuited the Brazilian government to halt its road development plans. Eventually, the government, the *seringueros*, and the ranchers came to an agreement to create an "extractive reserve"—that is, an area like a national park that the rubber tappers could use to tap rubber yet maintain as a forest (this fits into a "sustainable development" scheme, as discussed in Lesson 20). This innovative idea joined the interests of local people's livelihoods with the larger "environmental" interests of the "global" environmental community. As with other Southern campaigns, we should ask whether the rubber tappers were really environmentalists or whether they were framing their interests creatively to best appeal to the shifts in international thinking regarding the environment.

If they had framed this battle as one of human rights or workers' rights, it may not have succeeded at this time in history. Unfortunately, this story does not have a happy ending. Mendes went on to help other communities facing similar battles. In 1988, he was shot and killed by cattle ranchers. In some areas of Brazil, he is considered a hero. In 1989, the Brazilian government agreed to protect 50 million more acres in extractive reserves. This case shows how "local" environmental groups were able to gain support from global environmental actors to win (or at least make some gains) locally.

In my own work, I have looked at the consequences of transnational cooperation involving conservation movements with a focus on Latin America. In Ecuador, international NGOs have had a positive effect on conservation. Ecuadorian conservationists tell me that the Ecuadorian government has protected additional areas because of actions taken by transnational environmentalists and that, without these actors' interventions, Ecuadorian forests would be worse off. In the 1980s, international NGOs created a funding mechanism for conservation called a "debt-for-nature swap." In short, what happens is that conservation groups negotiate with banks on behalf of Southern nations so that instead of states making their full loan payments, a fraction of their payment is channeled within their country to pay for conservation and to fund conservation organizations. A number of swaps took place in Ecuador, which kept funds in the country that were earmarked for environmental activities and were tremendously important for conservation. In Ecuador, international conservationists helped protect a large percentage of land. They also helped found and fund environmental organizations. These were the upsides; the downside was that it created competition among Ecuadorian environmental groups for resources that were distributed by agents from the Global North. The competition among organizations for resources persists in Ecuador today and hinders the cooperation of Ecuadorian conservationists. Again, the "globalization of environmentalism" has had some complicated outcomes. While there are more groups working for the environment in Ecuador, they are not working together.

Another twist is that the organizations that were created by the influx of funds are professionalized organizations and their practices are more similar to NGOs in the Global North than to the grassroots resistance organizations described in the case studies. Environmental groups have been founded by international interaction throughout the Global South. In general, early environmentalism in these regions fit the patterns of livelihood struggles described in the case studies. Over time, however, as organizations sought international support, their forms became more institutionalized. In an analysis of the origins of environmental groups around the world, Wesley Longhofer and Evan Shofer (2010) noted that in the "industrialized west" (Global North in the terms of this lesson), the average date of founding for environmental groups was 1958. In South and Central America, the average date was 1983. What this suggests is that while grassroots environmental campaigns, without official organizational status, or perhaps under the auspices of other groups like labor unions, existed prior to 1983, what

happened in the 1980s and later is that organized, professional groups came into being.

RESISTANCE TO ECOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM

When international NGOs work in Ecuador to protect lands for the "good of humankind," what does this mean for locals? For sovereignty in Ecuador? Whose needs are being met? What if Japan wanted to buy a chunk of the Pacific Northwest to protect it? How would people in Oregon respond? Who controls the environment and decisions regarding its use?

Transnational environmentalism has been criticized by some from the South as a form of "**ecoimperialism**." This critique parallels criticisms of development. "Development" was intended to change "backward/traditional" societies into "modern" societies; however, much official development has led to greater inequality between the Global North and the Global South, and many nations that started out poor are now poorer and further in debt and have less control over their choices. The critique of transnational environmentalism is that organizations "helping" with environmental issues are creating the same problem. By becoming involved in the Global South, actors from the Global North are attempting to exert control over foreign environments. For example, Arturo Escobar (1998) looked at what he called the "dominant biodiversity discourse" that comes from the West and suggested that there are multiple ways that other actors understand biodiversity. He argued that international conservation projects based on the Western, "global" conception of biodiversity (which he called the "resource management dominant view") are just one way of understanding, and that locals have alternative conceptions of the nature–culture relationship. In the current formulation, the "globalization of the environment" has opened doors to funding flows between North and South. This makes more and more possibilities for the North to "manage" the South.

Along this same line, Akhil Gupta (1998, p. 306) argued that "In contrast to the humanistic pronouncement of 'sharing one world,' made mostly by leaders and activists from the North, is the view of representatives of poor countries that the environment is a crucial arena where conflict between the haves and have-nots manifests itself." There have been specific instances of local groups in the Global South resisting the North's environmentalism. Back again to Ecuador: In 1995 frustrated, angry fishermen from the Galápagos Islands took their machetes and rounded up researchers from the Charles Darwin Research Station and held them hostage for 4 days. Why? The government limited fishing in the area on the basis of the Northern environmental scientists' assessment. The fishermen's access to fish, and thus their economic survival, was limited by Northern recommendations to limit withdrawals. This conflict in the Galápagos, between the local economy and international environmental protection, has been

ongoing. This conflict, like ones dealing with sustainable development, highlights conflicts between the Global North and the Global South in which the North focuses on the environment at the expense of development and vice versa (see also Lesson 20).

Some interesting changes have been taking place with regard to "alternative development" and the environment, especially in Latin America. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa was elected president in 2006 and took office in 2007. *Alianza PAIS,* the political party that Correa founded, promised to create a new 21st-century socialism. Under President Correa, there was a referendum to elect a constituent assembly that would rewrite the constitution. The new constitution included constitutional rights for nature. Nature has "the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution" and the government is required to protect such rights. This was the first time nature has ever had these rights, anywhere. Bolivia adopted a similar change to its constitution in 2011. The Ecuadorian constitution also included language, written in Spanish and Kichwa (one of the dominant indigenous languages spoken in the country), expressing the right to *"buen vivir,"* and *"sumak kawsay"*—a right to living well. Many suggest that these changes create openings for Ecuadorians (and others) to create an alternative development model that incorporates nature rather than simply extracting it for human use. The Pachamama Alliance, an organization that works with indigenous peoples in the Amazon and is based in San Francisco (with a sister foundation in Ecuador), summarizes aspects of the indigenous conception of *sumak kawsay*:

> Sumak kawsay values people over profit. It is also a new way of viewing "developing nations" because it expresses a relationship with nature and surroundings that epitomizes the opposite of profit and commodification. A key piece is how development is defined: it calls for a decreased emphasis on economic and product development, and an increased focus on human development—not in population, but an enrichment of core values, spirituality, ethics, and a deepening of our own connection with pachamama [mother earth]." (The Pachamama Alliance, 2012)

These views of development and nature are at odds with the dominant worldview of the Global North.

One of the concrete proposals that have come out of President Correa's administration, which seems to be influenced by *sumak kawsay,* is a proposal that attempts to address global warming and lead the world to a "post-fossil fuel society." President Correa presented his ITT-Yasuní Initiative at the UN in 2007. The basic plan is that the state will not grant oil concessions in the ITT oil corridor that runs through Yasuní National Park if the international community can compensate Ecuador for half of the revenue that it would have earned over a 10-year period (in other words, asking for $3.6 billion in environmental donations in lieu of $7.2 billion in oil export profits). The argument is that the plan would protect one of the most biodiverse places on earth AND reduce greenhouse gas emissions AND protect indigenous

people living on those lands. Environmental organizations have formed to promote the project and solicit funding. By the end of 2013, Ecuador had not received the funds it requested. As I write, Ecuador's government is making plans to drill in part of the park amid protest. It is not clear what will unfold in the near future, but it is a story worth following. If Ecuador is able to "keep the oil in the soil," this would mark a stark contrast to the days when the Ecuadorian state allowed Texaco to drill and create environmental devastation and endanger indigenous peoples' livelihoods in the Amazon.

CONCLUSION

Grassroots environmentalism in the Global South is more akin to environmental justice struggles in North America than to the professionalized movement industry represented by mainstream groups like the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund. Over time, however, the Global South's environmental movement has become more professionalized along the lines of environmental organizations in the Global North, and it is creating two different forms of organizations in the Global South: (1) grassroots-based direct action activists and (2) professionalized environmental groups who work from their offices.

Environmental movements in the Global South must attend to the concerns of those who are poor and want economic development and those who are poor and suffering from the negative effects of economic development. In many cases in the South, there have been outright attacks against environmentalism, as in the case of attacks and killings of activists working for the U'wa and Ogoni as well as Chico Mendes, since environmentalism often comes into conflict with states' and TNCs' interests. Economic globalization is one of the biggest foes of the environment in the Global South and represents an issue that is bigger than what most single-campaign organizations can focus on. When I ask environmentalists in Latin America if they've been successful, they respond, "Yes, we've slowed environmental degradation, but as long as we continue on this economic development path, the environment is bound for destruction." Some alternative models, such as that presented by Ecuador, suggest that alternative forms of "development" and "good living" may be possible.

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