Discussion 11
DUBSTER
Lessons_learnt_and_areas_to_be_improved_in_Nepal_response.pdf
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NEPAL EARTHQUAKE: A RAPID REVIEW OF THE RESPONSE
AND A FEW LESSONS LEARNT
François Grünewald & Anne Burlat
January 2016
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Groupe URD: Evaluation, research and training institute for international aid organisations
Created in 1993, Groupe URD is an independent institute which specializes in the analysis of practices and the
development of policy for the humanitarian and post-crisis sectors. Its role is to help organizations to improve the quality
of their programmes through evaluations, research and training, and by providing them with methodological support.
We have run a number of aid observatories (Haiti, Chad and Afghanistan) in order to be able to work with organisations
in the field and promote lessons learned.
As an independent observer, we produce strategic analysis of emergency and post-emergency contexts based on our
holistic, cross-sector vision. On the strength of this unique vision, we also make proposals and develop innovative tools
for the humanitarian sector.
As an internationally recognized think tank, we provide strategic advice to operational and policy-oriented organizations
(United Nations agencies, donors, Red Cross institutions, NGOs, etc.).
The authors
François Grünewald is the Executive Director of Groupe URD.
Anne Burlat is the Housing and Urban Specialist of Groupe URD.
Groupe URD
La Fontaine des Marins
26170 PLAISIANS
Tel: + 33 (0)4.75.28.29.35
Fax: + 33 (0)4.75.28.65.44
E-mail: [email protected] | www.urd.org
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.
© Groupe URD
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Acronyms
BoO Base of Operation
CADRE Community Action for Disaster Response
CBDRR Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction
CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management (cluster)
CDMC Community Disaster Management Committee
CDO Chief District Officer
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CGIS Corrugated Iron Sheet
DD District Development Committee
DDPR (P) District Disaster Preparedness and Response (Plan)
DFID UK Department for International Development
DiPECHO Disaster Preparedness ECHO
DIU District Implementation Unit
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
DRM Disaster Risk Management
DUDBC Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (under MoUD)
DWCC District WASH Coordination Committee
DWSS Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (under MoUD)
ECHO European Office for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EPS Earthquake Preparedness for Safer Communities programme
EPP Emergency Preparedness Project
ER Early Recovery
ERU Emergency Response Unit
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FMT(CC) Foreign Medical Team (Coordination Cell)
GFDRR World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GLOF Glacial Lake Outburst Flood
GoN Government of Nepal
GIS Geographic Information System
HEOC Health Emergency Operation centre
HFA Hyogo Framework for Action
HFT Himalayan Frontal Thrust
HI Handicap International
HOPE Hospital Preparedness for Emergency project
ICC Inter Cluster Coordination
ICIMOD International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent movement
INSARAG International Search And Rescue Advisory Group
IOM International Organisation for Migration
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KAP Knowledge, Attitude, Practice
KVERMP Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project
LDO Local Development Officer
MBT Main Boundary Thrust
MCM Mass Casualty Management
MCT Main Central Thrust
MoAD Ministry of Agriculture Development, Government of Nepal
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MoE Ministry of Education, Government of Nepal
MoFALD Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development
MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Nepal
MoHP Ministry of Health and Population, Government of Nepal
MoUD Ministry of Urban Development, Government of Nepal
NEOC National Emergency Operation centre
NCDM National Council on Disaster Management, Government of Nepal
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
NDRF National Disaster Response Framework
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NFI Non Food Items
NPC National Planning Commission
NRA National Reconstruction Authority
NRCS Nepal Red Cross Society
NRRC Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium
NSDRM National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management
NSET National Society for Earthquake Technology, Nepal
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODF Open Defecation Free zone (Program)
IOM International Office of Migration
OSOCC On site Operation Coordination Center
PDNA Post-Disaster Need Assessment
PIU Project Implementation Unit
RCC Reinforced Cement Concrete
RCO Resident Coordinator Office
RCS Reception on Dispatch Center
SAR Search and Rescue
SEDM Study on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation (for Kathmandu Valley)
UN United Nations
UNDAC United Nations Disasters Assessment and Coordination
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children
UNRC-HC United Nations’ Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
VCA Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
VDC Village Development Committee
WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO World Health Organisation
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Table of contents Executive summary .................................................................................................................................. 6
FULL REPORT ........................................................................................................................................... 9
1. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................. 9
2. NEPAL RISK PROFILE AND INSTITUTIONAL SET UP FOR DRM ......................................................... 10
2.1. Geopolitics .................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2. Risk profile .................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.1. Rural Nepal’s risk profile ........................................................................................................ 11
2.2.2. Urban Nepal’s risk profile ...................................................................................................... 12
2.3. Legal framework and institutional set up for disaster management ........................................... 13
2.3.1. The legal framework .............................................................................................................. 13
2.3.2. The operational set up........................................................................................................... 15
3. THE POST EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT ............................................................................................... 18
3.1. Immediate response to the April earthquake and the May aftershocks ...................................... 19
3.1.1. The national response ........................................................................................................... 19
3.1.2. The international response ................................................................................................... 21
3.2. International Coordination ........................................................................................................... 24
3.3. Transition to development ........................................................................................................... 24
3.4. The impact of the border problems on relief and reconstruction ................................................ 27
4. LESSONS LEARNT AND AREAS TO BE IMPROVED .......................................................................... 28
4.1. Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries ....................................................................... 28
4.2. Improve communication with the affected population ............................................................... 28
4.3. Need to develop a building code for rural housing ...................................................................... 29
4.4. Strengthen national search and rescue capacity .......................................................................... 29
4.5. Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase ............................. 29
4.6. Enhance access to remote areas .................................................................................................. 30
4.7. Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned stocks ...................... 30
4.8. Improve the management of internal displacements .................................................................. 30
4.9. Debris removal and management ................................................................................................ 30
4.10. Improve communication with the affected population ............................................................... 30
4.11. Improve the national capacity for Information and data management ....................................... 31
5. THE WAY FORWARD ................................................................................................................... 31
5.1. Supporting the Nepali Government in its recovery efforts .......................................................... 31
5.2. Residual and future humanitarian needs ..................................................................................... 31
5.3. Promoting risk-informed recovery and reconstruction ................................................................ 31
5.4. Kathmandu .................................................................................................................................... 32
ANNEXES ........................................................................................................................................... 33
Annex n°1: Risk in Nepal ............................................................................................................................ 33
Annex n°2: DRR Efforts in Nepal ................................................................................................................ 35
Annex n°3: Deployment of international usar teams ................................................................................ 38
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Executive summary
Nepal’s risk profile
Nepal is a small landlocked country between India and China. Its population is about 26.6 million with an
annual growth rate of 1.40 percent (preliminary findings of 2011 census) and it is one of the poorest countries
in the world (currently ranks 157 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index with a per capita
income of less than US$650). Administratively, the country has been divided into seven states since the
promulgation of a new constitution in autumn 2015.
Nepal is one of the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world and has gone through many crises in the last
20 years, including a bloody civil war, and regular disasters of different kinds (floods, landslides, earthquakes,
windstorms, hailstorms, fire, glacial lake outburst flood (GLOFs) and avalanches). Out of 200 countries, Nepal
ranks 11th and 30th, respectively, with regard to relative vulnerability to earthquakes and floods (UNDP/BCPR,
2004). The physical vulnerability of Nepal is very high, with most buildings and infrastructures built without
reference to hazard-resistant technology.
Kathmandu is the most populated district in Nepal. According to the preliminary findings of the Population
Census of 2011, Kathmandu was the district with the highest population growth rate in the country over the
previous decade with 60.93 percent and a population density of 4408/ km2. Its population, which was 1.6
million ten years ago, currently stands at 1.74 million.
Kathmandu valley (consisting of three districts; Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur) is one of the fastest-
growing urban agglomerations in South Asia, with a population of around 2.5 million people. It is situated on
a major fault line, placing it at significant risk of an intense earthquake. Out of 21 cities worldwide that lie in
similar seismic zones, Kathmandu is the most at risk in terms of impact on people. Moreover, rapid, haphazard
urban development, including non-compliance with the building code, failure to use qualified engineers or
trained masons, encroachment of buildings on open spaces and water table depletion are increasing
vulnerability at a significant rate. Kathmandu’s critical infrastructure and essential services are also extremely
vulnerable.
According to the Global Earthquake Safety Initiative, Kathmandu is exposed to the greatest earthquake risk
per capita among 21 megacities around the world, largely due to building collapse and insufficient
preparedness and medical care. The older neighbourhoods which form the historical core of Nepal's cities are
particularly vulnerable to earthquake tremors. The poor quality of building and infrastructure construction is
the main cause of structural vulnerability. The fact that over 90% of existing structures are non-engineered,
and the poor quality control of materials and construction practices mean that the built environment, and
especially lifeline facilities, are problematic.
The importance of DRR in the Nepalese context
Due to its position on the slopes of the Himalaya ranges, Nepal has been a priority for the disaster risk
reduction community, with several donors (ECHO, DFID, OFDA, etc.) investing massive amounts of resources
in the development of risk reduction and management capacities, including through a flagship programme,
the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC), bringing together UN agencies and other DRR stakeholders1 to
work on earthquake and flood preparedness. Specific activities have been carried out to make the health
system resilient to shocks and able to remain operational to deliver health services of all kinds after a high
1 For more, see: GRUNEWALD F & CARPENTER S., 2014, Urban Disaster preparedness in Katmandu, Nepal; British Red Cross and Groupe URD.
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impact disaster. The programmes implemented have involved both rural and urban CBDRR and a number of
specific programmes supported by USAID, DIFD and DG ECHO have aimed to ensure that health services will
function in the event of a high-impact earthquake both in the Kathmandu Valley and in other parts of the
country.
The initial response to the 2015 earthquakes: successes and
shortcomings
Three key factors shaped the post-earthquake situation. First of all, neither the April nor the May earthquakes
were the very high magnitude shock that had been feared. Secondly, although they affected part of
Kathmandu Valley, their locations in rural districts meant that the main impact was in low-density rural areas,
even though some small towns were also affected. Thirdly, the first tremor fortunately occurred on a Saturday
around mid-day, when most people were not at work. If it had taken place on a working day when people
were in their offices and children were in their schools, the situation would have been even more tragic.
Reaching the 864,000 people living below the poverty line in hard-to-reach areas, and who had lost their
homes, was a priority.
As in many earthquake situations, there were many casualties due to collapsed buildings and infrastructure.
The capacity of the health system to care for the wounded was crucial. Prior to the earthquakes, both
development and emergency donors had focused on providing assistance to help strengthen the resilience of
the health system at all levels.
With the impending monsoon rains expected to further isolate remote villages, district authorities and
humanitarian partners prioritized the distribution of shelter materials in the northern-most Village
Development Committees (VDCs).
Moving to recovery and rehabilitation: challenges and innovations
The transition to recovery has been difficult due to the problems caused by the political situation in Nepal.
The constitutional reform towards federalism that was implemented led to heated debate about the number
of new entities to be created. This led to tension at the Indian-Nepali border in the Madesh territory in Terai.
As a result it became difficult to import consumer goods, food items and fuel from neighbouring India. This
led to a sharp increase in the price of construction materials and transportation, making reconstruction
extremely costly for individuals and aid agencies. 8 months after the earthquake, many remote areas were
still in ruins or had been rebuilt in a very rudimentary manner as the people living there could not afford to
“build back safer”.
Similarly, the political stalemate has held up the creation and staffing of the National Reconstruction Agency.
The political leaders who are expected expected to bring together all national forces and bring about a proper
and risk-informed reconstruction, are lost in internal politics. It took them 9 months to vote through the
reconstruction bill despite the suffering of the population affected by the monsoon rains and the cold winter.
Despite this, many innovations have been tried in the Nepali context: cash distributions have been used
relatively frequently despite the weakness of the banking system in remote rural areas. 3 D printers have been
used for the first time to deliver spare parts for water system rehabilitation. The Health Emergency Operation
Centre, its network of hospital hubs and its relatively well trained health personnel has been able to provide
treatment to most of the patients in the Kathmandu Valley, showing that DRR pays off.
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Key lessons learnt and recommendations
Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries: The new Disaster Management Act needs to be adopted
rapidly as it will fill the gap in policy definition, and implementation guidelines preparation and supervision.
All national institutions involved in the national disaster structures will then have a clear action plan and their
responsibilities will be clearly spelled out. Revisions should be made regularly to make the policies more
practical
Improve communication with the affected population: In Nepal, where the political context is very complex
and is still affected by the decade of civil war and the complexity of the peace process, aid delivery has been
affected a great deal by political factors, there is a need to invest more in communication to establish more
active dialogue with the affected populations.
Develop a building code for rural housing: It is essential to adjust the Building Code to rural settings and
ensure that all building codes are implemented in urban, peri-urban and rural areas.
Strengthen national search and rescue capacity: The development and strengthening of national rescue and
relief capacity should be made a priority. The Nepalese army, police and fire brigades should be trained so
that they can act as a middle level rescue capacity. A 7/7 medium type USAR team should be established with
a National Disaster training centre.
Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase: It is important to ensure that
incoming actors have a much better understanding of the context and existing needs, as well as the gaps that
need to be filled. The list of items to be provided to disaster victims should be decided in advance, in a
coordinated manner by all stakeholders. Tax deduction procedures should be designed accordingly. A “one
door system for relief provision” should be put in place for relief distribution, using the Disaster Relief
Committees under the supervision of local institutions and aid agencies.
Enhance access to remote areas: To assist the population in high altitudes, difficult terrain and bad weather,
there should be a sufficient number of helicopters in country. The MOHP/NEOC should also have their own
flying capacity. Helipads should be identified and marked at an early stage at the VDC and DCO levels.
Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned stocks: National and decentralized
pre-positioned stocks should be increased.
Improve the management of internal displacements: It is very important to find ways to improve the
management of IDPs with proper movement tracking procedures and registration processes
Debris removal and management: Policy decisions will have to be made in relation to all the weakened and
dangerous buildings that need to be demolished and the debris that needs to be removed.
Improve communication with the affected population: The call centre established in the Ministry of
Information and Communication (call 1234) should be put in place at the NEOC and HEOC and made more
widely known amongst the public.
Improve the national capacity for Information and data management: There should be a strong IS system
available at the NEOC, and it should be easily accessible by the national disaster centre. A Victim ID Card
system should be put in place
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FULL REPORT
1. BACKGROUND
The key objective of disaster response is to minimize morbidity and mortality. The initial “search and rescue
/medical” response is usually followed by relief operations, where the main areas of activity are food, shelter,
water and sanitation. During this phase, a number of cross-cutting issues are taken into account, such as
gender, protection and “do no harm”. Subsequently, there is a transition to development, via the early
recovery and recovery phases.
Of course, rather than this sequence of clear and distinct phases, in reality there are a lot of overlaps between
phases.
The lessons learned from the response to the earthquakes in Nepal in 2015 are of particular interest because
the country had previously been the focus of numerous peace building, humanitarian and disaster
management activities.
Over a period of four years, Groupe URD conducted a series of field visits to Nepal, two before the earthquakes
and three since. These have provided valuable insight into the way disaster management has evolved in the
country.
The following review presents lessons learned about the strengths and weaknesses of the disaster response,
particularly the initial phases of the response and the difficulties faced in recovering from this period. It is
structured as follows:
- The first chapter deals with Nepal’s risk profile and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) activities that
were in place before the earthquake;
- The second one describes some of the key features of the response to the 2015 earthquake, including
successes and shortcomings;
- Finally, the report examines key lessons learnt and includes a series of recommendations.
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2. NEPAL RISK PROFILE AND INSTITUTIONAL SET UP FOR DRM
2.1. Geopolitics
After a decade of civil war, from 1996 to 2006, and after the abolition of the Rana monarchy in 2008, the
political situation in Nepal is not yet stable. It is faced with the difficulty of establishing an effective coalition
government2 due to the tensions between the main parties (the Congress Party, the Maoist Party, who were
the flag bearers of the insurrection at the time of the civil war, and the Marxist-Leninist Party, which was
created following a split in the Maoist Party3.
There is still not a great deal of confidence between the population, the Armed Forces, the Police, and the
administration and social unrest, strikes and “banh”( street demonstrations) are frequent.
The drafting of the new constitution has been held up even though a second constituent assembly has been
formed. The blockages are the result not only of the tensions between the main political parties, but also
disagreements about the type of federalism to put in place, either on a purely territorial basis, or taking into
account ethnic-religious considerations in dividing the different territories4.
Indeed, Nepal’s economy is fragile. The country is landlocked, with no industrial sector and very limited
resources apart from its agriculture and the manpower it exports to the Gulf countries. It therefore faces many
challenges. Due to its location in a complex political landscape surrounded by China and India, Nepal has found
itself in the middle of a geostrategic equation that has resulted in a great deal of aid being allocated
(International Crisis Group, 2013).
2.2. Risk profile
Nepal is exposed to several types of natural and man-
made hazards (Government of Nepal, 2011). A wide
variety of physiographical, geological, ecological and
hydro-meteorological factors contribute to the high
levels of hazards faced. Other factors, such as rapid
population growth, slow economic development, high
levels of poverty, lack of awareness of mitigation
measures, and a lack of political and social commitment
also contribute to making the country extremely prone
to disasters.
The greatest risk of disaster is linked to the geological and climatic features of the country. The seismic record
suggests that the risk of a strong intensity earthquake on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MMI X6) is
high. The main source of seismic activity in Nepal is subduction of the Indian plate under the Tibetan plate (the
Himalayas).
2 This is the 7th government since the end of the civil war. 3 Of the 601 members of parliament, 185 represent the Congress Party, 160 the Marxist-Leninists and 127 the Maoists,
and there are about 15 small parties. 4 Indo-Nepalese (Hindu), Tibetans (Buddhists) and Tibetan-Burmese (mixture of Hindu, Buddhist and animism).
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2.2.1. Rural Nepal’s risk profile
In rural Nepal, many extreme events, leading to floods and landslides, are caused by the Monsoon rains. The
related hazards are presented in the table below. The Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs regularly produces
Disaster Reports. The geological map below appeared in the 2011 report.
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2.2.2. Urban Nepal’s risk profile
There are a lot of small, fast-growing cities in Nepal exposed to a wide range of risks: floods, landslides and
earthquakes, political unrest, epidemics and economic crises. However, most of the efforts on risk profiling
have taken place in the capital city, Kathmandu. It is located at an altitude of 1200m in the Himalayan
mountain belt, which was produced by the collision between the Indian and Eurasian plates in the early
tertiary period. Three major faults, the Main Central Thrust (MCT), the Main Boundary Thrust (MBT) and the
Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT), run throughout the length of Nepal from east to west and have resulted in
many earthquakes in the past in excess of moment magnitude M8. There is therefore a need to estimate
possible hazards in order to engage in risk estimation. In 1934, the fault line that runs beneath the Kathmandu
valley slipped. In the 20th century alone, over 11,000 people have lost their lives in four major earthquakes.
The 1934 earthquake destroyed 20 percent and damaged 40 percent of the building stock in the Kathmandu
valley (NSET, 1999). In Kathmandu itself, a quarter of all homes were destroyed. Many of the temples in
Bhaktapur were destroyed as well. Three earthquakes of similar size occurred in Kathmandu Valley in the 19th
Century: in 1810, 1833, and 1866. The most damaging recent earthquake to take place before the earthquakes
in 2015 was the earthquake of 1988. This magnitude 8.4 earthquake destroyed more than 80,000 buildings
and claimed 8,500 lives. Since 1988 the city of Kathmandu has evolved enormously.
Kathmandu metropolitan area
Due to the evolution of the context in Nepal since 2000, Kathmandu has become one of the fastest-growing
urban agglomerations5 in South Asia, with 5000 new concrete buildings built in the valley every year. Rapid
population growth and urbanization due to migration to the Kathmandu Valley from different parts of the
country has increased demand for housing, water, electricity, drainage, roads and other utilities (Bhattara and
Conway, 2010), leading to infrastructure expansion and major pressure on the environment.
As is often the case, new urban constructions are built on the nearest agricultural land and along the roads
leading to the city, land that does not have basic infrastructure (road, water, drainage, etc.) but is more easily
accessible to new migrants. Subsequently local governments face increased demand for the provision of
infrastructure after the construction of houses. Implementing infrastructure in these cases renders the
housing on agricultural land more expensive in the long run than on urban developed land. Central
government agencies and municipalities (with financial contributions from local communities) are responsible
for providing basic services, but most often the agencies and municipalities are not in a position to expand
their networks due to lack of funds, lack of management capacity, and lack of proper planning. Local
authorities do not have the capacity to provide the appropriate infrastructure and services and their roles are
limited to local-level infrastructure only.
Urbanization in the Kathmandu valley but also in other cities has been largely uncontrolled and even though
building codes have existed since 1994, they have not been very effective in promoting earthquake resistant
construction due to their poor implementation. Every year there is greater risk due to declining construction
practices, uncontrolled urban development and a rapidly increasing population, which has now reached two
million people in the urban agglomeration. If an earthquake were to take place, it could be even more deadly
than the Haiti earthquake of January 2010.
The Ministry of Urban Affairs and the Ministry of Land Management are both involved in revising urbanization
in Kathmandu and the different vulnerabilities and structural fragilities in cities (Chamlagain, 2013). Many
studies have been carried out in the past to study the seismic risk in the Himalaya Range and to evaluate the
5 Muzini and Apericio, Urban growth and spatial transition in Nepal, 2013.
http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/731284070.pdf
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earthquake risk in the Kathmandu Valley and there is abundant scientific literature on the subject. There has
also been abundant survey literature following the growth of Kathmandu.
The most significant of these studies is the Study on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation for Kathmandu Valley
(SEDM) which was carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) in 2002 with support from the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (JICA, 2002). However, given the changes in the Valley it is generally
agreed that this survey needs to be updated.
Building materials are an important factor when predicting the potential impact of an earthquake:
- Mud buildings: a lot of people will be suffocated by mud dust (based on the experience of the Bam
earthquake in Iran in 2003);
- RCC buildings: this will lead to a predominance of broken bones, open wounds, and haemorrhagic
wounds (based on the experience in Haiti).
Land use and occupancy, land tenure, and house and flat rental are still not fully understood and in-depth
study of these phenomena is needed. Two processes are currently taking place:
- The city limits are expanding rapidly, with new buildings being constructed in the middle of the rice
paddy every day;
- Roads are being widened, especially in the old areas. This has an impact on both house occupancy and
the structural integrity of buildings that have to be altered.
The Kathmandu Valley is now a densely populated home to almost 2.5 million people, many living and working
in buildings that will not withstand a significant seismic event. In addition, many buildings are not being used
for the purpose that they were intended with many private schools and hospitals, restaurants and offices in
buildings intended for residences. An earthquake could displace more than 1.8 million people, kill over
100,000 and injure a further 300,000. Sixty percent of buildings could be destroyed or damaged, according to
NSET.
2.3. Legal framework and institutional set up for disaster management
Improving the response to natural and man-made disasters is a core component of any resilient and
sustainable community. In order to increase their capacity to respond to an emergency, local institutions, from
the national to the community level, engage in “preparedness” activities which are defined as the “set of
measures that ensure the organized mobilization of personnel, funds, equipment, and supplies within a safe
environment for effective relief.”6
2.3.1. The legal framework
With its high exposure to disasters, Nepal is considered to be one of the first countries in South Asia to have
created a policy and legal environment for disaster risk management. The formulation of policy and legislative
procedures on disaster issues in Nepal dates back to the early 1980s with the 1982 Natural Calamity (Relief)
Act. This document formalizes disaster response as a responsibility of the government to provide relief to the
6 World Health Organization, Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action. WHO and Emergency Preparedness
at the Global Level. September 13, 2000. Available at: www.who.int/disasters/repo/5813.doc. Accessed October 4,
2015.
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victims of disasters, and it designates authorities at the centre and district levels to coordinate the rescue and
relief efforts of various response agencies. However, the experience of the past three decades has shown that
this structure is only capable of coordinating small to medium level disasters. The institutional mechanisms
that were created were unable to manage the emergency response to above medium level disasters such as
the Udayapur earthquake of 1988 or the flood disaster in south-central Nepal in 1993. The overarching
mechanism for policy elaboration is the National Council for Disaster Risk Management (NCDM). The NCDR is
the highest level institution involved in DRM under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The Minister of
Home Affairs is the Deputy Chair and Council members include ministers, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of
the police departments and representatives of civil society. The NCDM is responsible for:
- The endorsement of national policies on DRM;
- Approving national & sector-wide DRM plans (including the existing 49 sectoral response plans being
currently put into place);
- Guiding and overseeing the management of fund generation and mobilization on Risk Reduction,
Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
- Providing policy guidance for bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation in the area
of DRM.
Learning from the devastating 1988 Udayapur earthquake, the Nepali Government began drawing up the
Nepal National Building Code, which was finally completed in 1994, and carried out several studies. The
Building Code that was developed incorporated provisions for making buildings earthquake-resistant, and
addressed the problems not only of buildings designed by engineers but also of houses in rural, semi-urban
and urban areas that are mostly constructed without input from staff qualified in para-seismic construction.
However, the building code was not enforced immediately. The Government only decided to make compliance
with the building code mandatory in all government buildings in 2003 and encouraged its implementation in
all municipal areas. It is widely recognized that it is not yet enforced by municipalities who do not have the
capacity to do so.
To cope more broadly, proactively and practically with disaster risks, Nepal drew up its National Strategy for
Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) based on the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) in
consultation with the relevant stakeholders across all levels7. This aimed to implement Disaster Risk
Management (DRM) in Nepal in line with current international understanding, scientific progress and regional
initiatives. The strategy provides the road map for all sectors to prepare sector specific programs for DRM and
formulate the necessary policy decisions for facilitating mainstreaming DRM into the development process.
The Disaster Management Bill, 2009 aims to promote effective management of risk reduction throughout the
disaster management cycle - preparedness, mitigation, rescue and relief, rehabilitation and recovery. The
proposed Disaster Management Bill, 2009 is due to replace the existing Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, 1982.
The principal features of the proposed DM Bill are:
- Disasters are defined distinctly as natural and human-induced;
- Provision for National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) to be chaired by Prime Minister of
Nepal with clear mandate and functions, duties, responsibilities and authority of the Council;
7Reference to HFA was made not only because it recommends what every country should do for disaster reduction, but
also because the Government of Nepal had taken part in developing this framework and has made commitments to
implement it.
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- Proposal to set up National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) under the NCDM, to act as the
focal point for disaster management functions in Nepal from formulation of appropriate strategies
and plans to implementation and supervision of disaster management activities;
- Clarifies the role, responsibility and functions of security forces including Nepal Army, Nepal Police
and Armed Police Force; institutions, industrial sector and private organizations. These institutions are
the key responder in the first 48 hours – the military are the most competent of all the trained forces
(trained by US engineer corps and US PACOM).
When the Disaster Bill is passed, a National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) will be created and will
become the national focal point for the implementation, facilitation, coordination and monitoring of Disaster
Risk Management strategies. During and after a national level disaster, the NDMA should be responsible for
emergency response, recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. At this stage, the National Emergency
Operation Centre is the de facto NDMA, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs
Strategies, standards and guidelines, and design plans and programmes for capacity building and emergency
response will need to be developed. The draft text of the Disaster Bill promoted the constitution of Regional,
District and local level Disaster Management Committees (DMC). It is very urgent for the Disaster Management
Bill to be passed to support the implementation of the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management
(including the creation of the NDMA) in order to help the country to prepare for the challenges ahead. The
Disaster Bill has two main objectives:
- To reinforce inter-ministerial coordination for overall disaster management (to increase the
involvement of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Health Foreign Affairs, Urban construction, Land
Management, etc. in addition to the Ministry of Home Affairs);
- To streamline operational procedures by having a strong NDMA that is directly controlled by the
highest levels of the state.
In addition to these preparedness efforts, processes are being put in place to be applied in the event of a mega
disaster requiring international assistance. In such a situation, as described in the National Disaster Response
Framework (NDRF), the Government of Nepal can request help from the UN system, through the humanitarian
Coordinator, regional organizations (ICIMOD, the organization of South Asia), neighbouring countries (India,
China), bilateral donors, the Red Cross Movement, and national and international NGOs. Until the NDMA is
set up, the Ministry of Home Affairs will facilitate and coordinate the overall management of the international
humanitarian community, in accordance with the Guidelines for Accepting International Assistance and Early
Registration to be prepared in consultation with the Ministry of Finance.
2.3.2. The operational set up
The central body of the operational set up, in the absence of the NDMA, is the National Emergency Operations
Centre (NEOC) under the Planning and Special Services Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The
NEOC is responsible for the coordination and communication of disaster information throughout the country,
and acts as the central command and control body at the national level for the different government agencies
and other response and recovery stakeholders. The NEOC is located in a standalone prefabricated building
situated in the Ministry of Home Affairs premises in Singha Durbar. The building has been built to earthquake
standards and is completely self-contained, including multiple back-up power supplies. With its Operation
room, its capacity to keep staff present 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, and its communication equipment
(still relatively rudimentary), the NEOC is supposed to remain on stand-by 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and
works round the clock during a disaster. It is currently run by a nine-member personnel team under the
leadership of the Under-Secretary. Many of the staff would welcome additional training in large-scale disaster
16
management and coordination (with UNDAC and international military forces who might be deployed in the
case of a disaster).
Nepali Urban search and rescue capacity
Prior to the earthquake, there was only a mid-level USAR team and a limited dog search capacity in Nepal.
These are principally connected to the Army, the Police and the Armed Police. The network of fire brigades is
insufficiently developed. Some efforts are being made to move towards more INSARAG compliant capabilities
for collapsed structure USAR and develop a group of INSARAG-light trained instructors who will increase the
capacities of the Army, the Police and the Fire brigades.
A large number of people have been trained and equipment has been distributed by NGOs, through DIPECHO,
DFID and USAID funded projects, by the NRCS under the CADRE project as well as by NSET – Nepal. The
quantity of kits of equipment distributed by the CADRE project to wards and sub-wards (2 kits by CDMC) is
insufficient to have much of an impact if a major event takes place. They will nevertheless help to give the
impression that some people are equipped and are “trying to do something” and will appease anxiety and
tension.
Prior to the 2015 earthquakes, Nepal was highly dependent on external actors in the event of a major
earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley. If national capacities are overwhelmed in the future, Nepal will have
little choice other than to rapidly dispatch USAR teams, probably under regional leadership (India, China), or
international leadership (USA, UNDAC). The critical factor in these circumstances will be the state of the airport
and of the road and bridge networks between Kathmandu and India and neighbouring Nepali provinces (for
the transportation of heavy equipment which is in short supply in the Valley).
The health emergency response system
Regarding health, a Health Emergency Operation Centre was created in 2014. Having been tested for the first
time following the 2014 floods, it was activated very rapidly after the earthquake. Making the health sector
able to withstand shocks and still remain operational has been seen by both the Government and donors as
key to the resilience of the city (Merlin, 2012). There are many public and private hospitals in the Kathmandu
Valley, but how many of these will remain operational after a large-scale earthquake is open to question. The
structural safety of private hospitals and schools is currently being looked into by the State, donors and NGOs.
It should also be mentioned that the Nepali Army has been given two field hospitals to be deployed in the
event of a disaster to complement their USAR capacity.
Hospital Safety: Ensuring hospitals remain intact to save lives and treat the injured
NRRC Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety (www.nrrc.ne)
According to a 2001 assessment, a major earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley would result in only 10% functionality of
hospitals, which will threaten the response to immediate needs, sustainable recovery efforts and health driven
development. Led by the Ministry of Health and Population and the World Health Organization, the NRRC Flagship 1 will
ensure that hospitals in the Kathmandu Valley will structurally survive a major earthquake and have the capacity to
operate after a disaster to save lives, treat the injured and support recovery.
Strategy
- Structural and non-structural vulnerability assessments to determine which hospitals are in critical need of attention.
- Phased physical retrofitting/strengthening of hospitals of prioritized hospitals.
- Training of health practitioners and engineers in earthquake resiliency and the development of national training
materials to guide hospital safety.
Objectives
- To complete non-structural safety work in 3 hospitals in Kathmandu Valley by the end of 2012.
- A seismic vulnerability survey of major hospitals in 2012 will identify priority hospitals for structural surveys and
retrofitting design. A donor conference will be held in mid-2013 to identify funding for major structural retrofitting
17
programmes in 10 hospitals. This will ensure that key hospitals are structurally resilient to a natural disaster and remain
fully functional for post-disaster needs and recovery.
Major accomplishments to date:
- A comprehensive structural survey is been conducted through 2012-2013 to provide detailed plans for 10 hospitals.
- A Technical Advisory Group has determined how to prioritize hospitals for the comprehensive structural survey. This
will include the 7 priority hospitals identified during a government workshop held in 2010.
- The Government of Nepal has allocated funds for retrofitting Patan Hospital.
- Non-structural assessments have been completed in 2 hospitals in Kathmandu Valley with non-structural retrofitting
(including water systems) currently ongoing in TU (Teaching Hospital).
This project complements another project by a group of partners (World Health Organization, Handicap
International, Merlin and Oxfam) funded by DIPECHO.
Enhance the capacities of MOHP (Ministry of Health and Population), health facilities and catchment communities
around the targeted health facilities to respond effectively to a major disaster (Earthquake)
Objectives
The project aims at contributing towards enhancement of capacities of MOHP, health facilities and surrounding
communities to respond effectively to earthquake in Kathmandu Valley.
The project builds upon the DIPECHO VI cycle activities, during which the project has developed the national mass
casualty management strategy for health sector, trauma guidelines, national emergency referral guidelines and key
documents to document best practices on health sector emergency preparedness. It aims to replicate lessons learnt and
best practices from DIPECHO VI cycle and where needed scale up to other facilities and surrounding communities to
increase their preparedness and response capacity to manage mass casualty incidents during major disasters.
Strategy:
The project adapts a multi-pronged strategy; at first level the project seeks to strengthen the capacities of MOHP to carry
forward the implementation of comprehensive mass casualty management systems and replication in other areas; at
second level, building the capacities of health facilities including personnel’s skills to respond to mass casualty incidents
and at third level to strengthen the capacities of targeted catchment communities of health facilities to be better
prepared and respond to disasters. Taking into account the characteristics of the highly populated population catchment
of the Kathmandu Valley, the project implemented several activities:
- Preparedness of critical infrastructure needed (nonstructural as most of the structural retrofitting work was done under
other projects, especially those funded by DFID);
- Ensure that mechanisms are in place for the response, including the support to the creation of an HEOC, connected with
the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) which operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The HEOC
represents the main Incident Command system in health and can support different types of activation mechanisms,
including the activation of the Hub system, the deployment of health professionals, etc.;
- Establishment of the referral network around a certain number of Hub hospitals servicing lower level health structures;
supported by an established early deployment scheme of the Nepali Health professionals on the basis of a roster;
- Preparedness for the functioning of health systems: MCM, medical guidelines, treatment guidelines and standardized
training packages.
In addition to the development of these emergency health capacities, a specific set of activities have taken
place for dead body management. In Nepal this issue has important legal, religious, cultural and symbolic
connotations. Places in morgues and mortuaries are limited, and due to the heat during part of the year, dead
body management should be implemented relatively swiftly. Bodies are cremated, after which analysis and
identification are impossible. This means that it is particularly important that bodies are identified early, that
families are informed, misconduct is prevented, rituals are implemented, and that any other forensic
procedures are carried out as required. The ICRC has developed training modules on dead body management
which are extremely well suited to Nepal.
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3. THE POST EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT
Nepal was struck by a 7.8 Magnitude earthquake on Saturday 25th April 2015 with the epicentre located 81
km northwest of the Nepali capital Kathmandu at a depth of 15km. This was not the “big one” everybody was
fearing, and turned out to be more of a rural disaster than an urban one. Luckily, most people were at home
in the city and were able to escape from their houses.
Many people stayed outside in open spaces for a few nights, but the large fields where IOM and OXFAM had
set up facilities were largely underused. There was less destruction in the Kathmandu valley than had been
feared, and most people preferred to stay in their neighbourhoods to protect their belongings and remain
with their friends and relatives.
After a series of aftershocks (including a 6.7 magnitude earthquake and, on 2 May 2015, another 5.0
magnitude quake near Pokhara), another significant tremor of 7.3 magnitude affected another area west of
Kathmandu on 12 May 2015. This caused further damage, and increased levels of fear and anxiety. Aftershocks
continued for many months. It is estimated that around eight million people have been affected overall.
Luckily, the airport was unaffected and remained operational, but was rapidly congested. Most of the critical
infrastructures of the city remained more or less functional, including telecommunications, electricity, and
water, with only short disruptions. There were no major fires, despite the fact that these are often caused by
earthquakes in urban settings.
As of 3 June 2015, the Government of Nepal (GoN) reported a total of 505,745 houses destroyed and 279,330
houses damaged by the 7.8 magnitude earthquake on 25 April 2015 and the 7.3 earthquake on 12 May 2015.
The earthquakes killed 8,702 people and injured thousands of people. An estimated 2.8 million people are still
in need of humanitarian assistance.
It is important to clarify some salient features of the situation:
- April- May was not a cold period, although weather was an issue for the high altitude villages that
were affected;
- The events took place before the rainy season when access was still relatively easy. The transportation
of people and goods became much more complicated when the monsoon rains started; there were
frequent landslides in areas where the geological substratum had been weakened by the series of
tremors;
- The majority of people tried to avoid staying too long in tents in the camps and, as soon as they could,
they managed to find shelter with relatives. Very few camps were established in the districts although
groups of temporary shelters were erected, but in most instances these were located very close to the
former houses if not on the same sites;
- The situation became much more complicated when the political situation at the Indian border made
it difficult to import goods. Fuel and many priority consumer goods are now in very short supply;
- Transporting aid and reconstruction materials, and travelling to and from the field for staff rotation
and monitoring became contingent on the capacity to access black market fuel…
- Several political events took place during the post-earthquake period and contributed to slowing
down key processes, such as the creation of the National Reconstruction Authority, the promulgation
of the reconstruction code, etc.
- The earthquakes took place while the harvest was in granaries and seeds were being stored in houses.
Due to the destruction in rural areas, many agricultural assets were lost;
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- After an initial phase where the flow of aid actors was made easy, the GoN restricted the granting of
working permits and NGO accreditation, arguing that national human resources should take
precedence over international ones. Only a few international NGOs were registered. Others had to
work through a Nepalese organization or illegally.
3.1. Immediate response to the April earthquake and the May aftershocks
3.1.1. The national response
First responders
Despite its many structural and institutional weaknesses and limited means, the Government of Nepal reacted
relatively swiftly. The fact that the earthquake took place at mid-day on a Saturday, during the only day off of
the week, meant that all offices were closed and key staff involved in the response had to rush to their work
place. The national institutions reacted as well as they could in this context, with the immediate activation of
the NEOC (National Emergency Operation Centre) and the mobilization of the Nepali Armed Forces (which
comprise “special response teams”) and the Nepali Red Cross.
However, the specific characteristics of the event took everybody by surprise: the disaster mainly affected
rural areas, though several urban centres, including Kathmandu itself, were also seriously affected, and there
were several aftershocks, a particularly strong one taking place in a different region. The news on the situation
in the districts reached the staff on duty in the NEOC who immediately informed the chain of command. A lot
of unforeseen difficulties were created by the fact that the earthquake took place in more remote districts,
while existing response plans for a high magnitude earthquake were focused on Kathmandu. This situation
continued after the second significant aftershock in Sindupalchock area. To respond to this situation, the
government mobilized its full logistical capacity, including the fleet of military helicopters to deploy national
staff (and soon international teams) to remote areas. However, many areas remained accessible only on foot
due to the large number of landslides caused by the weakened geological strata.
The decentralized structure of the country (districts and village development committees), which is the result
of a reportedly relatively effective process towards federalism, meant that information could be shared
relatively soon after the first earthquake. The strong institutional position of the district authorities helped
with regard to the transfer of information to the central level, and by mid-May, the Government had
announced that 14 of the 75 Nepali districts had been severely impacted. However, the engagement of Chief
District Officers and Local Development Officers (who respectively report to the MoFALD and the MoHA) was
uneven, as was their internal capacity to coordinate the aid system. They nevertheless played a key role in the
humanitarian response and recovery phases.
As an auxiliary to the public authorities, the Nepali Red Cross Society (NRCS) rapidly activated its Emergency
Operation Centre, mobilized its resources, including many volunteers in the district chapters and branches.
The NRCS has given a central place to DRR for a number of years, with many preparedness programmes
supported by the Red Cross family (IFRC, British Red Cross, etc.). As a result of this, and the experience it gained
during the decade of conflict in the country, it played a strategic role in the early response. Light USAR teams
present in the different branches and chapters of the NRCS were mobilized in the afternoon of the 25th and
started to work immediately.
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Health
The response to the earthquake was the first test for the Nepali health system since the beginning of the
efforts to improve its response capacity. Staff mobilized rapidly, leaving their families at home to reach their
duty stations in the different health institutions. It is very important to differentiate between the response in
Kathmandu valley and the response in rural districts, as there had been far fewer health preparedness
activities beyond the limits of the Kathmandu Valley. The government rapidly decreed that health fees would
be waivered during the state of emergency. Unfortunately, this information did not reach every area and many
wounded people stayed at home out of fear that they would have to pay for expensive surgical operations
and post-op care.
For Kathmandu, Mass Casualty Management and injury management were managed in a relatively
comprehensive manner with positive results in the areas of first aid, rescue, triage, surgery and wound care
and slightly less positive results in terms of continuity of care beyond discharge, including early rehabilitation,
and follow up in different kinds of environments (hospitals, communities, and rehabilitation centres). The first
steps of mass casualty management were put in place very quickly thanks to the response capacity developed
through pre-earthquake preparedness (EPP project, HOPE project, DFID support). Many of the sources
interviewed indicated that triage was relatively well organised with red, yellow and green zones rapidly
established. As well as the earthquake victims, the hospital staff also had to deal with all the patients who had
been evacuated and were afraid of aftershocks. The large number of patients who refused to go back to their
wards due to the aftershocks made the situation chaotic. Help desks were set up rapidly and played an
important role in the first days by providing patients with information. Coordination between the different
desks was essential but not sufficiently effective. Due to the prepositioning of drugs and equipment (drugs
and surgical equipment by WHO, mobility and rehabilitation devices by HI), operational wards and post-op
systems were able to function in a satisfactory manner. However, hospitals ran out of stock rapidly and were
not resupplied as quickly as expected. Contingency stocks are never sufficient and have to be rapidly
supported by proper resupply systems. This area was a little weak in Kathmandu.
The situation was much more complicated in rural areas, where many health facilities had been partially or
completely destroyed. Either spontaneously or at the initiative of the HEOC, most of the emergency cases
were transferred to Kathmandu in the first 6 days. While this was not always ideal, it was a wise decision as it
allowed better case management, due to the poor conditions in many health structures in the districts. While
some facilities were underused, others struggled to provide quality care to patients and had to discharge some
who were still in need of care. The lack of a clear referral system was the main reason for
underutilization/overloading. In many health structures in the districts, there was no MCM plan in place, and
the response was very much on an ad-hoc basis. Limited triage capacity and no Standard Operational
Procedures for evacuation meant that there was “no prioritization of cases”. This led to a certain amount of
chaos and exhaustion amongst the clinicians. The post operation and discharge procedures were even more
chaotic as these took place in a largely destroyed environment.
The Nepali army and police deployed their own tented hospitals, with equipment and specialized staff.
According to several witnesses, these health structures functioned extremely well despite all the constraints.
Dead body management remained a complicated issue. The Nepali Police and the local administration were
mobilized to ensure that Dead Body Management procedures were followed in areas where bodies were
retrieved from debris.
Grant allocation for disaster victims
The government established a system for allocating financial assistance to earthquake victims, so that they
could start rebuilding basic facilities. This initial cash grant allowed many affected families to repay their depts.
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3.1.2. The international response
As soon as the earthquake took place, several national and international response mechanisms were
activated. Nepal (GoN) requested international humanitarian assistance on 26 April 2015. The reaction from
the international community was also very rapid and generous. One principal concern was to not repeat the
mistakes made in Haiti after the earthquake (the phrase, “Haiti is the Bogey man”, was frequently heard8). The
UNRC-HC (United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator) encouraged UN agencies to take action
outside Kathmandu, where the humanitarian needs were reported to be much greater, and not to stay within
the confines of the UN compound.
The search and rescue response
UNDAC deployed rapidly a strong capacity via an electronic event on the Virtual-OSOCC listserv on the
dedicated OCHA web site and in the field with an OSOCC in Kathmandu, a Reception and Dispatch Center (RDC)
at the airport and a Base of Operation (BoO) to coordinated logistics for field displacements. Many USAR teams
arrived in the country in the days after the earthquake with varied effectiveness and impact, as shown by the
table presented in annex N°3, obtained from the NEOC.
In view of the type of disaster (with the capital slightly affected but the main impact in rural areas stretching
over 14 districts), light, mobile and self-sufficient SAR teams performed much better than the INSRAG
registered “heavy teams”. The one-storey houses in rural areas rarely cause the quantity of debris that
requires canine teams.
On 27 April, the GoN decided that there were enough in-country SAR teams to meet the remaining needs and
announced the end of the international USAR phase on 3 May. The GoN also asked all foreign USAR teams to
leave the country as it began the transition from relief to early recovery activities. No additional international
teams were requested to respond to the May aftershock, which caused additional damage, as a certain
number teams were still present in country.
The health response
WHO called for assistance and many countries and organizations sent Foreign Medical Teams (FMT) to support
Nepal with medical services such as surgery, mobile clinics, orthopaedics, gynaecology, obstetrics, and
psychiatry? A Foreign Medical Teams Coordination Cell (FMTCC) was established, directly coordinated by the
HEOC to coordinate the presence and activities of the 142 FMTs from 123 organizations following the OSOC
model (tasking and placement on the basis of needs assessed and skills provided). Very rapidly, the FMTs in
Kathmandu realized that the significant and relatively well-prepared national health capacity in Kathmandu
was able to cope with the needs. There were far greater needs in rural areas, but many teams that had been
deployed did not have the logistical capacity to reach isolated areas and function relatively autonomously. In
fact, the MSF field hospital and the Red Cross health Emergency Response Units (ERU) were among the few
health structures that were able to function in the harsh conditions of rural Nepal. Thus, early in the response,
the government asked for the deployment of additional FMTs to be postponed or cancelled.
The Red Cross and Red Crescent system mobilized its Health Emergency Response Units. Field clinics (Basic
Health Care Units), and field hospitals (Rapid Deployment Emergency Hospitals) were deployed. They are fully
self-sufficient for one month, and can operate for up to four months with supplies and a multidisciplinary team
of 10 to 20 aid staff. Rapidly after their arrival in Nepal, ERUs were dispatched to the different areas in need,
under the guidance of the HEOC. They provided both surgical care to the earthquake victims and all other
health care services that were required, including mother and child care, community health and psychosocial
support. Some of these ERUs were sent to difficult areas in mountainous areas. The Canadian Red Cross field
hospital in Dhunche, for instance, had a full medical team including a surgeon, an obstetrician, emergency
medicine physicians and general practitioners. The staff also provided the doctors, nurses and health aid
8 Meaning that the difficulties and mistakes made during the Haiti earthquake response had to be avoided at all costs.
22
workers from the Nepali health system who were still active in the community with support. Other ERUs were
sent to less difficult districts, such as the Norwegian Red Cross field hospital which played a key role in a district
capital where the hospital had been seriously damaged by the earthquake.
Despite the efforts of the HEOC, coordinating health actors in the field was much more complicated. Much of
the response in rural areas was limited to places that were easily accessible and this sometimes led to
saturation and duplication, while many areas in need did not receive any assistance. Some villages were visited
by a number of different evaluation teams, sometimes even three health assessment teams, who had not
coordinated their visits.
Shelters and NFI
With many houses completely or partly destroyed and the monsoon season arriving fast, the distribution of
basic shelter materials and non-food items (NFI) was seen as a priority. The initial idea (based, to a great
extent, on the experience in Haiti) was to skip the tarpaulin phase and to move straight to the distribution of
Corrugated Iron Sheets (CGIS) to limit complex and time-consuming distributions and related processes
(identification, recording, targeting, distribution, post-distribution monitoring). Due to the scarcity of local
stocks and problems in negotiating tax-free CGIS imports with the GoN (which took up a lot of time and was
unsuccessful, despite the efforts and mediation of the door community and UN), aid agencies had to resort to
multiple tarpaulin distributions, causing delays, additional costs, and a lot of frustration on the part of the
population. A massive effort was then put in place to move tons of CGFIS to the affected villages, including by
helicopter and on people’s shoulders in hard-to-reach mountainous areas. Different models of shelter were
built (squares, tunnel forms, etc.), using different materials (bamboo and clay in certain areas, wood and CGIS
in others, etc.), the vast majority being erected by the populations themselves, some with technical advice
from aid agencies. A large number of cash-based programmes were implemented for the reconstruction but
many people had already undertaken repairs long before they received cash assistance due to the approaching
monsoon.
NFI distributions were also delayed by airport congestion, customs clearance difficulties in Nepal, lengthy
border crossings at the India-Nepal border (made worse by demonstrations by the Madesh people blocking
the whole Terai region). Emergency prepositioned stocks (NFI, Wash, tarpaulins) were rapidly dispatched to
the 14 open spaces that had been identified and where part of the population stayed for the first few nights.
Food security and economic security
Food security was assessed as being relatively precarious in several areas, although in many other places,
farmers managed to save most of the stored crops, seeds and animals and managed to plant and transplant
rice in their terraces. The FAO and several NGOs provided assistance to families who had lost draft animals,
milking buffalo females, seeds and equipment. While food aid was widely used for emergency relief, there
was also a large cash-based response. This usually took the form of unconditional cash transfers, with people
able to use the cash as they wanted: shelter, food, school, health, or debt repayment, which was a significant
issue for many families. The regular distribution of 15.000 Nepalese Rupees (a bit more than 100 Euros) was
for specifically vulnerable families complemented by an NFI distribution (tarpaulins, blankets, kitchen sets,
shelter kits) to ensure that the cash would be used for other priority needs.
Cash was transferred in a number of ways, from the simple handing out of envelopes to bank transfers. Very
few agencies had a pre-earthquake negotiated agreement with a Financial Service Provider, though this sector
was booming due to the large number of remittances sent by Nepalese overseas workers. This meant that
cash was transferred late, and arrived in a disconnected manner in relation to needs: people had already gone
into additional debt in order to begin reconstruction work or to meet basic needs when the cash arrived.
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Debris removal
Proper debris removal is essential for the return to a certain level of normality, and first of all, to allow people
to move around. In most situations, this took place naturally and was undertaken by the population itself so
that they could return to their houses and find out what kind of life they could re-establish there. In rural areas
this was relatively simple, as the quantity of debris was relatively small (when there was no additional debris
caused by a landslide) and could be stored nearby, though there was some added difficulty due to the fact
that many areas were sloped. In addition, temporary shelters were often constructed near the destroyed
houses, and debris was initially left in the nearby rice fields. In urban centres, the quantity of debris was much
higher, transportation and storage was more complex and there were more technical issues involved. As a
result, it took a long time and many areas were still not cleared months after the tremors.
It is important to underline that no building reconstruction can take place before the demolition of dangerous
structures and the removal of debris have been properly carried out. Debris removal labelled as “early
recovery activity” under the coordination of the Early Recovery (ER) Cluster, was led by the MoFald and co-led
by UNDP. The ER cluster therefore had an important role to play and it was also important that it cooperated
properly with other clusters. The government established that only debris lying on the roads, damaged public
buildings and buildings that were a danger to the public would be removed.
Private owners had to manage the removal of debris from their buildings. Heavy equipment, such as heavy
duty vehicles were sometimes needed, particularly for multi-storey concrete buildings. However, this
equipment is difficult to use in the narrow streets that can often be found in older neighbourhoods. Many of
these areas were still not cleared at the end of 2015, 9 months after the earthquake.
A second issue of concern is damaged private houses that are still standing, but have been classified “red” by
the expert assessment. Nine months after the earthquake, the situation is unchanged. The inhabitants /
owners are not living in these unsafe houses and nothing has been done to demolish them.
Debris removal is a dangerous job, and thus requires care and supervision. The whole chain has to be
considered as a comprehensive system, with different chains of actions:
- On-site debris removal to the primary point of deposit, then transportation to a secondary storage
point and then on to the final point of storage would have been the normal course of events. This was
made very difficult and costly by the topography and the frequent disruption of transportation due to
landslides.
- Possible on-site utilization (land stabilization, terracing, road repairs, etc.).
The environmental impact of either solution needed to be assessed properly.
In order to increase efficiency, debris removal has been shared between two main actors, UNDP and the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The IOM is responsible for cities and urban centres, while
UNDP is in charge of villages and rural areas. They have developed two different ways of working:
- The IOM hires contractors who either contract local companies with heavy equipment and people
through Cash for Work Programmes (“daily labourers recruited by private companies”).
- UNDP operates through the local authorities and then promotes community participation through
Cash for Work Programmes. However, this is a much more time-consuming approach and requires a
lot of additional measures to ensure the safety of the workers.
As is often the case, these activities can have either a positive or a negative impact on local markets as well as
on the labour market. The latter is especially important in Nepal as a significant proportion of young men work
24
abroad as labourers in the Gulf States. In the field, the IOM hires equipment on the local market (i.e. cars and
drivers), thus providing income for local entrepreneurs, but also inducing price increases. UNDP, on the other
hand, procures everything it needs from Kathmandu. As a result, it does not have a negative impact on the
local market, but does not contribute to the local redistribution of wealth.
3.2. International Coordination
The OCHA office in Nepal was closed for some times and did not reopen its office in Nepal immediately after
the 25th April earthquake. Instead, a strong surge capacity was deployed from the OCHA Bangkok Regional
office to support the office of the RC-HC. The OCHA Head of office arrived 4 weeks later, and immediately
opened three hubs in the three main affected districts (apart from the Kathmandu valley), Sindhupalchok,
Gorkha and Dolakha. These were closed at the end of September, five months after the earthquake. Initially,
in Dolakha, the cluster system had been implemented on the basis of the District Disaster Preparedness and
Response Plan (DDPRP9 - 2011), which only included five clusters (without the Early Recovery cluster). In view
of the critical involvement of the District institutions, various clusters brought the coordination down to the
district level, allowing for decentralized decision-making and a shorter response time. OCHA was only present
for a short time. After the Government decided that the humanitarian period was over, OCHA closed its office
at the end of 2015, when the situation remained highly precarious and unpredictable.
Following the Government of Nepal’s request for help and the UN mobilization, the full cluster system was
immediately deployed at the central level using the pre-existing cluster system in place prior to the
earthquake. The organization of the cluster system differed slightly from the usual set up in this post-
earthquake response. For instance, when most of the camps closed down in Kathmandu, it became clear that
the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster was no longer needed. The CCCM and shelter
clusters therefore merged.
3.3. Transition to development
As is often the case after a disaster of this kind, a PDNA was launched to assess the level of damage and
quantify recovery and reconstruction needs. The needs identified included:
- Public buildings and facilities (hospitals, health posts, schools, and administrative buildings - for CDOs,
and LDOs, for instance);
- Private buildings (houses, shops);
- Some infrastructure (roads, bridges);
- Agricultural systems (irrigation, damaged seed stocks);
- Livestock and agricultural assets that are normally sheltered or
stocked in house compounds;
- Water sources and water distribution systems that were
damaged by the different shocks.
- Etc.
Though it is important to estimate the cost of the reconstruction, the PDNA was limited to quantitative
analysis, and did not include qualitative analysis of how to take advantage of the situation to “build safer”.
9 http://un.org.np/page/list/Preparedness2011/key%20document
25
On 25th June, exactly two months after the earthquake, the Government of Nepal organized the International
Conference of Nepal’s Reconstruction 2015. The Prime Minister announced the government’s decision to
establish “a high level National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) under the Prime Minister for carrying out the
tasks of sustained, durable and planned reconstruction”. Discussions were held with the Head of a similar
structure that was established in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake about how this type of agency could
function. On 13th August, Govind Raj Pokhrel, was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the NRA. In his previous
post as the Vice-Chair of the National Planning Commission (NPC) he had led the task of preparing the PDNA
report, which was unveiled just before the 25 June International Conference. A few days before this meeting
of donors, the GoN announced the end of the tax exemption for humanitarian products (a list of around 15
products). Two months after the disaster, all imported materials were subject to a 42 % import tax. After the
earthquake, humanitarian stakeholders had asked for a tax exemption for CGI sheets, but this was refused by
the government, who argued that some retailers had already paid taxes. CGI sheets, which are essential for
the roofs of temporary shelters, were never exempted.
One of the reasons the Government of Nepal declared that the humanitarian phase was over was so that
recovery funds went through the Ministries, who would then implement projects once policies had been
established. Many donors, UN agencies and NGOs did not fully agree with this process, due the risks on aid
integrity and are still waiting for the operational policies to be formulated in order to see how they can
operate. Some are working in partnership with district authorities and are trying to implement a response
based on existing needs. The difficulties encountered in setting up the NRA have shown that concerns about
political stability were largely founded. The Reconstruction Bill permitting the creation of the Reconstruction
Agency was only adopted a few days before Christmas, nearly 8 months after the disaster and the Agency is
far from being operational.
The aid sector has been implementing the transition to recovery for a number of months. By July all the
clusters had begun thinking about their own transition to recovery. As part of the initial efforts, the ER cluster
was activated very early under the leadership of the Joint Secretary of the MoFALD (first meeting on 27th April).
An Early Recovery advisor was nominated straight away at the RCO (Resident Coordinator Office), for 6 weeks.
The ER Advisor was not maintained as the system evolved quickly and the different technical agencies with
development departments who had been active in the country prior to the earthquake had initiated their own
transition to recovery. The task of advising on ER issues was given to the inter-cluster coordination under
OCHA.
The shelter cluster - DUDBC, (Department of Urban Development and Building Reconstruction / MoUD), IFRC
The IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross, Red Crescent movement), the co-lead of the shelter
cluster, immediately appointed an (early) recovery advisor who stayed a few months. The targets for housing
recovery and reconstruction were established by the World Bank as the sector leader in the PDNA. They are
preparing a large and apparently well-funded program with the MoUD. The first step will be an exhaustive
reconstruction needs assessment. REACH already carried out damage assessment just after the earthquake
and its aftershock10. In August, four months after the earthquake, the Shelter Cluster had set up a Recovery
and Reconstruction working group led by the IFRC.
Even though the DUDBC (Department of Urban Development and Building Reconstruction, MoUD) is the
cluster lead, various working groups have been created to address specific issues, under the initiative of the
Shelter Cluster co-chaired by IFRC. The MoUD has mainly developed its expertise in cities and it is planning
BBB projects in Kathmandu, in areas where buildings have been destroyed. However, these projects focus on
10 Shelter and settlements vulnerability assessments, June 2015.
26
house owners to the detriment of those who rent flats. The reconstruction of destroyed buildings will also be
a major part of the recovery in small urban centres in rural districts.
The MoFALD, the early recovery cluster lead, is very active in rural and remote areas, where their CDOs are
the core institutional level. Care should be taken to avoid overlapping of reconstruction activities by these two
structures. It might be useful to limit the MoUD to major urban areas and let the MoFALD operate in rural and
remote areas, where its local institutions have good knowledge of contexts and needs. It is not the Shelter
cluster’s role to propose this separation of areas of activity, but it could still have some influence.
All clusters, including the shelter cluster were closed at the end of 2015. As there was still a need for
coordination, a platform was set up, embedded in UN Habitat, to continue the coordination of the housing
reconstruction sector. The first meeting of this platform, the HRRP (Housing Recovery and Reconstruction
Platform), was held in the last week of 2015, chaired by the CEO of the National Reconstruction Authority
(NRA).
The WASH cluster -DWSS (department of Water Supply and Sewerage / MoUD), UNICEF
Before the earthquake, there were a lot of activities in the WASH sector. Water supply systems had been
installed in both rural and urban settings. A long-term project to improve hygiene had been running, the ODF
program (Open Defecation Free zone), co-led by the DWSS (under the Ministry of Urban Development) and
UNICEF. Despite these efforts, there was still a high prevalence of water-borne diseases and cholera was
endemic in the Kathmandu Valley. The relief response after the earthquake consisted largely in building
emergency latrines, mainly inside camps, but also in affected rural areas (1 latrine for 1 to 5 houses). These
shared latrines are not in keeping with Nepalese customs and are not well appropriated by the Nepalese. As
almost all the camps are closed and people are trying to rebuild their lives close to their former houses, the
GoN has rapidly resumed the ODF approach before people return to their former habits. As the ODF program
is implemented at the district level, the WASH clusters will be turned into DWCCs (District WASH Coordination
Committees). The DWCCs will be chaired by LDOs and will have a particular focus on Sanitation and Hygiene.
The residual emergency work on IDPs will be undertaken by a WASH task force in DWCC sub-groups.
The WASH cluster did not focus on water supply, which is managed at the central level. Local water treatment
is carried out using purification tablets. Water and sanitation systems were less damaged than initially feared.
The water safety system should be revised with the aim of Building Back Better.
The health cluster - MoHP (Ministry of Health and Population), WHO & UNFPA
Many activities had been taking place in the health sector prior to the earthquake, with support to the health
surveillance system, and to the curative and preventive health services at the central and decentralized levels.
The impact of the earthquake was strongly felt in the sector as many buildings where health institutions were
located were either destroyed (or their equipment rendered unusable) or weakened structurally, making them
unsafe.
The recovery approach was based on a series of steps, including:
- Dismantling the emergency health structures set up by the aid agencies and re-establishing health
services either in their original buildings when it was possible to retrofit them rapidly or in temporary
buildings when the hospitals or health posts had been destroyed by the earthquake or had to be
demolished. This critical component of the health recovery approach is largely focused on “destroy,
remove and rebuild”. The IOM is very involved in “destroy and remove” activities while several
financial institutions have promised sizeable envelopes for the reconstruction and re-equipment of
health infrastructures.
27
- Discussing how to manage the impact of the return to the health fees and cost recovery schemes that
were in place prior to the earthquake. The earthquake underlined how difficult it is for many
inhabitants in remote areas to pay for health care as they also have to pay for costly transportation
and lodgings for the patients and their care takers.
- Taking disaster preparedness in the health sector into consideration in the light of the lessons learnt
from previous efforts under the EPP.
The earthquake also revealed the imbalance in the number of health personnel between Kathmandu Valley
and the rest of the country. This is an issue that the Ministry of Health wants to address as part of the recovery
efforts, with different types of incentive mechanisms.
Food Security cluster - MoAD, WFP & FAO
Once the initial phases of food distributions with high protein biscuits and other emergency food had been
implemented, the Food Security Cluster had to address a number of key issues:
- What should be done in areas where the earthquakes had destroyed existing food stocks, seed
reserves and livestock?
- When and where should food be distributed and when and where should there be a rapid transition
to cash transfer programmes?
- How should the recovery potential of agriculture and livestock activities be assessed?
- How should the “off farm” sector be assessed and supported, especially in the different types of urban
centres affected by the earthquake?
While the shift to cash was extremely rapid, support for the productive sector was a bit slower and support
for the resumption of non-agricultural activities was largely left to individuals and the private sector.
Education cluster -DOE (Department of Education / MoE), UNICEF & Save the Children
In the education sector, only buildings were destroyed, as the earthquake took place on Saturday at mid-day,
when there was nobody in the schools. Temporary solutions were built in many areas, to ensure that children
could continue to attend school up to the end of the school year. UNICEF and a wide range of NGOs supported
these temporary schools and supplied basic school equipment. A transitional phase will take place from
September to December after which the National Education Cluster is planned to be de-activated.
The national co-lead agencies will continue to provide coordination capacity at the national and district levels
until December. It is expected that the full National Education Cluster will be replaced by a core group of NGO
representatives who will meet regularly and could be called upon on an ad hoc basis as needed. School building
reconstruction is planned to take place through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), chaired by the DoE’s
Director General, and District Implementation Units (DIUS) at the district level.
3.4. The impact of the border problems on relief and reconstruction
The revision of the Constitution and the establishment of a federal system of 8 regions led to serious political
problems with the Madesh people living in the Terai region. As this ethnic group is present on both sides of
the border, they managed to create a situation of insecurity at the different border crossing points between
Nepal and India. This led to a quasi-blockade that caused major scarcity of nearly all the goods that are
normally imported via or from India. Fuel, cement, cooking gas, and even some food items became more and
more rare and costly. It has now become extremely expensive to transport people, relief items and
reconstruction items, and as a result, reconstruction efforts are being held up.
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4. LESSONS LEARNT AND AREAS TO BE IMPROVED
4.1. Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries
With the Disaster Management Act not yet approved by the Assembly, the legal framework for national and
international organisations remained rather weak, and ad-hoc solutions had to be found all the time. This led
to difficulties in the management of the response and led to a lot of different implementation methods running
in parallel, which created problems. In a disaster of this kind, a single ministry cannot be effective, so a “whole
of government” response has to be implemented. There were signs of efforts in this direction in the response
to the earthquakes, but they had no solid legal basis.
� Therefore, the new Disaster Management Act needs to be adopted rapidly as it will fill the gap in
policy definition, and implementation guidelines preparation and supervision. All national
institutions involved in the national disaster structures will then have a clear action plan and their
responsibilities will be clearly spelled out. Revisions should be made regularly to make the policies
more practical.
4.2. Improve communication with the
affected population
In Nepal, where the political context is very complex and is still
affected by the decade of civil war and the complexity of the
peace process, aid delivery has been affected a great deal by
political factors. Aid actors and donors may see targeting as a
virtuous process, but in Nepal, it is, at best, socially rejected, and,
at worst, manipulated for political gain or to favour a particular
political or ethnic faction. In addition, in most places, lists had to be approved by Government officials. While
VDC and District officials were often extremely helpful and processed the files with energy and dedication,
cases of corruption and political manipulation were also reported. In order to counterbalance these trends, it
is necessary either to implement an extremely complex, and often costly and time-consuming procedure, or
to engage in extensive and in-depth dialogue with local opinion makers, social leaders and local activists to
diffuse any potential time bomb linked to unaccepted targeting systems.
This does not apply only to Nepal. Indeed, while Nepal benefits from a high level of sympathy abroad, which
helped to mobilize financial resources, for many governments their key concern was their own citizens
stranded in Kathmandu and along trekking routes, due to politics at home. The high level of resources that
were mobilized to locate and evacuate foreign tourists and trekkers was regularly criticized in the Nepali
media.
In addition, in many cases, the affected population were insufficiently informed about what they could expect
from aid agencies, where they could get relief and medical assistance, etc. Although agencies started to use
social media, local radio and other mechanisms to communicate with the affected population, many of the
interviewees felt that these had been insufficiently used to give information about programmes, explain
selection procedures, counteract rumours, and prevent political manipulation.
� The only solution to these two problems is to invest more in communication to establish more active
dialogue with the affected populations.
29
4.3. Need to develop a building code for rural housing
While urban construction is largely standardized, using concrete beams, cement blocks and special retrofitting
techniques which incorporate existing para-seismic technologies, in rural areas, the existing building code is
not adequately implemented and there are a lot of self-built houses. As a result, there was a lot of damage and
a high number of casualties in the villages. In addition, many areas were already prone to landslides and this
has been made worse by the 2015 tremors.
� It is essential to adjust the Building Code to rural settings and ensure that all building codes are
implemented in urban, peri-urban and rural areas.
4.4. Strengthen national search and rescue capacity
In large-scale urban disasters, a key factor of a successful emergency response is how fast you are able to get
people out of the rubble. What is needed is:
- a highly-trained formal Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) force capable of undertaking collapsed
structure interventions in multi-storey buildings and dangerous situations;
- a medium-level capacity in the form of a network of equipped fire brigades;
- a largely decentralized light and very light search and rescue capacity able to operate rapidly in all
areas even if communication and transportation lines are cut.
Due to a lack of trained human resources and equipment, foreign help was requested in this domain where
the quality of the response depends on timeliness and technical know-how.
� The development and strengthening of national rescue and relief capacity should be made a priority;
� The Nepalese army, police and fire brigades should be trained so that they can act as a middle level
rescue capacity. A 7/7 medium type USAR team should be established with a National Disaster
training centre.
4.5. Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase
The first few days after a disaster are often very complicated with the arrival of many relief teams and
organizations who are not necessarily well equipped or prepared. It is often difficult for the national authorities
to know what and how much to expect from these organisations. OCHA/UNDAC normally provides the sector
with early guidance and information on needs, but in Nepal, as too often in disaster situations, many more
people than were needed arrived from abroad. A lot of money was spent inappropriately and national
institutions are still burdened with having to coordinate these different actors.
� When Nepal requests international support, it is important to ensure that incoming actors have a
much better understanding of the context and existing needs, as well as the gaps that need to be
filled in order to orient the flow of aid towards where it is actually needed.
There was little coordination of the items provided to disaster victims, and many private organizations brought
inappropriate items.
� The list of items to be provided to disaster victims should be decided in advance, in a coordinated
manner by all stakeholders. Tax deduction procedures should be designed accordingly.
Although there were several attempts to organise a “one door policy” for relief distribution at the DCO and
VDC, this initiative was not supported a great deal by aid agencies, leading to gaps, duplications and inequality.
30
This “one door” system does not mean that agencies lose visibility or assessment and monitoring capacity. It
just means that a more coherent system will be in place and that this will alleviate the burden on local
institutions.
� A “one door system for relief provision” should be put in place for relief distribution, using the
Disaster Relief Committees under the supervision of local institutions and aid agencies.
4.6. Enhance access to remote areas
As the earthquake affected mountainous and hilly regions, there was great demand for helicopters. The
national army provided theirs and all other options were used. India, China and the US provided a few, but not
enough. Due to high altitudes, difficult terrain and bad weather, many helicopters could not be mobilized
effectively. In many remote VDCs, it was very difficult to evacuate the wounded and provide relief.
� Helipads should be identified and marked at an early stage at the VDC and DCO levels.
� There should be a sufficient number of helicopters in country, with the security providers. The
MOHP/NEOC should also have their own flying capacity.
4.7. Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned
stocks
Although the WFP has warehouses in the different airports and in different areas, the overall storage capacity
is insufficient.
� National and decentralized pre-positioned stocks should be increased.
4.8. Improve the management of internal displacements
Many people were displaced within or outside their district of origin. This created some difficulties in terms of
relief allocation. In addition, in the Kathmandu valley, people took shelter in a number of different locations in
fear of additional aftershocks. It was very difficult to find these people and provide them with assistance.
� It is very important to find ways to improve the management of IDPs.
4.9. Debris removal and management
Debris management was difficult in rural areas as well as in urban centres. Many houses have cracks and have
been weakened structurally, and they will have to be destroyed. Rubble clearing will require a lot of equipment
and heavy machinery, and will take a long time in rural areas and in certain parts of Kathmandu.
� Policy decisions will have to be made in relation to all the weakened and dangerous buildings that
need to be demolished and the debris that needs to be removed.
4.10. Improve communication with the affected population
The call centre established in the Ministry of Information and Communication (call 1234) has been widely used.
� This system should also be put in place at the NEOC and HEOC and made more widely known
amongst the public.
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4.11. Improve the national capacity for Information and data management
Due to the geographical complexity of the terrain, many VDC and DCC were not fully taken into account.
� There should be a strong IS system available at the NEOC, and it should be easily accessible by the
national disaster centre.
Victim identification, follow up and long-term assistance requires proper data management and is always a
challenge following a large-scale disaster. An open system that can be used by all agencies, and that can be
properly monitored and adjusted is needed. One solution would be a non-duplicable Victim ID system.
� A Victim ID Card system should be put in place.
5. THE WAY FORWARD
5.1. Supporting the Nepali Government in its recovery efforts
The central government has shown real commitment to establishing policies on recovery and reconstruction,
including building codes. The responsibility for implementing the national recovery and reconstruction
strategy has been largely placed in the hands of the district and village levels, as there is a direct link between
district authorities and populations and they are usually aware of people’s needs. However, it will be important
to ensure that there is a sufficiently strong feeling of accountability among district staff, and also that they
have the right competencies. These are areas where international and national NGOs could join forces and
support the whole process to ensure that needs are properly covered and that aid reaches the population.
In this respect, the debate concerning the establishment of the Prime Minister Relief Fund is of particular
interest. Although, from the beginning, the GoN wanted all international actors to contribute to the PMRF,
instead they purchased essential relief items and distributed them themselves. International Development
Partners did not follow the “one goal policy” which would have been more coherent with the OECD Paris
development Principles than to GHDI humanitarian principles and this led to a lot of frustration in government
circles.
� After the next big disaster, the international community could channel some resources through the
PMRF on an experimental basis and carefully monitor how they are used to learn from the process.
5.2. Residual and future humanitarian needs
The Nepalese government’s desire to move on from the humanitarian phase as quickly as possible should not
mean that the remaining humanitarian needs are overlooked. Even though recovery is very fast in certain areas
(urban centres, areas close to roads), there are still many areas in the hard-to-reach zones that will recover
only very slowly from the effects of the earthquake. Care should be taken to ensure that possible humanitarian
needs in these areas are monitored and responded to. At the same time, there remain numerous political,
agro-ecological, climatic and geological risks in Nepal.
� The Nepalese authorities and the aid community should remain able to move rapidly to high alert
mode and respond to possible future needs.
5.3. Promoting risk-informed recovery and reconstruction
Risk-informed recovery and reconstruction should be the overall paradigm, and this also applies to the early
phase of the recovery. This implies that risks are analysed, and taken into account when recovery operations
32
are designed and implemented. Specific markers could be used, such as the recently developed ECHO marker
on DRR and resilience which is very simple.
� Risk informed programming should be promoted at all costs.
5.4. Kathmandu
Although the city was less affected than feared, many buildings have been structurally weakened. Various
types of retrofitting activities have been observed, but it is likely that major difficulties still lie ahead, especially
if there is a significant new tremor. UNHABITAT and a few other actors are concerned about this and regularly
voice their worries. So far, this issue has not yet been taken up properly by the sector…
A specific issue is that of preserving old houses and cultural and religious heritage. The latest earthquake
damaged many buildings of cultural significance. Although it was known that there were high risks, little was
done to make them more resilient, or even to maintain them adequately. Specific measures are needed for
both the reconstruction and preservation of the cultural heritage.
33
ANNEXES
ANNEX N°1: RISK IN NEPAL
Flood – Flood is a recurrent problem in the Tarai as well as in the mountain regions. Most part of Terai
faces problem of floods during the monsoon periods (June-August). Most of the flood disasters take
place along the banks of the larger rivers such as Mechi, Kankai, Koshi, etc. Rivers originating from the
Siwaliks are mostly of ephemeral nature, being wild during the monsoon season, and they also pose
high flood hazards to the Terai. Extensive inundation in the Terai plain is due to frequent change in the
river courses, bank erosion and erosion in the river meanders. In the mountainous regions, rivers are
in spates during the monsoon season. Bank undercutting, inundation of the flood plains are the results.
But more disastrous are the floods in the high gradient tributary streams due to cloud bursts or high
intensity rainfall concentrated usually in a small catchment. Such flash floods cause triggering of
landslide, deep scouring of the stream bed and the side slopes and they rapidly develop into debris
flows capable of transporting several cubic meter sized boulders. The problem of flooding in the Terai
is also high due to the high bed load, in addition to the suspended load, barred by the rivers. In the
plains, all the rivers are widening and cutting their banks each year.
Drought – A severe drought hit Nepal during 1981-1982 causing heavy damage to crops leading to a
decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by about 1.4%. Failure of monsoon rains or its late arrival
causes partial drought affecting major crops in different parts of the country. Uneven distribution of
the monsoon rains, with several parts of the country not receiving the required rains in the required
time for the major crop is a recurrent phenomenon. Since a large part of the country still depends on
rainfall for cultivation, such phenomena affect the agriculture production of the country very
adversely.
Storm – Storms (line-squalls) with heavy rainfall and hail are common during the summer months in
the tropical and sub-tropical parts of the country. Major damage from storms has been recorded in
eastern Nepal (1980) and mid-western Nepal (1983). Storm winds of even moderate velocities have
major effects in the Tarai, where most of the houses and structures are lightly roofed. The most
occurring disaster in March/April and October are hailstorms that have a disastrous effect especially
on agriculture. While most of the hail that precipitates from the clouds is fairly small and virtually
harmless, there have been cases of golf ball sized hail that causes much damage especially to the
standing crops and inflict injuries.
Landslide and Debris Flow – The causes of landslides in Nepal can be assigned to a complex interaction
of several factors which are natural as well as human activity related. High relief, concentrated
monsoon rainfall, withdraw of underlying as well as lateral supports by toe cutting and bank erosion,
presence of weaker rocks, active neotectonic movements and a complex geological history, which has
resulted in very intense faulting, folding and fracturation of the rocks, are the natural factors causing
landslides in Nepal. But human activities are also responsible for the very high extent, and they add to
the density of landslides in the country. Overgrazing of protective grassy cover, mass felling of trees
leading to an unprecedented deforestation, disturbance of the hill slopes by road/canal construction,
non-consideration of the geologic conditions in the corresponding location, planning or designs of
infrastructures etc. are some of the important anthropogenic factors leading to landslides. There are
other social causes for the greater extent of damage. Unawareness on the part of the population and
34
the decision makers may be cited as the most important of all the anthropogenic activity related
indirect causes of landslides. High intensity rainfalls during the monsoon season trigger many highly
destructive debris slides and debris flow along the high gradient hill slope channels. Incessant rainfall
during the period, when the antecedent moisture content of the land surface reaches a certain critical
stage, is accompanied by landslides. Debris flows, frequent in the mountainous parts of the country,
are caused by deep scouring of the stream bed and side slope by a high gradient stream. Damming of
rivers and tributaries due to landslides and debris and subsequent sudden breaching of the dam is
another important phenomena for the generation of debris flows. In the higher mountains, debris
flows are frequently generated by Glacial Lakes Outburst Floods (GLOFs) due to the breaching of the
moraines or glacier ice damming the lakes. The debris flow travels usually to greater distances along
the river valley and destroy terraces, infrastructures and settlements along its course.
Earthquake – The entire territory of Nepal lies in high seismic hazard zone. The country's high
seismicity is related to the movement of tectonic plates along the Himalayas that has caused several
active faults. A total of 92 active faults have been mapped throughout the country by the Seismic
Hazard Mapping and Risk Assessment for Nepal carried out as part of the Building Code Development
Project – 1992-1994 (MHPP, 2994). Earthquakes of various magnitudes occur almost every year and
have caused heavy losses of lives. The entire country falls in a high earthquake intensity belt: almost
the whole of Nepal falls in high intensity scale of MMI IX and X for the generally accepted recurrence
period. The seismic zoning map of Nepal, which depicts the primary (shaking hazard), divides the
country into three zones elongated in northwest-southeast direction: the middle part of the country is
slightly higher than the northern and the southern parts (Bilham & al, 1997). Based on the data
available from the Department of Mines and Geology, CBS (1998) concludes that earthquakes of more
than or equal to 5.0 on the Richter scale have occurred at least once every year in The Richter scale
Nepal since 1987, with the exception of 1989 and 1992 when no such events were recorded. The
current disaster database of Nepal shows that there were 22 earthquakes with magnitudes ranging
from 4.5 to 6.5 on the Richter scale throughout the country for last 37 years period (1971-2007). About
34,000 buildings were destroyed and 55,000 were damaged (DesInventar, 2007) during this period due
to earthquakes. Earthquake is another important landslide triggered. Apart from developing fissures
both along and parallel to the hill slopes, and thus generating the potentials for debris slides, the
earthquakes are found to trigger a variety of landslide types including huge rock slide, rock fall and
slumps. Some of the very big landslides have been reported to have been initiated by the Nepal-Bihar
earthquake of 1934 AD.
Epidemic – Epidemics are in fact the number one killer in Nepal, with an average of 410 deaths per
year. During 1983-2010, fifty-two per cent of the 22,306 people who lost their lives were caused by
epidemics. The pattern is not much changed during later time as well. Lack of treated drinking water
supply and poor hygiene conditions, not only in the rural areas but also in the crowded, unplanned
urban settlements are the cause for the potentially high risk from epidemic. Gastro-enteritis, cholera,
encephalitis, meningitis, dysentery and diarrhoea account for more than 50% of the total deaths due
to epidemics. Break out of epidemics after a major disaster such as flood and earthquake etc. is quite
frequent. Epidemics of contagious diseases have two peaks: during the months of May and June,
before the rainy season begins and in August, the height of the monsoon. Unsafe drinking water and
poor sanitation are the main causes of water-borne diseases in Nepal. Waterborne diseases continue
to take lives in Nepal. In fact, over 80 per cent of all illness is attributed to inadequate access to clean
water supplies, poor sanitation and poor hygiene practices.
Source: 2011 Nepal Disaster report, MoHA
35
ANNEX N°2: DRR Efforts in Nepal
For over a decade, the international community witnessed the conflict and froze most development
aid and kept is presence largely focused on humanitarian aid. With the end of the internal conflict and
the emergency of a more peaceful context, the aid community re-engaged vigorously in Nepal in order
to stabilize the peace and deliver peace dividends. Disaster Preparedness attracted a lot of interest in
this country frequently affected by disasters. DIPECHO programmes have been very important.
DIPECHO programmes have significantly contributed to o enhance the capacities and resilience of local
authorities and communities vulnerable to natural hazards through effective linkages, strengthening
DRR systems and structures and replication of DRR initiatives across project areas.
Due to the years of conflict and the frequency of disasters, the humanitarian and DRR communities
are quite dynamic in Nepal, with a fully developed Humanitarian Country Team, a complete set of
clusters is in place inherited from the conflict period, many national and international agencies working
on disaster management and a strong commitment of Donors towards DRR and resilience building.
Yet, if DRR has been for long time and still largely focussed on rural issues, it is not anymore the case
and the urban contexts are more and more taken into account.
The originality of Nepal nowadays is the existence of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium11 (NRRC),
an initiative arising from the commitment of the Government to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)
and supported by the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management NSDRM.
The NRRC (NRRC 2012a,) brings together aid agencies (IFRC, UNOCHA, UNDP, NGOs) and main donors
(World Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID, USAID). The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)
was conceived in 2009 and formally launched in 2011. Driven by key motivated individuals within the
government and in key agencies, especially the RC/HC and donors (DFID, USAID), the NRRC is probably
to date the most integrative project to support resilience in a significant manner in a high risk prone
context. The NRRC seeks to mitigate the many risks identified in Nepal, but with a focus on two main
ones: the risk of “big one” in the Kathmandu Valley and the frequent devastating floods of the Koshi
River (NRRC, 2012-b).
The political context (reconciliation, preparation and agreement of a new constitution and uncertainty
about what this will mean for local government structures in the context of coming local elections)
made it very challenging, but also created a very useful platform for dialogue (Taylor, G. & al, 2013).
The NRRC has three objectives:
- Support the national efforts in DRM;
- Develop multi-stakeholder collaboration and coordination;
- Deliver key practical outputs through five Flagship areas (see below).
11 See Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Flagship Programmes, NRRC Secretariat (2012) ‘The Nepal Risk
Reduction Consortium’, Humanitarian Exchange, 53, pp. 32-34, February 2012.
36
A set of specific programmes derived both from the commitment of the NRRC and the lessons learnt
from the Haiti earthquake, for instance the identification and preparation of open spaces to host
affected population in and around Kathmandu. There is now an “Open Space Act, a legislative
reference for the identification and the protection of 83 sites that can host around 900.000 people.
OXFAM is currently mapping them and pre-stocking arrangements are being made for water and
sanitation equipment for these sites. Several key projects were launched both for global preparedness
and for specific sectoral aspects, ranging from by the earthquake risk assessment and scenario
development in 1997 by Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project (KVERMP)
implemented by the National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal (NSET) to specific activities
to enhance school and hospital “resilience” to earthquake, so they can continue to perform and be key
centres of activity even in the case of global chaos. UNDP is conducting a more detailed hospital
assessment, in three phases, beginning with 60 hospitals and ending with the selection of 10 hospitals
to go to a 2014 donor conference for retrofitting.
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The Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project (KVERMP)
The KVRMP was implemented from between 1997 and 1999 by the National Society for Earthquake
Technology – Nepal (NSET) in technical collaboration with GeoHazards International (GHI), the Asian
Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (AUDMP) of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), with
core funding by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID.
Objectives:
1) To evaluate Kathmandu Valley’s earthquake risk and prescribe an action plan for managing that risk;
2) To reduce the public schools’ earthquake vulnerability;
3) To raise awareness among the public, government officials, the international community and
international organizations about Kathmandu Valley’s earthquake risk;
4) To build local institutions that can sustain the work launched in this project.
Activities
KVERMP included a wide variety of activities aimed at beginning a self-sustaining earthquake risk
management program for Kathmandu Valley. Project components included the following.
1) Development of an earthquake scenario and an action plan for earthquake risk management;
2) A school earthquake safety program · A survey was conducted of all of the public school buildings in
Kathmandu Valley. Studies were conducted to determine the most vulnerable types of school building
construction prevalent in Kathmandu Valley and to determine methods for retrofitting these
structures.
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ANNEX N°3: DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL USAR TEAMS
MNMCC OSOCc
coordinated USAR
Country group
Country
Nbr
members
Canine
team Arrival date
Dead
body
Person
rescued Departure
MNMCC /
OSOCC
Algeria 73 9 01-may 10-may M and 0
Australia na na 27-apr Na O
Bangladesh 19 0 26-apr 09-may M and 0
Belgium 44 2 28-apr 10-may O
Bhutan 77 0 27-apr 21-may M
Canada 199 10 29-apr 1 25-may O 56/M
China 942 12 26-apr 3 03-may 0 131/M
France 32 9 27-apr 2 01-may O
German 58 7 27-apr 06-may O
Hungary 3 0 27-apr 06-may O
India 1415 8 25-apr 128 11 05-may O 330/M
Indonesia 105 0 28-apr 14-may O20 / M
Israel 286 2 28-apr 11-may 0 123 /M
Japan 114 8 26-apr 5 Na O 95 / M
Malaysian 56 0 28-apr 06-may O 9 / M
Mexico 20 0 30-apr 10-may O
Netherland 66 11 27-apr 3 10-may O
Norway 35 5 1 1 10-may O
Oman 20 0 01-may 10-may O
Pakistan 94 0 28-apr 15-may M
Philippines na na 28-apr Na O
Poland 85 12 27-apr 03-may O 4 / M
Russia 87 7 10-may O
South Korea 24 2 28-apr 5 10-may O
Singapore 182 4 28-apr 1 09-may O 71 / M
Spain 60 11 28-apr O20 / M
Sri Lanka 141 0 26-apr 11-may M
Sweden 42 0 29-apr 10-may O
Switzerland 9 0 27-apr 2 10-may O
Thailand 54 0 29-apr 12-may O 17 / M
Turkey 82 2 26-apr 1 10-may O
Emirates 87 6 30-apr 10-may O
UK 134 2 28-apr O 56/M
USA 286 12 28-apr 1 O 108 / M
Total 4521 141 149 16
39
Groupe URD
La Fontaine des Marins
26170 Plaisians – FRANCE
Tel: + 33 (0)4 75 28 29 35
www.urd.org
