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‘‘Me, myself & I’’: practical egoism, selfishness, self-interest and business ethics

Jelena Debeljak and Kristijan Krkač

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to elucidate some of the arguments against egoism in the current debate, as well as to create some new arguments, or rather objections (epistemological and ontological from the position of egoism as moral solipsism), and to explicate some arguments against egoism (descriptive, normative, and ideological) as being not so convincing. It also aims to explicate Jesus’s second commandment in a fashion similar to that of Adam Smith when he tried to combine self-love with sympathy.

Design/methodology/approach – This paper is based on the premise that some foundational philosophies, worldviews, or paradigms exemplify at least one type of egoism/selfish strategy. In that light the analysis of egoism and the objections are formulated.

Findings – They paper finds that present arguments in favour of egoism in business, and especially as certain ‘‘business ethics’’, are not acceptable, at least on the practical and theoretical grounds on which they are presented as sound arguments.

Research limitations/implications – The paper implies that there is fundamental difference between theoretical and practical egoism, and that practical egoism sometimes uses the theoretical one as its ‘‘quasi-justification’’.

Practical implications – The paper can be summarized in a series of general advices about an altruistic attitude and practices which in the long term show more benefits than costs for any group, and consequently for business organizations as well.

Original/value – The paper presents ontological and epistemological interpretations and objections against egoism, emphasizing the somewhat neutral or at least bivalent position of Adam Smith regarding the matter in question, and introducing altruistic strategies as being compatible with the basic ideas of a free-market system.

Keywords Altruism, Business ethics, Corporate social responsibility, Corporate image

Paper type Conceptual paper

1. Basic problem of pure (and enlightened) type of egoism

The term ‘‘egoism’’ is usually used to address exclusive concern with satisfying one’s own

desires, getting what one wants. It is the phenomenon of acting in strict accordance with

one’s own desires, wishes, and best interests in terms of self-preservation, or self-interest

satisfaction, or preference satisfaction. So basically, egoism can be understood both as

presupposing others and not.

À propos the first possibility, which seems to be implicit in the common notion of it, egoism

presupposes others – i.e. their desires, wishes, and interests – explicitly stating that one’s

own desires, wishes, and interests are to be satisfied exclusively and explicitly contrary to

the interests of others. So, a common understanding of egoism presupposes and excludes

others at the same time (is it then paradoxical?). It presupposes others in the manner that it

must presuppose others in order to be described as being contrary to others, i.e. in order to

be identified as ‘‘(pure) self interest’’. At the same time it excludes others in order to be

identified as ‘‘pure (self) interest’’. In other words, egoism must presuppose others in order

DOI 10.1108/17471110810856974 VOL. 4 NO. 1/2 2008, pp. 217-227, Q Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 1747-1117 j SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY JOURNAL j PAGE 217

Jelena Debeljak is a

Teaching Assistant and

Kristijan Krkač is a

Professor, both at the

Zagreb School of

Economics and

Management, Zagreb,

Croatia.

The authors wish to thank David Crowther, Khosro S. Jahdi and Josip Lukin for valuable comments and suggestions.

to be identified as ‘‘self interest’’ and it must exclude others in order to be identified as

‘‘pure’’ self interest.

Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility that an egoist can satisfy the interests of

others as the by-product of the exclusive satisfaction of his/her own interests. But, as far as

egoism as satisfaction of one’s own preferences includes others, it seems to be important

whether others are egoists or non-egoists. Because, if egoism necessarily includes at least

some use of others (in case of scarce resources) in order to satisfy one’s own preferences, it

then seems that egoism is possible only if most of the people are not egoists, since if the

opposite were the case, then egoist could not satisfy his/her preferences very easily. In fact,

and in the case of scarce resources, if others are not egoists but, for example, altruists,

utilitarians or pragmatists, an egoist would satisfy his/her preferences much more easily than

in the case where others are egoists (see Table I). The second possibility is that egoism does

not presuppose the existence of others, at least in some relevant sense, for example as

autonomous, rational and free moral agents. This possibility will be discussed below.

However, as mentioned, and from a logical point of view, it is not inconsistent that an egoist

cannot satisfy the interests of others as a by-product of satisfying his/her own interests,

because under ideal conditions it would be highly probable, very easy to achieve and eo

ipso the only rational thing to do. Ideal conditions are such that the most or all people are

egoists and that there is a sufficient amount of resources, skills, and motivation to use these

resources in a way that every egoist can and in fact does satisfy his/her own preferences

without preventing others doing so as well. But, since there are no ideal conditions, what we

have here is a certain problem. So, we have two types of egoism:

1. in the first case we have ‘‘enlightened egoism’’ since others exist but they serve as mere

means for the egoist’s ends; and

2. in the second case we have ‘‘pure egoism’’ which ontologically ends in solipsism since

others do not exist in the same way as the egoist.

If egoism is pure, then it implies solipsism, which can be refuted quite easily, at least from

certain ontological and epistemological positions. On the other hand, if egoism is

enlightened, then it faces an ethical objection which states (at least from the known Kantian

perspective) that its consequence is that an egoist uses others as a means to his/her own

ends, while he/she should treat others as ends in themselves. It is arguable that pure egoism

is also morally wrong since it excludes others on the basis of some relevant features like

autonomy, freedom, etc. But, is this common understanding (and its explication) of egoism

correct, and above all acceptable (see Figure 1)?

Table I Satisfying preferences under scarce and non-scarce resources

An egoist will satisfy his/her preferences in the case of: Others: egoists Others: non-egoists

Scarce resources Hard Easy Non-scarce resources Easy Easy

Figure 1 Pure and enlightened egoism

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2. Does pure egoism imply ‘‘moral solipsism’’?

2.1 Ontological objection

The possibility of pure egoism will be examined here. Pure egoism is stating that one’s own

interests are not just ‘‘more valuable’’ than the interests of others, but due to ‘‘exclusiveness’’

it also states, or at least implies, that mentioned interests are ‘‘the only valuable’’ interests,

and if it states that the interests of others are not interests at all, then it seems to imply the

ontological position known as solipsism.

In short, does it imply that others exist at all, or does it imply a certain type of solipsism, say

‘‘ethical solipsism’’, something like ‘‘Others are not moral agents’’? If ‘‘being more valuable’’

is just jargon or the rhetoric of egoism, and if ‘‘exclusiveness’’ is taken seriously, then there is

nothing to be excluded because there are no others (at least in terms of their interests, their

moral status, or their moral agency), since they are used as mere means for the egoist’s

ends. On the other hand, solipsism as a type of ontology has many difficult problems, and

they apply to ‘‘moral solipsism’’ ceteris paribus. The problem then is not an ethical one – i.e.

the problem of ‘‘others-regards’’ or ‘‘regarding of others’’ – but prior to this it is an ontological

one, i.e. the problem of ‘‘inclusion of others’’, or in fact their exclusion from the moral

perspective or moral horizon (this possibility will be discussed in some detail in section 5).

For one thing solipsism cannot be stated consistently as Bertrand Russell quite clearly

pointed out in Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits (Russell, 1994). Other objections are

that solipsism is psychologically impossible to believe, and that if one pretends that one

believes in solipsism, then one must be insincere (and if one states that he/she sincerely

believes in solipsism, then one is either lying, or has some kind of disorder, or is just

‘‘bullshitting’’ in Frankfurt’s terms), and finally solipsism is just technical play with Descartes’

principle ‘‘Je pense, donc je suis’’.

So, if it is possible to argue that egoism implies solipsism, or that in fact egoism is moral

solipsism, then this argument would be a nice objection to the common understanding of it,

but only, of course, if the common understanding implies ‘‘pure egoism’’.

2.2 Epistemological objection

A somewhat different possibility of objection to egoism is not from the point of view of

solipsism as ontological implication of egoism, but rather from the point of view of solipsism

as its epistemological implication. Namely, the question is – how is egoism formulated? It

seems to state ‘‘There is nothing beside my interests’’, and its final conclusion is ‘‘I don’t

know anything besides my interest’’. But this is not precise because there is no sense in

saying ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘my’’, since there are no others. Finally, there is something like ‘‘These are the

interests’’, and what follows is the list of them or just ‘‘the list’’, since there can be only

interests on the list.

So egoism as moral solipsism becomes more senseless and unacceptable as it becomes

more rigorous and logically consistent.

However, solipsist-based objections presuppose that egoism implies solipsism as a radical

denial of others not just as beings with interests, or generally speaking valuable, but more

than that: if egoism is moral solipsism, then others are existent as moral agents of the same

kind as an egoist, but only as beings of lesser value. The difference is not in level but in kind.

As a result, these objections hold only if egoism implies solipsism and/or if egoism is ethical

solipsism. Since it is not argued in the literature that it does not or that it is not, and more than

that, it seems that common understanding confuses psychological, ethical, and so-called

rational egoism, we must examine the distinction and these differences.

3. Types of egoism and a summary of some objections

There are few types of egoism. First, we can differentiate between descriptive and normative

egoism. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than

describe what one does do. Descriptive types are psychological, and as it were rational, and

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the most famous normative is ethical, but we can also construct aesthetical, cultural,

religious, political, economical, and legal types of normative egoism.

Economical egoism will be explicated and discussed in next section as the primary subject

matter of this paper. Types of egoism can be classified as shown in Figure 2 (the distinctions

are somewhat modified in comparison those commonly stated; see especially Wilbur, 1997;

Shaver, 1999, 2002).

The most frequent objections to psychological egoism are formulated in many cases of

sacrifice where there is no obvious reason why we should count an action of sacrifice as an

action of satisfaction of self-interest. However, in the opinion of the present authors, Kavka’s

‘‘predominant egoism’’ bypasses all of these and similar counterexamples (see Shaver,

2002), since there is vast difference between ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘predominant’’ egoism.

On the other hand, moral egoism differs greatly from other moral theories. This is because

other moral theories, such as virtue ethics, Kantianism, utilitarianism, etc., give substantial

weight to the interests of the others, and egoism does not. This distinction between

self-regard and others-regard and between self-interest and interest of the self seems to be

the core problem of egoism (as it will be discussed in section 5).

This leads to many objections (prescriptiveness, universalisability, etc.) to moral egoism

which show that it is theoretically unacceptable. But, the core problem is not that egoism is

inconsistent or unjustified, but rather that it is practised, and further that it is used as an

explication and justification of practice, especially in some spheres of human life. One such

often emphasised sphere of life is business and commerce. Here of course, we differentiate

between egoism as moral theory and egoism as practice since one who holds egoism as

moral theory can be very rational and even altruistic in practical matters.

But we are interested in the opposite possibility, namely the possibility in which one acts on

the basis of selfish motives and tries to justify (in fact rationalise) one’s actions by appeal to

egoism as moral theory, i.e. as psychological or moral egoism, which seems to be the case

in business activities.

4. Business (ethics), self-interest and interest of the self

Ethical egoism is often spelled out as the basic way of acting in business, i.e. ‘‘We ought to

act in an egoist manner’’ is the basic idea. Adam Smith, who is often cited as the founder of

economic egoism as moral theory, was obviously not so sure. For one thing he advanced

only some kind of psychological egoism in his An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the

Wealth of Nations (1776), but defended different position in his earlier book The Theory of

Moral Sentiments (1759). Egoism in such a jargon simply means an amoral position (for

problems in Smith’s position or the so-called ‘‘Adam Smith problem’’, see Black, 2006).

Figure 2 Types of egoism

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However, interpretations of Smith’s major ideas are somewhat divergent, but Black (2006)

summarises them very precisely (see Table II).

Besides such historical and/or quasi-theoretical explanations of egoism, businessmen often

say that their morally good deeds are reserved for their private lives, not for their professions.

So, contrary to Friedman’s idea that the only social responsibility of business is to make

profit, the most stated idea is that there is ethics in business and that it is ‘‘egoistic business

ethics’’.

In fact business people do not speak of egoism, and of pursuit of self-interest, but rather of

utility maximisation. So, in fact, business people are not simple egoists, but rather

‘‘enlightened egoists’’, since they believe that an egoist should not be ignorant regarding the

interests of the others, but rather that an egoist should have ‘‘other-regarding’’ interests in a

way that he/she should use others as an instruments for their own ends.

But a nice objection has been formulated against ‘‘enlightened egoism’’, especially in

business. Self-interest in business, as well as in other spheres of human activity, requires

many things besides exclusively good consequences toward the self, namely freedom of

choice, continuous concern, consistency, etc. So self-interest is possible only if these

conditions are present and maintained. When an egoist maintains these conditions for

him/herself, he/she maintains them for everyone, since they are the same for everyone

(Wilbur, 1997, p. 577). And if this is so, then the ‘‘enlightened egoist’’ should believe that

egoism is good for everybody, and in such a case, i.e. in a case where the most of people are

egoists and resources are scarce, it would be quite hard, if not practically impossible, to

achieve egoist goals.

But, businessmen can answer to such objections in a manner holding the position of

descriptive or psychological egoism, i.e. the fact that most people act egoistically, and that

they should do so also. But, there are further objections to such position.

First and foremost, and according to some views, this is a wrong conclusion from ‘‘is’’ to

‘‘ought’’. Second, it must be at least mentioned that, quite unfortunately for businessmen,

some empirical investigations of ‘‘homo economicus’’ (at least in small-scale societies) show

that there is no such human egoistic nature (Henrich et al., 2001, pp. 73-8).

It can also be added that there is some evidence that ‘‘altruistic nature’’ is in fact what

predominates. But the argument can also be formulated the other way around in order to be

more obvious to economists. One of the best-selling textbooks in the USA says:

The primary driving force of capitalism is self-interest. Each economic unit attempts to do what is

best for itself. An entrepreneur . . . Workers . . . Consumers . . . In brief, capitalism presumes

self-interest as the modus operandi for the various economic units as they express their free

choices. The motive of self-interest gives direction and consistency to what might otherwise be an

extremely chaotic economy. Pursuit of self-interest should not be confused with selfishness

(McConnell and Brue, 1999, p. 63).

So, what we know about self-interest is in fact nothing. Since it is very important not to

confuse it with selfishness, or even with egoism, as the textbooks often emphasise, we can

presume that the formula is more complicated than it first seemed. That is, the entrepreneur,

Table II Different interpretations of Smith

WN WN and TMS TMS

Accepting only WN self-interest, and rejecting TMS theory of altruism

Accepting both as ‘‘economic realism’’ (Becker, 1989; Rosenberg, 1990; Mini, 1972)

Accepting both as a sign of complete system (Heilbroner, 1982; West, 1969; Morrow, 1928; Rosenberg, 1960; Cropsey, 1975)

Accepting only TMS in favour of criticism of WN and affirmation of economic role of benevolence (Etzioni, 1988; Collard, 1978; Lutz and Lux, 1988)

Notes: WN, The Wealth of Nations; TMS, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. All references are cited in Black (2006)

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worker, or consumer can do something that is not selfish but still in their best self-interest.

But, self-interest is always connected with maximization of profit, so there is not much of a

choice here: in fact, the choice is between direct and indirect selfishness. But to choose

between them, the entrepreneur, worker, or consumer must be rational in making the choice.

So the formula goes something like this:

Maximisation of profits þ rational choice þ direct or indirect selfishness

¼ economic self-interest

(while the first and the second correct the third). But, some textbooks, besides defining

self-interest, are also engaged in some kind of questioning of the formula: for example, are

people fundamentally selfish? So, they come up with the conclusion that there are many

exceptions to the outcomes predicted on the basis of the assumption that people are

self-interested in the narrowest sense. A very realistic and critical approach to self-interest can

be found in Sen’s work Rationality and Freedom (Sen, 2002), pp. 22-32, 46-8, 225-8). Of

course, Sen is talking of ‘‘self-interest maximization’’ (Sen, 2002), pp. 22-6), which means that

to behave rationally is to behave in such a way that maximises one’s self-interest. However,

Sen is quite critical, especially from the moral point of view. But, and it seems important to

mention, Sen takes into consideration realistic self-interest, rather than oversimplified

concepts of romantic morality on one hand, and on the other, of self-interest as pure egoistic

(or predatory) strategies. Moreover, it seems that he clearly rejects at least RTC-3 (rational

choice theory 3) which says that ‘‘the self-interest of the person is narrowly self-centred and is

unaffected by interests of others and about fairness of processes’’ (Sen, 2002), p. 31).

At this point, we do not have in mind alternative solutions like a needs-based economy

instead of a preferences-based economy. This nevertheless implies a certain ‘‘mixed

economy’’, or as Doyal and Gough (1991) call it, ‘‘liberal democratic socialism’’ (p. 295).

However, there is a certain distinction in the meaning of the term ‘‘mixed economy’’.

Sometimes it refers to a mixture of economic and political values such as in ‘‘liberal

democratic socialism’’ (Doyal and Gough, 1991), ‘‘participatory economics’’ (Albert,

Hahnel), or in ‘‘real models’’ (Pope John Paul II in the Encyclical Letter ‘‘Centesimus annus’’).

On the other hand, sometimes it refers to the strong influence of government, non-profit

economy, and industrial democracy on capitalist procedures, values, and goals (in short it

refers to the level of economic freedom and democratisation of the private economic sector

at the same time). Every day, people walk away from profitable transactions whose terms

they believe to be ‘‘unfair’’. Because there are many exceptions from self-interest (honesty,

cooperation, altruistic strategies, etc.), we must be sceptical about this feature of capitalism.

But there are clear results from cultural anthropology that show that self-interest (as action in

one’s own best interest) is not so common among some societies and that there are different

strategies like others-interests as the main motive (as action in the best interest of others, or

of the majority, or of all, or of an oppressed minority or majority).

Principal argument: so, if there are no empirical data that show that there is an egoistic

human nature, especially in business activities and commerce, and if there is no consistent

ethical theory that can justify ethical egoism as selfish practice, then egoism as selfishness

in business is just a question of jargon and rhetoric of the modern and contemporary market

economy and capitalist ideology, some kind of predatory mindset (maybe just a game, and

maybe even a kind of disorder) which is not just an irrational thing to believe in but also

morally unacceptable, at least as the practice of believing in it as a rational thing to do, and

maybe as a justification of practice also.

This leads us back to the first problem discussed at the beginning of the paper. But, besides

all these objections we are in fact practical egoists from time to time, and we have certain

rhetoric we use to explicate it, and after all we believe it is OK. Why is this so?

5. Self-interest and interest of the self: the question of moral perspective

As far as we can see, there is an ethical theory of egoism, and also a psychological

explanation of human actions in terms of egoism, and the dominant ‘‘business ethics in

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action’’, no matter how invalid, descriptively, ethically, or rationally, and financially successful

on the other hand. But if we try to analyse the basic notion of egoism, especially regarding

business, then we can surely differ between self-interest and interest of the self, and that

seems to be the core of the problem.

First and foremost every business is about profits. In a similar way, architecture is about

buildings, and the medical profession is about curing disease and maintaining health, etc.

However, if a bridge falls down due to unprofessional actions by an architect and builders,

we would say that it was done unprofessionally and contrary to a code of ethics or conduct in

these professions. On the other hand, if a business is managed profitably and at the same

time with severe damage or harm to different stakeholders (as ‘‘externalising machine’’), it

would be said that it is just business.

Why is it unacceptable in the first case to say ‘‘It is just medicine’’ or ‘‘It is just architecture’’,

and it seems to be acceptable in the second case to say ‘‘It is just business’’? There is no

obvious reason. Or, stated the other way around, why is it acceptable in the first case to say

‘‘It is an obvious case of misconduct and immoral action’’, but this seems to be

unacceptable in the second case? Once again, there is no obvious reason.

But there is a certain distinction, since the principal motive, namely in business, is

self-interest, and in other professions it seems to be an interest of the self/selves. The

difference here is substantial and it concerns the difference in perspective (in function or in

context, not in substance), since what an egoist lacks is just a perspective, and acceptance

of certain naı̈ve consequence – there are others or other selves and they have their interest

and goals in themselves as well as I do. There is also an even stronger consequence – there

are selves and their sometimes common, sometimes unique interests that should be

recognized for their own sake. In the words of the German philosopher H.G. Gadamer, the

first insight is quite simple:

[To] acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to

look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and a truer proportion (Gadamer, 1979,

p. 305).

So what one who identifies interests of the self with self-interest really lacks is moral

perspective. This moral perspective, on the other hand, is that which will lead him/her toward

recognition and inclusion of the other.

If businessmen are practically selfish and if this is the only way to be financially successful,

then a business, if it is financially sustainable, must violate the human rights of the others; in

other words, it is incompatible with the requirement of being environmentally friendly and

socially responsible, as is suggested in the Green Paper of the European Commission,

‘‘Promoting a European framework for corporate social responsibility’’ (European

Commission, 2001).

6. A note on Jesus’ second commandment

According to gospels Jesus summarized the Ten Commandments in two. The second

commandment is the commandment of love toward others with the measure of love for one’s

self or self-love: ‘‘Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’’ (Matthew 22: 39).

According to classical interpretations of the text (by Catholics as well as by Reformed

Christians), the text contains no affirmation of self-love at all. We can summarize this

interpretation as follows: the question whether the text of the double commandment

legitimates self-love in its directive to ‘‘love the neighbor as yourself’’ has been much

debated. In our narcissistic culture impregnated with popular psychology, many have taken

this as a command for self-love. But, according to the interpretation, the text does not

command self-love; possibly it recognizes its existence, and at the very most it legitimises it.

The measuring rod is not ‘‘self-love’’. Certainly ‘‘as yourself’’ does not include the command

to love one’s self nor state that one should love one’s self. The comparison was not intended

to recognise the legitimacy of self-love but to point to the power of self-assertion.

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Even if there is just recognition of the fact of self-love, and of the power of self-assertion, there

is another possible and unorthodox interpretation.

So, what he said seems to be that we should be altruist measured by our egoism. On one

side, one who cannot love him/her-self surely cannot love others. On the other side, one can

love him/her-self only by loving others. This kind of radical altruism seems strange, almost as

radical egoism. In both cases a self is completely defined by others, in the first case by

serving others, and in the second case by using others for egoistic purposes. But, the fact is

that there are selves with their interests as a ‘‘self-assertion’’ even in the orthodox reading of

the commandment. The fact is that each and every one of us loves him/her-self, and if it is so,

then this seems to be a good measure for our love toward others in terms of proportionality.

But this is not inconsistent with the fact that every average human being has self-regards

and others-regards in certain proportion. In this way it seems to be a strong realistic position.

The question is – which proportion is morally acceptable? As far as we can see, Jesus

commands that 1:1 is an acceptable proportion. So if we have two scales from 1 to 10, where

one scale is for egoism and the other is for altruism, with 1 being the lowest quantity and

quality and 10 being the highest quantity and quality of self-love and others-love, then Jesus

commands that proportions like 1:1, 5:5, and 10:10, for example, are morally acceptable,

and proportions like 5:1, 1:5, 3:8, 7:4, etc., are morally unacceptable. However, it does not

say that the 10:10 proportion is more acceptable than 5:5, for example. Radical egoism (5:1

for example) as well as radical altruism (1:5 for example) is excluded by the commandment

according to our interpretation. In fact, this quantitative interpretation is probably, and also

according to some commentators, what Smith’s idea regarding the rule was (Black, 2006,

referring to West, 1969, p. 95).

This interpretation can also be quite consistently connected to the ‘‘Golden Rule’’. Since the

eighteenth century the ‘‘Golden Rule’’ has commonly designated the ethical maxim, ‘‘Do

unto others as you would have others do unto you’’, attributed to Jesus by Matthew (7: 12)

and Luke (6: 31). The descriptive terminology is thus quite modern, but it had an antecedent

in the expression, ‘‘Golden Law’’ used of the maxim as early as 1674. So reciprocity is quite

important, and why shouldn’t it be in the Second Commandment also? If it is, then they fit

nicely together and explicate in which way egoism as self-regard should be understood,

accepted and practised in its everyday context, private or public, business or otherwise.

7. Strong enough to care: cool guys don’t care, or is it the other way around?!

Sometimes is seems people today are tending to become something like the ex-Enron leaders.

Maybe because they seem really bold and daring . . . but this is not where their story stops; they

were no Supermen (the reader will hear more about this character later). Weren’t they a perfect

example of self-interest and egoism? They picked the path of unlimited greed (i.e. were

deceived by the power of money) that led them towards a dead end. On the opposite sides of

those very two powers that run a great part of the world – i.e. money and sex – stand love and

care as the opposite choice in any context of unlimited sexual or material consumption.

Thus, not caring, or not being able to express care/love, would be a sign of weakness or

some apparent psychological deviation. And there are not many, especially not in such a

macho-oriented kind of society as ours, who want to be weak. But this calls for a song line:

‘‘Where have all the good men gone/And where are all the gods? [. . .] It’s gonna take a

superman to sweep me off my feet’’ (Bonny Tyler, I Need a Hero). And Superman cares. A lot.

He would save everyone. He did care about his neighbour and others. He would even risk

his own life (he was a fictional superhero so un-reciprocity on behalf of others is allowed).

Jesus, one of the original authors of moral reciprocity theory, as described above, actually

did die for all humanity once, saying something as that one time would do, so we can freely

continue following the moral reciprocity and nobody has to die for anyone or anything. But

He was God so He could step beyond the limits of moral reciprocity in behalf of all

humankind. That was His excuse. (Also the chain that needed to be broken in the eternal war

between Good and Evil asked for only one just man’s death. Jesus took that sacrifice.) As for

the rest of us, to be just, we only need to care. It’s nice to have Superman to remind us of the

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moral strength a man has the potential to pose. This strength grows by each decision one

makes in the part of the good. That takes courage.

Ethics of care representative Nell Noddings differentiates two types of caring:

1. ‘‘caring for’’ (in direct encounters in which one person cares for another, refers to a special

attribute of relations, and as such, theoretically stands above ‘‘caring about’’); and

2. ‘‘caring about’’ (more general, refers to care as a virtue and take us to a more public

realm; may be foundation of justice).

It’s important to notice that ‘‘care for’’ is about ‘‘closer’’ relationships because we ‘‘care for’’ in

one-to-one relations: ‘‘It is physically impossible to ‘care for’ all of humanity, strangers who

have not addressed us directly, or those unknown others at a great distance’’ (Noddings, ‘‘Two

concepts of caring’’; cited in Debeljak et al., 2007). Those ‘‘unknown others’’ we can ‘‘care

about’’: ‘‘Still, when we have acquired the attitude of care, we feel impelled to do something for

any people who are suffering’’ (Noddings, ‘‘Two concepts of caring’’; cited in Debeljak et al.,

2007). Although Noddings explains that the act of caring requires moving away from one’s self

and standing for the reality of someone else’s life, she says that care ethics also includes self

care – but in a nurturing, not self-maximising way (Debeljak et al., 2007).

This sort of thinking can be linked with an interpretation of Jesus’s lesson in Luke 6, 41-45 (‘‘41

Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank

in your own eye? 42 How can you say to your brother, ‘Brother, let me take the speck out of your

eye’, when you yourself fail to see the plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the plank

out of your eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye’’),

meaning ‘‘How can you be truly interested and care about somebody else, if you don’t care

about your own self first?!’’. And Mark 4, 24 as well (‘‘24 ‘Consider carefully what you hear’, he

continued. ‘With the measure you use, it will be measured to you – and even more. 25

Whoever has will be given more; whoever does not have, even what he has will be taken from

him’’’). This argues for the account of reciprocity between caring/loving one’s self and others.

Altruism can be viewed as:

B Healthy altruism – self love, or self care, with the purpose of being able to love others, in

line with Jesus’ first commandment of love and ethics of care way of understanding self

care.

B Unhealthy altruism – with the purpose of calming down one’s conscience, hidden

self-interest or non-reciprocity (as explained above). Namely, we can ask – when legal

persons are displaying, for example, philanthropy toward some neglected

stakeholder-group, is it just to show off or a simple advertisement, since in most cases

these very legal persons will one way or another make a profit out of it, or is it genuine care

for this group (which was ‘‘their’’ stakeholder-group in the first place, which is often

forgotten)? On the other hand, this seems to be a somewhat unfair question since there is

no way to object to the explanation of such actions in a way that a legal person cares as

their first goal, and only profit is only a by-product of this, maybe from advertising itself by

advertising such caring actions (this is in fact application of the well known ‘‘double-effect

theory’’). Comparing numbers regarding results of such care towards the neglected

stakeholder group and regarding the legal person’s profits from it (directly or indirectly,

regarding business culture and tax system; see Krkač and Debeljak, 2006; Krkač, 2007)

will be not sufficient for conclusive argument perhaps, but quite illustrative nevertheless.

There is a string flowing among people in society making them hesitate to show that they

care, as if it would be a sign of weakness. This sort of thinking, furthermore, also shows

prejudice towards a traditionally typically female way of knowing, based on a certain blend

of emotion, intuition and reason, on which care ethics is built. But, judging by what has been

said previously, not caring is a great sign of weakness.

In fact, (and following Walzer’s insight regarding the very nature of toleration; Walzer, 1997) it

can be claimed that to care is at least a sign of power, and not to care is at least a sign of lack

of power, maybe even a sign of fear or weakness.

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If one does not or cannot care about/love one’s neighbour (Jesus’s terminology) or the other

(Noddings’s terminology), it means one does not love one’s self. Jesus included this in his

first love commandment – we can love our neighbour only if we treat ourselves well first; and

we can also understand Noddings’s differentiation between care for and care about in the

way of supporting this argument. In addition, if one does not care/love, it means that one acts

un-nicely – destructively (inwardly, outwardly), to a certain degree. If you do not love

yourself, how can you be loved back by someone else? In order to avoid narcissism, it needs

to be taken in respect that self love, or self care, is limited or surrounded by humbleness and

appreciation of other people’s freedom. A young political science high school teacher,

talking about freedoms, said: ‘‘My personal freedom reaches as far as my arms can reach –

because that is the point where someone else’s freedom starts’’.

Throughout this thinking we are just trying to argue that care requires the kind of strength not

many possess; that so-called ‘‘soft’’ skills are not as soft as they sound, that it is advisable to

look behind the curtains – i.e. things we take for granted because they ‘‘seem’’ to be one

way.

Care and love are somewhere at the core of the moral strength. As with any sort of strength,

physical for example, in order to make it stronger and more solid, we need to practise

making the ‘‘right’’ choices, in the sense of the good ones, in order to make the civilized

world civilized, more human-like, and a step away from the primitive way of dealing with

issues, which would be proposing aggressive solutions.

To care, or simply caring, requires a certain moral strength. Or just requires strength! When

one does not possess the strength to care, not even the ‘‘ þ zero number’’ of strength of

finding the necessary real strength that potentially lies within each human being, it has been

understood as taking the easy way out – this path can also lead towards certain forced, or

conditioned, or fake altruism, or apparent care – through which it becomes possible to cover

up one’s own restless consciousness, comfort oneself or try to justify oneself by doing

something seemingly nice and worthy – which is not proposing a solution to restless

consciousness.

There is some good in each human being, just as there is bad. But the final decision between

good or bad, in every moral dilemma, which as a result leads towards which of the two, good

or bad, is going to prevail in an individual as a choice, and will therefore define him/her as a

good or bad person. The growth of either good or bad within us depends on choices we

make on the part of one or the other, consciously or not, in every particular moment.

Care and love require the greatest strength of all. They are no soft skills – capturing this is

gained best by exercising love and care in practice. Regarding this we can quote the

following passage from Wittgenstein’s book of notes, Culture and Value: ‘‘It is not by any

means clear to me that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in

a way we live, making all these questions superfluous’’ (Wittgenstein, 1947, p. 70).

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