Philosophy Assignment

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Notes on Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, for PL 202. Page numbers refer to selections in textbook, which is taken from the 1873 Abbot translation. It is not as clear as one might like.

The following quote is from Nietzsche, and it is quite insightful. “Kant’s joke. — Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the whole world, that the whole world was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in favor of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people” (The Gay Science, § 193).

THE GOOD WILL

81: only the good will is good without qualification. All of the other things we consider goods— intellectual goods like wit, intellect, etc., and moral goods like courage or resolution—are only as good as the will that directs them. They are good, then, only insofar as they are directed by a will that is good. They are not good in themselves. Even health, wealth, and happiness itself are only good if a good will is present with them—without that good will, they are not good; in fact, Kant suggests that they are occasions of pride and presumption. They are only good when the good will is present to correct their influence on the mind. A good will, Kant concludes, is “the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness” (81).

81-82: Some qualities, Kant argues, presuppose a good will—moderation, self-control, deliberation. These things are good insofar as they presuppose a good will. A moderate, self- controlled, deliberative man without a good will would be a very effective evil-doer.

82: the good will is good simply. It is not good because of what it does or accomplishes. It need not accomplish any good, in fact—it is good simply. Even if it is, through chance or nature, incapable of acting, it is still good. The good will is good regardless of whether or not it terminates in action. Compare this to Aristotle: for Aristotle, the virtues are only virtues if enacted. For Kant, the good will alone is sufficient—regardless of whether or not it terminates in action.

THE FIRST PROPSITION OF MORALITY

82: Kant’s point in bringing up the tradesman is that the tradesman behaves honestly, but not necessarily because he has a good will—his own advantage requires it. Kant concedes that people may behave honestly out of self-interest rather than good will. Kant writes: “men are thus honestly served, but this is not enough to make us believe the tradesman acted from duty and from principles of honesty: his own advantage required it. Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view” (82).

82-83: Kant compares this—honesty because of self-interest—with the duty to preserve one’s life. In addition to the duty obligatory upon all for self-preservation, Kant says that there is also a natural inclination toward self-preservation. So, inclination and duty coincide—however, Kant

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notes, though people may “preserve their life as duty requires,” that does not mean that they do so because they have a duty to do so. They may do it because of their natural inclination. The man who preserves his life because he loves it—it is pleasant and joyous—does not present to us a maxim of moral value; he may act simply on the basis of his innate inclination. It is the man who preserves his life though weary of it—the man who suffers and wishes for death, yet will not end his life, not out of fear, but out of duty—who provides a maxim with moral worth.

Beneficence toward others, Kant says, is a duty. Even though there are many who practice such beneficence out of natural inclination and a joy at spreading joy, nonetheless, their actions have no moral worth. Only those who do it out of duty (rather than inclination or pleasure at pleasing others) do something with true moral worth. Similarly, those who pursue projects of public benefit but do so out of a love of honor rather than a sense of duty do actions with no moral worth. For such actions to be morally valuable, they must be susceptible to expression as a maxim: all should behave as I do out of duty. “All should behave as I do out of pleasure” is not susceptible to such universal statement because people will not take pleasure in the same things. Only duty is universal. The natural question, then, is: what is our duty and how do we know it? Kant’s point is this: when we do what is right or proper from a sense of our duty rather than from natural inclination, then and only then, does the action of moral worth. Aristotle’s virtuous man chooses virtuous action for its own sake—he takes pleasure in virtuous action. The very fact that virtue is pleasant for the virtuous man makes the virtuous man suspect. Aristotle’s continent man—who does the right thing because he knows it is the right thing, even though he desires wrongly—is closer to what Kant has in mind. Rousseau, in the Reveries of the Solitary Walker, simply says that he finds it easy and pleasing to perform acts of morality on the basis of feeling and inclination, but when they are demanded by custom or duty, he chafes under them.1 Kant’s point is that desire is insufficient—what makes a moral action a moral action is when it is done from duty.

83: Kant turns to the Christian injunction to love one’s enemies in this light. “Love, as an affection,” he writes, “cannot be commanded, but beneficence for duty’s sale may.” His point is that the Christian injunction imposes a duty whereby one must carry out beneficent action, performing the actions of love, which one can choose to do, rather than possess beneficent feelings or sentiment, which are ultimately not subject to the will.

THE SECOND AND THIRD PROPOSITIONS OF MORALITY

The second proposition of morality, Kant says, is that the moral value of an action does not derive from the effect of the action. It depends only on the “principle of volition” by which it has been undertaken. The purposes that we pursue do not matter; the effects that we actually

                                                                                                                          1 Opening of the Sixth Walk in Rousseau’s Reveries of the Solitary Walker

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accomplish do not matter. All that matters, Kant says, is “the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action.”

The third proposition is a consequence of the first two. This is that: “Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law.” This means that actions from inclination or desire are not actions from duty. Any action that stems from inclination or desire, even if it is identical to the action that Kant would say moral duty requires, is questionable because of the admixture of interest. He writes: “an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations.”

I want to step back from Kant at this point and emphasize just how radical a break Kant represents with most of the other thinkers we have read. Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hobbes can broadly be considered eudaimonistic thinkers—they can be grouped under this heading because they identify a human orientation toward happiness and argue that moral virtue is conducive toward that end in various ways. Aristotle says this explicitly; the natural law in Aquinas is oriented toward earthly good; in Hobbes it is oriented toward the satisfaction of the passions. In all three cases, virtue is not set apart from self-interest or the good of the individual. Additionally, Aristotle explicitly states that virtue is pursuit of a mean relative to us as a prudent man would identify it according to an assessment of all of the particulars of a situation. What this means is that moral reasoning occurs on “rough ground,” and the results of moral reasoning are always tied to specific conditions. Aristotle is no absolutist, as the proper action will vary— sometimes wildly!—depending on the particulars of the situation. Now, what has Kant been telling us up until this point? He has been telling us that moral action is a) disconnected from individual desires or passions as well as individual happiness and b) it is properly understood as law-governed coupled with an individual duty to follow that law. Kant’s formulation leaves little room for deviation, and severs morality itself from concerns of human happiness. Kant’s view, based as it is upon duty, is called a deontological ethic as opposed to the eudaimonistic ethics of Aristotle or the natural law thinkers we have read this semester.

Returning to Kant, he now explicitly states that the moral value of an action is separate from the expected effect, and from any principle which is tied to the expected effect of the action. These effects could occur through other causes, such as chance, and they would not, therefore, require the presence of a rational will; however, it is in such a will only that “the supreme and unconditional good” exists—the good will, discussed above. Moral good consists only, says Kant, in “the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, insofar as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will.”

THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY: THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

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What sort of law can determine the will independent of any consideration of ends, effects, or interest in order that the will can be called good without qualification? The will is to be governed by one simple principle—the categorical imperative: “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.” Kant’s point is that this is universal. It does not consider particular situations or specific actions—it cannot do so if we are to take the idea of duty seriously.

84: Kant’s first example: can I, in distress, make a promise with the intention of breaking it? Kant rightly notes that the question has two senses: is it prudent to do so? Is it right to do so? He concedes that it may sometimes be prudent, i.e., it may serve a particular interest in the short term. But, he suggests, consideration of long-term interest may lead to conclude that it is better to promise only with the intention to keep the promise, because to do otherwise may prove troublesome. Even then, however, Kant does not think it truly moral, because it is based on the fear of consequences. Benjamin Franklin famously said that honesty is the best policy. But that simply means that honesty is the most useful policy. Kant rejects such arguments and justifications because they entail doing a moral action (being honest) for what Kant does not consider a sufficiently moral reason (self-interest). Instead, Kant says the simplest way to answer the question is to ask:

Should I be content that my maxim… should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others; and should I be able to say to myself, ‘Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself’? Then I presently become aware that, while I can will the lie, I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe the allegation, or if they over-hastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, so soon as it should be made a universal law, would destroy itself (bottom left-top right of 84).

Because of this, Kant says, he doesn’t need to have experience in the many things of the world. He only needs to ask himself if the maxim of his action can be universalized. That is the only question. Note that this means a rejection of prudence. Socrates, in book I of the Republic, asks Cephalus: “as to this very thing, justice, shall we so simply assert that it is the truth and giving back what a man has taken from another, or is to do these things sometimes just and sometimes unjust? Take this case as an example of what I mean: everyone would surely say that if a man takes weapons from a friend when the latter is of sound mind, and the friend demands them back when he is mad, one shouldn’t give back such things, and the man who gave them back would

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not be just, and moreover, one should not be willing to tell someone in this state the whole truth.”2 Kant would not agree with the Socratic proposition.

Also, we have (at last) a definition of duty: “the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law.” Kant’s use of law is particularly noteworthy: Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, suggests the law speaks generally and must be supplemented or corrected by a specific kind of justice – “equity” in most translations – that can take account of particulars. Kant is presenting it as simply a matter of being duty bound to follow a law.

Kant closes this section by noting that all men hold to this view, even though they do not articulate it in these terms.

IMPERATIVES: HYPOTHETICAL AND CATEGORICAL

To be rational is to be capable of acting according to law. Note that Kant is in agreement with Hume on a crucial point: “the will is nothing but practical reason,” in other words, the will is other than theoretical reason. Kant does not root it in sentiment as Hume did, but he does break with the ancient and medieval views. An objective principle, conceived as obligatory to the will, is a command of reason called an Imperative.

85.

Imperatives are expressed by the word ought or shall.

Imperatives are either a. Hypothetical – possible action as a means to something else that is willed. Such

actions are good only as means, Kant says. a. Good for some possible purpose – problematical b. Good for some actual purpose - assertorial

b. Categorical – action as necessary of itself, not as a means. The categorical imperative concerns action that is “good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which itself conforms to reason.”

a. The categorical imperative is an apodictic principle FIRST FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: UNIVERSAL LAW A hypothetical imperative depends on conditions, therefore it cannot be known beforehand. A categorical one differs. What is the categorical imperative? See the bottom left on page 85.

                                                                                                                          2 Republic 331c.

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FOUR ILLUSTRATIONS (pp. 85-86)

1. A suicidal man. Kant says that from self-love he desires to end his life because of the prospect of greater evils than satisfaction. “his maxim is: from self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.” This, says Kant, is not universalizable, because then a sentiment meant to improve and preserve life – self-love – would be used to destroy life.

2. What of a man in great financial need? Such a one might promise to repay a loan even though he has no intention of repaying the loan. Can such a principle be consistent? Only with his own welfare, but not as universalized maxim: “supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promises, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view of it”

3. Someone is especially gifted by nature, but chooses not to cultivate that talent, instead whiling away life in idle pleasures. Such a maxim is not incompatible with nature, but nevertheless, cannot be willed: “as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.”

4. Someone prospers while others have to contend with misery. He could help them, but asks: why is it my business? [This is the Ayn Rand argument; note that such an argument is not the same thing as a libertarian argument] A maxim based on that unwillingness to help is impossible, because “a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.”

SECOND FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF

What is the will? It is a faculty determining action in accordance with certain laws, and therefore the will only exists in rational beings. The ends which are pursued as the effects of action are merely relative, and therefore cannot be rendered universal – these particular ends can only give hypothetical imperatives. A categorical imperative requires “something whose existence has in itself and absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would like the source of a possible categorical imperative” (85- 86). 86. Man and any other rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means. Kant will provides two vivid examples in his Lectures in Ethics: “Sexual love,” as opposed to true human

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love, “makes of the loved person an Object of appetite; as soon as that appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which has been sucked dry.”3 On the subject of prostitution, Kant writes: “to allow one’s person for profit to be used by another for the satisfaction of sexual desire, to make of oneself and Object of demand, is to dispose over oneself as over a thing and to make of oneself a thing on which another satisfies his appetite, just as he satisfies his hunger upon a steak.”4 Objects of our inclinations have only a conditional worth – because without those inclinations, they would have no value. This means the worth of objects that are acquired by our actions are only conditional at best. Human beings, as rational, are persons rather than things, to be treated as ends rather than means merely. The foundation of the principle underlying the universal practical law or categorical imperative in respect of human will is: “rational nature exists as an end in itself.” This leads to the practical imperative: act in such a manner as to treat human beings, either in oneself or in other people, as ends in themselves rather than as means to an end. THE KINGDOM OF ENDS The concept of the kingdom of ends is derived, Kant says, from a consideration of the will of a rational being as one which must conceive of itself as giving universals laws through the maxim of its actions. By kingdom, Kant means “the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws.” This is a conception of all the multiple ends – special ends and rational beings as ends in themselves – conceived of as a “systematic whole.” This is a common union or kingdom of rational beings because each of the rational beings is ordered under a law whereby all other rational beings must be treated as ends rather than means. Kant’s conception here is of the rational being as universal lawgiver – each rational being, qua rationality, acts in way that legislates and each rational being is therefore both member and sovereign in the kingdom of ends. 88. In light of all this, what is morality? It is the referring “of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible.” In other words, morality is identical to acting in such a manner that the will could regard itself as providing maxims to justify universal law. What makes an action moral? Correspondence with this requirement. Can one deviate from “universal moral laws” for the sake of prudence or necessity? No. For Aristotle, virtue identifies the mean in any given situation; it is the application of a principle, prudentially, to the particulars of a situation. Not so for Kant – for Kant, morality is a matter of rule-following. Kant says (para. 2),                                                                                                                           3  Quoted in Arthur & Scalet, 8th edition, 286. 4 Quoted in Arthur & Scalet, 8th edition, 287.

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that neither feelings, nor impulses, nor inclinations have anything to do with this – it is entirely based on the relation of rational beings one to another, and in such a relation the will must always be conceived of as legislative. In the kingdom of ends, everything has value or dignity; dignity is superior to value says Kant. Market value exists in reference to human wants in general – hard work and labor, for example; fancy value in reference to the particular tastes of particular men – wit, imagination, and humor; dignity “constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself” and denotes an intrinsic worth – principled benevolence and keeping promises, for example. What has dignity? Humanity – previously morality was identical to acting as though one’s maxim could be made a universal law; now it is “the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself.” It is important to notice the mover Kant has made here: a rational being, to have dignity, must follow or recognize the categorical imperative. Failure to do so is failure of rationality. One must participate in “morality” in order to be an end in oneself. Human beings are the only things possessing dignity or intrinsic worth because they are capable of being moral. Actions associated with dignity, Kant says, are “looked on with immediate favour and satisfaction” and are imposed on the will by the simple presence of reason. Why is this the case? Kant says it is because we are free – we are free in regard to physical nature, and therefore only abound by the laws we legislate for ourselves. Human dignity is based on rational autonomy – but rational autonomy means legislating for ourselves the categorical imperative. 89. THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL What does autonomy mean? Kant says it means the will is a law unto itself, and therefore that the principle underlying it is that we should choose in a “way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law.” THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM IS THE KEY THAT EXPLAINS THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL What does Kant mean by freedom of the will? He means it can be an independent causa efficiens. The language comes from Aristotle – Kant means that the will is an independent and un-influenced cause of motion or change; i.e., it is not determined by physical causes. Therefore freedom of the will is identical to autonomy. What makes us free beings? Human freedom stems from the fact that we can act under the aspect of freedom, or, put alternatively, the fact that the will is an independent efficient cause. It must regard itself as free from “foreign influences.”