Introduction to Philosophy :weekly writing
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Lecture7INTRODUCTIONTOHUMESDIALOGUES.pptxINTRODUCTION TO HUME’S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION
TWO VIEWS OF GOD THAT WERE CURRENT IN HUME’S DAY
THEISM
A perfect being created the world.
He is actively involved in the course of events in the world, influencing history through miraculous interventions, issuing revelations through prophets and inspired scripture, the answering of prayer, etc.
DEISM
A perfect being created the world.
Since he created a perfect world, there is no need for him to keep tampering with it, or to intervene in its natural laws. The various stories of scripture and prophecy are not credible.
We can know about this being through rational inquiry, but not through any alleged sacred text.
POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF
(1) FIDEISTIC RELIGION
Where we disavow all rational justification for our religious beliefs, but believe anyway: a ‘leap of faith’ is taken.
In the main monotheistic traditions, this first approach is historically not so popular. But it does have some advocates (e.g. Tertullian, Calvin, Pascal, Kierkegaard).
POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF (continued)
(2) RATIONAL RELIGION
Where we provide reasons and arguments for our religious beliefs.
(2a) REVEALED RELIGION
We can know certain religious truths via God’s revelations, either DIRECTLY, or INDIRECTLY ( = the usual case, where God’s revelation is mediated by prophets and/or scripture)
Of course, we have to provide arguments for believing that our sources of revelation are indeed authentically divine. Usually this involves (i) the evidence of miracles as vouching for this authenticity (Aquinas, Locke); some also argue (ii) from the aesthetic and ethical beauty of scripture.
POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF (continued)
(2b) NATURAL RELIGION
We can know certain religious truths through general reason and argument, independently of any actual historical revelation. (Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke)
E.g. The argument from design, the regress argument to a first cause, the ontological argument etc…
Note: Natural religion alone would presumably only underwrite a deistic sort of belief. To get to theism, we’d also need some sort of argument from revealed religion.
HUME’S TREATMENT OF THESE VARIOUS POSSIBLE GROUNDS
(1) FIDEISTIC RELIGION
Barring the odd satirical jibe, Hume largely ignores this.
(2) RATIONAL RELIGION
(2a) REVEALED RELIGION
Hume argues that the testimonial evidence for alleged miracles falls far short of our usual standards for historical evidence. (See ECHU 10)
(2b) NATURAL RELIGION
Hume presents a comprehensive critique of the scope and limits of natural religion in the Dialogues. He devastates many traditional arguments in natural religion, but (arguably) endorses ends up endorsing a (very) threadbare version of natural religion.
THE THREE CHARACTERS IN HUME’S DIALOGUES
DEMEA
Endorses the a priori ‘first cause’ argument for God’s existence
Argues that, while we certainly know that God exists, it is impious to think that we can understand God or to think that he can be conceived in human terms.
CLEANTHES
Advocates the a posteriori argument from design for God’s existence.
Argues that we can know some things about God’s nature (reasoning from the type of Universe He has produced), and that He is like us in some respects.
PHILO
Spends most of the Dialogues raising problems for natural religion.
Says that he believes in God, though the content of this belief turns out to be a very attenuated form of threadbare deism.
The Problem of Evil Hume’s Dialogue
The Problem of Evil
The problem of evil is a challenge posed to theists committed to the claim that there is an perfectly benevolent, powerful and knowing God.
The challenge is how to explain the presence of evil in a world created by such a being.
Commonly, discussions of the problem of evil make an important distinction between types of evil.
Natural Evil: evil events or circumstances for which no agent is responsible.
Moral Evil: evil done by agents.
Hume, Dialogues
Our reading for this time is another excerpt from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
At this point, Philo is conversing with Cleanthes (our old friend from the discussion of the design argument) and another interlocutor, Demea.
Demea is a natural theologian who previously had offered a version of the cosmological argument that both Cleanthes and Philo were critical of.
When we pick up the discussion, Demea has just finished arguing that the best way to encourage belief in God is to ask people to reflect on the "misery and wickedness of men" (261c1).
"misery and wickedness"
Philo, with Demea's help, then offers a catalogue of the miseries plaguing humans.
There are external miseries, both those imposed by natural law (261c2, think of Twain's hookworm), and those imposed by human law (262c1, think of Jim Crow laws).
There are internal miseries (262c1), both those that are beyond our control (like mental illness) and those that are part of our volitional scheme (tragic errors of judgment).
Cf., the summary 262c1-2.
What's the Upshot?
Adopting the anthropomorphic account of Cleanthes, Philo then considers what if anything we can say about the moral situation of a theistic deity who would create and govern such a world.
His conclusion is stark (262c2-263c1).
In the context (talking to Cleanthes) he goes on to note that the problem of evil is even sharper in the context of the argument from design.
The Evidential Problem of Evil
The argument offered by Philo is a version of what's known as the evidential problem of evil.
The evidential problem of evil is a probabilistic argument to the effect that, though the existence of evil is not inconsistent with the existence of God, it lowers the likelihood that theism is true.
The key to the argument is the catalogue of the various forms of wickedness and suffering. Given the vast extent of evil, of all of the various forms, it seems highly unlikely that all of it is somehow necessary or essential. If it's not, and a theistic God could and would prevent it, it follows that it is unlikely that such a God exists.
Demea's Response
Demea, consistent with her cosmological perspective, offers the objection that our perspective of evil is just that, a perspective, and that what we are missing, is how it all balances out (263c2).
Philo doesn't need to respond to this, for Cleanthes (who has already expressed his dissatisfaction with Demea's approach), offers the obvious rejoinder, that to speculate about what in principle we cannot perceive, is essentially useless, and certainly does not overwhelm what Demea has already insisted is evident and obvious to us (i.e., the presence of evil in the world).
Cleanthes's Response
For his own sake, Cleanthes responds by just denying what both Demea and Philo have insisted, "The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man…And for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments" (264c1).
In other words, Cleanthes is trying to undercut the argument by contesting the inductive ground of the argument: the catalogue of misery and wickedness.
Philo's Response
Philo criticizes Cleanthes's denial of the significance of the experience of evil on a number of grounds.
First, even granting what Cleanthes was insisting, though evil be less common, it is much more "violent and durable."
Second, without granting Cleanthes's claim, Philo notes that Cleanthes leaves an important theological concern (the moral status of God) on very shaky ground: the adequacy of Cleanthes's judgment about the character of human experience.
Third, Cleanthes's position doesn't even answer the question. Maybe good does outweigh evil, but why would God permit any evil whatsoever?
For these reasons, Philo rejects Cleanthes's position on the problem of evil with more optimism than he did is advocacy of the design argument (265c2).
Reading assignment
Reading this article on Hume on Religion
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/
