

M G 42 Machine Gun 1500-

* D-Day - Normandy
June 6 1944 - OMAHA

2000 rounds per Minute



1st; 29th U.S. Divisions

* Breakout Front & Hedgerows
July-Sept. 1944



Sgt Curtis Culin And The
Hedgerow Cutter - (Blades
Welded To Front of Tank)

I. The Problem of Combat Compliance

A. The Problem. What Incentives Would Motivate Compliance With Commands That Demand Willing Acceptance of Mortal Peril / (Risk = Payoffs Discounted by the Probability of Occurrence (like Attack))

B. Constraints (on Explanations)

1. Core Rationality -

- a. Ability to Roughly Calculate Means and Ends
- b. Ability to Calculate Pay-Offs

II. Alternative Explanations - (Hypotheses That Can Be Tested On the Basis of Consensus Evidence)

1 Consensus Evidence -
Accepted Military History
of Gettysburg - 1863


A. Automaticity - Compliance
As A Function of Automatic
Behavior

B Leadership - Compliance Is
Determined By the Quality
of Central and Local Leaders

C. Combat Contract - Compliance
Is A Function of the Cause -
What Are We Fighting For / Against

D. The Problem - The Observable Variability of Compliance

1. The Types (Levels) of Compliance Vary From Maximum Non-Compliance To Maximum Compliance
2. The Compliance Continuum



E. Types (levels) of Compliance

1 Maximum Non-Compliance

- Mutiny (Rebellion) of the
Command Hierarchy

a. France - 1917 (Rare)

b. Russia 1917 - (Widespread)

2 Minimum Non-Compliance

(Collective Shirking & Free-Riding)

- Renegades of Combat Commands

a. France - 1917 b. All Wars -

The Quantity Is Crucial

3 Minimum Compliance -

Within Command Parameters

4 Maximum Compliance Heroism -

Beyond Command Parameters

a. D-Day - Omaha Beach

5. The Crucial Issue - Compliance

Is Variable (A Variable) Across

Militaries; Nations; Histories / Periods

I. Automaticity - Compliance
Is A Function of Learned
Automatic Behavior

A. Types of Explanation
1 Habituation

2. Coercion

3. Entrapment (By Terrain)

B Habituation - (Training
Generates Automatic Response)

C. Strengths/Value of Explanation
a. Significance

1 Learning Cohesion (
Collective Action Capacity)

2. Learning Combat Skills

c. Tactics - Standard
Operating Procedures

3. Combat Is Team-Productive
- Cohesion Is Necessary

D. Limitations of the Explanation

1. Rational / Coercion -

Is Self Coercion Reaction /

a. Authority Experiments

2. Cohesion Can Facilitate

Both Compliance And Non-

Compliance - Cohesion Is

Necessary But Cannot Ensure

Compliance

E. Coercion - Compliance Is
Forced Through Threats of
Punishment

a. Military Justice And Desertion

F. Significance (Strengths)

a. Demonstrative Coercion

And The Trust Intensive Nature
of Combat - The Demand For
Coercion

G. Limitations of Coercion
1 Coercion IS Not ($\neq$) A
Rational Strategy of
Compliance Motivation
Given

- a. Costs of Resistance
- b. Costs of Organization
and Utilization
- c. Opportunity Cost
- d. Coercive Militaries Are
Weak Militaries (Iraq)

H. Entrapment - Compliance
Is Automatic Because Some
Kinds of Terrain (Like
Islands Motivate Fight + C-
Die Responses

- 1 Significance - Limiting Choices
- 2. Limitation - Learning And
Resistance - h. h. I

II. The Leadership Hypothesis Compliance Variability Is

A Function of Leadership -
High Quality - High Compliance Levels

B. Significance of Explanation
- Leadership Facilitates the
Ability To Succeed (Win)

C. Functions of Leadership

1. Central Leadership -

"Top" or Operational Leadership
a. Management - Efficient
Logistics -

b. Institutional Design
Efficient Standard
Operating Procedure -

c. Intelligence - Estimation
of Enemy Compliance

d. Coordination - Battle Fighting

D. Local or Small Unit (1200 or less)
Constants & Leadership The
Crucial level of leadership -
Functions!

1 Inspiration - Demonstrative
Leadership - Demonstration of
Rational Possibility - Leading
From the Front & Office.

Casualty Rates & Ratios

2 Learning, Innovation
And Adaptation

a. Task Warfare (1939-2004)

3. Unit Welfare

E. Limitations!

1 The Imperfect Correlation

- Good Leaders - Low Compliance

- Bad Leaders - High Compliance (W.S. Critcher)

The Imperfect

Correlation - U.S. Civil War

Low Quality Leadership, But
High Levels of Compliance

A. Gettysburg - July 1-4 1863

1. General Lee "Granny Lee"

2. George Meade "Old Snapping
Turtle"

Cemetery Ridge
Union

Little
Round
Top

↓
Dan Sickles

Confederate

Seneca Ridge

Sickles Move Threatens Union
Left Flank and Retreat

* The Korean War 1950-53

I - The Third World War

- A. Balancing WAR Fe + G / Global
- Balance of Power (U.S. - U.S.S.R)
- B. WAR of Aggression - North Attacks South
- C. WAR of Retribution (U.N. (Primarily U.S.) Forces Counter - Attack North)
- D. 1950 - China Intervenes with Soviet Support - Major Power WAR
- E. 1951-53 Attrition And Stalemate

- ## II. Costs And Consequences
- A. 4 Million Koreans Dead (20% of Pop.)
 - B. 200,000 Chinese Dead; 50,000 U.S./O.A.
 - C. Long Term But Not Permanent Division of Korea
 - D. Permanent U.S. Troop Commitment (Trophy And Credible Commitment)
 - E. Isolation And Decline of the North
 - F. Growth and Industrialization of the South

XX America's Vietnam WAR 1945-1972

A. 1949-54 - Fall of France In

Vietnam (Dien Bien Phu) - End of French Colonial Rule And Provisional Division of Vietnam - Non-Communist South; Communist North - Promise of Elections

1. South - Focus on Economic Growth

2. North - Focus on Mass Mobilization

3. Both Plan Reunification - WAR IS NECESSARY

B Increased Communist Infiltration of South and Rural Insurgency - South WALKERS

U.S. Intervenes - C.B.I. sends Ground Troops

C. 1965-1971 - WAR OF ATTRITION and

the North's 'Credible Commitment' Tet

Offensive 1968 - U.S. Faces Hard Strategic

Choice - Invade North; Fight Attritional WAR

1 The Role of China Fear - 2. 12 Month Town

D. 1969-72 - Nixon; Vietnamization of

Withdrawal (with Commitment to South)

1. 1972. Easter Offensive and Linebacker

2. 1975 - Reunification, Radicalism, Reform