

MAJOR Power-Minor Power-WARS - WARS of Retribution 1500-2000's (Commitment)

A. The Dutch - 1500's - 1800

B The American Revolution
1775-83

1 New England (1775-1777)

2. Mid-Atlantic (1777-1780)

3. South (1780-1783)

C. Serbia 1914

D Finnish WAR 1939-1940

E. Soviet-Afghan WAR 1979-89
(Faith, Nation, Family)

F. Gulf WARS 1991; 2003

G. WARS Begin Before Minor

Power Attracts Powerful Allies
- Credible Commitment; Domestic
Commitment

H. WARS of Refusal - Refusal of

Attractive Bargain (Britain 1970-91)

I. WARS of Aggression (1939-41; Germany)

I. WARS OF Retribution (Major-Minor Power Wars)

A War Can Be Better Than
A Bargain IF WAR CAN STOP
A Survival Threat (Decline) Or
Pre-empt A Hegemonic Threat
B But, Counter-indivisible WAR
CAN ALSO OCCUR

C. Major-Minor Power WAR
IS Counter-indivisible Because It
Should Never Occur. Why?

A Minor Power Should Always
Bargain IF He Gains From
Trade (Bargaining) Always
Exceed The Benefits of WAR

D Yet Major-Minor Power
WAR IS Frequent (Europe-1900's)

II. The Logic of WARS OF Retribution

A. Major Power Demands

Concessions From Minor Power

1. Demands Are Significant
(costly) - May Threaten

Sovereignty (Serbia, 1914)

B. Minor Power Must
Choose Bargaining OR WAR

C. The Major Power Is
Indifferent Between
WAR And An Equivalent Bargain

Because 1 Costs of WAR Are
Equal to the Costs of the Status
Quo 2. Costs of WAR Equal Bargaining
Costs

III. The Rational / WAR Choice

A. For the Major-Power!

1. Benefits of Bargaining

Exceed the Costs of Bargaining

2. Benefits of WAR Exceed
The Costs of WAR (cannot be Defeated)

a. Benefits = Some Reduction In
the Minor Powers Capabilities.

3. WAR Therefore Is A
Function of the Minor Power's

Choice - WAR OR Bargaining

4. IF WAR, Major-Power Fights


B. The Minor Power Chooses WAR

IF (1. Costs Are less than defeat or

unacceptable Damage (2. cost of

Bargaining Are Greater than Acceptable Damage

IV. Thus, Major Power
Is Indifferent Between
WAR AND Bargaining,
Needs An Extra Incentive
To Choose WAR OR Bargaining
A. Derived From Pivotal
Voter Logic



Pivotal
Voter IS
Indifferent Between
Oppose or Support Can
needs "sweeten"

(IV.)

IV. A Deal You Must Refuse

A. The Major Power Will Demand More From A Bargain Than The Certain Benefits (Damage to Minor Power) of WAR

1. Opens A Possible Survival Threat To Minor Power

B. The Minor Power Will Bargain Only If The Ability To Resist (Wage WAR At A High Cost To The Major Power) Is Minimal or Zero.

1 This, in turn, depends on Domestic Factors:

2. The Level of Domestic Commitment to Fight For the State

3. Possible Punish / Allier - But Allies Will Not Act Unless the Minor Power First Resists

* WAR CA Be Better
Than A Bargain if

A. No Bargain Is Available

1. Major-Power WAR

And The Balance of Power

B. G, WAR Just Is Better.

Than A Bargain (for ^{one} ~~any~~ Power)

1. WAR S. of Retardation

2. WAR S. of Aggression

a. W.W. II 1935-48

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I. Incomplete Information As
Explanatory Variable - Rebuttal Case

A. The Short-WAR Illusion
of Political Leaders & Military
Planners Falsely Believe That
A Major, Systemic WAR CAN
Be Short & Won By A
Decisive Battle (WAR "Plans")

B. The Problem - WAS This Belief
False & Necessary

C. The Necessary Search For
A Short WAR Is The Result
of Strategic Constraints -
Limits On Rational Strategy
Dictated By Mass Militaries
And Industrial Weapons

II. Strategic Constraints

A. Maximum Mobilization And Minimum Mobility.

1. Maximum Mobilization - Given Population Size And Economic Constraints, The Major Powers Militaries Were As Large As Feasible (2 million+)

2. Minimum Mobility - The Necessity of Rapid Concentration (Railroads) And Slow Deployment (Foot And Horse Power)

B. Paradox of Offensive Necessity And Extreme Defensive Advantage

B. Offensive Necessity Because
of Budgetary Limits; Public
Opinion; Morale of Reservists;
Gaining the Initiative

C. Extreme Defensive Advantage
- Industry / Weapons Allow
Defenders Some Advantage

1. Machine Guns; Rapid
Fire Artillery 3. Rifles;

III. Planners' Rational Preferences

A First Preference Strategy 1.
Decisive Battle

B. Second Preference Strategy
Rational Attrition

C. This Strategy Let US Rational
Because Planners Were Aware of Constraints

The Reinvention of the Citizen-Soldier (1800-2000's)

A Constraints (1700's - 1860's)

1. Conscription - Resistance

2. Linear Warfare (Tactics)

B. Linear Warfare

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Column
Line

C. The Process

1. Column Marches (Full Pace)

2. Deploy to Line

3. Maintain Cohesion (at Line -
"Shoulder to Shoulder")

4. Volley Fire (2-3 per minute)

a. Loading

b. Fire (40 to 100 yds)

5. Artillery and Cavalry (Defend)

6. Moment of Decision.

Defend or Attack (Bayonet)