*Domestic Commitment And WAR - The American Case!
1941-45
A. The Problem - Create A Military Capable of Fighting and Winning A Two-Front WAR On Land, Sea, And Air And Supply Crucial Resources To Allies
B. The Means - Mobilization of the Industrial Economy And Mass Conscription (11 Million In Uniform
C. The Costs (1. Public Debt (2. Delayed Civilian Consumption (3. Hard War - (400,000 Dead)
1. Rationing (Gas, Meat, etc.)
2. Relocation of Workforce
3. Government Bureaucracy
D. How Do We Explain The Willingness of Civilians To Accept These Costs

I. Domestic Commitment Or Paying For WAR (The How Question)

A. The Problem and Paradox:

Many Theories Assume That As The Costs of WAR For Domestic Populations Increases Resistance Should Increase Absent Coerced Commitment, Because WAR Is Assumed To Be of Low or Zero Value for Ordinary Citizens.

B. However, Over-all Commitment Has Increased Without Coercive Control (Consent Not Compulsion)

C. If the Value of Membership In A Given State Is High Value, (If Low Commitment Is Low)

D. The Bargaining Hypothesis

1 Falsification/Possibility, Coercion

(C. Non-Rational Motivation.

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A. The Cost Curve For WAR:



1. Direct Costs (Taxation, Debt)
2. Damage (Civilian and Military)
3. Duration - Lengths of WAR And Preparation for WAR

B. Escalation of the Commitment Threshold



II. The Origins of The Commitment Problem:

A. The Logistics Constraint: The Production And Distribution of the Means of WARFARE

B. Two Strategies of Resolution

1. Self-Supply - Fighters Are Producers

a. Central Asian Horse Archers

b. Greeks, Romans, Aztecs

2. Specialization - Division of Labor Between Fighters And Producers -

a. Necessitated By The Cost, Scale And Complexity of Gunpowder WARFARE

III. The Specialization Strategy Creates The Modern Logistics Chain

A. Taxation and Debt Mobilization

B. Recruitment

1. Volunteering

2. Conscription (esp. 1800-1945)

C. Production of Physical Inputs (Weapons, Fuel, Food)

D. Distribution - Either By States Or Private Contractors

E. The Guaponeder Dilemma - (For Rulers): Invest, Don't

1. Don't - Minimizes Domestic Resistance

2. Invest - Minimizes Strategic Dilemma

3. A European Security Dilemma

I. The Bargaining Hypothesis

A. The Logic of ASSET Binding

1. Rulers Extend the Net Benefits Produced By the State (or Assets) and the's Binds the Fate of Subjects (Citizens) to the Fate of the State (Defeat In WAR Can Destroy the Value)

2. Logic: The More You Have The More You Can Lose, The Greater the Investment In Commitment You Will Make

3. The Four Commitment Bargains

a. The Specialization Bargain

b. The Fiscal Bargain

c. The Conscription Bargain

d. The Security Bargain

II. The Specialization Bargain (1526-1660)

A. Rulers (Primarily Territorial Kings & Princes) Exchange

1. Increased Domestic And International Security (Policing) & Security From Foreign Attack) as Well as Legal Rights & Privileges Including Nobility & Monopoly (Economic) For

2. Permanent Military Establishments (Standing Armies, Navies)

3. Permanent Money Taxation

4. General Support For the Rulers' WARS & Foreign Policies

III. The Fiscal Bargain (1660-1790's)

A. Rulers Exchange

1. Efficient Legal Rights and Privileges (Primarily Property Rights; Security; and Privilege (Nobility, Economic Monopoly)

2. For:

a. Permanent Taxation

b. Permanent Public Debt

1. The Origin of Central Banks (Bank of England)

C. Limited (Fiscal) Conscription

1. Prussia, Sweden, Russia

2. Lottery Conscription

3. Power to "Nationalize" the Military

4. Specialized Navies

C1860-1945, or 2000's)

IV. The Conscription Bargain

A. Rulers Exchange a Package of Civil, Political, Social Rights For WAR Taxes, Debt and Mass Conscription (minimal exemptions) - Citizenship Rights

1. Civil Rights (Legal Equality)

2. Political Rights - voting, Parliaments with Power

a. Italy - post-1859

3. Social Rights - The Origins of the Welfare State (post 1919, 1945)

a. Health, Education, Labor Rights, Pensions (Military & Civilian),

b. The Home Fit For Heroes

Sacrifice & Public Recognition

V. The Security Bargain
1945-2000's

A. An Exchange of
High Value Citizenship

B For the Cost of A
Permanent Military Economy

1 Opportunity Cost

2. From the Citizen
Soldier To the Citizen
Professional (Primarily
Volunteers

3. Research and Development

4 The Infantry Combat
Soldier