Espionage

Lecture3-CIAssetRecruitment.pptx

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Click to edit Master title style Click to edit Master text styles Second level Third level Fourth level Fifth level 2/2/2021 ‹#›

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Class Three: CI & Agent Recruitment AKA How To Get Away With Espionage

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Spy of the Week – Brian Regan Born in 1972, enlisted in the Air Force. Worked as an Air Force assignee to the NRO from 1995 to 2000. Re-hired as a contractor in October 2000. Had $117,000 in credit card debt, began to download classified information. Passed a coded letter to the Libyan embassy offering to commit espionage which provided it to the FBI through a confidential informant. Wanted to sell information to China, Iraq & Libya for $13 million. Arrested in August 2001, sentenced to life in prison in 2003.

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Translation Time!

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Today’s Topic How do intelligence officers operate? How do intelligence agencies: Choose their agents? Convince them to commit espionage? Properly secure their agents? Communicate securely? Assess the reliability of their information? End the relationship?

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A Reminder Intelligence Officer – “A professionally trained member of an intelligence service. He or she may be serving in the home country or abroad as a member of a legal or illegal residency.” Intelligence agencies hire & train intelligence officers to clandestinely collect intelligence. The person collecting the intelligence from the asset is called the Case Officer – “A professional employee of an intelligence or counterintelligence organization who is responsible for providing directions for an agent operation and/or handling intelligence assets.”

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Take it from the Russians Confidential Contacts in the KGB's Foreign Intelligence and Work with Them Analytical Overview V. M. Maksimov Moscow - 1977

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The Russian Approach “The foreign intelligence service of the Committee for State Security (KGB) performs critical assignments to obtain intelligence information essential to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and the Soviet government for making important political and strategic decisions; influencing the foreign and domestic policies of the capitalist and developing countries to the USSR’s advantage; and ensuring the state security of the Soviet Union. The chief means of fulfilling these assignments is the network of foreign agents, through whose assistance access can be gained to the most guarded secrets of the targeted countries, and the carrying out of sensitive and deeply clandestine active measures, to ensure successful resistance to the enemy's subversive actions. Therefore, the broadening, strengthening and improving of the agents’ apparat is the primary task of all operative subdivisions of the central apparat of foreign intelligence, the intelligence subdivisions of territorial agencies and the KGB's rezidenturas abroad.”

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How Intelligence Officers Operate Overseas activities are centered around a Station*. Usually (but not always) located under cover in an official installation. Senior officer in charge known as the Chief of Station (COS) in the US. Second in command is the Deputy Chief of Station (DCOS). Responsible for all intelligence activity in that country. Secondary locations within a country known as bases. Run by Chief of Base (COB) or Deputy Chief of Base (DCOB). British equivalent is Head of Station. Russian equivalent for station is residency or rezidentura . Senior officer is known as the rezident . *Description from Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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So You Want to be a Spy The CIA’s website* names six types of clandestine positions: Collection Management Officer - CMOs drive collection, actively manage the two-way dialogue between intelligence consumers and the DO, and evaluate foreign intelligence to ensure DO collection is providing US foreign policy and national security decision-makers with timely, accurate, clear, and concise reporting in a manner that safeguards sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Language Officer - Language Officers perform a critical and dynamic function within the DO – contributing advanced foreign language skills combined with cultural experience and expertise to producing high-quality, accurate, and timely translations, interpretations, and other language-related support to DO clandestine operations. Operations Officer - Operations Officers focus on clandestinely spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, and handling non-US-citizens having access to foreign intelligence vital to US foreign policy and national security decision-makers. Paramilitary Officer - Paramilitary Operations Officers serve at CIA Headquarters and overseas focusing on intelligence operations and activities in support of US policy objectives in hazardous and austere overseas environments. Staff Operations Officer - SOOs provide the seamless integration between CIA Headquarters and DO offices in the field necessary to drive operations to success. Targeting Officer – Targeting Officers combine specialized training, advanced analytical skills, the most sophisticated analytical tools available, and in-depth knowledge and experience in DO operational tradecraft TOs to identify new opportunities for DO operational activity and to enhance ongoing operations. *https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/index.html

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Cover Definition – “A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true affiliation with clandestine or other sensitive activities.”

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Some Cover Terms* Cover for action – “A verifiable and documented protective guise used to disguise the true intent of an individual, organization, or activity and to provide a credible explanation as to participation in a particular activity.” Cover for status – “A verifiable and documented protective guise used to legitimize an individual’s, organization’s, or activity’s extended presence in a particular area.” Backstopping – “Arrangements made through documentary, oral, technical, fiscal, physical, or other means to support covers (both individual and organizational). A backstopped cover provides sufficient documentation to project an identity in the immediate area or circumstance and in primary USG and commercial information systems. Backstopping cover may be constructed to withstand scrutiny ranging from casual or unwitting general population to a targeted hostile adversary.” * TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS https://fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf

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Using Cover Cover is needed to justify the posting of an officer overseas. Can be divided into two categories: Official Officers serving overseas as part of a governmental organization. Often have diplomatic immunity and will be declared persona non grata (PNG) and expelled if caught in the act of espionage. * Provided by other government agencies and departments. Some examples: State Department. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Foreign Trade. “Officers began building their official cover months, sometimes years before leaving for an assignment. They learned the procedures, lingo, and customs of their cover jobs, so by the time they arrived in the Soviet Union, they were virtually indistinguishable from their nonintelligence colleagues.” ** * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006. ** Spycraft : The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs , From Communism to Al-Qaeda, Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, 2008.

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Using Cover Cont’d Non-Official Cover Officers that have no visible affiliation with their host government.* “NOCs, as they are called, might typically operate as business executives, students, writers, or in some other nongovernmental capacity . They perform those jobs in addition to doing their espionage. If they are caught in the act of spying, they do not have diplomatic immunity and are subject to the full force of the local law, including prosecution for espionage and imprisonment. NOCs usually receive less scrutiny and surveillance from the local authorities than their official colleagues.” “The New York Times even wrote a profile of me entitled “A Popular Russian.” The piece described me as “a real personality kid” and went on to say that I was the son of a Leningrad city clerk and was chosen for the Fulbright student exchange by my professors at Leningrad University and “Soviet educational authorities.” I had to chuckle, of course. It was all a lie. The Soviet educational establishment had not sent me to America for a year. The KGB had. I was not, as the article described, a bright young Soviet journalist. I was a green KGB officer, the son of a man who also had worked for the Soviet secret police.” – Oleg Kalugin , Spymaster , My Thirty-two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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A NOC Example Marian Zacharski – Worked in the US as a Polish intelligence officer under the guise of the Polish American Machinery Company (POLAMCO). Recruited William Bell, a financially strapped Hughes Aircraft Company employee. Bell received $150,000 in exchange for Secret level documents. Bell passed classified information on “a so-called "quiet” radar system; a look-down, shoot-down radar system; an all-weather radar system for tanks; an experimental radar system for the US Navy; the Phoenix air-to-air missile for the F-14; a ship surveillance radar; a new air-to-air missile; the improved HAWK surface-to-air missile; the Patriot air defense missile; and a submarine sonar system.”* Arrested in 1981 after a Polish defector claimed access to Hughes documentation. Exchanged in 1985 for three Soviet Bloc spies & 25 people being held prisoner in Eastern Europe. Bell pled guilty & received 8 years in prison. *Sources CI Centre, Defense Personnel & Security Research Center (http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/espionagecases/industry.html)

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Illegal Cover Illegal Cover* “An officer, employee, or agent of an intelligence organization who is dispatched abroad and who has no overt relationship with the intelligence service with which he/she is connected or with the government operations that intelligence service. Term is derived from the fact that the individual is in the host country illegally.” * TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS https://fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf

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A Former MI5 Officer’s Take on Illegals:

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Russian Illegals A covert intelligence officer who typically live abroad on “long-term, ‘deep cover’ assignments.”* “Hide all connections between themselves and Russia” Operate under a false identity to operate on behalf of Russia. Subset of illegals perform the same work but under their true name. Some other countries (namely Cuba) have been shown to use illegals. * Affidavit - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -v. - ANNA CHAPMAN, and MIKHAIL SEMENKO, 28 Jun 2010

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Illegals Cont’d Russian illegals program begun in 1920s by the GRU when the USSR did not have diplomatic relations with its primary foreign intelligence targets. Illegals undergo several months or years of training before deployment. Language, tradecraft, etc. Travels abroad and is given documents to blend in. Finds an inconspicuous job that ideally will pay his/her own way. Usually not permitted to actually recruit assets. A failed recruitment would expose the illegal. Primarily used to handle exceedingly sensitive assets or serve as communications hubs.* * Mole , William Hood, 1982

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A Russian Illegal – Gordon Lonsdale Canadian citizen living in the United Kingdom. Arrested in 1961 in London after meeting a British civilian who had been identified by the CIA as a Soviet asset. Sentenced to 25 years in prison, exchanged in 1964 for a British citizen being imprisoned in the Soviet Union. He had been born Konon Molody in Moscow in 1922. The real Gordon Lonsdale was born in 1924 in Canada, moved to Finland with his mother in 1931 and died during World War II. Lived with an aunt in California from 1932 to 1938, served in the Red Army and joined the KGB in 1951.

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Let’s Talk Classification Information is classified solely to protect sources and methods . Types of US classification*: Top Secret – Release could cause “exceptionally grave damage” to US national security. Secret – Cause “serious damage” to US national security. Confidential – Cause “damage” to US national security. *Executive Order 13526--Classified National Security Information

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Putting Together Classification Classification on documents constructed from left to right*. Several caveats can be applied to further restrict document sharing. Separated by a // or / Some popular caveats are: SI (Special Intelligence – usually SIGINT), HCS (HUMINT Control System), TK (Talent Keyhole - Imagery), ORCON (Originator Controlled), NOFORN (Not releasable to foreign nationals), REL (releasable only to the listed foreign country trigraph ). ALWAYS IN CAPITAL LETTERS. An example: SECRET//SI//NOFORN * DoD Information Security Program: Marking of Classified Information , Department of Defense, 24 Feb 2012.

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Take a Shot You have a Top Secret document that contains HUMINT and SIGINT that you want to pass to our friends in Canada. How would this be classified? Answer: TOP SECRET//HCS/SI//REL USA, CAN Or TS//HCS/SI//REL USA, CAN style.visibility

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Communicating Cable traffic is the lifeblood of operational activity. Official record of operational guidance. Enables secure communications between Headquarters and the field or among different field elements. Can be restricted to improve compartmentation and allow for greater security controls. Assets and officers given code names and pseudonyms to further enhance security. Digraphs or trigraphs used to avoid specifically mentioning the asset or program. Example: CKSPHERE Pseudonyms only used in internal agency cable traffic. * *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story Of The CIA's Final Showdown With The KGB, Milton Bearden and James Risen, 2003 Digraph Code Word

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Code Words Change! BKCROWN BKHERALD BKTRUST DYCLAIM JKLANCE KUBARK NWBOLTON PNEXCEL PNINFINITE PNJEWEL PNPEAK PNRADIUS PNREADY PNVALUE PNWORLD RTACTION RVROCK TQHIGHROAD TQWOODSIDE WOFACT WOFIRM ZACABL All of these cryptonyms refer to the same thing:

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Cables – An Introduction “…The first thing I noticed was that most of the cable traffic was simply making arrangements for travel back and forth; the flights, the hotels, what identification they were using, contact arrangements, and so on. None of that appeared in FBI files… The next thing I noticed was that the CIA was incredibly chatty. There didn’t seem to be anything too trivial to ignore. If an FBI agent took a potential source on a family picnic, what transpired would take a paragraph. When a CIA officer did the same thing, they’d write up everything from how they liked the potato salad to what games the kids played – and how well. Operational details would be spelled out the same way… CIA officers would go on at great length about what they did to ingratiate themselves, and how their target reacted to it…It was way too much, but I reached a point of appreciating having so much information on the interaction of the case officer and the target, an important factor in looking at cases from a counterintelligence perspective, and missed learning that when I returned to plowing through FBI files.” – Christopher Lynch, The C.I. Desk: FBI and CIA Counterintelligence As Seen From My Cubicle.

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CIA Cables:

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Cables – What’s In Them? Classification & Date. Cite – Who’s it from (MOSCOW 1234)? To – Who’s it going to (DIRECTOR – aka Headquarters) and what’s the priority? Ref – What other cables are related to this one? Text.

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Cables – A CIA FOIA Example

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Cables – Another Example From The Main Enemy: The Inside Story Of The CIA's Final Showdown With The KGB, Milton Bearden and James Risen, 2003

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Cables – Another Example

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It’s Not Just an Intel Thing State and DoD send cables too! They’re usually more boring though.

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Foreigners Send Cables Too!

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Foreigners Send Cables, Too! Part Two

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Cables – Why You Should Pay Attention This is how you’ll communicate for your final project (!!) Cables are an official, corporate product. Written in plural. Avoid using names of officers/assets. Short enough to keep your attention but long enough to cover the subject. Instructions must be clear, detailed & precise. May include a tearline when necessary. “A physical line on an intelligence message or document separating categories of information that have been approved for foreign disclosure and release.”* Cables are how stories are told. *TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, 9 June 2014

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The Agent Recruitment Cycle Our bible for the remainder of the class. The cycle: 1) Spot 2) Assess 3) Develop 4) Recruit 6) Handle 7) Turnover or terminate* * An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS, Randy Burkett; Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013)

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Spotting Definition - “To locate and recruit people with demonstrated access to intelligence targets.” The process of identifying specific targets of intelligence interest due to their past, current, or future access to information. Requires an understanding of current intelligence gathering priorities. “This means moving in wide circles around town and hanging out in places where foreign recruitment targets can be ‘spotted’. Case officers, for example, might regularly attend diplomatic receptions, conferences, ceremonies, dinner parties, etc., in an effort to observe foreigners who have access to intelligence information of interest.”* * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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“More on the Recruitment of Soviets” – CIA Studies of Intelligence, 1964

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Assessing Some key questions: What is the target’s access currently or in the future? Would he/she make a good agent? Can he/she keep secrets? What will be his/her likely reaction to a clandestine relationship? “Assessment information can be gathered from the files, from casual observation or conversation, from directories, and from other sources…Assessment information might also be obtained through surveillance, telephone taps, or audio devices.”* * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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Development Establishing a relationship with a prospective agent. Altering and improving one’s assessment of the target. “Development is the establishment of some form of direct contact between the case officer and the target. It might at first be nothing more than occasional chitchat at diplomatic functions. That might lead to lunches or dinners together to discuss international topics of mutual interest.”* * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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Recruiting Two types of pitches: Regular pitch – The target has been adequately assessed and developed by the case officer. “Carefully crafted to maximize the probability of success and, in fact, are not usually approved unless the odds of acceptance are extremely high.”* Cold pitch – “Recruitment approach without prior development or, in some cases, contact”*** Low chance of success, prepared for failure. * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006. ** Circle of Treason: CIA Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed, Sandra Grimes and Jeanne Vertefuille , 2012 *** TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS https://fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf “I know I pitched him and I think he said yes and I think he pitched me and I know I said no” – CIA Officer**

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Recruiting – Crafting The Pitch A thought on cold pitches: “Nobody likes cold pitches because they’re the worst technique in the profession of intelligence. It’s going up to somebody whom you don’t know and asking them to do the equivalent of going to bed with you. It’s a very intimate, and if you’re not developing it from a practical interrelationship human kind of way, 99.9 percent of the folks will say no.” – Michael Rochford, FBI Counterintelligence Division (2011) There’s also the “gangplank pitch” - made as the target is leaving the host country and supplying him or her with a means of establishing contact in the future, probably in a third country.

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If The Pitch Is Accepted… Eyewash – “False entries made in files, usually to protect the security of a source, often indicating that a particular target has rejected a pitch, when in fact the offer was accepted.”

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Handling A clandestine relationship is formalized. Tradecraft is introduced. “The agent steals documents, diagrams, computer disks, and other classified information from his or her place of employment and delivers the data secretly to the case officer, using the tradecraft techniques established for this purpose.”* * Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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Types of Agents Developmental Asset – Someone who has promise as an agent but is not fully vetted and recruited. Confidential Contact (or Unwitting Agent)– “The foreigner, within the framework of legal relations, may be used by the intelligence officer primarily unwittingly or may wittingly provide help to the intelligence officer of the type which is of a strictly personal nature from the perspective of this foreigner and does not contradict his interests and the target he represents and does not violate regulations.” – V.M. Maksimov Witting Agent – Someone who is providing intelligence and is aware of what they’re doing and who they’re doing it for.

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Tradecraft 101 Tradecraft is a set of procedures/behaviors used to ensure operational success. Begins with an operational plan (ops plan) Summary of who the asset is, handling officer, risk involved, potential security issues. Next comes the communications plan How will communications with the asset be handled? Personal vs impersonal communications. Emergency recontact plan.

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Communicating With Assets Personal communications (AKA meeting the asset): Preferable for running an agent. Avoiding surveillance is the key to a successful agent meeting. Assets and handling officers undertake a surveillance detection run or route (SDR). “A carefully crafted route, of varying lengths and complexity depending on the operational environment, used by a case officer and/or agent to get to a meeting site, and after leaving the meeting site, determine that the case officer and agent are not under surveillance before going to and after the ops meeting.”* “Professional case officers of all services, conduct lengthy SDRs before engaging in operational acts. A good SDR gives a case officer the opportunity to flush out surveillance if it is there and to make a determination of his or her surveillance status. The CIA jargon for completing an SDR and verifying without any doubt that surveillance is not there is “getting black.”** * TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR DoD COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, DIA, May 2011 ** Fair Play: The Moral Dilemmas of Spying, James Olson, 2006.

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Quick Detour - Types of Surveillance* Physical surveillance vs Technical surveillance. Physical – observation conducted by humans. Technical – oversight using electronic means. Methods of surveillance: Fixed – surveillance performed from a location that doesn’t change. Foot – mobile surveillance on foot. Vehicular – mobile surveillance using a car, boat, helicopter, etc. *Allen W. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (2006)

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Impersonal Communications The way to work with an asset without meeting him/her. Safer, much more difficult to detect. More complex, more prone to glitches, less personal. Some impersonal communications methods: Short Range Agent Communications (SRAC) Brush Passes Accommodation Address Mailings Secret Writing Microdots Steganography Dead Drops

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The Dead Drop “A clandestine location for transferring material to or from an agent or asset.” Made up of a drop site and a signal site. Drop site is the exact location the agent or service should place the package. Should be isolated from heavy foot or vehicular traffic but also a place the asset could legitimately visit. The drop site’s location should not inherently implicate the asset if the information is discovered.

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Dead Drop Cont’d Signal site – A nonalerting signal that can be used to either begin or complete a dead drop. Often a piece of tape or chalk in a public location frequented by both the asset and the intelligence service. “According to his KGB instructions, John was supposed to leave a Seven Up can at his dead drop site as a signal that he was in the area and ready to leave his stash of stolen secrets.”* ** *Family of Spies: The John Walker Jr. Spy Case, Pete Earley , 1988 ** The Virginian-Pilot - http://hamptonroads.com/2010/05/john-walker-spy-ring-25-years-ago-week

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Dead Drop Cont’d Dead drop and signal sites should be varied and not used repeatedly. Because the asset will not actually be meeting an intelligence officer, instructions for both sites should be very detailed and explicit . A map is great. The asset may have the best idea of what will make a good signal/drop site.

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An Example* Description of Dead Drop Number 1 Address and Location: Moscow, corner of Proend Khedoshetvenogo Testra and Pushkinakaya ulitsa . The dead drop is located in the main entrance (foyer) of Number 2, located on Pushkinsakaya ulitsa – between the store Number 19 “ Myaeo ” and the store “ Zhemskaya obuv ’.” The main entrance is open 24 hours a day. It is not guarded , there is no elevator. In the entrance (foyer) – to the left/ upon entering therein/a dial telephone, No. 28, is located. Opposite the dial telephone/to the right as one goes into the entrance hall/ is a steam heat radiator, painted in oil paint in a dark green color . This radiator is supported by a single metal hook, fastened into the wall. /If one stands facing the radiator, then the metal hook will be to the right, at the level of one’s head hanging from the arm. Between the wall, to which the hook is attached, and the radiator there is a space of two-three centimeters. For the dead drop, it is proposed to use the hook and the space /open space/ between the wall and the radiator. It is necessary to place and camouflage any written material , for example, in a match box, then, the box should be wrapped with soft wire /of a green color/, and the end of the wire bent hook-shaped, which will permit the small box to hang from the book (or bracket) of the radiator between the wall and the radiator. The location of the dead drop is on the unlighted right-hand corner of the entrance hall. In the entrance hall it is convenient to make a call on the dial telephone and it is very simple and easy to hang some type of small object on the indicated hook. The site for placing the signal indicating that material has been placed in the drop, is located at a five minutes’ ride from the dead drop / or a fifteen minutes’ walk/. Thus the time the material is in the dead drop can be held to a minimum. I will await the signal indicating placing of the material in the dead drop after 12.00 and after 21.00 each day, beginning with 15.8.60 . * CIA FOIA release

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An Example Cont’d

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Short Range Agent Communications (SRAC) Method of sending short messages. Very difficult to detect, requires a sender device and a receiver transmitter. Both devices are typically concealed or innocuous looking and have limited range that requires the sender and receiver to be physically nearby when sending/receiving a message. “The new SRAC device, a form of “burst transmitter,” carried the code name BUSTER. Measuring approximately 6 x3 x 1 inches and weighing just over half a pound, the unit was small enough to conceal easily in a coat pocket. BUSTER had a tiny single-digit display with a Cyrillic type font and a keyboard that was no larger than an inch and a half square. To load a message, Polyakov would first convert his text into a cipher using a one-time pad, then poke at the tiny keyboard one character at a time to store up to 1,500 characters. After the data was loaded, Polyakov would contrive a reason to go within the transmitter’s thousand-foot range of the base station receiver and press the SEND button.”* * Spycraft : The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs , From Communism to Al-Qaeda, Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, 2008.

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Brush Pass A very brief personal encounter where documents or information can be exchanged.

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Accommodation Address Mailings Definition - “An address with no obvious connection to an intelligence agency, used for receiving mail containing sensitive material or information”* Secret Writing – Communication through hidden messages placed in innocuous text. * Spycraft : The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs , From Communism to Al-Qaeda, Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, 2008.

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Other Secret Writing Techniques Microdots – “an optical reduction of a photographic negative to a size that is illegible without magnification, usually 1mm or smaller in area.” * Steganography – The process of hiding data or a message in an innocuous image. * Spycraft : The Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs , From Communism to Al-Qaeda, Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, 2008

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Asset Validation “ In the spy trade asset validation is simply a system of measures to establish the reliability and veracity of sources.” - Michael Sulick , American Spies: Espionage Against the United States from the Cold War to the Present. Asset validation should occur at every stage of the case. A vetting process is applied in order to determine if a source is: Who he/she claims to be? Free of external control Capable of behaving in a secure manner Possesses placement and access consistent with tasking.* * TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, 9 June 2014

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Types of Assets* Many assets will skip the first three steps and will “volunteer” to an intelligence service. How volunteers volunteer: Walk-in – Direct approach to foreign intelligence service or officer. Write-in – Note delivered to foreign intelligence service or officer. Types of assets: Defector – An asset who has permanently left his/her former life. Recruitment-in-Place – An asset who will continue committing espionage in the foreign target. * - TERMS & DEFINITIONS OF INTEREST FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, 9 June 2014

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The CIA on Welcoming Walk-Ins:

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Turnover or Termination Turnover – Changing of an agent’s handling officer. Could be necessitated by any number of reasons: Initial officer leaves. Another officer with more natural cover is preferred. A new approach is needed. Termination – The end of the relationship. Also numerous reasons for termination: The asset loses access permanently, the asset decides to call it quits, the intelligence service decides the asset isn’t worth the risk, there are security concerns, the asset is arrested, or the asset is successfully exfiltrated .

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Exfiltration “A clandestine rescue operation designed to bring a defector, refugee, or an (officer) and his or her family out of harm's way”* Ideally assets will self- exfiltrate if/when they are ready to defect. Sometimes difficult and complex exfiltrations from hostile countries are necessary. *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story Of The CIA's Final Showdown With The KGB, Milton Bearden and James Risen, 2003

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Exfiltration Cont’d “ Gordievsky had calmed considerably since he had taken his place in the trunk of the car. For the first time in three days he could no longer hear his own fear-driven heartbeat. Though the heat was stifling in the cramped quarters, he was thankful that the mosquitoes had been left behind in the marsh. Counting off each stop the car made at the Soviet border check-points, he controlled his breathing and hoped that the thermal blanket would effectively conceal his body heat from prying KGB sensors. As the car pulled to a halt for the fifth and what he thought would be the final time on the Soviet side of the border, he heard the voices of a couple of Russian women and assumed that he had cleared the KGB checkpoints and that the car was now passing through Soviet customs. Gordievsky held his breath as he heard the whining and sniffing of dogs near the car. From inside the car’s trunk he couldn’t know that the wife of one of the British SIS officers was busily popping potato chips into the drooling mouth of the customs dog, keeping it away form the rear of the car.”* *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story Of The CIA's Final Showdown With The KGB, Milton Bearden and James Risen, 2003

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Questions?

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Class Three: CI & Agent Recruitment Asher, Jeffrey Asher, Jeffrey 1 2021-02-02T21:50:00Z 2021-02-02T21:52:18Z

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2 5938 Microsoft Office PowerPoint On-screen Show (4:3) 616 64 0 0 1 false Fonts Used 3 Theme 1 Slide Titles 64 Calibri Calibri Light Times New Roman Retrospect Class Three: CI & Agent Recruitment Spy of the Week – Brian Regan Translation Time! Today’s Topic A Reminder Take it from the Russians The Russian Approach How Intelligence Officers Operate So You Want to be a Spy Cover Some Cover Terms* Using Cover Using Cover Cont’d A NOC Example Illegal Cover A Former MI5 Officer’s Take on Illegals: Russian Illegals Illegals Cont’d A Russian Illegal – Gordon Lonsdale Let’s Talk Classification Putting Together Classification Take a Shot Communicating Code Words Change! Cables – An Introduction CIA Cables: Cables – What’s In Them? Cables – A CIA FOIA Example Cables – Another Example Cables – Another Example It’s Not Just an Intel Thing Foreigners Send Cables Too! Foreigners Send Cables, Too! Part Two Cables – Why You Should Pay Attention The Agent Recruitment Cycle Spotting “More on the Recruitment of Soviets” – CIA Studies of Intelligence, 1964 Assessing Development Recruiting Recruiting – Crafting The Pitch If The Pitch Is Accepted… Handling Types of Agents Tradecraft 101 Communicating With Assets Quick Detour - Types of Surveillance* Impersonal Communications The Dead Drop Dead Drop Cont’d Dead Drop Cont’d An Example* An Example Cont’d Short Range Agent Communications (SRAC) Brush Pass Accommodation Address Mailings Other Secret Writing Techniques Asset Validation Types of Assets* The CIA on Welcoming Walk-Ins: Turnover or Termination Exfiltration Exfiltration Cont’d Questions? false false false 16.0000