Retail Marketing
Supply Chain Management Partnership or Power Struggle?
NBS7030B
Retail Marketing & Management
Ratula Chakraborty
Professor of Business Management
Director MSc Programmes
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Retail supply chains and retail logistics
The rise of retailer buyer power
Different forms of buyer power
Economic effects of buyer power
Public policy responses
Case study – UK Groceries Market
Key question:
To what extent is the modern retailer-supplier relationship a collaborative partnership or an adversarial power struggle?
Lecture Outline
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1. Retail supply chains and logistics
Route to market
factory –> sortation depot –> RDC –> local warehouse –> retail store –> consumer
The role of the Regional Distribution Centre (RDC)
Breaking bulk and storing supplies, distribution, amalgamation of product assortments for stores, preparation of merchandise
Costs in the supply chain
Transportation, handling, warehousing/storage
Product-push v. customer-pull based logistics systems
Efficient consumer response and collaboration with suppliers
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System Rivalry
Supply Push v. Demand Pull
Brand Retailer
Retailer
Retailer
Brand Producer
Producer
Producer
Consumers
Consumers
Retail Marketing & Management Lecture – Supply Chain Management 2
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Chain-stores and increasing retail concentration
Most retail sectors now dominated by a handful of major retailers that suppliers need to trade with in order to survive
Retailer-led supply chains
Retailers determine product ranges and how they are supplied
Relative bargaining positions in retailer-supplier relations
Suppliers economically dependent on key retailer customers
Easier for retailers to switch suppliers, than vice versa
Retailers control shelf space and all in-store marketing levers to favour/disfavour products
2. The rise of retailer buyer power
Retail Marketing & Management – Supply Chain Management 2 Ratula Chakraborty
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De-listing threats and other retailer bargaining tactics
Intimidation, scare tactics, continuous pressure to lower prices
The use of competitive tendering and online auctions
Used for unbranded commodity products (e.g. cheese, bleach)
Own-label development to weaken brand power
Provides an alternative to reduce retailer’s dependency on brands
Exploiting different roles to leverage buyer power
Retailers serve three roles for brand producers: as their customers (i.e. gatekeepers to consumers), competitors (selling own label), and suppliers (supplying shelf & advertising space)
The rise of retailer buyer power
Retail Marketing & Management – Supply Chain Management 2 Ratula Chakraborty
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Retailer Buyer Power
Exploiting Different Roles
Retailers as “Suppliers”
Pressure on Suppliers
Retailers as “Competitors”
Retailers as “Customers”
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Buyer power is manifested in two forms:
Buying effectiveness on supply prices
Lowest prices generally obtained by firms with highest market share
Small retailers can pay significantly more (10%+) for their goods than leading chains
Contractual obligations placed on suppliers
To provide direct or indirect financial benefits
To increase suppliers’ economic dependency
To hamper retail rivals (e.g. raise their costs)
http:// www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/People/Video-supermarket-ombudsman-depends-on-food-and-drink-suppliers
3. Different forms of buyer power
Retail Marketing & Management – Supply Chain Management 2 Ratula Chakraborty
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Discounts to retailers
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Payments for shelf-space (slotting allowances) and “pay to play” and “pay to stay” fees
Exclusive supply obligations (“only supply us”)
Most-favoured-customer (MFC) requirements
Late payments and enforced sale-or-return (shifting business risk on to suppliers)
Retrospective discounts and enforced contributions (post-contractual opportunism)
Supermarkets hurting suppliers (BBC News, 17/10/2009, 3:00mins)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8311930.stm
Examples of contractual obligations imposed on suppliers by retailers
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The Tesco profit overstatement that exposed the scandal of delayed payments to suppliers) (22/9/2014) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306893 (1:40 min)
(More details and a 9:40 min video interview with the (then) new CEO, Dave Lewis, at http ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306444 )
(commentary on background - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11122425/Tesco-scandal-could-spark-a-long-overdue-shake-up-of-the-retailer-supplier-relationship.html )
Examples of contractual obligations imposed on suppliers by retailers
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The start of the investigation (5/2/2015) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31143709 (2:20 min)(background – “Tesco: where it went wrong” - http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30886632 )
The results of the investigation (26/1/2016) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35407612 (2:30 min)(and written summary at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35408064)
Commentary on what this means now for suppliers see - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/12124265/Tacons-verdict-leaves-Tesco-suppliers-dancing-in-the-aisles.html , http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/12122662/Five-ways-Tesco-turned-the-screws-on-its-suppliers.html , http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Supply-Chain/Tesco-should-be-fined-for-grocery-code-abuses
Examples of contractual obligations imposed on suppliers by retailers
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Can driving down supply prices ever be bad?
Three ways in which buyer power may adversely affect competition and harm consumers:
Demand withholding – exploiting monopsony power to restrict demand and drive down supply prices
Reducing suppliers’ incentive to invest and innovate
“Waterbed effect” with small retailers charged higher supply prices due to discounts given to large retailers
But, buyer power can also be manifested through anti-competitive requirements or restraints on suppliers
4. Economic effects of buyer power
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Distorting Retail Competition
Further tilts uneven playing field
Large retailers in “virtuous circle”, small retailers in “vicious circle”
Small retailers can suffer “waterbed effect”
Assists predatory pricing
Combining local price flexing with below-cost selling to target small/specialist retailers
Loss of retail variety with sole focus on price
Economic effects of buyer power #2
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Distorting Supplier Competition
Small suppliers driven out of the market
Most vulnerable to retail buyer power
No alternative routes to market given demise of small/specialist retailers
Long term decline in supplier investment
Marginal cost pricing for suppliers with no power, so unable to cover fixed costs
Product quality, variety and innovation suffer due to inability to recover investment costs
Economic effects of buyer power #3
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Retailer-Supplier relations and buyer power
3 minute BBC interview (21 January 2013) with Christine Tacon, the newly appointed supermarket ombudsman who is the 'Groceries Code Adjudicator
http :// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21141841
http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-354080 64
2 minute BBC news story (23 July 2012) on dairy farmers protesting about the prices they receive for milk from supermarkets:
http :// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18963839
Economic effects of buyer power #3
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Questions for Discussion #1
Are there supply chains which are still largely producer driven rather than retailer driven? Why? Will this last? (e.g. newspapers and cars)
Why is it often easier for a retailer to switch to different suppliers, but harder for a supplier to switch to different retailers? Are there exceptions? What are the implications for the balance of bargaining power?
Why is the development of lookalike retailer own label goods a particular competitive challenge to the major brand producers? How should brand producers respond?
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Direct measures to prevent exploitative or anti-competitive buyer power
“Code of Practice” governing retailer relations with suppliers (e.g. UK and Australia)
Economic dependency laws (e.g. France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain)
Ban discriminatory pricing in intermediate goods markets (e.g. Robinson-Patman Act in the US)
Prohibit anticompetitive buyer-led vertical restraints (under EU Articles 81 and 82)
Allow co-operative agreements amongst producers (e.g. permitted in various European countries)
5. Public policy responses
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Broader measures to preserve retail diversity and competition
Predatory pricing laws (but often seen as ineffective)
Blanket below cost selling bans (but viewed as inflationary in France and Ireland)
Targeted below cost selling bans (e.g. Germany)
Tight planning restrictions (notably for large stores)
Strict retail merger policy (with low market share thresholds)
Enforced store divestiture or store swaps
Public policy responses #2
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Competition Commission “Groceries Market” Inquiry 2008
Retail sales worth £123.5bn in 2007, representing 16% of total consumer expenditure in UK
Grocery sales: 72% in supermarkets, 20% in convenience stores, 8% in specialist outlets
“Big 4” supermarkets control 75% of grocery store sales
Food/drink manufacturing industries increasingly concentrated (70% with C3 > 50%), but over 6,000 firms
307,000 agricultural holdings – fluctuating fortunes but particular concern about dairy farmers
6. Case Study – UK Groceries Market
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Buyer power effects
CC find the gap in supply prices paid between largest and smallest retail chains averages around 11-13%
CC find that 26 different practices imposed on suppliers by retailers are anti-competitive
But, is there any evidence of harm from buyer power?
Harm to retail competition?
Harm to supplier profitability and viability?
Harm to consumers from reduced product choice or higher retail prices?
Case Study – UK Groceries Market
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Retail Sector Composition
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Case Study - Conclusion
UK grocery retailing dominated by “Big 4” retailers
Concern that increased buyer and seller power of leading retailers may harm competition
Evidence of buyer power in differential buying effectiveness and use of buyer power practices
Limited evidence of buyer power adversely affecting profitability and viability of other parts of the supply chain
Little evidence to emerge that consumers have been harmed in respect of product choice/innovation and prices
Policy response: “Groceries Supply Code of Practice” and an ombudsman scheme for handling supplier complaints
Plans for the new code of practice (BBC News, 4 February 2010)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8497451.stm
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Some exposures…
The Tesco profit overstatement that exposed the scandal of delayed payments to suppliers) (22/9/2014) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306893 (1:40 min)
(More details and a 9:40 min video interview with the (then) new CEO, Dave Lewis, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29306444 )
(commentary on background - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11122425/Tesco-scandal-could-spark-a-long-overdue-shake-up-of-the-retailer-supplier-relationship.html )
How Tesco mistreats its suppliers (22/10/2014) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29703600 (2:40 min)
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The start of the investigation (5/2/2015)
http ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31143709 (2:20 min)
(background – “Tesco: where it went wrong” - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30886632)
The results of the investigation (26/1/2016) - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35407612 (2:30 min)
(and written summary at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35408064)
Commentary on what this means now for suppliers see - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/12124265/Tacons-verdict-leaves-Tesco-suppliers-dancing-in-the-aisles.html , http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/12122662/Five-ways-Tesco-turned-the-screws-on-its-suppliers.html , http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Supply-Chain/Tesco-should-be-fined-for-grocery-code-abuses
Questions for Discussion #2
How might retailers and their suppliers find win-win solutions where both sides can gain from trading?
If supply chains are dominated by powerful retailers how do food/drink producers like Coca Cola, Unilever Procter & Gamble, Nestle, Kraft, etc., earn £ billions in profits each year?
How can small retailers compete against the buying power of the major retailers to ensure they remain competitive and economically viable?
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Further Reading
Varley, R. and Rafiq, M. (2014), Principles of Retail Management, Ch. 7 & 11.
Competition Commission, Supermarkets, Cm 4842, October 2000 (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2000/446super.htm)
Competition Commission, Groceries Market, Final Report, 2008 (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402141250/www.competition-commission.org.uk/our-work/directory-of-all-inquiries/groceries-market-investigation-and-remittal/final-report-and-appendices-glossary-inquiry)
Dobson, P.W. and R. Chakraborty (2008), “Buyer Power in the U.K. Groceries Market”, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 53 (2), pp. 333-368, Summer 2008.
BBC Panorama - Trouble at Tesco (30 min, Jan 2015) - https :// www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlubbsWNmnY
Articles on Lecture Handout
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Buying E
ffectiveness
of UK
G
rocery R
etaile
rs, 1998/9
Number of
product
lines
(max = 130)
Relative
buying
performance
(av
g
= 100)
% of lines
where
prices
paid are less
than average
% of av
ge
paid relative
to Tesco
(av
g
= 100)
Market share
in grocery
retailing
Tesco
126
96.2
80
100.0
23.0
Sainsbury
125
97.7
74
101.6
18.7
Asda
127
97.8
66
102.3
12.2
Somerfield
130
98.4
65
103.0
9.8
Safeway
123
98.8
65
103.1
11.5
Morrison
122
99.8
46
104.6
3.9
Co
-
ops
n.a.
100.5
n.a.
n.a.
6.4
Iceland
66
101.0
38
105.3
3.0
Budgens
85
103.6
24
109.4
0.7
Netto
24
104.2
21
109.5
0.7
Waitrose
103
104.4
23
110.1
3.0
Booth
74
104.4
26
111.1
0.2
Source
: Competition Commission 2000