Religious-pilgrimage system

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INTENTIONAL HAZARD RISK MANAGMENT NOVEMBER 2020 LECTURE 4.3 HRVA

Introduction

Purpose of today’s class is to apply all that we have learned with NUG analysis for

natural hazards and apply it to Intentional hazards.

Homework 4.1: Far too many cadets keep plagiarizing even though this was an easy

homework assignment. Why? Why so much resistance to studying and learning?

Homework 4.2: Due Saturday 11:59PM November 21

Why so few cadets at my office hour on Thursday at 3PM?

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Intentional Hazards: Review

Intentional hazards exist because certain people think they can enhance their utility by

engaging in acts of unlawful destruction.

They will approach such destruction from a cost-benefit perspective, however.

Each act of deliberate destruction comes with attack costs (direct and indirect).

Each act of intentional destruction comes with attack benefits (political, religious,

ideological).

Each act of intentional destruction comes with performance levels or magnitudes.

So, terrorists, insurgents, organized criminals will only pursue such acts of destruction

when it is profitable to them, or when their NUG analysis leads to positive or

maximum levels

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Deterrence

The profit seeking nature of intentional hazard generators is very important for

mitigating this type of risk.

What happens if the people defending against intentional hazards can arrange their

defenses and protections such that the profits secured by the attackers is very low or

even negative?

Will this attack still occur? No! Another asset will get selected that represents higher

NUG, or new investments will get made to increase NUG with that asset.

So, Deterrence is about creating the perception of attackers that their attack will lead

to zero or negative NUG.

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Exceptions?

Are their intentional hazards who will attack regardless of the NUG is generates?

Yes, there are fanatics or idiots who attack out of a sense of duty to avenge some

wrong regardless of the consequence.

There are also drug addicts or low I.Q. criminals who aren’t affected by cost-benefit

reasoning.

But these situations generally involve low performance attacks against a single person.

The really high-magnitude intentional hazards invariable come from NUG maximizing

organized criminals, terrorists, insurgents or even military organizations who make

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Optimizing Attack Magnitude

Take a look at Fig 1 in the Lecture Notes 4.3

Here we see a terrorist organization’s total benefit, TB(z) function and its reduced

value TB1(z) when subject to counter-ideology arguments from the government.

One can also see the total cost function, TC(z), and its enhanced value, TC1(z) when

subject to enhanced protection measures.

Z* is the hazard magnitude level without any risk mitigation measures

Z1* is the much smaller hazard magnitude level with risk mitigation or protection

measures.

Notes how NUG(z*) is much greater than NUG(z1*) with risk mitigation.

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Tactics for Driving up the Total Cost Function

One basic strategy for deterring intentional hazards is thus to push up their total cost

function. Specific tactics include

Active physical security measures at asset: armed guards, dogs, surveillance camera

operators, trained employees, identification verifiers, alarms connected to

local police force.

2. Passive physical security measures at asset perimeter: walls, gates, barbed wire,

car barriers.

3. Intelligence operations to detect plots of perpetrators.

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Increasing Direct Attack Costs and Attack Investments

Risk Management efforts can also involve

1.  Driving up the direct or variable attack costs of launching an attack. 1.  Enhance security at asset to force attackers to increase cost of weapons, getting arrested,

getting injured or killed.

2.  Enhanced national surveillance to force attackers to spend more on avoiding detection.

2.  Driving up the attack investments that attackers used to drive down thier cost of launching attacks. 1.  Paying informants to locate safe hourse and bomb factories to confiscate equipment and

weapons.

2.  Beefing up border security to increase the cost of smuglling in weapons and high-tech

equipment.

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How to Deter Different Types of Intentional Hazards?

How can you increase the costs and decrease the benefits to deter

1.  Religious extremists?

2.  Corrupt government officials?

3.  Drug Cartels?

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Deterrence Analysis: Quantitative Example

Examine the Figures in Lecture Notes 4.3

Fig.2 shows the total variable cost and total benefit functions for two different

investments in propaganda or ideology, and two different investments in attack

investment.

Fig.3 shows the maximum NUG at z* that emerges when A = A2 and P = P1

Fig. 4 shows how when risk management efforts pushes up the total cost function,

TC(z, P1), to TC1(z, P1) and pulls down the NB(z, A2) function to NB1(z, A2). Not only

does the NUG decrease, but the optimum level of attack magnitude decreases from z*

to z1*.

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NUG Equation from Risk Management Perspective Let

q = performance of eternal security system protecting an asset

P = investment in external security system

M = investment in internal protection or mitigation

NUG (q, P) = TB(q) – TC(q, P)

TB (q) = R(0) - R(q) TC (q) = TVC(q, P) + P Therefore, NUG(q, P) = R(0) – R(q) – TVC(q, P) – P

See Fig. 6 and 7 for graphical analysis to determine optimum level of P and q.

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Exercise 1: Draw total benefit and total cost functions

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P1

M1

TVC(q, P1)

q

P2

M2

TVC(q, P2)

R(q, M1)

R(q, M2)

Exercise 2: Draw the net benefit and total cost functions

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P1

M1

TVC (q, P1)

q

P2

M2

TVC (q, P2)

TB(q, M1)

TB(q, M2)

Exercise 3: Draw with Dotted Line the Maximum Net Benefit and Minimum Total Cost, and Determine Maximum NUG and q*

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P1

M1

TC (q, P1)

q

P2

M2

TC (q, P2)

NB(q, M2)

NB(q, M1)