Literature Review 3

236 P

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C ustom

s, N orm

s, and Learning

F ollow

ing the ancient G reeks, I contend that appetite, spirit and reason

are fundam ental

drives, each seeking its ow n ends. E

xisting paradigm s

of international relations are nested in appetite (M arxism

, liberalism ) or

fear (realism ). T

he spirit-w hat

the G reeks often called thum

os-had not until

recently generated a paradigm of politics, although M

aFhiavelli and R ousseau

recognized its potential to do so .... I lim

it m yself to four underlying

m otives:

appetite, spirit,

reason and

fear. M odern

authorities have offered different

descriptions ofthe

psyche and hum

an needs. Freud reduces

all fundam ental

drives to appetite, and

understands reason only in its m

ost instrum ental

sense. A nother prom

inent form

ulation is A

braham

M aslow

's hierarchy

of needs, developed from

his study of great people and w

hat accounted for their accom plishm

ents. M

ore recently, psychologists have sought to subsum

e all hum an em

otions to seven fundam

ental ones. M

aslow 's

hierarchy of needs is conceptually

confusing and rooted

in a distinctly nineteenth-century

understanding of hum

an na-

ture. C ontem

porary psychology's

efforts to classify em otions

assum es that

its typology is universally applicable, w

hich is highly questionable. E

ven if defensible, this and other typologies include em

otions like love, sadness and joy that can hardly be considered central to foreign-policy

decisionm aking.

O ther em

otions, like anger, surprise,

disgust and contem pt,

have m ore rel-

evance but, I contend, can effectively be reduced to one or the other of m

y four m

otives.

T H

E SP

IR IT

A

spirit-based paradigm

starts

from the prem

ise that people,

individually and collectively,

seek self-esteem .

Self-esteem is a sense of self-w

orth that

m akes people feel good about them

selves, happier about life and m ore con-

fident in their ability to confront its challenges.

It is achieved by excelling in activities valued by one's peers or society and gaining respect from

those w

hose opinions m atter.

B y w

inning the approbation of such people w

e feel good about

ourselves. Self-esteem requires

som e sense of self but also rec-

ognition that

self requires society because self-esteem

is im possible

in the absence of com

m only

shared values and accepted

procedures for dem

on- strating excellence.

T he spirit

is fiercely protective

of one's autonom

y and honor,

and for the G

reeks the tw o are closely related.

A ccording

to Plato, the spirit

R ichard N

ed L ebow

, from "Spirit, Standing, and H

onor," in W

hy N ations F

ight: P ast and

F uture M

otives for W ar. C

opyright© 2010 R

ichard N ed L

ebow . R

eprinted w ith the perm

ission of C

am bridge U

niversity Press.

R IC

H A

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O WI S

pirit, S

tanding, and H onor

237

responds w

ith anger

to any restraint on its self-assertion

in private or

civic life. It w ants

to avenge all affronts to its honor,

and those against

its friends, and

seeks im

m ediate

satisfaction w

hen aroused.

M ature

people are restrained by reason

and recognize the w

isdom

of the ancient m

axim , as O

dysseus did in the O dyssey, that revenge is a dish best served

cold .... Societies have strong

incentives to nurture

and channel the spirit.

It engenders self-control

and sacrifice from w

hich the com m

unity as a w

hole prospers.

In w arrior

societies, the spirit

finds expression in bravery

and selflessness, from

w hich the society as a w

hole profits. A

ll societies m ust

restrain, or deflect

outw ards,

the anger aroused

w hen

the spirit is chal-

lenged or frustrated. T

he spirit is a hum an

drive; organizations and states

do not have psyches and cannot be treated

as persons. T

hey can neverthe- less respond to the needs of the spirit the sam

e w ay they do to the appetites

of their citizens. People join or support collective enterprises

in the expec- tation of m

aterial and em

otional rew

ards. T

hey build self-esteem the sam

e w

ay, through the accom

plishm ents

of the groups, sports

team s,

nations and religions w

ith w hich they affiliate. A

rguably, the m ost im

portant func-

tion of nationalism

in the m odern w

orld is to provide vicarious satisfaction to the spirit ....

Self-esteem is closely connected to honor

(tim e), a status for the G

reeks that describes the outw

ard recognition w e gain from

others in response to our excellence. H

onor is a gift, and bestow ed upon actors by other actors. It car-

ries w ith it a set of responsibilities w

hich m ust be fulfilled properly if honor is

to be retained. B y the fifth century, honor cam

e to be associated w ith political

rights and offices. It w as a m

eans of selecting people for office and of restrain- ing them

in their exercise of pow er. T

he spirit is best conceived of as an innate hum

an drive, w ith self-esteem

its goal, and honor and standing the m eans by

w hich it is achieved.

H ierarchy

is a rank ordering

of statuses. In honor

societies honor de-

. '

term m

es the nature

of the statuses and w

ho fills them

. E

ach status has

privileges, but also an associated

rule package. T

he higher the status, the

greater the honor and privileges, but also the m ore dem

anding the role and elaborate its rules. K

ings, form erly at the apt!x of the social hierarchy,

w ere

often expected to m

ediate betw

een the hum

an and divine w

orlds and de-

rived authority and status from

this responsibility. T

his holds true for so- cieties as diverse as ancient A

ssyria, Song C hina and early m

odern E urope.

Status can be ascribed, as it w

as in the case of elected kings or G

erm an

~ar chiefs. In traditional

honor societies·, the tw

o are expected

to coin- cide. T

he king or chief is expected to be the bravest

w arrior

and lead his ~orces int_o battle.

O ther

high-ranking individuals

m ust assum

e high-risk, if subordm

ate, roles. Service and sacrifice-the

m eans by w

hich honor is

w on and m

aintained-have the potential

to legitim ize hierarchy.

In return for honoring

and serving those higher up the social ladder, people expect

to be looked after in various

w ays. Protecting

and providing for others is

238 P

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C ulture:

C ustom

s, N orm

s, and Learning

invariably one of the key responsibilities

of those w ith high status and of-

. £ice. T he Song dynasty carried this system

to its logical extrem e,

integrat- ing all m

ales in the kingdom into a system

of social status signified initially by seventeen,

and then tw enty,

ranks. O

bligations, including

labor and

m ilitary service, cam

e w ith rank, as did various econom

ic incentives. A s in

aristocratic E

urope, the severity of punishm

ents for the sam

e crim e varied

by rank, but in reverse order.

G reat pow

ers have had sim ilar responsibilities in the m

odern era, w hich

have been described by practitioners and theorists alike. T

he U nited N

ations Security C

ouncil is an outgrow th

of this tradition. Its purpose, at least in the

intent of those w ho drafted the U

nited N ations

C harter, is to coordinate

the collective efforts of the com

m unity to m

aintain the peace. T raditional

hierar- chies justify them

selves w ith reference to the principle of fairness; each actor

contributes to the society and to the m

aintenance of its order to the best of

its abilities and receives support depending on its needs. M ore m

odern hier- archies invoke the principle of equality. T

he U nited N

ations attem

pts to in- corporate

both in tw o separate organs: the Security C

ouncil and the G eneral

A ssem

bly. H

onor is also a m

echanism for restraining

the pow erful

and preventing the kind of crass, even brutal exploitation com

m on to hierarchies in m

odern, interest-based w

orlds. H onor can m

aintain hierarchy because challenges to an actor's status, or failure to respect the privileges it confers, arouse anger that can only be appeased by punishing the offender and thereby "putting

him in

his place." H

onor w

orlds have the potential to degenerate

into hierarchies based on pow

er and becom e vehicles for exploitation w

hen actors at the apex fail to carry out their responsibilities

or exercise self-restraint in pursuit

of their ow

n interests. I define hierarchy as a rank order of statuses. M

ax W eber offers a differ-

ent understanding of hierarchy:

an arrangem ent

of offices and the chain of com

m and

linking them together.

W eber's

form ulation

rem inds us that sta-

tus and office are not alw ays coterm

inous, even in ideal-type w

orlds. In the Iliad, the conflict betw

een A gam

em non and A

chilles arises from the fact that

A gam

em non holds the highest office, m

aking A chilles his subordinate,

w hile

A chilles, the bravest

and m ost adm

ired w

arrior, deeply resents

A gam

em -

non's abuse of his authority.

In international relations,

great pow erdom

is

both a rank ordering

of status and an office. A

s in the Iliad, conflict can

becom e acute w

hen the tw o diverge, and states-m

ore accurately,

the lead- ers and populations-believe

they are denied office com m

ensurate w

ith the status they claim

. Standing

and honor

are another

pair of related

concepts. Stand-

ing refers to the position

an actor occupies

in a hierarchy. In an ideal-

type spirit

w orld,

an actor's standing

in a hierarchy is equivalent

to its degree

of honor. T

hose tow

ard the apex of the status

hierarchy earn

the requisite degree

of honor by living up to the responsibilities

associ- ated w

ith their rank or office, w

hile those w ho attain

honor by virtue

of

R IC

H A

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pirit, S

tanding, and H o~or

239

their accom plishm

ents com

e to occupy appropriate offices. E

ven in ideal spirit w

orlds, there is alm ost alw

ays som e discrepancy

betw een honor

and sta~~ing

because those w ho gain honor

do not necessarily w

in the com -

petit10ns that

confer honor.

In the Iliad, Priam

and

H ector

gain great

honor because of their perform ance

on and off the battlefield but lose their lives _and city. In fifth-century

G reece, L

eonidas and his band of Spartan

~arno~s w

on hon~r and im

m ortality

by dying at T herm

opylae. R

esign- m

_g ~££ice for the nght reasons

can also confer honor.

L ucius Q

uinctius C

m cm

natus w

as m ade

dictator of R

om e

in 458 and again

in 439 B

C E

. H

e resigned his absolute

authority and returned

to his hum ble

life as a hardscrabble

farm er

as soon as he saved his city from

the threat of the

V ols~ians and A

equi. H is hum

ility and lack of am bition m

ade him a legend-

ary fi~ure after w hom

a ~ity in the w ilderness of O

hio w as nam

ed. G

eorge W

ashm gton

em ulated

C m

cinnatus and retired

to his plantation at the end

of the R evol~tionary

W ar. L

ater, as first president of the new

R epublic, he

refused a third term

on principle and once again returned

to M ount

V er-

non. H is self-restraint

and com m

itm ent

to republican principles earned him

num

erous m

em orials

and a perennial ranking as one of the top three presi-

dents in history. H

onor and standing can diverge for less adm irable reasons. H

onor w orlds

are extrem ely com

petitive because standing, even m

ore than w ealth

is a re- lational concept. H

obbes com pares it to glory, and observes that, "ifall m

en have it, no m

an hath it." T he value placed on honor in spirit-based

w orlds

and the intensity of the com petition

for it tem pt actors to take shortcuts

to gain honor. O

nce actors violate the rules and get aw ay w

ith it, others do the sam

e to avoid being disadvantaged. If the rules governing honor are consis-

tently violated, it becom es a m

eaningless concept. C om

petition for honor is

transform ed

into com petition for standing, w

hich is m ore unconstrained

and possibly m

ore violent. T his is a repetitive pattern

in dom estic politics and in-

ternational relations. T

he quest for honor generates a proliferation of statuses or ranks. T

hese order~ngs can ~eep conflict in check w

hen they are know n and respected, and

effectively defm e the relative status of actors. T

hey intensify conflict w hen

they are am biguous

or incapable of establishting precedence.

T his is m

ost ~ikely to happen w

hen there are m ultiple w

ays (ascribed and achieved) of gain- i~g honor and office. E

ven w hen this is not a problem

, actors not infrequently disagree about w

ho am ong them

deserves a particular status or office. T

his kind of dispute has particularly threatening consequences in international

re- lations because there are no authorities

capable of adjudicating am ong com

- peting claim

s. E

xternal honor

m ust be conferred

by others and can only be gained

through deeds

regarded as honorable.

It has no m eaning

until it is ac-

know ledged,

and is m ore valuable still w

hen there is a respectful audience. T

he G reek w

ord for fam e (kleos) derives from

the vt;rb "to hear" (kluein).

A s H

om er

knew ,

fam e not only requires

heroic deeds,

but bards to sing

I 'I

240 P

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C ulture: C

ustom s, N

orm s, and Learning

about those deeds and people w

illing to listen and be im pressed,

if not in- spired to em

ulate them . For honor to be w

on and celebrated, there m

ust be a consensus,

and preferably one that transcends

class or other distinctions, about the nature

of honor, how

it is w on and lost and the distinctions

and obligations

it confers. T

his presupposes com

m on

values and traditions,

even institutions. W

hen society is robust-w hen

its rules are relatively un- am

biguous and largely follow

ed-the com

petition for honor

and standing instantiates

and strengthens the values of the society. A

s society becom es

thinner, as it generally

is at the regional and international

levels, honor w

orlds becom e m

ore difficult to create and sustain. In the absence of com -

m on values,

there can be no consensus,

no rules and no procedures

for aw

arding and celebrating

honor. E ven in thin societies, honor

can often be w

on w ithin robust sub-cultures.

H am

as and other groups that sponsor sui- cide bom

bing, publicize

the nam es of successful

bom bers,

som etim

es pay

stipends to their

fam ilies

and alw ays

encourage young

people to lionize

them . Such activity strengthens

the sub-culture and m

ay even give it w ider

appeal or support. H

onor societies tend to be highly stratified

and can be likened to step pyram

ids. M

any, but by no m

eans all, honor societies are sharply

divided into tw

o classes: those w ho are allow

ed to com

pete for honor

and those w

ho are not. In m any traditional

honor societies, the principal

distinction is betw

een aristocrats,

w ho are expected

to seek honor, and com

m oners,

or the low -born,

w ho cannot.

T his divide is often

reinforced by distinc-

tions in w

ealth, w

hich allow

m

any of the high-born to buy the m

ilitary equipm

ent, afford the leisure, sponsor the cerem

onies and obtain

the edu- cation

and skills necessary to com

pete. A

s in ancient G

reece, birth

and w

ealth are never fully synonym

ous, creating

another source of social ten-

sion. W ealth

is generally a necessary,

but insufficient condition

for gain- ing honor.

A m

ong the egalitarian Sioux, honor

and status w

ere achieved by holding various

cerem onies,

all of w hich involved providing

feasts and gifts to those w

ho attended. H

orses and robes,

the principal gifts, could

only be gained

through successful

m ilitary

expeditions against

enem y

tribes, or as gifts from

others because

of the high regard in w

hich brave

w arriors

w ere held.

R ecognition

into the elite circle w here one can com

pete for honor is the first, and often m

ost difficult, step in honor

w orlds.

T he exclusiveness

of m

any honor societies can becom e a m

ajor source of tension, w hen individu-

als, classes or political units dem

and and are refused

entry into the circle in w

hich it becom es possible to gain honor.

W hat

is honorable, the rules

governing its attainm

ent, and the indices used to m

easure it are all subject to challenge. H

istorically, challenges of this kind have been resisted, at least

initially. Societies that have responded to them positively have evolved, and

in som e cases gradually

m oved aw

ay from , w

holly or partly, their w

arrior base.

R IC

H A

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pirit, S tanding, and H

onor 241

A final caveat

is in order .... I use the term

"recognition"

to m ean

acceptance into

the circle w

here it is possible

to com

pete for

honor. R

ec~g~ition carries

w ith

it the possibility of fulfillm

ent of the spirit;

and tt 1s not to be confused w

ith the use the term has com

e to assum e in

m oral

philosophy. H

egel m ade

the struggle for recognition

(K am

pf um

A

nerkennung) a central concept

of his P hilosophy

of R ight,

w hich is now

understood

to offer an affirm ative

account of a just social order that

can transcend

the inequalities of m

aster-slave relationships.

In a sem inal

es- say published

in 1992, C harles T

aylor applied

H egel's

concept to the de-

m ands

for recognition of m

inorities and other

m arginalized

groups. H

e argued

that hum

an recognition

is a distinctive but largely neglected

hu- m

an good, and that w e are profoundly

affected by how w

e are recognized and m

isrecognized by others.

T he political

psychology of recognition

has since been extended

to international relations,

w here

subordinate states

are assum ed to have poor self-im

ages and low self-esteem

. A

xel H onneth

stresses the

im portance

of avoiding m

aster-slave relationships

am ong

states. _Fernando C ornil argues that subaltern

states enjoy the trappings of

sov_ere1gnty but often internalize the negative

im ages of them

held by the m

a1or pow ers.

I acknow ledge

the relationship betw

een status and esteem

but m ake a

different argum ent.

In term s of at least foreign policy, it is po;erful

states, not w

eak ones, w ho often feel m

ost hum iliated. M

y explanation for this phe-

nom enon

draw s on A

ristotle's understanding

of anger, w hich is narrow

er than our m

odern W estern conception.

It is a response to an oligoria, w hich

can be translated as a slight, lessening or belittlem

ent. Such a slight can is-

sue from an equal, but provokes

even m ore anger w

hen it com es from

an actor w

ho lacks the standing to challenge or insult us. A nger is a luxury that

can only be felt by those in a position to seek revenge. Slaves and subordi-

nates cannot allow them

selves to feel anger, although they m ay develop m

any form

s of resistance. It is also senseless to feel anger tow ard those w

ho cannot becom

e aw are of our anger. In the realm

of international relations, leaders-

and often peoples-of pow

erful states are likely to feel anger of the A ristote-

lian kind w hen they are denied entry into the system

, refused recognition as

a great pow er or treated

in a m anner

dem eaping

to their understanding of

their status. T hey w

ill look for som e w

ay of asserting their claim s and seeking

revenge. Subordinate states lack this pow er and their leaders and populations

learn to live w ith their low

er status and m o,re lim

ited autonom y.

G reat pow

- ers w

ill feel enraged if challenged by such states. I believe w e can profit from

reintroducing the G

reek dichotom y betw

een those w ho w

ere included in and excluded from

the circle in w hich it w

as po~sible to achieve honor and A ris-

totle's definition of anger. L

et us turn to the w

ider im

plications of honor

as a m otive

for for- eign policy. First and forem

ost is its effect on the preferences

of states and their leaders. R

ealists and other international-relations scholars insist that

242 P

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ustom s, N

orm s, and Learning

survival is the overriding goal of all states, just as dom estic politics explana-

tions assert that it is for leaders. T his is not true of honor

societies, w here

honor has a higher value. A

chilles spurns a long life in favor of an honor- able death that brings fam

e. For H om

er and the G reeks, fam

e allow s people

to transcend their m

ortality. G

reat deeds carry one's nam e and reputation

across the generations

w here they continue

to receive respect and influ-

ence other actors. In the real w orld, not just in G

reek and m edieval fiction,

w arriors,

leaders, and som etim

es entire peoples have opted for honor over

survival. W e encounter

this phenom enon

not only in 'm y case studies of an-

cient and m edieval societies but also in nineteenth-

and tw entieth-century

E urope and Japan.

M orgenthau

and W altz draw

on H obbes,

and W altz on

R ousseau,

to argue that survival

is the prim e directive

of individuals and

political units alike. L

eo Strauss sees H obbes

as an im portant

caesura w ith

the classical tradition and am

ong the first "bourgeois" thinkers

because he m

akes fear of death and the desire for self-preservation the fundam

ental hu-

m an end in lieu of aristocratic

virtues. A m

ore defensible reading of H obbes

is that he aspired to replace vanity w ith m

aterial interests as a prim

ary hu-

m an m

otive because he recognized that

it w as m

ore effectively controlled by a com

bination of reason

and fear. For H obbes,

the spirit and its drive for standing

and honor rem ained a universal, potent

and largely disruptive force. As T

hucydides and H

obbes und~rstand,

the quest for honor and w

ill- ingness to face death to gain or uphold

it m ake honor-based

societies ex- trem

ely w ar-prone.

Several aspects of honor contribute to this phenom

enon. H

onor has been associated w

ith w arrior

societies, although not all w

arrior societies are honor

societies, and not all w arrior

societies are aristocratic. In such societies, w

ar is considered not only a norm

al activity but a neces-

sary one because w ithout

it young m en could not dem

onstrate their m

ettle and distinguish

them selves.

M ore fundam

entally, w

ar affirm s the identity

of w arriors

and their societies.

I have argued elsew

here that

T hucydides

considered the threat

A thenian

pow er posed to Spartan

identity, not their

security, the fundam ental

reason w hy the Spartan

assem bly voted for w

ar. E

rik R ingm

ar m

akes a persuasive case that it w as the principal

m otive be-

hind Sw eden's

intervention in the T

hirty Y

ears W ar, w

here standing w

as sought

as a m eans of achieving a national

identity. In A

C ultural Theory

of International R

elations, I docum

ent how

such considerations w

ere im -

portant for leaders and peoples from

post-W estphalian

E urope to the post-

C old W

ar w orld.

In honor societies, status is an actor's

m ost precious

possession. C

hal- lenges to status

or to the privileges it confers are unacceptable

w hen they

com e from

equals or inferiors. In regional

and international societies, sta-

tuses are uncertain, there m ay be m

ultiple contenders for them and there are

usually no peaceful w ays of adjudicating

rival claim s. W

arfare often serves

this end, and is a com m

on cause of w

ar in honor societies.

It often finds expression in substantive

issues such as control over disputed territory, but

can also arise from sym

bolic disputes (e.g. w ho is to have prim

acy at certain

1-

R IC

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pirit, S

tanding, and H onor

243

festivals or processions, or w hose ships m

ust honor or be honored by others at sea).

For all three reasons, w arfare in honor w

orlds tends to be frequent, but the ends of w

arfare and the m

eans by w hich it is w

aged tend to be lim ited.

W ars betw

een political units in horior societies often resem ble duels. C

om bat

is highly stylized, if still vicious, and governed by a series of rules that are generally follow

ed by participants. W

arfare am ong the G

reeks, A ztecs, Plains

Indians, and eighteenth-century E uropean states offer variants on this them

e. B

y m aking a place for violence in com

m unity-governed

situations, it is par-

tially contained and m ay be less dam

aging than it otherw ise w

ould be. H ow

- ever, these lim

itations apply only to w

arfare betw

een recognized m

em bers

of the sam e society. W

ar against outsiders, or against non-elite m

em bers of

one's ow n society, often has a no-holds-barred

quality. G reek w

arfare against tribesm

en or against the Persians at M arathon,

Salam is and Plataea, A

m erican

w arfare against native A

m ericans and colonial w

ars in general illustrate this nasty truth.

D espite the endem

ic nature of w arfare in w

arrior-based honor societies,

cooperation is not only possible but routine. C ooperation

is based on appeals to friendship, com

m on descent and m

utual obligation m ore than it is on m

u- tual interest.

T he norm

s of the hierarchy dictate

that actors of high status

assist those of low er status w

ho are dependent on them , w

hile those of low er

status are obliged to honor and serve their protectors or patrons.

Friendship usually involves the exchange

of gifts and favors and provides

additional grounds for asking for and receiving aid. C

ooperation in honor societies is

m ost difficult am

ong equals because no actor w ants to accept the leadership

of another and thereby acknow ledge its higher standing. T

his situation m akes

cooperation difficult even in situations w here there are com

pelling m utual se-

curity concerns. A

s honor is m

ore im portant

than survival,

the very notion of risk is

fram ed differently. W

arrior societies are risk-accepting

w ith respect to both

gain and loss. H onor cannot be attained w

ithout risk, so leaders and follow ers

alike w elcom

e the opportunity to risk lim

bs and lives to gain or defend it. A c-

tors w ill also defend their autonom

y at alm ost any cost because it is so closely

linked to their honor, unless they can find som e j~tification

for disassociating it from

honor that is convincing to their peers. R isk-taking w

ill be extended to the defense of m

aterial possessions and territory to the extent that they have becom

e entw ined w

ith honor and sym bols of th.em

. T

o sum m

arize, honor-based

societies experience conflict about w ho is

"recognized" and allow

ed to com pete for stanqing; the rules governing agon

or com petition;

the nature of the deeds that confer standing; and the actors

w ho assign honor, determ

ine status and adjudicate com peting claim

s. T rack-

ing the relative intensity of conflict over these issues and the nature

of the changes or accom

m odations to w

hich they lead provide insight into the extent to w

hich honor rem ains a prim

ary value in a society and its ability to respond to internal and external challenges. It also perm

its inform ed speculation about

its evolution.