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39. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 4.

40. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 9-13

41. Hyman, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 9.

42. A/1-506, group interview, 43-4.

43. Kudrna, quoted in HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 24.

44. Captain John Rascher, quoted in I/2-506, group interview, 20.

45. HHC/4th BSTB, group interview, 14-5.

46. Indo-Asian News Service, “Suicide bombers storm police HQ, kill 12,” Hindustan Times, 27 November 2010, http://www.hindustantimes. com/world-news/Afghanistan/Suicide-bombers-storm-police-HQ-kill-12/ Article1-631653.aspx (accessed 30 December 2011).

47. B/1-506, group interview, 41.

48. W/2-506, group interview, 4-7.

49. Hansen, quoted in E/2-506, group interview, 22.

50. E/2-506, group interview, 21.

51. B/1-506, group interview, 17-8, 31-3.

52. I/2-506, group interview, 17-20.

53. Rascher, quoted in I/2-506, group interview, 19.

54. Womack, interview, 4.

Leading the Charge

A Cavalry Platoon’s Fight in Badghis Province

Matt M. Matthews

Early signs of spring brought little relief to Red Platoon. Led by First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, the unit was formally designated 1st Platoon, Bravo Troop, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment (1/B/7-10 CAV) of the US Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 4th Infantry Division (4ID). Throughout the blistering summer of 2010 and the frigid winter of 2010- 11, Red Platoon had relentlessly conducted combat missions in northern Murghab District, Badghis Province, in northwest Afghanistan. For Law’s

in northern Murghab. On 4 April, the platoon’s Soldiers experienced the 1

Background

Lieutenant Colonel C. Scott Mitchell’s 7-10 CAV arrived in Afghanistan in the summer of 2010. Tasked with providing security to two provinces with only 513 Soldiers, his Alpha, Charlie, Delta, Headquarters and Headquarters Troops (HHT) occupied positions in Herat Province. Bravo Troop (christened Bulldog Troop) established positions in Badghis Province. By occupying the Bala Murghab Valley in the Murghab District, Bulldog Troop was isolated from the rest of the Squadron, a situation that created a formidable logistical challenge. “The way that they received supplies primarily was by CDS (Container Delivery System) drop,” Major

would get two or three CDS drops a week,” he explained, most of which were dropped by United States Air Force C-17 Globemaster IIIs. Lauer

supplied up there [because] there was no secured, reliable ground route… up to Bala Murghab at all.” Law also described the situation as “a logistical nightmare.”2

Command and Control (C2) also presented challenges for 7-10 CAV. In Herat Province, units from 7-10 CAV colocated with a Spanish Task Force, while the Bulldog Troop Headquarters in Badghis Province colocated with an Italian army regiment located in the town of Bala Murghab on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Todd. “We fell in on what was a very, very complex

1BCT, 4ID, stationed in Kandahar, they conducted operations on territory

assigned to the Italian and Spanish armies. Furthermore, while both the Italians and the Spanish forces fell under Regional Command-West (RC-

tension between 7-10 CAV and its NATO allies.3

Figure 1. Badghis Province and Bala Morghab District.

relationship between 7-10 CAV and its Italian and Spanish allies. “They were not prosecuting the war, necessarily, to the degree that it really demanded out there,” Lauer declared. Indeed, Italian and Spanish units, along with their Afghan counterparts, performed few patrols or operations into suspected Taliban locations. “Because the Italians and Spanish didn’t go [to] a lot of places, didn’t actively patrol a lot of places…there was a lot of area that was relatively ungoverned, or under what was fully acknowledged to be [under] Taliban control. So there were areas you just didn’t go,” Lauer noted.4

By late March 2011, Bravo Troop, commanded by Captain Tyrek Swaby, occupied FOB Todd in the town of Bala Murghab. At the same time, Swaby’s 2d Platoon (White Platoon), commanded by First Lieutenant Nick Costello, occupied a Combat Outpost (COP) south of Bala Murghab.5

Law’s Red Platoon and an Afghan National Army (ANA) platoon manned COP Metro north of the town. All three positions were within what was referred to as the security bubble. “That bubble was really the village of Bala Murghab…our cav[alry] platoon on the north side and our cav[alry] platoon on the south side, were sort of the northern and southern boundaries

also pointed out that areas outside the security bubble were impenetrable. “If you [ventured outside the bubble] you were guaranteed to get into a

explosive devices (IEDs) in the area, stating, “It was heavily IEDed to the north and south. Inside the security bubble, it was relatively secure.”6

Law bluntly decried the security situation around COP Metro. “It was trench warfare is what it was,” he stated. “They were set up [north of Bala Murghab] in the valley…it was no man’s land pretty much. And anybody that went up there was going to be shot at. Any kind of…coalition forces, or anything that represented the government, was going to get shot at.” While there were brief lulls, the Taliban attacked Law’s Platoon almost

Taliban insurgents planting IEDs. Law’s Soldiers also faced a dedicated, entrenched and well-supplied enemy.7

With the approaching spring and improved weather conditions, 7-10 CAV intended to bolster counterinsurgency operations. “What we really wanted to do is start to connect the Afghan provincial and district governance with more…of its population,” Lauer explained. In order to carry out this ambitious mission, Bulldog Troop needed to make contact with the small villages north and south of FOB TODD. The Squadron

enemy activity. Soon however, White Platoon found success in the south. In what was described as a series “of fortuitous events,” the platoon killed

Taliban cells, one operating in the south and the other in the north. 8

White Platoon’s actions proved so successful they stood up new, temporary positions, conducted a series of patrols designed to upset enemy operations, and reestablished coalition control south of FOB TODD. “We were having a good deal of success in the south,” Lauer stated, so “we

because we did get a lot of indications that those two cells were working together, asking each other for help.” The squadron determined to keep the enemy on its heels and pressed Bulldog Troop to conduct an operation north of COP Metro. The mission took Red Platoon further north than coalition forces had ventured since the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan.9

Planning the Mission

First Lieutenant Law, a native of Moultrie, Georgia, had served three years in the US Army as an enlisted military intelligence specialist. Upon completing his enlistment, he attended Georgia Southern University under the US Army’s Green to Gold program, returning to active duty as a Scout Platoon Leader. Law’s Platoon contained a diverse group of Soldiers.

Almost all of his men were veterans of the Iraq war, but none had deployed to Afghanistan. Law admitted, that the deployment “was something we

that there were some things we were going to have to learn very, very quickly.” The platoon had trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) prior to deployment. Law was thankful for the JRTC training in COP defense, particularly since the enemy attempted to overrun his COP

According to the platoon leader, gaining the trust of the local population and working with the ANA proved a daunting task. Locals observed Red Platoon’s activities and reported them to the Taliban. Law’s Platoon also initially endured abysmal living conditions. “We had generators that barely worked most days, living in dirt houses where any animal could

hand washing clothes and gear, [and] living about three to four kilometers away from support,” Law lamented. With the construction of COP Metro in October 2010, conditions improved. However, their isolated position, combined with their limited numbers, made the platoon highly vigilant, knowing full well they could be easily ambushed from numerous locations north of COP Metro.11

To help defend against enemy attacks, Law built a small observation post (OP) about 500 meters northeast of COP METRO. The new position was called (OP) Liberty. Seven Soldiers of the platoon, rotating with each other every three to four days, manned OP Liberty.12

Captain Swaby, the Bulldog Troop Commander, and Law planned for an operation north of COP Metro in the last weeks of March 2011. Law and Swaby spoke via radio and both men used their FBCB2 (Force

situation and a possible course of action. With Bulldog troop spread out, Law pointed out that this was “pretty much how we had to communicate with the Troop Commander, because…he couldn’t get out there to us all

Metro and they intended to take a patrol right up to the enemy’s doorstep. Swaby and Law set their sights on the small villages of Kamusari and Joy Gange. Law recalled that they wanted to go there, “basically [into] what

village because it afforded the enemy access to the valley from the north and the population provided support to the Taliban.13

Over the course of the next few days, Law’s Platoon conducted night reconnaissance missions north of COP Metro. Creek beds provided

exceptional cover and concealment for Law’s reconnaissance missions. “I used a creek bed, because we could move north and south and not be detected,” he recalled. “Nobody could ever see you moving in the creek bed, because the creek bed was maybe seven or eight feet below the ground level. It was completely dried up.” Law soon located a vacant compound about 400 meters south of Kamusari Village and determined it made a suitable Observation Post (OP) for the upcoming mission. Petty

Platoon on the mission, describing the compound as “ruins.” He recalled that the building had no roof and only three rooms. “All the rooms were interconnected by a passageway down the middle. It looked like it was made of mud. I think it had one or two entry points.” Law’s Platoon named the compound OP Reaper.14

Although Law’s Soldiers were highly motivated and welcomed the upcoming mission, the platoon leader worried about several issues. First,

Law recalled having only a limited number to strengthen the OP. Second,

Platoon Sergeant, Senior Scout, Bravo Team Section Sergeant and two other key sergeants were all on leave. So, I was basically having junior E-5 Sergeants doing the jobs of senior staff sergeants.” Yet the manpower shortage did not deter Red Platoon.15

On the night of 3 April, Law gave his operations order to the platoon. He named the mission Operation RED SAND, based on their designation as Red Platoon. Law told his platoon that its mission was to observe the area around Kamusari village for enemy activity and conduct a Senior Leader Engagement (SLE) with village leaders in Kamusari. He hoped the meetings promoted greater cooperation between the villagers and the local government. The platoon also intended to conduct patrols throughout the area. Law’s intent was to observe activity and “interdict enemy offensive operations.” Phase one of the mission consisted of a night move from COP METRO to OP Reaper. Once OP Reaper was cleared, the platoon planned to fortify the outpost. After OP Reaper was established, the plan called for several night reconnaissance missions around Kamusari. At daybreak, Law decided to head straight into Kamusari village to conduct Senior Leader Engagements (SLEs) with the local population.16

As part of the move to OP Reaper, Law designated Sergeant Jeff

Red Platoon members included Sergeant Peter Nalesnick, Forward Observer (FO) Specialist Dewayne Sims-Sparks, Medic Specialist Kellen

West, Specialist William Newland, and Private First Class Ben Bradley. Additionally an ANA squad was attached to the force. US Navy Petty

accompanied Law on the operation. Both Lee and Valdo had worked with the Squadron in the past. Days earlier, Captain Swaby and Bulldog Troop First Sergeant Mike Dempsey introduced United States Air Force

1st Class John A. Pearl to Law. Both men were members of a Combat Camera Team. Another section of the platoon, commanded by Staff

if Law made contact with the enemy.17

S3, arrived at COP METRO only hours before Law gave his operations order. Lauer was visiting units, making the rounds across the squadron’s area of operations (AO). Lauer recalled talking with Law, “to kind of help him understand why we had directed a mission like this from the squadron

it was a very spread out, dispersed kind of squadron layout, and it was

in the north of the Bela Murghab River Valley were impacting operations in the south.” Lauer decided to accompany Red Platoon on the mission, but made it clear that this was Law’s operation. “I was merely there as part

myself, so I could bring it back to the staff, as to what they were facing in that AO.”18

As part of Law’s plan, a Red Platoon Quick Reaction Force (QRF) consisting of two M-ATVs “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain Vehicles” remained at COP METRO under the command of Staff Sergeant Ray Mundo. Law could also rely on Bulldog Troop’s QRF located at FOB TODD and commanded by First Sergeant Dempsey if his Platoon encountered serious resistance. The Red Platoon Leader also coordinated

Operations Center (TOC) and the Italian Army located at FOB TODD. In concluding his operations order, Law reiterated the key objectives of Operation RED SAND. A covert movement to the observation post was of paramount importance, as was clearing and establishing OP Reaper. The night area reconnaissance around Kamusari village also remained of

the platoon’s paramount goal, “the defeat of all enemy [dismounted] teams in [the] AO.” Turning to his men, Law told them, “Hey, it’s going to be really cold, and we’re going to be getting there at night, we’re going to have to dig in. We’re going to be up there for at least 24 to 48 hours minimal.” The Platoon Leader also advised his men that contact with the Taliban was “expected.”19

The Mission

At 2300 on 3 April, Law and Red Platoon departed COP METRO on foot. According to Private First Class Ben Bradley, the platoon moved north on Route BRONZE before turning west on a small road toward Kobali village. The patrol moved quickly through Kobali village and then headed north, using the creek bed for cover and concealment. Upon emerging from the creek bed, the patrol worked its way northeast through

Upon arriving at OP Reaper, Law’s men strengthened the mud and dirt

all those types of typical routine tasks,” Combat Camera Team member John Pearl remembered. “I didn’t have any night equipment with me, and certainly we were using light and sound discipline,” he stated. “So there was really nothing for me to do, except to just go ahead and integrate with the platoon at that point. To be honest with you, this was well outside of my previous experiences. So I was pretty jacked up.” Fellow Combat

walls. “It was just kind of the ruins of a house once upon a time,” Wallace pointed out. “There was three distinct doorways to the north that were

effort to create more space and improve their position.21

“I took a four-man patrol, and we started probing in the village, just identifying routes in and routes out; and just looking for signs of life,” Law stated. Valdo and his handler Lee accompanied the patrol. Air Force

booby traps, bombs, and IEDs. Law saw few signs of life as his small team crept through the village. Making their way back to OP Reaper, the patrol team managed to catch about an hour of sleep before Law roused his Soldiers for another patrol. At roughly 0400, Law moved his patrol back

toward Kamusari village. “Usually, the locals will come out for prayer around four o’clock, for cooking and things like that,” Law recalled. Concealed by darkness, the team listened for any signs of activity. The platoon leader remembered trying to gauge “the activity there, looking to see if there’s kids, or if you hear laughing, or if you hear women talking, [any] signs that there’s actual normal activities, and not just military age males in that village.” From the observations, the team concluded that only military-age males were in the village. After a last, quick survey of the village, the patrol headed back to OP Reaper. Major Lauer accompanied this second patrol. Valdo and Lee returned with the team and the bomb dog “didn’t hit on anything the whole time.” Lauer also pointed out that they were able to walk in and around Kamusari village without any trouble. “We certainly didn’t hear anybody. Very few lights [were] on at all.” Lauer concluded there was no electrical power inside the village. 22

Figure 2. Red Platoon Operations, 3-4 April, 2011.

Upon returning to OP Reaper, Law’s Soldiers prepared their positions and watched for signs of the enemy. As the sun came up, the platoon leader saw two males walking out of Kamusari. Wallace reported that they stopped

the men and questioned them. “We tried to assess any information. Is there any Taliban activity going on in the village, or are Taliban present now? We were getting negative responses out of the two people we grabbed. We let them both go and just kind of kept an eye on them, and they headed

Meeting the Village Elders

After daybreak, Law decided to conduct a SLE with Kamusari elders. He promptly gathered a new patrol team consisting of Major Lauer, Sheppard, Sims-Sparks, Pearl, Wallace, 3 ANA Soldiers and an ANA interpreter. The patrol headed out of OP Reaper north toward Kamusari. “We crept up right on them…we set up a cordon and started doing tactical questioning, talking to some of the older men,” Law recollected. Wallace recalled that in the daylight, the village looked like “a waste land.”24

“It goes back to the traditional ways of thinking that they have, that they’re not going to change. They’re pretty much set on being anti-government…

They don’t have any adult leaders to be…pro-government or…pro- anything different than what they’ve done for the past thousands of years.” Law tried to convince the elders that the Afghan government could help them, but it was to no avail. “The more and more I spoke with them, the

change their mind,” Law insisted. Lauer later stated that Law “did a good job of just approaching them and telling them who he was [and] what they were doing. I would say you didn’t get the feeling they were happy to see us there, but you certainly didn’t get the feeling that they were hardcore Taliban that were out for our destruction. They certainly talked about the Taliban being there. They said, ‘oh they all left when you guys came.’” As the conversation continued, more villagers joined the small group.25

As Red Platoon members pulled security around Law’s conference, a middle-aged Afghan male appeared. He instructed the Americans and ANA that they should leave. Law asked why it was not safe and the Afghan responded, “There’s Taliban everywhere.” Law replied, “Well, where’s the Taliban? Well, they’re not here now, but they come all the time. Well, if the Taliban comes all the time, why don’t you tell them they’re not welcome here?” The Afghan man was growing more and more upset. He

the Taliban would be resurgent. Law asked the man if he had been to the

district center so he could see what the government had to offer. “When you look around here,” Law told the man, “this is what the Taliban can offer.”26

Figure 3. First Lieutenant Joseph Law, Red Platoon Leader, Bulldog Troop (7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment) conducting SLE in Kamusari 4 April 2011.

Law is on the right.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

At this point, the Afghan encouraged Law to follow him into the village because it was not safe to stay where they were. With Shepherd and Sims-Sparks providing security, safety did not appear to be a problem. The villager, however, claimed that they were being watched. Following him into the center of the village, Law and his team were confronted by four

of the group in conversation. “I’ve been around several Afghans, but I’ve not seen them act like these guys were,” Wallace later stated. “They were angry! They were spitting as they talked, which in their culture is a sign of disrespect, so you rarely ever see them spit in public, but they were spitting when they were talking to Lieutenant Law and our ANA Sergeant, so it was obvious that the conversations weren’t going in a positive direction.” Wallace concluded that the Afghans were disturbed by the fact that the Americans and the ANA had come into their village and penetrated the northern line of the security bubble. “We were in their backyard, and they

no doubt that these men were Taliban insurgents.27

nowhere and that the patrol was in a precarious situation. He decided to return to OP Reaper. “I knew as soon as we left, that something was going to go down,” Law explained. The platoon leader gave the villagers his contact information and told them that he understood their concerns and would bring them to the Afghan security forces and the Afghan government

Within minutes, the patrol headed south through the village, back toward OP Reaper. As they proceeded through the village, an Afghan villager approached Law’s ANA Sergeant and warned him of an IED directly in the patrol’s path. The ANA Sergeant then relayed the information to Law. “No we can’t go that way, there’s an IED over there,” he told the platoon leader. Wallace thought this was strange as Lee had just taken Valdo through the area in search of IEDs. However, Wallace stated that Law did not want to take any chances and “brought us around to the other side of the building, so we left in the opposite direction that we came in.” As the patrol headed south out of Kumusari, Wallace noticed an ominous sign. As the patrol

about 12 Afghan villagers gathering on top of a two story compound in the village. He watched in horror as other Afghans handed weapons to the men on the roof. Law also saw another portentous sign. While he had not noticed any women or children in the village during the SLE, he now

instant, the patrol picked up the pace. “We weren’t tactically moving…We weren’t even scanning for mines, we were pretty much just getting the hell out of there,” Wallace recalled.29

The Fight at OP Reaper

Law did not know if the Taliban in Kamusari were aware of OP Reaper and he decided to move toward the creek bed and enter the OP from the south. Hastily moving into the OP, Law’s men took up defensive positions and waited. In the western room of the OP, Wallace, Pearl, Shepherd and Bradley also took up defensive positions. They were soon joined by Lee and Valdo. Major Lauer, Law, an ANA Sergeant and Sergeant Nalesnick occupied the center room, along with Red Platoon Medic Kellen West. At the same time, FO Sims-Sparks, Newland, the interpreter and the

of the OP. “So we got into our respective rooms, and we were talking about basically what had just happened, and anticipating contact,” Wallace maintained. As they prepared for a possible attack, West observed Sheppard and Nalesnick walking “the line to police up the guys and ordering them

to be on high alert for [a] possible attack.” Sims-Sparks then moved into the center room to coordinate with Law to send pre-plotted targets for the mortars at FOB TODD.30

Figure 4. Specialist Dewayne Sims-Sparks, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment forward observer, secures a sector of Kamusari Village, 4 April, 2011 in

northern Bala Murghab Valley, Badghis Province, Afghanistan.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

Inside the west room, the Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors scanned their sectors for any sign of an attack. As their anxiety increased, Lee told the others in the room, “They’re not going to do anything. There’s no way.

Nothing’s going to happen.” As soon as he uttered the last few words, enemy bullets smashed into OP Reaper. “It was just so funny, one tiny line like that, as soon as he said ‘Nothing’s going to happen’ all of a sudden,

experienced,” Pearl stated. “The magnitude of the rounds, the proximity of the RPGs, [rocket propelled grenades] the accuracy – all those things

to make sure that I wasn’t struck by any rounds,” Pearl remarked. “I continued shooting video, because this was exactly the scenario that you kind of want in my role. So I went ahead, got my camera, and got right to work. As the engagement continued, it became evident we might be in a

and help the OP defend itself.”31

In the west room, Wallace watched three enemy rounds slam into the wall inches from Pearl’s face. Sergeant Sheppard ordered the cameraman

from the compound to the north, the canal to the east and the canal to the west.” Except for the interpreter, Law’s team returned a blistering volley,

into the enemy positions 400 meters away. Wallace recalled that Specialist Newland and the ANA were “heavily engaged” with the enemy in the

of insurgents in Kamusari. From the western room, Wallace and the others

eastern creek bed. Wallace also continued to check the southern approach 32

In the center room, enemy bullets barely missed Nalesnick’s head as

rounds continued to slice into the OP, Kellen West grabbed his M-14. “I picked up the M-14 and started peeking up over a small groove in the northern wall,” he wrote. “I was observing the north calling out enemy

had a problem with, because the Italian mortars – well, it’s different than using the American mortars. Because, as the commander on the ground, if I said…I want you to bring it closer, you know, you can bring it in danger close, [and] the Americans will do it, but the Italians won’t do it, because they can actually be tried in a civilian court if something goes bad.” As the

In the western room of the OP, Sheppard and Bradley engaged enemy

Nalesnick in the center battle position. From his position on the west side of the OP, Sheppard used his M203 to drop 40mm grenades onto enemy positions in the creek bed. From the east room Newland also put effective

midst of the barrage of bullets and incoming RPGs, Law and Sims-Sparks

out.”35 Incredibly, the Italians still refused to engage the Taliban.

Even though we were out of danger close range, I mean I’m

off to the west, because they didn’t want to [have] any casualties. So, basically… when I’m sitting there telling them where I want it, they refused to take our word…I mean, it was a Taliban squad that we had up in that village, and anybody who was friendly, or innocent, had already left the village.

stemmed from the dispersed nature of the American and Italian TOCs. He

Soldier would have to run over to the Italian Regimental Headquarters and locate the Regimental Commander. The Italian Soldier “let him know what was going on [and brought] him over to the American [TOC], and

mortars, especially when it was rocket-assisted,” Lauer recalled. While the Italian rocket-assisted 120mm mortars could range from FOB TODD,

rounds to land, exploded uncomfortably close to OP Reaper. “Initially,” Wallace reported, “they were hitting right next to us.”37

“mortars [were] not working exactly like we wanted.” With the mortars

enemy positions around the OP. Law recalled him “putting them…spot

his M240 machine gun and M203s on to enemy targets in Kamusari. The

time, Law called for CAS and coordinated with Staff Sergeant Matthew

heavy machine guns on the creek bed to the east of OP Reaper in order to repulse enemy attempts to maneuver through the ravine. Fletcher’s Soldiers also engaged enemy targets in Kamusari.38

began hitting the OP with RPGs launched from the enemy occupied building in Kamusari. “They initially hit the ground in front of the center room,” Wallace remembered. “Next they hit the front wall between the center and western room, and then directly hit the wall on the western room.” At this

“we probably need to move out of this position.” As Law’s men redoubled

west room. The explosion wounded almost everyone in the room. West heard screams and Sheppard and Bradley yelling “Medic! Medic!” West

to shout ‘get the dog.’” West crawled over to Valdo and Lee and found that the dog was severely injured. “The rest of the US personnel,” West noted, “called their wounds out to me…Sheppard shrapnel to the arm…

Lee claimed no injuries at the time.”39

With casualties mounting, and a strong recommendation from Major Lauer to leave OP Reaper, Law decided to move back to COP METRO. “We had to get out of there,” the platoon leader exclaimed. The men gathered their equipment, prepared to exit the OP, and treated the wounded. West was concerned about bleeding from Sheppard’s arm, and quickly made a tourniquet for the wounded Soldier.40

Figure 5. Private First Class Ben Bradley (left), and fellow scout Sergeant Jeff Sheppard, engage the enemy from OP Reaper 4 April 2011.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

Law’s plan called for the platoon to head for the cover and concealment of the east side creek bed. Once in the creek they moved south, in the

heads, Lauer and Nalesnick ran for the creek bed. As they were leaving

occupied building in Kamusari. “Having always been on the receiving end of the RPG, never having been on the outgoing RPG, for me, was fairly interesting,” Lauer remarked. “Pretty loud boom as that thing goes out,

Wallace was awed by the actions of Lauer and Nalesnick. “They got into contact, when they came down the [creek bed] but they cleared the way

of running with a scout…to clear the [creek bed]…I haven’t seen many things like that in my career!”41

and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arrived over Kamusari. An ISAF

Platoon did not think the CAS produced the desired effects.42

Lauer and Nalesnick jumped into the creek bed and cleared the surrounding area. Next, the S3 radioed Law, informing him that the area was clear. Law’s Platoon bolted out of OP Reaper and headed for the creek

embankment.43

With Nalesnick on point, Red Platoon headed south toward COP METRO. As they began to move, Pearl noticed that Valdo could not make the trek on his own. Pearl stated that Valdo was “as much a part of the team as anyone else,” and he rushed to help him. “I don’t know if it was

“I think he tried to get the dog to walk through the ditch, and I think the dog actually did that. Quickly it became clear the dog was not going to be able to leave under his own power.” As enemy bullets continued to crack overhead, Pearl grasped Valdo and threw him over his shoulders, determined to carry the dog back to COP METRO.44

As they hurriedly moved south, Red Platoon remained under constant

putting Red Platoon at a “disadvantage.” However, Law’s Platoon did not

objectives. As the enemy maneuvered out of Kamusari and Joy Gange, they were spotted by the UAV and CAS. “The CAS was starting to identify

As the platoon continued its trek, Law coordinated with the QRF on standby. After taking the casualties at OP Reaper, the QRF, consisting of two M-ATVs commanded by First Sergeant David Dempsey and Staff Sergeant Ray Mundo, another member of Red Platoon, advanced swiftly out of COP METRO. The M-ATVs headed northwest in the direction of the creek bed. Private First Class Joshua Kukosky explained that Mundo gave the order to “prepare the M-ATVs” as soon as Law called with the casualty report. As they advanced closer to the creek bed, they received

team emerged from the ravine. The Red Platoon Soldiers at OP Liberty also engaged insurgent targets as the patrol exited the creek bed. “Climbing out of the canal was pretty intense, because you’re climbing up and the sides of the canal just break apart as you climb,” Wallace recalled. “But, one by

an RPG bounce off the hood of one of the [M-ATVs] that came to rescue

weight of his equipment as well as two radios and Mundo jumping out of his M-ATV to help his fellow platoon members. “I got guys bleeding and screaming behind me, and we get up, and we have to crawl out of this creek bed. I look up, and all I see is Sergeant Mundo standing there, and I hear rounds going through the trees, and he’s screaming at the guys to start throwing bags up there, to get them out…They had to…physically help us

As the men came up out of the ravine, the wounded, including Valdo,

portion of his team moved out on foot. “We had to run the whole way,” Law stated. “The trucks tried to stay in front of us as much as they could.”

COP METRO, Sheppard, Lee and Valdo were placed on the MEDEVAC aircraft and taken to FOB TODD. While the rest of the Platoon caught

Tyrek Swaby, the Bulldog Troop Commander radioed Law. “Hey, right now is the best time to go back in there, and really get at them, because we know where they are now.”47

The Counterattack

Although Law was apprehensive about the new mission, he planned

Law explained, “I’m missing so many key players…but we’ve got to put something together right now, because if we’re going to get [them], this is the best time to do it.” The platoon’s reaction to the new order was mixed. Some quipped that the mission was “bullshit,” while others were eager to return to the fray. One of Law’s men responded “Hell yeah. Let me get my stuff.”48

As Law, Dempsey and Lauer formulated the plan, the other Red Platoon Soldiers prepared their M-ATVs for the return north. Based on the Bulldog Troop Commander’s guidance, the plan called for an assault of Joy Gange. As the planning conference ended, Law turned and yelled, “Hey who’s getting in the truck with me.” Private First Class Kukosky

piled into the trucks. As the M-ATVs sped north on Route BRONZE, CAS

assemble this force and then push north again towards the village of Joy Gange.”49

The two M-ATVs swiftly pushed north. Arriving on the outskirts of Joy Gange, Law, Dempsey and Kukosky dismounted from their trucks and moved toward a compound near the road. “Basically, they dropped us off right there behind the compound,” Law explained. “We jumped the wall, all three of us…into this compound not knowing what the hell was in it.” As they scaled the wall, the M-ATVs engaged Taliban targets inside Joy Gange with .50 caliber machineguns. Climbing to the top of an outhouse, Law and Dempsey spotted a host of enemy targets in the

Dempsey remained unobserved by the enemy. “They didn’t know we were in the compound,” Law boasted. “We were basically spotting everything that they were doing, and calling up the trucks.” Law recalled that this was

Staff Sergeant Mundo arrived on the scene from COP METRO with his

he called the “mechanic’s bay,” Law called in an airstrike. In no time a jet responded by dropping a bomb on the building and its occupants. As the smoke rose from the building, Law abandoned the compound and moved directly into Joy Gange.50

Moving out of the compound, Dempsey radioed his truck, ordering them back to the drop off point. When the M-ATV arrived, the three

there were already too many people in it. Undeterred, the dismounted

the western side of Joy Gange. After they had walked about 200 meters, another truck, with open seats, arrived and the Soldiers jumped inside. As

compound to the east. While Mundo and a truck commanded by Sergeant

careened toward the complex. As the truck jerked to a halt, Dempsey, Law and Lauer dismounted the vehicle and began to clear the compound. By

the complex they found a vast array of IED making material. They also

lab.” The compound would have to be destroyed.52

Figure 6. An insurgent compound explodes after an Air Force B-1 Lancer drops a guided bomb on the facility in northern Bala Murghab Valley, Badghis

Province, Afghanistan 4 April, 2011.

US Air Force photo/Technical Sergeant Kevin Wallace/RELEASED

With Lauer present, the team took swift action. Law made clear that, “Major Lauer is the S3…he has a lot of pull with the Squadron, so he can pretty much make the call on the ground that this place needs to be demolished.” Lauer lobbed a smoke grenade onto the top of the building as a marker for a circling Air Force B-1 Lancer, and then the three Soldiers quickly mounted Dempsey’s M-ATV. As the smoke swirled upward from the roof, all three Red Platoon vehicles sped away from the Joy Gange. As they drove to the east side of Route BRONZE, a 2,000 pound bomb from the B-1 destroyed the IED-making facility.53

Although the 2,000 pound bomb leveled the building, it failed to demolish other structures in the compound. When Lauer and Red Platoon returned to Joy Gange to conduct a battle damage assessment (BDA), they discovered another building with IED making material inside and requested that the B-1 reengage. As the team moved back across Route BRONZE, another 2,000 pound bomb fell on the target, completely destroying the structure. Returning to the village, Red Platoon conducted another BDA.

probably the quietest I’d ever seen the area.” As the Taliban melted away into the hills north of Joy Gange, Red Platoon and its attachments returned to COP METRO.54

Aftermath

The tactical impact of Operation RED SAND was truly impressive.

unwilling to engage us, as well as unwilling to stay in those positions of

Indeed, Bulldog Troop ultimately cleared all the Taliban from Joy Gange. Shortly after the mission, Red Platoon participated in a village shura and connected the population with the district government. “We even got to the point where we were doing some projects. They were working with the platoon. We were able to get some projects started to help them for working closely with us, and get them some better basic services,” Lauer recalled. Clearly, victory in combat had translated into opportunities in governance and reconstruction.56

Although Law and his Soldiers fought without their senior NCOs

professionally and with valor. Reluctant to sit idly inside the security bubble, the squadron sought opportunities to enlarge its counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Despite being shorthanded and saddled with passive coalition partners, the squadron and troop persisted in expanding security and governance within the province. Without doubt, their persistence laid the groundwork for success. The squadron and troop decision to launch Law’s counterattack proved decisive. Law’s counterattack into Joy Gange

The ANA Soldiers attached to Law’s platoon also performed well and

casualties on Red Platoon, Law’s decisive and composed leadership helped restore order. The platoon leader explained that it was:

The hardest moment in my life, and as a leader, to deal with that, and hear those Soldiers screaming, and then to hear NCOs screaming, and you don’t know if they’re OK. You don’t know which one’s dead. At the same time, you must be able to maintain

describe that moment to full effect, to anyone who’s never been in that position.

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In the end, all of Law’s injured personnel returned to duty. Valdo, the most seriously wounded, was medically retired. 57

When Law announced his plans for the counterattack into Joy Gange, he displayed tenacious and inspired leadership. While not everyone in the Platoon was enthusiastic about the mission, no one stayed behind. During the counterattack, Red Platoon, First Sergeant Dempsey and Major Lauer

OP Reaper and the counterattack into Joy Gange, Red Platoon killed 7-12

Reaper and the counterattack into Joy Gange. “The true test of leadership is the willingness of others to follow you into what could possibly be

The pride I keep from the accomplishments of my Soldiers will always be with me. Operation RED SAND broke the backs of the Taliban in north Bala Murghab and paved the way for coalition forces to advance further than we had ever gone. The credit is not

Soldiers who [faced] off with the enemy every day. Every victory in Afghanistan is earned on the sweat and blood of the Soldiers.

Victory on that day was not elusive.59

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Notes

1. First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 December 2011.

2. Major Jonathan Lauer, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 October 2011, 12; First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 October 2011, 4.

3. Lauer, interview, 8.

4. Lauer, interview, 11-12.

5. Law, interview, 2; Lauer, interview, 15; Law, e-mail, 14 December 2011.

6. Law, interview, 2; Lauer, interview, 15; Law, e-mail, 14 December 2011.

7. Law, interview, 5.

8. Lauer, interview, 20-22.

9. Lauer, interview, 22-23.

10. Law, interview, 1-2; Law, e-mail, 15 December 2011.

11. Law, e-mail, 15 December 2011.

12. Law, e-mail, 15 December, 3 January, 2011; Lauer, interview, 27-28.

13. Law, interview, 6-8; Lauer, interview, 24.

Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 October 2011, 5.

15. Law, interview, 9-11.

16. Law, interview,7; First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, Operations Order for Operation RED SAND, no date, copy author’s collection; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, Private First Class Ben William Bradley, 4 April 2011, 1.

17. List of Red Platoon members, locations and weapons systems, no date, author’s collection; Lauer, interview, 37; Pearl, interview, 2.

18. Lauer, interview, 33-34.

19. List of Red Platoon members, locations and weapons systems, no date, author’s collection; First Lieutenant Joseph C. Law, Operations Order for Operation RED SAND, no date, copy author’s collection; Law, interview, 9-10.

20. Sworn Statement, Bradley, 1; Law, interview, 11-12.

21. Pearl, interview, 7-8; Technical Sergeant Kevin P. Wallace, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15 August 2011, 6-7.

22. Wallace, interview, 7-8; Law, interview, 12.

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23. Wallace, interview, 8-9; Law, 12-13.

24. Sworn Statement, Specialist Kellen West, 4 April 2011, 1; Law, interview, 12-13; Wallace, interview, 9.

25. Law, interview, 13-14; Lauer, interview, 41-43.

26. Wallace, interview, 11-12.

27. Wallace, interview, 12-13.

28. Law, interview, 14; Lauer, interview, 44.

29. Wallace, interview, 13-14; Law, interview, 14.

30. Wallace, interview, 15; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, Specialist Kellen Gordon West, 4 April 2011, 1.

31. Pearl, interview, 15-16.

32. Wallace, interview, 16.

33. Sworn Statement, West, 1.

34. Law, interview, 15.

35. Sworn Statement, West, 1.

36. Law, interview, 17-18.

37. Lauer, interview, 46, 48; Wallace, interview, 17.

38. Law, interview, 17-18; DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, First Lieutenant Joseph Cecil Law, 4 April 2011, 1; Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 3 January 2001.

39. Wallace, interview, 18; Lauer, interview, 49; Sworn Statement, West, 1.

40. Law, interview, 18; Sworn Statement, West 1-2; Wallace, interview, 23

41. Law, interview, 18; Sworn Statement, West 1-2; Wallace, interview, 23.

French Mirage. Lauer, interview, 48; Wallace, interview, 23

43. Lauer, interview, 52; Wallace, interview, 24.

44. Sworn Statement, Bradley, 2; Pearl, interview, 21-22.

45. Lauer, interview, 54.

46. DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement, Private First Class Joshua Travis Kukosky, 4 April 2011, 1; Wallace, interview, 25-26; Law, interview, 22.

47. Sworn Statement, Kukosky, 1; Law, interview, 23-25.

48. Law, interview, 26.

49. Law, interview, 26; Lauer, interview, 57.

50. Sworn Statement, Kukosky, 1; Law, interview, 28-29.

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51. Law, interview, 29-30.

52. Law, interview, 31; Lauer, interview, 62-63.

53. Lauer, interview, 63.

54. Lauer, interview, 63-64; Law, interview, 33.

55. Lauer, interview, 64-65.

56. Lauer, interview, 64-65.

57. Law, interview, 20.

58. Lauer, interview, 65; Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 3 January 2012.

59. Law, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, 3 January 2012.