Leading digital innovation

Leading digital innovation

UBER AND STAKEHOLDERS: MANAGING A NEW WAY OF RIDING

By 2015, technological innovations—the smartphone and the advanced data connectivity that enabled it—created new opportunities for people to move around cities quickly and conveniently without owning a car, via car-sharing services like Zipcar or new ride-sharing services. Uber, a five- year-old startup, enabled users to order private rides via a smartphone app. In mid-2015, the company had achieved a pre-IPO market valuation of $50 billion, with operations in 311 cities in 58 countries. Despite its scale and success, Uber often found itself embroiled in controversy, with resistance from a broad range of unhappy stakeholders—regulators, competitors, drivers, and even some customers and partners—across the U.S. and the world. Could Uber continue this route? THE PRIVATE RIDE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES U.S. ride-for-hire services traditionally consisted of limousine services and taxis, each with its own set of regulations. But a third category was emerging: transportation network companies (TNCs), which shared attributes of both categories but were not yet subject to clear rules. The U.S. ride-for-hire industry grew at about 2.7% per year from 2010 to 2015, with 2014 revenues estimated at $12 billion. Large operators existed, but competition was fragmented and included many single-worker owner-operators; businesses in the space were estimated to exceed 200,000.5 Regulations varied by area, but limousines, taxis, and their drivers were generally subject to strict safety and insurance requirements. In New York City, for example, professional drivers were required to take defensive driving courses every three years, pass criminal background checks and annual drug tests, receive a medical exam, and undergo annual sex trafficking awareness training. New York also required for-hire vehicles to pass annual inspections and carry minimum commercial insurance of $100,000 per passenger and $300,000 per incident. Once approved, cars received special license plates identifying them as for-hire vehicles. LIMOUSINE SERVICES Limousine services, also referred to as livery, limo, or “black car” after the ubiquitous Lincoln Town Car favored by many companies, typically provided a premium service with professional drivers, prearranged pickup and drop-off points, comfortable luxury sedans or SUVs, and set rates that included driver tips. Trips might include free snacks or water, worktables, or rear-seat entertainment systems. Starting prices for Town Cars were about $55 per hour in Boston, with higher prices for Cadillac or Mercedes sedans, SUVs, and stretch limousines. In Las Vegas, where regulations mandated a one-hour minimum, prices averaged $46 per hour. Corporate travelers accounted for about 65% of demand for black car services; car services often had extensive contracts with businesses as preferred vendors, with prearranged billing and invoicing procedures. Though the pace of technological innovation in the industry was relatively slow, operators had responded to the Internet revolution with online reservation portals, including the Limos.com site that referred customers to operators in its network. Observers estimated that limousine industry revenues for 2014 totaled about $5.9 billion, though the U.S. Census estimate was closer to $4.2 billion. Some national leaders in the U.S. livery industry had emerged, though the industry remained relatively fragmented. The largest was Carey International, founded in 1921 in Washington, D.C. Carey’s market share was estimated at 3.5%, with estimated 2014 revenues of about $340 million, global operations—550 cities in 60 countries around the world—and more than 1,200 employees. New York’s Empire Limousine had an estimated 1.4% market share and estimated 2014 revenue of $132 million; it and other regional players, like Air Brook Limousine in New York (estimated revenue of $67 million), Boston Coach ($60 million), and Commonwealth Limousine ($32 million), also had limited operations in other cities and abroad. Large services dominated most metropolitan markets, accounting for almost half of industry revenue, but accounted for only about 4% of limousine companies; about 90 percent of companies were independent owner-operators. Barriers to entry were typically low, with few requirements beyond a suitable vehicle and a livery license. State agencies usually regulated black car services and enforced commercial insurance, operating, and licensing requirements. Although specific rules varied by location, livery services were typically required to schedule trips well in advance, set prices prior to pick-up, and carry a passenger manifest. In New York, limousine companies were required to transact 90% of business via contractual voucher work, making ad-hoc trips paid via credit card or cash more difficult. TAXICABS The U.S. taxi industry had estimated 2014 revenues of about $6.5 billion. Taxi services were typically priced lower than black car services; in Boston, the minimum fare was $2.60 for the first 1/7 mile, with an additional $0.40 per 1/7 mile thereafter and $28 per hour while stopped. Some cities also included flat rates for specific destinations, such as a regulated $52 fare between New York’s JFK Airport and Manhattan. In major cities, comparatively low car ownership, dense populations, and visiting tourists supported the economics of taxi use. Passengers could hail taxis at the street or call-in requests for immediate pickup. (The notion of cab “dispatch” was heavily ingrained: in Chicago and some other cities, taxis were required to communicate via two-way radio with dispatch stations). To facilitate safe hailing, cabs were usually required to be clearly marked, a requirement that established the now-iconic New York yellow cab. Taxis also carried calibrated and sealed taximeters, which determined standardized prices based on time and distance, with tips at passengers’ discretion. In some areas, taxi drivers had to undergo special training to operate legally. London, for example, required aspiring black cab drivers to train for and pass what some considered the world’s most difficult test: the Knowledge of London. The test, which required an average four years of intensive study and was described as comparable in time and effort to getting a medical degree, required takers to memorize the entirety of London—its 25,000 labyrinthine streets and any conceivable landmark— and instantly plan an efficient route anywhere on demand.26 Some questioned the Knowledge’s value in an age of GPS and Google, but others pointed to contests in which certified taxi drivers had beaten drivers using GPS, noting, “We’re trying to be the best in the world. ” Others defended the Knowledge as an end, a quest to “know the unknowable. ” Cities, which usually regulated their local cab industries, often sold medallions that provided the right to operate a taxi and regulated the territories where cabs could pick up passengers, including city centers and airports. Medallions were difficult to obtain due to their rarity and their cost: in New York, two medallions were auctioned in late 2013 for $1.3 million each—a significant revenue source for the city and a large investment for an owner to recoup. The prohibitive cost of medallions meant that ownership was concentrated in cab companies, which then rented out access to their drivers. Some reports suggested that this dynamic lent itself to abuse: in Boston, investigative journalists revealed that drivers were forced to bribe dispatchers for shifts during busy times, charged to fill cars that had full gas tanks, and otherwise exploited by profiteering owners.31 Drivers, charged various leasing fees, typically started each shift about $100 in debt to owners. A UCLA study found that Los Angeles taxi drivers worked an average of 72 hours per week, for average wages of $8.39 per hour; considered independent contractors, none received health benefits. Some cab companies worked to build customer loyalty and develop relationships with businesses as preferred providers, but riders often had little choice, picking the first cab in a cab stand or on the street. The relative anonymity of service and poor feedback mechanisms for customers led to complaints about the courtesy, quality, and safety of service; cab drivers also concentrated around areas where they were most likely to find passengers, making it more difficult to find a ride in underserved areas. One writer’s satirical how-to guide for cab drivers suggested the extent of dissatisfaction with the industry: “For the health of passengers smoking is not permitted in any vehicle unless YOU want to smoke.” The writer continued, “In order to keep abreast of any potential emergencies…wear a Bluetooth headset and always stay on the phone with your girlfriend. Please feel free to argue with her.” Some black and Hispanic riders reported difficulty hailing cabs. African- American New York City Councilman James Sanders commented: “45 minutes later and [after] 20 cabs, I said this isn’t working.” After a driver waiting at a cab stand declined to pick him up and drove off, the cab “went 20 feet away and picked up a nice white couple”. As in the limousine industry, competition was fragmented, with no national leaders— though historically the Yellow Cab Company, since split into regional companies, had maintained a national fleet in the 1960s. The largest taxi company, Yellow Cab Chicago—a descendant of the national Yellow Cab Company—operated 2,600 vehicles and accounted for less than one percent of industry revenue. Other Yellow Cab regional companies were often the largest players in their markets, with several exceeding $100 million in revenue, but competition was dispersed—and independent owner-operators often operated with loose affiliation to a network that provided dispatch, branding, and payment- processing services to compete with fleet operators. Though no national operators existed, booking networks like 1-800-Taxicab connected operators in different markets and provided a single point of contact for consumers. In Boston, the largest player was Boston Cab, which owned one in five of the city’s 1,825 medallions, followed by the Metro Cab Association and Veterans Taxi. Despite a reputation for underinvestment and stasis, the taxi industry was slowly changing. A major development had been the push to accept credit cards. New York City required its cabs to accept credit cards in 2007; despite initial resistance, increased ridership from the convenience afforded by credit card sales convinced many cabbies that the change was a positive one. Cab company owners in Boston reported a similar increase in ridership after the city required its cabs to accept credit cards in 2009—though drivers complained about excessive card processing fees, and riders reported occasional false claims that credit card machines were broken. In addition to convenience for customers, adding wireless connectivity to cabs also increased the advertising revenue that taxi companies had previously earned via print ads on top of cabs. “Taxi TV,” produced and distributed by payment vendors like VeriFone Systems or Creative Mobile Technologies, displayed a mix of news clips and advertisements during trips on small screens facing the backseat—though drivers usually did not receive a cut of revenue from these ad sales, and cab owners had to negotiate revenue sharing in their contracts with vendors. OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH NEW TECHNOLOGY The spread of sophisticated, location-enabled smartphones such as the iPhone and high-speed mobile data connections created opportunities for new ways of connecting buyers and sellers. New startups embraced the “sharing economy,” also called “collaborative consumption,” which used the new technology to connect providers and consumers of goods and services who would not otherwise have been able to transact business. The movement had idealistic roots: Zipcar, an early example, took its inspiration from a Swiss car-sharing collective and championed car-sharing not only for its convenience and cost, but also for the environmental benefit of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As a means of consumption, the sharing economy promised to put idle assets to good use. “Collaborative consumption gives people the benefits of ownership with reduced personal burden and cost and also lower environmental impact,” wrote sharing economy advocates Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers. Zilok.com created a network for peer-to-peer tool sharing, while UsedCardboardBoxes.com sought to “rescue” cardboard boxes and claimed to have saved over 900,000 trees. Airbnb, which allowed owners to rent out rooms or entire homes to guests via its Internet marketplace, achieved a $20 billion valuation in early 2015. Its founder, Brian Chesky, described his service as a “revolution.” “Ridesharing” was a particular target. New technologies made it possible to build services in which customers could order rides with just a tap on their smartphones. Using proprietary algorithms and location-aware apps, new services were able to create a seamless experience that connected customers and drivers, tracked the arrival of a car, offered driver reviews, and automated cashless payments via online credit card accounts; the services took a cut of fares. Silicon Valley startups raced to compete in the new ridesharing space, though some questioned whether they really involved sharing; in 2015, the Associated Press stopped using the term in favor of “ride-hailing.” Uber, founded in 2009 and launched in June 2010, was the most visible app-based transportation service and originally provided only on-demand black car service using limousine drivers who had time between scheduled trips, priced about 1.5 times higher than a typical San Francisco cab but less than a limousine. Other companies also competed: Lyft, which launched in 2012 and grew out of the carpooling company Zimride, connected riders with non-professional drivers in personal cars and called itself “your friend with a car.” (By mid-2015, Lyft had achieved a private market valuation of $2.5 billion, making it Uber’s chief rival, with a $100 million investment from prominent investor Carl Icahn. Sidecar, also founded in 2012, allowed drivers in personal cars to set their own prices, which consumers would see before reserving a ride. Other startups, like Wingz (which focused on airport rides) and Summon (which scheduled rides ahead of time), also sought to gain a foothold. Ride-hailing startups exhibited some characteristics of taxi services, like on-demand service or time- and distance-based fares, but did not acquire medallions or meet other licensing requirements. They shared some characteristics with black car services, like variable rates and unmarked cars, but did not comply with requirements for commercial insurance, passenger manifests, preset fares, or advance booking. They also owned technology and data, not cars, and classified their drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. Uber, Lyft, and other startups were quickly met with cease-anddesist orders from the public authorities responsible for regulating limousines and taxis—orders the startups cast as anti-competitive, while regulators pointed to a need to protect the public. In late 2013, the California Public Utilities Commission—the agency responsible for regulating the state’s limousine industry—created the TNC category, establishing a legal framework for app-based private rides to operate. Some states followed California’s lead, but in other states the app-based services remained illegal. Despite regulatory uncertainty and vocal opposition from some in the taxi and limousine industries, growth soared. UBER’S RISE Uber founder Travis Kalanick, who dropped out of UCLA in 1998, had previously founded Scour.com, a media search engine and file sharing service. Though Scour was initially successful, legal action from the recording and film industries led its founders to defensively declare bankruptcy. Kalanick and co-founders used their experience to start another file-sharing company, Red Swoosh, which they sold to Akamai in 2007 for $19 million. In 2009, Kalanick and partners including Garrett Camp, a wealthy entrepreneur who talked Kalanick into the idea, founded UberCab, an on-demand black car service. Kalanick and Camp, unable to find a cab on a cold night in Paris, wanted to “ride around like a pimp [sic]” at lower cost and greater convenience than traditional black car services offered. UberCab generated buzz with its sleek service and invitation-only June 2010 launch in San Francisco, but soon received cease-and-desist orders from the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (the taxi regulator) and the California Public Utilities Commission. In October 2010, Uber raised $1.25 million in venture funding, adding another $11.5 million in February 2011. Despite resistance from authorities and competitors, Uber grew rapidly, expanding in 2011 to Seattle, Chicago, New York, and Boston—and to Paris, its first international market, in December 2011. This growth and Kalanick’s enthusiastic boosting— including promises that Uber’s technology could later provide on-demand services far beyond the scope of private rides—led to a successful $37 million Series B round in late 2011. Uber soon dropped “Cab,” avoiding being regulated like a taxi company, and focused on black car service as “Everyone’s Private Driver.” Limousines sat unused for a large part of many workdays, and Uber promised to utilize these idle assets and help drivers find additional customers. Uber offered professional service at a slight discount to normal black car rates, with a $7 base fare in Boston and charges of $3.95 per mile and $0.45 per minute. The Uber app used smartphones’ GPS signals to supply a location for pickup; once a driver accepted a ride request, users could track a car’s arrival in real time, view a driver photo and license plate, and contact the driver. To encourage drivers to sign on and maintain reliable service, Uber implemented multiples of its base fare (“surge pricing”) when demand exceeded supply. Customers and drivers rated each other once trips were complete. Poor driver ratings would automatically trigger feedback and possible dismissal from the system; poorly rated riders would have trouble booking future rides. The app handled payment— customers’ credit cards were linked to their accounts, and tipping was forbidden. Uber took 20% of trip costs and returned the rest to drivers, whom it classified as independent contractors—partially justified by the fact that drivers used their own cars; Uber did not own a fleet. Customers raved. The service offered a level of convenience and seamlessness that traditional ride-hiring could not match. Good service distinguished Uber from the surly reputation of taxicabs. In August 2014, Uber added the ability for passengers to input destinations to provide drivers with automatic turn-byturn directions. In spring 2012, the company rolled out Uber Taxi, bringing cab drivers in Chicago into its network, and that summer introduced UberX—a down-market service, priced at a slight premium to cabs, that allowed amateur drivers to offer rides with their personal vehicles—initially limited to hybrids like the Toyota Prius but later expanded to include nearly any late-model car with four doors.79 The new UberX service would compete more closely with cabs and other peer-to-peer ride-hailing services—though it remained more formal than Lyft, which had roots in the sharing economy and called its version of surge pricing “Prime Time” and bargain times “Happy Hour.”80 “The experience will be efficient but not as elegant” as livery service, Kalanick said. UberX expanded quickly to markets across the country and abroad, where it was known as UberPOP. Customers quickly embraced the service—especially after Uber slashed prices in early 2013 to compete with cabs. In Boston, UberX rates in 2015 included a $2 base fare, with additional fees of $0.21 per minute and $1.20 per mile. Uber’s growth impressed investors, who valued it at $41 billion in a December 2014 funding round. Though it did not publicly disclose its finances, Uber was estimated in 2015 to earn approximately $10 billion gross and $2 billion net revenue—an order of magnitude greater than the leading traditional limousine company, Carey—with 2015 revenue projections far higher. In May 2015, Uber sought an additional $1.5 to $2 billion at a reported $50 billion valuation—about 120 times trailing revenue. The valuation would make it the second startup after Facebook to reach a $50 billion valuation prior to going public. The $50 billion valuation of Uber after just five years outpaced Facebook’s $15 billion valuation at the same point in its history. Some scoffed, but others were impressed at its ability to grow the market: in San Francisco, the company’s most mature market, Uber’s revenues of $500 million, growing at 200% annually, already dwarfed the city’s $140 million taxi industry. In June 2015, when Uber turned five, it was active in 311 cities—181 in the U.S.—and 58 countries, with more than a million drivers and hundreds of millions of completed rides globally.89 “Looking back at where we’ve been is incredible,” it announced. “Where we’re going together is even better.” TENSIONS IN THE ECOSYSTEM Uber developed a reputation for hard-driving tactics, which some described as cutthroat. As it grew, the company’s tactics raised questions about how best to manage stakeholders in a complex, rapidly changing environment. Uber had to manage regulatory uncertainty and ecosystems that had developed around limousines and taxis, including a variety of stakeholders who were not aligned around the vision. It could attempt to follow established rules, work to change the rules, or operate in defiance of authority. It had similar options for dealing with other forms of stakeholder resistance: it could try to win critics’ support, ignore them, or cultivate its own, new stakeholder groups. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT Different state and local ordinances regulating the limousine and taxi industries raised questions about how to classify Uber. Uber exhibited characteristics of livery services, like cashless payments and unregulated rates, and sometimes used licensed limousine drivers; other elements, like on-demand hailing and time- and distance-based fare calculations, suggested that it operated more like a taxi service. Uber insisted that it was neither and should not be subject to controls from either regulatory group; that it was not a transportation provider at all, but a data-based marketplace that connected drivers of varying types with riders. As an upstart in a mature, highly regulated market, tensions arose as Uber negotiated its relationship with rules and their makers. Fights with Regulators New technology often outpaces the ability to write rules, creating an opportunity for incumbents to invoke existing rules in trying to prevent challengers. Uber’s initial unveiling in San Francisco illustrated the challenges. When Uber launched, it quickly received cease- and-desist orders from both the California Public Utilities Commission—the state agency that regulated livery services—and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, which oversaw taxis. Uber ignored the orders and continued to operate despite the threat of fines and possible jail time, relying on media buzz and loyal, affluent customers to overcome regulatory resistance. Kalanick joked at a 2011 conference: “I think I’ve got 20,000 years of jail time in front of me.” Events in San Francisco showed how Uber entered new markets: quickly, and often in open defiance of regulators. A former Uber general manager described the strategy as: “Try and stop us, and if you try and stop us, we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it. ”Critics compared Uber’s tactics to a steamroller; an attempt to flatten resistance and bully regulators into compliance. After Uber won a battle with the Washington, D.C., taxi commission in July 2012, Kalanick described his strategy as: “We gave constituents a voice, people who would never have been heard before. ” Kalanick cast rules as anti-competitive; he once posted a cease-and-desist order on Instagram, the photo-sharing service, with the caption: “Charming greeting card from a taxi cartel representative. “One former employee recalled meeting with taxi industry representatives: “I was certainly taken out to a lot of really sketchy steak lunches where they’d sit on the other side of the table smoking cigars, saying, ‘You got to come into this on our terms or things will happen’… you know, ‘Watch out.’ Fights with regulators generated free media; in May 2014 alone, U.S. newspapers discussed the company in 185 separate articles; in the same month, Lyft received only 78 mentions. In Massachusetts, though some cities’ governments had tentatively welcomed Uber, the state Division of Standards banned it in August 2012 over its use of GPS data to calculate fares. Uber’s Boston office took to Facebook and Twitter to denounce the move, and social-media-savvy users quickly escalated the protest, with viral tweets directed at Governor Deval Patrick highlighting the perceived hypocrisy of a ban by a pro-innovation administration. The social media unrest worked; within a day, Patrick announced via twitter that he would overturn the ban and seek new rules for ridehailing apps. In June 2014, city officials in adjoining Cambridge attempted to regulate Uber and other app- based transportation companies. Angry constituents used social media to encourage others to turn out and fill the city council’s meeting room. Officials quickly backed down. Other fights were more protracted. In December 2012, the city of Toronto charged Uber with 25 different licensing offenses; further charges came in 2014, and in March 2015 the city arrested eleven UberX drivers for violating insurance requirements and picking up passengers without a license. In Las Vegas, Kalanick had launched a Twitter campaign, #VegasNeedsUber, at the January 2014 Consumer Electronics Show, in response to ordinances in Nevada that prohibited Uber from operating. The Las Vegas effort failed to sway officials, who impounded cars and sued Uber, with a court injunction banning operation until the Nevada legislature passed a May 2015 bill authorizing transportation network companies. In Seattle, the City Council voted in March 2014 to limit to 150 the number of drivers who could operate on each ridehailing app at any given time, limiting Uber’s ability to scale in the city. After several months of public outcry and aggressive lobbying, Seattle councilors relented, passing new regulations that eliminated driver caps, issued new taxi licenses to placate the taxi industry, and imposed new insurance requirements on Uber and its competitors. Insurance Questions Uber often cast such clashes as between an innovative upstart and corrupt protectionists set on insulating the taxi industry, renowned for poor service, from competition. But the situation was more complicated. In a tragic example, in the evening of December 31, 2013, a San Francisco Uber driver hit six-year- old Sofia Liu, her four-year-old brother, Anthony, and her mother as they walked in a crosswalk downtown. Sofia died on the scene; her mother, Huan Kuang, later reported that the last thing she saw before the crash was light from a cell phone on the driver’s face. “He [kept] looking at [his] phone,” she said. The driver, Syed Muzaffar, was signed into the app but between fares. Uber issued a statement of condolence but was also quick to argue that its insurance only covered drivers while they carried passengers, and that it was not liable for the girl’s death. It was later revealed that Muzaffar had already been convicted of reckless driving. Should Uber and other app-based services be required to cover their drivers only during trips or during the entire period a driver was signed into the service? Soon after the incident, Uber announced a new contingent liability policy that would cover any potential “insurance gaps” for drivers whose personal insurance refused to pay. Despite the new policy, Uber refused to accept liability for the San Francisco accident. Liu’s family ultimately received a $15,000 accidental-death payout from Muzaffar’s personal liability insurance, while her younger brother continued to receive trauma counseling. Lobbying for Legal Recognition In 2013, Uber began to lobby cities and states to pass laws that would legalize its operations and recognize it as one of a new class of TNCs. In September 2013, Uber, Lyft, Sidecar, and other ride-hailing apps reached an agreement with the California Public Utilities Commission, one of its first public-agency opponents, that created a regulatory framework for TNCs to operate legally and establish rules for insurance, background checks, training, and vehicle inspections. Uber used lobbyists—including David Plouffe, a well-known architect of the successful Obama presidential campaigns—to enact TNC laws in almost twenty states and cities, including overturned bans in Nevada and Virginia, with bills under consideration in many other state houses— though some officials continued to pursue bans. In California, the leader in TNC regulation, concerns remained; in September 2014, the state Senate passed a law to require TNCs’ insurance to cover drivers from the moment they signed into the app instead of when they began a ride. In Boston, despite efforts at the state level to create a legal operating framework for TNCs,115 city police continued to issue $500 tickets to Uber and Lyft drivers in mid-2015 for operating “illegal vehicles for hire.” The ability to pick up and drop off passengers at airports was an evolving regulatory question for Uber and industry peers. By mid-2015, some airport authorities, mindful of transportation network companies’ popularity, had written rules to allow operation. San Francisco International allowed Uber and Lyft, while Los Angeles mayor Eric Garcetti pledged to lift restrictions at Los Angeles International. But other airports were less receptive. In New York, Kennedy and La Guardia airports allowed pickups only from Taxi and Limousine Commission-certified drivers. Police at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International, the busiest U.S. airport, handed out more than 100 citations to Uber drivers in the first five months of 2015—though driver Ingemar Smith reported that he had “figured out what the hazards and tricks were” to avoid trouble with law enforcement, such as hiding his Uber smartphone and having passengers sit in front, as well as communicating with other drivers to monitor police. Still, in 2015 Atlanta officials recognized the need to accommodate new services after Georgia passed a TNC law that created a legal framework for Uber and its peers. The airport weighed how to charge Uber the same airport access fees paid by taxis and limousines. Although Uber’s lobbying slowly established a legal framework for TNCs to operate, its history of clashing with regulators and tendency to cast regulators as anti-competitive led Matthew Daus, head of the International Association of Transportation Regulators, to describe Uber’s behavior as “childish” and unprofessional. As Uber worked to legalize its operations, some wondered whether different tactics might have eased this task. (…)

Questions :

1) How’s Kalanick leading style? What do you think of his crisis management? (In Sofia Liu’s case, for instance). What would you do differently, if you were the CEO? (Unit 5)

2) Describe the changes in legislation referred to UBER in a timeline. (unit 6)

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