paper

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

The role of personality in having a ghost experience and the role of personality and experience in the development of ghost belief William Langston⁎, Tyler Hubbard1, Christof Fehrman2, Micah D'Archangel1, Kevin Anderson Middle Tennessee State University, MTSU Box X-174, 1301 E. Main St., Murfreesboro, TN, 37129, United States

A R T I C L E I N F O

Keywords: Belief formation Ghost belief Ghost experience Personality and belief

A B S T R A C T

The goal of this project was to understand who might have a ghost experience and how that experience might influence belief. We measured three types of ghost experience (personal, close other's, and story), ghost belief, and twenty-five personality dimensions to evaluate which personality variables predict belief in ghosts and whether experience mediates the personality belief relationship. We found that schizotypy, absorption, anom- alous perception, transliminality, sensation seeking, openness, and private self-consciousness predicted all three types of experience. Variables that more strongly predicted experience generally affected belief in ghosts via an indirect pathway, suggesting a role for experience in creating belief for some types of personality. These results may be useful for developing belief interventions in that they identify who might have experience-based beliefs and thus might be influenced by experience-based interventions.

1. Introduction

People develop consequential misbeliefs (e.g., vaccine hesitancy, Larson et al., 2015) and these can be difficult to change (e.g., Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, and Freed, 2014, for the belief that vaccines cause autism). Consequential misbeliefs are those that can cause harm to the person holding them or to others. Consequential misbeliefs cover a wide range, from trainees' expectations that clients must be “underweight” to be diagnosed with anorexia (Veillette, Serrano, and Brochu, 2018) to climate change denial (Lewandowsky, Pilditch, Madsen, Oreskes, & Risbey, 2019). Our research was concerned with how people develop these misbeliefs. Understanding how beliefs develop can allow better prediction of when potentially harmful beliefs will be adopted and may help to develop interventions to change those beliefs.

The research design was inspired by analogy to Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, and Bebbington's (2002) model of the formation of persecutory delusions. In their model, a first stage was associated with belief formation and a second stage was associated with belief main- tenance and updating. We concur with the notion of exploring the two stages separately, and are focusing on an evaluation of the belief for- mation stage. We investigated personality variables that might predict whether or not a person has a ghost experience and whether or not experience mediates the relationship between personality and ghost

belief. We investigated belief in ghosts for pragmatic reasons: ghost be-

lievers are relatively prevalent (32% of the population, Gallup, 2005), as is ghost experience (e.g., Clarke, 1995, found 9% reporting a per- sonal ghost experience), and a large literature exists to guide the se- lection of measures (as discussed below). These data come from a larger project on the role of experience in belief formation. Tseng, Tsai, Hsieh, Hung, and Huang (2013) proposed personal experience, close others' experiences, story-telling, and television as possible sources for beliefs. The study presented measures of experience in each of these categories for both ghost and general paranormal experiences. For this analysis, we are focusing on only personal, close other's, and story ghost ex- perience. A full accounting of the experience measures will be pre- sented in a separate manuscript.

We chose personality measures that might influence belief in ghosts based on a review of the literature on ghost, paranormal, and religious beliefs. The goal was to cast a wide net and assess variables likely to be relevant. Transliminality (how easily information passes into and out of awareness) is associated with paranormal experiences (Thalbourne and Houran, 2000). Schizotypy (a potential precursor to schizophrenia af- fecting, in part, perception) is also related to some aspects of para- normal belief (Kelley, 2011). An external locus of control is related to superstition beliefs (Sagone and De Caroli, 2014). Lobato, Mendoza,

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110077 Received 4 November 2019; Received in revised form 13 March 2020; Accepted 20 April 2020

⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (W. Langston), [email protected] (T. Hubbard), [email protected] (C. Fehrman),

[email protected] (M. D'Archangel), [email protected] (K. Anderson). 1 Present address Vanderbilt University. 2 Present address University of Virginia

Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

0191-8869/ © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

T

Sims, and Chin (2014) found that the extraversion and neuroticism scales from a measure of the Big 5 personality variables predicted “epistemically unwarranted beliefs” (p. 621). Smith, Johnson, and Hathaway (2009) found openness to experience and sensation seeking to be related to paranormal belief. Saucier and Skrzypinska (2006) found absorption (how much people get caught up in experiences) to be related to subjective spiritualism (as was self-consciousness). We in- cluded a cognitive biases scale to capture perceptual experiences that have been related to paranormal experiences (Peters et al., 2014). Bouvet and Bonnefon (2015) found that reflective thinkers are less likely to adopt paranormal beliefs. We used a measure of emotion regulation (reappraisal and suppression) to stand in for a willingness to re-think one's position.

Previous research in our lab has found that participant suspicion is an important influence. Therefore, we measured paranoia and critical thinking. A measure of empathy was included because it seemed rea- sonable to expect that it might influence accepting someone else’ ex- perience. Private body consciousness and a self-consciousness scale were included because awareness of bodily states may allow for the perception of ghost experiences.

The analysis is organized around two questions: Which personality variables predict ghost experience? and What is the role of experience in the development of ghost belief? Because of the large number of personality and experience variables involved, we will refrain from providing an overly detailed set of hypotheses. Some variables should predict ghost experience (e.g., transliminality, anomalous perception). It seems reasonable to expect that some of those variables will influence ghost belief via an indirect path through experience. However, the nature of this project is to cast a wide net to evaluate the role that personality variables play, and it seems dishonest to provide a series of specific hypotheses for an exploratory exercise.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

A community sample was recruited by students in the first author's research methods classes in two phases, with data collection stopping (as planned) at the ends of their respective semesters. People were in- vited to participate via social media and then sent the link to the survey in Qualtrics. In phase 1, 216 participants began the survey (128 in- cluded in the final sample) and in phase 2, 92 began the survey (69 included). The two phases were compared on the 29 measures used in the analysis (and age) using independent samples t-tests (Bonferroni corrected α = 0.002). Only the age difference was significant; phase one participants were younger (M = 30.65 years) than phase two participants (M = 37.10 years). A chi-square test found no difference in the gender breakdown in the two phases.

Participants completing less than 90% of the survey (N = 94) or selecting “I did not try very hard, and you should probably not include my results” (N = 17) were removed. The 90% cut-off was determined in advance; 12 participants completed between 51% and 89%; 54 completed 25% or less. The analyses were also run including all but those reporting a lack of effort. This added between 2 and 7 participants to each analysis (mode = 4) and there were few differences in statis- tical significance (13/275 = 5%). An alternative Fig. 2 based on this analysis is available in the supplements.

There were 197 participants in the final sample (60 male, 132 fe- male, average age = 32.9 years, ranging from 18 to 79). Thirty parti- cipants had a high school education or less, 61 reported some college, 77 had an associate's or bachelor's degree, and 24 had at least some graduate school. Fifty-seven reported attending weekly religious ser- vices, 135 said they did not; average religious intensity on an 11-point scale was 5.32 (SD = 3.46). Thirty-eight reported going on a ghost tour and 102 said they had not. The study was reviewed by the university IRB and all participants provided consent.

2.2. Measures

2.2.1. Experience As part of a larger project, participants reported personal, close

other's, story, and television ghost and paranormal experiences. Personal experience questions were answered on a 5-point scale (“Have you ever experienced an encounter with a ghost?”; 0 = “definitely not” to 4 = “definitely yes”). All other experiences were reported as 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes” (participants should know, e.g., whether or not they heard a ghost story). For each experience participants reported relevant aspects (e.g., for personal ghost they reported how many, what happened, their age, fear, and quality measures). A full accounting of experience is beyond the scope of this manuscript; the complete ma- terials are posted with the data on the link in the results section.

2.2.2. Ghost belief The scale that measured ghost belief contained four items: (1) “I

believe in the existence of ghosts” (Wiseman, Watt, Greening, Stevens, and O'Keeffe, 2002), (2) “The soul continues to exist though the body may die”, (3) “It is possible to communicate with the dead” (both from the Paranormal Belief Scale, PBS, Tobacyk and Milford, 1983), and (4) “It is possible for places to be haunted” (Laythe and Owen, 2012). Participants also responded to the items from the PBS Extraordinary Life Forms and Precognition subscales. All remaining items from the revised PBS were added in phase 2 of data collection (Tobacyk, 2004). Only the ghost belief scale (α = 0.86) will be discussed here. Two measures of religious belief from these data were presented in (Langston, Fehrman, Anderson, D’Archangel, & Hubbard, 2018) com- paring religious and paranormal believers.

2.2.3. Personality 2.2.3.1. Sensation seeking. A 4-item scale assessed sensation seeking (SSS; Stephenson, Hoyle, Palmgreen, and Slater, 2003; 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”). A sample item is “I like to do frightening things” (α = 0.82).

2.2.3.2. Private body consciousness. A 5-item scale measured private body consciousness (PBC; Miller, Murphy, and Buss, 1981; 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”). A sample item is “I can often feel my heart beating” (α = 0.73).

2.2.3.3. Schizotypy. Schizotypy was assessed with the 22-item schizotypal personality questionnaire-brief (SPQB; Raine and Benishay, 1995; 0 = “false”, 1 = “true”). The SPQB has three subscales: (1) cognitive-perceptual factor (“Do you often pick up hidden threats or put-downs from what people say or do?”; α = 0.65), (2) interpersonal factor (“People sometimes find me aloof and distant”; α = 0.78), and (3) disorganized factor (“I am an odd, unusual person”; α = 0.75). The reliability for the total scale (SPQB-T) was α = 0.85. Because of the low reliability for the schizotypy subscales, we used the total score in the analyses.

2.2.3.4. Transliminality. Transliminality (Trans) was measured with the 17-item scale from Lange, Thalbourne, Houran, and Storm (2000) with 0 = “false”, 1 = “true”. A sample item is “At the present time, I am very good at make-believe and imagining” (α = 0.83).

2.2.3.5. Empathy. The 20-item Basic Empathy Scale in Adults assessed empathy (Carré, Stefaniak, D'Ambrosio, Bensalah, and Besche-Richard, 2013; 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”). The three subscales were (1) emotional contagion (BESeC; “After being with a friend who is sad about something, I usually feel sad”; α = 0.80), (2) cognitive empathy (BES-E; “I can understand my friend's happiness when she/he does well at something”; α = 0.79), and (3) emotional disconnection (BES-D; “My friends' emotions don't affect me much”; α = 0.82).

W. Langston, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

2

2.2.3.6. “Big five”. The “big five” factors of personality were tested with the 20-item mini-International Personality Item Pool scale (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, and Lucas, 2006; 1 = “very inaccurate” to 5 = “very accurate”). The five subscales were: (1) extraversion (E; “Am the life of the party”; α = 0.75), (2) agreeableness (A; “Sympathize with others' feelings”; α = 0.74), (3) conscientiousness (C; “Get chores done right away”; α = 0.70), (4) neuroticism (N; “Have frequent mood swings”; α = 0.72), and (5) intellect/imagination (I; “Have a vivid imagination”; α = 0.72).

2.2.3.7. Paranoia. Paranoia (Par) was measured with a 20-item scale (Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992; 1 = “not at all applicable to me” to 5 = “extremely applicable to me”). A sample item is “I sometimes feel as if I'm being followed” (α = 0.92).

2.2.3.8. Emotion regulation. The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross and John, 2003) was a 10-item scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) that measured two variables: (1) reappraisal (ERQ-R; “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I'm in”; α = 0.86) and (2) suppression (ERQeS; “I control my emotions by not expressing them”; α = 0.77).

2.2.3.9. Critical thinking. Critical thinking was measured with the Critical Thinking Disposition Assessment (Yuan, Liao, Wang, and Chou, 2014; 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”). The subscales are: (1) systematicity and analyticity (CT-SA; “I draw conclusions by logical thinking and methodological analysis”; α = 0.82), (2) inquisitiveness and conversance (CT-IC; “I try to delve into anything, or any viewpoint, that is new and novel”; α = 0.78), and (3) maturity and skepticism (CT-MS; “When I am thinking, I am able to tolerate different viewpoints or opinions”; α = 0.76).

2.2.3.10. Self-consciousness. The self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss, 1975) had 23 items (1 = “extremely uncharacteristic of me” to 5 = “extremely characteristic of me”) that measured: (1) private self-consciousness (SC-Priv; “I'm always trying to figure myself out”; α = 0.70), (2) public self-consciousness (SC-Pub; “I'm concerned about the way I present myself”; α = 0.79), and (3) social anxiety (SC-SA; “It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations”; α = 0.83).

2.2.3.11. Absorption. Absorption (Abs) was measured with the 34-item Tellegen Absorption Scale (Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974; 0 = “false”, 1 = “true”). A sample item is “I can be deeply moved by a sunset” (α = 0.90).

2.2.3.12. Locus of control. Locus of control (LC) was measured with the 29-item Rotter Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Participants circled responses that indicated an internal or external locus of control (e.g., for internal “What happens to me is my own doing”; α = 0.96).

2.2.3.13. Cognitive biases for psychosis. The 30-item Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (Peters et al., 2014) presented statements with three answers each (indicating no bias, some bias, or bias) to assess two themes (threatening event, anomalous perception) derived from vignettes encompassing five potential biases. A sample item (choose A, B, or C) is “Imagine you are sitting at home and suddenly you feel very odd: A: I wonder why I feel odd, could something sinister be going on somewhere [some bias]; B: This feeling is proof that there is something bad happening somewhere to someone I know [bias]; C: I must be overtired or something [no bias]”. For threatening event (CBP- T), α = 0.77, and for anomalous perception (CBP-A), α = 0.82.

2.3. Procedure

Participants completed the survey online. After consent, the sections of the survey (belief, experience, and personality) were presented in random order (with demographic items always appearing last).

3. Results

Full descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations are available in the supplements. Data and materials are available from (Langston, Hubbard, Fehrman, D’Archangel, & Anderson, 2019).

3.1. Analyses outline

The data were analyzed with parallel multiple mediation models using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2018). The parameters for the analysis were model 4 with 99% confidence intervals and 10,000 bootstrap samples. For all analyses, personality was the antecedent and ghost belief was the consequent. The mediators were personal ghost experi- ence, close other's ghost experience, and story ghost experience. Per- sonal ghost experience was reported on a Likert-type scale, but close other's and story ghost experiences were framed as “yes” or “no.” Therefore, a 5-item experience quality scale (e.g., “I can form a clear mental image of this encounter”), rated from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”, was used as the mediator (personal α = 0.86, close other's α = 0.74, and story α = 0.73). Zero was entered as the quality score for participants without an experience. The full results are included in the supplements.

3.2. Which personality variables predict ghost experience?

Fig. 1 illustrates the design of the mediation model. Path coefficients for the mediation models are presented in Table 1. Fig. 2 illustrates the significant predictors of experience (a coefficients). The variables that predicted all types of experience were SSS, SPQB-T, Trans, I, SC-Priv, Abs, and CBP-A.

3.3. What is the role of experience in the development of ghost belief?

All of the models significantly predicted belief (R2s are presented in Table 1). For personal ghost, all b coefficients were significant (e.g., controlling for personality and close other's and story experiences, personal experience significantly predicted belief). None of the b coef- ficients were significant for close other's experience. For story ghost experience, the significant b coefficients were in the models for SSS, BES-E, BES-D, E, C, I, ERQ-S, CT-SA, CT-IC, and SC-SA. This suggests that personal and close other's experiences overlap in their shared variance with belief, but that story ghost experience makes a unique contribution.

Total and specific indirect effects are presented in Table 2 (the

Personal Ghost

<Personality>

a3

Ghost Belief

Close Other’s Ghost

Story Ghost

a1

a2

b3

b2

b1

c’

Fig. 1. Multiple mediator model of the effects of personality on belief. Note. Table 1 presents the coefficients and Table 2 presents the tests of indirect effects. Personality was a variable that was different for each model.

W. Langston, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

3

Table 1 Coefficients from multiple mediator models with three types of ghost experience as mediators.

Path SSS PBC SPQB-T Trans BES-C BES-E BES-D E A C N I Par

a1 2.230 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.124 0.410⁎⁎ 0.937⁎⁎⁎ 0.176 0.232 −0.099 0.326 0.231 −0.587⁎⁎ 0.229 0.492⁎ 0.085

a2 1.568 ⁎ 0.322 0.294⁎ 0.891⁎⁎⁎ 0.075 0.337 −0.004 0.221 0.236 −0.396 0.190 0.837⁎⁎⁎ 0.108⁎

a3 1.666 ⁎⁎ 0.308 0.322⁎⁎ 0.673⁎⁎⁎ 0.269⁎ 0.387⁎ −0.038 0.160 0.141 −0.412⁎ 0.363⁎ 0.433⁎ 0.125⁎⁎

c′ −0.069 0.028 0.021 0.062⁎⁎⁎ 0.038⁎⁎ −0.002 −0.033⁎ −0.010 0.046⁎ 0.018 0.019 −0.009 0.003 b1 0.062

⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.062⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎

b2 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.013 b3 0.017

⁎ 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.014 0.016⁎ 0.016⁎ 0.016⁎ 0.015 0.017⁎ 0.015 0.016⁎ 0.014 R2 0.386⁎⁎⁎ 0.392⁎⁎⁎ 0.392⁎⁎⁎ 0.427⁎⁎⁎ 0.411⁎⁎⁎ 0.379⁎⁎⁎ 0.399⁎⁎⁎ 0.385⁎⁎⁎ 0.403⁎⁎⁎ 0.387⁎⁎⁎ 0.387⁎⁎⁎ 0.384⁎⁎⁎ 0.383⁎⁎⁎

Path ERQ-R ERQ-S CT-SA CT-IC CT-MS SC-Priv SC-Pub SC-SA Abs LC CBP-T CBP-A

a1 0.113 −0.104 0.014 0.139 −0.018 0.238 ⁎ 0.052 0.020 0.470⁎⁎⁎ 0.227 0.261 0.603⁎⁎⁎

a2 0.150 −0.178 0.235 ⁎ 0.192 0.003 0.503⁎⁎⁎ 0.196 0.054 0.523⁎⁎⁎ 0.270 0.092 0.493⁎⁎

a3 0.198 ⁎ 0.020 0.074 0.076 0.070 0.263⁎ 0.149 0.051 0.297⁎⁎⁎ 0.030 0.346⁎ 0.465⁎⁎

c′ 0.019⁎ −0.011 0.001 −0.004 0.004 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.028 0.034⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎

b1 0.061 ⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.058⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.058⁎⁎⁎ 0.056⁎⁎⁎

b2 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012 b3 0.013 0.016

⁎ 0.016⁎ 0.016⁎ 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016⁎ 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.012 R2 0.397⁎⁎⁎ 0.387⁎⁎⁎ 0.380⁎⁎⁎ 0.380⁎⁎⁎ 0.380⁎⁎⁎ 0.385⁎⁎⁎ 0.382⁎⁎⁎ 0.384⁎⁎⁎ 0.395⁎⁎⁎ 0.387⁎⁎⁎ 0.393⁎⁎⁎ 0.414⁎⁎⁎

Note. The paths are indicated in Fig. 1. R2 is for the model predicting belief. ⁎ p < .05. ⁎⁎ p < .01. ⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.

Fig. 2. Significant a coefficients, direct, and indirect effects from the models.

W. Langston, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

4

coefficients for the direct effects are in Table 1). All of the personality variables that predicted all three types of experience also produced significant indirect effects. Five of these influenced ghost belief only through experience. Trans and CBP-A also had significant direct effects. There was one additional significant indirect effect for C. Five addi- tional variables produced significant direct effects (BESeC, BES-D, A, ERQ-R, and CBP-T), and of these, two did not predict experience at all (BES-D, A), and three predicted only story experience (BESeC, ERQ-R, and CBP-T).

4. Discussion

Our first question was: Which personality variables predict ghost experience? A perusal of Fig. 2 allows us to answer that question: sensation seeking, schizotypy, transliminality, openness, private self- consciousness, absorption, and anomalous perception. There are also suggestions in the data that different personality variables predict dif- ferent types of experience (e.g., story experience is predicted by em- pathy, neuroticism, and threat whereas the others are not). In order to

specify the personality variables that predict experience, it might be necessary to specify the type of experience being predicted. The selec- tion of personality variables was guided by the literature, but also in- volved some guesswork as to which variables might be influential for ghost experience and belief. These data allow more focus on the vari- ables that matter and a winnowing of the set of variables that need to be measured. Additional research will be required to evaluate whether the same set of variables predict other types of experience associated with other beliefs. For example, other paranormal experiences and beliefs (e.g., precognition) may be predicted by the same personality variables, but would that be true of vaccine experiences and vaccine hesitancy beliefs?

The second question was: What is the role of experience in the de- velopment of ghost belief? Controlling for personality and other types of experience, personal ghost experience predicted belief and close other's experience did not. Whatever the effect of close other's experi- ence is, it is associated with the same variability as personal experience (this is consistent with Clarke's, 1995 finding that other people's ex- periences can feel like one's own). For some models, story experience still predicted ghost belief while controlling for personality and other types of experience.

For variables producing direct and/or indirect effects, the pattern that emerges from the data is that variables that strongly predict ex- perience have indirect effects on belief, whereas variables that weakly predict experience have direct effects on belief. These results have implications for the design of belief interventions. People with per- sonality traits that predict experience are more likely to have experi- ence-based beliefs and therefore should be more susceptible to experi- ence-based interventions. People with other personality characteristics might respond better to other types of interventions. Obviously, addi- tional research is necessary to test this prediction.

One clear limitation of these results is that they are the product of an exploratory process. Again, the choice of variables was inspired by the literature, but based on their prior influence on a wide range of beliefs and experiences. A replication evaluating predictions made based on these results would be useful.

There are still many open questions. We have been thinking of be- liefs as belonging to categories (roughly experience driven vs. not). These results suggest that an alternative conceptualization is to think of people as being categorized as susceptible to certain beliefs or not. This has implications for the role of experience in belief that need to be explored with additional research.

To that end, we think this approach to belief research could be applied to a variety of beliefs. Whereas there is some evidence of a common factor influencing different types of belief (e.g., Lobato et al., 2014), non-scientifically supported beliefs may form a category with common antecedents. It might be necessary to gain a full understanding of other beliefs by evaluating relevant personality, experience, and belief variables and subjecting them to a similar analysis.

Freeman et al. (2002) also proposed a belief updating and main- tenance stage. With belief at the center of a feedback loop interpreting experience, the personality variables involved in forming experiences might become less important relative to variables involved in filtering the evidence. Additional belief intervention research will be needed to sort out the role of personality variables at each stage.

With repeated exposure to consequential misbeliefs (e.g., ongoing misinformation about climate change, (Lewandowsky et al., 2019)), understanding how beliefs form grows increasingly important. These results provide information about how personality exerts its influence on belief formation and provide some potential guideposts for the de- sign of interventions.

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110077.

Table 2 Total and specific indirect mediation effects for three sources of ghost experi- ence predicting ghost belief.

Estimate (SE) Lower Upper

SSS Total indirect effect 0.188 (0.047) 0.067 0.314 Personal ghost 0.138 (0.042) 0.035 0.257 Close other's ghost 0.021 (0.017) −0.013 0.081 Story ghost 0.029 (0.018) −0.013 0.088

SPQB-T Total indirect effect 0.032 (0.010) 0.009 0.059 Personal ghost 0.024 (0.008) 0.005 0.047 Close other's ghost 0.004 (0.003) −0.003 0.014 Story ghost 0.005 (0.004) −0.003 0.016

Trans Total indirect effect 0.063 (0.013) 0.032 0.098 Personal ghost 0.050 (0.011) 0.025 0.082 Close other's ghost 0.006 (0.007) −0.012 0.026 Story ghost 0.007 (0.006) −0.009 0.026

C Total indirect effect −0.048 (0.015) −0.088 −0.010 Personal ghost −0.036 (0.012) −0.071 −0.006 Close other's ghost −0.005 (0.004) −0.020 0.004 Story ghost −0.007 (0.005) −0.024 0.004

I Total indirect effect 0.049 (0.015) 0.011 0.088 Personal ghost 0.030 (0.012) 0.001 0.066 Close other's ghost 0.012 (0.007) −0.005 0.033 Story ghost 0.007 (0.005) −0.003 0.023

SC-Priv Total indirect effect 0.024 (0.010) 0.001 0.051 Personal ghost 0.014 (0.008) −0.004 0.037 Close other's ghost 0.006 (0.004) −0.006 0.018 Story ghost 0.004 (0.003) −0.002 0.015

Abs Total indirect effect 0.038 (0.008) 0.019 0.061 Personal ghost 0.027 (0.006) 0.013 0.047 Close other's ghost 0.007 (0.005) −0.006 0.019 Story ghost 0.004 (0.003) −0.002 0.014

CBP-A Total indirect effect 0.045 (0.013) 0.013 0.083 Personal ghost 0.034 (0.011) 0.008 0.066 Close other's ghost 0.006 (0.005) −0.004 0.023 Story ghost 0.006 (0.005) −0.007 0.021

Note. Significant effects are highlighted in bold (the confidence interval does not contain zero).

W. Langston, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

5

CRediT authorship contribution statement

William Langston:Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Formal analysis, Investigation, Resources, Data curation, Writing - original draft, Project administration.Tyler Hubbard:Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Resources, Writing - review & editing.Christof Fehrman:Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing - review & editing.Micah D'Archangel:Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing - review & editing.Kevin Anderson:Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Writing - review & editing.

Declaration of competing interest

None.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Michael Hein for assistance with the analysis plan and to Alan Musicant for reviewing the manuscript.

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

References

Bouvet, R., & Bonnefon, J. F. (2015). Non-reflective thinkers are pre-disposed to attribute supernatural causation to uncanny experiences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(7), 955–961. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215585728.

Carré, A., Stefaniak, N., D'Ambrosio, A., Bensalah, L., & Besche-Richard, C. (2013). The Basic Empathy Scale in adults (BES-A): Factor structure of a revised form. Psychological Assessment, 25, 679–691. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032297.

Clarke, D. (1995). Experience and other reasons given for belief and disbelief in para- normal and religious phenomena. Journal for the Society for Psychical Research, 60, 371–384.

Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). The mini-IPIP scales: Tiny-yet-effective measures of the Big Five factors of personality. Psychological Assessment, 18, 192–203. https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.18.2.192.

Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522–527. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0076760.

Fenigstein, A., & Vanable, P. A. (1992). Paranoia and self-consciousness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 129–138. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514. 62.1.129.

Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., & Bebbington, P. E. (2002). A cognitive model of persecutory delusions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 41, 331–347. https://doi.org/10.1348/014466502760387461.

Gallup (2005). Three in four Americans believe in paranormal. Retrieved from https:// news.gallup.com/poll/16915/Three-Four-Americans-Believe-Paranormal.aspx.

Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation pro- cesses: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348–362. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348.

Hayes, A. F. (2018). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach (2nd ed.). New York: The Guilford Press.

Kelley, M. P. (2011). Correlates of paranormal beliefs, 1: Schizotypy. Journal of Parapsychology, 75, 301–325.

Lange, R., Thalbourne, M. A., Houran, J., & Storm, L. (2000). The revised transliminality scale: Reliability and validity data from a Rasch top-down purification procedure. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 591–617. https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.2000.0472.

Langston, W., Fehrman, C., Anderson, K., D’Archangel, M., & Hubbard, T. (2018). Comparing religious and paranormal believers. Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology, 24(2), 236–239. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000342.

Langston, W., Hubbard, T., Fehrman, C., D’Archangel, M., & Anderson, K. Ghost Experience and Belief. Open Science Framework. https://osf.io/u7zcq/?view_only= f4777b273af545e797091aa67c636943.

Larson, H. J., Jarrett, C., Schulz, W. S., Cbaudhuri, M., Zhou, Y., Dube, E., ... the SAGE Working Group on Vaccine Hesitancy (2015). Measuring vaccine hesitancy: The development of a survey tool. Vaccine, 33, 4165–4175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. vaccine.2015.04.037.

Laythe, B., & Owen, K. (2012). Paranormal belief and the strange case of haunt experi- ences: Evidence of a neglected population. Journal of Parapsychology, 76, 79–108.

Lewandowsky, S., Pilditch, T. D., Madsen, J. K., Oreskes, N., & Risbey, J. S. (2019). Influence and seepage: An evidence-resistant minority can affect public opinion and scientific belief formation. Cognition, 188, 124–139. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. cognition.2019.01.011.

Lobato, E., Mendoza, J., Sims, V., & Chin, M. (2014). Examining the relationship between conspiracy theories, paranormal beliefs, and pseudoscience acceptance among a university population. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 617–625. https://doi.org/10. 1002/acp.3042.

Miller, L. C., Murphy, R., & Buss, A. H. (1981). Consciousness of body: Private and public. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 397–406. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 0022-3514.41.2.397.

Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., Richey, S., & Freed, G. L. (2014). Effective messages in vaccine promotion: A randomized trial. Pediatrics, 133, e835–e842. https://doi.org/10.1542/ peds.2013-2365.

Peters, E. R., et al. (2014). Cognitive biases questionnaire for psychosis. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40, 300–313. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbs199.

Raine, A., & Benishay, D. (1995). The SPQ-B: A brief screening instrument for schizotypal personality disorder. Journal of Personality Disorders, 9, 346–355. https://doi.org/10. 1521/pedi.1995.9.4.346.

Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of re- inforcement. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 80(1), 1–28. https://doi. org/10.1037/h0092976.

Sagone, E., & De Caroli, M. E. (2014). Locus of control and beliefs about superstition and luck in adolescents: What’s their relationship? Procedia–Social and Behavioral Sciences, 140, 318–323. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.04.427.

Saucier, G., & Skrzypinska, K. (2006). Spiritual but not religious? Evidence for two in- dependent dispositions. Journal of Personality, 74, 1257–1292. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00409.x.

Smith, C. L., Johnson, J. L., & Hathaway, W. (2009). Personality contributions to belief in paranormal phenomena. Individual Differences Research, 7, 85–96.

Stephenson, M. T., Hoyle, R. H., Palmgreen, P., & Slater, M. D. (2003). Brief measures of sensation seeking for screening and large scale surveys. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 72, 279–286. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2003.08.003.

Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974). Openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences (“absorption”), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 83, 268–277. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0036681.

Thalbourne, M. A., & Houran, J. (2000). Transliminality, the mental experience inventory and tolerance of ambiguity. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 853–863. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00143-9.

Tobacyk, J. J. (2004). A revised paranormal belief scale. The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 23, 94–98.

Tobacyk, J., & Milford, G. (1983). Belief in paranormal phenomena: Assessment instru- ment development and implications for personality functioning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1029–1037. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.5. 1029.

Tseng, Y.-C., Tsai, C.-Y., Hsieh, P.-Y., Hung, J.-F., & Huang, T.-C. (2013). The relationship between exposure to pseudoscientific television programmes and pseudoscientific beliefs among Taiwanese university students. International Journal of Science Education, Part B: Communication and Public Engagement. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 21548455.2012.761366.

Veillette, L. A. S., Serrano, J. M., & Brochu, P. M. (2018). What’s weight got to do with it? Mental health trainees’ perceptions of a client with anorexia nervosa symptoms. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 2574. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02574.

Wiseman, R., Watt, C., Greening, E., Stevens, P., & O’Keeffe, C. (2002). An investigation into the alleged haunting of Hampton Court Palace: Psychological variables and magnetic fields. The Journal of Parapsychology, 66, 387–408.

Yuan, S.-P., Liao, H.-C., Wang, Y.-H., & Chou, M.-J. (2014). Development of a scale to measure the critical thinking disposition of medical care professionals. Social Behavior and Personality, 42, 303–312. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2014.42.2.303.

W. Langston, et al. Personality and Individual Differences 163 (2020) 110077

6