



Landmark
Cases

Brown v. Board of Education

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/483/>) (1954), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court declared state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white students to be unconstitutional. The decision overturned the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision of 1896, which allowed state-sponsored segregation, insofar as it applied to public education. Handed down on May 17, 1954, the Warren Court's unanimous (9–0) decision stated that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." As a result, *de jure* racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This ruling paved the way for integration and was a major victory of the Civil Rights Movement,^[1] and a model for many future impact litigation cases.^[2] However, the decision's fourteen pages did not spell out any sort of method for ending racial segregation in schools, and the Court's second decision in *Brown II* only ordered states to desegregate "with all deliberate speed".

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Brown v. Board of Education



Supreme Court of the United States

Argued December 9, 1952

Reargued December 8, 1953

Decided May 17, 1954

Full case name	<i>Oliver Brown, et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al.</i>
Citations	347 U.S. 483 (https://supreme.justia.com/us/347/483/case.html) (<i>more</i>) 74 S. Ct. 686; 98 L. Ed. 873; 1954 U.S. LEXIS 2094; 53 Ohio Op. 326; 38 A.L.R.2d 1180
Prior history	Judgment for defendants, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)
Subsequent history	Judgment on relief, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (<i>Brown II</i>); on remand, 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955); motion to intervene granted, 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979); judgment for defendants, 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987); reversed, 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989); vacated, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (<i>Brown III</i>); judgment reinstated, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992); judgment for defendants, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Kan. 1999)

Holding

Segregation of students in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because separate facilities are inherently unequal. District Court of Kansas reversed.

Court membership

Miranda v. Arizona

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/384/436/>) (1966), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court. In a 5–4 majority, the Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them.

This has a significant impact on law enforcement in the United States, by making what became known as the Miranda rights part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights. The Supreme Court decided *Miranda* with three other consolidated cases: *Westover v. United States*, *Vignera v. New York*, and *California v. Stewart*.

The Miranda warning (often shortened to "Miranda", or "Mirandizing" a suspect) is the name of the formal warning that is required to be given by police in the United States to criminal suspects in police custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the *Miranda* ruling. Its purpose is to ensure the accused are aware of, and reminded of, these rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that they know they can invoke them at any time during the interview. The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda rights, are "custody" and "interrogation". Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Per the U.S. Supreme Court decision *Berghuis v. Thompkins* (June 1, 2010), criminal suspects who are aware of their right to silence and to an attorney, but choose *not* to "unambiguously" invoke them, may find any subsequent voluntary statements treated as an implied waiver of their rights, and used in evidence. At least one scholar has argued that *Thompkins* effectively

Miranda v. Arizona



Supreme Court of the United States

Argued February 28 – March 1, 1966

Decided June 13, 1966

Full case name *Miranda v. State of Arizona*;
Westover v. United States; *Vignera*
v. State of New York; *State of*
California v. Stewart

Citations 384 U.S. 436
(<https://supreme.justia.com/us/384/436/case.html>) (*more*)
86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694;
1966 U.S. LEXIS 2817; 10
A.L.R.3d 974

Argument Oral argument
(http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1965/1965_759/)

Prior history Defendant . Superior Ct.;
affirmed, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz.
1965); cert. granted, 382 U.S. 925
(1965)

Subsequent history Retrial on remand, defendant
convicted, Ariz. Superior Ct.;
affirmed, 450 P.2d 364 (Ariz.
1969); rehearing denied, Ariz.
Supreme Ct. March 11, 1969; cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969)

Holding

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his or her rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney. Supreme Court of Arizona reversed and remanded.

Court membership



Roe v. Wade

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/113/>) (1973), is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court on the issue of abortion. It was decided simultaneously with a companion case, *Doe v. Bolton*. The Court ruled 7–2 that a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion, but that this right must be balanced against the state's interests in regulating abortions: protecting women's health and protecting the potentiality of human life.^[1] Arguing that these state interests became stronger over the course of a pregnancy, the Court resolved this balancing test by tying state regulation of abortion to the third trimester of pregnancy.

Later, in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* (1992), the Court rejected *Roe*'s trimester framework while affirming its central holding that a woman has a right to abortion until fetal viability.^[2] The *Roe* decision defined "viable" as "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid."^[3] Justices in *Casey* acknowledged that viability may occur at 23 or 24 weeks, or sometimes even earlier, in light of medical advances.^[4]

In disallowing many state and

Roe v. Wade



Supreme Court of the United States

Argued December 13, 1971

Reargued October 11, 1972

Decided January 22, 1973

Full case name	<i>Jane Roe, et al. v. Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County</i>
Citations	410 U.S. 113 (https://supreme.justia.com/us/410/113/case.html) (<i>more</i>) 93 S. Ct. 705; 35 L. Ed. 2d 147; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 159 (https://www.lexis.com/research/slft?cite=3139373320552E532E204C455849532020313539&keynum=15451&keynum=0)
Argument	Oral argument (http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_18/argument/)
Reargument	Reargument (http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_18/reargument/)
Prior history	<i>Judgment for plaintiffs, injunction denied</i> , 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); <i>probable jurisdiction noted</i> , 402 U.S. 941 (1971); <i>set for reargument</i> , 408 U.S. 919 (1972)
Subsequent history	<i>Rehearing denied</i> , 410 U.S. 959 (1973)

Holding

Texas law making it a crime to assist a woman to get an abortion violated her due process rights. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Court membership

Chief Justice

Warren E. Burger

Associate Justices

William O. Douglas · William J. Brennan, Jr.
Potter Stewart · Byron White

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case. In a split opinion, the Court held that the Surgeon General's warning did not preclude suit by smokers against tobacco companies on several claims. The warning at issue said:

WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL
HAS DETERMINED THAT CIGARETTE
SMOKING IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR
HEALTH.

The court's holding and some of Justice Stevens's reasoning enjoyed majority support, but the opinion eventually gained full majority support 16 years later in *Altria Group v. Good*.

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Background

Rose Cipollone began smoking at the age of sixteen. She continually smoked a pack and a half a day of Chesterfield cigarettes until she first attempted to quit when she became pregnant, as requested by her husband Tyrone Cipollone. Though she cut down on her regular smoking, she still secretly smoked during her pregnancy. In 1955, Mrs. Cipollone switched to Liggett and Myer

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.



Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 8, 1991

Decided June 24, 1992

Full case name	<i>Thomas Cipollone, Individually and As Executor of the Estate of Rose D. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., et al.</i>
Citations	505 U.S. 504 (https://supreme.justia.com/us/505/504/case.html) (<i>more</i>) 112 S. Ct. 2608; 120 L.Ed.2d 407; 60 U.S.L.W. 4703; CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. P13,199; 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1087; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5517; 92 Daily Journal DAR 8688; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 589
Prior history	893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) <i>Interpretation of previous federal law preemption decision as barring plaintiff's failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, express warranty, and conspiracy to defraud claims affirmed. Reversal on other issues require a remand for a new trial.</i> 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988) <i>Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict for the plaintiff and other post-trial motions denied.</i> 683 F.Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988) <i>Motion to strike design defect claim granted (not appealed).</i>

brand of cigarettes on the basis that their “pure white Miracle Tip” filter appeared to be a healthier alternative to her habit.^{[1][2]} In 1968, she switched, this time to Philip Morris’ Virginia Slims brand because the women advertised smoking seemed “cool, glamorous, and grown-up”.^{[1][2]} A few years later, in 1972, Ms. Cipollone switched to smoking Parliament brand cigarettes for reasons she attributed to health; Parliaments were advertised to have a recessed filter and lower tar content. Finally, Cipollone switched to Lorillard’s True cigarettes under the recommendation of her physician to either quit smoking or switch to this brand of cigarette with its advertised plastic filter inserts. Rose Cipollone was under the misguided impression that “tobacco companies wouldn’t do anything to kill you,” and therefore, continued to smoke cigarettes.^[1]

In the mid-1960s, Rose Cipollone began to develop a smokers’ cough, as well as problems such as chest pain and hypertension. In 1981, doctors found a carcinogenic spot on her right lung and performed a partial lung resection. Mrs. Cipollone still continued to smoke, “though often now in secret”.^[1] In 1982, the cancer had spread to her lower and middle right lung, and Cipollone had surgery to remove the entire lung as well as a large adrenal mass in 1983. Rose Cipollone died on October 24, 1984, after her lung cancer had spread and become inoperable.

Rose Cipollone became the litigant in the case after she was recommended by her chest surgeon to attorney Marc Edell. Edell had previously represented the asbestos companies in their defense in regard to the health-related claims brought against them. Due to his involvement in asbestos litigation, Edell became familiar with “pulmonary pathology and risks of smoking” and became interested in litigation against the tobacco industry.^[1] In need of a client, Edell took on Cipollone’s case and filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Liggett and Myers, Philip Morris, and Lorillard in five separate tort cases on August 1, 1983.

Trial

First case

107 S.Ct. 907, 93 L.Ed.2d 857 (1987) *Certiorari denied, case returned for trial.*

789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986) *Ruling on motion reversed, remanded for further proceedings.*

593 F.Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984) *Motion to strike federal law preemption defense granted.*

Holding

In this divided ruling, the Court found that a 1966 federal cigarette labeling law did not preempt state law damages actions; but later amendments to the act in 1969 did preclude not just “failure to warn” claims, but also on the broader duty “to inform consumers of known risks.”

The 1969 amendments, however, did not preempt claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Court membership

Chief Justice

William Rehnquist

Associate Justices

Byron White · Harry Blackmun

John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor

Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy

David Souter · Clarence Thomas

Case opinions

Majority	Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (Parts I, II, III, and IV)
Concurrence	Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, White and O'Connor (Parts V and VI)
Concur/dissent	Blackmun, joined by Kennedy and Souter
Concur/dissent	Scalia, joined by Thomas

Laws applied

Obergefell v. Hodges

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ____ (2015), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held in a 5–4 decision that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.^{[2][3]}

In November 2014, following a lengthy series of appeals court rulings from the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that state-level bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it was bound by *Baker v. Nelson* and found such bans to be constitutional. This created a split between circuits and led to an almost inevitable Supreme Court review.

Decided on June 26, 2015, *Obergefell* overturned *Baker* and requires all states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other jurisdictions.^[4] This legalized same-sex marriage throughout the

Obergefell v. Hodges



Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 28, 2015

Decided June 26, 2015

Full case name	<i>James Obergefell, et al., Petitioners v. Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al.</i>
Docket nos.	14-556 (http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/14-556.htm)
Citations	576 U.S. ____ (<i>more</i>) 135 S. Ct. 2584; 192 L. Ed. 2d 609; 83 U.S.L.W. 4592; 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 472; 2015 WL 2473451; 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4250; 2015 BL 204553
Related cases	<i>Bourke v. Beshear</i> , <i>DeBoer v. Snyder</i> , <i>Tanco v. Haslam</i> , <i>Love v. Beshear</i> .
Argument	Oral argument (http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_14_556/argument-1)