political science essay"International Relations of the Middle East" 2 pages needed

The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Iraq Author(s): Nader Entessar Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1984), pp. 911-933 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991802 Accessed: 22/10/2008 21:22

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NADER ENTESSAR

The Kurds in Post-revolutionary Iran and Iraq

Who are the Kurds? The Kurdish question has been one of the oldest festering problems in the Middle East subregion. The Kurds, a Muslim ethnic group number- ing some 18 million people, inhabit several Middle Eastern countries, as well as some Soviet republics. The bulk of the Kurds, however, reside in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Although there are no reliable estimates of the size of the Kurdish population, there are probably 8 million Kurds in Turkey, where they are officially referred to as the 'mountain Turks', 5 million in Iran, and 3 million in Iraq.

The origin of the Kurds has also created controversy among scholars. Many, including the Kurds themselves, trace their origin to the Medes, a tribal group which moved into the Iranian plateau from Central Asia at the end of the second millennium and ruled over the area from 614 BC to 550 BC. However, there has never been an independent country of Kurdistan (the land of the Kurds), nor has there ever been a self-governing political entity exercising exclusive jurisdiction over all the Kurds.

From the time of the Arab conquest in the mid-seventh century, the name 'Kurd' has been applied to the western Iranians and other socioculturally related peoples 'established astride the mountain systems of the Zagros and the eastern extension of Taurus'.' The Kurds, as a group, played an important role in the history of Western Asia until 1258, when the Arab caliphate of Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongol invasion. Individual leaders of Kurdish origin also became prominent leaders in the Islamic world. One such leader was Salah-ed- din (Saladin) Ayubbi, who was born a Kurd in 1137 at Tikrit on the Tigris. Saladin, however, fought as a Muslim, and not as a Kurd, against the Crusaders and Richard the Lionhearted, and eventually reclaimed Jerusalem for the Muslims. It is important to note that Saladin never emphasised his Kurdish extraction, nor did he rule or control the major part of the Kurdish-inhabited lands.

1 C J Edmonds, 'Kurdish Nationalism', Journal of Contemporary History, 6(1) 1971, p 8.

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Kurdish Ethnic Identity The Kurds have long contended that as a distinct ethnic group and as a nation, they are entitled to the universally recognized right of self- determination. The Kurds, like many other ethnic groups, have adhered to a set of shared principles which have shaped the course of their ethnic awareness. Scholars of ethnicity have differed on what differentiates an ethpic group from the dominant group(s) in the larger society. Nevertheless, most students of ethnicity have attributed the develop- ment of ethnonationalism to the existence, actual or perceived, of a common language, race, religion and historical experience. The development of ethnic consciousness would give an ethnic group (or nation) a sense of distinctiveness from that of the larger nation within which it lives.

In most multiethnic Third World societies, ethnonationalism has been suspect in the eyes of the dominant elite. They view this phenomenon as a hindrance to unity and the process of nation-building. Although not totally rejecting the appeal of ethnic identity, the Third World has remained suspicious of the disintegrative potential of ethnonationalism in societies too fragile to withstand the barrage of demands from their ethnic groups with often contradictory or opposing objectives. Consquently, multiethnic Third World nations have endeavoured to ameliorate ethnic consciousness among their ethnic groups by accentuating their commonalities with the dominant sub- group(s) and integrating them into the larger society. Such integration has been undertaken largely through the processes of acculturation, amalgamation, and identification.

Acculturation refers to a process by which an ethnic group gradually absorbs the cultural ethos of the dominant societal group. The Kurdish acculturation in Iran and Iraq has taken several forms. In pre- revolutionary Iran, the principal vehicle of acculturation was the institution of monarchy. Glorification of the ancient Persian empires and the contributions of the Kurds to achievements made by those empires in various fields was to serve as a reminder of Kurdish affinity and unity with the dominant group in Iranian society-the Persians.

Following the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the concept of Islamic unity was to serve as the channel of acculturation. For the Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, ethnonationalism and conflicts arising out of ethnic distinctiveness are secondary issues which will wither away after the greater goal of Muslim unity is achieved. In other words, unity of the

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Islamic community will, in time, overcome ethnic conflict. In Iran, neither monarchical institutions nor the illusive concept of Islamic unity succeeded in overcoming Kurdish ethnonationalism.

Unlike Iranian Kurds, the Kurds in Iraq have been able to gain recognition of their ethnic separateness from the Arab majority. However, successive Iraqi governments, through glorification of Arab- ism and Arab nationalism as interpreted by the ruling Ba'ath Party, have sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to acculturate their Kurdish popula- tion by suppressing Kurdish cultural, educational and political institu- tions. As we shall discuss later, none of the attempts made to date have dampened the Kurdish desire to maintain its sociocultural identity in the country.

The second vehicle of ethnic integration is amalgamation. Amalga- mation occurs mostly through the process of miscegenation among two or more ethnic groups in society. Since intermarrying rarely occurs between a Kurd and a non-Kurd, the Kurds are a long way from assimilation into the dominant groups in Iran and Iraq.

The third assimilative variable is identification, either on individual or group levels, of ethnic elements with a larger and more pluralistic society. In both Iran and Iraq, Kurdish identification has been minimal and generally limited to individual levels of assimilation. That is, while some prominent Kurds have attained high-level positions in the Iranian and Iraqi governments and have been coopted into the dominant groups of their respective countries, the Kurdish nation has been left outside the societal mainstream and has remained marginal to it.

In short, the assimilative variables of acculturation, amalgamation and identification have been outweighed by the potentially disintegra- tive factors of cultural distinctiveness exhibited by the Kurds. Among the principal factors contributing to Kurdish ethnic nationalism, as alluded to earlier, are a shared language, religion, race and territoriality.

The degree of shared experiences in language and religion has long been recognised as a major contributor to the development of ethnic consciousness. The Kurdish language is composed of three major dialects and a number of sub-dialects. The three major dialects of Kermanji, Kurdi and Zaza are, to some extent, mutually exclusive, and in the case of Zara, not intelligible to the speakers of the other two dialects. Despite this apparent lack of homogeneity, the perception of a common language as an integral part of the Kurdish nation is very strong among Kurdish nationalists.

With respect to the existence of a common religion, the Kurds are

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overwhelmingly Sunni (orthodox) Muslims. In the Kermanshah (Bakh- taran) region of Iran, most Kurds, like their Persian counterparts, are adherents of the minority Shi'a sect of Islam. The Sunni-Shi'a schism, which from time to time has erupted into Muslim communal conflicts elsewhere, has been remarkably absent among the Kurds. If there have been conflicts between Kurdish Sunni and Shi'a leaders, they have generally occurred not over religious and doctrinal disputes, but over political matters affecting the Kurdish nation. Prominent Kurdish religious leaders have traditionally been able to use their prestige and social status to transcend religious sectarianism and act on behalf of the Kurdish nation as a unified whole.

Radically, the Kurds have retained their distinctiveness more than most other Muslim ethnic groups in the Middle East. Because the phenomenon of miscegenation has not significantly affected the Kurd- ish population, they have tended to pride themselves on belonging to a pure racial stock and, hence, being distinct from other ethnic groups in the region. As Aryans, however, the Kurds share similar traits with the Persians, but are certainly distinct from the semitic Arabs and the Turks. The importance of race, however, should not be overemphasised in the development of Kurdish ethnic consciousness, but we should recognise that it has given an added dimension to the Kurdish claim of ethnic distinctiveness.

Finally, the notion of territoriality and its role in enhancing Kurdish ethnic consciousness should be mentioned at this juncture. Terri- toriality refers to the geographic concentration of an ethnic community and the concomitant sense of belonging to a relatively well-defined territory. The overwhelming majority of the Kurds have always resided in the territory of Kurdistan encompassing areas in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria (see the map). This fact of continuous habitation in Kurdistan, albeit without recognised boundaries, has provided the Kurds with an emotive force to demand autonomy and/or independence for their homeland.

Modern Kurdish nationalist movements, which started in the late nineteenth century, were not successful in achieving the goal of statehood for the Kurds (the following chart illustrates the highlight of major Kurdish nationalistic events). However, in the first half of the twentieth century, two watershed events augured the dawn of a new era for the Kurds. The first event occurred after the conclusion of World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire which had controlled Kurdish areas in modern-day Turkey and Iraq. Among the treaties

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

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Historical Roots of Modern Kurdish Nationalism, 1880-1946 1880 Revolt of Sheikh Ubaydollah of the Hakari province of the

Ottoman Empire. This was the first major Kurdish uprising with nationalistic, as opposed to feudalistic and tribal, overtones.

1897 Founding of the first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan, by the prominent Badr Khan family. It served as a conduit for the dissemination of Kurdish culture and nationalistic activities.

1919 Sheihk Mahmud of Suleymanieh declared his independence from British control, resulting in British military attacks on his stronghold and Sheikh Mahmud's eventual defeat.

1919-22 Ismail Agha Simitqo (or Simko) managed to create a semi-autonomous Kurdish entity along the northwest fron- tier areas of Iran and Turkey.

1920 Treaty of Sevres was signed by the representatives of the victorious Allied Powers and the defeated Ottoman sultan. It called for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in Kurdish-inhabited regions previously under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

1923 Sheikh Ahmad, and his younger brother, Mullah Mustafa, of the Barzan tribe initiated their long campaign for Kurdish autonomy.

1942 Komala, the first Kurdish nationalist political party, was created by a group of Kurdish activists in Mahabad, Iran.

1945 The Kurdish Democratic Party is founded, incorporating all Kurdish nationalist movements (including Komala) under its umbrella.

1945 The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, with its own president, cabinet and legislature is established. The Mahabad Republic was the first and the only independent Kurdish state in history.

1946 The Imperial Iranian army retakes Mahabad and abolishes the Mahabad Republic. Many of its leaders, including President Qazi Mohammad, were subsequently executed.

1946 The Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party is founded by a group of Iraqi Kurdish intellectuals. Mullah Mustafa Barzani accepts the leadership of the party.

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signed between the victorious Allied powers and the defeated Ottoman Sultan, the Treaty of Sevres buoyed the hope of Kurdish nationalists as it called, inter alia, for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. However, due to the emergence of Mustafa Kamal as an important stabilising force in Turkey opposing further dismemberment of his country, and because of the rise of British economic interests in Iraq, the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres were not fully implemented. After several ill-fated attempts to resolve the Kurdish question, the Council of the League of Nations, in December 1925, voted in favour of maintaining the status quo and allowing Turkey and the newly independent Iraq to control their Kurdish areas on the vague condition that minority rights be guaranteed for the Kurds.

The second major event was the establishment in December 1945 of an independent Kurdish state in the city of Mahabad, Iran. The new state, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, received material and moral support from the Soviet Union whose forces, occupying northern Iran as part of the Allied occupation forces in the latter stages of World War II, helped set up the new Kurdish state. The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was short-lived as it disintegrated in December 1946 in the face of Iranian armed forces and after the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Iran.2 Despite its brief existence, it remained the only independent Kurdish state to date and is still a source of reference and inspiration for Kurdish nationalists.

The Kurdish setbacks, both in terms of non-implementation of the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres and the defeat of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, placed them in a precarious bargaining position vis-a-vis the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran and the Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq. Because of non-recognition and military suppression of Kurdish ethnic demands by those two regimes, the Kurds became active supporters of movements that overthrew the two monarchies. How- ever, as we shall see in the following discussion, neither the Iraqi revolution of 1958 nor the Iranian revolution of 1979 resulted in the realisation of long-standing Kurdish aspirations.

Republican Iraq and the Kurds In 1958, a group of military officers under the titular leadership of Abdul Karim Qassem, overthrew the Hashemite family and declared the establishment of a new republican political system in Iraq. The new 2 See Archie Roosevelt, Jr, 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad' in Gerard Chaliand (ed), People

Witiout a Coiuntry: the Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Zed Press, 1980, pp 135-45.

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regime promised to bring about a drastic transformation in the condition of the Kurds. A provisional constitution was promulgated which, for the first time, acknowledged the Kurds as a legitimate ethnic group with national rights. The 1958 constitution, after reaffirming Iraq's place as an integral and inseparable part of the Arab nation, stated that 'Arabs and Kurds are considered partners in this nation'.3 Qassem, himself, was intent on improving the lot of the Kurds. His mother was purportedly a Shi'a Kurd, and several Kurds were appointed to prominent positions after Qassem's accession to power. Most importantly, the exiled Kurdish leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was allowed to return to Iraq and was given a hero's welcome.

In the early years of the Qassem regime, a symbiotic relationship developed between the government and the Kurds. While allowing Kurdish political and cultural activities to flourish, Qassem used the Kurds to keep his enemies (the monarchists, the Ba'athists and other Arab nationalists) at bay. Furthermore, Barzani's political ascendancy and new alliance with Baghdad allowed him to settle 'old scores' with other Kurdish tribes, 'especially the Bardosts, who had helped the Iraqi government in the 1930s and 1940s against Barzani'.4 Similarly, Mullah Mustafa used his newfound power to gain control of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq which he had lost during his exile years in the Soviet Union.

As Mullah Mustafa's power increased and as he solidified his control over the Kurdish movement, his relations with Qassem began to deteriorate. Barzani's requests that the Kurds be given virtual auton- omy was deemed unacceptable by Qassem. As a result, fighting erupted with the Iraqi forces and Barzani'speshmergas in the Autumn of 1961; it continued until January 1963 when a ceasefire agreement was signed.5

A month after the ceasefire, Qassem was overthrown by his Ba'athist enemies. The new regime was in turn overthrown in November 1963 by Abdul Salam Arif. Barzani's initial reaction to this dizzying pace of governmental change was to offer a truce, which halted the fighting between the two sides. However, the 1964 Iraqi Constitution under- mined the shaky truce as it did not specifically recognise the equality of

3 Richard F Nyrop (ed), Iraq: a country study, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979, p 61.

4 Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp 38-9.

5 For details, see Sa'ad Jawad,Iraq and the Kurdish Questioni, 1958-1970, London: Ithaca Press, 1981, pp 63-105.

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the Kurds and the Arabs in their partnership endeavour to build a new Iraq.

The Kurdish position vis-a-vis the Iraqi government was weakened as a major split occurred within the leadership of the KDP. The younger and intellectual elements of the KDP politburo, particularly Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad, challenged Barzani's handling of ceasefire negotiations with the government. Undeterred, Barzani continued to negotiate a ceasefire with the Iraqi regime while simul- taneously fighting the Iraqi troops and his opposition within the KDP.

President Arif died in a plane crash in April 1966 and was replaced by his brother, General Abdul Rahman Arif. Barzani seized this opportun- ity to offer a truce to the new government and to gain 'a breathing spell from the fighting'.6 A major breakthrough appears to have occurred in the Kurdish-Iraqi stalemate in July 1966 when Prime Minister Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz offered his 'Twelve-Point Programme' for Kurdish self-rule. Although this did not satisfy all of Barzani's demands, it nevertheless did represent the first genuine government commitment since 1958 towards accommodating Kurdish autonomy requests. Moreover, Bazzaz's reputation for integrity compelled Barzani to accept the government's proposal as the basis for Kurdish-Iraqi negotiations.

Prime Minister Bazzaz, however, was unable to implement his pro- gramme as he was replaced by Naji Talib, who unlike Bazzaz, was of the opinion that Barzani was not the representative of all the Iraqi Kurds and that acceding to Barzani's autonomy demands would result in the de facto partition of the country. Talib's rejection of Kurdish demands resulted in intensification of Kurdish-Iraqi clashes which persisted throughout Abdul Rahman Arif's regime.

Arif was overthrown in July 1968 and the second Ba'ath government since the Iraqi Revolution came to power. After twenty months of bloody fighting with the Kurds, the Ba'athist regime in March 1970 issued a directive regarding the government's new policy towards the Kurdish movement. The document, known as the March Manifesto, was the most extensive programme which the Iraqi government had hitherto adopted to accommodate Kurdish national desires. Its major parts included the recognition of Kurdish as the official language in areas where a Kurdish majority was in existence, appointment of a Kurdish vice-president, self-rule, and the creation of national adminis-

6 Ghareeb, op cit, p 41.

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trative units in the Kurdish region, and the constitutional recognition of the equality of the Kurdish nation in bi-national Iraq.7

Other provisions of the March Manifesto included the establishment of a Kurdish academy of letters and a Kurdish university at Sulaymanieh, the appointment of various ministers and governors of Kurdish origin, the formation of the Duhok governorate encompassing the Kurdish province of Mosul, and implementation of a major land reform programme in Kurdistan. In return, the Kurds would relinquish their heavy arms to the government and dissolve their clandestine broadcasting station.

Although efforts were made to implement the provisions of the March Manifesto, problems began to hinder the full realisation of the Kurdish autonomy demands. The question of a Kurdish vice-president was never resolved as the Iraqi government refused to accept the nomination of KDP's Secretary, Habib Mohammad Karim, ostensibly because of Karim's Iranian origin. The Kurds could not agree on an alternate candidate acceptable to the Iraqi regime. The major drawback of the March Manifesto, however, was its failure to define the geographic area to be covered by the autonomy provisions of the Manifesto. The latter proved to be the stumbling block to instituting self-rule in Kurdistan.

Barzani was adamant in his demand that Kirkuk and other oil- producing areas be part of the Kurdish autonomous area. The Ba'athist government, on the other hand, insisted that only in areas with a proven Kurdish majority should the provisions of self-rule apply. Barzani was well aware of the fact that, due to the removal of the Kurds from the north to other parts of Iraq in previous years, the census might confirm the government's contention that Kirkuk did not contain a Kurdish majority, hence it would not be part of the Kurdish autonomous region. As Barzani stated, 'Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan. If the population census shows that the majority of its inhabitants are not Kurds, I will not recognise this. I will not bear, before the Kurds, the responsibility for relinquishing Kirkuk. Maybe this can take place after me'.8 With the deadlock in implementing the March Manifesto, another full-scale war erupted between the Kurds and the Iraqi armed forces. With the support of the Shah of Iran, Israel and the United States, Barzani's

7 For the complete text of the March Manifesto, see Ath-thawra (Central Organ of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party), Settlement of the Kurdish Problem in Iraq, Baghdad: Ath-thawra Publications, nd, pp 111-22.

8 ibid, pp 38-9.

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peshmergas engaged the Iraqi troops for four years in protracted guerrilla warfare and inflicted heavy casualties on them.

Autonomy Law of 1974 Faced with a protracted war it could not win, on 12 December 1973 the Iraqi government offered a new plan for Kurdish autonomy, but it fell short of demands made by the KDP. The chief objection of the KDP revolved around the government's insistence that the 1957 census be used to demarcate the boundaries of the Kurdish autonomous reg- ion-a point which had previously been rejected by Mullah Mustafa and the KDP. The Ba'athist government once again reformulated its autonomy plans for the Kurds. On 11 -March 1974 Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr passed an extensive new law of self-rule in the Kurdish area and related constitutional amendments. In addition to provisions for Kurdish cultural autonomy, the law provided for the establishment of a Kurdish legislature and an executive council as governing organs of the autonomous region.

The Iraqi government gave the Kurds 15 days to accept the 1 1 March 1974 autonomy law or forfeit any chance of gaining self-rule. The Kurdish leadership, after a long period of indecision, rejected the government's latest offer. This was mainly due to the KDP's demand that Kirkuk be designated the administrative centre of the Kurdish autonomous region, whereas the government insisted on maintaining the city of Irbil as the administrative heart of the area. Another, and perhaps more serious reason for Barzani's rejection of the autonomy law of 1974 was the promise of aid he had received from the Shah of Iran, the United States and Israel. As Barzani later contended: 'Without American promises, we would not have acted the way we did. Were it not for American promises, we would never have become trapped and involved to such an extent'.9

Indeed, early indications pointed to the United States' commitment to Barzani's cause. In Spring 1974, a US Army operations headquarters was established in the Iranian city of Rezayieh (now Urumiyeh), near the Iraqi border, to advise the Kurdishpeshmergas. Furthermore, a CIA station was reportedly established in the border village of Haj Umran, not far from Barzani's headquarters. High-level Kurdish personalities

I As quoted in Ghareeb, op cit, p 159.

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and KDP officials have acknowledged the presence of American, Iranian and Israeli advisers amongst their forces.'0

Barzani's initial optimism regarding an unending supply of American weapons for his forces proved to be premature. Henry Kissinger, the chief architect of the US assistance programme to Barzani, became obsessed with implementing the Sinai disengagement agreement be- tween Egypt and Israel, which Syria opposed. In order to put pressure on Syria to ameliorate its opposition, Kissinger found it prudent to lessen pressure on Syria's Ba'athist rival, Iraq. Consequently, American commitment to the Kurds began to weaken.

The Shah of Iran was also beginning to re-evaluate his policy of allowing his country to be used as a conduit for weapons destined for Barzani and as a staging ground for Kurdish military operations against the Iraqi forces. After years of confrontation with many Arab states, the Shah had decided to pursue a policy of accommodation towards major Arab countries and 'did not want to alienate them by waging a direct war with his Arab neighbour'.1'

In early Spring 1975, the Shah officially terminated Iran's support for the Kurds. At an OPEC meeting in Algiers in March 1975, the Shah and Saddam Hussein, the Vice-President of the Iraqi Revolutionary Com- mand Council (RCC- the governing body of Iraq) signed an agreement which 'completely eliminated the conflict between the two brotherly countries'.12 The Algiers agreement obligated Iran to withdraw -its support for the Kurds in return for Iraq's abandonment of its claim of absolute sovereignty over all of the Shatt-al Arab river (which formed the southernmost border between the two countries), and some minor adjustments over land boundaries between Iran and Iraq.

With its supply route closed, the Kurdish rebellion seemed to have reached a dead end. The Iraqi government subsequently offered an amnesty to Kurdishpeshmergas who would surrender by 1 April 1975. Similarly, the Iranian government informed Kurdish refugees that the border between Iran and Iraq would soon be sealed along the Kurdish regions, and those willing to return to Iraq should do so before the 1 April deadline. The Shah also offered to allow Barzani and some of his 1 ibid, p 160. Menachem Begin, the former Israeli Prime Minister, has acknowledged that his

country armed and trained Barzani's guerrillas when they fought the Iraqi forces from 1965 to 1975. See New York Times, 30 September 1980.

" Ghareeb, op cit, p 165. 12 Richard Sim, 'Kurdistan: The Search for Recognition', Conflict Studies, no 124, November

1980, p 14. For the complete text of the Algiers Declaration and its subsequent protocols, see Tareq Y Ismael, Iraq and Iran: roots of conflict, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982, pp 60-68.

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fighters to reside in Iran. After fleeing to Iran, Barzani and his peshmergas were housed in camps away from Kurdistan and in areas where they could be closely supervised.13

The Algiers agreement, however, did not bring about a permanent cessation of Iraqi-Kurdish hostilities. The Kurdish peshmergas regrouped themselves under the banner of the Kurdish Democratic Party-Provisional Leadership. This group, under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa's sons, Massoud and Idris, continued to fight the Iraqi government with little success. Still, other allies and associates of Mullah Mustafa accepted the Iraqi regime's limited autonomy. They, under the leadership of Hashim Hassan Aqrawi, the current head of the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party, they have supported the Ba'athist government against the KDP-Provisional Leadership. Still another split in the ranks of the Iraqi Kurds occurred in November 1975 when a few KDP members, who had been ousted by Mullah Mustafa, accused him of betraying the Kurdish cause and held him responsible for the defeat of the Kurdish resistance. These dissidents, led by Jalal Talabani, formed a group called the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). All these groups have continued to fight each other, thereby debilitating the strength of the Kurdish movement in Iraq.

Of all the post-Barzani Kurdish groups, only the official KDP (Aqrawi's group) has participated in the autonomy scheme for the Kurdish region, which now includes Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymanieh but not Kirkuk. As alluded to earlier, the governing structure of the Kurdish autonomous region is composed of the Executive Council and the Legislative Assembly located in Irbil. The latter organ acts as an advisory body to the former, which wields both executive and legislative powers. The Legislative Assembly's eighty members are principally large landowners or traditional tribal chiefs and are appointed by the Iraqi government and are, hence, subservient to Baghdad. The Execu- tive Council is headed by a cabinet and includes up to twelve members appointed from the deputies of the Legislative Assembly. The powers of the local government in the Kurdish autonomous region are severely limited and the majority of the Kurds consider the local governmental organs as puppets of the Baghdad government.

In December 1983, Jalal Talabani's PUK, in a dramatic turnaround, announced its decision to accept a ceasefire with the Iraqi government and begin negotiations over a new autonomy scheme with Saddam 13 Suffering from cancer, Mullah Mustafa Barzani left Iran for the United States a few months after

his arrival in Iran. He died in 1979 in Washington DC, and was buried in Oshnovieh, Iran.

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Hussein's regime. The PUK, which had been fighting the Iraqi army, the Iranian forces, and the KDP-Provisional Leadership, apparently found it debilitating to take on three forces simultaneously. As one PUK official contended: 'At least we can talk to Saddam Hussain. Khomeini has killed 20,000 Iranian Kurds and sees all minorities as agents of Satan'.14

In addition to extracting a pledge for further cultural autonomy, Talabani was able to obtain promises from Baghdad to allow all previously deported Kurds to return to their homes, and that PUK peshmnergas be allowed to carry arms for the purpose of defending the Kurdish region. The new agreement has given the PUK an opportunity to lessen its dependence on Syria. In the words of a PUK official: 'We know the agreement will not last, but at least it has proved that we are independent from Damascus or any other regime.. . . It has given us a breathing space which we will use to prepare for the next on- slaught . . .'15

The Iranian Revolution and the Kurdish Issue The Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 was supported enthusiastically by a broad spectrum of the Kurdish population of Iran. The Kurds partici- pated actively in the revolutionary process from the outset. The memory of the Algiers agreement and what the Kurds considered the Shah's betrayal of them without 'the least bit of compunction'16 provided added incentives for the Kurds to join the revolutionary bandwagon in Iran. The only group which refrained from partaking in anti-Shah activities was composed of traditional tribal chiefs who had been co-opted into the monarchical system through a policy of financial and political rewards.

The Jaf tribal chiefs are a good case in point. The traditional power-holders in the tribe were given high-level positions in local and central governments, and their large landholdings were practically untouched by the Shah's land reform programme. Sardar Jaf became an influential tribal member of the majlis (the lower house of parliament) and his brother, Salar Jaf, was a high-level official in the Shah's palace. Similarly, the Aradalan tribe provided a large number of people who rose to prominence during the Shah's reign, and the Shah's last court minister was an Ardalan Kurd. The Kurds also provided good soldiers

14 Quoted in The Middle East, no 112, February 1984, p 10. 15 ibid. 16 Yosef Gotlieb, Self-Determination in the Middle East, New York: Prager, 1982, p 100.

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whose loyalty catapulted them to the highest ranks in the armed forces of the monarchical Iran. One of the most loyal supporters of the Shah, even after the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, was General Palizban, the Kurdish Governor-General of Kermanshah. Using his knowledge of the region and his Kurdish connections, Palizban has continued to haunt the Islamic Republic from his base in Iraq.

The initial Kurdish euphoria over the downfall of the Shah, however, gave way to the bitter realisation that the Kurdish autonomy demands would go unheeded by the new regime in Tehran. It was evident that Khomeini's goal of creating a strong, centralised Islamic Republic would clash with that of the autonomy-seeking Kurds. As Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini, the influential religious leader of the Mahabad Kurds stated: 'We fought in the revolution not out of religious convictions but for political goals. We want autonomy-our own parliament, our own language, our own culture'.'7 To this end, the Kurds held free elections in several cities and elected city councillors, many of whom were members or sympathisers of the newly-revived Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

Dr Abdul Rahman Qassemlou, who had returned to Iran after several years of exile in Europe, assumed the leadership of the KDPI. Qassemlou's Marxist ideology coupled with Sheikh Husseini's socialist views couched in religious terms, compelled Ayatollah Khomeini to view the Kurdish demands as Marxist-inspired and a conspiracy against the nascent Islamic Republic of Iran. Consequently, Khomeini declared the elections of Kurdish city councillors void and began to refer to both Qassemlou and Ezzedin Husseini as 'Satanic' figures. Qassemlou, for his part, insisted that his goal was not to establish an independent Kurdish state, but his motto was 'democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan', which has now become a popular slogan for the KDPI. Qassemlou's autonomy scheme has, in fact, required the establishment of a Kurdish region in which only defence, foreign relations and finance would be controlled by Tehran.

Religious factors also played an important role in exacerbating tensions between the Iranian Kurds (who are mostly Sunni) and the Shi'a religious leadership in Tehran and Qom. However, the Kerman- shah Kurds, who are predominantly Shi'a, tended to support Khomeini. The Qom clerics, in return, promoted Ahmad Moftizadeh, a conserva- tive Shi'a cleric, as the true representative of the Kurdish nation. Sheikh

17 New York Times, 1 March 1979.

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

Ezzedin Husseini, on the other hand, continued to oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of Islamic government with its emphasis on velayat-e-faqih (government of jurisprudence), which promotes the concentration of all power in the hands of an infallible faqih. Sheikh Husseini summarised his objections to Khomeini's notion of a just government thus: Many governments in the past have claimed to act in the name of Islam, but in reality they were not Islamic. The Safavid and Ottoman governments were cases in point; more recently we have the case of Khomeini in Iran. They are queshri-backward and vulgar-and have ruined Islam and its spirit. What we have is not religious government, but a dictatorship under the name of Islam. ... In Sunni Islam there is no imam as political leader or na'ib (deputy) imam. The role of the clergy is to be morshed, or guide, in knowing God. You will also find some Shi'i clergy who reject Khomeini's concept of faqih. It is not an Islamic regime.18

The notion of clergy as guides and interpreters of Islamic laws collided with Khomeini's conception of clergy as active participants and perhaps the dominant force in society.

Notwithstanding tensions between the Kurds and the theocratic establishment in Iran, the first post-revolutionary cabinet included two Kurds in its ranks: Dr Karim Sanjabi, the veteran leader of the National Front, and Dariush Foruhar. Sanjabi was appointed Foreign Minister while Foruhar was given the Labour portfolio. Both of these men were respected nationalists with anti-Shah credentials.

On 14 February 1979, Foruhar was sent to Mahabad as the head of a goodwill government delegation to discuss Kurdish autonomy demands. However, due to the multiplicity of power centres in Tehran and the weakness of Prime Minister Bazargan's government vis-a-vis the Revolutionary Council (the de facto government of Iran), the Foruhar delegation was unable to make any firm commitments to the Kurdish side. Compounding the problem was the ambiguity of the nature of Kurdish autonomy demands. It was assumed that the areas of defence, foreign policy, and economic planning and trade would be the exclusive domain of the central government. The powers and functions of the local government were not clearly stated.

Another vexing problem was the boundaries of the Kurdish home- land. The Kurds insisted that any future autonomy plans be implemented in the provinces of West Azarbaijan, Ilam, Kermanshah as well as Kurdistan. Although Kurds have resided in all of these

1 MERIP Reports, no 113, March-April 1983, pp 9-10.

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provinces, their only politico-cultural strongholds were in Kurdistan. In West Azarbaijan, the Azari-speaking Iranians overwhelm the Kurds, and in Ilam and Kermanshah, where Shi'a pro-Khomeini sentiments are strong, the autonomy-seeking Kurds have been in a weak negotiating position.

Stalemate between the Islamic Republic and the Kurds exacerbated tensions, which eventually erupted into armed clashes between the Kurdish peshmergas and Islamic pasdarans (revolutionary guards). Simultaneously, clashes occurred between forces aligned with the conservative landowning Kurds and peasants who engaged in a series of land seizures in Kurdistan. Skirmishes between the Azaris and the Kurds in the West Azarbaijan city of Urumiyeh further debilitated the Kurdish position in talks with the central government authorities.'9

The Kurdish tensions might have been defused through further negotiations. However, the Kurdish leadership felt that any prolonged negotiations with government representatives might be turned into a ruse to allow the Iranian army and pasdarans to regroup and attack Kurdistan. The presence of Marxist guerrillas of Fadayan-e Khalq fighting alongside the leftist KDPI forces further increased Tehran's fears that Kurdish autonomy demands were part and parcel of a communist conspiracy to dismantle Iran and establish a separate Kurdish republic similar to the Mahabad Republic of 1946.

Major Kurdish cities of Mahabad and Sanadaj witnessed bloody clashes between the government and Kurdish forces. Both of these cities have had symbolic and strategic importance to the Kurds. Mahabad was not only the capital of the Kurdish province but also served as the site of the only independent Kurdish republic in history. Sanadaj has been the heart of the Kurdish region from where the Shah's security agency, SAVAK, directed its anti-Kurdish activities. The control of Mahabad and Sanadaj symbolised the renewal of Kurdish nationalistic aspirations.

The late Ayatollah Talequani, a highly respected politico-religious figure in Iran and a man accepted by all parties as an impartial intermediary, interceded to stop the bloodshed. He agreed to head a government delegation which finally succeeded in signing a limited autonomy scheme with the Kurds. This programme, agreed upon on 24 March 1979, included the teaching of Kurdish and Persian in Kurdish schools, administration of the local economy and government by 9 See Komala's published declaration in Review of Iranian Political Economy and History (RIPEH)

3(2), Fall 1979, pp 55-9.

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

elected Kurdish representatives, and Kurdish participation in drafting a new national constitution for Iran.

As was the case with the previous autonomy agreement, the plan arranged by Ayatollah Taleqani did not last long. The Kurds suspected that the government was using this as an inducement to get Kurdish acquiescence for the impending referendum on the creation of an Islamic republic in the country. The slogan 'No referendum, self- determination first' epitomised the Kurdish feelings towards Tehran's latest autonomy scheme. As a result, the fragile truce between the Kurds and government forces broke down, and major clashes ensued. The Kurdish boycott of the March 1979 referendum on the future type of government in Iran was followed by a similar boycott in December 1979 of voting on the new Islamic Constitution. The Kurdish objections to the proposed constitution were twofold: (1) the new constitution did not contain any reference to ethnic minority rights, and (2) the Shi'a Islam was mentioned as the official religion of the country whereas the Sunni Kurds had demanded Islam in general be considered as Iran's official religion.

On 27 August 1979, a five-man Kurdish delegation arrived in Tehran to offer a new peace plan. The plan's six points included the immediate removal of Sheikh Sadeq Khalkhali from the Kurdish areas (Khalkhali was responsible for condemning several hundred Kurdish nationalists to death), an end to the execution of Kurdish activists, the withdrawal of non-Kurdish pasdaran from Kurdistan and their replacement with Kurdish guards, an immediate ceasefire, an end to the bombardment of Kurdish strongholds, and convening of a comprehensive conference to grant the Kurds autonomy within the framework of the Iranian state. All of these demands were deemed unacceptable by Ayatollah Kho- meini so long as the Kurds were armed and challenging his authority. However, on 3 September 1979, Prime Minister Bazargan did arrive in Mahabad to offer some concessions to the Kurds, including the power to establish a Kurdish university in Mahabad, an amnesty to all KDPI peshmergas and a promise of massive economic aid to bolster Kurdis- tan's sluggish, war-torn economy. The Bazargan mission also failed to achieve positive results as the fighting intensified between the two sides.

A final attempt to negotiate an overall settlement of the Kurdish demands was made in November 1979 when once again, the Labour Minister Dariush Foruhar headed a government delegation to Mahabad. Thus delegation was given an eight-point plan, which was the most detailed presentation of the Kurdish autonomy demands. It called

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for the inclusion of the concept of Kurdish autonomy in the national constitution, the recognition by the government of the provinces of West Azarbaijan, Ilam, Kermanshah and Kurdistan as an autonomous region, the establishment of a freely-elected Kurdish national assembly with jurisdiction over all local affairs (including internal security functions), guarantee of the freedom of religion, speech and assembly throughout Iran, the inclusion of Kurdish representatives in the central government machinery, use of Kurdish (along with Farsi) as the primary language in official business and schools, and the allocation of a fixed amount of the national budget to the development of the backward economy of Kurdistan. The Kurdish plan also reiterated the supremacy of the central government in national defence, foreign policy and economic planning.

These demands, with minor modifications, were accepted by the Foruhar delegation. However, as it became known that the Islamic Republic's new constitution did not expressly recognise Kurdish minority rights, the eight-point plan unravelled. In an attempt to induce the Kurds, and other Muslim ethnic minorities in the country, to participate in the 1980 presidential election, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that he was prepared to guarantee Sunni minority rights, possibly in the form of an amendment to the new Islamic constitution. The amendment would allow the Sunnis to have their own religious courts in areas where they constituted the majority of the population. However, Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini, and other Kurdish leaders, rejected Khomeini's proposal as insufficient in meeting the Kurdish autonomy demands. By 1980, hopes of a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish issue had all but vanished. As the fighting between the Iranian forces and the Kurds continued, the Kurdish strongholds in major cities gradually fell to the government forces. The Kurdish peshmergas were forced to retreat to the countryside and take up defensive positions there.

Intra-Factional Politics Among the Iranian Kurds The tenacity and intensity of Kurdish guerrilla fighting against the forces of the Islamic Republic have masked to a great extent the intra-factional tensions and conflicts among Kurdish factions. Cur- rently, the major groups fighting against the Khomeini regime in Kurdistan include: a) The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). The largest and one of the most active Kurdish groups, the KDPI has embraced leftist slogans. Under the leadership of Abdul Rahman Qassemlou, the party

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

has expanded its membership and has joined forces with other non-Kurdish groups opposing the Khomeini regime. This is particularly true in the case of military and political collaboration between the KDPI and the Mujahedin-e Khalq, an Islamic, non-Marxist leftist guerrilla organisation which, like the KDPI, is a member of the Paris-based National Council of Resistance (NCR). The NCR is a broad-based umbrella organisation comprising several leftist and nationalist opposi- tion movements to the Khomeini regime.

The KDPI's programme is strikingly similar to that of the original Kurdish Democratic Party established in 1945, the exception being the KDPI's commitment to the integrity of Iran. The phrase 'Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan' is the essence of the KDPI's programme.20 That is, for autonomy to be established in Kurdistan, democracy should first be achieved in all of Iran. It is only within this democratic framework, the KDPI contends, that Kurdish autonomy could be realised. Qassemlou on several occasions has accused foreign interests, especially the United States, of creating obstacles in the path of democracy in Iran, principally through tacit support of the Khomeini regime. In Qassemlou's words, 'Imperialism, through Khomeini, is launching a massive attack on radical and revolutionary forces as to facilitate instituting an American alternative in Iran'.2" In addition to fighting the pasdarans and regular Iranian forces, the KDPIpeshmergas have fought against the KDP-Provisional Leadership whose leaders, Massoud and Idris Barzani, have received aid from the Khomeini government and have on occasion supported and fought alongside the Iranian forces against the Iraqis as well as anti-Khomeini Kurds. b) The Revolutionary Organisation of the Kurdish Toilers of Iran (Komala). A Marxist-Leninist movement which ranks second to the KDPI in membership and influence among the Iranian Kurds. Komala's relations with the KDPI have vacillated from cooperative to conflictual. Occasionally, Komala has received the endorsement of Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini and, thus, it has claimed Husseini as the movement's spiritual leader. However, Sheikh Husseini has no official ties with Komala. Komala's platform calls for Kurdish autonomy via a Marxist revolution in Iran.22

In September 1983, Komala underwent structural transformations. It

20 For details, see Barnameh va Asasnameh Hezb-e Demokrat-e Kurdestan-e Iran, Fourth Congress of the KDPI, 19-23 February 1980, Mahabad, Iran.

21Iran Times, 1 July 1983. 22 Junbish-e Moqavamet-e Khalq-e Kurd va Komala, Document Series 2, 1980.

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patterned itself after the hierarchical communist parties elsewhere, with a central committee, secretariat and politburo as its core. At the same time, it renamed itself the Communist Party of Iran in Kurdis- tan-Komala. Under the leadership of its first Secretary-General, Abdullah Mohtadi, the new Komala has become more assertive in challenging the hitherto dominant position of the KDPI in Kurdish affairs and has staged some of the fiercest intra-Kurdish factional attacks against the KDPIpeshmergas in recent history. c) Mujahedin-e Khalq. This leftist Islamic guerrilla organisation has, as mentioned earlier, joined forces with the KDPI to oppose the Khomeini regime. Both Kurdish and non-Kurdish Mujahedin have fought along- side regular KDPI peshmergas and have coordinated their politico- military activities with them. It was through the Mujahedin that the former Iranian President, Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr was given shelter by the Kurds while planning his escape from the country.23 After the decimation of Mojahedin guerrillas by Khomeini's forces, the guerrilla organisation has found it necessary to concentrate its remaining military forces in Kurdistan where they will be less vulnerable and carry out their guerrilla attacks against the regime more effectively. For its part, the government has accused the Mujahedin, as well as other Kurdish groups, of being the tools of an 'international imperialist conspiracy' against the Islamic Republic.24 d) Fadayan-e Khalq. This Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group has experi- enced tumultuous and devastating factional infighting since the advent of the Islamic Republic. After a year of tacit approval of the new regime, two contrasting tendencies developed within the leadership of the Fadayan. The majority was of the opinion that Khomeini as an 'anti-imperialist' leader should be supported, and that opposing his regime would inflict irreparable damage to the revolution. A minority view within the Fedayan leadership argued that it would be a tactical error to support the 'bourgeois' clerical regime.

The majority faction eventually allied itself with the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party and sought to bring about changes through working within the system. The minority faction, which ironically surpassed the majority faction in membership, continued its armed resistance against the Khomeini regime. In Kurdistan, it joined forces with Komala and the Ashraf Dehqani group (a Fadayan faction named after its revolu-

23 See Bani Sadr's statement in the New York Times, 5 July 1981. 24 Kurdestan: imperialism va Goroohaye Vabaste, Tehran: Political Bureau of the Islamic

Revolutionary Guards, 1980, pp 10-52.

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

tionary leader) and fought the Iranian theocracy from its bases in that area.

In 1983 yet another tendency developed within the so-called minority faction of the Fadayan which further fractured opposition to Khomeini in Kurdistan. Reiterating the necessity for armed struggle, one sub- group argued for expansion of its organisation's military activities throughout Iran. The other sub-group, on the other hand, asserted the desirability of concentrating the organisation's military activities in Kurdistan where the Khomeini forces were most vulnerable.

In addition to the aforemented groups, a number of smaller movements have sprung up to advance the Kurdish cause. For example, Jama'e-e Zanan-e Mobarez-e Saqqez (Society of Militant Women of Saqqez) was formed in March 1979 in the Kurdish city of Saqqez with the broad objective of 'crushing the conspiracies of the reactionaries and continuing the struggle for the liberation of all toiling forces and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man . . .'2 More specifically, this organisation has endeavoured to provide what it has termed 'gender-specific' benefits to Kurdish women. These include improving welfare benefits and working conditions of working Kurdish women.26

The fractious nature of the Kurdish movement and internecine infighting has substantially weakened the Kurdish cause. The assort- ment of peshmergas still conduct hit-and-run tactics against the Iranian government forces, but they have all but lost their strategic positions in the urban area of Kurdistan. Moreover, by playing one faction against another, the Islamic Republic has succeeded in weakening the Kurdish movement. The regime, for example, has provided aid to Massoud and Idris Barzani's KDP-Provisional Leadership to fight the leftist KDPI forces. In return, the KDP-Provisional Leadership has hoped to receive material and logistical support in its fight against the Iraqi government. In July 1983, when the Iranian Army overran the mountain village of Haj Umran in Northern Iraq, the Barzani guerrillas were invited to take over their former strongholds in the area.

The Iran-Iraq War, which could have provided an opportunity for the Kurds to exploit the conditions created by the preoccupation of the two Gulf countries with each other, exacerbated the tensions among major

25 As quoted in Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh (eds), In the Shadow of Islam: the women's movement in Iran, London: Zed Press, 1982, p 222.

26 A smaller group of Kurdish women has established Etehadieh-e Zanan-e Kurdestan (Union of Kurdish Women), which is associated with the Komala party. Other minor Kurdish groups include Rastgari Corps and the III Corps. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report, South Asia, 21 July 1983, p 13.

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Kurdish groups. The pro-Ba'athist official KDP in Iraq called upon its members, supporters and 'the sons of the Kurdish people in the autonomous region to intensify their strikes against the Iranian enemy . . .'27 Similarly, the Islamic Republic urged the Iraqi Kurds to 'rise up for the support of your religion, Islam, in order to establish an Islamic homeland as your brethren in the Islamic Republic of Iran did'.28 However, the shifting constellation of power and the fluidity of inter-Kurdish relations have prevented the two major protagonists in the Gulf war from using the Kurds against each other. By the same token, the Kurdish weakness has prevented them from exploiting politico-military situations opened to them as the result of the Iran-Iraq conflict.

What Next for the Kurds? Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iran and Iraq, although unique in many respects, represents dilemmas faced by most multiethnic societies in terms of conflict management in their societies. Historically, autonomy demands by ethnic groups in those societies have elicited complete or near rejection of such demands, followed by a period of varying degrees of repression by the dominant ethnic cultural group. For better or worse, ethnic affirmation has been largely identified with separatist tendencies, disintegration of the political system and the concomitant disorder and chaos. This has historically been true in the case of Iranian society which, in addition to the Kurds, comprises several ethnic nationalities.

Granting total autonomy to one ethnic group would necessitate implementation of similar measures with respect to others, hence the first step toward possible disintegration, as many have contended. On the other hand, the enormous cost of perpetual ethnic conflictual relations behoves us to search for a pacific approach to managing such conflicts. Such an approach may entail 'shifts in jurisdictions, the redistribution of resources, and changes in resource allocation pro- cedures'.29 This approach, of course, would entail a genuine degree of administrative decentralisation and the establishment of a federal

27 FBIS, Daily Report, Middle East and Africa, 26 July 1983, p E3. 28 FBIS, Daily Report, South Asia, 26 July 1983, p 13. For a brief analysis of the Kurdish position in

the Gulf War, see Edgar O'Ballance, 'The Kurdish Factor in the Gulf War', Military Review 61(6) June 1981, pp 17-19.

29 Martin 0 Heisler and B Guy Peters, 'Scarcity and the Management of Political Conflict in Multicultural Polities', International Political Science Review 4(3) 1983, p 329.

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THE KURDS IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND IRAQ

system of government with power being shared between the federal and state governments. Perhaps this is easier said than done. But in the absence of another viable alternative, federalism would be the first step towards managing centuries-old ethnic conflicts in Iran and Iraq.

933