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T.S. Kuhn (1922-96)

• Author of one of the most cited academic books of the 20th Century, ‘ The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ 1st edition 1962. Second edition with a postscript 1970.

• Legacy of popularizing the term ‘paradigm’ in the way now most commonly used: a revolutionary change in attitude or world view.

• Supposedly Al Gore’s favourite book. • Whilst written for a philosophy and history of science audience cited

in broad number of academic fields (often out of context?)

• Trained in Physics at Harvard University graduating with PhD in 1949.

• Taught on history of science until 1956, during this time wrote ‘ The Copernican Revolution’ (1956) which became one of the standard texts for looking at the Scientific Revolution.

• Kuhn in this period became interested in Aristotelian Physics and became troubled by whig historians treating it as irrational. He noted that rather than being irrational it seemed to offer an alternative way of observing and generating theories of nature.

• In 1956 Kuhn moved to University of California Berkeley, and took up a position as Historian of Science.

• Added to his concerns with problems of whig history of science, interests in role of social interactions of scientific communities (Fleck, Polanyi); Metaphysics(Koyre); Language (Wittgenstien), and theory loading of observation (Hanson, Feyerabend), in shaping scientific knowledge.

‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’

• Most philosophy of science significantly concerned with demarcation problem, ie: how can philosophers of science tell us whether or not something is scientific and what constitutes the scientific method and how can we explain the progress of science.

• In the ‘Structure’ Kuhn re-focuses these traditional questions.

• Taking whig history and theory loading as starting points Kuhn asks from a much wider perspective:

• Are there recognizable patterns of change and continuity in the history of science ? And how can they be explained?

More Descriptive approach

• Kuhn’s approach to this general question tends to be more historical and descriptive than accounts such as Popper. Ie: not setting out to tell scientists how to do better science.

• Rather than focus on Science as a whole it is historically more acceptable to think in terms of major scientific traditions. Physics, Chemistry etc

• Kuhn observes that in these major traditions of science long periods of stability(given theory loading something of an achievement) and much briefer but turbulent periods of change.

• One feature of the major scientific traditions is these periods of strong consensus, other areas of human activity and knowledge often more

difficult to have such stability (rather limited demarcation criterion)

Details of process

• The great scientific traditions eg: Physics have seemed to develop in the following way.

• Pre- Science • Normal Science(Paradigm) • Crisis/Revolution • New Normal Science(Paradigm) • Crisis /Revolution • And the process continues…

1. Pre- Science

• 1. Period of pre-science, lack of theoretical agreement on basics, possible to observe different things, think of the world as being constituted from different things (Metaphysics), disagreement on ways of gaining knowledge etc.

• Eg. Pre- Aristotelian Physics.

2. Normal Science/ Paradigm

• Agreement on ‘basics’ sufficient to ‘see the same things’, agree about what nature is made up of (ie: shared metaphysics).

• Basic agreement about what counts as valid knowledge (epistemology).

• Agree on problems, use similar scientific methods, ideal problem solutions and exemplars.

• Research geared towards filling in gaps in knowledge or puzzle solving, educational structures re-inforce these ways of knowing (dogmatic)

• Complimentary to broader society. • These elements of a Paradigm are lived and learnt rather than simply

being written down like a set of rules.

Eg. First great Paradigm of Physics Aristotelianism ?

• Metaphysics: eg: universe being made up of earth air fire and water and natural places and motions

• Epistemology and ‘scientific methods’: eg: classification, logic, observation in natural settings, teleological causation ( reluctance towards using experiment and mathematics)

• Research geared towards filling in gaps in knowledge or puzzle solving: eg: question of (not an anomaly) planetary motion

• Ideal problem solutions and exemplars: uniform circular motion, Ptolemy’s epicycles.

• Dogmatic educational structures re-inforce these ways of knowing eg: scholasticism.

• Complimentary to broader society eg: hierarchical society medieval synthesis with theology

3: Crisis/ Revolution

• ‘Anomalies’: problems begin to build up within the paradigm that are perceived to question the building blocks of the paradigm. NB there are always problems in a paradigm eg: retrograde motion. During a settled period of normal science these are just a puzzles to be solved, during a crisis they take on significance.

• When problems become anomalies it is for more than just academic/ rational reasons and open to historical explanation.

• New alternative ‘building blocks’ alternatives appear and become the new consensus like a political revolution this process can occur relatively quickly and be bitter.

• Like a ‘Gestalt shift’ or religious conversion

Crisis in Aristotelian ‘Paradigm’

Retrograde motion of planets becomes an anomaly for Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo and requires challenges to the building blocks of Aristotelian normal science. Eg: Geocentricism, not just problem to be solved. These challenges also correspond with broader changes in Metaphysics and Epistemology within a broader historical period of change. Eg: Neo-Platonism, Renaissance Humanism the Reformation.

4.(New) Paradigm

• New Paradigm is revolutionary not because it has answered anomalies in a simple sense, but has done so, by significantly redefining the questions to make them largely redundant . New paradigms will look at the world differently, rely on new building blocks, new Metaphysics?, new institutions, new methods etc

• Old paradigms will die off, not just academically, but socially ie: institutions, individuals etc

New Paradigm of Physics/ Galileo and Newton

• Building blocks and basic theories of physics redefined, by Galileo, Kepler, Descartes and Newton.

• Many Aristotelian ‘questions’ are no longer relevant.

• New methods for doing Natural Philosophy and new epistemologies. Eg. mathematics, experiment, primary vs secondary qualities.

• New metaphysics: mathematics, mechanical metaphors etc.

• New educational/ social structures: scientific societies, diminishing

significance of scholasticism, wider educated audiences, crafts etc. • Newtonian Paradigm will develop and last for next 300 years, uptil

Einstein…

Issues

• How do we compare knowledge between paradigms and if we can’t, what does this mean for scientific progress ? (the so called incommensurability issue).

• How do we sort out the difference between rational and irrational factors in explaining the success of one paradigm over another ?

• In response to question 1: Kuhn suggested that later paradigms whilst still significantly different offered greater breadth and explained more things.

• To question 2: He suggested that there are some criteria for a good paradigm including simplicity and elegance.

• These responses not necessarily consistent with original propositions in first edition of ‘the structure’

• Whether or not these issues are seen as problems varied between philosophers, sociologists and historians, the former more troubled.

• Some critics suggest ‘paradigm concept’ excessively broad captures too many things and possible meanings.

Some Implications of Kuhn’s work

• Because of emphasis on the importance of consensus between scientists, scientific education and influence of scientific institutions on what counts as science Popperian ideals of ‘science’ as a fundamentally socially critical enterprise are challenged.

• It opens up much more room for questions about how social, psychological factors shape the choices scientists make between theories.

• Raises questions about the relevance of demarcating science on the basis of a single scientific method, ie: scientific methods will be different in different paradigms.

• Links philosophical questions about science to sociological and historical questions.

• Suggests scientific education and scientific institutions and relationship between science and broader society are important in understanding processes of scientific change.

• Raises questions about the way we define scientific progress.

• Suggests that most important changes in science have involved radical shifts in perspective rather than just incremental changes in knowledge.

Differing Interpretations

• In general, historians and sociologist received Kuhn’s work more positively whilst Philosopher’s have been divided and sometimes critical.

• Even amongst the positive views a general feeling that Kuhn oversimplifies his model of normal science and revolutions and doesn’t really need to suggest such a structured pattern, and that his most significant contribution has been to re-focus the way academics ( and even broader audiences) look at science.

• Plenty of examples of incremental scientific change, and theoretical criticism within periods of stable science( normal science)

• Encouraging a lot of questioning about the value of idealized models of the history of science.

• Some have interpreted Kuhn’s work as encouraging political radicals (against Kuhn’s own wishes) who have used ‘the structure’ to legitimate arguments that the only way to create new ideas in academia, science or society is through revolutionary paradigm shifts.

• Others have suggested that Kuhn’s work has had the opposite effect . They argue that by emphasising the mix of sociological, psychological and philosophical factors involved in science, Kuhn has discouraged people holding scientists accountable to philosophically rational highly critical standards suggested by philosophers such as Popper.