essay questions

Consequential Courts

JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Edited by

DIANA KAPISZEWSKI University of California, Irvine

GORDON SILVERSTEIN Yale Law School

ROBERT A. KAGAN University of California, Berkeley

CAMBRIDGE UNHTERSITY PRESS

5

The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court into

an Arena for Political Contestation

Monica Castillejos-Aragon*

"In the process of transformation of a post-colonial regime, judicial leadership matters. Public

Interest Litigation began with a letter addressed to the Supreme Court from an inmate

imprisoned in the South of India. After I read the communication, I decided to visit the

poorest areas in India. I spoke with the less advantaged citizens and I got to know their

needs. Based on those needs, I developed my own social philosophy and promoted important

changes within the Supreme Court."

- From my interview with Chief Justice N.P. Bhagwati in New Delhi, India,

on July 17, 20io

Between 1929 and 2000, the legislative and judicial branches of the Mexican gov-

ernment were subordinated to the executive's control. In theory, the separation of

powers was recognized by the dominant political party, the Partido Revolucionario

Institucional (PRI), as a leading tenet defining the governmental structure. How-

ever, in practice, the president limited the powers of the other branches through

various constitutional reforms. These institutional reforms effectively restricted the

Mexican Supreme Court from properly functioning as arbiter between the presiden-

tial and congressional powers, and from protecting fundamental rights. The court

system essentially preserved authoritarian rule and the Mexican Supreme Court

turned into a passive and unimportant institution. Judges aligned themselves with

the executive in an effort to avoid any kind of confrontation. As Domingo (2004)

* This chapter draws on my doctoral dissertation, "Judges as Institutional Builders: The Transformation

of the Mexican Supreme Court into an arena for Political Contestation." I am deeply grateful to my

dissertation advisors Malcolm M. Feeley, Martin M. Shapiro and Diana Kapiszewski for helping me

develop and frame the ideas in both my doctoral dissertation and this chapter. I am also thankful to

Robert A. Kagan for his insightful comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this document, and to

Peter W. Williams for his invaluable input and support as I wrote the final version. I extend my sincere

gratitude to my mentor, Justice Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, for giving me the opportunity to witness and

participate in his project of judicial transformation. The chapter also draws on my experiences as a

clerk on the Mexican Supreme Court from 2004 to 2007.

The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court Z39

ribes, the judiciary responded to the wishes of the executive as expressed through

imber of formal and informal pressures and incentives such as political rewards

and career incentives

Mexico's judicial inadequacies sprung many sources, including weak judicial

ice, thousands of inconsequential cases, and corrupt and incompetent

yes. Because of these inadequacies, myriad serious violations of fundamental

went unpunished during the seven decades of authoritarian rule. Human

rights violations were condoned or suppressed by the PRI authorities responsible for

rosecuting and investigating them. For its part, the Supreme Court addressed the

few cases that produced student public outcry, and created commissions allegedly

responsible for investigation. However, these commissions rarely established the

facts (Rubio 1990). Moreover, the Court often refused to hear amparo lawsuits that

challenged violations of rights presumably committed by the PRI authorities (Cossio

Diaz 2001). Consequently, judicial decisions received very little media attention and

were rarely mentioned by rights advocates and activists in their struggles. In sum,

the Mexican Supreme Court's influence over the battle for the protection and

recognition of the fundamental rights of citizens was futile.

However, from 1995 to 2010, the Mexican Supreme Court initiated a fascinating

of institutional transformation, which positioned justices to develop novel

fundamental-rights jurisprudence. Since 2007, the Court has come to be viewed not

merely as a forum to settle disputes but as an instrument of societal change. It has

issued decisions that were unthinkable during the authoritarian rule, and engaged

in unprecedented constitutional interpretation of women's rights, indigenous rights,

decriminalization of abortion, transgender rights, HFV rights, labor rights, and health

rights; freedom of expression, freedom of press, and freedom of privacy rights, the

right to information, same-sex marriages, DNA rights, children's rights, property

rights, and freedom of association, among many others. Why has the Mexican

Supreme Court begun to serve as an arena for political contestation?

Most students of the Mexican Supreme Court point to hvo causal factors to explain

the Court's political awakening: (a) the 1994 judicial reform (Incldn Oseguera 2009;

Fix Fierro 2003; Finkel 2000; Staton 2010); and (b) the advent of a new competitive

political party system in 2000 (Magaloni and Sanchez 2006; Rios-Figueroa 2007).

First, in December 1994, during the last PR[ administration (1988-1994), President

Ernesto Zedillo proposed a judicial reform that restructured the entire judiciary;

changed the judicial appointment process and appointed all new justices to the high

court; granted the Court the power to review constitutional or substantial challenges

to the state (not simply legal or procedural questions) in amparo lawsuits (Magaloni

2003); and more generally sought to convert the court into a constitutional tribunal

according to the Kelsenian model (Ferejohn 2002; Castillejos 2005; Fix Zamudio

1993; Finkel 2003; Gudino Pelayo 2005; Gongora Pimentel 2005). According to this

account, this restructuring granted the Court a higher degree of independence

enabled justices to rule against the government.

140 Monica Castillejos-Aragon The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court 141

Research in the second vein claims that in addition to the 1994 legal reform,

the new competitive party system that emerged in 2000 constituted a turning point

for the institutional operation of the Supreme Court. It also suggests that the new

political atmosphere provided the Supreme Court with institutional autonomy to

address issues that were systematically neglected during the PRI regime.

In this chapter, I argue that although legal reform and the new competitive

political party system played a role in the Court's empowerment and its higher

degree of independence, they are not sufficient to explain the Court's new role as an

'arena for political contestation," or its new approach to interpreting fundamental

rights. In addition, we must pay special attention to progressive judicial leadership.

By implementing substantial institutional changes within the Court and converting

the courtroom into an individual-state forum, over the last four Supreme Court

terms (from 1995 to 2010) judicial leaders provided political and social advocates

an opportunity to convert grievances into legal claims (Moustafa 2007). In brief,

progressive justices converted the Court into an arena for political contestation to

propel political change by cultivating bonds between the Supreme Court and various

agents (see Figure 5.1); the executive and the legislature (1995-1999 and 1999-2003);

mass media and the legal complex (see Halliday, Ch. 13 in this volume) (2003-2007);

and civil society organizations and interest groups (2007-2010). Importantly, and in

contrast to the United States' Warren Court (see Kagan, Ch. 8 in this volume) and

India's Bhagwati Court (see Mate, Ch. 10 in this volume), these institutional changes

were not carried out exclusively by chief justices, but also by associate justices who

followed their own incentives. The justices cultivated those connections because

the type of social change they envisioned required building synergies with agents

who, by working together, would produce results not obtainable by any one of them

alone. As a result of these synergies, the Court began issuing an increasing number

offundamental-rights decisions by 2007.

This finding is in line with much of the judicial impact literature, which suggests

that courts alone can rarely do much to advance progressive social agendas (Schein-

gold 1974; Rosenberg 1991). However, it calls into question propositions developed

in the rights-revolution literature that suggest the transformation of supreme courts

into guardians of individual rights occurs as a result of pressure from below (i.e.,

through deliberate, strategic, organized effort by rights advocates; Epp 1998). It also

departs from most studies of courts, which analyze judicial behavior primarily on

the basis of judicial rulings. Indeed, focusing on judicial decision making, scholars

of the Mexican Court have been unable to explain why the Court began to pay more

attention to fundamental-rights cases after the end of the PRI era, and have missed

the larger political role the Court has developed and begun to play.

This chapter proceeds in three sections. Section I describes and explains the

absence offundamental-rights interpretation by the Mexican Supreme Court during

the PRI regime. Section II discusses the three variables that I argue combined to pro-

duce the Court's new role as an arena of political contestation: the 1994 legal reform;

1994 LEGAL REFORM + 2000 COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEM

PROGRESSIVE JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP

THE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT'S

NEW SYNERGIES (1995.2010)

TRANSFORMATION OFTHE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT INTO AN ARENA FOR POLITICAL

CONTESTATION (2007)

INCREASE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DECISIONS

FIGURE 5.1. Mapping the Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court.

progressivejeadership on the Court after 1995. Section III analyzes the past four

Supreme Court terms and shows how the work of three energetic and progressive

^ustices^- Justice Juventino Castro y Castro, Chief Justice Genaro Gongora, and

Justice Jose Ram6n Cossio - helped the Court build synergies with new audiences,

emerge as an arena for political contestation, and develop a new rights role.

FACTORS INHIBITING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS INTERPRETATION DURING PRI RULE

The overt reluctance of the Mexican Supreme Court to address fundamental-rights

challenges during the PRI era frequently attracted public criticism. This judicial

unwillingness eventually provoked Mexican intellectuals to harshly scrutini2

142 Monica Castillejos-Aragon

PRI rule (1929-2000) (Cossfo Diaz 2001; Magaloni and Zaldivar 2006; Raphael

2006). Although the Mexican Constitution of 1917 fully protects a range of rights and

freedoms, the Court's actions undermined these protections, and the entire judicial

system was known for delay and unpredictability, especially in lower courts and rural

areas.

There are five major explanations for this weak judicial commitment to funda-

mental rights. First, under the PRI regime, government officials severely limited the

judiciary s latitude - effectively preventing courts from vindicating rights or chal.

lenging the PRI's abuses of power. Second, the procedural mechanism available to

challenge state action, including human rights violations, before federal courts - the

amparo writ (juicio de amparo) - was laden with technicalities and antiquated rules

that made rights litigation costly and inefficient. Third, as a result, legal profession-

als rarely sought to use the courtroom to seek societal change. Fourth, civil society

and rights advocates discounted the Supreme Court as a trushvorthy institution,

and thus brought their claims before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

Fifth and finally, the absence of support structures such as mass media, the legal

profession, civil society, and interest groups limited the justices' opportunity to issue

more progressive rights decisions. I develop each of these reasons in turn.

The first explanation can be extracted from the literature on the judicialization

of politics, originally advocated by Martin M. Shapiro (1981, 1994; Shapiro and

Stone Sweet 2002). Shapiro claims that under specific political circumstances, courts

are able to make enduring policies. However, despite the empowerment of the

Supreme Court in 1994, justices did not immediately exert their power because

they were hesitant to challenge their appointer (PRI President Zedillo [1994-2000]),

and because Mexico continued under one-party rule through 2000. From 1995 to

2000, politicians used methods of discipline such as dismissals and impeachments to

discourage justices from deciding significant constitutional issues and challenging

the PRI's status quo (Fix Fierro 2003). The second explanation concerns the nature and design of writ ofamparo. The

amparo procedure allows citizens to take specific constitutional questions concern-

ing rights to federal courts, including the Supreme Court. However, historically in

Mexico, the amparo procedure did not allow citizens to effectively challenge human

rights violations (Fix Zamudio 1981), but rather served primarily as a set of rules that

protected and legitimated existing political and social hierarchies (Galanter 1974).

It is well documented that this procedure is an ineffective, costly, and inefficient

legal recourse, and embedded with legal uncertainty and complex technicalities that

made it inaccessible to the majority of the population. Moreover, scholars have docu-

merited that under the PRI, the Supreme Court often denied judicial review in con-

stitutional cases that explicidy challenged the PRI by focusing on scrutinizing proce-

dural technicalities in the amparo lawsuits as grounds to deny judicial review (Cossio

Diaz 2001). Consequently, no standards of review were developed and litigants

were generally unable to unravel the rationale behind the Court's dismissal of

The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court ^

F60cieta!progrels.nor..a kgal too1 to syb)ect_the P^erences of the powerful to the

fcons!^ ^^,£thls way' the'PRI:s'cm^^^1^^1^ ^ emergence of rights litigation.

T^lrc?.lnforweak ludicial protection off""d^enta] rights draws on the legal-compl^itera^ure^e Halliday, Karpik, and-FeeTey7oo°7;lSduarawC^nt

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i^ta^bfa"^ ^7°i= S^"-Sb^:^ I groupl^l;SSS!ntererts:an:d thesupre^c<^:'S^S^t

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VARIABLES THAT TRIGGERED THE NEW ROLE OF THE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT

l^s'^s,s=^s-—

144 Monica Castillejos-Aragon

The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court l45

Additionally, scholars suggest that the emergence of a new competitive political item in 2000 enabled justices to rule against the government'^interests

^thoutbeingsystematically challenged or ignored (Rios-Figueroa 2007). These two

vanabies'aTone arguably expanded the Court's formalpower and empowered justices

tos'afeguaidthe'rrghts and liberties mandated m the constitution,Howevfr^he7 are

not"sufflcientto-eoxplam the new role of the Mexican Supreme Court. A third and

esTential'variable -progressive judicial leadership - enabled the Court to convert

itself into an arena for political contestation.

Variable I: The 1994 Judicial Reform

When President Ernesto Zedillo assumed office in 1994, Mexico was undergoing

toical^c^om^and^ocial struggle. In December 1994, President Zedillo^ssem-

£Ied"the'main''polit7ical party leaders to discuss and pass a constitutional reform to

r"estmcture"the Mexican judiciary, one step in broader efforte to ^ess the multi-

factete7crisis.'This judicial reform, subsequently enacted by the legislature^mple-

±mented"three main' proposals: (i) it granted and strengthened the Supreme Court's

^function as an authentic constitutional tribunal, according to l

"model of judicial review; (2) it modified the judicial appointment process,

^reas'edthe'number of justices from twenty-one to eleven, and appointed all new

JuTticesTo "the bench; (3) it created a Judicial Council to alleviate the need for

\ to perform'administrative tasks and allow_them to^ focus on jurisdictional

L7ue7(Jimefn7z''Remus 1996). The 1994 Judicial reform established the ins^ticmal c'onditions"for-the Supreme Court" to become independent from the Executive

^duL7gislative"branches7 influence. Of course, ^such a reform coul^d^^

an"immSe change in justices' attitudes toward the adjudication °ff""damenta

"and"the"Cou°rt's constitutional engagement on fundamental rights^contin-

u^dto bTextaordmarily weak through 2000 (Cossfo Diaz 2000). In sum, the^94

fudicTafreform'msnecessary to expand the Supreme Court's^ PoweK^ut^wa; nuoTsufflcientto motivate the newly appointed justices to pay sustained attention to

fundamental lights and liberties issues in their first years on the new Uourt.

Variable II: The Emergence of a New Competitive Party System in 2000

iing to fragmentation theory, in countries where there is^a dominant party^

cZn1uborDdinate°courts, courts tend to be weaker; by contrast, when there are mult

compTting parties, those parties are less likely to override judicml <kcisio

gisiati'on& ^"reshape the courts through changing personnel, aHowing^courts^o

be'comTpowerful and act as an autonomous branch of government (^Fere^, Ch."i4"inthis-volume). Thus, the greater the fragmentation in the Executive an

slative branches, the more likely it is that courts will rule against the government

land engage m policy-making (Finkel 2005; Rios-Figueroa 2007). This theory has been

applied to the Mexican case, arguing that the Supreme Court has gradually moved

Ifroin being a weak institution during the PRI regime to becoming a powerful one

after the PRI was defeated by the conservative Partido Accion Naciona] (PAN) in

2000. President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) established two important conditions that

influenced the Supreme Court's operation in the first three years of his presidential

administration. First, his judicial appointments dramatically changed the judiciary's

internal dynamics and debates. Second, his enactment of the Law of Transparency

and Access of Governmental Information provided justices with opportunities to

gain institutional legitimacy through various channels.

These first two variables set the stage for the Mexican Supreme Court's insti-

tutional conversion into a space for political activism. However, they only gained

significance when progressive justices embraced them and advocated for institu-

tional change within the Court in the later 19905.

Variable III: Progressive Judicial Leadership

Much political and legal research on how courts operate and change focuses on

legalistic and jurisprudential issues, neglecting the human factor. As with all types of

institutions, however, without effective leadership viable innovation and reform are

impossible (Mahoney 1988; Wice 1995). Indeed, the literature on judicial leadership

assumes that when highly motivated and liberal justices commit to court reform and

combine intelligence with effective leadership, they can make significant improve-

ments within their justice systems (Wice 1995). We must carefully define "leader-

ship," however. In contrast to the United States and Indian examples mentioned,

the type of progressive judicial change witnessed in the past fifteen years in Mexico

did not derive exclusively from the vision and actions of the chief justice. Rather,

during specific periods after the 1994 judicial reform, highly motivated justices -

and especially Justice Juventino Casb-o (1995-1999), Chief Justice Genaro Congora

(1999-2003), and Justice Jose Ramon Cossfo (2004-2010) - developed and promoted

various landmark institutional changes in order to develop a new role for the Court.

In particular, they built connections (synergies) with new agents - the Executive,

Legislative mass media, legal complex, civil society, and interest groups. The result-

ing judicial forum (the Court itself) fomented a public dialogue and debate among

these new audiences and encouraged them to bring fundamental-rights cases.

LEADERSHIP ON THE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT AND ITS NEW SYNERGIES: 1995-2010

^ This section explores how the contributions and agendas of three key justices - Justice

^ Juventino Castro y Castro (1995-1999), Chief Justice Genaro Gdngora Pimentel

146 Monica Castillejos-Arag,6n The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court i47

(i999-2003)>an<^ Justice Jose Kamon Cossfo (2004 to 2010) - led to the development

of the Mexican Supreme Court's new role.

Justice Juventino Castro y Castro and the Establishment of the SC's

Agenda, 1995-1999

When the newly appointed Supreme Court initiated its operation in January 1995^

Mexico was experiencing multifaceted crisis. Further, the PRI was still the major

force in the federal executive and legislature. The judiciary was marked by high

levels of corruption, public distrust, and a lack of legitimacy and the PRI's legal

formalism continued to prevail in judicial ideolosgy. Judicial independence was

rhetoncally recognized by the other branches, but in practice was very weak. For its

part, the Mexican Supreme Court rarely heard cases concerning political matters

such as elections or electoral legitimacy. In interviews Schatz (2000) conducted with

various justices, they discussed the PRI's continued influence on the Court. Justice

Juventino Castro y Castro, for example, referenced the Supreme Court's continuing

weakness and the executive's ongoing intervention in judicial affairs during the

1995-1999 term- Iustice Mariano Azuela explained the Court's continued tendency

to subordinate its operation to the executive's wishes. These statements help explain

why the Court continued to be unable to act as a genuine constitutional tribunal to

protect the rights of individuals.2 Given the PRI's continued dominance, the Court focused on developing its orga-

nizational structure and, much more urgently, setting the agenda for the future. In

view of the overload of existing and pending cases, the deficiency of the Court's

automated management systems (i.e., databases), and insufficient standards of

procedures and training of judicial personnel (Aguinaco Aleman 1997), the justices

mostly confronted issues of case management and processing.

With regard to setting the new judicial agenda, the leadership of Justice Juventino

Castro y Castro was particularly critical. He promoted a respectful attitude toward

rights and liberties mandated in the Constitution, and sought to recognize the

important role the Court played in constitutional interpretation and creating condi-

tions under which the rule of law could be fully realized in Mexico (Staton 2010).

Justice Castro y Castro also advocated for a real political party system to tip the

balance among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and openly criticized Pres-

ident Zedillo's Annual Presidential Report, which suggested that Mexico's system

was characterized by a division of powers.? The justice highlighted that despite legal

reforms, the Executive remained reluctant to delegate power to the other branches

of government in a meaningful way, continuing to serve as commander in chief of

2 Justice Juventino Castro y Castro served fifteen years on the Supreme Court from 1995 to 2005.

3 AgustinAmbriz, "El ministro Juventino Castro refuta a Zedillo: hay desequilibrio de poderes," Proceso

tember 5,1999.

e Mexican army, head of foreign affairs, chief architect of economic policy, as

;]1 as the head of the administrative tribunals. The executive's veto powers and

us ability to initiate legislation preserved the political hegemony that such reforms

aimed to dispel.

Over the years, in his publications and speeches, Castro y Castro delineated the

many obstacles facing the nation's administration of justice and proposed ideas for

improvement (Castro y Castro 2003).4 First, he advocated for reform of the legisla-

tion guiding the amparo procedure, which he alleged was designed to obstruct the

administration of justice in Mexico. Originating in 1847, these antiquated rules and

foj-malistic principles fostered high levels of corruption and distrust in the judiciary,

and allowed the more powerful to profit at expense of the less advantaged. He also

proposed to grant the Court the power to present initiatives before Congress and

thus to participate in the political process in areas directly related to judicial activity.

Third, he suggested the Court be given financial autonomy and the ability to request

an annual budget (subject to congressional approval). He also advocated incorporat-

ing administrative tribunals into the judicial structure, and proposed constitutional

reform to establish oral trials (juicios orales) to make the justice sector more expedi-

tious, transparent, and efficient (Castro y Castro 2004). Finally, he initiated alliances

between the Court and media, speaking with journalists to inform them of judicial

outcomes in a timely fashion, thus joining the national debate.5

In sum, during this first term on the Court, Justice Castro y Castro played a

pivotal role in setting the agenda for and scope of judicial activity. Indeed, each of

his proposals was undertaken and promoted in the following judicial terms.

Chief Justice Genaro Gongora Pimentel: Lobbying for Institutional

Emancipation, 1999-2003

On July 2, 2ooo, Mexico's political system experienced the unthinkable: the PRI

lost the presidential election for the first time since the political party was founded

in 1929. President Ernesto Zedillo announced Vicente Fox's historical victory in a

televised speech, and claimed to be the president who had made democratic change

possible in Mexico. In the wake of this political earthquake, the close ties behveen

the state and the PRI collapsed (Bell and Pansters 2001), and a new competitive party

system emerged that provided justices with the opportunity to situate the Supreme

Court as an autonomous institution (Gongora Pimentel zooo).6 The Court's main

goals during this period - championed by Chief Justice Genaro Gongora - were

4 Justice Juventino Castro y Castro, "Retirement Speech" delivered at the Mexican Supreme Court on

November 28, 2003.

? Interview I conducted with Licenciada Rosalba Rodnguez Mireles, a former staff attorney of Justice

Castro y Castro, in December 2010 in Mexico City.

Genaro Gfingora, "Sin Independencia no somos nada" (Mexico: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la

Naci6n, August 2000).

148 Monica Castillejos-Aragon

emancipation from executive and legislative influence, and the promotion of a nevy

kind of interaction with elected leaders (Gongora Pimentel 2000). i

The central tenet of Chief Justice Gongora Pimentel's judicial term was, "Let's

simplify the law."8 He strongly advocated for interbranch collaboration on reform

proposals^ and more generally, promoted a new political dialogue between the

Supreme Court and the other branches of government. The newly established com-

petitive party system empowered Gongora Pimentel to position the Court as an

autonomous branch of government and push for the dismantlement of the PRI's

subordination and control. This increase of autonomy allowed him to advocate for

three landmark constitutional reforms during the 1999-2003 term: (a) reforming

the Amparo Law; (b) granting financial autonomy to the Supreme Court; and

(c) granting the Supreme Court the power to present reform initiatives before

Congress.

The Amparo Law Reform

The reform of the amparo law constituted the most important debate of this judicial

term, and of subsequent terms, as well. In 1999, Chief Justice Congora Pimentel

appointed a committee to help carry out the New Amparo Law Project (Proyecto

de la Nueva Ley de Amparo). Through this committee, the Supreme Court invited

judges and other members of the legal profession, academic institutions, and civil

society to submit proposals for the Amparo Law reform. Ultimately, 1,430 propos-

als were submitted by civil society groups, political parties, academic institutions,

and litigants. Most proposals focused on improving the mechanism's effectiveness at

protecting human rights. The proposals were discussed in various forums led by intel-

lectuals and justices, and the outcomes of these debates were ultimately published in

August 2006 in the form of The White Book of the Judicial Reform (El Libro Blanco

de la Reforma Judicial). Supreme Court justices distributed The White Book to

executive and legislative authorities, and its contents were broadly disseminated in

various forums at the federal and state levels. After twelve years of political debate, the

Senate passed the reform of the Amparo Law in October 2on.10 The new law incor-

porates novel provisions to facilitate the filing ofamparo lawsuits by citizens, groups,

and organizations that have experienced violations of their fundamental rights by

state authorities. As such, the new law will facilitate access to justice in Mexico.

7 Justice Genaro Gfingora served on the Supreme Court from 1995 to 2009.

8 Gongora sold this idea to the legislature as a means to promote economic growth and encourage

foreign investment. See his speech delivered in April 2001, "Urge Simplificar Nuestras Leyes" (The

Mexican Supreme Court Speeches Collection); see also a speech delivered in November 2000, For

que debemos invertir en la Justicia" (The Mexican Supreme Court's Speeches Collection).

9 The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, Annual Report, 2000.

10 Horacio Jim6nez y Ricardo G6mez, "Aprueba Senado La Nueva Ley de Amparo," El Universal,

October 13, 2ou.

The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court

Financial Independence and the Power to Present Reform Initiatives

149

In addition to the Amparo Law reform, in February 2002, Chief Justice Gongora

pimentel held various meetings with President Vicente Fox to seek his support

for other reform proposals that would affect the Court's independence. One such

sal concerned guaranteeing the judiciary 3 percent of the federal budget.

president Fox agreed to create a commission to consider Chief Justice G6ngora

pimentel's proposal. This proposal aimed to avoid the cutting of the judicial budget

that had occurred in the past, and to tackle the workload and corruption issues

that plagued the administration of justice. According to newspaper reports, the

chief justice had already secured the support of the hvo opposition parties - the

pRI and Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) - when he began these

unprecedented negotiations with President Fox." In addition, in June 2001 Chief

Justice Gongora Pimentel appeared before Congress to call for amending Article 71

of the Constitution to award the Supreme Court the power to propose reforms to the

Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the Federation and other legislation closely

related to judicial activity, arguing that the Court knew better than any other actor

what judicial reforms were necessary (Staton 2008).

These two proposals encountered strong opposition from political party leaders,

mostly because they were advanced at an inopportune political moment (in advance

ofstate-level elections). Nonetheless, Chief Justice Genaro Gongora Pimentel's lead-

ership is significant in terms of explaining how the Supreme Court began function-

ing as a political actor, seeking legal reform and institutional autonomy. Whereas

pursuing the recognition of the Court as truly a third branch of government, he strate-

gically established new synergies with the Executive and Congress, fundamentally

altering the relationship behveen the Supreme Court and elected leaders.

Justice Jose Ramon Cossw Diaz and His Fundamental Rights

Program, 2004-2007

The 2004-2007 judicial term was the most controversial in the history of the Mex-

ican Supreme Court. On the eve of the 2006 presidential election - which would

be the second most competitive in the country's history - the media reported a

private meeting behveen President Vicente Fox (of the PAN party) and Supreme

Court Chief Justice Mariano Azuela. The two allegedly discussed the political

fate ofAndres Manuel Lopez Obrador, the left-wing presidential candidate of the

PRD.12 The meeting unleashed serious accusations against Chief Justice Azuela and

Jorge Teheran, "Pide Poder Judicial Autonomia Financiera/'E; Universal, June 27,2001; CarlosAvil^s

and Julian Sanchez "Solicita la SCJN a Fox autonomi'a financiera," El Universal, February 2002.

Jorge Ramos> "Desafuero y Azuela, en agenda del PRD," E; Universal, September 22, 2004; Carlos

Aviles, "Legal, reunion con Fox dice titular de la Corte," El Universal, September 22, 2004.

150 Monica Castillejos-Aragon The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court i5i

negatively impacted the Supreme Court's image.l3 Somewhat paradoxically, this

judicial term proved crucial for the Supreme Court's efforts toward incorporating

principles of transparency into its operation through its Fundamental Rights Pro.

gram, championed by Justice Jose Ramon Cossfo. The program included three

facets: (i) judicial transparency; (2) interaction with the legal profession; and (5)

utilizing judicial remedies to increase rights decisions.14

The Supreme Court benefitted from two conditions created during the Fox

administration. First, President Fox appointed four new justices: Jose Ramon Cossio

Diaz (2003), Margarita Luna Ramos (2004), Sergio Vails Hemdndez (2004), and

Fernando Franco Gonzalez Salas (2006). These judicial appointments raised the

quality of judicial debates and changed the dynamic of the Supreme Court's deci-

sion making. Second, President Fox presented to Congress a proposal for a Federal

Law of Transparency and Access to Public Governmental Information. This law,

which was successfully passed and entered into effect on June n, 2002, represented

an opportunity for the Supreme Court to build synergies with the mass media and

legal profession.

Judicial Transparency and Access to Information, 2005

The 2002 Transparency Law expressly mandated that the Supreme Court and Judi-

cial Council adjust the judiciary's institutional structure to the principles and regu-

lations contained in the law. In response, in 2003 the Supreme Court issued various

administrative rules or Acuerdos Generales to regulate access to information stored

in the Supreme Court's archives.^ Ultimately and more indirectly, the law led to

the implementation of other important measures including increased access to judi-

cial decisions (both hard copies and electronic versions), the establishment of a

television channel (Canal Judicial) dedicated to the judiciary, the creation of the

Supreme Court's Web site, and initiation of a public radio station to educate the

public on matters of important social concern decided by the Court.16 In addition,

Chief Justice Azuela, Justice Cossfo Diaz, and Justice Vails created a Committee of

Social Communication to set the rules, procedures, and objectives of the judicial

channel.1? The justices also organized training programs for journalists responsible

'3 Aranda, Jesus, "La Corte debe resolver aun en contra del interns del Estado: Gongora Pimentel," La

Jomada, November 16, 2009. '4 Justice Gossi'o joined the Supreme Court in November 2003, and will serve until 2018.

15 Acuerdo General 9/2003 (May 27, 2003); "Lineamientos de la Comisi6n de Transparencia y Acceso

a la Informacion Pdblica de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion, relatives a la organizacion,

catalogaci6n, clasificacion y conservacion de la documentacion de este Alto Tribunal" (June, 2,

2003); Acuerdo General 12/2003 and Reglamento de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci6n y del

Consejo de la Judicatura Federal para la Aplicaci6n de la Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la

Informaci6n Publica Gubernamental (April 4, 2004).

16 E? Universal, "Inicia transmisiones Canal Judicial," May 29, 2oo6.

'7 Acta Extcaordinaria del Comite de Comunicaci6n Social de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la

Nacion, September 2005.

covering the judiciary in an effort to keep civil society informed of the Court's

,.18 "Going public" in these ways allowed the general public, litigants, and

•ivil society to witness the judicial decision-making process and participate in the

national debate (Staton 2003).

In addition to promoting these institutional changes. Justice Cossfo Diaz empha-

sized the importance of integrating principles of transparency and access to informa-

tion into Judiciary's daily operations, proposing the following agenda (Cossfo Diaz

2005)-19 First, Cossio Diaz promoted a simplified format for judicial opinions. Under

the PRI> the Court issued lengthy opinions loaded with inconsequential transcrip-

tions and legal jargon that were incomprehensible to nonlegal audiences. To correct

this deficiency. Justice Cossfo Diaz proposed the adoption of the Manual of Style for

Judicial Opinions,20 in hopes ofhomogenizing forms of drafting opinions and noting

citations. Adoption of the manual's format resulted in better organized and more

concise rulings that could be evaluated by the general public. This change was per-

ceived by the legal profession and society as the beginning of a new public dialogue

behveen the Court and members of the legal profession. Second, the Court began

to publish its rulings and transcriptions of its deliberations (versiones estenogrdficas)

on its Web site to inform the public about the judicial decision-making process.

Third, Justice Cossio Diaz encouraged the participation of interest groups in the

judicial decision processes through amicus curiae briefs. Finally, the justice invited

litigants, academics, and the media to utilize the new channels opened by the

Supreme Court to formulate well-informed and high-quality critiques as an effort to

build Mexico's democratic society. These institutional changes regarding judicial

transparency dismantled former PRI practices of secrecy and obscurity within the

judicial decision-making processes.

Inviting the Legal Complex to Participate with the Supreme Court, 2006

Justice Cossfo Diaz also launched an immensely influential "legal education cam-

paign" in hopes of encouraging members of the legal profession to work in conjunc-

tion with the Supreme Court in an effort to consolidate democratic principles in

Mexico. In July 2006, Cossio Diaz delivered a presentation before the Mexican Bar

in which he encouraged lawyers to participate in articulating a constitutional theory

supporting the aspirations of the fundamental rights listed in the Constitution, the

first time in the Court's history it reached out to members of the legal profession in

such a way.21 However, Cossfo Diaz also called on lawyers to serve as social engineers,

Capacitacion a Periodistas en Temas Juridicos," Supreme Court Press Release, 2010.

19 Jos6 Ramon Cossi'o, "Un ano de apertura," El Universal, October 13, 2005.

20 "Propuesta para la EIaboracion de Proyectos de Sentencia en la Primera Sala derivada del Consenso

adoptado en la reunion de fecha 12 de Septiembre del ano en curso entre el Ministro Jose Ram6n

Cossi'o Di'az y los Coordinadores de las Ponencias de esta Sala."

"The Role of Lawyers and the Necessity of Building a Constitutional Theory in Mexico" (Cossfo

2006).

152 Monica Castillejos-Aragon The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court I53

bringing claims concerning policy making to the courts. Overall, Cossfo Dfg

highlighted that increasing the Court's fundamental-rights docket and fomentii

rights jurisprudence was a collective responsibility involving justices and the legg}

profession.22 As president of the Court's First Chamber,^ Justice Cossfo Dfaz also

reinforced the idea of strengthening bonds with the legal community and improvii

the constitutional questions posed by its members. Most broadly, he portrayed the

Court not as a mere problem solver but as an arena in which political struggles could

be waged to change the fundamental nature of society by interpreting the scope of

the fundamental rights incorporated in the Constitution.24

Judicial Remedies to Increase Fundamental Rights Decisions, 2007

Despite substantial improvements in judicial transparency and the Court s emerging

public dialogue with members of the legal profession, the Court's fundamental-rights

jurisprudence continued to be weak. To address this ongoing problem, in 2007

Justice Cossio Diaz promoted the Fundamental Rights Program. He also employed

an unusual strategy: using the Court's Facultad de Atraccion (Attraction Power)

to bring fundamental-rights cases to the Court. The Facultad de Atraccidn grants

the Supreme Court the power to hear amparo cases - whose original jurisdiction

corresponds to circuit courts - by request of any justice, circuit court magistrate, or

the attorney general because of the "importance or transcendence" of the case.'s

Once a case is "attracted" to the Court from the circuit court, the justices decide

whether or not the case deserves to be heard by the Supreme Court on the basis of

the importance and transcendence standard.

This power, which is unique to Mexico, granted the Court enormous leverage

(which, for obvious reasons, it rarely used during the PRI regime). After 2007,

the Court used the power to identify "potential" fundamental-rights challenges in

amparo cases in circuit courts across the country.26 In order to effectively track these

cases, on July 3, 2007, the Judicial Council created the Integral System for Tracking

" Justice Cossi'o reiterated this mutual responsibility in his 2006 and 2007 First Chamber's Annual

Reports. 23 The Mexican Supreme Court functions in two Chambers. The First Chambers reviews civil and

criminal cases and the Second Chamber reviews administrative and labor cases. Each chamber is

composed by five justices; the Chief Justices belongs to neither.

24 Informe de Labores de la Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naridn del 2006 and

Informs de Labores de la Primera Sala de Id Suprema Carte de]usticia de la Naci6n del 2007.

25 A legal reform in 1988 originally empowered justices to "attract" amparo cases that deserved to be

heard by the Court because of fulfilling the "special characteristics" standard. In the 1994 legal

reform, the "importance and transcendence" standard replaced the special characteristics standard.

Over the years, the Supreme Court had significant discretion in applying the "importance" standard;

the "transcendence" standard was determined in terms of the case's consequences.

26 "La Suprema Corte atrae asuntos sobre presuntas violaciones a los derechos humanos," Mexican

Foreign Affairs Minister, Press Release, March 2010; "Conocerd la Suprema Corte amparo promovido

par Amalia Garcia Medina sobre el derecho fundamental a la no incriminacion," The Supreme

Court, Press Release, June 2011.

Tudidal Files database (Sistema Integral de Seguimiento de Expedientes; SISE).27

[is database contains statistical data on circuit court cases, including the number

of cases each court has, the challenge involved in each, and the timing of their

resolution. The Facultad de Atraccion has become a major "judicial remedy" that

the Supreme Court has utilized to fill the void of fundamental-rights challenges.

Using this power, the Court has attracted cases concerning people's right to their own

image, children's best interest, due process for indigenous people, protection from

domestic violence, privacy rights and personal data, right to health, and transgender

rights, among many others.

Implementing these various institutional changes succeeded in validating the

Court's transparency and increasing access to information for society. Further, using

the Facultad de Atracci6n (together with the SISE database) represented an inno-

vative judicial strategy to increase the number of fundamental-rights challenges at

the Supreme Court. Justice Cossio Diaz's legal education campaign - for the first

time in the Supreme Court's history - highlighted the legal profession's shared

responsibility in setting the rights agenda and consolidating democratic principles

in Mexico.

Justice Jose Ramon Cossw Diaz and the New Role of the Mexican

Supreme Court, 2007-2010

By 2007, the Mexican Supreme Court's transformation was almost complete: the

Court had promoted synergies with the Executive and Congress (1999-2003), and

with mass media and the legal profession (2003-2007). However, synergies with

support structures (civil society, interest groups, and international organizations)

still needed to be established. The leadership of Justice ]os€ Ramon Cossio Diaz

would again prove crucial to the implementation of significant instihitional changes

that allowed the Court to fully adopt its new role. Indeed, the 2007-2010 judicial

term represented one of the Court's most flourishing moments.

At the beginning of this new judicial term, the Court's strategy was to divide

the judicial calendar by year - the year of transparency and access to information

(2008), the year of society (2009),28 and the year of access to justice (zoio)29 -

in order to cultivate and strengthen bonds with new audiences - the mass media

(20o8), civil society groups (2009), and interest groups, such as the Mexican scientific

community (2010). Further, Justice Cossio Dfaz sought to democratize the judicial

27 Acuerdo de la Comision de Admmistracion del Consejo de la Judicatum Federal, que establece el proced-

imiento de asignacion, certificacion y uso de la Firma Electronica para el Seguimiento de Expedientes

fFESE). Issued by the Judicial Council and published at the Diario Oficial de la Federacidn on July 3>2o°7-

Speech delivered by Chief Justice Guillermo Ortiz in the Inauguration of 2009 Judicial Calendar Year, January 2009.

9 Speech delivered by Chief Justice Guillermo Ortiz at the inauguration of 2010 Judicial Calendar Year,

January 2010.

i54 Monica Castillejos-Aragon The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court i55

decision-making process by launching a rights consciousness campaign. The pri

purpose of this campaign was to reach out to civil society and interest groups to invitg

them to collaborate with the Supreme Court in cases with social implications for

the country. In the past, civil society had minimal opportunity to influence political

or judicial decision-making processes (Blake 1996). Further, distrust in the judiciary

discouraged human rights advocates from seeing the Supreme Court as a forum to

challenge state actions. In 2007, the Supreme Court took various steps to end those

authoritarian legacies and establish a judicial arena in which civil society, litigants

and activists could seek political reform.

As part of this rights consciousness campaign. Justice Cossio Dfaz suggested

new channels through which academic and scientific institutions could influence

the Court's decision-making process, such as amicus curiae briefs,30 public-interest

litigation (Hernandez Areas 2009), and public hearings. For instance, in a lecture

on "Science, Technology and Law," Justice Cossio Diaz underscored how the filing

ofamicus curiae briefs helped bring about social change in the United States. He

also invited the scientific community, nongovernmental organizations, and human

rights activists to work together with the Supreme Court in the construction of

Mexico's constitutional theory.31 In similar forums, Justice Cossio Diaz discussed

the importance of providing law students with training in social justice through

Public Interest Clinics and emphasized the driving force this type of litigation

could represent in fomenting societal change. Successful litigation outcomes in the

newly established Public Interest Clinics at two top academic institutions, Centre

de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econdmicas and Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de

Mexico reflect the positive response of the academic and scientific communities.

THE NEW SUPREME COURT AS AN ARENA FOR POLITICAL CONTESTATION

Beginning in 2007, the Mexican Supreme Court emerged as a critical arena for

political contestation. From that time, individuals and groups have used the Court

as a forum to generate attention over particular issues, and the Court has been asked

to decide technical cases with enormous social implications including challenges

involving unlawful monopolistic practices (Ley Televisa, 2oo-j),y the definition of

abortion,?? gross violations of indigenous people's human rights (El caso Acteal,

3° Cossi'o Diaz, ]os^ Ram6n. "La figura del Amicus Curiae en la Jurisdiccion Constitutional," speech

delivered at the Seminar "Science, Technology and Law," the Mexican Supreme Court and the

Mexican Academy of Science, May 26, 2008.

31 For example, Centre de Investigacion y Docencia Economica (CIDE), in collaboration with the

Prevention and Control Center for HIV/AIDS (Centro de Prevencion y Control del VIH/SIDA), filed an amicus curiae brief on cases that challenged the constitutionality of the Social Security Legislation

of the Mexican Forces.

y "Con expertos revisara la Corte la Ley Televisa," Diario Milenio, December i, 2008.

33 Elsa Conde, "La Suprema Corte ante la Interrupci6n Voluntaria del Embarazo," La Jomada, June 27,

20o8; Marta Lamas, "Justicia y Aborto en MiSxico," El Pais, September 9, 2008.

Vi and even the recognition ofsame-sex marriages and its legal implications.35

all of these cases, the Supreme Court saw an opportunity to open new channels

for societal participation: Justices welcomed amicus curiae briefs and the expertise

gf renowned scientists from the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico and

^e National Polytechnic Institute. The Court also began holding public hearings

\iencias publicas) in landmark cases.36 This new decision-making process distin-

lishes the Mexican Court from other high courts around the world, and constitutes

an open invitation to different sectors of society such as NGOs, political party leaders,

members of the church, and the public in general to participate in the consolidation

of democratic principles.

As a result, since 2007, the Court has received societal opinions about public inter-

est issues, and requested scientific guidance on scientific technicalities embedded

in the language of the law. To give just one example, in 2007 the Supreme Court

debated landmark amparo cases involving the withdrawal of army members because

of their HIV-positive condition, unleashing harsh debate between the liberal and

ultraconservative wings at the Court. This case represented an opportunity for Justice

Cossio Dfaz to reach out to civil society and interest groups and solicit their partic-

ipation in the judicial decision-making process. Acknowledging publicly that there

are cases that exceed the legal knowledge of judges, for the first time in the history of

the Supreme Court, Justice Cossio Dfaz sought scientific guidance on technicalities

embedded in the language of the law. Further, he formulated a questionnaire with

his concerns about HIV and the seropositivity condition and elicited responses from

prestigious scientists and experts of the Mexican Academy of Science. After reading

the answers to his questions, Justice Cossfo Diaz concluded that the seropositivity

condition did not prevent individuals from conducting normal activities.37 This

decision established an important precedent of societal change, and further opened

the door to broader participation in future judicial debates on government policies.

The Court's openness to society also triggered forceful public-interest litigation

from newly established clinics in prestigious academic institutions across the coun-

try. The positive effects of this new societal participation motivated Justice Cossio

Dfaz to advocate for the signing of various collaboration covenants with presti-

gious institutions and organizations such as the Mexican Academy of Science,38

34 Laura Poy Solano, "El Fallo de la Carte sobre Acteal no descarta el crimen de Estado: CIDE," La

Jomada, August 29, 2009.

35 Solicita Ministro Vails Apoyo Tecnico a la UNAM sobre Matrimonios del mismo Sexo," The

Supreme Court Press Release, April 2010; Fabiola Cancino, "La Suprema Corte acepta el derecho de

adopci6n a matrimonios gay," CNN, August 16, zoio.

Reglas Operativas para el Desahogo de las Audiencias Publicas en relacion con la accion de inconsti-

tucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada.

37 Carlos Aviles, "Divide opiniones en la Carte el case con militares con SIDA," El Universal,

February 20,2007.

3 "Asesora la Academia Mexicana de Ciencias a la Suprema Corte," The Mexican Academy of Science

Press Release, November 2006.

156 Monica Castillejos-Aragon The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court 157

the National Medical Academy of Mexico,?9 the National Commission of Medical

Arbitration, the Autonomous Metropolitan University,^ the National Polytechnic

Institute^1 the Justice Studies Center of the Americas,42 Mexican Transparency^

and the National Women's Institute, among many others.44 Further, as part of its

new role, the Court also placed gender issues on the judicial agenda, creating new

opportunities for women to participate in the decision-making process. For instance,

in September 2009, Justice Olga Sanchez and Justice Cossio Diaz - both members

of the newly created Supreme Court Gender Commission - presented the "Diag-

nostic on Gender Equality at the Mexican Supreme Court," and initiated a new

gender project in the Court+5 From that time, the Court has actively emphasized

gender roles in the judicial decision-making process and signed covenants with

women's organizations such as the National Women's Institute,46 and the National

Council to Prevent Discrimination in an effort to incorporate gender perspectives

into judicial activity. The active role of Justice Cossio Diaz and a series of institutional changes imple-

mented under his leadership transformed the Mexican Supreme Court into a space

for political activism and contestation. Since 2007, when the Court institutional-

ized this arena, it has sought to create and capitalize on societal support structures,

providing them with various legal channels and remedies to influence the judi-

cial outcomes such as filing amicus curiae briefs and engaging in public-interest

litigation. All of these changes have allowed the Court to hand down landmark

fundamental-rights decisions. By 2010, its rulings had begun to receive considerable

attention from the academia, civil society, interest groups, and media. In a positive

cycle, media dissemination has had a positive impact on public opinion, foment-

ing further participation in the Court's initiatives by multiple societal sectors, the

executive, and the legislature.

CONCLUSION

Since the mid-1990s, Mexico has experienced a rights revolution. This chapter

argued that legal reform in 1994 and the new competitive party system contributed

to, but do not completely explain, the shift in judicial attitudes toward the protection

of fundamental rights. In order to explain this outcome, we must closely examine

39 (Jrbano Barrera, "Suscribe SCJN Convenio con la Academia Nacional de Medicina," Ovaciones,

February 3,2009. 4° Signed May 2007, Portal de Transparencia, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion-

41 Signed May 2007, Portal de Transparencia, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Ndcidn.

42 Signed December 2007, Portal de Transparencia, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion.

43 Signed November 2007, Portal de Transparencia, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacidn

44 "Fiiman Convenio de Colaboracion la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci6n y el CONAPRED,"

Consejo nacional para prevenir la discriminacion, Supreme Court Press Release April 2010

45 "Presentan Micrositio con temas de equidad y genero en el PJF," Compromiso: The Judicial Power of

October 20og,pp.26-29.

the actions of the progressive justices who made possible the Mexican Supreme

Court's new role as a forum for political activism and contestation. In Mexico, sig-

nificant societal transformation occurred as part of political campaigns advocated by

^gressive justices promoting a new judicial agenda, pushing for judicial indepen-

dence, and inspiring political action. To develop this new role - and a fundamental-

rights agenda in Mexico - justices promoted new interactions and interdependence

between the Court and the other branches of government, civil society, the legal

profession, and interest groups. Doing so helped the Court initiate unprecedented

constitutional interpretation of fundamental rights and freedoms such as freedom

of expression, religious creeds, reproductive rights, gender equality, and criminal

ice.justice.

This research thus depicts a new model of rights revolutions. Whereas Charles Epp

attributes the transformation of courts into guardians of individual rights to pressure

from below, especially deliberate, strategic, organized effort by rights advocates, the

development of the Mexican Supreme Court from 1995 to 2010 tells a different

story. The Supreme Court effectively became a guardian of fundamental rights only

after progressive justices reached out to new audiences and provided them with new

tools and legal channels (amicus curiae briefs, public hearings, judicial remedies,

and public-interest litigation) to influence the Court's decisions. These institutional

changes implemented by progressive justices are central to understanding how the

Mexican Supreme Court became an arena for political contestation: it was only

in the last seven years - when the executive. Congress, media, civil society, and

interest groups acted in tandem with the Supreme Court - that the number of fundamental-rights decisions increased considerably.

The contribution of Justice Juventino Castro y Castro was particularly crucial in

setting the judicial agenda of the Supreme Court in its four post-PRI terms. Justice

Genaro Gdngora Pimentel was central in dismantling former PRI legacies, and

emancipating the Court from the Executive's and Congress's influence. Gongora

Pimentel did so by proposing three key constitutional reforms, including the Amparo

Law (ultimately passed in October 2011), which will facilitate use of that mechanism

to challenge fundamental-rights violations. Justice Jose Ramon Cossio Dfaz advo-

cated for a more liberal reading of the constitutional text, greater media coverage of

Supreme Court decisions, and more participation by civil society, the scientific com-

munity, the legal profession, and interests groups in the judicial decision-making

process. In short, all these justices' leadership proved pivotal in creating a new role

for the Court - as an arena for political contestation.

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PART II

Expanding Judicial Roles in Established Democracies