Government The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations Assignment

Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address" ?Them Author(s): John Kincaid and Carl W. Stenberg Source: Public Administration Review, March | April 2011, Vol. 71, No. 2 (March | April 2011), pp. 196-202 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41061180

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Intergovernmental

Management Symposium

John Kincaid

Lafayette College Carl W. Stenberg University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations

and Management: Who Will Address Them?

Fiscal administrative, andpolitical tensions among the

partners in thefederal system have not eased, andperhaps have grown, since the demise ofthe U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to

address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data

collection, deliberation, andpolicyformulation.

the death of the U.S. Advisory Commis- sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in

1996, important intergovernmental issues have

remained on the country's agenda. Shortly after the

2008 presidential election, forexample, the Federal

Systems Panel (2008) of the National Academy of Public Administration delivered an "Intergovernmen- tal Agenda" to the incoming administration asserting a need to "restructure intergovernmental management across the federal system" on the basis of "collabora- tion rather than command and control." The agenda cited such policy challenges as health care access

(e.g., Medicaid) and cost reductions, housing, natural

disasters, terrorism, energy consumption, unemploy- ment, and infrastructure. The agenda disappeared in

the bowels of the White House.

Yet continuing intergovernmental process issues

deserve attention. These include, among others, fiscal

pressures on all governments; declining federal aid forsuch place-based functions as infrastructure and economic development; escalating social welfare costs

forstate and local governments; increasing condi- tions of federal aid; the proliferation of grants to

more than 900; federal programs designed poorly for

efficiency, effectiveness, and equity; coercive inter-

governmental regulations and federal preemptions; unfunded and underfunded federal and state man-

dates; tensions in state-local jurisdictional and fiscal

relations; impediments to multistate and substate

regional collaboration; the nationalization of state

criminal law; federal restrictions on state and local

taxes; and federal court orders (Kincaid 2008; Posner and Conlan 2008).

The following 15 questions- which are not exhaustive

and do not include constitutional questions such as

those posed by the Patient Protection and Affordable

Care Act of 2010 and by calls to repeal the Seven- teenth Amendment- are derived from the contribu-

tions to this symposium as well as recent literature. In

framing these questions, itis difficult to distinguish

consistently between intergovernmental relations

(IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM). In the main, we take "intergovernmental relations" to

be a term that encompasses all types of interactions between elected and nonelected officials of federal,

state, and local governments. The especially important dimension of IGR is policy making- both lawmaking and regulation promulgation- in which elected of-

ficials and agency heads are important actors. We take

"intergovernmental management" to be a less compre- hensive term, encompassing the implementation and

management of intergovernmental policies. Politics

cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but

the especially important dimension of IGM is admin-

istration, in which nonelected officials from agency heads to street-level bureaucrats are prime actors.

We do not seek to answer the following questions, but rather to pose them, sometimes provocatively, for discussion.

/. Can intergovernmental relations generate more

effective and efficientpolicies and implementation without restoring theprimacy ofthe "governmen- tal" in intergovernmental? The U.S. ACIR was

founded on the democratic premise that elected

government officials legitimately represent the people. The ACIR also was founded on the constitutional

premise that American democracy is federal. The

people's democratic representatives, therefore, are

principally the elected executive and legislative of-

ficials of the nation's general-purpose federal, state,

and local governments, with federal and state officials

each presiding over a sovereign order of government.

Consequently, intergovernmental initiatives should be

formulated and overseen by elected federal, state, and

196 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

Intergovernmental

Management Symposium

John Kincaid

Lafayette College Carl W. Stenberg University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations

and Management: Who Will Address Them?

Fiscal administrative, andpolitical tensions among the

partners in thefederal system have not eased, andperhaps have grown, since the demise ofthe U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to

address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data

collection, deliberation, andpolicyformulation.

the death of the U.S. Advisory Commis- sion on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in

1996, important intergovernmental issues have

remained on the country's agenda. Shortly after the

2008 presidential election, forexample, the Federal

Systems Panel (2008) of the National Academy of Public Administration delivered an "Intergovernmen- tal Agenda" to the incoming administration asserting a need to "restructure intergovernmental management across the federal system" on the basis of "collabora- tion rather than command and control." The agenda cited such policy challenges as health care access

(e.g., Medicaid) and cost reductions, housing, natural

disasters, terrorism, energy consumption, unemploy- ment, and infrastructure. The agenda disappeared in

the bowels of the White House.

Yet continuing intergovernmental process issues

deserve attention. These include, among others, fiscal

pressures on all governments; declining federal aid forsuch place-based functions as infrastructure and economic development; escalating social welfare costs

forstate and local governments; increasing condi- tions of federal aid; the proliferation of grants to

more than 900; federal programs designed poorly for

efficiency, effectiveness, and equity; coercive inter-

governmental regulations and federal preemptions; unfunded and underfunded federal and state man-

dates; tensions in state-local jurisdictional and fiscal

relations; impediments to multistate and substate

regional collaboration; the nationalization of state

criminal law; federal restrictions on state and local

taxes; and federal court orders (Kincaid 2008; Posner and Conlan 2008).

The following 15 questions- which are not exhaustive

and do not include constitutional questions such as

those posed by the Patient Protection and Affordable

Care Act of 2010 and by calls to repeal the Seven- teenth Amendment- are derived from the contribu-

tions to this symposium as well as recent literature. In

framing these questions, itis difficult to distinguish

consistently between intergovernmental relations

(IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM). In the main, we take "intergovernmental relations" to

be a term that encompasses all types of interactions between elected and nonelected officials of federal,

state, and local governments. The especially important dimension of IGR is policy making- both lawmaking and regulation promulgation- in which elected of-

ficials and agency heads are important actors. We take

"intergovernmental management" to be a less compre- hensive term, encompassing the implementation and

management of intergovernmental policies. Politics

cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but

the especially important dimension of IGM is admin-

istration, in which nonelected officials from agency heads to street-level bureaucrats are prime actors.

We do not seek to answer the following questions, but rather to pose them, sometimes provocatively, for discussion.

/. Can intergovernmental relations generate more

effective and efficientpolicies and implementation without restoring theprimacy ofthe "governmen- tal" in intergovernmental? The U.S. ACIR was

founded on the democratic premise that elected

government officials legitimately represent the people. The ACIR also was founded on the constitutional

premise that American democracy is federal. The

people's democratic representatives, therefore, are

principally the elected executive and legislative of-

ficials of the nation's general-purpose federal, state,

and local governments, with federal and state officials

each presiding over a sovereign order of government.

Consequently, intergovernmental initiatives should be

formulated and overseen by elected federal, state, and

196 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

This content downloaded from �������������73.85.161.15 on Sun, 20 Jul 2025 12:44:50 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

local officials. In this respect, assembling these officials (and from

both political parties) in a peak intergovernmental advisory organi- zation made eminent sense. The ACIR reflected the sine qua non of

late 1990s, local governments were relegated, perhaps, to a back seat

in Washington, D.C.

the idea of cooperative federalism. Even though about 63 percent of federal aid is dedicated to social welfare benefits for individuals, which is predominantly a state

However, the rise of "governance" as a theoreti-

cal perspective and empirical reality brought into play a competing organizational dynamic rooted in the private sector. This dynamic reflected disenchantment with government as well as enchantment with the thought of a more porous, pluralistic polity made wiser, more effective, and more democratic

by networks of "governing" organizations in

which government isone among many actors

and in which government officials enjoy no

presumption of primacy, even though they are

the only democratically elected representatives of the people within governance networks.

Furthermore, because the federal government isthe preeminent source of fiscal and regula- tory resources forsuch networks, itis not clear that the governance paradigm even values state

[T]he rise of "governance" as a theoretical perspective and

empirical reality brought into

play a competing organizational dynamic rooted in the private

sector. ... in which government is one among many actors and in which government officials

enjoy no presumption of

primacy, even though they are the only democratically elected

representatives of the people within governance networks.

responsibility, the health of "places" remains vital to the social welfare of all citizens. As a Canadian initiative put it,"We are rediscov-

ering that economic competitiveness, social

well-being, and ecosystem resilience depend, in large part, on collective behaviour in specific

'places'" (Shugart andTownsend 2010, 4). Furthermore, some other federal countries have strengthened the intergovernmental roles of local governments, and several have even

recognized local, usually municipal, govern- ments as the third order of government in their

constitution (Steytler 2009).

3. How will efforts to induce national economic growth and remedy the inter-

governmental systems unsustainablefiscal condition affect state and local revenues

and local officials and, thereby, intergovernmental relations. Given that state and local governments are entrenched constitutionally,

intergovernmental relations remain a necessary- and perhaps, for the paradigms proponents, a lamentably factional- component of

governance, but not a component necessarily valued as a principle of democratic self-government and multigovernmental negotiation to

enhance policy outcomes.

2. Should localgovernments have a moreprominent seat at the

intergovernmental table?Although local governments are not constitutional partners of the federal system, as a practical matter,

they are vital to IGR and IGM. Local governments gained a seat at the intergovernmental table during the New Deal, largely because of their Democratic political clout, especially that of big-city mayors. Hence, federal aid often flowed directly to local governments, and local officials cooperated and competed with their state superiors in the federal arena. Local officials sometimes distrusted state gover- nors and legislators, and they argued that federal funds forlocal, especially urban, needs and the poor would not reach their targets if they were passed through state agencies. This concern triggered a debate, which was addressed by the ACIR, about whether federal aid bypassing state capitals was beneficial or detrimental to federal- ism and public policy, and under what conditions federal aid should

go through the states.

However, three developments largely unseated local governments from being influential intergovernmental lobbyists. First, President Ronald Reagan and subsequent Republican presidents defined IGR as primarily a federal-state relationship. Democratic presidents have been more attentive to local governments, but only insofar as ithas been politically advantageous to do so. Second, after 1987, federal aid shifted sharply from places to persons, significantly reducing federal funding forlocal place functions such as economic devel-

opment, urban renewal, housing, education, transportation, and

government operations. Third, the ACIR was eliminated in 1996. Local governments occupied 27 percent of the ACIR's seats. By the

and services? Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Of- fice (GAO), Congressional Budget Office, Peterson Foundation, National Academy of Public Administration, and others point to

the unsustainability of current federal, state, and local spending. The GAO (2010b) has projected a $9.9 trillion fiscal gap between state and local expenditures and revenues for2009 to 2058 that

could require state and local spending reductions or tax increases of about 12.3 percent every year forthe next 50 years. Under current

policies, the GAO also expects that demographic changes (mainly a

growing senior citizen population), rising health care costs, and defi-

cit spending will require the federal government's major entitlement

programs, plus net interest payments, to consume "93 cents of every dollar of federal revenue" by 2030 (2010a, 6). These projections, if

accurate, have grave implications forintergovernmental programs and state and local finances. In turn, the possibility of reviving a

program such as General Revenue Sharing (e.g., Shiller 2010) is

virtually out of the question.

No agreement has been reached on solutions, although Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and deficit spending have been identified as prime targets forfederal budget reform. Given the

high-profile politics associated with these budget items and the

"sacred cow" status of the major programs, lower-profile programs could bear the brunt of initial cutbacks. For example, discretionary spending forboth place (e.g., infrastructure) and person (e.g., social services) functions carried out by states and localities could be re- duced. Also, the federal government could enact new taxes, such as a national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT). A federal consumption tax likely would place downward political pressure on state and local sales tax rates. Conceivably, the states could be pressured or man- dated to abolish their sales taxes and join a national VAT regime, which would make them dependent on revenues distributed by the federal government from itsVAT. The tax-exempt status of state and local bonds could be reduced further, too. There isa need to identify and measure the possible impact of such federal initiatives on state and local finances.

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 197

local officials. In this respect, assembling these officials (and from

both political parties) in a peak intergovernmental advisory organi- zation made eminent sense. The ACIR reflected the sine qua non of

late 1990s, local governments were relegated, perhaps, to a back seat

in Washington, D.C.

the idea of cooperative federalism. Even though about 63 percent of federal aid is dedicated to social welfare benefits for individuals, which is predominantly a state

However, the rise of "governance" as a theoreti-

cal perspective and empirical reality brought into play a competing organizational dynamic rooted in the private sector. This dynamic reflected disenchantment with government as well as enchantment with the thought of a more porous, pluralistic polity made wiser, more effective, and more democratic

by networks of "governing" organizations in

which government isone among many actors

and in which government officials enjoy no

presumption of primacy, even though they are

the only democratically elected representatives of the people within governance networks.

Furthermore, because the federal government isthe preeminent source of fiscal and regula- tory resources forsuch networks, itis not clear that the governance paradigm even values state

[T]he rise of "governance" as a theoretical perspective and

empirical reality brought into

play a competing organizational dynamic rooted in the private

sector. ... in which government is one among many actors and in which government officials

enjoy no presumption of

primacy, even though they are the only democratically elected

representatives of the people within governance networks.

responsibility, the health of "places" remains vital to the social welfare of all citizens. As a Canadian initiative put it,"We are rediscov-

ering that economic competitiveness, social

well-being, and ecosystem resilience depend, in large part, on collective behaviour in specific

'places'" (Shugart andTownsend 2010, 4). Furthermore, some other federal countries have strengthened the intergovernmental roles of local governments, and several have even

recognized local, usually municipal, govern- ments as the third order of government in their

constitution (Steytler 2009).

3. How will efforts to induce national economic growth and remedy the inter-

governmental systems unsustainablefiscal condition affect state and local revenues

and local officials and, thereby, intergovernmental relations. Given that state and local governments are entrenched constitutionally,

intergovernmental relations remain a necessary- and perhaps, for the paradigms proponents, a lamentably factional- component of

governance, but not a component necessarily valued as a principle of democratic self-government and multigovernmental negotiation to

enhance policy outcomes.

2. Should localgovernments have a moreprominent seat at the

intergovernmental table?Although local governments are not constitutional partners of the federal system, as a practical matter,

they are vital to IGR and IGM. Local governments gained a seat at the intergovernmental table during the New Deal, largely because of their Democratic political clout, especially that of big-city mayors. Hence, federal aid often flowed directly to local governments, and local officials cooperated and competed with their state superiors in the federal arena. Local officials sometimes distrusted state gover- nors and legislators, and they argued that federal funds forlocal, especially urban, needs and the poor would not reach their targets if they were passed through state agencies. This concern triggered a debate, which was addressed by the ACIR, about whether federal aid bypassing state capitals was beneficial or detrimental to federal- ism and public policy, and under what conditions federal aid should

go through the states.

However, three developments largely unseated local governments from being influential intergovernmental lobbyists. First, President Ronald Reagan and subsequent Republican presidents defined IGR as primarily a federal-state relationship. Democratic presidents have been more attentive to local governments, but only insofar as ithas been politically advantageous to do so. Second, after 1987, federal aid shifted sharply from places to persons, significantly reducing federal funding forlocal place functions such as economic devel-

opment, urban renewal, housing, education, transportation, and

government operations. Third, the ACIR was eliminated in 1996. Local governments occupied 27 percent of the ACIR's seats. By the

and services? Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Of- fice (GAO), Congressional Budget Office, Peterson Foundation, National Academy of Public Administration, and others point to

the unsustainability of current federal, state, and local spending. The GAO (2010b) has projected a $9.9 trillion fiscal gap between state and local expenditures and revenues for2009 to 2058 that

could require state and local spending reductions or tax increases of about 12.3 percent every year forthe next 50 years. Under current

policies, the GAO also expects that demographic changes (mainly a

growing senior citizen population), rising health care costs, and defi-

cit spending will require the federal government's major entitlement

programs, plus net interest payments, to consume "93 cents of every dollar of federal revenue" by 2030 (2010a, 6). These projections, if

accurate, have grave implications forintergovernmental programs and state and local finances. In turn, the possibility of reviving a

program such as General Revenue Sharing (e.g., Shiller 2010) is

virtually out of the question.

No agreement has been reached on solutions, although Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and deficit spending have been identified as prime targets forfederal budget reform. Given the

high-profile politics associated with these budget items and the

"sacred cow" status of the major programs, lower-profile programs could bear the brunt of initial cutbacks. For example, discretionary spending forboth place (e.g., infrastructure) and person (e.g., social services) functions carried out by states and localities could be re- duced. Also, the federal government could enact new taxes, such as a national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT). A federal consumption tax likely would place downward political pressure on state and local sales tax rates. Conceivably, the states could be pressured or man- dated to abolish their sales taxes and join a national VAT regime, which would make them dependent on revenues distributed by the federal government from itsVAT. The tax-exempt status of state and local bonds could be reduced further, too. There isa need to identify and measure the possible impact of such federal initiatives on state and local finances.

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 197

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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

4. What designfeatures should accompanyfederal economic stimulusprograms, health care andfinancial regulation reform, and other nationalpolicy initiatives in order tofacilitate more

effective state and local implementation in times ofausterity? Federal responses to the 2007-9 national recession, banking and securities failures, stock market collapse, housing crisis, and soaring health care costs have focused more on money than on manage- ment. While this is understandable, little attention has been given to the implementation of national remedial actions by state and local governments, many ofwhich have reduced managerial capacity in the wake of retirements, hiring freezes, and personnel cutbacks. For example, from September 2009 to September 2010, state and local government employment declined by 1.3 percent, while fed-

eral employment grew by 3.4 percent (Cauchon 2010). Traditional channels forawarding funds have usually been followed, producing delays and distortions, and performance measures have been modest or nonexistent, as exemplified by the sole metric of the American

Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): the number of jobs cre-

ated by stimulus funds, an indicator developed by auditors, not

managers (Posner 2010, 26-27). The success of these national initia- tives is largely in the hands of state and local public administrators

who are operating with minimal guidance and support, whose ranks

are stretched thin, and whose oversight abilities are diminished.

Having an organizational capacity to anticipate and prepare forthe IGM dimensions of national policy making could improve imple- mentation and avoid micromanagement and "horror stories."

The experience with ARRA also suggests that the federal govern- ment has not developed a capacity to provide effective counter-

cyclical aid to states and localities. Generally, ARRA's economic outcomes are consistent with analyses of previous federal effortsto assist states and localities during recessions, which suggest that such

programs are less than optimal because they are not usually timed

well, triggered adequately, or targeted effectively (Mattoon 2009).

In 2005, the Presidents Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform

recommended eliminating income tax deductions forstate and local taxes. Most state and local officials oppose the elimination. This issue has a partisan dimension, though: in 2005, forinstance, the average state and local tax payment in Democratic states was

$7,487, compared to $4,834 in Republican states (Maggs 2005). Because most state income taxes are coupled to the federal tax code, state officials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax

cuts and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues. Federal officials feel no obligation to coordinate tax policies with state and local officials.

At the same time, many state and local governments have been less

than fiscally responsible. The GAO found, forinstance, that tax

increases boosting state and local own-source revenues increased faster than the growth ofpersonal income in 43 states during 1977-2007. State and local general expenditures increased faster than personal income growth in 47 states during 1977-2007 (GAO 2010b). Al-

though most states are formally complying with their balanced budget rules, some are making questionable choices or unwarranted fiscal

assumptions in order to do so. Many states also have exhausted their

"rainy day" funds. It has become evident, as well, that most state and local governments have underfunded pension programs and health

care benefits fortheir employees, placing a potentially huge fiscal

burden on taxpayers in future years. There isa need to monitor the

complex interactions of federal and state tax laws and revenues, as well

as trends in funding commitments and capacities to meet obligations.

6. Shouldfunctional responsibilities be (sorted out" with turn-

backs orpartial de-intergovernmentalization in order to achieve

greater efficiency and effectiveness?Attempts to "divide the job" of service delivery among intergovernmental actors originated in

the early days of cooperative federalism, but effortsto do so have

not been undertaken since President Reagan's unsuccessful "swap"

5. How can state and localgovernments be viable intergovernmentalpartners without

greaterfiscal capacity andfiscal responsi- bility? One characteristic of contemporary federalism is federal preemption of state taxes

through legislation and judicial action usually undertaken pursuant to the commerce clause,

beginning especially with the enactment of

limits on tax-exempt private activity bonds in

1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibi- tions of state taxation of Internet services and interstate mail-order sales are among the most

prominent constraints. In October 2007, President George W. Bush signed a seven-year extension of the moratorium on state and local taxation of Internet access.

A number of states negotiated the Streamlined

Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect taxes on interstate mail-order sales. The agreement was

One characteristic of

contemporary federalism is

federal preemption of state

taxes via legislation and judicial action usually undertaken

pursuant to the commerce

clause, beginning especially with the enactment of limits

on tax-exempt private-activity bonds in 1984. Federal judicial

and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet

services and interstate mail- order sales are among the most

prominent constraints.

initiative in 1981-82. Some observers contend that "sorting out" is futile because of the com-

plexity of intergovernmental management, the

resilience of functional picket-fence silos, the

widely varying appetites for taxes and services

among states and localities, and the lack of

political rewards. Others contend that sorting out is unrealistic because of the complex inter-

governmental interdependence ofmost policy functions. Still others add that "bigger is not

necessarily better."

To these skeptics, consolidation or integration of services and better coordination among state, regional, and local agencies are more

practical and promising ways to bolster the

performance of governmental functions. Yet

these modest steps might not be sufficient. If

revenue constraints and spending cutbacks

prove to be long-term IGM conditions that

cause public officials to fundamentally rethink

implemented voluntarily among consenting states in October 2005.

Although several large retailers comply voluntarily with the agreement,

Congress has not sanctioned the agreement or otherwise authorized

states to require sales tax collections by out-of-state vendors.

198 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

their service delivery strategies, then bold idea federalism studies

could help challenge the status quo and highlight innovations from

across the world forconsideration by federal, state, and local policy makers.

4. What designfeatures should accompanyfederal economic stimulusprograms, health care andfinancial regulation reform, and other nationalpolicy initiatives in order tofacilitate more

effective state and local implementation in times ofausterity? Federal responses to the 2007-9 national recession, banking and securities failures, stock market collapse, housing crisis, and soaring health care costs have focused more on money than on manage- ment. While this is understandable, little attention has been given to the implementation of national remedial actions by state and local governments, many ofwhich have reduced managerial capacity in the wake of retirements, hiring freezes, and personnel cutbacks. For example, from September 2009 to September 2010, state and local government employment declined by 1.3 percent, while fed-

eral employment grew by 3.4 percent (Cauchon 2010). Traditional channels forawarding funds have usually been followed, producing delays and distortions, and performance measures have been modest or nonexistent, as exemplified by the sole metric of the American

Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): the number of jobs cre-

ated by stimulus funds, an indicator developed by auditors, not

managers (Posner 2010, 26-27). The success of these national initia- tives is largely in the hands of state and local public administrators

who are operating with minimal guidance and support, whose ranks

are stretched thin, and whose oversight abilities are diminished.

Having an organizational capacity to anticipate and prepare forthe IGM dimensions of national policy making could improve imple- mentation and avoid micromanagement and "horror stories."

The experience with ARRA also suggests that the federal govern- ment has not developed a capacity to provide effective counter-

cyclical aid to states and localities. Generally, ARRA's economic outcomes are consistent with analyses of previous federal effortsto assist states and localities during recessions, which suggest that such

programs are less than optimal because they are not usually timed

well, triggered adequately, or targeted effectively (Mattoon 2009).

In 2005, the Presidents Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform

recommended eliminating income tax deductions forstate and local taxes. Most state and local officials oppose the elimination. This issue has a partisan dimension, though: in 2005, forinstance, the average state and local tax payment in Democratic states was

$7,487, compared to $4,834 in Republican states (Maggs 2005). Because most state income taxes are coupled to the federal tax code, state officials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax

cuts and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues. Federal officials feel no obligation to coordinate tax policies with state and local officials.

At the same time, many state and local governments have been less

than fiscally responsible. The GAO found, forinstance, that tax

increases boosting state and local own-source revenues increased faster than the growth ofpersonal income in 43 states during 1977-2007. State and local general expenditures increased faster than personal income growth in 47 states during 1977-2007 (GAO 2010b). Al-

though most states are formally complying with their balanced budget rules, some are making questionable choices or unwarranted fiscal

assumptions in order to do so. Many states also have exhausted their

"rainy day" funds. It has become evident, as well, that most state and local governments have underfunded pension programs and health

care benefits fortheir employees, placing a potentially huge fiscal

burden on taxpayers in future years. There isa need to monitor the

complex interactions of federal and state tax laws and revenues, as well

as trends in funding commitments and capacities to meet obligations.

6. Shouldfunctional responsibilities be (sorted out" with turn-

backs orpartial de-intergovernmentalization in order to achieve

greater efficiency and effectiveness?Attempts to "divide the job" of service delivery among intergovernmental actors originated in

the early days of cooperative federalism, but effortsto do so have

not been undertaken since President Reagan's unsuccessful "swap"

5. How can state and localgovernments be viable intergovernmentalpartners without

greaterfiscal capacity andfiscal responsi- bility? One characteristic of contemporary federalism is federal preemption of state taxes

through legislation and judicial action usually undertaken pursuant to the commerce clause,

beginning especially with the enactment of

limits on tax-exempt private activity bonds in

1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibi- tions of state taxation of Internet services and interstate mail-order sales are among the most

prominent constraints. In October 2007, President George W. Bush signed a seven-year extension of the moratorium on state and local taxation of Internet access.

A number of states negotiated the Streamlined

Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect taxes on interstate mail-order sales. The agreement was

One characteristic of

contemporary federalism is

federal preemption of state

taxes via legislation and judicial action usually undertaken

pursuant to the commerce

clause, beginning especially with the enactment of limits

on tax-exempt private-activity bonds in 1984. Federal judicial

and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet

services and interstate mail- order sales are among the most

prominent constraints.

initiative in 1981-82. Some observers contend that "sorting out" is futile because of the com-

plexity of intergovernmental management, the

resilience of functional picket-fence silos, the

widely varying appetites for taxes and services

among states and localities, and the lack of

political rewards. Others contend that sorting out is unrealistic because of the complex inter-

governmental interdependence ofmost policy functions. Still others add that "bigger is not

necessarily better."

To these skeptics, consolidation or integration of services and better coordination among state, regional, and local agencies are more

practical and promising ways to bolster the

performance of governmental functions. Yet

these modest steps might not be sufficient. If

revenue constraints and spending cutbacks

prove to be long-term IGM conditions that

cause public officials to fundamentally rethink

implemented voluntarily among consenting states in October 2005.

Although several large retailers comply voluntarily with the agreement,

Congress has not sanctioned the agreement or otherwise authorized

states to require sales tax collections by out-of-state vendors.

198 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

their service delivery strategies, then bold idea federalism studies

could help challenge the status quo and highlight innovations from

across the world forconsideration by federal, state, and local policy makers.

This content downloaded from �������������73.85.161.15 on Sun, 20 Jul 2025 12:44:50 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Although the federal government has a poor track record of approv- ing turnbacks, they are still worth considering. For example, some observers have long regarded surface transportation (and motor

fuels taxes) as a prime candidate fora federal turnback to the states

(see, e.g., ACIR 1987a). Nothing intrinsic to federalism requires a federal role. In Canada, forexample, since 1867, "the provision of

highways has been mainly a provincial responsibility, with only a small role played by the federal government" (Turgeon and Vaillan-

court2002, 179).

Is education a candidate forpartial de-intergovernmentalization? (Kincaid 1992). Since 1965, the federal regulatory role in K-12 education has increased tremendously, while the federal fiscal role

has grown modestly; yet education outcomes remain unacceptably low, and President Barack Obama acknowledged on NBC's Today Show in early October 2010 that "our per-pupil spending has gone up during the last couple of decades even as results have gone down"

(quoted in McGurn 2010, 10). To what extent has the federal role

increased the bureaucratization, legalization, unionization, and nationalization of education to the detriment of the state- and,

especially, local-specific factors associated with better outcomes, such as teacher qualifications, rewards forgood teaching, principal and superintendent leadership, challenging curriculum, and parental involvement? By contrast, K-12 and postsecondary education are

predominantly provincial responsibilities in Canada (Simeon and

Papillon 2006) and cantonal responsibilities in Switzerland (Fleiner 2006); in each case, the federal government plays small fiscal and

regulatory roles. What other policy fields might be candidates for turnbacks or partial de-intergovermentalization?

Some governors have argued that "a crisis is a terrible thing to

waste." Current economic conditions and fiscal projections might signal an opportunity to reconsider the Reagan swap proposal with

respect to Medicaid. Federal assumption of fiscal responsibility for the long-term care component ofMedicaid would relieve the states

(and local governments in states that require a local contribution to

Medicaid) of a huge fiscal burden. Perhaps the swap could be even

larger: Medicaid and children's health care entirely could become a federal responsibility in exchange forturnbacks of education, trans-

portation, housing, community development, and other human services. Such a swap would be about fiscally even overall (Harkness 2010), although itsimpacts would vary from state to state, the pros- pect ofwhich would generate conflict between expected winners and losers in any swap.

7. Shouldfederal categoricalgrants-in-aid be consolidated in order to reduce overlap, target resources, and improve results? For most of itslife,the ACIR called on Congress to consolidate

grant programs, especially those of relatively small fiscal size, on the

grounds that they are overlapping and duplicative. The rise of block

grants potentially offered elected state and local officials both more discretion and more authority over program design and implemen- tation. However, congressional policy entrepreneurs, working with interest groups and federal agencies, resisted these calls, leading to de facto recategorization ofmany block grants, severe limits on the amount of funds delivered through block grants, and a steady increase in the number and costs of categorical grants, with only two exceptions during the presidencies ofJimmy Carter and Ronald

Reagan. Although the multiplication of grants offersstate and local

officials a cornucopia of choices, italso creates problems, such as

the limited capacity ofmost local governments to access grants or

manage multiple grants, time-consuming grant seeking, difficulties

coordinating grant activities within states and localities, distortions of recipient priorities, and negligible impacts of small grants on

long-term state and local capacities.

There also is a growing need to coordinate grants across federal

agencies such as housing, environmental protection, and trans-

portation so as to promote sustainable communities, among other

things. To what extent are systems performance approaches to policy programming frustrated by a stovepiped grant system, and how can

public officials be held adequately accountable forproducing results

under such conditions?

Ifworsening federal budget conditions make discretionary pro-

grams targets for cutbacks, itwould be valuable to have impartial information about where to begin and what impacts will result. Reviews under the Government Performance and Results Act and Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) provide some data about program effectiveness, and GAO evaluations offeradditional insights, but these are federal perspectives that sometimes fail to

consider state and local management conditions. For instance, block grants have been ranked relatively low in PART reviews rela-

tive to accomplishing national goals, even though these instruments are intended to maximize recipient flexibility in achieving their

objectives and are popular with state and local officials and manag- ers (Radin 2008).

8. How can theflexibility, discretion, and innovative aspects of block grants be balanced against theperformance and trans-

parency expectations ofCongress and thepresidency?As noted earlier, research suggests a mismatch between PART expectations and the design of block grants. Yet there has been no effortto reconcile the conflict between discretion and flexibility for state and local recipients with the accountability and transparency needed by federal officials (Stenberg 2008). At the same time, the

original vision ofmany block grant promoters that block grants would foster more systems-wide planning and programming has, for the most part, not seen the light of day, although the surface

transportation program has moved somewhat toward systems- wide thinking.

Similarly, since the demise of the ACIR, little attention has been

given to the effects of "recategorization" of existing block grants on

intergovernmental management. This trend has been in response to

congressional, federal agency, and interest group concerns about the

priorities and projects chosen by state and local recipients, and it undercuts the intent of this instrument and the spirit of cooperative federalism. The rise of earmarking also has reinforced narrow proj- ect-by-project thinking and, at times, even distorted or contradicted

systemic plans prepared by state or local governments pursuant to

federal grant requirements. An example is the Water Resources Act of 1986, which largely displaced project initiation rooted in river

basin planning in favor of locally initiated projects and congressio- nal earmarks (NAPA 2007). Assuming that one strategy forcutting federal discretionary spending might be to consolidate functionally related categorical programs into block grants, analyses of the rede-

sign features and management issues would be useful.

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 199

Although the federal government has a poor track record of approv- ing turnbacks, they are still worth considering. For example, some observers have long regarded surface transportation (and motor

fuels taxes) as a prime candidate fora federal turnback to the states

(see, e.g., ACIR 1987a). Nothing intrinsic to federalism requires a federal role. In Canada, forexample, since 1867, "the provision of

highways has been mainly a provincial responsibility, with only a small role played by the federal government" (Turgeon and Vaillan-

court2002, 179).

Is education a candidate forpartial de-intergovernmentalization? (Kincaid 1992). Since 1965, the federal regulatory role in K-12 education has increased tremendously, while the federal fiscal role

has grown modestly; yet education outcomes remain unacceptably low, and President Barack Obama acknowledged on NBC's Today Show in early October 2010 that "our per-pupil spending has gone up during the last couple of decades even as results have gone down"

(quoted in McGurn 2010, 10). To what extent has the federal role

increased the bureaucratization, legalization, unionization, and nationalization of education to the detriment of the state- and,

especially, local-specific factors associated with better outcomes, such as teacher qualifications, rewards forgood teaching, principal and superintendent leadership, challenging curriculum, and parental involvement? By contrast, K-12 and postsecondary education are

predominantly provincial responsibilities in Canada (Simeon and

Papillon 2006) and cantonal responsibilities in Switzerland (Fleiner 2006); in each case, the federal government plays small fiscal and

regulatory roles. What other policy fields might be candidates for turnbacks or partial de-intergovermentalization?

Some governors have argued that "a crisis is a terrible thing to

waste." Current economic conditions and fiscal projections might signal an opportunity to reconsider the Reagan swap proposal with

respect to Medicaid. Federal assumption of fiscal responsibility for the long-term care component ofMedicaid would relieve the states

(and local governments in states that require a local contribution to

Medicaid) of a huge fiscal burden. Perhaps the swap could be even

larger: Medicaid and children's health care entirely could become a federal responsibility in exchange forturnbacks of education, trans-

portation, housing, community development, and other human services. Such a swap would be about fiscally even overall (Harkness 2010), although itsimpacts would vary from state to state, the pros- pect ofwhich would generate conflict between expected winners and losers in any swap.

7. Shouldfederal categoricalgrants-in-aid be consolidated in order to reduce overlap, target resources, and improve results? For most of itslife,the ACIR called on Congress to consolidate

grant programs, especially those of relatively small fiscal size, on the

grounds that they are overlapping and duplicative. The rise of block

grants potentially offered elected state and local officials both more discretion and more authority over program design and implemen- tation. However, congressional policy entrepreneurs, working with interest groups and federal agencies, resisted these calls, leading to de facto recategorization ofmany block grants, severe limits on the amount of funds delivered through block grants, and a steady increase in the number and costs of categorical grants, with only two exceptions during the presidencies ofJimmy Carter and Ronald

Reagan. Although the multiplication of grants offersstate and local

officials a cornucopia of choices, italso creates problems, such as

the limited capacity ofmost local governments to access grants or

manage multiple grants, time-consuming grant seeking, difficulties

coordinating grant activities within states and localities, distortions of recipient priorities, and negligible impacts of small grants on

long-term state and local capacities.

There also is a growing need to coordinate grants across federal

agencies such as housing, environmental protection, and trans-

portation so as to promote sustainable communities, among other

things. To what extent are systems performance approaches to policy programming frustrated by a stovepiped grant system, and how can

public officials be held adequately accountable forproducing results

under such conditions?

Ifworsening federal budget conditions make discretionary pro-

grams targets for cutbacks, itwould be valuable to have impartial information about where to begin and what impacts will result. Reviews under the Government Performance and Results Act and Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) provide some data about program effectiveness, and GAO evaluations offeradditional insights, but these are federal perspectives that sometimes fail to

consider state and local management conditions. For instance, block grants have been ranked relatively low in PART reviews rela-

tive to accomplishing national goals, even though these instruments are intended to maximize recipient flexibility in achieving their

objectives and are popular with state and local officials and manag- ers (Radin 2008).

8. How can theflexibility, discretion, and innovative aspects of block grants be balanced against theperformance and trans-

parency expectations ofCongress and thepresidency?As noted earlier, research suggests a mismatch between PART expectations and the design of block grants. Yet there has been no effortto reconcile the conflict between discretion and flexibility for state and local recipients with the accountability and transparency needed by federal officials (Stenberg 2008). At the same time, the

original vision ofmany block grant promoters that block grants would foster more systems-wide planning and programming has, for the most part, not seen the light of day, although the surface

transportation program has moved somewhat toward systems- wide thinking.

Similarly, since the demise of the ACIR, little attention has been

given to the effects of "recategorization" of existing block grants on

intergovernmental management. This trend has been in response to

congressional, federal agency, and interest group concerns about the

priorities and projects chosen by state and local recipients, and it undercuts the intent of this instrument and the spirit of cooperative federalism. The rise of earmarking also has reinforced narrow proj- ect-by-project thinking and, at times, even distorted or contradicted

systemic plans prepared by state or local governments pursuant to

federal grant requirements. An example is the Water Resources Act of 1986, which largely displaced project initiation rooted in river

basin planning in favor of locally initiated projects and congressio- nal earmarks (NAPA 2007). Assuming that one strategy forcutting federal discretionary spending might be to consolidate functionally related categorical programs into block grants, analyses of the rede-

sign features and management issues would be useful.

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 199

This content downloaded from �������������73.85.161.15 on Sun, 20 Jul 2025 12:44:50 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

9. How has the "state" ofstate-local relations changed, andwhat actions might be taken to improve these relationships? Competi- tion forgrants, funding cutbacks, unfunded mandates, and restric-

tions on local authority continue to strain state-local relations. The ACIR devoted substantial research and recommendations to actions that states could take to reduce tensions and strengthen relation-

ships with their local units, including granting more "home rule" or

discretionary authority; devolving more power over functions, per- sonnel, and finances; providing more state grants and discretionary financial assistance to cities and counties; restraining state mandates;

providing compensatory aid forregulations with statewide impacts; assuming greater fiscal and operational authority from local govern- ments forsocial welfare, courts, mental health, elementary and sec-

ondary education, corrections, transportation, and other functions; and creating a state ACIR equivalent to consider state-local issues, conduct research on intergovernmental topics, and provide technical assistance. Although each state monitors itsown state-local rela- tions in various ways, there is a need fora nationwide overview and

comparative perspective on state-local relations in order to discern

trends, spot emerging problems, and disseminate useful innovations.

10. Should incentives or requirements beprovided infederal and state grant and regulatoryprograms topromote greater interlo- cal collaboration? For decades, the structures of local governments in metropolitan areas have been debated, and research has not

confirmed the superiority of the public choice, consolidationist, or

middle-ground positions. The ACIR moved away from a more con- solidationist (ACIR 1982) to a less consolidationist position (e.g., ACIR 1987b). What is known is that local structure is resistant

to change and that federal incentives and requirements have had minimal impacts. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government

provided financial incentives to encourage regional organizations to facilitate planning, provide technical assistance, and conduct

program reviews. Management circulars from the president's Office

ofManagement and Budget complemented these efforts,and several

states regionalized planning and program administration. A few

states offered financial incentives forinterlocal program cooperation. Most of these effortsno longer exist, other than those in transpor- tation, where metropolitan planning organizations are a federal

requirement, and in economic development, where economic de-

velopment districts assist distressed communities in rural areas and small metropolitan regions.

Needs to work across jurisdictional and sector boundaries have grown

(Agranoff and McGuire 2001), but new ways of doing so effectively and efficiently while preserving the people spreferences forlocal self- government have not kept pace. Experiments in collaborative gov- ernance are under way across the country, and itwould be useful to

know more about the successes and failures of these innovations. This

is a good example of the need foran ACIR-type capacity because research on such experiments requires considerable and costly data

collection, which is usually beyond the reach of academics.

//. Under what circumstances are unfundedfederal or state mandates warranted or unwarranted, andwhen andhow should thefederalgovernmentpreempt state and local authority or

provide waiversfor state and local exemptions and experiments? Intergovernmental regulation, including mandates and preemptions, has replaced grants-in-aid as the focal point forstate and local lob-

bying, given the substantial impacts of these regulatory tools on the

flexibility and resources of states and localities. However, the demise of the ACIR, resulting in part from its1995-96 work on federal

mandates, had a chilling effect on studies seeking to assess the ben- efitsand costs of regulatory federalism. One exception to this regu-

latory trend is the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which,

despite significant loopholes in coverage such as homeland security, welfare, and education, seems to have reduced unfunded mandate enactments while also acting as a useful lobbying tool forthe state

and local interest groups and a procedural tool forthe Congressio- nal Budget Office to monitor mandate initiation and fiscal impacts. Few studies of state mandates on local governments have been undertaken recently (although the Pennsylvania Local Government Commission was mandated by the state senate in 2010 to undertake such a study), perhaps because of their politically volatile nature and the decrease in state ACIRs, which sometimes were charged with

conducting such studies. Furthermore, the federal government is, arguably, circumventing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act by

enacting more conditions of aid that are unfunded or underfunded de facto mandates. Given the currently anemic economy and the

dismal long-term financial prospects forstate and local govern- ments, rigorous analysis of the benefits and costs ofmandates would seem to be imperative.

Similarly, preemption is a hot-button issue in Washington, D.C., and in some state capitals. In a global economy especially, debate over whether the nation should have a single national standard or 50 standards on commerce, health and safety,banking and finance, the

environment, natural resources, and many other matters has been contentious. Generally speaking, many conservatives and Republi- cans who once championed states' rights now favor federal preemp- tion in a number of fields; many liberals and Democrats who once

championed federal preemption now oppose itin a number of fields

or support partial preemption in certain policy fields, such as envi-

ronmental and consumer protection. (Under partial preemption, the

federal government usually establishes a minimum national standard to which all states and localities must adhere but allows state and local governments to enact higher, more rigorous standards.)

Another regulatory device, waivers, has become more prevalent since

the ACIR's demise. This executive tool is also politicized. Presidents

Reagan and George H. W. Bush, forexample, issued some waivers,

but they were constrained by Democratic Congresses fearing that

these presidents would deploy waivers to gut social programs. Presi-

dent Bill Clinton faced a Democratic Congress and then Republican Congresses more friendly to waivers, especially in social policy. Un- der Clinton, several Republican governors (e.g., Tommy Thompson ofWisconsin) became national figures by using waivers to reform

welfare and lay the groundwork forthe Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Although waivers

can facilitate innovation, little attention has been given to their con-

stitutional and normative problematics insofar as "[t]hey jeopardize the integrity of the rule of law and potentially enhance executive

power over legislative power . . . pose issues of democratic account-

ability insofar as they are negotiated and implemented by executive

officials outside of floodlit legislative processes . . . raise questions of

equity . . . insofar as they introduce variability in the implementa- tion of law and, thus, equal-protection concerns, and insofar as they

politicize law enforcement" (Kincaid 2001, 22).

200 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

9. How has the "state" ofstate-local relations changed, andwhat actions might be taken to improve these relationships? Competi- tion forgrants, funding cutbacks, unfunded mandates, and restric-

tions on local authority continue to strain state-local relations. The ACIR devoted substantial research and recommendations to actions that states could take to reduce tensions and strengthen relation-

ships with their local units, including granting more "home rule" or

discretionary authority; devolving more power over functions, per- sonnel, and finances; providing more state grants and discretionary financial assistance to cities and counties; restraining state mandates;

providing compensatory aid forregulations with statewide impacts; assuming greater fiscal and operational authority from local govern- ments forsocial welfare, courts, mental health, elementary and sec-

ondary education, corrections, transportation, and other functions; and creating a state ACIR equivalent to consider state-local issues, conduct research on intergovernmental topics, and provide technical assistance. Although each state monitors itsown state-local rela- tions in various ways, there is a need fora nationwide overview and

comparative perspective on state-local relations in order to discern

trends, spot emerging problems, and disseminate useful innovations.

10. Should incentives or requirements beprovided infederal and state grant and regulatoryprograms topromote greater interlo- cal collaboration? For decades, the structures of local governments in metropolitan areas have been debated, and research has not

confirmed the superiority of the public choice, consolidationist, or

middle-ground positions. The ACIR moved away from a more con- solidationist (ACIR 1982) to a less consolidationist position (e.g., ACIR 1987b). What is known is that local structure is resistant

to change and that federal incentives and requirements have had minimal impacts. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government

provided financial incentives to encourage regional organizations to facilitate planning, provide technical assistance, and conduct

program reviews. Management circulars from the president's Office

ofManagement and Budget complemented these efforts,and several

states regionalized planning and program administration. A few

states offered financial incentives forinterlocal program cooperation. Most of these effortsno longer exist, other than those in transpor- tation, where metropolitan planning organizations are a federal

requirement, and in economic development, where economic de-

velopment districts assist distressed communities in rural areas and small metropolitan regions.

Needs to work across jurisdictional and sector boundaries have grown

(Agranoff and McGuire 2001), but new ways of doing so effectively and efficiently while preserving the people spreferences forlocal self- government have not kept pace. Experiments in collaborative gov- ernance are under way across the country, and itwould be useful to

know more about the successes and failures of these innovations. This

is a good example of the need foran ACIR-type capacity because research on such experiments requires considerable and costly data

collection, which is usually beyond the reach of academics.

//. Under what circumstances are unfundedfederal or state mandates warranted or unwarranted, andwhen andhow should thefederalgovernmentpreempt state and local authority or

provide waiversfor state and local exemptions and experiments? Intergovernmental regulation, including mandates and preemptions, has replaced grants-in-aid as the focal point forstate and local lob-

bying, given the substantial impacts of these regulatory tools on the

flexibility and resources of states and localities. However, the demise of the ACIR, resulting in part from its1995-96 work on federal

mandates, had a chilling effect on studies seeking to assess the ben- efitsand costs of regulatory federalism. One exception to this regu-

latory trend is the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which,

despite significant loopholes in coverage such as homeland security, welfare, and education, seems to have reduced unfunded mandate enactments while also acting as a useful lobbying tool forthe state

and local interest groups and a procedural tool forthe Congressio- nal Budget Office to monitor mandate initiation and fiscal impacts. Few studies of state mandates on local governments have been undertaken recently (although the Pennsylvania Local Government Commission was mandated by the state senate in 2010 to undertake such a study), perhaps because of their politically volatile nature and the decrease in state ACIRs, which sometimes were charged with

conducting such studies. Furthermore, the federal government is, arguably, circumventing the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act by

enacting more conditions of aid that are unfunded or underfunded de facto mandates. Given the currently anemic economy and the

dismal long-term financial prospects forstate and local govern- ments, rigorous analysis of the benefits and costs ofmandates would seem to be imperative.

Similarly, preemption is a hot-button issue in Washington, D.C., and in some state capitals. In a global economy especially, debate over whether the nation should have a single national standard or 50 standards on commerce, health and safety,banking and finance, the

environment, natural resources, and many other matters has been contentious. Generally speaking, many conservatives and Republi- cans who once championed states' rights now favor federal preemp- tion in a number of fields; many liberals and Democrats who once

championed federal preemption now oppose itin a number of fields

or support partial preemption in certain policy fields, such as envi-

ronmental and consumer protection. (Under partial preemption, the

federal government usually establishes a minimum national standard to which all states and localities must adhere but allows state and local governments to enact higher, more rigorous standards.)

Another regulatory device, waivers, has become more prevalent since

the ACIR's demise. This executive tool is also politicized. Presidents

Reagan and George H. W. Bush, forexample, issued some waivers,

but they were constrained by Democratic Congresses fearing that

these presidents would deploy waivers to gut social programs. Presi-

dent Bill Clinton faced a Democratic Congress and then Republican Congresses more friendly to waivers, especially in social policy. Un- der Clinton, several Republican governors (e.g., Tommy Thompson ofWisconsin) became national figures by using waivers to reform

welfare and lay the groundwork forthe Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Although waivers

can facilitate innovation, little attention has been given to their con-

stitutional and normative problematics insofar as "[t]hey jeopardize the integrity of the rule of law and potentially enhance executive

power over legislative power . . . pose issues of democratic account-

ability insofar as they are negotiated and implemented by executive

officials outside of floodlit legislative processes . . . raise questions of

equity . . . insofar as they introduce variability in the implementa- tion of law and, thus, equal-protection concerns, and insofar as they

politicize law enforcement" (Kincaid 2001, 22).

200 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

This content downloaded from �������������73.85.161.15 on Sun, 20 Jul 2025 12:44:50 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Much like the State and Local Legal Center has identified pend- ing U.S. Supreme Court cases affecting federalism and state and local interests and prepared briefs to argue itsclients' positions, an intergovernmental organization could monitor trends, conduct inventories of regulatory tools, and collect cost estimates to compare with those provided by the Congressional Budget Office so as to

help Congress make better-informed decisions.

12. How could social equity be better reflected in aidformulas and administrative arrangements? During the past 15 years or so,

equity has joined efficiency and effectiveness as the third leg of the

intergovernmental management stool (Frederickson 2010)- from

the design of programs (e.g., eligibility) to delivery (e.g., assisting elderly, disabled, poor, and non-English-speaking residents dur-

ing natural disasters) .Yet itremains unclear how social equity can be better embedded in the design and implementation of federal

and state aid formulas and management systems, especially in light of Congress's penchant forspreading money around. Geographic targeting has been a weak feature of federal as well as state grants for many years. Despite increases in the number and dollar amounts of grants since the late 1980s, federal aid programs remain small

compared to those ofmost other federal countries; nearly all aid

programs contain no explicit fiscal or jurisdictional equalization or

tax capacity objectives; they remain basically input based rather than

performance based; and they are characterized by increasing propor-

needed of the impacts of these new forms of participation. In what

ways do they enhance and diminish governmental efficiency and effectiveness?

14. What trends have takenplace during thepast two decades in

intergovernmental relations and in toolsfor transacting inter-

governmental business?h valuable service rendered by the ACIR to

researchers, policy analysts, and students was to regularly track the

number and types of tools used to implement intergovernmental programs. This included collecting and interpreting data on general and special-purpose governments, categorical and block grants,

regulations and preemptions, and interlocal contracts and service

agreements. The annual Significant Features ofFiscal Federalism was one of the ACIR smost popular publications. The ACIR also mounted annual surveys (1972-94) of public opinion on federal-

ism and taxes. After the ACIR's demise, the void in this literature

was filled partly by the GAO, Congressional Budget Office, Census Bureau, Rockefeller Institute, and Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism, but there is no one-stop shop forthis information. Many of the new

providers of information do so only intermittently and sometimes

inconsistently, some lack the credibility and policy audiences of the

ACIR, and some information has not been collected at all.

15. Who will answer the "big questions?" In the post-ACIR world, other than a few federal agencies, no intergovernmental organiza-

tions dedicated to people-oriented rather than

place- or project-oriented programs. Some

intergovernmental welfare programs, especially Medicaid, also pose significant intergenera- tional equity dilemmas, particularly as states

reduce funding foreducation, infrastructure, and economic development in order to finance senior citizen programs.

13. How do the new ways to engage citizens in governance affect transparency, ac-

countability, and effectiveness? Thanks to

developments in communications technology, old-style approaches to citizen outreach and

engagement such as public hearings, advisory bodies forfederally funded programs, com-

munity surveys, and citizen advisory boards have been supplemented and, in some ways,

surpassed by electronic government and social media. Citizens now have tools to make direct contact with government agencies, monitor in real time performance data and informa- tion provided to grantors, as well as share their

views on government operations and person- nel through blogs. To this extent, government has become more transparent and accessible;

yet intergovernmental relations have grown more complex and interconnected. Public

managers need help to find ways to untangle the intergovernmental management web and to more clearly explain what their agencies do, who is responsible, and how their capacity to deliver services is affected by "new nor- mal" conditions. At the same time, analysis is

Citizens now have tools to make direct contact with government agencies. ... To this extent,

government has become more

transparent and accessible;

yet intergovernmental relations have grown more

complex and interconnected. Public managers need help to find ways to untangle the

intergovernmental management web and more clearly explain what their agencies do, who is responsible, and how their

capacity to deliver services is affected by "new normal"

conditions.

In the post-ACIR world, other than a few federal agencies, no

intergovernmental organization has risen to provide continual

nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, deliberation, and policy

formulation.

tion has risen to provide continual nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, delib-

eration, and policy formulation. Think tanks

and scholars investigate some of these subjects, but often with limited resources, narrow

foci, or a particular political or philosophical point of view. Yet many people (e.g., Brunori

2001; Harkness 2010) who study or practice intergovernmental relations express the need forongoing impartial or balanced attention to

intergovernmental management issues, as well as to emerging trends and their implications. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) remarked during the debate on the ACIR's final appropriation, "the ACIR does important, if largely unheralded, work. And we stand on the brink of terminating it.This is a mistake, which we will regret . . .without the ACIR, our knowledge of important matters will never be anything more than meager. The action we are about to take will harm our capacity to

govern effectively" (quoted in McDowell 1997, 127).

Was Moynihan right? In the absence of an ACIR-type capacity in Washington, D.C., and in many states, will the "big questions" of IGR and IGM remain largely unanswered or not answerable at all?

As this symposium has underscored, the odds do not favor proponents of a new ACIR-type institution. Perhaps only a truly dramatic

event, one that could prove a significant "game

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 201

Much like the State and Local Legal Center has identified pend- ing U.S. Supreme Court cases affecting federalism and state and local interests and prepared briefs to argue itsclients' positions, an intergovernmental organization could monitor trends, conduct inventories of regulatory tools, and collect cost estimates to compare with those provided by the Congressional Budget Office so as to

help Congress make better-informed decisions.

12. How could social equity be better reflected in aidformulas and administrative arrangements? During the past 15 years or so,

equity has joined efficiency and effectiveness as the third leg of the

intergovernmental management stool (Frederickson 2010)- from

the design of programs (e.g., eligibility) to delivery (e.g., assisting elderly, disabled, poor, and non-English-speaking residents dur-

ing natural disasters) .Yet itremains unclear how social equity can be better embedded in the design and implementation of federal

and state aid formulas and management systems, especially in light of Congress's penchant forspreading money around. Geographic targeting has been a weak feature of federal as well as state grants for many years. Despite increases in the number and dollar amounts of grants since the late 1980s, federal aid programs remain small

compared to those ofmost other federal countries; nearly all aid

programs contain no explicit fiscal or jurisdictional equalization or

tax capacity objectives; they remain basically input based rather than

performance based; and they are characterized by increasing propor-

needed of the impacts of these new forms of participation. In what

ways do they enhance and diminish governmental efficiency and effectiveness?

14. What trends have takenplace during thepast two decades in

intergovernmental relations and in toolsfor transacting inter-

governmental business?h valuable service rendered by the ACIR to

researchers, policy analysts, and students was to regularly track the

number and types of tools used to implement intergovernmental programs. This included collecting and interpreting data on general and special-purpose governments, categorical and block grants,

regulations and preemptions, and interlocal contracts and service

agreements. The annual Significant Features ofFiscal Federalism was one of the ACIR smost popular publications. The ACIR also mounted annual surveys (1972-94) of public opinion on federal-

ism and taxes. After the ACIR's demise, the void in this literature

was filled partly by the GAO, Congressional Budget Office, Census Bureau, Rockefeller Institute, and Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism, but there is no one-stop shop forthis information. Many of the new

providers of information do so only intermittently and sometimes

inconsistently, some lack the credibility and policy audiences of the

ACIR, and some information has not been collected at all.

15. Who will answer the "big questions?" In the post-ACIR world, other than a few federal agencies, no intergovernmental organiza-

tions dedicated to people-oriented rather than

place- or project-oriented programs. Some

intergovernmental welfare programs, especially Medicaid, also pose significant intergenera- tional equity dilemmas, particularly as states

reduce funding foreducation, infrastructure, and economic development in order to finance senior citizen programs.

13. How do the new ways to engage citizens in governance affect transparency, ac-

countability, and effectiveness? Thanks to

developments in communications technology, old-style approaches to citizen outreach and

engagement such as public hearings, advisory bodies forfederally funded programs, com-

munity surveys, and citizen advisory boards have been supplemented and, in some ways,

surpassed by electronic government and social media. Citizens now have tools to make direct contact with government agencies, monitor in real time performance data and informa- tion provided to grantors, as well as share their

views on government operations and person- nel through blogs. To this extent, government has become more transparent and accessible;

yet intergovernmental relations have grown more complex and interconnected. Public

managers need help to find ways to untangle the intergovernmental management web and to more clearly explain what their agencies do, who is responsible, and how their capacity to deliver services is affected by "new nor- mal" conditions. At the same time, analysis is

Citizens now have tools to make direct contact with government agencies. ... To this extent,

government has become more

transparent and accessible;

yet intergovernmental relations have grown more

complex and interconnected. Public managers need help to find ways to untangle the

intergovernmental management web and more clearly explain what their agencies do, who is responsible, and how their

capacity to deliver services is affected by "new normal"

conditions.

In the post-ACIR world, other than a few federal agencies, no

intergovernmental organization has risen to provide continual

nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, deliberation, and policy

formulation.

tion has risen to provide continual nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data collection, delib-

eration, and policy formulation. Think tanks

and scholars investigate some of these subjects, but often with limited resources, narrow

foci, or a particular political or philosophical point of view. Yet many people (e.g., Brunori

2001; Harkness 2010) who study or practice intergovernmental relations express the need forongoing impartial or balanced attention to

intergovernmental management issues, as well as to emerging trends and their implications. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) remarked during the debate on the ACIR's final appropriation, "the ACIR does important, if largely unheralded, work. And we stand on the brink of terminating it.This is a mistake, which we will regret . . .without the ACIR, our knowledge of important matters will never be anything more than meager. The action we are about to take will harm our capacity to

govern effectively" (quoted in McDowell 1997, 127).

Was Moynihan right? In the absence of an ACIR-type capacity in Washington, D.C., and in many states, will the "big questions" of IGR and IGM remain largely unanswered or not answerable at all?

As this symposium has underscored, the odds do not favor proponents of a new ACIR-type institution. Perhaps only a truly dramatic

event, one that could prove a significant "game

"Big Questions" about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 201

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All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

changer" in the dynamics of intergovernmental relations, is required to rejuvenate support and momentum foran ACIR-type entity.

Perhaps the current economic crisis, and responses to it,will have transformative impacts on intergovernmental relations. Leadership from the president and federalism proponents in Congress, support from the Big 7, and advocacy by IGM practitioners and students could greatly enhance the prospects forintergovernmental institu-

tional redevelopment.

Acknowledgments We especially thank our colleagues Richard L. Cole and Bruce D. McDowell fortheir helpful ideas.

References Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2001. American Federalism and the Search

forModels ofManagement. PublicAdministration Review 61(6): 671-81.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1982. State and Local

Roles in the Federal System. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

. 1987a. Devolving Selected Federal-AidHighway Programs andRevenue Bases:

A CriticalAppraisal. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

. 1987b. The Organization ofLocal Public Economies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Brunori, David. 2001. Advice to the New Congress- Bring Back the ACIR. State

Tax Notes, January 15, 189.

Cauchon, Dennis. 2010. Government Workforce Slashed at Local Levels. USA Today,

October 29.

Federal Systems Panel. 2008. An IntergovernmentalAgendafor the Obama Administra-

tion. Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration.

Fleiner, Thomas 2006. Swiss Confederation. In Distribution ofPowers and Respon-

sibilities in Federal Countries, edited by Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and

Douglas M. Brown, 266-94. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Frederickson, H. George. 2010. Social Equity and PublicAdministration: Origins,

Development, andApplications. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Harkness, Peter. 2010. A Grand Swap Meet. Governing 23(6): 14-15.

Kincaid, John. 1992. Is Education Too Intergovernmental? Intergovernmental Perspec-

tive 18(1): 28-34.

. 2001. The State ofU.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis.

Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 31(3): 1-69.

. 2008. Three Faces of Contemporary American Federalism. In The Federal

Nation: Perspectives on North American Federalism, edited by Iwan W Morgan

and Philip J.Davies, 63-81. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maggs, John. 2005. Limping Toward Tax Reform. NationalJournal, October 22,

3280.

Mattoon, Robert H. 2009. Should the Federal Government Bail Out the States? Les-

sons from Past Recessions. Chicago FedLetter,no. 265. http^/www.chicagofed.

org/webpages/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2009/august_265.cfm [accessed

December 10,2010].

McDowell, Bruce D. 1997. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in

1996: The End of an Era. Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 27(2): 111-27. McGurn, William. 2010. Speak Up on D.C. Schools, Mr. President. Wallstreet

Journal, October 5.

National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). 2007. PrioritizingAmericas

Water Resource Investments: Budget Reformfor Civil Works Construction Projects at

the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers. Washington, DC: NAPA. Posner, Paul L. 2010. The Recovery Act: An Accountability Test forOur Federal Sys-

tem. In Framing a PublicManagement Research Agenda, edited by Jonathan D.

Breul, 17-29. Washington, DC: IBM Center forthe Business of Government.

Posner, Paul L., and TimothyJ.Conlan. 2008. Conclusion: Managing Complex Problems in a Compound Republic. In IntergovernmentalManagementfor the

Twenty-First Century, edited by TimothyJ.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 338-52.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Radin, Beryl A. 2008. Performance Management and Intergovernmental Relations.

In IntergovernmentalManagementfor the Twenty-First Century, edited by Timothy

J.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 243-62. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

Press.

Shiller, Robert J.2010. The Case forReviving Revenue Sharing. New YorkTimes,

August 29.

Shugart, Ian, and Thomas Townsend. 2010. Bringing "Place" In- Exploring the Role

of the Federal Government in Place-Based Approaches. Horizons 10: 4-6.

Simeon, Richard, and Martin Papillon. 2006. Canada. In Distribution ofPowers and

Responsibilities in Federal Countries, edited by Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts,

and Douglas M. Brown, 92-122. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Stenberg, Carl W. 2008. Block Grants and Devolution: A Future Tool? In Intergov-

ernmentalManagementfor the Twenty-First Century, edited by TimothyJ.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 263-85. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Steytler, Nico, ed. 2009. Local Government andMetropolitan Regions in Federal Sys- tems.Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Turgeon, Mathieu, and Francois Vaillancourt. 2002. The Provision of Highways in

Canada and the Federal Government. Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 32(1): 161-80.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2010a. The Federal Governments

Long-Term Fiscal Outlook:January 2010 Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office. GAO-10-468SP.

. 2010b. State and Local Governments: Fiscal Pressures CouldHave Implica-

tionsfor Future Delivery ofIntergovernmental Programs. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. GAO- 10-899.

Keep up with the discussion in the world ofPublicAdministration

Drop into ASPA's Blog at

http://aspanational.wordpress.com/

202 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

changer" in the dynamics of intergovernmental relations, is required to rejuvenate support and momentum foran ACIR-type entity.

Perhaps the current economic crisis, and responses to it,will have transformative impacts on intergovernmental relations. Leadership from the president and federalism proponents in Congress, support from the Big 7, and advocacy by IGM practitioners and students could greatly enhance the prospects forintergovernmental institu-

tional redevelopment.

Acknowledgments We especially thank our colleagues Richard L. Cole and Bruce D. McDowell fortheir helpful ideas.

References Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2001. American Federalism and the Search

forModels ofManagement. PublicAdministration Review 61(6): 671-81.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). 1982. State and Local

Roles in the Federal System. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

. 1987a. Devolving Selected Federal-AidHighway Programs andRevenue Bases:

A CriticalAppraisal. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

. 1987b. The Organization ofLocal Public Economies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Brunori, David. 2001. Advice to the New Congress- Bring Back the ACIR. State

Tax Notes, January 15, 189.

Cauchon, Dennis. 2010. Government Workforce Slashed at Local Levels. USA Today,

October 29.

Federal Systems Panel. 2008. An IntergovernmentalAgendafor the Obama Administra-

tion. Washington, DC: National Academy of Public Administration.

Fleiner, Thomas 2006. Swiss Confederation. In Distribution ofPowers and Respon-

sibilities in Federal Countries, edited by Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts, and

Douglas M. Brown, 266-94. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Frederickson, H. George. 2010. Social Equity and PublicAdministration: Origins,

Development, andApplications. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Harkness, Peter. 2010. A Grand Swap Meet. Governing 23(6): 14-15.

Kincaid, John. 1992. Is Education Too Intergovernmental? Intergovernmental Perspec-

tive 18(1): 28-34.

. 2001. The State ofU.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis.

Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 31(3): 1-69.

. 2008. Three Faces of Contemporary American Federalism. In The Federal

Nation: Perspectives on North American Federalism, edited by Iwan W Morgan

and Philip J.Davies, 63-81. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maggs, John. 2005. Limping Toward Tax Reform. NationalJournal, October 22,

3280.

Mattoon, Robert H. 2009. Should the Federal Government Bail Out the States? Les-

sons from Past Recessions. Chicago FedLetter,no. 265. http^/www.chicagofed.

org/webpages/publications/chicago_fed_letter/2009/august_265.cfm [accessed

December 10,2010].

McDowell, Bruce D. 1997. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in

1996: The End of an Era. Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 27(2): 111-27. McGurn, William. 2010. Speak Up on D.C. Schools, Mr. President. Wallstreet

Journal, October 5.

National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA). 2007. PrioritizingAmericas

Water Resource Investments: Budget Reformfor Civil Works Construction Projects at

the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers. Washington, DC: NAPA. Posner, Paul L. 2010. The Recovery Act: An Accountability Test forOur Federal Sys-

tem. In Framing a PublicManagement Research Agenda, edited by Jonathan D.

Breul, 17-29. Washington, DC: IBM Center forthe Business of Government.

Posner, Paul L., and TimothyJ.Conlan. 2008. Conclusion: Managing Complex Problems in a Compound Republic. In IntergovernmentalManagementfor the

Twenty-First Century, edited by TimothyJ.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 338-52.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Radin, Beryl A. 2008. Performance Management and Intergovernmental Relations.

In IntergovernmentalManagementfor the Twenty-First Century, edited by Timothy

J.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 243-62. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

Press.

Shiller, Robert J.2010. The Case forReviving Revenue Sharing. New YorkTimes,

August 29.

Shugart, Ian, and Thomas Townsend. 2010. Bringing "Place" In- Exploring the Role

of the Federal Government in Place-Based Approaches. Horizons 10: 4-6.

Simeon, Richard, and Martin Papillon. 2006. Canada. In Distribution ofPowers and

Responsibilities in Federal Countries, edited by Akhtar Majeed, Ronald L. Watts,

and Douglas M. Brown, 92-122. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Stenberg, Carl W. 2008. Block Grants and Devolution: A Future Tool? In Intergov-

ernmentalManagementfor the Twenty-First Century, edited by TimothyJ.Conlan and Paul L. Posner, 263-85. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Steytler, Nico, ed. 2009. Local Government andMetropolitan Regions in Federal Sys- tems.Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Turgeon, Mathieu, and Francois Vaillancourt. 2002. The Provision of Highways in

Canada and the Federal Government. Publius: TheJournal ofFederalism 32(1): 161-80.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2010a. The Federal Governments

Long-Term Fiscal Outlook:January 2010 Update. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office. GAO-10-468SP.

. 2010b. State and Local Governments: Fiscal Pressures CouldHave Implica-

tionsfor Future Delivery ofIntergovernmental Programs. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. GAO- 10-899.

Keep up with the discussion in the world ofPublicAdministration

Drop into ASPA's Blog at

http://aspanational.wordpress.com/

202 Public Administration Review • March |April 2011

This content downloaded from �������������73.85.161.15 on Sun, 20 Jul 2025 12:44:50 UTC��������������

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms