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Race, class and persistent coloniality: US policing as liberal pacification

Markus Kienscherf Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

Abstract This article argues that US policing ends up maintaining and reinforcing substantive intersecting racial and class divisions, precisely because of its avowed formal neutrality. The article is divided into two main sections. The first section sets up a theoretical apparatus for conceptualising the seeming contradiction between general and specific social control. This section argues that US policing has a colonial genealogy but now serves to reproduce a neo- colonial order characterised by both formal legal equality and substantive racial and class inequalities. Moreover, this section shows that the transition from a colonial to a neo-colonial order has been effected by a change in policing’s strategic focus from classical colonial pacification to liberal pacification, which combines coercion with developmentalism. Through a genealogy of US policing, the second section will demonstrate empirically how US policing’s shift towards a strategy of liberal pacification has enabled and continues to facilitate the (re) production of a neo-colonial social order. Since this genealogical section covers quite a long historical period, it will primarily draw on secondary sources. By developing a more nuanced and finely grained policing-as-pacification model that highlights both the colonial genealogy and the contemporary neo-colonial ontology of US policing, this article helps us better understand how and why formally neutral law enforcement ends up producing and reproducing racial and class divisions.

Keywords class struggle, colonialism, liberalism, pacification, police, race

Corresponding author: Markus Kienscherf, Freie Universität Berlin, Lansstr. 7-9, 14195 Berlin, Germany. Email: [email protected]

815246 CNC0010.1177/0309816818815246Capital & ClassKienscherf research-article2018

Article

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Introduction In liberal capitalist social formations, policing – ‘the set of activities aimed at preserving the security of a particular social order, or social order in general’ – is characterised by a fundamental contradiction (Reiner 2010: 5). On the one hand, state police forces – the primary institution (albeit not the only one) tasked with policing – are viewed as largely neutral, though imperfect, enforcers of existing laws, thus protecting and serving every- body irrespective of their race, ethnicity, class, gender or sexuality. On the other hand, the police frequently single out particular populations, most notably the racialised poor, for much more coercive or even brutal treatment than others. So policing purports to ensure the regularity, predictability and security of a general social order that is said to serve the common interest and that is predicated on the formal equality of the rule of law. At the same time, policing more often than not aims to secure a specific social order marked by substantive inequalities along the lines of class, race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality (Marenin 1982: 258–259; see also Loader & Walker 2006: 172–175). In short, policing in advanced capitalist liberal social formations is torn between general social control and specific social control, which often amounts to class and/or racial control (Reiner 2010: 95).

Whereas liberal police scholarship has traditionally focussed primarily on the largely consensual and legitimate aspect of policing (see, for example, Waddington 1991), a more radical tradition has pointed out its inherently coercive and violent character (see Seigel 2018; Vitale 2017). Yet, any meaningful radical critique of liberal policing also needs to tackle policing’s efforts to produce its own legitimacy and thus also the legiti- macy of the overall socio-political order through the expansion of a rationality of neutral law enforcement that also extends, at least some, police protection and services to the racialised poor. In brief, effective radical critique must not just point out the repressive aspects of liberal policing but must also engage with its productive aspects.

This article argues that US policing in particular ends up maintaining and reinforcing substantive intersecting racial and class divisions, precisely because of its avowed formal neutrality. The article is divided into two main sections. The first section sets up a theo- retical apparatus for conceptualising the seeming contradiction between general and spe- cific social control. Drawing on the literature on contemporary coloniality and internal colonialism, this section argues that US policing has a colonial genealogy but now serves to reproduce a neo-colonial order characterised by both formal legal equality and sub- stantive racial and class inequalities. Moreover, this section shows that the transition from a colonial to a neo-colonial order has been effected by a change in policing’s strate- gic focus from classical colonial pacification to liberal pacification, which combines coer- cion with developmentalism. The second section will map how policing in the US shifted towards a strategy of liberal pacification and how ever more formally class- and race-neutral forms of policing have ended up producing and reinforcing a neo-colonial social order. Since this genealogical section covers quite a long historical period, it will primarily draw on secondary sources.

By developing a more nuanced and finely grained policing-as-pacification model that highlights both the colonial genealogy and the contemporary neo-colonial ontology of

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US policing, the article will help us better understand how and why formally neutral law enforcement ends up producing and reproducing racial and class divisions.

Capitalism, (neo-)colonialism and liberal pacification

Race and class Policing is the product of conflicting public and private demands placed on state police organisations. These conflicting demands are conditioned by societal conflicts. In capitalist social formations, class divisions are a key source of societal conflicts. Capitalist social formations are societies where the capitalist mode of production is the predominant form of economic activity. The capitalist mode of production is characterised by private ownership of the means of production and ‘the generalisation of the commodity form of labour’ which means that labour power can be bought and sold (almost) like any other commodity (Jessop 2002: 12). Private ownership of the means of production and the commodification of labour gives rise to class divisions: a binary division between the capitalist classes who own the means of production and the working classes who must sell their labour power, as well as more finely grained class differences that derive from domestic and global divisions of labour. There are, however, other sources of societal conflicts besides class struggles. In capitalist social formations, conflicts along the lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality and so on, become entangled with class struggles even if they cannot be reduced to them. This article focuses primarily on how US policing has responded to and also shaped racial and class struggles, not because conflicts around gender and sexuality are less impor- tant but because race and to a lesser extent class are the main sticking points in cur- rent debates about US criminal justice.

The ideology of ‘race’ developed as a direct consequence of the colonial conquest of the Americas, where, as Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano (2000) puts it, ‘[t]he conquistadors assumed this idea [of race] as the constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination that the conquest imposed’ (p. 533). In the United States, the ideology of ‘race’ developed through the codification of differences between free and enslaved people in order to justify and reproduce slavery ‘in a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights, and, more important a republic in which those doctrines seemed to represent accurately the world in which all but a minority lived’ (Fields & Fields 2014: 141). From the foundation of the American Republic, racism and class oppression have been inextricably intertwined. African Americans became a ‘race’ because of their oppression, subordination and exploitation – in short, because of their violently imposed class position as enslaved people (Fields & Fields 2014: 266–267). Yet, the ideology of ‘race’ persisted even after the peculiar class posi- tion from which it originally derived was abolished. The ideology of ‘race’ has undoubt- edly undergone profound historical changes but it still serves to justify various forms of racism – that is to say, forms of differential treatment alleged to result from supposed and ultimately fictitious innate differences of the individuals and/or groups who are

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the victims of discrimination. This is what Karen E Fields and Barbara J Fields (2014) call ‘the social alchemy of racecraft [which] transforms racism into race’ so that ‘[d] isguised as race, racism becomes something Afro-Americans are, rather than something racists do’ (pp. 261, 297). Particular populations are thus ‘racialised’ because they are the targets of racism and not the other way around. Even though racism is no longer directly tied to the class position of enslaved people, in capitalist social formations in general and in the United States in particular, racism still serves to reproduce an easily exploitable labour force, to segment labour markets and even ‘to exclude populations from the labor market’ (Grosfoguel 2003: 210).

Contemporary coloniality Drawing on Aimé Césaire’s (1972: 5) idea of a ‘boomerang effect of colonization’, schol- ars have pointed out that attempts to secure social order in the metropoles have long been informed by colonial techniques of control (see Arendt 1968; Foucault 2003: 103; Graham 2010). A number of scholars have noted the cross-fertilisation of rationalities and practices of policing between metropole and colony (see, for example, Brogden 1987; Hönke & Müller 2012; McCoy 2009; Müller 2015). What has, however, not been given equal consideration is the idea that contemporary metropolitan policing may still serve the largely colonial purpose of producing populations acquiescent to existing socio- economic inequities through a targeted application of both coercion and consent along the intersecting lines of class and race (McMichael 2017; Neocleous 2011; 2013; 2014; Steinmetz et al. 2017; Williams 2011 are notable exceptions).

In their article on ‘American Policing and Colonialism’, Kevin F Steinmetz et al. (2017) suggest that ‘contemporary policing in the United States continues to perpetuate systems of inequality and domination that, in many ways, mirror colonial forms of con- trol’ (p. 9). But does US policing merely ‘mirror colonial forms of control’? Or is it a colonial form of control? Is the coloniality of US policing genealogical or ontological? In order to answer these questions, we have to briefly consider what colonialism actually is. Colonialism is both a form of warfare and rule. The term is mostly used to describe both the processes through which an external invader violently conquers a distant territory and subdues the local population and the resultant systems of rule that allow for the exploitation of geography and people (Blauner 1969; Fanon 2004; Glenn 2015; Pinderhughes 2011; Steinmetz et al. 2017). Colonial violence and exploitation were pivotal for the eventual take-off of the capitalist mode of production. In Marxian terms, colonialism was a form of primitive accumulation, a term that describes the expansion and concentration of private property in the means of production. Primitive accumula- tion did not only provide a large influx of capital into Europe, which paved the way for industrialisation, but also violently divested numerous people from their means of pro- duction (primarily the land) (Marx 1887: 506–547). Primitive accumulation occurred both in the colonies and in Europe, but with a key difference: whereas in Europe, the large-scale dispossession of people mostly forced them into wage labour, the colonised were frequently forced into forms of unpaid labour. However, through the global expan- sion of the capitalist mode of production, colonial forms of unpaid labour were articu- lated ‘around the capitalist wage-labor relation’ (Quijano 2000):

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This articulation was constitutively colonial, based first on the assignments of all forms of unpaid labor to colonial races […]. Second, labor was controlled through the assignment of salaried labor to the colonizing whites. (p. 539)

The adjective ‘primitive’ (from the German ursprünglich) implies that the violent dispossession of people was merely capitalism’s original sin. What is more, colonialism is widely held to have ended with the independence of most former colonies. Yet, a number of scholars argue that coloniality persists despite the abolition of colonial forms of labour control and the independence of former colonies (Grosfoguel 2003; Pinderhughes 2011; Quijano 2000). A hierarchical division of labour along the lines of race and ethnicity established through colonialism ‘continues to be an integral part of the contemporary global division of labour even after independence and the global expansion of the capital- ist wage-labour relation’ (Grosfoguel 2003: 146). In fact, ‘the entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes with a racial/ethnic hierarchy and its derivative classifications of superior/inferior, developed/undeveloped, and civilized/barbarian people’ constitutes a global coloniality even in the absence of any formal colonial system of rule (Grosfoguel 2003: 17; see also Quijano 2000).

This ‘entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes with a racial/ethnic hierar- chy’ also marks the domestic situation in the United States as profoundly colonial. US scholars and activists developed the concept of internal colonialism to explain the persis- tence of racial oppression after the end of settler colonisation and the abolition of chattel slavery (Allen 1969, 2005; Blauner 1969; Pinderhughes 2011). The concept came into its own during the civil rights struggle and rising Black militancy in the 1960s but lost importance after the more radical wings of the civil rights movement either fizzled out or were destroyed by the state. In 2005, Robert L Allen, one of the most prominent propo- nents of the internal colonialism theory, revisited the arguments he made in his seminal 1969 book Black Awakening in Capitalist America. In this article, he argues that the political successes of the civil rights movement gave rise to a neo-colonial logic of indirect rule where a small assimilated Black professional class increasingly governs African Americans in the interests of the White capitalist power structure (Allen 2005: 5–6; see also Pinderhughes 2011: 249). However, as we will see in the next section, a neo-colonial logic of indirect rule evolved well before the onset of mass urban rebellion in the 1960s. Since at least the 1920s, this has been the position of northern urban liberals (Miller 2015). This position manifested itself in efforts to manage social conflict without addressing its underlying political-economic causes, but thus also entailed an extension of rights and limited self-governance to African Americans. In short, this was a domestic variant of developmentalism – developing a capacity for self-governance in at least a small group of the colonised so that they can govern their own populations while repro- ducing the overall ‘entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes with a racial/ethnic hierarchy’ (Grosfoguel 2003: 17); in brief, social peace without social justice.

So, although African Americans (as well as other racialised groups who are considered citizens) now have formally equal rights, although there now is a sizable Black profes- sional class and although the United States elected its first Black president, a racial and ethnic hierarchy that intersects with and is exacerbated by massive class divisions remains firmly in place. In the United States, the racialised poor thus still find themselves in a

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colonial situation. Yet, this situation should be termed neo-colonial in order to highlight both the ruptures (abolition of colonial labour control, granting of formally equal rights, some forms of self-rule etc.) and the continuities (racial/ethnic division of labour, persis- tence of racism) between classical colonialism and its contemporary liberal variant. I thus have to disagree with Viviane Saleh-Hanna’s (2008: 17–18) and (Steinmetz et al. 2017, 11n) rejection of the term neo-colonial. Even if the techniques of control used for (re-)producing a neo-colonial situation are not new and clearly derive from classical colonialism, they are still deployed under conditions that have undoubtedly changed partly due to the large-scale global contestations of the colonised in the latter half of the 20th century. This is why it is important to distinguish between a colonial geneal- ogy and a neo-colonial ontology when it comes to US policing. Western liberal polic- ing in general has a clear colonial genealogy because many of the techniques used for securing the domestic social order derive from colonial experience. Yet, contemporary US policing in particular – and this may well also hold for policing in other national territories as well as for international forms of policing (see Ryan 2013) – deploys these techniques under new ontological conditions, primarily formal legal equality and the absence of colonial forms of labour control.

In short, classical colonialism was primarily about the expropriation, subordination and exploitation of racialised populations, whereas with today’s liberal neo-colonialism, the idea of development has become more important. Ironically, through attempts at development oppression, subordination and exploitation have become less visible but perhaps also more entrenched. Globally, the rise of liberal developmentalism happened in the context of decolonisation struggles and Cold War rivalry. Within the United States, neo-colonial developmentalism arose in response to the civil rights struggle and geopolitical concerns about the international image of the United States. The next sec- tion will show that liberal pacification became the key strategy for developing and inte- grating racialised populations while reproducing a colonial racial and class hierarchy.

Liberal pacification Liberalism emerged as a critique of the logic of police along the lines of political econ- omy and the rule of law. Police or police science, which arose across Europe with the breakdown of feudalism, covered a much broader field than what we now understand by the term police. The central concerns of police were to ensure that resources were allo- cated in such a way as to increase prosperity and hence also the strength of the state as well as to promote the general happiness of the population (Neocleous 2000: 11–21; see also Foucault 2007: 311–332). First of all, through the ‘discovery’ of political economy in the 18th century, prosperity came to be seen as the product of the generalised pursuit of private interest rather than as the effect of state regulation. Second, the 18th century also saw a major shift in ideas about general happiness. Philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant, asked whether a sovereign should (or even could) promote general happiness as he (or, perhaps more unlikely, she) saw fit. Ultimately, this gave rise to the liberal principle of the rule of law and the argument that sovereignty should be limited to protecting security and freedom so that everyone could freely pursue their own happiness (Neocleous 2000: 22–30). However, the supposed neutrality and formal equality of the rule of law

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also generalised and legitimated the substantively unequal distribution of private prop- erty in the means of production which was brought about by primitive accumulation.

Liberalism thus sought to demarcate a socio-economic sphere of autonomous human activity (civil society and the market) from the political sphere which came itself to be seen as the product of the convergence of the political interests of individual autonomous subjects. At the same time, liberal political thought constantly problematised the human capacity for autonomy, for not everybody was considered equally capable of responsible self-governance. Women, children, colonial subjects and the domestic undeserving poor were frequently seen as either incapable of self-governance or as not yet able to exercise their autonomy in a responsible manner (Dean 2000; Rasmussen 2011). Liberal govern- ment through freedom has thus always depended on a specifically liberal form of polic- ing. Liberal policing has sought to control those subjects who were deemed incapable of doing so themselves and to (often coercively) promote the capacity for responsible self- governance of those who were held to not yet possess it. In fact, liberal policing rests on a binary distinction, between safely autonomous subjects and subjects whose excess of autonomy is viewed as a threat as well as a hierarchy of liberal development. Liberal policing thus hinges both on a temporal scale of development, of becoming liberal, and on a spatial distinction between safe and dangerous subjects.

The combination of a rigid binary with a developmental hierarchy also indicates the coloniality of liberal policing. For, according to Quijano (2000: 552–553), the articulation of a rigid binary between primitive and civilised upon a developmental hierarchy that ranges from the state of nature to European modernity is also one of the hallmarks of colo- nial Eurocentrism. Indeed, liberal policing was profoundly shaped by colonial experiences. Not only did the denial of colonised subjects’ capacity for self-governance provide a con- venient legitimation for their expropriation, oppression and exploitation but the actual experience of producing and ruling colonised subjects also helped develop and perfect techniques for coercively regulating the behaviour of domestic ‘problem’ populations.

Indeed, classical liberal political thinkers frequently justified colonial domination by referring to what they saw as irreducible racial differences preventing the colonised from governing themselves in a responsible manner (the domestic poor were also often por- trayed in racialised terms). But with the expansion of the capitalist mode of production and its need for ‘free’ labour, essentialist conceptions of autonomy began to shift towards more relational markers of autonomy (without ever being fully replaced by them). The level of capacity for self-governance has come to be decided by one’s relation to the mar- ket, by one’s market utility, by one’s ability and willingness to freely sell one’s labour power. Yet, these market-based ascriptions of autonomy still reproduce the legacy of racial domination and also produce new forms of inequality. It is no coincidence that populations whose autonomy has traditionally been put into question are now widely seen as failing the test of the market. The economic plight of African Americans, their supposed reliance on welfare and their overrepresentation in the prison population thus give a new purportedly colour-blind inflection to traditional forms of racism that denied them their capacity for responsible self-governance on purely racial grounds. It is precisely around the perceived (in)capacity for self-governance, now primarily structured by notions of market competitiveness, that class and race intersect and mutually rein- force one another. The political economy that took shape against the background of the

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protracted crisis of the 1970s, which came to known as neoliberalism, prompted a down- wards pressure on wages, a decreasing demand for unskilled and semiskilled labour and a retrenchment of welfare. This had a disproportionate effect on African Americans. Neoliberalism has, thus, produced a criminalised sub-proletarian surplus population whose irresponsible autonomy is viewed as an obstacle to capital accumulation. Consequently, contemporary US policing serves to incapacitate those members of this sub-proletarian surplus population whose excessive autonomy is seen as dangerous, while – as somewhat of an afterthought – trying to coercively integrate those members of this population who are still considered worthy of showing their responsible autonomy through participation in the lowest rungs of the labour market.

So, the decline of essentialised ideas about autonomy, which was brought about both by changes in capital accumulation and through political contestations of the oppressed, also necessitated the need for more developmentalist interventions in order to develop autonomy while still reproducing both the overall capitalist mode of production and its racial and class hierarchies.

And this is where liberal policing comes in. Liberal policing aims to develop auton- omy in those who are deemed incapable of responsible self-governance, to remove obsta- cles to responsible self-governance and to eradicate forms of autonomy that are considered dangerous.

Liberal policing is thus engaged in what I call liberal pacification – a strategy for pro- ducing and reproducing populations capable of responsible self-governance through the selective and differentially targeted application of a combination of coercion, support and consent. It is perhaps no coincidence that the term pacification as well as the set of practices it denotes emerged in the same context as the ideology of ‘race’, namely, during the Spanish colonial conquest of America in the late 16th century (Neocleous 2011: 198). The coercive ordering of unruly, risky, dangerous and, more often than not, racial- ised populations through techniques of pacification has ever since been one of the key concerns of colonial policing/warfighting and continues to be a major concern for Western counterinsurgents (see, for example, US Department of the Army 2014). In brief, as Mark Neocleous has pointed out, pacification has been one of the central tech- nologies of colonialism and continues to be a key strategy for reproducing ‘wage labour as the grounds for accumulation’ (Neocleous 2013: 25).

However, the transition from classical colonialism based on ‘mere’ expropriation and oppression to a neo-colonial global and domestic order that combines formal legal equal- ity with substantive class/racial inequalities calls for a more nuanced conception of paci- fication. Indeed, the principle of liberal legal equality, which is after all based on notions of autonomy, figures prominently in contemporary liberal pacification, because liberal pacification also seeks to develop its targets’ capacities for responsible liberal self-govern- ance. Liberal pacification rose to prominence during post-WWII struggles for national liberation. The strategy of liberal pacification, which became a central component of Western counterinsurgency doctrines from the 1960s, seemed to offer a solution to the problem of developing the colonies’ capacities for self-governance in such a way as to secure their continuous availability for capitalist exploitation and geo-strategic domina- tion in the absence of direct rule. Liberal pacification ought to be understood as a fusion of security and development – to secure Western geo-strategic and geo-economic inter- ests while developing indigenous capacities for responsible self-governance in order to

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unevenly integrate colonial populations into the global circuits of capital accumulation (Duffield 2010; Kienscherf 2013; Shafer 1988). However, although liberal pacification came into its own at the cusp of decolonisation after WWII, it has a much deeper geneal- ogy based in classic colonialism and domestic class struggle. Attempts to civilise or mod- ernise colonies was also a key goal of Western colonial powers, above all France and Britain, during the 19th century. And so were strategies of indirect rule through local strongmen in the all-too-frequent case that grand civilising missions failed in the face of stiff local resistance (see Porch 2013). What is more, throughout the 19th century, rising working-class militancy across Western metropoles also prompted the need for political strategies that combined the integration of the working classes into the social order through development (granting rights, welfare etc.) with efforts to secure the existing capitalist class structure (Owens 2015).

What is important to note is that in liberal pacification, the actual on-the-ground blend of security and development ultimately depends on the level and organisation of local resistance and on the specific politico-economic interests of the dominant classes. In short, liberal pacification is a technology of ordering that can be summarised as social peace without social justice because it addresses only those grievances that do not ques- tion any fundamental structural inequities.

Pacification deploys reasonable and/or minimum necessary force as one of its key tac- tics. Ryan (2013) suggests that reasonable force, which is ‘a mode of persuasion where force stands as a defensive line behind the progress of reasonable argument’ is ontological to police power (p. 435). He further argues that ‘police power ultimately aims to produce coherent, self-governing rational actors who perform productively in […] a globalized raison d’etat’ (p. 456). Since the use of force by anybody who does not wield police power is thus always construed as illegitimate and unreasonable, it becomes ‘the more reasonable […] for police to move up the scale of violence in its reaction’ (p. 456). So, ‘what is reason- able has become what is necessary’ (p. 443). In fact, minimum necessary force is one of the central principles governing the liberal use of violence (Kienscherf 2016: 1185). Minimum necessary force is the exact amount of force that is seen as reasonable in a par- ticular situation. The more unreasonable the targets of liberal force appear, for example because of their militant or even armed resistance against an oppressive and exploitative neo-colonial situation, the more force can be used against them. Minimum necessary force is what ultimately enables liberal pacification’s other forms of reasonable force that seek to produce more pliable subjects without any actual use of force.

The next section will use the analytic of liberal pacification to highlight how in the United States ever more formally class- and race-neutral forms of policing have ended up producing and reinforcing a neo-colonial social order marked by substantive inequalities along the intersecting lines of race and class.

US policing as liberal pacification

Patrolling racial lines From its beginnings as a White settler colony, the United States has been riven by drastic racial and class divisions. The contours of this racialised and class-based social order have undoubtedly changed (both on the basis of shifts in capital accumulation and through

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contestation from below), but the institution of chattel slavery has left indelible marks on the US social order and thus also on the institution of the police. Chattel slavery constituted a classical colonial order defined by the brutal subordination and oppression of enslaved people for the purpose of coercively extracting their labour power. Slavery, moreover, was entangled with international systems of banking, insurance and credit and also contributed to the rise of industrialisation, first in Britain and later in the American north (Baptist 2014; Oakes 2016). The size of the slave population was considered a massive social control problem. The threat of slave insurrection and the constant risk of slave flight led to the emergence of ever more formalised slave patrols. The first slave patrols were formed in the 17th century and were informal bands of volunteers tasked with recapturing runaway slaves. In the course of the 18th century, slave patrols became more organised and were also charged with preventing insurrection. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 gave state governments wide-ranging authority to recruit individuals – espe- cially poor Whites – into slave patrols that now had almost unlimited coercive powers over the slave population. Slave patrols were tasked with the routine surveillance of the slave population in order to regulate and manage their movement according to the polit- ico-economic imperatives of chattel slavery (Bass 2001: 159; Brucato 2014: 38–39). In fact, slave patrols were a significant strand in the genealogy of the US police (Bass 2001; Brucato 2014; Hadden 2001).

Brutal efforts to control the movement and hence also the labour power of the Black population continued after the abolition of slavery. There was, however, a brief interlude during which the federal government tried to turn freed people into citizens and autono- mous wage labourers through the establishment of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, better known as the Freedmen’s Bureau. The Freedmen’s Bureau was set up towards the end of the Civil War in March 1865 to provide immediate relief to freed people as well as to poor Whites uprooted by the war, but its mission quickly expanded to a large-scale and often contradictory effort to protect freed people’s civil and political rights, to revive agricultural production in the South and to turn former slaves into free wage labourers (often on the same plantations they used to work on as slaves) (Goldberg 2007: 31–75). The Freedmen’s Bureau can be understood as an early, albeit ultimately failed, attempt at liberal pacification which sought to develop African Americans’ capacity for self-governance in order to integrate them into a Northern capi- talist order as both citizens and self-dependent but docile wage labourers. Despite its chequered track record, the Freedmen’s Bureau started from the assumption that African Americans were at least potentially capable of responsible self-governance. This is per- haps why W.E.B. Du Bois (2007: 179) praised the Bureau as ‘the most extraordinary and far-reaching institution of social uplift that America has ever attempted’, despite the fact that it also frequently served as an instrument for disciplining Black labour (Goldberg 2007: 40–42). The Bureau’s efforts to develop African Americans while also protecting them from continuing White violence did not go down well with Southern Whites who ultimately succeeded in swaying Congress to terminate the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1872.

Immediately after the end of the Civil War, most Southern states replaced their Slave Codes with the so-called Black Codes which were aimed to severely restrict the freedom of former slaves and maintain them in a state of quasi-slavery through extremely low wages, debt peonage as well as numerous sweeping vagrancy statutes. After mounting

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criticism from Northern States, increasing legal pressure from the Congress and 11 years of direct military administration of the Southern States, the Black Codes were replaced by Jim Crow in 1877. The Jim Crow laws contained many provisions that were fre- quently as, if not more, sweeping than the original Black Codes. As Sandra Bass (2001) puts it, ‘Essentially, African Americans lived in a police state in which every aspect of shared public life was proscribed. Formal police organizations under this system were responsible for upholding the formal and informal social order’ (p. 161). Besides man- dating strict racial segregation and brutally punishing any infraction against Whites, Jim Crow laws also ensured African Americans continuing availability as docile and easily exploitable agricultural labour through debt peonage and convict leasing. What is more, this brutal colonial regime of racist oppression and exploitation was ultimately backed up by both legal and extra-legal violence in the forms of lynchings (Marable 1983: 108–121).

Pacifying class struggle The first urban police force in the United States was founded in New York in 1845 and was closely modelled on the famous London Metropolitan Police (Miller 1999; Monkkonen 1981). The idea of a uniformed urban police force was also a product of colonialism. When British Home Secretary Robert Peel set up the Metropolitan Police of London in 1829, he drew heavily on his earlier experiences as Chief Secretary of Ireland (1812–1818). During his time in Ireland, Peel realised that an external military force was ill-suited to pacifying a poor and rebellious colonial population. This led to experimenta- tion with ‘a new kind of bureaucracy, located in a social space midway between an out- side military force and the group of people to be controlled’ – the Irish Constabulary (Monkkonen 1981: 39). A bureaucracy that was modelled on the military but not (quite) a military force itself and whose frontline troops were recruited from the population to be controlled also offered a more legitimate and thus ultimately more effective way of pacifying metropolitan working-class militancy.

Indeed, one of the key tasks of early US urban police forces was to pacify class strug- gles as well as intra-class ethnic conflicts brought about by rapid industrialisation, urban- isation and immigration in many Northern and Midwestern cities (Harring 2017; Vitale 2017; Williams 2015). Early municipal police forces also provided important services to the communities they controlled. In fact, many urban police forces ran soup kitchens, gave shelter to the homeless and searched for lost children (Monkkonen 1981: 86–128). As Sidney L Harring (2017) notes, ‘the police institution gains legitimacy when it makes some accommodation to the communities being policed’ (p. 16). In short, through a combination of coercion and support 19th century urban policing helped produce, rein- force and ultimately legitimate a capitalist social formation based on class subordination and exploitation.

Early urban police forces were rather decentralised, poorly trained and engaged in many off-the-books activities. In fact, throughout the 19th century, cops frequently acted as enforcers for corrupt ward bosses and political machines (Chriss 2011: 28–32). As many police scholars have it, the progressive era, starting in the 1890s, marked the end of the so-called political spoils era of American policing (Chriss 2011; Kelling &

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Moore 1988). Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, police departments came to be organised along more bureaucratic lines, adopted more militarised command and control structures, introduced new technologies and professionalised police training. The progressive era also saw increasing police specialisation. Police began to fashion themselves as professional law enforcers. Progressive-era police reform also had a clear colonial pedigree. Historian Alfred McCoy (2009) shows how the colonial occupation of the Philippines in the late 19th and early 20th centuries prompted numerous innova- tions in the fields of policing, intelligence, counterintelligence and surveillance, many of which were reimported into US domestic policing, eventually giving rise to what he calls ‘the surveillance state’. McCoy argues that the police apparatus created by the American army in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th century ‘was far more advanced’ than contemporaneous US domestic police forces (p. 61). Many of the policing practices honed in the colonial Philippines were brought back into the United States by colonial veterans whose racial frame of reference often made them view America’s ‘ethnic com- munities not as fellow citizens but as internal colonies requiring coercive controls’ (McCoy 2009: 294).

According to Harring (2017), the sweeping reforms of US municipal police depart- ments towards the beginning of the 20th century occurred primarily in response to a growing need to pacify escalating class struggles. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, an increasing number of large-scale strikes led to calls for an expansion and centralisation of police departments. On the other hand, there were also heightened concerns over police corruption as well as a more general trend towards the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of urban governance. Surely, the focus on depoliti- cised, bureaucratic, centralised and purportedly neutral law enforcement also served to make police departments more legitimate in the eyes of the working classes (Harring 2017: 232). At the same time, law enforcement afforded an opportunity extensively to intervene in the lives of working-class people, patrolling the line between independent workers and the dependent, criminalised poor. More often than not this occurred through the enforcement of sweeping vagrancy statutes that were modelled on or even directly taken over from what Marx (1887: 522) called ‘a bloody legislation against vaga- bondage’ that was enacted throughout Western Europe form the 15th century in order to crack down on people who were forcibly dispossessed through primitive accumulation (see also Adler 1989; Chambliss 1964). Until the Supreme Court declared them uncon- stitutional at the beginning of the 1970s, vagrancy laws afforded the police a lot of legal leeway to come down hard on undesirables:

Armed with a roving license to arrest, officials employed vagrancy laws for a breath-taking array of purposes: to force the local poor to work or suffer for their support; to keep out poor or suspicious strangers, to suppress differences that might be dangerous; to stop crimes before they were committed; to keep racial minorities, political troublemakers, and nonconforming rebels at bay. (Goluboff 2016: 2–3)

Police reform thus served to generalise and legitimate class control through an exten- sion of rationalities and practices of enforcing formally neutral laws which in practice only particular groups of people happened to be in violation of. Even though laws

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directed against status-type offences such vagrancy have been declared unconstitutional, they have now increasingly been replaced by civility codes that target behaviours rather than status. But more often than not these happen to be types of behaviour, such as sleeping outdoors, drinking and urinating in public, the racialised poor are more likely to engage in than members of the middle classes. Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert (2009) document how new urban social control tools, such as off-limit orders, park exclusion laws and new trespass laws ultimately criminalise complex social problems, wash up even more people in the criminal justice system and create a new legal status – excluded – which is predominantly assigned to the racialised non-working poor.

Pacifying racial conflict Although there were much fewer overly segregationist laws in Northern and Midwestern cities, there was still a racialised social order based on informal spatial segregation as well as the exclusion of African Americans from most well-paying jobs (Miller 2015: 7–9). Following growing Black migration from the early 20th century onwards – due to a crisis of agricultural production in the South and heightened demand for unskilled and semi- skilled labour in the industrial North and Midwest – the Black population of Northern and Midwestern cities grew significantly. And, so did the animosity of local politicians, real estate agents and White homeowners, who used a variety of tactics to maintain a racialised social order through residential segregation. Blacks were confined to inner-city ghettoes that served the twin function of excluding them from White society while including their exploitable labour power in the industrial economy. All the while, urban police depart- ments played an important role in producing and maintaining this racialised order (Bass 2001; Wacquant 2001). In the context of growing Black urban populations targeted by various forms of racism, the ideology of Northern racial liberalism took shape. According to Karen Miller (2015), ‘racial liberalism married the same two components that color- blind racism does today: an extension of racial inequality alongside a commitment to the language of interracial understanding and race neutrality’ (p. 7). Faced with growing Black demands for more socio-economic equality, on the one hand, and the vested interests of many Whites to maintain racial hierarchies especially in terms of residential and labour patterns, on the other, many liberal urban governments thus sought ‘to regulate race rela- tions and avoid racial conflicts in the name of urban peace’ (Miller 2015: 9). This amounted to a strategy of liberal pacification: social peace without social justice – addressing only those Black grievances that did not question the overall racialised capitalist order. In fact, ‘[m]aintaining capitalism thus meant, in part, maintaining racial inequalities’ (Miller 2015: 145). Indeed, the increasing political significance of Northern racial liberalism marked the beginning of a transition from a colonial to a neo-colonial order.

The ideology of racial liberalism also informed a second wave of police reform that slowly took shape against the background of rising Black liberation struggles starting in the 1940s. Growing efforts to modernise the criminal justice system in general and police in particular were prompted by a liberal desire to pacify racial conflict. Here, according to Naomi Murakawa (2014), lies a significant and often overlooked factor for the emer- gence of the contemporary US carceral state. From the 1940s, liberal policymakers

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increasingly problematised racial tensions – above all White racist violence in the South – in terms of law and order. White racist violence in the South frequently occurred with the tacit support of or even in direct collusion with local police or sheriffs’ departments. But, liberal policymakers viewed racial violence as primarily a problem of illegitimate, unlawful and ultimately unreasonable violence and considered the modernisation and professionalisation of the organs of state-sanctioned, reasonable force as an adequate solution. The articulation of law and order upon race gave rise to a liberal political agenda based on ‘tightening hardware’ and ‘healing hearts’; that is to say, efforts to mod- ernise and professionalise criminal justice agencies as well as attempts to bolster state legitimacy in the eyes of African Americans (Murakawa 2014: 44–53). However, the liberal law and order agenda proved to be vulnerable to being hijacked by Southern race conservatives, who re-framed the supposed link between crime and race not as a problem of White racist violence but as a problem of Black criminality – an astonishing feat of ‘racecraft’ that would have a lasting impact (see Fields & Fields 2014). Hence, there emerged a strong bipartisan consensus on the need for criminal justice reform, even though the ultimate objectives of these reform efforts differed along partisan lines: creat- ing more racial fairness was the prime goal of race liberals, whereas repressing Black criminality and shoring up the racist colonial order were the aims of race conservatives (Murakawa 2014: 74). As President Johnson’s Safe Streets Act bill went through Congress in 1967, a number of key changes were introduced by conservatives. The provisions for the federal funding of local police contained in the original bill stipulated for federal-to- local categorical grants. This would have given the federal government a lot more say in how local police and sheriffs’ department would ultimately use the monies. Yet, through several amendments in the House and the Senate, this was changed to federal-to-state block grants. So, the monies went directly to the states that could then distribute them to local law enforcement agencies as they saw fit. The final piece of legislation – the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 – eventually established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in an effort to cut crime rates through the modernisation of local police. The LEAA failed in achieving its ultimate goal of reducing crime, but, primarily due to the amendments to the original bill, resulted in local police departments’ stockpiling of military-grade gear and the proliferation of para- military police units across the country (Murakawa 2014: 85–90; see also Kraska & Kappeler 1997; Parenti 1999). The LEAA was also a major step towards generalising the Northern model of the professional urban police, though policing remained highly local- ised. So, the machinery was definitely tightened. But what about healing the hearts?

Rising Black militancy, massive ghetto uprisings and the political successes of the civil rights movement in the 1960s prompted the re-importation of many techniques of colo- nial control into the continental United States. Local police departments acquired mili- tary equipment, such as CN and CS gas (originally developed for use in Vietnam), helicopters and armoured personnel carriers as well as training in military tactics (Parenti 1999; Pinto 1971; Quinney 1974). However, it was not just the coercive techniques of overseas counterinsurgency operations that were reimported into domestic US policing in the late 1960s. More consensual techniques of expeditionary counterinsurgency also boomeranged back into the continental United States. This is exemplified by two

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developments: (1) the rise of more consensual approaches to protest policing and (2) the emergence of community policing.

From the early 1970s, protest policing changed from ‘escalated force’ to ‘negotiated management’ (McPhail et al. 1998; McPhail & McCarthy 2005; Soule & Davenport 2009). During the 1960s, police response to protest was overwhelmingly coercive and included, often unprovoked, mass arrests, the indiscriminate use of force, and showed little patience with protesters’ First Amendment rights. Escalated force frequently led to property damage, injuries and even deaths, which in turn prompted rising public criti- cism of police on the part of both civil liberties groups and political elites. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, various congressional commissions – the most famous of which was the National Commission on Civil Disorder (Kerner Commission) – found that violent protest was often exacerbated if not triggered by overly aggressive policing (McPhail & McCarthy 2005: 63). In 1967, at request of the Justice Department, the US Army Military Police School (USAMPS) set up a Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (SEADOC) for municipal police and the National Guard. The main concern of SEADOC I, which ran from February 1968 to April 1969, was with the suppression of urban riots through an escalation of force. In May 1970, SEADOC II was launched and continued until at least 1978. SEADOC II included many of the recommendations made by these congressional commissions. The focus was no longer merely on how to suppress riots but on how to effectively manage a variety of different protest events. SEADOC II centred on the strategic concept of ‘confrontation management’, which sought to avoid any overreaction on the part of police to protesters’ provocations, and on the tactical principle of ‘minimum necessary force’, which is, as we have seen, a key com- ponent of liberal pacification (US Army Military Police School 1972, cited in McPhail & McCarthy 2005).

Community policing is a much-vaunted policing strategy supposed to help police (re) build and (re)establish legitimacy especially in the eyes of marginalised and impoverished communities (Herbert 2006). Although most US police departments officially state that they do some sort of community policing, it remains unclear what community policing actually means in practice (Herbert 2006: 4; Saunders 1999a, 1999b). But as Steve Herbert (2006) writes, ‘community policing programs generally seek to help police departments to improve their connections with citizen groups and to decentralize their operations to make better use of input from those groups’ (p. 4). Community policing also amounts to a form of liberal pacificion. The author of a 2006 RAND report On ‘Other War’: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research suggests that ‘pacification is best thought of as a massively enhanced version of the “community polic- ing” technique that emerged in the 1970s (encouraged in part by RAND research)’ (Long 2006: 53). In his discussion of possible ways of fixing a broken criminal justice system, late legal scholar William J Stuntz (2011) suggested that US counterinsurgency tactics used in Iraq ‘could have been taken from a community policing manual’ (p. 293). And he continued as follows:

Today’s policing conventional wisdom emphasizes the same three moves: a more public police street presence in the most violent areas, a problem-solving approach to local blights like

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garbage on the streets or gang signs on local buildings, and, most important of all, the building of relationships between police officers and local neighborhood residents. (p. 293)

Stuntz also argued that these policing strategies are not only effective in reducing urban crime but could also help curb ‘the state’s seemingly insatiable desire to punish young black men’ (p. 310). However, in practice, community policing hardly offers any real alternative to mass incarceration. On the contrary, concerns over ‘urban blights’ frequently lead to massive increases in detentions, arrests and criminal records for often minor misdemeanours, such as loitering or drinking in public, primarily in neglected and underinvested minority neighbourhoods (Harcourt 2001). This is also borne out by an activist report on the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) (We Charge Genocide 2015). CAPS is one of the most ambitious and largest community policing programmes in the United States and was officially rolled out in 1993 (Chicago Police Department 2016). The Counter-CAPS report found that ‘at CAPS meetings, police effectively deputise a small group of residents to engage in surveillance. These residents are disproportionately white property owners, especially in gentrifying neighborhoods’ (We Charge Genocide 2015: 4). This seems to be a general problem of community policing. The terrain of urban communities remains marked by substantive inequalities, which the police are neither able nor willing to tackle; while the police engage with com- munities in a highly uneven fashion, and vice versa. In fact, the police do not seek every- body’s input equally and some (generally well-heeled) community groups are in a much better position to voice their grievances to the police than others (Herbert 2006; see also Muñiz 2015). So, despite the pleasant ring of the term and some genuine democratising potential inherent in attempts to seek more community input, community policing remains, above all, a rhetorical strategy that alongside the use of some substantive prac- tices seeks to persuade people of the legitimacy of the state in general and of the police in particular (Saunders 1999a, 1999b):

State formation involves not just the practice of state agencies, but also the active participation (if not the consent) of state subjects. Community policing is one such instance, therefore, in which the capacity for concrete oppression is wedded to processes of legitimation. (p. 137)

As a consequence, community policing ought to be understood as an instance of liberal pacification which uses reasonable force to garner the participation and consent of the population in securing the existing social order. However, reasonable force is still backed up and ultimately facilitated by the actual violence to be used against subjects who prove to be too unreasonable to be swayed by reasonable force (Ryan 2013). Community policing thus ultimately reproduces and legitimates a purportedly colour- blind and class-neutral neo-colonial order marked by the ‘the entanglement of capitalist accumulation processes with a racial/ethnic hierarchy’ (Grosfoguel 2003: 17).

Conclusion As Manning Marable (1983) wrote, ‘Blacks occupy the lowest socioeconomic rung in the ladder of American upward mobility precisely because they have been integrated all

Kienscherf 17

too well into the system’ (p. 2). As has been shown, the United States ought to be under- stood as neo-colonial order based on both formal legal equality and substantive racial/ class divisions. Through a strategy of liberal pacification aimed at formally integrating African Americans into the social order through a combination of security and develop- ment, US policing has been and continues to be pivotal for producing and reinforcing a neo-colonial order structured around formal legal equality and substantive racial and class inequalities. In fact, US policing operates as an instrument of class and racial oppression precisely because it aims to coercively integrate marginalised populations into a social order characterised by the generalisation of specific racial/class divisions through principles of formal legal equality and individual autonomy. This generalisation of spe- cific inequalities that are conducive to capitalist accumulation has been brought about by means of liberal pacification: some (more often than not coercive) development for those who are seen as still having some labour market utility and incapacitation for those who have permanently failed the test of the labour market or who are seen as a threat to capi- talist accumulation. This market-based ascription of autonomy and the lack thereof is precisely what reproduces substantive inequalities within a system of formal equality.

As Elizabeth Jones (2018) puts it, the US criminal justice system ‘has always operated as a mediator between black labour and capitalist modes of production’ (p. 42). What is more, ‘racism works both ways: to justify the reproduction of a cheap labor force and to exclude populations from the labor market’ (Grosfoguel 2003: 210). Problematisations of crime and disorder thus serve to criminalise a population many of whose members are now structurally condemned permanently to fail the test of the labour market. Indeed, racialisation through racist criminalisation is a purportedly colour-blind mechanism for upholding a neo-colonial racial and class hierarchy in the context of de jure equality. But, despite the best efforts to make it seem so, capitalism has never been colour-blind.

ORCID iD Markus Kienscherf https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7202-1482

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Author biography Markus Kienscherf is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. He is author of US Domestic and International Regimes of Security: Pacifying the globe, securing the homeland (2013) and a number of articles that appeared in Critical Military Studies, Critical Sociology, Radical Criminology, Security Dialogue and Topia. He is currently working on a research monograph on the political economy of US policing.