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International Journal of Public Administration

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Small, Slow, and Gradual Reform: What can Historical Institutionalism Teach us?

Walter J. M. Kickert & Frans-Bauke van der Meer

To cite this article: Walter J. M. Kickert & Frans-Bauke van der Meer (2011) Small, Slow, and Gradual Reform: What can Historical Institutionalism Teach us?, International Journal of Public Administration, 34:8, 475-485, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2011.583768

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International Journal of Public Administration, 34: 475–485, 2011 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 online DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2011.583768

Small, Slow, and Gradual Reform: What can Historical Institutionalism Teach us?

Walter J. M. Kickert and Frans-Bauke van der Meer Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

In this article, the issue of “small, slow and gradual reform” is explored, particularly from the perspective of “historical institutionalism.” Historically grown and solidified institutions explain why change usually is only small, slow, and gradual. We have a closer look at the political science theory of historical institutionalism. After considering key-concepts of his- torical institutionalism such as “path dependency” and “punctuated equilibrium,” we look at recent developments of typologies of incremental, gradual transformations. Elaborating upon this typology we develop a conceptual framework of various and varying types of change. The descriptive validity of this framework is “tested” by offering empirical illustrations in three case studies of changes that have occurred in and around the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture.

Keywords: administrative reform, historical institutionalism, organisational change, agriculture

INTRODUCTION

In this article the issue of “administrative reform is usually only small, slow, and gradual” will be addressed, particu- larly from the perspective of “historical institutionalism.” Studies of administrative reform often conclude that reforms are piecemeal, gradual, and incremental. The conclusion that hardly anything ever changes is, however, not right. Small, slow, and gradual reform does in fact often lead to “real” change, e.g., by a long-term accumulation of many small changes.

In this article we will explore the issue of small, slow and gradual reform by having a look at what the politi- cal science theory of “historical institutionalism” can teach us about types of reform. For a widely used explanation for administrative reform to be small, slow, and gradual, is that historically grown national traditions and institu- tions have a conserving effect on current reform. Although the political science theory of “historical institutionalism” often is about macro-historical research of big questions and fundamental historical changes (revolutions [Goldstone, 2003], democracy and authoritarianism [Mahoney, 2003])

Correspondence should be addressed to Walter J. M. Kickert, Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: kickert@ fsw.eur.nl

some leading historical institutionalism scholars (Pierson, 2003, 2004; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2003) have developed interesting and useful typologies of incremental, gradual transformations.

We will elaborate upon these typologies and show how various types and degrees of change, when further differen- tiated and nuanced, at second look can reveal quite different properties. What at first sight looks like one type of change, at second look can turn out to be quite another type. Small, slow, and gradual change can assume many different forms.

We will finally “test” the descriptive validity of the con- ceptual framework of various and varying types of change with three empirical case studies of the changes that have occurred in and around the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality.

Administrative Reform and Institutions

The past decades were an “age of reform” throughout the Western world. The public budget deficits in the 1980s, due to the economic recession following the oil crisis, forced Western governments to cut back their costly welfare states that had expanded especially since the Second World War. It led to the age of “new public management” reform. All over the Western world reforms in organization, financial, personnel, and information management were carried out. At least, that is what protagonists of public management

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reform, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, wanted us to believe. The entire Western world allegedly was converg- ing upon one single type of administrative reform, that is, “new public management.”

In reaction to this worldwide convergence hypothesis, scholars of administrative reform have engaged in inter- national comparative studies of administrative reform and found out that public management reform varied across countries. Apart from the exemplary “success stories” of public management reform in the Anglo-Saxon world, espe- cially Britain and New Zealand, in many countries such reform appeared to be far less successful. Administrative reform in actual reality usually appeared to be a slow, incre- mental, gradual process of only small changes (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).

In international comparative studies of administrative reform (Flynn & Strehl, 1996; Kickert, 1997; Lane, 1997; Lynn, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) the historical institu- tional perspective became an important one. The rediscovery of the institutional approach in administrative reform and organizational change by March and Olsen (1989) con- tributed to its popularity. The basic idea is that reform of public administration depends on the social and political institutions that have historically grown in the respective country.

Historical traditions in state, politics, government, and administration have an influence on administrative reform. The longer such institutional patterns exist, the harder to change them. France is an example of a state with a long institutional history, more or less uninterrupted since the Revolution. And although the German state radically changed after the Second World War, its tradition as con- tinental European “Rechtsstaat” did influence recent mod- ernizations (Jann, 2003). Historical state traditions like the French “Napoleonic state” do influence the current pub- lic management reforms in Southern European countries (Kickert, 2007; Ongaro, 2008, 2009).

Scholars of administrative reform have carried out histor- ical studies of traditions of governance in various countries (Kickert, 2004; Kickert & Hakvoort, 2000; Rhodes, 2003). Comparative studies of administrative reform further distin- guish political institutions according to the usual typology of comparative politics, such as types of state, forms of govern- ment, various political systems, types of bureaucracies, sorts of state-society relations, etc. (Blondel, 1990; Hague et al, 1992; Otenyo & Lind, 2006; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).

Our impression is that many comparative studies of administrative reform that use the historical institutional per- spective, do so in a rather broad and general way. Certain features of historically grown institutions are mentioned and are supposed to have influenced certain features of current reforms. Actually, that comes down to the socio- logical perspective on the concept of institution (Lammers et al., 1997; Peters, 1999). An institution is more than

only an organizational structure, it is about historically grown and solidified rules, values, norms, and patterns. The institutional context is considered the normative embedding of a reform. And in that sense history does matter. But in current political science “historical institutionalism” has a more specific meaning and is explicitly distinguished from “sociological institutionalism.” In political sciences three approaches of institutionalism are distinguished: the ratio- nal choice approach, the historical, and the sociological one (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In view of the importance of the historical institutionalism perspective in explaining admin- istrative reform, we will have a closer look at that theoretical perspective.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

The “historical institutionalism” (Pierson, 2004; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; Sanders, 2006; Thelen, 1999) teaches us that “history matters,” that institutional changes are dependent on the historical path that led to these institutions (path depen- dency). Changes are not only dependent on current actions and events but also on a series of previous events. Historical institutionalists often address “grand” issues like transitions to democracy, the rise and fall of authoritarian regimes (Mahoney, 2003), the developments of welfare states and economic regimes (Pierson, 2003), and social movements and revolutions (Goldstone, 2003). Historical institutional- ists analyze temporal processes, sequences of events that led to certain important big changes. It is a search for the crucial moments and events in time (critical juncture) that triggered a subsequent sequence of events that finally resulted in the major institutional change.

Path Dependency

Path dependency is often used in a rather vague way. Just mentioning a series of historical moments, events, and developments, and subsequently mentioning a current institutional change, does not prove much of an alleged rela- tionship. Understandably, some have argued for a stricter and more specific use of the concept of path dependency.

Mahoney (2000) argued against the “vague notion” that “history matters” or that “the past influences the future” and proposed a methodologically stricter and more specific def- inition of “path dependency”: contingent events in the past influence a later sequence of events leading to a particular outcome. Path dependency is about process, sequence, and temporality. The sequence of events, which are related by causal links, deterministically leads to a certain outcome. The origin of an institutional pattern is a “critical juncture,” a contingent event, an unexpected unpredictable choice of a certain institutional pattern out of more alternatives.

Pierson (2000a, 2000b) also warned against the use of the concept “without careful elaboration.” He conceptualized path dependence by using the economic model of

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HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 477

“increasing returns.” The exit costs to leave the path will increase over time, so it is rational to stay on the path. Pierson (2000a, 2003) explicitly used the economic “rational choice” model to develop a rigorous framework of concepts used in historical institutionalism. Notice that neither the strict causal-deterministic approach nor the economic “ratio- nal choice” approach are always followed in political and administrative sciences.

Historical institutionalism leads to the insight that chang- ing is not easy. Historical traditions in state, politics, gov- ernment, and administration have a conserving influence on current developments. Current reforms are dependent on the historical path that led to the present situation. Long- term grown institutional patterns are not easily changed. Institutional patterns have a high degree of stability, or call it immobilism or inertia. If change occurs at all it will mostly be not abrupt radical change, but, rather, gradual incremental small change.

Punctuated Equilibrium

In the historical institutionalism perspective, long periods of institutional stable equilibrium are only now and then briefly interrupted by an external shock (critical juncture) that dis- rupts the equilibrium and enables an abrupt radical change, after which a next equilibrium comes in place. This is called “punctuated equilibrium.” In the long static periods between such brief “critical junctures” reforms are piecemeal, grad- ual, and incremental (Pierson, 2004; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 1999).

The analogy with similar concepts in systems theory is interesting. In the historical institutionalism perspective long periods of stable equilibriums of institutional patterns dominate, and only incremental changes take place. In sys- tems theory the definition of a stable equilibrium is that it restores from disturbance. The initial changes after an exter- nal disturbance are undone. Incremental changes are only temporary. In time nothing changes in a stable equilibrium.

In systems theory such stability is modeled by the concept of feedback (homeostasis): a certain state of a system is kept stable by feedback of the external disturbances. A method of systems not to be influenced by external disturbances is to close the boundaries of the system: in closed systems no external influences penetrate, environmental disturbances are kept out. Organizations and institutions can lock them- selves off from the outer world and become immune from disturbances. The disadvantage of closed systems is their tendency to become rigid and cramped. Closed systems cannot innovate and learn.

A more intelligent model of closedness is “autopoiesis” (Kickert, 1993): a system that is open for external influ- ences and is capable of changing, but does not alter its institutional ordering. On this meta-level the order of the sys- tem is always reproduced and confirmed. On this meta-level the system is closed. Autopoiesis seems a good model for

institutional stability or immobilism. In such a system at the object-level many things are changing due to external influ- ences, but at the meta-level of the institutional order nothing changes. The ordering is reproduced—an open and adap- tive system that reproduces its structure. In his interpretation of autopoiesis, Morgan (1986) considered this as a model of “dynamic conservatism”: all sorts of things are changed by the organization, but actually with the only intention of conserving its existence—changing to conserve.

In historical institutionalism the concept of “punctuated equilibrium,” that an external shock disrupts a system and leads to a radical change resulting in fundamental new order, has mainly been applied to macro-historical processes, to “grand narratives” about “great transformations” such as the origins of fascism, social democracy, and liberalism, or the transformations of authoritarian regimes, or the devel- opments of welfare state (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002). These are examples of order-conserving systems that after revo- lutionary disturbances cross a threshold and create a new order.

The idea of “punctuated equilibrium” also is a cen- tral concept in the so-called “chaos theory” that became very popular in the 1980s (Gleick, 1987). In chaos theory, equilibrium, evolution, and dynamics have quite unusual connotations. Evolution is a dynamic process that in constant exchange with the environment leads to structural innova- tions of systems. Contrary to structure-preserving systems an evolutionary system is capable of generating so much change and fluctuation that the threshold is passed to a new structure, a new order. The picture here is one of order that develops out of increasing imbalance, out of chaos (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)—a picture of a system far- out-of-equilibrium, strongly fluctuating, very chaotic, which pushes back frontiers, opens new horizons, breaks new grounds. In such a perspective equilibrium is considered as stagnation and death, and order is supposed to develop from chaos. In this context self-organization of a system has a totally different connotation than conservatism. When the threshold of stagnating conservatism is crossed by an increasing pressure for change, by strong dynamics and imbalance, it is reassuring to know that the self-organizing capacity of the system will eventually generate and repro- duce a new order, that the chaos does indeed create new order.

The revolutionary change concept in chaos theory of “punctuated equilibrium” has also attracted attention in man- agement and organization theory (Gersick, 1991; Sastry, 1997). The basic idea behind “punctuated equilibrium,” the transition from evolution to revolution, is also at the heart of the political science study of revolutions (Goldstone, 2003; Skocpol, 1979): finding out in what circumstances a revolution can break out.

The study of evolution and revolution is not restricted to social sciences. In population biology and ecology the possible transformation of an evolutionary growth process

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into a sudden explosive growth or extinction, is also central to the field. It is likewise in meteorology and other natural sciences.

Actually, “chaos theory” was an amalgam of many dif- ferent fields of science, not in the least the natural ones. For a mathematician all the examples of “punctuated equi- librium” in physics, biology, meteorology, and other fields, simply come down to the theory of non-linear differential equations. In mathematics a dynamic process is modeled by differential equations. Non-linear differential equations typ- ically posses the mathematically nasty characteristics that are so cherished in chaos theory and historical institution- alism: a slight change in the initial conditions can make a huge difference in subsequent process and ultimate outcome (butterfly effect, small events can have large consequences), a process can suddenly (critical juncture) become unstable and either explode (revolution) or reach a new stable point (order out of chaos), etc. Not that this will be of much use to historical institutionalists: it is mostly impossible to make mathematical models of grand macro-social pro- cesses, and, furthermore, non-linear differential equations are mostly impossible to analyze.

SMALL, SLOW, AND GRADUAL CHANGE

Historical institutionalism teaches us that changing is dif- ficult, substantial changes hardly ever take place, usually only marginal, incremental, slow, small changes around the “status quo ante,” not a novel wisdom in administra- tive science (Lindblom, 1959). Studies of administrative reform, however, do not only conclude that reforms mostly are piecemeal, gradual and incremental changes. They also emphasize that it would be wrong to draw the consequence that almost nothing ever changes, that reform mostly is a “failure.”

On the contrary, studies of administrative reform show that incremental gradual change can nevertheless lead to “real” change (also stipulated by Lindblom (1959)), that many small changes can add up to a substantial change, that ossified institutional patterns can be circumvented by adding new ones besides the existing old ones, that immobilism and inertia in one terrain can be compensated by introducing “real” changes in other terrains, that major radical reforms now and then do take place, that an abrupt radical reform can be the consequence of a slow gradual building-up of pres- sure that passes a certain threshold at a certain moment, and so on.

In historical institutionalism various sorts of small incre- mental changes have been discerned besides the abrupt radical ones. Streeck(2005) and Thelen (2003) introduced a further distinction between the category “adaptation and reproduction”—the institutional pattern is stable and does not change—and the category “gradual transformation”— though the changes are incremental, something is really

changing. Streeck and Thelen distinguished five modes of gradual but nevertheless transformative change:

• Displacement. Discovering and activating alternative institutional forms that did exist before, but were considered deviant, aberrant.

• Layering. Creating new institutions without abolishing the existing ones. The old ones continue to exist, but new ones are added, besides or onto.

• Drift. Changing institutions because of insufficient maintenance. Neglect leads to erosion or atrophy of the institution.

• Conversion. Existing institutions are redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes, but they continue to exist.

• Exhaustion. The institution is gradually exhausted and breaks down. The collapse is gradual rather than abrupt. Ageing, tiring and exhaustion ultimately lead to decay.

The category of abrupt, radical change has also been nuanced (Pierson, 2003, 2004). The idea that long-term sta- bility and equilibrium can only briefly be broken up by a sudden radical change due to a heavy external shock, is not useful from the viewpoint of change. Great shocks and large changes do not necessarily have to be sudden and abrupt. A large shock can be the result of a long and slow accumu- lation of small changes. Pierson (2004) distinguished three modes of slow processes causing a large shock and radical change:

• Cumulation. A slow, incremental and cumulative growth. The accumulation of many small changes can ultimately lead to a large radical change.

• Threshold. A slow, incremental growth surpasses at a certain moment a certain threshold and then suddenly leads to a radical change.

• Causal chains. One small change causes a next one, which on its turn causes a next change, and the causal chain ultimately leads to a radical change.

SMALL, SLOW, AND GRADUAL REFORM REVISITED: METAMORPHISM

We will now further elaborate upon the aforementioned typologies developed by Pierson (2003, 2004), Thelen (2003), and Streeck and Thelen (2005), and especially focus on the alterations of types of change. An accumu- lation of many small changes can lead to large change. Passing a threshold can lead to large change. Seemingly radical change can be a disguise for preserving the exist- ing order. Borrowing from the sociological institutionalist term “isomorphism” (Powell & Dimaggio, 1991), demean- ing similarity and stability of organizations, we use the term

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HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 479

“metamorphism,” to demean the dynamic changes between types of organizational change.

Let us have a look at different types of change and fur- ther nuance and distinguish them into subtypes, which at second look reveal quite different properties. What at first sight looks like absence of change, at second look does reveal change, even considerable one. What at first sight looks like small change, at second look can result in large change. Small, slow, and gradual change can assume various and varying forms.

At First Sight no Change

• The existing institution remains unchanged—stable equilibrium. After a short and small disturbance the existing order is restored. What Streeck and Thelen (2005) called adaptation and reproduction. Remark that although the disturbance is only temporary and order is restored, some degree of change of the system is necessary to adapt.

• The existing institution remains unchanged. However, new institutions are created without ending or replac- ing old existing ones, besides or on top of exist- ing ones. The existing institution is a closed system, shut off from disturbances—what Streeck and Thelen (2005) called layering. Remark that at the level of the individual institution no change takes place (or at most adaptation and reproduction of its steady state), but that at a broader level of the system of institu- tions change does takes place. That broader change can be considerable, such as e.g., the post-war estab- lishment of a parallel “welfare state administration” in Italy –(Ongaro, 2008, 2009).

• The existing institution remains unchanged. However, as a consequence of long-time inactivity and non- decision-making ultimately some change occurs— what Streeck and Thelen (2005) called drift. It is change after doing nothing—unintentional change resulting from inactivity. Remark that the ultimately resulting change can be considerable. A long pro- cess of neglect, lack of maintenance, aging, tiring, and exhaustion can lead to ultimate starvation.

At First no Change

• In the beginning the institution remains unchanged. Institutional change can consist of a sequence of subsequent stages with different types and degrees of change. Initially, the institution resists against exter- nal disturbances by closing off its boundaries from the outer world—non-action, even no reaction, inactive, closed. In the next stage the institution starts defend- ing itself against external accusations. It has opened, but is only reactive and defensive. In a later stage the institution is forced to further open itself, to be

receptive and adaptive to criticism, to actively carry out changes—active, but with the intention to continue its existence.

• In change management literature (Burnes, 2009) models exist of how people in an organization go about change, such as the well-known “unfreeze- change-refreeze” model of Lewin (1951). People first have to be convinced of the need for change, or else nobody will be willing to move. That model was later elaborated, such as the five-stage “cop- ing cycle” of “denial-defence-discarding-adaptation- internalisation” (Carnall, 2003). Not only people, but also organizations and institutions can go through a process of similar stages.

At First Sight Small Change

• The existing institution only marginally and gradually changes, but the small change is real. The small change can be unintentional or intentional. In the first case of unintentional change it can be a consequence of long- time inactivity, neglect, and non-decision-making, as discussed above. In the latter case the small gradual change of the institution is the consequence of a delib- erate choice of some action—a deliberate, intended, small change.

• The existing institution only marginally and gradually changes, but small change can ultimately lead to large change. A long and slow accumulation of many small changes can ultimately on the long term lead to large change. The case of long-time inactivity and neglect ultimately leading to decay has been discussed above.

• A slow and gradual accumulation of small changes can ultimately lead to a large change, and moreover— after passing a threshold—lead to a fast and sudden change (see Figure 1). Notice the resemblance of the long accumulative process of many changes with the concept of “path dependency” and the resemblance between passing a certain threshold with the concept of “critical juncture.”

At First Sight Large Change

• The institution substantially changes. As remarked before that can be intentional or unintentional, and large changes can be the result of a long accumula- tive process of many small changes or a one-off large

Fast and abrupt Abrupt, radical

Slow and gradual Accumulation of gradual

marginal changes

Surpassing

of threshold

FIGURE 1 Speed of change.

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change. Another distinction is to consider change at different levels. The institution substantially changes at the object-level, but in fact mainly does so in order to survive at the meta-level. All sorts of thing are changed in the institution, even its mission, goals and functions, but actually with the only intention of conserving its existence, to survive—changing in order to conserve, what Streeck and Thelen (2005) called conversion and Morgan (1986) in his interpretation of “autopoiesis” called a model of dynamic conservatism.

• The institution substantially changes. But institutional change can have a different degree and speed at differ- ent levels. The political-administrative apex of a public organization can be convinced of the need for a strate- gic change due to a marked change in external political and societal circumstances, but it can take a long time before this substantial change has “landed” deep down into the organization. The actual operating behavior on the organizational “work floor” can remain unchanged for years. It can be even slower and more difficult to carry through the changes into the societal policy sec- tor, the “outer world.” Moreover, what seems a small change to one person can be perceived by another as a large change.

At First Sight Abrupt, Radical Change

• The institution undergoes an abrupt and radical change. A gradual accumulation of small changes slowly grows until a certain threshold is passed, which then leads to an abrupt radical change (see before).

• The institution abruptly and radically changes due to a sudden external shock. An acute urgent major cri- sis forces the institution to immediately and radically transform.

• The institution abruptly and radically changes due to an external shock. The external shock is the result of a slow-growing accumulation of changes that ultimately passes a threshold and then leads to a sudden shock (Pierson, 2004).

• The abrupt, radical change can be brief or lengthy. Lengthy, radical changes are of course lethal to any system.

Notice that an abrupt external shock can be the causal reason for a fast radical change, but it is also possible that a sudden external shock (scandal, crisis, etc.) is only an occasion for change, merely the “trigger” that shakes loose the stuck and rigid institution, while the “real” reasons for change lie elsewhere. Think of the corruption scandals in Italy in the early 1990s that triggered a subsequent radi- cal change in the political system (Bull & Rhodes, 1997). Think of the death in 1975 of the Spanish dictator Franco which triggered a subsequent sequence of events leading to constitutional democracy.

THEORETICAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Research Questions

What conclusions can we reach from the afore-going theo- retical exploration?

Regarding administrative reform as “small, slow and gradual” change rather than as radical change, implies that we analyze it as a continuous process of subsequent events, as a series of accommodations, adjustments, and adapta- tions; an ongoing accumulation of small, slow, and grad- ual changes, with certain more or less important “crucial” events, but not one singular, radical, one-off change moment. Regarding administrative reform as “small, slow and grad- ual” change, implies that we analyze the process in terms of the many various and varying subtypes of change that were derived from the historical institutionalist typologies devel- oped by Pierson (2003, 2004), Thelen (2003), and Streeck and Thelen (2005).

Our hypothesis is that administrative reform can better be analyzed in terms of small, slow, and gradual changes than in terms of radical change. So our main research question is: What is the descriptive validity of the small, slow and gradual change perspective?

This main question will be addressed by examining whether the various and varying subtypes of change, that were developed in the previous theoretical section, can empirically be observed in a number of different change pro- cesses that took place in and around the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002, 2007; see below). We will present three case studies of institutional change, one of the European con- text of the Ministry of Agriculture, one of a fundamental reorganization of the ministry, and the last of a new mis- sion formulation in the ministry. After brief descriptions of the cases we investigate what subtypes of change can be observed and how the subtypes of change in the course of the change process take up different forms. This empirical “test” of the various and varying subtypes of change shows us whether this change perspective has descriptive validity. This leads us to the following research sub-questions:

• Can the change processes be described in terms of the various subtypes of change such as adaptation, layering, dynamic conservatism, exhaustion, and so on?

• Can the change processes be described in terms of alterations between the various subtypes of change such as accumulation, threshold, small and large, grad- ual and abrupt, and so on?

One should, however, realize that it is methodologically difficult to really “test” the descriptive validity of a concep- tual perspective. When a perspective is adopted to analyze an empirical case, one will always obtain positive evidence.

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If one wears green spectacles, the world will inevitably be observed as green. In a methodologically strict sense the case studies are no empirical “tests” of the descriptive validity of the change perspective but, rather, empirical “illustrations” of its plausibility.

Empirical Methodology

The empirical basis of the three case studies is multiple. First, the author is a specialist in management and orga- nization of Dutch central administration (Kickert, 1993, 2008; Kickert & in’t Veld, 1995) and has carried out sev- eral specific studies about the Ministry of Agriculture, such as the development of fishery policy, the privatization of the Agriculture Information Service (Kickert, 1993), the agencification of the Agricultural Research Service (Kickert, 1998), and the reorganization of the ministry in 1993–1994 (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002).

Secondly, the author has been working as a councilor at the strategic policy unit of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1995–1996. The Dutch “village” of politics and administra- tion in “departmental The Hague” (the administrative capital of The Netherlands) is relatively small and well-known to the author, and the ministerial department of Agriculture in particular. Many formal and informal contacts with key play- ers in and around that ministry have taken place in the past and present, which might be accounted for as “background information.”

The most important source of empirical evidence for this case study was a research project commissioned by the secretary-general of the ministry to investigate the external societal developments relevant for the ministry, and to inves- tigate the capacity of the ministry to cope with them, in other words, the adaptive change capacities of the ministry. This research was carried out involving extensive document analysis and some 50 interviews with persons inside, but especially relevant actors outside the ministry. The outcomes of the research project were published (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2007).

Most background material on these cases (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002, 2007) is in Dutch. In view of the predomi- nantly English-language audience of this journal, summaries of the cases are provided. Nevertheless, we realize that the necessarily very brief case descriptions might be hard for a foreign audience to understand.

EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF VARIOUS AND VARYING TYPES: CHANGES IN AND

AROUND AGRICULTURE

Developments in and around the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002, 2007) offer empirical illustrations of the var- ious and varying types of large and small, fast, and slow,

abrupt, and gradual changes that were distinguished in the afore-mentioned typology. In and around that ministry many different forms of institutional change do occur and often simultaneously. The empirical illustrations deal with both changes at the micro-level of the organization of the min- istry, changes at the meso-level of the agricultural policy sector, and changes at the macro-level of society and politics.

European Common Agricultural Policy: Gradual Accumulation of Small Incremental Changes Exhaustion Dubious

The developments of Dutch agriculture and the ministry are strongly related to the international and European context. The Netherlands is a relatively small and internationally very open economy. Dutch agriculture is strongly export ori- ented. After the Second World War (food shortage, famine) protection of food production became important and so did agriculture. This was one of the reasons for the protection- ism of agriculture in Europe. Soon after the establishment of the European Community (EC) (Treaty of Rome in 1957) the “Common Agricultural Policy” (CAP) became one of the most important components of EC-policy. The CAP con- sisted of protected (fixed) production prices within Europe, in combination with the levy of import tariffs and granting of export subsidies at the European boundaries. The CAP expenditures amounted to 85 percent of the EC-budget in 1970 (diminishing to about 50 percent in the 1990s).

Gradually and increasingly, the size of the CAP came under societal and political pressure. Overproduction of milk and butter, manure problems, and animal disease crises decreased the public and political popularity of the agricul- ture sector. The lowering esteem for agriculture contributed to the pressure to curve the CAP expenditures. An economic argument was that European citizens pay double for their food products, first by taxation that is spent on CAP export subsidies, and secondly by the artificially high product prices as a consequence of the CAP subsidies.

Another argument concerned the international negotia- tions about free world trade versus protectionism (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)). In the begin- ning that dispute was primarily between the United States and the European Community. A breakthrough occurred in the 1990s when the developing countries, led by Brazil, China, and India, gained influence in the negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). European protectionism was detrimental to agriculture in the Third World countries. The European CAP had to be changed and cut down. The pressures led to a revision of the CAP in the sense that product subsidies were transformed to income subsidies, and that subsidies became related to non-agricultural fac- tors like landscape, nature preservation and environmental protection.

The accession of relatively poor countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain to the European Community in

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the 1980s led to an increasing importance of the European structural funds (support for poor regions), which are des- tined to rural development, poverty combat, infrastructure, and education, at the expense of the European agriculture subsidies. Moreover, agriculture subsidies were preferably rather spent on poor farmers in Greece and Portugal than on wealthy international agribusiness corporations in The Netherlands or Denmark.

Nevertheless, the European agricultural expenditures are still enormous, and huge, vested economic interests are at stake. Agriculture in large countries like France, Germany, and Britain is a very powerful sector and these coun- tries are powerful, so the resistance against curbing the European CAP is enormous and very powerful. Changes in the European CAP are and will be slow, gradual, and incremental (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2007, 19–29).

The historical institutionalism perspective in terms of the afore-mentioned subtypes of change can clearly be applied to this change process of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It can be characterized as a long- term, gradual accumulation of small, incremental changes that took place in three different interacting change pro- cesses. The first change process was that the size of the CAP expenditures gradually became unacceptably large. That financial argument was a major reason for the MacSharry Agreement, between Europe and the United States in 1992, on a new World Trade Organization (WTO). The second process was the negotiations about free world trade. The deadlock between Europe and the United States was bro- ken through when the Third World became an argument in GATT and WTO, and when the Third World organized itself (Brazil, China, and India). The world trade negotiations still have a long way to go. The third was the accession of new poor member states to the European Community. The struc- tural development of poor regions became more important for the European Community at the expense of agricultural support.

In each of these three change processes the main type of change to be observed is gradual, slow accumulation of small changes. It took long time before the size of CAP expenditures was discussed. In the beginning noth- ing changed. Then came the chain non-action, reaction, and defense, before the CAP opened itself for criticism & dis- cussion. Some are convinced that the changes of CAP of the past decades were mainly meant to conserve its exis- tence, thus being an example of what Streeck and Thelen (2005) called conversion or Morgan (1986) called dynamic conservatism. Likewise are the international negotiations on free world trade a long-term, gradual, slow accumulation of small changes. And so was the development of the European policy of structural funds for poor regions.

These three different change processes do contain moments of important breakthrough (thresholds) resulting in accelerated change, such as the MacSharry Agreement, the establishment of the WTO, the organizing of Brazil, China,

and India, and the accession of new poor EC member states. These can, however, hardly be called “critical junctures.” The ultimate outcome of the change process cannot strictly be related to one single breakthrough (the strict definition of path dependency).

The change is a long-term gradual accumulation of incre- mental changes that in the end has led to major changes. The CAP in the end was substantially reduced in size, and substantially changed in form (from product to income sub- sidies, related to non-agricultural factors) and more changes can be expected. It is, however, dubious whether that will ultimately lead to the exhaustion and elimination of CAP. The vested economic interests in agriculture are enormous. The defense of these huge interests remains very powerful.

Reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Early 1990s: Resistance to Change, External Shock (threshold), and Abrupt Radical Change

Agriculture in the Netherlands after the Second World War (starvation famine in winter 1944–45) was a societal, public, and political priority. Moreover, agriculture was an enor- mous success in financial-economic (export, trade balance) and technological (productivity, quality, innovation) terms. In the 1980s agriculture and fishery became public and political scapegoats (overproduction of milk and butter, pig manure problems, overfishing, etc.). A number of scandals led to the loss of confidence in the sector and its interest rep- resentative, the ministry. Politics threatened to abolish the ministry at cabinet formations. Interest representation could be moved to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Education and Research to the Ministry of Education and Sciences, only a couple of executive agencies would be left. Moreover, the ministry had more or less become an intermediary of Brussels rules and subsidies. National agricultural policy was on the leash of Brussels anyway, so why require a separate policy-making ministry.

The ministry and the agriculture sector reacted in the 1980s by closing off from the hostile outside world. The ministry became closed, introvert, non-susceptible for crit- icism, reactive and defensive. The outside world became more and more critical about the sector and the ministry. The political threat of abolishing the ministry grew. But the ministry closed ranks and resisted. Then a sudden external trigger occurred: a television broadcast in 1991 about alleged intimidation and wiretapping inside the ministry. The scan- dal led to the installment of an external independent inquiry committee. That triggered the ministry to go for a drastic reorganization. The hatches had to be opened, the ministry had to open up for criticism, to adapt to the changed environ- ment. A fundamental reorganization took place, especially a radical change in culture (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002, 67–101).

The historical institutionalism perspective in terms of the aforementioned subtypes of change can also be applied

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to this case. In terms of subtypes of change the ministry remained for years inert, not susceptible for changes in the environment, on the contrary, it closed off and resisted external disturbances, it preserved the existing institutional order. In the beginning the existing institution remained unchanged, what Streeck and Thelen (2005) called adapta- tion and reproduction. After an inert, closed, passive phase there was a phase of defensive reaction to the angry, out- side world. Only after an external shock did the friction between internal conservatism and external dynamics pass a threshold and make the ministry abruptly swing into action. Previous behavior by the ministry had been long-term inac- tive, reactive, defensive in order to preserve the existing institution, with an accumulation of friction between institu- tion and environment. Then an external trigger led to sudden action. In the course of events the change process alternated several times in form: from non-action and defensive to gradual, marginal change, then passing a threshold to drastic change.

The external pressure had not suddenly occurred. It was a long-time accumulation of growing dissatisfaction and crit- icism in the outside world about the sector and its ministry, culminating in the political threat to abolish the ministry. This existential threat recurred time and again at virtu- ally every cabinet formation and formed an acute external pressure (actually at the cabinet formation of 2010 the min- istry was indeed abolished and merged with the Ministry of Economic Affairs).

The external trigger—the 1991 television broadcast of alleged malpractices—did happen suddenly. This scandal was, however, not the cause of the change—evidence about intimidation and wiretapping has never been found—but at most the trigger for change, to shake the ossified institution loose.

The actual degree of change can be doubted. The radi- cal reorganization—new culture, new organization, and new mission (see below)—due to heavy external pressure indeed looks like a radical change. An alternative interpretation, however, could possibly be that the new mission, goals, and functions were in fact meant to preserve the existing insti- tution. The ministry was saved, it continued to exist. Was it dynamic conservatism? Regardless, the ministry had learned its lesson and became flexible and adaptive (Kickert & van der Meer, 2007).

New Mission “Landscape” Early 1990s: Different Degree of Change at Different Level

Following the reorganization in the early 1990s the min- istry also created a new mission: not only representing the economic interests of the agricultural sector, but integrating agriculture, landscape, and nature. The ministry henceforth would be the guardian of landscape in the rural areas.

It is impossible to trace who invented this new mission and when. It, rather, was a growing idea and coincidence.

The in 1994 newly appointed Minister of Agriculture was said to have had the political assignment to reduce the dom- inance of agricultural interests at the ministry. The new mission had, however, been announced in earlier policy doc- uments of the ministry. The menacing abolishment of the ministry played an important role in the creation of this new mission. The ministry, which used to represent sec- toral interests only, transformed into a ministry of general administration, which henceforth represented different inter- ests of agriculture, nature, recreation, and landscape. It was a politically clever move. In the most densely populated coun- try of the world, the scarce open green space in between the eve-advancing housing and building construction, is a most rare and exceptional and thus most valuable com- modity. And the main function of the open green space in The Netherlands actually is agriculture, farming, and cat- tle breeding, which were formerly the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, the Directorate of Nature Preservation was located at that same ministry. From a power political point of view the new mission was a brilliant golden choice (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2002, 87–90).

In historical institutionalism terms of subtypes of change, this is an example of different degree of change at differ- ent levels. At the political and official strategic apex of the ministry this new mission was invented. Deeper into the organization, however, the carrying through of this change went much slower. The rank and file of the ministry did not adapt and change that swiftly. In the outside world the ministry is nowadays, 15 years later, still perceived as the interest promoter of agriculture.

The implementation of the new mission in the outside policy areas was even harder. Landscape and rural area is the responsibility of different ministries (spatial ordering, road and waterway infrastructure, environment, nature, agri- culture, etc.) and much authority has been decentralized to provinces and municipalities. At the level of minister and top-officials the change may have been radical and fast, at lower departmental levels and further outside levels the change was rather gradual and incremental with only now and then a relative breakthrough (Kickert & Van der Meer, 2007, 59–93).

CONCLUSIONS

Elaborating upon the typologies developed by histori- cal institutionalism scholars Pierson (2003, 2004), Thelen (2003), and Streeck and Thelen (2005) we have developed a conceptual framework of types of change and of alter- ations between types of change. In three empirical case studies of developments in and around the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture we have shown that they offer good illustrations of various types of large and small, fast and slow, abrupt, and gradual changes that were distinguished in the typology.

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484 KICKERT AND VAN DER MEER

A long-term gradual accumulation of many small changes in the European Common Agricultural Policy in the end has lead to large changes. The change process con- sisted of three intertwined sub-processes, each consisting of a gradual accumulation of small changes with moments of important breakthrough that accelerated the change. A long period of non-action, reaction and defense of the Ministry of Agriculture against growing external pressure, after the passing of a threshold, has lead to a sudden, abrupt and large change, that is, a fundamental reorganization. The historical institutionalism concepts of adaptation, reproduc- tion, preservation, accumulation, and threshold could well be recognized in this case of ministerial reorganization. The introduction of a new mission in the Ministry of Agriculture offered a good example of how different degrees of change occur at different levels inside and outside the organization. At the organizational apex a swift and radical change, at the bottom of the organization a much slower and incremental change with now and then moments of breakthrough (thresh- old). Although empirical illustrations in a methodologically strict sense do not offer a conclusive “test” of the descriptive validity of a conceptual framework, the cases made the valid- ity of the historical institutionalism perspective on small, slow, and gradual reform plausible.

It is remarkable that the political science theory of his- torical institutionalism, which is best known for its studies of macro-historical radical and revolutionary changes and for concepts like “path dependency,” “critical juncture,” and “punctuated equilibrium,” also offers excellent theo- retical insights in the category of small, slow, and gradual reform. The historical institutionalism offered most fruitful contributions to the further elaboration and specification of typologies of gradual reform, such as adaptation, neglect, layering, accumulation, threshold, exhaustion, and so on.

Notice that historical institutionalism is not explana- tory but rather descriptive and at most analytical (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; Thelen, 1999). Explanations why and how a certain historical development influences a current reform event cannot be found in historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism at most offers a description of possible types of sequences of events, such as adaptation, neglect, layering, accumulation, exhaustion, and so on. Why these patterns occur has to be explained separately.

The dichotomy that either a radical shock occurs or nothing changes at all is hardly useful for the study of admin- istrative reform. And it is simply not true that slow, small, gradual, incremental changes are not “real.” Such a view- point does not help understanding the empirical reality of reform. Pessimist exasperation that “nothing ever changes” is not necessary. Both from an analytical theoretical and an empirical perspective we have shown that it is not true that in actual reality hardly anything ever changes. In actual reality many things do “really” change. Small and slow changes do “really” matter. The exercise with various types of change showed that a multitude of various and varying types of

change can be discerned. And the empirical illustrations offered in this article showed that many of these various and varying types of change do occur in reality. Revolutionary breakthroughs do indeed seldom occur, which is a comfort as revolutions mostly end up in disaster. Students of admin- istrative reform had better be modest and content in studying the multitude of much more useful “small, slow, and gradual changes.”

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