

Abdurrauf Fitrat with two unidentified persons, ca. 1920.

The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform

Jadidism in Central Asia

Adeeb Khalid

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for my parents

Epilogue

THE TRANSFORMATION OF JADIDISM

The revolution marked a turning point in the history of Central Asian Jadidism. By 1917, the Jadids had been successful in asserting their presence as a new group in society and pursuing their claims to leadership in it. The advent of print (and later the use of theater) had allowed them to create a new public space from which older cultural elites were increasingly marginalized, their cultural capital slighted by the Jadids as being irrelevant to the needs of the age, and their commitment to the good of the nation questioned. The new knowledge brought in by print and reproduced in new-method schools led to new understandings of the world. The nation appropriated from dominant discourses of contemporary Europe was now used as a yardstick for measuring the utility of ideas and practices in Muslim society. Islam itself came to be abstracted from the social practices of religious scholars and anchored in sacred texts, access to which, the Jadids claimed, was open to anyone with the requisite knowledge. At the same time, the Jadids saw the welfare of Islam inextricably linked to the progress of Muslims. The Muslim community thus became a modern nation, with all the rights and obligations that went with it. Measured in terms of the number of new-method schools, publications, and theater, the Jadids' success was unquestionable before 1917. Central Asian cultural life in 1917 was very different from even a generation earlier.

Yet, Jadid success was very far from complete. The new public space was still minuscule, and the status and prestige of the older elites, though diminished, remained very strong in society at large. When the February revolution transformed overnight the old politics of cultural reform into one of mass mobilization, the Jadids found themselves on new, uncertain terrain. Their political strategies until then had been dictated by the constraints imposed on political activity by an autocratic colonial state. The promise of an inclusive liberal constitutionalism proffered by the Provisional Government marked a complete transformation of the political arena. The Jadids saw in liberal constitutionalism the promise for the fulfillment of their hopes for their nation, and as numerous pronouncements throughout the year show, they sought to work within that framework. This strategy failed, however: the Jadids were surprised by the vehemence of the opposition from within their society, just as the constitutional order collapsed under the weight of social radicalism. The new politics brought into the open deep conflicts that had existed ever since the rise of Jadidism but had remained confined to debate over culture. Through the course of 1917, the Jadids found themselves capable of organizing massive demonstrations but repeatedly failed to convert that support into votes. Rather, the ulama emerged as the leaders of the society, their claim confirmed, in many elections, by votes. The ulama's triumph was rendered moot, however, by the collapse of the constitutional order, which put an end to electoral politics and put power in the hands of members of the settler community.

But the struggle was far from over in Turkestan after the Soviet victory at Kokand. The three years following 1917 were a period of intense upheaval during which the entire social and political order in the former Russian empire was reconstructed in a multifaceted struggle of various social groups. For the Jadids the years were transformative of both their worldview and their strategies. They succeeded in becoming active agents in the contests over the reestablishment of state order in Central Asia, in which the future of Central Asia was defined. When the exclusionary policies of the Tashkent Soviet changed, under pressure from the central government, a remarkable concatenation of circumstances allowed the Jadids to first enter, and then briefly take over, the new institutions of power being created by the Soviet regime in Turkestan. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the state had come to play a significant role in Jadid strategies. This marked a significant break from the tsarist period, when Jadid reform was formulated solely in society, often against the suspicions of an exclusionary state.

The experiences of 1917 went a long way toward defining the new strategies. The nation had let the Jadids down. Their vision of the good of the nation was clearly not shared by large parts of the urban population (the rural population had remained largely invisible in Muslim politics throughout the year). Although the Jadids continued to blame ignorance for the ills of their society,[1] and struggles in the realm of culture and education remained at the forefront of their agenda, they had realized that new methods were required in the new era. Years of exhortation had produced scanty results. The new era was to be one of action and institution building. At the same time, the emphasis on politics had come to stay, but liberal constitutionalism gave way to the politics of mobilization. As Soviet attitudes changed, the Jadids came to see the state not as an enemy but as an instrument of change. The new regime was quite different from the old and presented its own opportunities and constraints. Jadid strategies accordingly shifted in the years after 1917. The revolution provided the chance for a politicized and radicalized cultural elite to win control of the destiny of the nation it sought to change. In the process, the nation itself came to defined anew, as an ethnically charged patriotism came to be synonymous with a nationalism expressed in confessional terms.

TOWARD SOVIET POWER

In some ways, the carnage at Kokand made surprisingly little difference for the Jadids. Most delegates to the November congress remained active in public life in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Mustafa Choqāy represented "Autonomous Turkestan" at several all-Russian gatherings of anti-Bolshevik forces in 1918 and 1919, before going into exile through Transcaucasia.[2] The Kokand Autonomy had never been able to assert its power beyond the old city of Kokand, and therefore its fall did not affect any significant part of the population beyond Kokand. Nor did military conquest result in effective rule by the Soviets. The Soviet government in Tashkent had admitted its own limits in December when it had allowed the demonstration in support of the Kokand Autonomy to take place in the old city but refused it entrance into the Russian quarter. There matters stood for quite some time. The old city, with its labyrinthine alleys and unfamiliar sights, remained alien to the new Russian power and largely beyond its control. The only manner in which Soviet power could be asserted in the old city was through requisitioning, carried out in brief armed sorties. These had picked up immediately after the Soviet takeover. The newspaper *Ulugh Turkistān* complained in early January of the numerous requisitions in recent days. "There was a time when people were dying every day of hunger in the old city, but the European inhabitants of the new city did not grieve. Now that the food supply is diminishing in the new city, they turn their gaze to the old city."[3] Beyond Tashkent the situation was chaotic still. Soviet power, to the extent that we can speak of it as a unitary entity, came to different places at different times, its fortunes varying greatly according to local conditions. In areas of Russian peasant settlement, Russian-dominated food supply committees took requisitioning in their own hands, often acting against the commands of the Tashkent regime. The establishment of Soviet rule in Turkestan ultimately became a matter of reestablishing the rule of the city over the countryside.[4]

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[1] Fitrat, "Maktab kerak," *Hurriyat*, 22 April 1918.

[2] D. A. Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm i Rossiia* (Moscow, 1994), 100, 105, 122.

The dislocation caused by the revolution also redefined the geopolitical situation in Central Asia. Although the Russian civil war did not officially begin until May 1918, the military situation in the empire had been uncertain at least since the autumn of 1917, and had seriously undermined the apparatus of colonial power established a half-century earlier. Soviet power was not established in any militarily meaningful way until 1920, when the central government, having emerged victorious in the civil war in European Russia, could send reinforcements to Central Asia. Until then, the Soviet regime in Tashkent remained vulnerable.

This geopolitical uncertainty was accompanied by a profound economic crisis. By 1918, the cotton economy was in utter ruin. Production had declined after a peak in 1916, and inflation, dating back to 1914, had rocketed in the revolutionary era (prices had increased by 466 percent in 1917, 149 percent in 1918, and 1065 percent in 1919, by which time they stood at 588 times the level of 1914).[5] Most significantly, however, the famine of 1917 had assumed disastrous proportions over the winter. Over the next three years, the famine and the accompanying epidemics and armed conflict with the Russians devastated the local population of Central Asia. According to Marco Buttino's careful estimate, the indigenous rural population declined by 23 percent between 1917 and 1920. (The figure was 30.5 percent for 1915–1920, which included the destruction of the 1916 uprising.) The loss was offset only in very small part by a modest 8.3 percent increase in the urban population, and there was doubtless some emigration to other parts of the Russian empire as well as to China, Afghanistan, and Iran. But the majority of the decline in population is attributable to hunger and war.[6]

Such were the political realities faced by the Jadids in the spring of 1918. Many entertained hopes of foreign intervention against the Soviet regime. One émigré account, written a quarter of a century later, suggests that many Jadids were in contact with Ottoman authorities in Transcaucasia as well as Istanbul, hoping to attract military intervention.[7] Rumors of such action had reached P. T. Etherton, the British consul in Kashgar, who also reported in December 1918 that "a deputation of the leading merchants of Ferghana and Kashgaria, men of great wealth and influence, came to see me and expressed the hope that British intervention would eventuate, whilst at the same time they voiced the confidence of the people in any action the British might take."[8] The Ottoman foray into Transcaucasia ended quickly, and the British, for all their concern about the security of India, were wary of active involvement in an unstable situation while the war still continued in Europe. Armed resistance did not appear as an option to the Jadids.

The Jadids had little connection with the Basmachi revolt in Ferghana, which began in 1918 and continued for several years, by which time it had also spread to eastern Bukhara. Conventional wisdom connects the Basmachi to the destruction of the Kokand Autonomy. Soviet historiography saw in them the force of counterrevolution, acting in unison with every reactionary force in the region to nip Soviet power in the bud. Non-Soviet scholarship has generally accepted the romanticized émigré view of the Basmachi as a guerrilla movement of national liberation.[9] Both views place a greater burden on the Basmachi than historical evidence can sustain. Instead, the revolt was a response to the economic and social crisis produced by the famine and the resulting "bacchanalia of robbery, requisitions and confiscations on the part of 'Soviet authorities.'"[10] Ferghana had been a turbulent area in the last decades of imperial rule, when the term *bāsmachi* was commonplace in *TWG,* whose pages were replete with accounts of banditry and murder in the region. The Basmachi represented one strategy of the rural population to cope with this dislocation.[11] The potential military threat that the Basmachi represented to Soviet power was recognized by many contemporaries, but always greatly overestimated. Both in terms of its organization and its goals (or rather the absence thereof), the movement was embedded in local solidarities, which remained alien to the more abstract visions of national struggle espoused by those who sought to coopt it to their goals.[12] We might do well to remember that Choqāy on more than one occasion disowned any connection between the struggle he had led and that of the Basmachi, who were little better than bandits in his opinion.[13]

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[3] "Eski shahrda tintuw," *UT,* 4 January 1918.

[4] The extremely complex politics of famine in Turkestan after 1917 are analyzed by Marco Buttino, "Politics and Social Conflict during a Famine: Turkestan Immediately after the Revolution," in Buttino, ed., *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union* (Milan, 1993), 257–277.

[5] Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia: opyt Turkestana* (Oxford, 1985 [orig. Moscow, 1921]), 164.

[6] Buttino, "Study of the Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan, 1917–1920," *Central Asian Survey* 9, no. 4 (1990): 64–69.

[7] Abdullah Recep Baysun, *Türkistan Millî Hareketleri* (Istanbul, 1943), 31–34.

[8] Etherton to Government of India, 9 December 1918, in IOLR, L/P&S/10/741, 211v–212.

The main political strategy of the Jadids came to focus instead on a struggle for participation in the new regime and its fledgling institutions. "Knowing that struggle in Turkestan was useless and could lead only to the ruin of the land," Choqāy wrote in 1923, "the core of the autonomists remaining after the defeat at Kokand called upon its supporters to work with existing authorities in order to weaken the hostility directed at the indigenous population by the frontier Soviet regime."[14] For reasons beyond their control, the Jadids were remarkably successful in this bid; in the process they outflanked the ulama in their quest for leadership of urban Muslim society.

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[9] Most recently by Baymirza Hayit, *Basmatschi: Nationaler Kampf Turkestans in den Jahren 1917 bis 1934* (Cologne, 1992).

[10] S. Ginzburg, "Basmachestvo v Fergane," in *Ocherki revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Srednei Azii: sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1926), 134.

[11] Richard Lorenz, "Economic Bases of the Basmachi Movement in the Farghana Valley," in Andreas Kappeler et al., eds., *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C., 1994), 277–303.

[12] The most quixotic of these attempts was that of Enver Pasha, who in 1921 briefly placed himself at the helm of the Basmachi in a bid to oust the Soviet regime from Central Asia. On this episode, see now Masayuki Yamauchi, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia, 1919–1922* (Tokyo, 1991).

[13] *Bor'ba* (Tiflis), 12 February 1921; Chokaev, "Korni vozstanii v Bukhare," *Poslednie novosti* (Paris), 29 September 1923.

[14] Chokaev, "Korni vozstanii."

MUSLIM COMMUNISTS

One of Lenin's first decrees had been directed "To the Toiling Muslims of Russia and the East," whose grievances the Bolsheviks sought to coopt. The policies of the Tashkent Soviet were, from this point of view, totally reckless and were challenged by the central government (which moved to Moscow in March 1918) early on. Yet, Moscow's influence was highly mediated. The civil war and the tenuousness of the Bolshevik hold on power in central Russia itself ruled out any direct intervention. Still, Turkestan's avowed adherence to Russia, an important pillar of its claim to legitimacy, gave Moscow some scope for moral suasion, which it sought to utilize to the fullest extent possible. The newly formed People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (or Narkomnats, in the revolutionary argot then coming into vogue) sent a mission with plenipotentiary powers to Turkestan to assert its will. The mission, composed of A. P. Kobozev and two Tatars, Y. Ibrahimov and Arif Klevleev, arrived in Tashkent in February 1918 and began the task of attracting Muslims into the new regime. Kobozev's tactics were straightforward: to support local Muslims almost indiscriminately against the Russians in control of the Soviet.[15] In a telegram to the Tashkent Soviet announcing the Kobozev mission, Stalin, then commissar for nationality affairs, informed the Tashkent Soviet that Klevleev was a former nationalist, but suggested that the new regime not be afraid of "the shadows of the past" and "attract to [Soviet] work other supporters of Kerenskii from the natives, to the extent that they are ready to serve Soviet power."[16] Kobozev's efforts bore fruit, and on the eve of the Fifth Turkestan Congress of Soviets in April, he was able to inform the Council of People's Commissars in Moscow that "white Muslim *chalmas* [turbans] have grown [in number] in the ranks of the Tashkent parliament."[17] Seven of the thirty-six members of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Autonomous Federative Republic that was proclaimed by the congress were Muslims. Kobozev also pushed for the formation of a Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (Turkomnats) in the new autonomous republic, to which the Tashkent government acceded in June after much footdragging. This was the first in a series of institutions that provided Muslims access to the new power structure. The terms of reference of the Turkomnats were fairly modest. Its main function was to represent and defend the interests of workers of various nationalities (including non-Russian Europeans living in Turkestan). With the moral support of Moscow, however, it gathered considerable political power around it and became the mouthpiece of Muslim opinion within the party. By the autumn of 1918, all oblast-level executive committees of the Soviet regime had sections on nationality affairs.

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[15] Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia,* 159.

[16] Stalin to Kolesov, 7 April 1918, in *PORvUz,* II: 223.

[17] Radiogram dated 16 April 1918, in ibid., 241.

Over the next few months, large numbers of Muslims flocked to the new institutions of power. The Bolsheviks finally formed their own party, the Communist Party of Turkestan (KPT), in June 1918. Archival research on the recruitment of Muslims into the party in its first years is still not possible, but all evidence suggests that large numbers of Jadids joined it as soon as it was possible. Klevleev was especially active in recruiting Muslims into the party and state apparatus. In May, he visited Samarqand, where he addressed a mass meeting in the Sher Dār madrasa organized by the Samarqand Labor Union. Later in the month, the union renamed itself the Muslim Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies of Samarqand uezd, and by August, a Muslim Workers' Communist Society (Musulmān Zehmatkash Ishtirākiyun Jamiyati) boasted 1,600 members in Samarqand. The Jadid newspaper *Hurriyat* had been adopted by the education section of the Samarqand Soviet as its organ.[18] In Tashkent, the Tatar Union reorganized as the Tatar Socialist Workers' Committee in June. Then, on 2 August, in a meeting held in the main mosque of Tashkent and chaired by Klevleev, it transformed itself into the Tatar section of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).[19] A Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies had appeared in old Tashkent, and it provided an important channel for recruitment of Muslims. After Klevleev engineered new elections for its Executive Committee in June, it included the Bolsheviks Abdullah Awlāni and Said Akram Said Azimbaev and the Left Social Revolutionary Tawallā. By August, Tawallā had been elected to the Executive Committee of the Tashkent Soviet, as was Bashirullah Khojaev, the brother of Ubaydullah Khojaev and an old Jadid in his own right.[20]

The Jadids thus rapidly transformed themselves into Muslim Communists and asserted the claim, again, to speak in the name of the Muslims of Turkestan. "Muslim" also functioned as an identity label in the

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[18] Ibid., 235, 267, 289, 324–325.
[19] Ibid., 303, 420–421.
[20] Ibid., 333–334, 461–462.

early Soviet period. For the new regime in Moscow, "Muslims" represented a nationality alongside Ukrainians, Jews, and Georgians in the vocabulary of the Narkomnats. (In Turkestan, "Muslim" had the added benefit of being usable as a synonym for "native.") The ulama, who had contested the Jadid claim to leadership the previous year, proved far less adept at operating in the new political language and quickly lost the initiative they had gained in Muslim politics in 1917. The Jadids went on the offensive quickly. In early 1918, they organized a Fuqahā Jamiyati (Society of Jurists) comprising ulama sympathetic to reform, which was clearly meant to counter the influence of the ulama. Then in April the Tashkent Soviet of Muslim Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, essentially a Jadid organization, asked the City Soviet to arrest the "counterrevolutionary" ulama belonging to the Ulamā Jamiyati and to requisition the property belonging to the organization. The request was duly carried out, and the Jamiyat was abolished on 5 May for "not corresponding to the interests of the working people" and its organ, *al-Izāh,* was banned.[21] The Fuqahā Jamiyati did not last very long, but it had done its work. When it was dissolved in its turn for being "irrelevant to current problems," its property was turned over to Madaniyat (Civilization), a new educational society formed by Jadids.[22]

For their part, the new Muslim Communists assimilated the language of class that legitimated the new regime. The Tashkent Soviet, in using the language of class to assert the national rights of the region's European settler population, had highlighted the importance of the new language. The Kokand Autonomy had also sought "proletarian" legitimacy for itself by organizing a Muslim Workers' and Peasants' Congress. From then on, class and revolution entered Jadid vocabulary and over the next several years were repeatedly used to assert the rights of the local population. To be sure, most of the Muslims who entered the party in 1918 and subsequent years had not been active Jadids before 1917. The revolution had seen a major influx of new people into public life, and their numbers continued to increase, thus broadening the base of the politically active elite in Turkestan. The politics of these Muslim Communists, however, represented in many ways a direct connection with the main thrust of Jadidism. Education and enlightenment continued to hold a central place in their strategies. The burst of activity that took place in 1917, when the Jadids organized teachers' courses and published new textbooks, continued and by the middle of 1918 found a more receptive official environment. Kobozev and Klevleev ensured that the new Commissariat for Education became involved in Muslim education as well. This provided a significant channel for the influx of Jadids into the new apparatus. Russo-native schools had been abolished in the summer of 1917, and now a new network of "Soviet" schools began to emerge around existing new-method schools. In the summer of 1918, twenty new schools were opened, and in 1919, in Tashkent alone, there were forty-eight Muslim schools with 158 teachers and 9,200 students, a significant increase over the figures of the tsarist period.[23] (This was in addition to the maktabs, which continued to exist.) Although details of the curricula of these schools remain elusive, there is no doubt that these schools were a direct continuation of the Jadids' new-method schools. The increase in the number of schools was made possible by the presence in Turkestan of Ottoman prisoners of war, many of whom were pressed into service as teachers.[24] They brought with them curricular and political attitudes that had little in common with those of the new regime. Ottoman Turkish was widely used in instruction, and the "national poetry" of the Jadids gave way to Ottoman martial songs and military drill.[25] Old textbooks were reprinted and new ones continued to appear in a very similar mold. Textbooks such as Wasli's *Ortāq* (Friend) or Shākirjān Rahimi's *Sawghā* (Present) scarcely differed, in tone or content, from any new-method textbook of the past, even though they were published by Soviet authorities.[26] In addition, several textbooks were translated from Russian or Tatar.[27]

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[21] Ibid., 203–204, 265.
[22] "Maqsad-u maslak," *Bayān ul-haq,* 16 August 1918 (n.s.).

The lithography-based publishing trade did not survive the revolution. The year 1917 had been the most prolific in Central Asian publishing, and the same activity continued into the first half of 1918, when several new periodicals appeared. By the summer, however, the Soviet regime had managed to nationalize all printing presses (the majority of which had existed in Russian parts of towns and for whom the printing of Arabic-script texts was a side operation), thus sounding the death knell of the book trade. The official monopoly on printing and publishing was in place, but again the only qualified personnel available were Jadids, and the new official press bore an uncanny resemblance to the Jadid press of old. The unofficial vernacular press had ceased to exist by mid-1918, to be replaced by *Ishtirākiyun* (Communists), the official organ of Turkomnats, which, as its Arabianate title indicates, retained a distinctly Muslim flavor. Jadid authors retained a commanding presence in the many such quasi-official newspapers that appeared throughout Turkestan over the next three years, as the officially sanctioned press became in those years a conduit for a Jadid voice.

But that voice had changed dramatically in the aftermath of the collapse of the old order. An ethnically charged patriotism rapidly came to characterize the Jadid rhetoric of the nation. In the first days of the revolution, the nation was universally defined as comprising the Muslims of Turkestan. Over the course of the year, the Jadid emphasis shifted gradually to Turkestan, which was now insistently seen as the homeland of the Turkic peoples. The ulama's appropriation of Islam was partially responsible for this, for it pushed the Jadids to cast their appeal increasingly in terms of ethnic nationalism. For Turkestani Jadids, the new conditions pushed to the fore the romantic notions of Turkicness that had been present in their rhetoric before the revolution. All through the year Jadid writers evoked Chinggis, Temur, and Ulugh-bek. Nowhere is this clearer than in the writings of Fitrat, who wrote a regular column in *Hurriyat* after becoming its editor in August 1917. In July, he wrote: "O great Turan, the land of lions! What happened to you? What bad days have you fallen into? What happened to the brave Turks who once ruled the world? Why did they pass? Why did they go away?"[28] This newfound Turkism was also reflected in Fitrat's language. Up until the revolution, Fitrat had published almost exclusively in Persian; in that year he switched to a highly purist form of Turkic. In September 1917, he published a reader for the fourth year of new-method schools (ostensibly for use in Bukhara) with a vocabulary so rigorously Turkist that Fitrat felt compelled to translate several words in footnotes. All the characters in the reading passages bear Turkic names.[29] In the spring of 1918, a newspaper, *Turk sozi* (Turkic Word), was being published in Tashkent by an organization called Turk Ortāqlighi (Turkic Friendship). Over the next two years, the same mood was to lead to the elaboration of a Chaghatāy nationalism by a number of Jadid writers under Fitrat's leadership, grouped in the Chaghatāy Gurungi (Chaghatay Conversation).[30]

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[23] Rakhimi, "Prosveshchenie uzbekov," *Nauka i prosveshchenie*, 1922, no. 2, 41–42; Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia*, 149.

[24] This episode remains little known; the only substantial piece of documentation is the reminiscences of Râci Çakıröz, one of the prisoners of war, in R. Çakıröz and Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkistan'da Türk Subayları," serialized in *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi* in 1987–1988.

[25] Sh. Rahim, *Ozbek maārifning otkandaki wa hāzirgi hāli* (Tashkent, 1923), 18–19.

[26] Wasli, *Ortāq* (Samarqand, 1918); Shākirjān Rahimi, *Sawghā* (Tashkent, 1919).

[27] N. P. Arkhangel'skii, "Uchebnaia literatura na uzbekskom iazyke," *Nauka i prosveshchenie*, 1922, no. 2, 2nd pagination, 36.

[28] Fitrat, "Yurt qāyghusi," *Hurriyat*, 28 July 1917.

[29] Fitrat, *Oqu* (Bukhara, 1917).

There were several sources of this new emphasis on Turkism. The abolition of censorship made possible the expression of hitherto unmentionable visions of identity. The most extreme expressions of Turkism still came from the Tatars, whose newspaper in Tashkent was called *Ulugh Turkistān* (Great Turkestan). In its first issue, Nushirvan Yavushev had claimed that the "30 million Turko-Tatars in Russia" were, "from the point of view of race, nationality, and language, tied to one another like the children of the same father and the branches of the same tree. Turkestan is the original homeland of the Turks. Therefore, no Turkic nation of Russia will stand back from helping our Turkestani brothers in their quest for autonomy. No Turkic son can forget that Turkestan is his own homeland."[31] This tenor was kept up throughout the year by *Ulugh Turkistān* and the Tatar press in European Russia.

The other source of this new Turkism was the Ottoman empire, where pan-Turkism had reached an apogee of influence during the war, the fetvâ depicting it as a holy war notwithstanding. Strict censorship imposed at the beginning of the war had excluded much of this rhetoric from Russia, but with the weakening of the Russian war effort by the autumn of 1917, such censorship waned. Ottoman victories in Transcaucasia in the spring of 1918 further heightened enthusiasm for Turkism among the Jadids. Yet, this was not the Ottoman-directed spread of pan-Turkism that Russian official had long feared (and that contemporary British intelligence services suspected). No evidence of direct Ottoman government support for Turkist or pan-Turkist groups in Central Asia has come to light. Rather, this enthusiasm for Turkism sprung from the radical mood of the Jadids. The most tangible connection between the Ottoman empire and Turkestan was the presence of several thousand Ottoman prisoners of war in Turkestan, who, in the chaotic circumstances of 1918, found themselves having to fend for a living. Yet their participation in local cultural life, although important, was hardly part of a centrally directed plot to disseminate pan-Turkist ideas.[32]

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[30] On the Chaghatāy Gurungi, see Hisao Komatsu, "The Evolution of Group Identity among Bukharan Intellectuals in 1911–1928: An Overview," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, no. 47 (1989): 122ff.; William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (Berlin, 1991), 232–239.

[31] N. Yavushev, "Turkistān āftānomiya āluw haqinda," *UT*, 5 May 1917.

It is also important to note that this rigorous Turkism did not come at the expense of Islam, which continued to figure prominently in Jadid rhetoric. Consider the following appeal for unity among Muslims published in October 1917 by the Shura's Central Council: "Muslims! All hopes, all goals of us Turks are the same: to defend our religion [*din*] and our nation [*millat*], to gain autonomy over our land [*toprāq*] and our country [*watan*], to live freely without oppressing others and without letting others oppress us. Turkestan belongs to the Turks."[33] "Muslim" and "Turk" were still used interchangeably, but all the Muslims of Turkestan were now assumed to be Turks.

This shift toward Turkism was accompanied by a sudden turn to anticolonialism in Jadid rhetoric. This turn, first noticeable in the autumn of 1917, is largely to be explained by contemporary events. The Jadids had supported the Russian war effort in the hope of securing a voice in imperial politics after the war. The February revolution had changed little in this regard; however, by autumn Russia's commitment to the war, and the geopolitical calculations that underlay it, had unraveled. Upon taking power in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks immediately cast their appeal in antiwar and anti-imperialist terms. Their appeal to toiling Muslims, meant to rattle the governments of the Entente powers,[34] was followed by the publication of secret treaties signed during the war, many of which were at the expense of the Ottoman empire. The publication of the treaties had a significant impact on Jadid thinking. For Fitrat, "it had now become clear who the real enemies of the Muslim, and especially the Turkic, world are."[35] The defeat of the Ottoman empire in 1918 further fueled anti-Entente sentiment, and anticolonialism (with an acutely anti-British ring) became a constant feature of Jadid rhetoric.

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[32] The main sources for our understanding of pan-Turkism have been contemporary British intelligence reports. Written in the heat of the moment, during a war that had a taken a turn that their authors often did not understand, these reports can easily exaggerate Ottoman influence in Central Asian affairs. They also assumed political manipulation behind every change of opinion among the "natives," who were usually assumed to not be able to think for themselves.

It is true that in the aftermath of the Ottoman collapse, both Enver and Cemal pashas found themselves in the Russian empire. But it is simplistic to assume that they were still chasing a pan-Turkist dream. Based on unprecedented access to Enver Pasha's private correspondence, Masayuki Yamauchi (*The Green Crescent under the Red Star*) has argued persuasively that Enver was motivated ultimately by a desire to recapture his political position in Anatolia. For much of his time in Soviet Russia, Enver sought ways in which he could upstage Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as the leader of the anti-Entente struggle in Anatolia by appealing to a mixture of anticolonial, anti-Entente, Muslim, and Turkic sentiments. It was only when he realized that the Soviet regime had little interest in backing him that he went to Bukhara and sought to rally the Bāsmachi against Soviet rule.

[33] "Musulmanlar!" *Turk eli*, 15 October 1917.

[34] The move achieved its goals, for the British were truly concerned and sought to ensure that news of the proclamation did not reach India or Egypt. The correspondence in this regard is in IOLR, L/P&S/11/130, file P4/1918.

This marked a significant break from the Jadid admiration for the "developed" and "civilized" nations of Europe, which had withstood all evidence to the contrary. Fitrat, who had chosen Europeans as his mouthpiece in his exhortatory tracts earlier in the decade, wrote *Sharq siyāsati* (Politics of the East), a bitter denunciation of Europe's imperial record in 1919. "To this day, European imperialists have given the East nothing except immorality and destruction. Even though they came to the East saying, 'We will open schools of civilization and colleges of humanity,' they have opened nothing but brothels and winehouses." The European policy of "enslavement and destruction" was current everywhere in the East and the Muslim world and had reached new heights after the recent war. The British now occupied all Arab lands with the exception of Hijāz, which, Fitrat wrote, they were about to swallow. "They will make an Englishman who has falsely converted to Islam the caliph and thus turn 350 million Muslims into their eternal slaves." The only solution for Muslims, and for the people of "the East," was to seek the support of Soviet Russia, which had already fought the imperialist powers and which needed help from "the East" for its own survival. Most significantly, "Today it is necessary to drop everything else and take on the English. In order to do that, it is our responsibility to befriend every enemy of the English."[36]

The plight of their counterparts in Bukhara further drew the Jadids to the Soviet regime. Bukharan Jadids has sought to force the amir's hand in April 1917, but the move had backfired. The amir turned the matter into one of Bukharan sovereignty and Islamic purity and persecuted the Jadids, most of whom fled to Kagan and Turkestan, where they continued to plot and publish.[37] Their writings from this period are

also marked by a conflation of revolution and national struggle. Abdullah Badri, who had written several plays before 1917, published two pamphlets in 1919 presenting the Young Bukharans (as the Bukharan Jadids had come to be known after 1917) to the peasant population of Bukhara. The amir appears not as the last surviving Muslim monarch in Central Asia, as Bukharan Jadids had seen him before 1917, but as a corrupt, bloodthirsty despot living off the toil of the peasants in his realm; other high-ranking dignitaries fare no better.[38] Fayzullah Khojaev, the leader of the Young Bukharans, writing in the first issue of the party's newspaper, *Uchqun* (Spark), connected the amir to imperialism, especially that of the British (who had forced the government of Turkey, the center of the Muslim world, to move to Anatolia and who had bombed Mecca and Medina). "Therefore, it is necessary for us," he concluded, "to destroy the cruel, bloodthirsty, and despotic amir [and his functionaries], and to form in their place a just and equitable government, so that poor peasants, artisans, and soldiers may live together in liberty and peace, like the children of the same parents. Thus, hand in hand with our coreligionists throughout the world, Afghans, Iranians, Indians, Arabs, and Turks, we will counter the English, accursed throughout the East, and their lackeys." Khojaev also concluded the need for assistance from Soviet Russia, "the tribune of justice and liberty in the whole world."[39]

But the conflation of class and nation allowed by anticolonialism could be used against Russian Communists in Turkestan just as easily as against the British. As the First Regional Conference of Muslim Communists, held in May 1919, noted, "The spirit and direction of the old privileged classes has not been removed decisively and . . . members of the former privileged classes as well as some self-styled Communists treat Muslims as subjects."[40] Another conference of Muslim Communists of Tashkent "consider[ed] it necessary to note that the primary hurdle to the Soviet construction of Turkestan is the mistrust shown by the

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[35] Fitrat, "Yāshurun muāhidalari," *Hurriyat,* 28 November 1917.

[36] Fitrat, *Sharq siyāsati* (N.p., 1919), 13, 37–47.

[37] Accounts of the revolution in Bukhara are to be found in S. Ayni, *Bukhara inqilabi tarikhi uchun materiallar* (Moscow, 1922); Faizulla Khodzhaev, *K istorii revoliutsii v Bukhare* (Tashkent, 1926); Khodzhaev [Fayzulla Khojaev], *Bukhara inqilabinin tarikhiga materiallar* (Tashkent, 1930); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et révolution chez les musulmans de l'empire russe,* 2nd ed. (Paris, 1981), 190ff.; Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924* (Cambridge, 1968), chs. 14–17; Reinhard Eisener, "Bukhara v 1917 godu," *Vostok,* 1994, no. 4, 131–144; no. 5, 75–92.

[38] Abdullah Badri, *Yāsh Bukhārālilār kimlar?* (Moscow, 1919); Badri, *Yāsh Bukhārālilar bechāra khalq wa dehqānlar uchun yakhshimi, yamānmi?* (Moscow, 1919).

[39] Fayzullah Khoja, "Bukhārāning yagāna āzādliq wa istiqlāl chāralari," *Uchqun,* 15 April 1920. The masthead of the newspaper proclaimed: "The liberation of the East is a matter of the People of the East themselves."

[40] Quoted by Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia,* 151.

European proletariat toward the toiling Muslim masses, as a result of which the Muslim proletariat is sidelined in the construction of the new life."[41] Food supply committees, subordinated to the soviets by early 1918, became the most significant arena of political conflict, but the conflict soon spread to the highest organs of the party itself.

The process was set in motion by the highest authorities of the (newly renamed) Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), or RKP(b), themselves, who by the spring of 1919 were stressing the need for "particular care and attention" toward "the remnants of national feelings of the toiling masses of the oppressed or dependent nations." This concern led to the formation in April 1919 of the Muslim Bureau (Musbiuro) of the Regional Committee of the KPT as the party analog of the Turkomnats.[42] Quite rapidly, the Musbiuro became autonomous of the Regional Committee of the KPT and began to assert its will quite openly. A Central Committee decree demanding that the indigenous population of Turkestan enjoy proportional representation in all state organs provided an opportunity for the Musbiuro to act. New party and Soviet congresses were hurriedly convened to act upon the new directive, and both elected new executive committees, both of which were dominated by Muslims. Turar Rïsqulov, a Qazaq from Awliya Ata, was elected president of both committees.

Muslim Communists made their most ambitious bid in January 1920, at the Fifth Regional Conference of the KPT, where they succeeded in passing a resolution changing the name of the KPT to the "Communist Party of the Turkic Peoples" and that of the Turkestan Republic to the "Turkic Republic."[43] This was accompanied by another resolution demanding wide-ranging autonomy for Turkestan. Rïsqulov had explicitly drawn a parallel with the Kokand Autonomy in describing to the congress the kind of autonomy the resolution hoped to institutionalize,[44] but the resolution, "On the Autonomy and Constitution of Turkestan," went much further. "In the interests of the international unity of toiling and oppressed peoples, to oppose by means of Communist agitation the strivings of the Turkic nationalities to divide themselves into different groups . . . and [their desire] to establish separate small republics; instead, with a view to forging the unity of all Turkic nationalities who have so far not been included in the RSFSR, it is proposed to unify them with the Turkic Soviet Republic, and wherever it is not possible to achieve this, it is proposed to unite different Turkic nationalities in accordance with their territorial proximity."[45] The juxtaposition of nationalist and Communist language was used again when Rïsqulov traveled to Moscow in May 1920 to present the Muslim Communist case to the highest party authorities after the resolution had been overridden, after some vacillation, by the recently appointed Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiia) of the Moscow Central Committee. In a presentation to the Central Committee, Rïsqulov argued that there were only two basic groups in Turkestan, "the oppressed and exploited colonial natives and European capital."[46] He went on to demand, in the name of the KPT and the government of Turkestan, the transfer of all authority in Turkestan to the Central Executive Committee of Turkestan, the abolition of the Turkkomissiia, and the establishment of a Muslim army subordinate to the autonomous government of Turkestan.[47] In their substance, these demands harked back to the hopes of 1917, but they were now couched in the language of revolution. But class had been replaced, in the colonial situation of Turkestan, by nation; national liberation of the Muslim community could be achieved through Communist means and in the Soviet context.

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The attempt to transform the KPT was, of course, defeated. The Turkkomissiia, shifting its attention to combating local nationalism, rescinded the resolution on autonomy as being "contrary to the principles of internationalist construction of the Communist Party." Instead, the Central Committee in Moscow passed its own resolution on the autonomy of Turkestan, which offered a strictly territorial autonomy to Turkestan. In June 1920, the Central Committee passed another four resolutions calling for stricter central control over Turkestan affairs. The Bolshevik victory in the Civil War and the massive presence of the Red Army in Turkestan made such resolutions meaningful. In September, party and Soviet congresses met to elect new executive committees that excluded Rïsqulov and his supporters and adopted the RKP(b) resolutions of July. This setback did not spell the end of Muslim participation in Soviet political life, though. The new central committees elected in September 1920 had a Muslim majority, and the people's republics formed in Khiva and Bukhara in that year were governed entirely by Muslims, mostly Jadids. The strengthened central position did not mean an unrestricted enforcement of a central will. The regime in Moscow had neither the means nor the resources for that. Indeed, ideologically committed to granting autonomy to all national groups within its domain, the regime was only too willing to accept the particularism of Central Asia. How that particularism was to be defined became the crucial question. The Turkic Muslim nation of the Jadids conflicted with the more narrowly defined ethnic nations supported by the Soviet regime (but also, increasingly, by many Muslims in Central Asia itself). Ultimately, with the "national delimitation" of 1925, ethnic nationalism supplanted broader Turkist visions of identity as the legitimate basis of autonomy. This process created new ethnographic knowledge, which made possible, but also legitimized, the new national identities.

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[41] Quoted by U. Kasymov, "Iz istorii musul'manskikh kommunisticheskikh organizatsii v Turkestane v 1919–1920 godakh," *Trudy Tashkentskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, n.s., no. 207 (1962): 10.

[42] T. Ryskulov, *Revoliutsiia i korennoe naselenie Turkestana* (Tashkent, 1925), 121–127.

[43] Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia*, 171.

[44] V. P. Nikolaeva, "Turkkomissiia kak polnomochnyi organ TsK RKP(b)," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, 1958, no. 2, 83.

[45] Quoted in Safarov, *Kolonial'naia revoliutsiia*, 171; see also *Rezoliutsii i postanovleniia s"ezdov Kommunisticheskoi partii Turkestana (1918–1924 gg.)* (Tashkent, 1968), 70.

[46] Quoted by Nikolaeva, "Turkkomissiia," 82.

[47] Ibid., 85.

By 1925, then, the political boundaries of modern Central Asia were largely in place. The political and cultural transformations they represent have only been briefly sketched here, but the involvement of the Jadids in the process cannot be overemphasized. Their adroit appropriation of the new language of class and revolution, perhaps most clearly visible in the resolutions passed by the Muslim Communists of Turkestan in January 1920, expressed what Alexandre Bennigsen has called "Muslim national communism," which was best developed by the Tatar Mirsaid Sultangaliev.[48] This was a new strategy called for by a new age. Prerevolutionary Jadidism had been fully imbricated in the imperial order, making use of the opportunities allowed by it while subject to its constraints. Hence the emphasis on self-improvement by the Muslim society with the hope of its inclusion in the imperial economy and the impe-

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[48] Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie: le «sultangalievisme» au Tatarstan* (Paris, 1960); Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Ideology for the Colonial World* (Chicago, 1979).

rial political order. Muslim national communism was the Jadids' strategy for the new age ushered in by the revolution. After 1920, Soviet rule provided the new context in which Central Asian cultures were to be imagined. The regime was quite different from tsarist autocracy: Instead of exclusion, it offered mobilization, and it increased the reach of the state into spheres of activity autocracy had been content to leave alone. Its emphasis on enlightenment and progress was easily comprehensible to the Jadids, and its methods of mobilization and organization evoked their respect. The Jadids had not forgotten the lessons of 1917. They had found in the Soviet regime the outside support they had been unable to muster in that year.

Muslim national communism represented a new expression of the secular Muslim nationalism that had motivated the Jadids before 1917, now expressed in the language of revolution and combined, seamlessly in the minds of those involved, with anticolonial struggle.[49] The Jadids' commitment to revolution was genuine, and the language of class was not evoked simply out of cynicism; yet, the Jadids' understanding of both these concepts was their own. Scholars outside the former Soviet Union have wasted much energy in debating whether the Jadids were "true" Communists or not. The assumption that both "Jadids" (or "Muslims") and "Communists" are stable entities whose essential characteristics are mutually exclusive is of course untenable in the light of historical evidence. To a radicalized cultural elite, the mobilizational methods of communism appealed greatly, and the rhetoric of revolution provided a means for struggling with enemies both within and without society.

For much of the 1920s, the Jadids played central roles in the political and especially the cultural life of Central Asia. Fayzullah Khojaev was prime minister of the Bukharan People's Republic and then president of Uzbekistan, while Fitrat served as minister for education in Bukhara. Cholpān, Qādiri, Hamza, Munawwar Qāri, Awlāni, Ayni, Ajzi, and Hāji Muin, to name only a few of the most important figures, were all central figures in the worlds of letters, arts, and education all through the decade. They saw themselves creating a new civilization—modern, Soviet, Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim all at once. They hoped to coopt the state to the work of modernization that exhortation alone had not achieved in the prerevolutionary era. As such, the Jadids in the 1920s were hardly the pawns of a monolithic Soviet regime; rather, they are best compared with fellow modernists in Iran and (especially) Turkey in the same decade who also used the newly established apparatus of a modern centralized nation-state to revolutionize society and culture.

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[49] The transition from anticolonial pan-Islam to anticolonial socialism also proved easy for many Muslim Indians: see K.H. Ansari, "Pan-Islam in the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists," *Modern Asian Studies* 20 (1986): 509–537.

But unlike their counterparts in Turkey and Iran, the Jadids' triumph was short-lived. By the late 1920s, the regime in Moscow had given up on the experimentation that had characterized much of that decade, and the Jadids' understanding of Soviet reality collided head on with the centralizing impulse of the new period. The results were catastrophic for the Jadids personally and for Jadidism as a cultural movement. Of the major figures, only Ayni died in his bed; most others met violent deaths at the hands of various enemies. Behbudi was the first to go, tortured to death in March 1919 by (appropriately enough, perhaps) the functionaries of the amir of Bukhara after they had apprehended him as he traversed Bukharan territory on his way, in all likelihood, to the Peace Conference in Versailles to plead the case of Turkestan. Hamza was killed by a mob in 1929 as he took part in a campaign against the veil. Munawwar Qāri, Cholpān, Qādiri, Hāji Muin, and Ubaydullah Khojaev all disappeared in the Gulag in the 1930s. By 1938, when Fitrat was executed and Fayzullah Khojaev, most famously of them all, mounted the podium at the Great Purge Trial in Moscow as part of the "anti-Soviet bloc of 'Rights and Trotskyites'" to face the fatal charges of counterrevolution and anti-Soviet activity, the Jadid generation had been obliterated. They were replaced by a new generation (the so-called Class of '38), whose education and worldview had been shaped entirely within the Soviet context.[50] Although this generation inherited many of the compromises of the 1920s and 1930s, it shared little else with the Jadids. It was a new political elite that over the next several decades came to entrench itself in the political structures of the Soviet Union. And although this new elite developed its own versions of (often virulent) nationalism, it had little in common with the visions of the Jadids. Given such a conjuncture of political interests between the new republican elites and the central regime, the memory of the Jadids was rapidly consigned to oblivion.

That oblivion has proved quite difficult to overcome. The process of reclaiming the memory began with the belated advent of glasnost to Central Asia, and in the heady days of 1991 and 1992, much was written

about the Jadids. But the Class of '38 survived in power (especially in Uzbekistan) and has sought to base its legitimacy in a nationalism that appeals to the safely distant past of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. "Amir" Temur, Ulugh-bek, and Alisher Nawā'i are the new heroes of independent Uzbekistan, while the Jadids serve largely to symbolize the martyrdom of the Uzbek nation at the hands of the colonial Soviet regime. The Jadids have thus been appropriated by a nation imagined largely in the Soviet period.

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[50] The term "Class of '38" was coined by Donald S. Carlisle, "The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83)," *Central Asian Survey* 5, no. 3/4 (1986): 99.