timed assessment 4hrs 1000words per question (2question, open book)
Reward Management
TEACHING AND LEARNING UNIT 10
Key Slides and Course Overview
Professor Brian Main
1
UNITS:
Unit 1. Introducing Employee Reward Systems; Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks.
Unit 2. The Legal, Employment Relations
and Market Context.
Unit 3. Base Pay Structures and Relationships;
Pay Setting, Composition and Progression.
Unit 4. Variable Pay Schemes.
Unit 5. Benefits and Pensions
( Remember the Course )
UNITS:
( Unit 6. Non-Financial Reward. Units 7 & 8. Rewarding Directors and Executives. Unit 9. International Reward Management. )
Assessment
( 40% Essay + 60% Final Exam )
· Try to think – what were key points?
· Any additional references (video/ class exercise/ reading)
· Spill Psychotherapy company
· Trade Union Recognition at Amazon
· Conducting an Equal Pay Review – Carrie Gracie at the BBC
· Job Evaluation/Job Sizing – UoE exercise
· Pay equity and the Monkeys
· Gordon Bethune – video clip
· FCA report on Incentives at Lloyds and BoS
· “Deliveroo” exercise
· “UBER” exercise
· Daniel Pink TED talk
· Google-Europe boss Matt Brittin – video clip
· Show me your money Pimlico Plumbers – video clip
· CEO remuneration – Persimmon case; Ryanair; Ocado.
· Purchasing Power Parity (McDonalds) exercise.
· Your Pay Report topic
( Overall: )
· Make a plan
· Answer the question.
Summary
· See lecture slides.
· Marked ‘core’ meant to denote ‘key material/ concept’.
· Marked ‘critical’ meant to denote ‘critical thinking’.
Reward Management Theory:
· Expectancy.
· Equity.
· Agency.
ALWAYS !
( 8 )
Critical Thinking
Recall.
( 9 )
· Do not accept models or arguments at face value.
· Think about and question the underpinning assumptions.
· Yes, examine the benefits of seeing things in a particular way
(a model).
· BUT, also be sure to identify any problems in terms of the underlying assumptions and claims.
· Not the same as simply being negative (“this is a stupid model!”).
· Requires that you engage deeply with the material.
Unit #1
Classical Labour Market
( Units (hours) of labour ) ( 10 )
a) Classical Labour Market - ‘Economic man’:
· market-based exchange relation
· assumption that an employee will seek to minimise sacrificed ‘leisure time’ to work and to maximise the rate of pay.
· ( S e D )Labour supply and demand regulate the price (wage rates).
Wage rate
Conventional View of Labour Supply
Wage
Marginal Value of Time
(£)
£25
£20
£15
Supply of Labour
D
C
B
£10
A
Labour units
5 9 11 14
Conventional view of Labour demand
Wage
Marginal Value of Labour
(£)
E
£25
F
£20
G
£15
£10
H
MVPL
Labour units
7 11 13 14
12
Conventional View of Labour Supply
Notion of the “going rate”
Marginal Value of Time
(£)
Wage
£25
£20
£15
E
Supply of Labour
F
C
G
B
£10
A
H
Labour units
5 9 11 14
Adam Smith’s
Compensating Wage Differentials
1. Non-pecuniary aspects of working conditions
2. Human capital: “Expense of learning the business”
3. Constancy of employment
4. Responsibility or trust reposed
5. Probability of success
( 15 )
Critical:
Efficiency Wages
( 15 )
Paying higher wages is CHEAPER:
1. Cheat-threat effect – lose good job
2. Sample selection effect – get good people
3. Turnover effect - stay at good job
4. Gift-exchange/ Morale effect – feel good
5. Union deterrence effect – do not need to join
Yellen (1984)
Unit #2:
Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context
· Legal regulation, e.g., Minimum wage; Trade Unions;
Equal Pay Act and statutory protections etc;
· Pay Audit
Unit #2
Trade Unions and Wages
- CRITICAL
( 20 )
Wage rate
S1 = # union members
S0
Union
effect
W1
“good” for TU
W0 members A
D
“bad” if lose job;
also higher costs
loss of competiveness
Unit #2
Wage rate
Minimum Wage
critical
( 19 )
B
W1
Good for those who keep their jobs.
S
MIN WAGE
W0 A
D
Bad for those who loose or cannot find
job
Unit #3
Internal Labour Markets
( 20 )
Promotion as incentive/ reward Not for ‘fit’
Internal Promotion
Entry Level 2
“ports of entry”
Entry Level 1
Promotion as an incentive device - tournaments
Anti-Discrimination Legislation
Equality and Human Rights Commission (2007)
9 Protected characteristics:
1. Age
2. Disability
3. Gender reassignment
4. Marriage and civil partnership
5. Pregnancy and maternity
6. Race
7. Religion or belief
8. Sex
9. Sexual orientation.
UK Equality Act
2010
Equal pay audit;
Equality impact assessments;
(later)
General Human Capital- University
( 22 ) ( Becker (1975) )
Earnings Or
Costs
W1
University decision
( Earnings with degree Earnings with no degree 21 Age )W0
18
General Human Capital – Numerical Example
- CRITICAL
Earnings
( “B” = £120,000 Earnings with degree Earnings with no degree “C” = £90,000 18 21 Age )Or Costs
W1=£40k
W0=£30k
· If employer pays your £90k University expenses, will you continue to work
( after graduation for £30k ?? ) ( 23 )
General Human Capital – Impact of family formation
( “C” ) ( “B” ) ( Then going to University is NOT worthwhile ) ( ≤ ) ( 24 )
Earnings Or
Costs
“B” = £80,000
- CRITICAL
( Earnings with degree )W1=£40k
W0=£30k
“C” =
Earnings with no degree
£90,000
18 21
Age
Family formation years
Unit #3:
Base Pay Structures and Relationships
1. Grading structures.
2. Job Evaluation Schemes.
3. How to pay.
Unit #3
Review - Types of pay structure
1. Individual ‘spot rate’ or ‘rate for the job’
2. Individual pay ranges
3. Narrow-graded structures
4. Pay spines
5. Broad-banded structures
6. ‘Job’ or ‘career’ families
Types of organisational structure
3. Narrow-graded structures
Higher education pay spine and model grading
structure
Broad bands
Traditional graded structure – 40% grade width:
Broadbanded structure – 100% band width:
Source: IPD (1997)
£ PAY
£ PAY
Unit #3
Progression types
1. Service
2. Performance
3. Competency
4. Skills
5. Market
6. Contribution
Types of job evaluation
Non-analytical schemes (whole jobs)
1. Job ranking.
2. Paired comparison ranking.
3. Job classification.
4. Internal benchmarking.
Analytical schemes (factors)
5. Factor comparison.
6. Point-factor rating.
7. Competence-based job evaluation.
32
Unit #3
Conserving pay after Job Sizing exercise.
Pay After JE
(£)
Current Pay (£)
Job evaluation – 11 issues
critical
1. Pseudo “Scientific” comparison of jobs.
2. Unions worry over “loss of ownership” of the job.
3. Originally devised for manual non-craft jobs.
4. Wage inflation through re-grading of jobs.
5. “Time span of discretion” (work unsupervised) as a metric.
6. Bureaucratic and paper intensive – undermines labour market forces.
7. Introduces ‘rigid hierarchy’.
8. Inhibits flexibility in placing people (on hire).
9. “Success” linked to moving to bigger and bigger jobs.
10. Not always what is best in knowledge economy.
11. “New Pay” writers see it as a barrier to pay as strategic reward.
Job evaluation - issues
Job Evaluations the Job, not the Person
critical
But, “New Pay” writers critique
– Ed Lawler, J.R. Schuster and Patricia Zingheim
pay systems are better if they expose employees to the consequences of their own behaviour and to their enterprise’s success (or failure) - a greater element of risk in a dynamic business environment
Unit #4:
Variable Pay Schemes
1. The concept of variable pay
2. Various means of delivery
3. The concept of incentive pay
4. Various types of incentive pay:
Theories of incentive pay
Important !
1. Efficiency Wage theory
2. Expectancy theory
3. Goal setting theory
4. Equity theory
5. Principal-Agent theory
38
( 39 )
2. Expectancy theory - Victor Vroom (1964)
Extrinsic motivational force (Xi) Xi = F(Eij, Ijk, Vk)
Xi = extrinsic motivational force on agent to take act i Eij = Expectancy that act i will be followed by outcome j Ijk = Instrumentality of outcome j for attaining outcome
(reward) k
Vk = Valency (value) of reward k
( can you attain the performance target ? * what do you get if you do ? * how important/valuable is that to you? )
( Theories ) ( Link to OB ) ( Important: )
4. Equity theory – Adams (1965)
( Link to OB ) ( Important: ) ( Theories )
( 40 )
[My reward] [My inputs]
?
[Co-worker’s reward]
=
[Co-worker’s inputs]
· If not, if I perceive co-worker to be getting ‘better treated’, then I will reduce my efforts.
· Until the arrangement seems ‘fair’.
Video clip with the Monkeys
Unit #4
Base Pay versus Performance Pay
( 42 )
Firm A
Pay
Firm B
Incentive compensation
Performance
Unit #4
Deferred Compensation
Note NOT the same diagram as above.
( 42 )
Firm A
Pay
Firm B
Deferred compensation
Years of service
Always LABEL AXES !!
Unit #4
2. The pros and cons of performance pay
Arguments for:
· It is right that those who perform better receive higher rewards than those who perform less well.
· Linking pay to performance improves motivation and hence performance.
· Performance-linked pay can send strong messages about what behaviour is expected (self-selection).
Case Study - Eddie Lazear (2000) – Safelite Glass Case
Unit #4
The pros and cons of performance pay
Arguments against:
· Pay is not a motivator.
· It de-motivates staff who do not benefit.
· It ruptures relationships and team work.
· It represents a diversion from managing staff performance properly.
· It discourages risk-taking.
· It undermines the intrinsic interest in the work.
Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation
Alfie Kohn (1993)
Jeff Pfeffer (2006) (“What’s Wrong with Pay-for-
Performance”)
Base Pay versus
Performance Pay
Pre-contractual:
· Self selection of high ability types
· Self selection of entrepreneurial types
· Tolerance for risk
· Self-belief
Post-contractual:
· Rewards effort
( Unit #4 )
( 45 )
Jeffrey Pfeffer: “Six Dangerous Myths About Pay”
(HBR May/June 1998)
1. Labour rates are the same as labour costs.
2. Cutting labour rates will lower labour costs.
3. Labour costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs.
4. Keeping labour costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge.
5. Individual incentive pay improves performance.
6. People work primarily for the money.
Unit #4 Incentivising Teams:
( This is a “dumb” outcome – not Pareto Optimal as everyone could be better off by working )
|
|
Others Work |
Others Slack |
|
I work |
(50,50) |
(-40,10) |
|
I slack |
(90,40) |
( 0, 0) |
(My net pay-off, net pay-off of representative other team member)
( merit bonus piece rates work measured commission non-cash rewards )Types of variable pay
Individual
( long-term goal-based incentives (e.g., end of project) )
Short-term Long-term
· ( group bonus team bonus team non-cash rewards ) ( share bonus option schemes )profit-sharing
· gain-sharing
Organisation-wide
Label AXES !
Work
Independent Interdependent
( Individual Bonuses ) ( Individualist )Misfit !!
People
( Team Bonuses ) ( Collectivist )Misfit !!
Unit #5:
Benefits and Pensions
1. Employee benefits
2. Purpose and role of pensions.
3. Origins of pension schemes.
4. Different types and advantages/disadvantages.
5. Main features of occupational pension scheme.
6. Choice of pension scheme.
7. Role of HR in design and choice of scheme.
8. Current trends in provision.
Unit #5
Benefits - Theory
1. Economic reasons – it’s cheaper
2. Asymmetric information/ sorting:
3. Psychological reasons
4. Paternalism
5. Government regulation
1. Tax-efficient means of payment. In a progressive tax system a pension smooths taxable income over lifetime.
2. Tax efficient means of savings. Contributions and
earnings on accumulated capital exempt from tax.
3. Insurance against disappointing productivity or health in old age.
( Unit #5 ) ( Six Explanations of Pensions )
4. Sorting device between high and low turnover types of worker.
5. Deferred compensation or bonding.
6. Underfunded pensions inhibit opportunistic behaviour by workers. Turns workers into unsecured bond holders.
( Unit #5 ) ( Six Explanations of Pensions )
Unit #5
5.1.1 Defined Benefit Scheme (Final salary)
( e.g. £40,000*(40/80) = £20,000 ) ( 55 )
£1
£2
£3
.
. Invested
. by
. company
. in
. Stock
Market
£38
e.g., scheme with a 1/80th
“accrual rate”.
Assume 40 years employment in scheme.
Best 12
£39
£40
months
* 40/80 = PENSION
Unit #5
5.1.2 CARE – Career Average Revalued Earnings, e.g. 1/80th
( Defined benefit = this amount per year ) ( Sum all of above ) ( 56 )
Sal1 *(1/80) = £1
Sal2 *(1/80) = £2 Sal3 *(1/80) = £3
.
. Invested
. by
. company
. in
. Stock
Market
………………………… £1 * inflation
……………………….. £2 * inflation
..………………….. £3 * inflation
Sal38 *(1/80) = £38 Sal39 *(1/80) = £39
Sal40 *(1/80) = £40
…………. £38 * inflation
……… £39 * inflation
….. £40 * inflation
Unit #5
CARE – Career Average Revalued Earnings
( • ) ( Agency. ) ( 57 )
· CARE accrual rate -1/80 above but can be more or less generous.
· CARE revaluation rate – inflation rate above, but may use
increase on average earnings.
· Still a Defined Benefit (DB) Scheme.
· Not a Final Salary.
· If enjoy no promotion in career then pension same as in Final Salary.
· If enjoy promotion then pension is an AVERAGE of career positions.
· Expectancy.
· Equity.
Unit #5
Defined Contribution Scheme
( £ 1 + £ 2 + £ 3 + £ 4 + £ 5 + £ 6 + £ 7 ………+ £ 36 + £ 37 + £ 38 + £ 39 + £ 40 )£1
£2
VALUE on STOCK
£3 MARKET
.
. Invested
. by you
. in
. Stock
. Market
£38
£39
£40
PENSION POT
( Buy ANNUITY )
e.g. £400,000
( “ANNUITY” ) Unit #5
Opposite of a life insurance policy.
Life insurance policy
· I pay £x per month and,
· when I die,
– the insurance company pays my heir/beneficiary £Y.
Annuity
· I pay the life insurance company £Z now, and,
· they agree to pay me £p per month,
– until I die.
Assume a Sixtieths Scheme:
( Unit #5 ) ( Defined Benefit Pensions - Retention )
( Years ) ( t 1 = 20 ) ( t 2 = 40 )
£ Possible job change at t1 ?
Ŵ(t)
W2 VM
W1
(20/60)W1 + (20/60)W2
£ VERSUS:
(40/60)W2
W2 W1
Ŵ(t)
VMP
Unit #5
Pros and cons
Defined benefit [DB] schemes:
· They were originally seen as assisting recruitment and retention because they encouraged employees to stay (example above).
· For employees, the big advantage is that the pension amount is ‘guaranteed’.
· The disadvantage for employers is that they have to take the risk and pay the guaranteed amount. The cost of the scheme may exceed liabilities, meaning that the employer has to make a substantial subsidy.
DB – final salary and DB-CARE career average revalued earnings.
Unit #5
Pros and cons
Defined contribution [DC] schemes:
· The advantage to the employee is the portability of the fund, so the schemes may be better for employees who change jobs frequently.
· The advantage to employers is that such schemes are relatively risk-free – deficits do not have to be met by the employer.
· The disadvantage for employees is that they will not know the value of the future pension until they retire(“retirement date risk”), and no fixed amount is guaranteed.
WHO BEARS THE RISK ?
Unit #6:
Non-Financial Benefits
· Holistic view of employees – as persons, not ‘resources’.
· Reflecting the ‘hierarchy of needs’ – and/or a sophisticated consumer culture in which ‘talent’ segments expect to mix a ‘reward bundle’ tailored to their personal situation.
· ‘Talent market segmentation’ analysis to optimise investment in different groups with changing traits.
· Social exchange theory predicts that employers who demonstrate a personalised commitment to their employees will be rewarded in return with ‘affirmative commitment’ and ‘discretionary effort’ – i.e., beyond a ‘continuance’ relationship (simply ‘turning up’) at work.
( Unit #6 ) ( THEORY: )
1. Holistic – focus on attract retain and motivate.
2. Best Fit – contingency approach – tailor to culture, structure and strategy.
3. Integrative – reward links to other HR practices.
4. Strategic – aligns with business strategy
5. People-centred – people key resource in sustainable
competitive advantage.
6. Customised – match employees’ needs, lifestyles and stage of life.
7. Distinctive – create ‘employer brand’.
8. Evolutionary – use incremental rather than radical change.
( Unit #6 ) ( THEORY: )
Unit #6
Intrinsic versus Extrinsic
Intrinsic motivation – dependent on interest or enjoyment of the task for its own sake. Derives from within the individual rather than relying on any external reward. Self-actualisation. (Maslow’s Hierachy)
Extrinsic motivation – dependent on securing an outcome that comes from others.
Recall Herzberg's two-factor theory:
· Motivating factors: challenging interesting work with recognition and responsibility) which give positive satisfaction, and
· Hygiene factors: job security, salary and fringe benefits- note, these do not
motivate as such, but, if absent, produce demotivation.
McGregor: Theory X v Theory Y people.
( Leadership Values Reputation Emotional Alignment Lifestyle Workstyle Building for future Quality of Work Engagement factors Car allowance Concierge service Corporate discounts Active benefits Retirement Health cover Holidays Passive Benefits Stock/ equity Performance shares Long-term incentive Annual bonus Commission Short-term incentive Annual salary Hourly wage Base cash ) ( TOTAL R E W A R D Total P A Y & B E N E F I T S Total Direct R e m u n e r C A S H )Examples Reward Element Definition
Total Rewards Optimisation (TRO)
Increase
( Unit #6 )
( Decrease )A
Impact on
Employee B
Behaviour
C
( Increase )Obvious Improvements
Impact on Cost
Copyright: Towers Watson
Decrease
Employee Value Proposition
Three Factor Approach to Employee Engagement
( Unit #6 )
REWARD
JOB CONTENT/ CAREER CONCERNS
( Attract Motivate Retain )
EMPLOYER REPUTATION / BRAND
culture, values, environment
Not assessed in 2021-22
Theories:
1. Agency.
2. Managerial Power.
3. Social Influence.
4. Institutions.
Unit #7 and 8:
Executive Reward
1. Market clearing, but a more complex picture than this: Not assessed in 2021-22
Wage
Supply of Labour
W * E
Labour Demand MVPL
L * Labour units
2. “The Board”
Not assessed in 2021-22
Executive directors
Non-executive directors
PAY
Remuneration Committee
Principal-agent solution
Not assessed in 2021-22
( 76 )
Two features in design
1: Maximise incentive – aim for greatest pay for performance possible.
Incentive effect
2: Design must ensure that expected (average)
outcome must be as good as can get in similar job elsewhere.
( Participation Constraint )
MARKET FORCES
Motivation and Remuneration
· Hidden information
– adverse selection
“Stay for a long time ?”
‘Low’ pay but great pension.
· Hidden action
– moral hazard
Not assessed in 2021-22
KEY
FACTOR
( 77 )
“Work hard in the interests of firm?”
Zero pension or base pay but
lots of performance shares
Units #7 & 8 Base Pay versus Performance Pay
( 78 )
1. Pay for Performance
Not assessed in 2021-22
Firm A
Pay
Firm B
Incentive compensation
Performance
Units #7 & 8
Base Pay versus Performance Pay
Not assessed in 2021-22
( 79 )
2. Deferred compensation - long term incentive
Firm A
Pay
Firm B
Deferred compensation
Years of service
Units #7 & 8 Not assessed in 2021-22
Incentive Alignment and the Participation Constraint
Typical share option/ Ltip design - threshold and cap
( quartile ) ( quartile ) ( 81 )
Not assessed in 2021-22
· No pay-out below a certain “threshold”.
Ltip = long term incentive plan
· Maximum pay-out (“vesting”) at a set level of performance (“stretch”).
%
Vest
“Target”
Stretch
Stretch
100%
Threshold
CAP
Bonus
Threshold
0%
Lower
Upper
Relative
perf.
3. Career Concerns
Not assessed in 2021-22
Internal Labour Market
( 82 )
Promotion as incentive/ reward Not for ‘fit’
Internal Promotion
Entry Level 2
Entry Level 1
Promotion as an incentive device - tournaments
( 83 )
Tournaments
Not assessed in 2021-22
Lazear, Edward and Rosen, Sherwin (1981) ‘Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No 5, October, pp 841-864.
Lazear Rosen
Top prize CEO job
Relative performance measures
Not assessed in 2021-22
Critical:
Pfeffer rejects the Principal-Agent perspective
( "The image of workers in these models is somewhat akin to Newton's first law of motion: employees remain in a state of rest unless compelled to change that state by a stronger force impressed upon them - namely, an optimal labor contract." )
Pfeffer (1998)
Bebchuk and Fried “Pay without Performance”
Not assessed in 2021-22
· There is no arms-length relationship.
· Long-term incentives are just ‘stealth wealth’.
· A way of paying executives ‘under the radar’.
· The only thing that restrains executives is the fear of
‘outrage costs’.
· The board itself is ineffective in restraining pay.
· The board is ‘captured’.
Institutional isomorphism
Paul DiMaggio
Not assessed in 2021-22
“social cascade”
Walter Powell
Critical:
DiMaggio and Powell
Isomorphisms in organisational practice
- need for legitimacy – mimic actions of others
Duesenberry on the distinction between economics versus sociology:
“Economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology is all about why they don’t have any choices to make.”
Unit #9
Unit #9:
International Reward Management
· The current context multinational employers encounter influencing their aims and choices on employee reward.
· The various types of employees involved.
· The use of theory and empirical research in weighing opportunities and problems in rewarding employees in an international context.
Stages:
· Exporting goods.
· Licencing and Franchising overseas activities.
· Establish host country facilities (“foreign direct investment, FDI”)– promoted by low cost labour and materials.
· Transnational taps tacit knowledge embedded in its
global network.
( Unit #9 ) ( Internationalisation )
Parent Country
( Host Country B Host Country A ) ( Host Country D Host Country C )
( Unit #9 ) ( Multinational )
( Host Country B Host Country A ) ( Host Country D Parent Country Host Country C )
A and D link; B and C link; not drawn here
( Unit #9 ) ( Transnational )
· Traditionally, usual assignment 3 – 5 years
· Now more of a continuum:
Sort Term Long Term
( Unit #9 ) ( Expatriates and Reward )
ST one- off
Commuters LT
assignment
LT
permanent
Regional v Global Accompanied vs. Unaccompanied
· “Making the expatriate whole”.
· An exchange relationship.
· Less emphasis on reward as such, or on the effort-reward bargain.
· Compensation for ‘dislocation’/ ‘hardship’.
· Preserve relativities with parent company peers.
· Purchasing power parity, tax equalisation.
· Home-based /salary build-up’/ ‘balance-sheet’
(see below).
· Home leave, education costs, dual-career allowance etc..
( Unit #9 ) ( Expatriates and Reward )
Major consideration in portfolio
· COLA – cost-of-living-adjustment
· Housing Allowance
· Education Allowance
· Foreign Assignment Allowance
· Tax adjustment
· Dual Career Allowance
· Foreign Assistance Allowance (Hardship Allowance – personal safety, distance, language, culture, climate etc.)
Also, subsequent repatriation and relocation costs.
( Unit #9 ) ( Expatriates and Reward )
( Foreign assignment allowance Housing allowance Adjustment cost of living COLA on 65 % = 65% home country component = 35% home country net salary component Health Insurance Social Security TAX (+/-) )Unit #9
( Net Salary Health Insurance Social Security TAX (+/-) )Balance Sheet Approach:
Note – here the cost of living adjustment is on the 65% of net income that is generally consumed
Exercise:
Using the Economist’s BigMac Index and the data provided there, calculate how much one would have to receive in the currency of your own country to be equivalent to $100,000 (USA $):
1. Using the International Spot Exchange rate.
2. Using Purchasing Power parity as suggested by the Big Mac
Index.
3. What is the % difference (#2 as % of #1)?
( If you are from the USA, pretend you are from another country – your choice. )
( Unit #9 ) ( Which Exchange Rate ? )
Switzerland
What costs = 6.5 CHF
In the USA costs = $4.79
To be equal: (6.5/exchange rate) = 4.79
$1 has to cost: (6.5/4.79) = 1.36
On Foreign Exchange Markets $1 costs 0.95CHF
( Unit #9 ) ( Which Exchange Rate ? )
Swiss Franc overvalues = (1.36/0.95) = 1.43
by 43%
Switzerland
· You live in USA and eat only BigMacs.
· You spend $2,000 per year on food (BigMacs).
· That (at $4.79) buys you 417.5 burgers.
· Going off to Switzerland for a year.
· Convert $2,000 at official exchange rate (0.95CHF/$).
· Get back 1,900 CHF
· Once in Switzerland find that you can only buy 292.3 burgers (=1,900/6.5).
· You paid too much for your CHF [417.5/292.3 = 1.43 ]
· The dollar appears overvalued by 43%
· If you do not recognise this your ex-patriates working in Switzerland are going to be very unhappy.
( Unit #9 ) ( Which Exchange Rate ? )
· This does not happen with traded goods.
· Otherwise would buy cheap in USA and sell at high price in Switzerland.
Bringing exchange rates into equilibrium.
· Key is that not all goods are traded.
· Purchasing Power Parity attempts to take this into account.
( Unit #9 ) ( Which Exchange Rate ? )
E.g., Japanese Employment System
· Job-related pay (“shokumukya”) still dominant.
· Recruit straight from school/University (“Shinsotsu-Ikkatsu-Saiyō”).
· Job-for-life with single (first) employer (“Syushin-Koyō”).
· External pay not considered.
· “Stock-based” approach (sum over career of individual’s performance to date
NOT (UK-type) “flow emphasis” on current worth.
· Twice yearly bonus paid in July & December – significant profit dependent part of remuneration “(kaki shoyo”).
· Personal bonuses/incentives rare.
Note: all of this is under considerable pressure after recent decades of poor economic performance.
( Unit #9 Culture and Institutions – make a difference: )
· Attitude to what makes an ‘effective’ employee.
· Orientation to giving and receiving performance feedback.
· Career anchor preference – e.g., seniority versus performance.
· Expectation of “manager subordinate” relationship.
· Conception of what makes ‘socially healthy’ pay distribution
between individuals and groups.
host-country labour market benchmarks.
( Unit #9 ) ( Local Culture and Reward )
· Many consistent/ contradictory results.
· Research conducted by application of Hofstede’s (1980) questionnaire (on culture).
· Failure to adequately incorporate institutional setting.
· Formal (legal etc.).
· Informal (social, cultural, religious etc.).
· Societal values (legitimacy of effort-reward bargain etc.).
Before transferring reward practices to host country need to understand individual’s satisfaction, preferences, and institutional impact of each aspect of the reward package.
Culture's consequences : international differences in work-related values
Geert H. Hofstede
Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications ; 1980], (and many other versions) Main Library (STANDARD LOAN) - 2nd floor GN502 Hof.
( Unit #9 ) ( National Cultures and Reward )
· Ecological fallacy – using country-level constructs to explain individual-level data)
· Protestant countries have higher suicide rates – does
being Protestant cause suicide?
· Counties with high fatty diets record higher incidence of breast cancer – does a fatty diet cause breast cancer?
· Mixes up correlation and causation.
The “Ecological fallacy” is drawing conclusions about the nature of individuals based on observations on the group to which those individuals belong. E.g., suicide rate were higher in Protestant countries (Durkheim,1897). But there are confounding factors – it is not the religion as such.
( Unit #9 ) ( National Cultures and Reward )
· “High power distance” (e.g. Latin and Asian countries, African areas and the Arab world)
· Title, rank matter
· Pay level associated with rank.
· Office / secretary important
“Low power distance” (e.g., UK, USA, Israel, ..)
· Financial reward matters more than title or rank
· Pay outcome dependent on performance
· Having office or secretary not key considerations
( Unit #9 ) ( National Cultures and Reward )
“High uncertainty avoidance” (e.g., Latin countries)
· Seniority.
· Skills weighting.
· Less focus on individual performance-related pay.
“Low uncertainty avoidance” (e.g., protestant/ anglo-saxon countries).
· Less on seniority.
· Less on skills weighting.
· More focus on individual performance-related pay.
( Unit #9 ) ( National Cultures and Reward )
High “Individualism” (e.g., USA, UK, Australia)
· Focus on performance-related pay in general.
· More focus on individual performance-related pay.
Low “Individualism” (e.g., Spanish/Portuguese speaking)
· Less performance-related pay.
· Collectivists keen to consolidate performance pay into base salary.
And so on ……….
( Unit #9 ) ( National Cultures and Reward )
Alternative approaches:
· Use ‘Topping-up’ home-based pay (Balance Sheet Approach)
versus
· Use host-country labour market benchmarks, especially in
developed countries ‘local-plus’
versus
· Permanent transfers ~ ‘localisation’
( Unit #9 ) ( core ) ( E xpatriates and Reward )
· Gaps in economic development
Gaps between local pay and expatriate
pay in that country.
Recall: Equity Theory [Adams (1965) - OB lectures]:
· Judgement on equity relative to own outcome.
· Judgements based on social referents
(“significant others”).
· Pay attention to treatment in other local transnationals
“(efficiency wage premium”).
· Expatriates themselves may be ‘too different’ to create any problem.
( Unit #9 ) ( T he Expatriate Local interface ) ( core )
Unit #1 – Introduction
· Lawler (1995) ‘The New Pay: a strategic approach’
· Yellen (1984) Efficiency wages
· Hilde Behrend (1957)
· Pfeffer (1994)
· Gomez-Mejia (2010)
· Smith (1776);
Unit #2 - The Legal, Employment Relations and Market Context
· EHRC (2013) [Equality and Human Rights Commission How to
Conduct a Pay Review]
· Hall and Soskice (2001);
· Freeman & Medoff (1984);
· Hirschman (1970); Gary Becker (1975);
· Mincer & Polachek (1974).
( Some standard references to draw on )
Unit # 3 - Base Pay Structures and Relationships; Pay Setting, Composition and Progression
· Doeringer & Piore (1971)
· Thompson, M. (2000), “Salary progression systems
· Lazear & Rosen (1981) – deferred compensation etc.
( Some standard references to draw on )
Unit # 4 - Variable Pay Schemes
· Fama (1980) settling-up + career concerns
· Lawler (1995) ‘The New Pay: a strategic approach’/Schuster & Zingheim (1992)
· Lazear (2000) – Safelite Glass
· Pfeffer & Sutton (2006);
· Victor Vroom (1964);
· Locke and Latham (2006);
· Adams (1965);
· Jensen & Meckling (1976);
· Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010);
· Kohn (1993); Pfeffer (2006);
· Yellen (1984);
· Smith (1776).
( Some standard references to draw on )
Unit # 5 - Benefits and Pensions
· Lazear (1979)
· Thaler & Sunstein (2009)
· Turner (2006)
· Herzberg (1987); Maslow (1954)
· Legge (1995);
Unit # 6 - Non-Financial Reward
· Daniel Pink [TED]
· Pfeffer & Sutton. (2006)
· Kohn, Alfie (1993) /Pink (2009);
· McGregor/ Maslow/ Herzberg
· Lawler(1995);
· Michaels (2001);
· Maslow (1954); Herzberg’s (1987); McGregor (1960);
( Some standard references to draw on )
Unit # 7 - Rewarding Directors and Executives
Jensen & Murphy (1990)
( Some standard references to draw on )
· Conyon et al. (2012)
· Main et al. (2008)
· Gregory-Smith & Main (2014)
· Rosen (1981);
· Michaels (2001);
· Edmans & Gabaix (2008) ;
· Vroom (1964);
· Holmstrom (1979);
· Pfeffer (1998);
· Bebchuk & Fried (2002);
· Fama (1980);
· Lazear and Rosen (1981);
· Milgrom and Roberts (1988);
· DiMaggio and Powell (1983).
Not assessed in 2021-22
Some standard references to draw on
Unit # 9 - International Reward Management
· all the above.
· Geert Hofstede (1980 +)