

justified, but a utilitarian animal liberationist like Singer would also be willing to experiment on retarded children if it maximized utility.

The second type of defense of animal rights is the deontological *rights* position, of which Tom Regan is the foremost proponent. The equal-rights position on animal rights contends that the same essential psychological properties—desires, memory, intelligence, and so on—link all animals and the human animal and thereby give us equal intrinsic value upon which equal rights are founded. These rights are inalienable and cannot be forfeited. Contrary to Singer's position, we have no right to experiment on chimpanzees in order to maximize the satisfaction of interests—that's exploitation. Animals like people are "ends in themselves," persons, so that utility is not sufficient to override these rights. Regan is thus more radical than Singer. He calls not for reform but for the total dissolution of commercial animal farming, the total elimination of hunting and trapping, and the total abolition of animal experiments. Just as we would condemn a scientist who took children and performed dangerous experiments on them for the good of others, so we must condemn the institutions that use coercion on animals.

Both utilitarian and deontological animal rights proponents have been attacked on their own ground. R. G. Frey, for example, has argued that utilitarianism does not justify the sweeping indictments or proposals that Singer advocates. He says that because of the greater complexity of the human psyche and its social system, utility will be maximized by exploiting animals. What is needed is an amelioration of existing large-scale farms and safeguards in animal experimentation to ensure against unnecessary suffering.

In our readings, Mary Anne Warren attacks Regan's deontological position for failing to see important differences between human beings and even higher animals, especially our ability to reason. Warren—who agrees that we do have duties to be kind to animals, not to kill them without good reason, and to do what we can to make their lives enjoyable—points out that Regan's notion of inherent value is obscure.

We begin our readings with Kant's view that because animals are not self-conscious rational agents capable of forming the moral law, they are not directly morally considerable, followed by Holly Wilson. She examines Kant's argument over animal egalitarianism (whether all animals are equal).

NOTE

1. *Utilitarianism* is the view that the morally right act is the one that maximizes utility. It aims at producing the best overall consequences. *Deontological* ethics holds that certain features in the moral act itself have intrinsic value regardless of the consequences. It is wrong to kill innocent people even to procure good consequences. Some utilitarians deny animals have rights but argue that we should seek to procure their welfare.

7 Rational Beings Alone Have Moral Worth

IMMANUEL KANT

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was born into a deeply pietistic Lutheran family in Königsberg, Germany, and was a professor of philosophy at the University of Königsberg. He is a premier philosopher in the Western tradition, setting forth major works in

The first section is from Kant's *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1783), trans. T. K. Abbott. The second section is from Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, Trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

metaphysics, philosophy of science.

Here, Kant first as mere means. Or are not rational, se part of the kingdom them anything. But us and help us treat animals are simply interpretation.

I. SECOND FORM CATEGORICAL IM HUMANITY AS AN

The will is conceived as a oneself to action in *action of certain laws*. An found only in rational b serves the will as the c self-determination is t assigned by reason alo rational beings. On which merely contains t of the action of which t is called the *means*. Th the desire is the *spring* of the volition is the *m* tion between subjecti springs, and objective motives valid for every principles are *formal* v all subjective ends; tl they assume these, a springs of action. The being proposes to him of his actions (materia tive, for it is only their desires of the subject worth, which therefor ples universal and ne beings and for every v tical laws. Hence all th rise only to hypothetic Supposing, howev thing *whose existence* worth, something whi

metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics, epistemology, political theory, and philosophy of science.

Here, Kant first argues that rational beings are ends-in-themselves and must never be used as mere means. Only they have intrinsic moral worth. Animals are not persons because they are not rational, self-conscious beings capable of grasping the moral law. Since they are not part of the kingdom of moral legislators, we who are members of that "kingdom" do not owe them anything. But we should be kind to them since that will help develop good character in us and help us treat our fellow human beings with greater consideration. That is, our duties to animals are simply indirect duties to other human beings. See the next reading for further interpretation.

I. SECOND FORMULATION OF THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF

The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in *accordance with the conception of certain laws*. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the *end*, and if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the *means*. The subjective ground of the desire is the *spring*, the objective ground of the volition is the *motive*; hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are *formal* when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are *material* when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as *effects* of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.

Supposing, however, that there were something *whose existence has in itself* an absolute worth, something which, being *an end in itself*,

could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, *i.e.* a practical law.

Now I say: man and generally any rational being *exists* as an end in himself, *not merely as a means* to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth; for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations themselves being sources of want are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that, on the contrary, it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus the worth of any object which is *to be acquired* by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are nonrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called *things*; rational beings, on the contrary, are called *persons*, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth *for us* as an effect of our action, but *objective ends*, that is things whose existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve *merely* as means, for otherwise nothing whatever

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