D-Board Kant

Kant

Handout #3

1

The relationship between the moral law and duty

1. “To have genuine moral worth, an action must be done from duty” (fn. 12, 12).

• From the examples we just discussed, especially that of the command to love your neighbor, we see that an action is moral—or has moral worth—when it is performed

from duty, i.e., when the motivation of the action is not the outcomes or an inclination,

but the recognition of the validity and worthiness of the moral law itself.

• In fact, the material a posteriori incentives or outcomes are not universal; they do not hold unconditioned obligation

→ The second formulation elaborates on where the moral worth comes from by answering the

following question: “Wherein, then, can this worth lie,” if not in the consequences of the action?

2. “An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it,

but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. The moral worth depends,

therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition

according o which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been

done” (12-13).

• Worth of an action is found in the a priori “principle” of the will o The will stands between it's a priori principle, which is formal, and the a

posteriori incentive, which is material. The will is a good will when it is

determined by its a priori principle, i.e., the action’s maxim

• Maxim: “A maxim is the subjective principle of volition” (ft. 13, 13)

3. “Duty is the necessity of an action done out of [from] respect for the law” (13).