philosophy

Philosophy 101, Summer Semester 2021

Handout #7

Immanuel Kant: The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

The Good Will

1. The Unqualified Goodness of the Good Will

· ‘Nothing in the world (…) can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.’

· Everything else (intelligence, wit, judgement as well as courage, resoluteness and perseverance and power, riches, honour, health) can become harmful if put to bad use.

· Since a person who is enjoying prosperity but who does not have a good will cannot appeal to an observer, the good will constitutes the core condition of the worthiness to be happy.

2. Against Consequentialism

· The goodness of the will has nothing to do with the consequences it yields.

· It is good ‘only because it its willing, i.e., it is good for itself.’

· ‘Uselessness or fruitlessness can neither diminish nor augment its worth.’

3. The Proof of the Unqualified Goodness of the Good Will

· Assumption: in nature every creature is best adapted to its purpose.

· But if preservation and welfare (and hence happiness) were a person’s chief purpose, the assumption would be contradicted.

· For happiness would be much more efficiently pursued by relying on instincts: reason (and the will) are not as well equipped as instincts to procure happiness.

· But reason is given to us ‘as a practical faculty’.

· Hence, reason’s function must be to produce a will that is good in itself.

Duty

1. In order to have moral worth, an action must be done from duty.

· An action where duty and inclination coincide has no true moral worth.

· This applies not only to selfish actions that happen to be beneficial, but even to beneficial actions performed out of inclination.

2. The moral worth of an action depends on the maxim that underlies it.

· A maxim is a guideline for action.

· What matters is hence not the actual outcome of the action, but the general guideline out of which it is performed.

3. An action is dutiful if it is carried out in accordance with general guidelines.

· It is not dutiful when performed in accordance with one’s inclinations.

· The idea of the generality (or lawlikeness) of the guidelines underlying moral actions is crucial.

The Moral Law

1. Universality

· Since inclinations have been discarded, all that remains to judge the goodness of a maxim is its universal applicability.

· So the crucial question becomes: can my maxim be coherently applied in all relevant cases?

· For instance: may I make a promise that I don’t intend to keep?

· All moral laws will be universal laws: they will apply to everyone and in every situation equally.

2. Rationality

· In order to find out about the moral worth of an action, we must hence ask: ‘Can I will that my maxim become a universal law?’

· If the answer is negative, then the maxim is unreasonable.

· Hence, it is in the very nature of reasoning that we should act in accordance with universalisable maxims.

· Reason itself (as opposed to inclinations or desires) provides us with the ability to think morally.

The Categorical Imperative

1. The Notion of an Imperative

· An imperative is an ‘objective principle’ that informs maxims.

· It is determined by reason (and not inclination or desire).

· Imperatives are normative: they contain an ‘ought’.

· They thus constrain the will.

2. Hypothetical Imperatives (HI)

· They ‘present the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieve something else which one desires’. (396)

· Hence, HIs distinguish ends and means to achieve those ends.

· The end is what one desires, the means is the way in which one satisfies the desire.

· Thus HIs take the following form: ‘if you want to achieve x, you ought to do y.’

3. The Categorical Imperative (CI)

· It ‘presents an action as of itself necessary, without regard to other end.’

· It is thus not contingently, but absolutely valid.

4. The Content of the Categorical Imperative

· The content of the CI is not dependent on an agent’s individual ends.

· All it contains is ‘the universality of law as such’.

· Hence one knows immediately what it contains (since its content can be known without knowing about any particular ends)

· ‘Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’

· Consider Kant’s examples: suicide, false promises, the South Sea Islanders, the Egoist

· Whenever we act on maxims that conform to the Categorical Imperative, we are acting out of duty.

The Ultimate Worth of Persons

1. The distinction between empirical (‘a posteriori’) and pure (‘a priori’) reasoning

· Empirical practical reasoning will always be based on inclination.

· Hence it is ‘unworthy to be an ingredient in the principle of morality’.

· For the absolutely good will is free from the contingencies of experience.

· Hence moral reasoning is ‘a priori’: logically prior to experience.

· So the question arises what end or purpose the CI could be directed at.

2. Objective ends

· It can only be directed at an end that is ‘objective’ – that is, it applies to everybody equally.

· There is only one objective end: ‘rational beings’

· Hence there is another way of formulating the CI:

· ‘Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.’ (402)

Moral Agents as Law-Givers to Themselves

1. Autonomy

· A fully rational person will determine the laws on which to act for herself.

· This is what Kant terms ‘autonomy’: fundamental freedom.

2. Morality

· The only way to be autonomous is to act in accordance with CI.

· Hence only a fully moral agent is an autonomous agent.

3. Universality

· The CI is a universal principle: it applies to everyone equally.

· Thus a community of fully moral agents will be fully autonomous and at the same time act in ways that are completely compatible with each other.