Sociology question

la_amoon

KalkhoffBarnum2000.pdf

Home >Social Science homework help >Sociology homework help >Sociology question

Social Psychology Quarterly 2000, Vol. 63, No. 2, 95-115

The Effects of Status-Organizing and Social Identity Processes on Patterns of Social Influence*

WILL KALKHOFF

CHRISTOPHER BARNUM The University of Iowa

Two theories of social influence, status characteristics theory (SCT) and social identity theory (SIT), have achieved an uncommon degree of theoretical cumulation. SCT focuses on the influence of status-differentiated actors in goal-oriented settings, while SIT addresses the influence of in-group versus out-group members in intergroup con- texts. We explore the joint effect of status and social identity. Using a modification of SCT's standardized experimental setting, we found that status-organizing and social identity processes operated concurrently: group membership combined with a diffuse status characteristic in a manner consistent with the aggregation assumption of SCT The study has implications for the theoretical integration of SCT with SIT The avenue we suggest would describe how status-organizing and social identity processes are interrelated through their interactive effect on the legitimation of informal power and prestige orders.

Social influence has interested social psychologists for many years. From the clas- sic studies of conformity and obedience to explorations of persuasion, status, and in- group bias, researchers employing the con- cept of social influence have provided us with fascinating, non-obvious findings on how human actors lead one another to mod- ify their actions and beliefs.

Two theories involving social influence have achieved an uncommon degree of the- oretical cumulation. These are status charac- teristics theory (e.g., Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972; Berger et al. 1977) and social identity theory (e.g., Hogg and Abrams 1988;

*Authors contributed equally. We gratefully acknowledge the support for this project received from the Center for the Study of Group Processes at the University of Iowa. We also sincerely appreciate the helpful feedback we received from participants in the Group Processes sessions of the American Sociological Association (August 1997, 1998). Also, Lisa Troyer, Michael Lovaglia, Barry Markovsky, Martha Foschi, Joseph Berger, and Kristen Marcussen offered especially helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Not least, we wish to thank Lynn Smith-Lovin and the anonymous SPQ reviewers who provided excellent suggestions and commentary. Address correspondence to Will Kalkhoff, Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; E-mail: william- [email protected].

Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner 1982, 1985; Turner et al. 1987). Although they emerged from two different camps of social psycholo- gy, status characteristics theory (hereafter SCT) and social identity theory (hereafter SIT) have generated especially well-devel- oped programs of research. By examining influence processes as described by SCT and SIT and by exploring the extent to which they operate concurrently, we may shed new light on influence processes.

At the core of such a consideration is the fact that SCT and SIT specify different operating principles of social influence. According to SCT, influence follows from actors' expectations that certain members of a task collectivity will be more competent at a task. Specifically, influence occurs when less competent (lower-status) task members defer to the recommendations made by more competent (higher-status) task mem- bers. By contrast, social identity theorists argue that influence follows from uncertain- ty that results when a disagreement arises between self and others categorized as simi- lar to self (i.e., in-group members). Because people believe that the opinions of in-group members are likely to match those which they themselves would express, uncertainty is reduced when in-group members achieve agreement. Thus, to reduce uncertainty, a

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

96 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

person will view in-group members' respons- es as more accurate than those of out-group members (Hogg and Turner 1987; Turner 1991;Turner and Oakes 1986, 1989).

Because SCT and SIT specify distinct processes of social influence, an immediate question for research is whether status-orga- nizing and social identity processes operate concurrently to produce social influence. To assess this problem, one must examine the separate effects of the two processes in a common setting. To investigate the interplay between status-organizing and social identi- ty processes, we conducted a laboratory experiment guided by the following ques- tions: (1) If status-organizing and social identity processes influence behavior sepa- rately in a common setting, then is the strength of their effects comparable? (2) Do status-organizing and social identity process- es operate concurrently in a setting? (3) If status-organizing and social identity process- es operate concurrently in a setting, then how do they concurrently affect patterns of influence? The answers to these questions may set the stage for the more rigorous task of formally integrating SCT with SIT.

We begin with an overview of SCT and SIT, and then describe the details of the experimental method used to investigate our questions. After presenting the results of the study, we conclude by suggesting some of the study's implications for future research.

STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY

SCT is a branch of expectation states research that was developed to explain par- ticipation inequalities in task- and collective- ly oriented settings' where actors are initially distinguishable as to culturally eval- uated attributes (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Such attributes are known as "status characteristics." Two types of status characteristics exist: specific and diffuse.

1 Task orientation occurs when individuals are motivated to solve a problem that they perceive has correct and incorrect outcomes. Collective orienta- tion occurs when individuals consider it necessary and legitimate to consider each other's suggestions in attempting to solve a task problem (Berger et al. 1972). Task and collective orientation define the "scope," or domain of applicability, of SCT.

Although actors use both of these to infer one another's ability at a task, specific status characteristics entail a more explicit, more bounded range of competencies. Mathematical ability or physical strength are examples of specific status characteristics.

By comparison, diffuse status character- istics also are associated culturally with some specific skills, but (more important) they carry general expectations for compe- tence that are unlimited in range. Men in the United States, for example, are expected according to cultural stereotypes to be bet- ter than women at fixing cars and worse at nurturing, but they are also expected to be generally more able than women at almost any task. Therefore, sex functions as a dif- fuse status characteristic.

SCT specifies five logically connected assumptions that link status characteristics with interaction patterns in task settings.2 First, the theory assumes that a status char- acteristic must be "salient" in order to serve as a basis by which actors in a task setting form expectations of competence. If a status characteristic differentiates members of a task setting or is perceived as relevant to the task, it will be salient. For example, sex in a task group composed of males and females differentiates members, while mechanical ability is relevant to a group attempting to fix a broken-down automobile.

Second, if a status characteristic is salient and has not been explicitly "disasso- ciated" from a task, actors in the setting will form expectations of competence for one another that are consistent with the states of the characteristic. Disassociation is any con- vincing act or claim that breaks the link between the task and the status characteris- tic. If sex is the discriminating status charac- teristic in a setting, then men in the setting will be expected to have more task ability than women in the setting as long as the actors do not encounter strong evidence indicating the irrelevancy of sex for the spe- cific task at hand.

More formally, status characteristics the- orists use graph-theoretic techniques to model the link between actors, status charac-

2 For a more complete discussion of the assump- tions of SCT, see Berger et al. (1980).

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 97

teristics, expectations, and task outcomes.3

Using this modeling technique, SCT posits

that stronger expectation states are pro-

duced by status characteristics that are linked more directly to a task. Because spe-

cific status characteristics relevant to a task

are linked more directly to task outcomes, they produce stronger expectation states than diffuse status characteristics. For exam- ple, if several actors are attempting to solve

an arithmetic problem, information that dif- ferentiates them in terms of mathematical

ability (a specific status characteristic) would produce stronger expectation states and

hence stronger influence effects than would

information differentiating their level of

education (a diffuse status characteristic). The third assumption of SCT describes

what occurs when actors exit or enter an

ongoing task engagement. It is assumed that performance expectations produced from

status information in one encounter are pre- served, even when particular actors change. For example, if a man interacts with a

woman in one task encounter (and if sex is the only salient status characteristic), the man will form higher performance expecta- tions for himself. However, if the woman leaves the task setting and is replaced by a new male interactant, the first man will retain somewhat higher performance expec- tations for himself as a result of his interac-

tion with the (lower-status) woman (Webster 1996).

The fourth assumption of SCT describes

how actors form expectations of competence in situations where multiple status character- istics are salient. It is assumed that actors

combine status information by way of a prin- ciple of "organized subsets." According to this principle, individuals first combine into cognitive subsets all positively evaluated sta- tus information and all negatively evaluated status information for each actor separately, including self. Specifically, each additional piece of similarly evaluated status informa-

tion that enters a given subset has less weight than if it had entered alone (the attenuation principle). Next, the principle of organized subsets specifies that actors com-

3 For a presentation of the graph-theoretic formu- lation of SCT, see Berger et al. (1977).

bine the subsets to produce aggregated

expectations, a single quantity for each

member of the collectivity. Because status

characteristics are culturally shared evalua-

tions of attributes, it is further assumed that

each actor arrives at the same set of aggre-

gated expectations for all members of the collectivity.

The final assumption of SCT is that once

actors have formed aggregated expectations

for self and other, an actor's "power and prestige" position in the collectivity will be a

direct function of his or her expectation advantage over others in the collectivity. An

actor's expectation advantage is that actor's

aggregated expectations minus the aggregat-

ed expectations for each other actor (i.e., separately). The greater an actor's expecta- tion advantage over others, the higher the actor's rank in the collectivity's power and

prestige order. A key indicator of an actor's position in a power and prestige order is the degree to which that actor secures agree- ment from others over contested issues (i.e., an actor's level of influence over the collec- tivity's decisions). A principle derivation of SCT is as follows: In task settings, higher- status actors will exert more influence than lower-status actors over decisions made by the task collectivity.

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

In contrast to SCT's focus on individu-

als' status characteristics as determinants of participation behavior in task settings, the goal of SIT is to understand the effect of "category membership" on people's percep-

tions and behavior. The theory stems from two classic experiments conducted by Tajfel (1959) and Tajfel and Wilkes (1963). The purpose of these experiments was to investi-

gate whether people's perceptions of physi- cal objects are altered by categorization, the explicit classification of objects into groups. Subjects in these experiments were required to judge the similarity of several physical objects. In one experimental condition, the objects were divided into two sets and were presented as separate groups. In a second

condition, the same objects were divided into sets but were not explicitly categorized. Tajfel discovered that when the sets were

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

98 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

categorized, people's perceptions of the objects were distorted. They tended to per- ceive greater similarity within the sets and less similarity between sets. Tajfel proposed that this "accentuation effect" occurred because people relied on a "peripheral dimension" (the category labels) as an aid in judging the "focal dimension" (the objects). Categorization, then, is a cognitive function that individuals use to organize a complex environmental state.

Soon after these early experiments, Tajfel and his colleagues (Doise 1978; Doise, Deschamps, and Meyer 1978; Tajfel 1969, 1978, 1981; Tajfel, Sheikh, and Gardner 1964; Turner 1975,1978a, 1978b) used the accentu- ation effect to explain perceptions of social phenomena. The categorization of individu- als generates the accentuation effect: people

perceive increased similarity within groups and decreased similarity between groups. Categorization essentially generates stereo- typical perceptions. These stereotypes are both descriptive and prescriptive: they define the group's designating characteris- tics as well as it's normative behaviors.

According to SIT, categorization is guid- ed by self-enhancement motives (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Tajfel 1981). People strive to achieve a positive view of self. Therefore, because group memberships pro- vide people with meaningful self-definitions, an evaluator who is comparing groups will strive to achieve a positive definition of his or her own group in relation to other rele- vant groups. For example, members of a col- lege basketball team who know that their team is relatively poor at making free throws, but relatively strong at making out- side shots, will tend to make comparisons with opposing teams in terms of outside shooting.

Social identity theorists, however, emphasize that intergroup comparisons are embedded in a structure of power and status relations. The process of social comparison provides individuals with information about their place in this structure. In a social con- text, an in-group that possesses comparative- ly low status provides an individual with a negative social identity; an in-group with comparatively high status provides an indi- vidual with a positive social identity (Tajfel

1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Because peo-

ple desire positive social identity, members of low-status groups are motivated either to

leave their group or to achieve a positive

reevaluation of the group (Tajfel 1974,1978;

Tajfel and Thrner 1979). If the structure of the existing system is permeable-that is, if it allows an individual to pass freely from a

lower-status to a higher-status group-indi- viduals in a lower-status group are likely to

engage in social mobility (Tajfel and Turner 1979). If the structure is nonpermeable, indi- viduals in a lower-status group can only

attempt to produce social change.

The type of social change that emerges

depends on whether the system possesses

secure or insecure status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). If the structure is secure (i.e., legitimate and stable), group members cannot conceive of alternatives to the sys- tem. Hence they are likely to use social cre- ativity (e.g., changing comparison groups or changing the dimension of evaluation) to enhance in-group status. If the structure has insecure status, group members are able to envision alternatives to the existing order and are likely to engage in social competi- tion (e.g., by attempting to change the social structure).

To manage the natural complexity of

categorization, much SIT research has employed a "minimal group" experimental design (Billig 1973; Billig and Tajfel 1973; Turner 1978a). This design utilizes subjects who are of the same age, sex, and race so that only the categories manipulated by the experimenter become the basis for inter- group discrimination. Typically, subjects are putatively separated into groups on the basis of some trivial criterion such as the flip of a coin or stated preferences for a painting. (The actual method of assignment is ran- dom.) Subjects then are assigned code num- bers that correspond to their group membership and are asked to distribute points to others in the experiment, two per- sons at a time. Those who receive points are anonymous to the distributor except for their group memberships. Subjects use spe- cial allocation matrices to distribute points

(Hogg 1987; Tajfel and Billig 1974; Tajfel et al. 1971). The matrices determine whether subjects give points to two in-group mem-

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 99

bers, two out-group members, or an in-group member and an out-group member. Subjects choose one of several distribution strategies;

these include giving both the in-group and

the out-group member numerous points, giv- ing each only a few points, or giving either

the in-group member or the out-group mem-

ber most of the points. Results of experiments employing the

minimal group paradigm have consistently

found that subjects exhibit behavior advan- tageous to in-group members (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Brown and Turner 1981; Hogg

and Abrams 1988; St. Claire and Turner 1982; Turner 1978a, 1978b). Turner (1975) argues that behavior in minimal groups is an almost automatic result of social competi- tion. That is, subjects are more concerned with relative group standing than with the acquisition of resources.4

Self-Categorization Theory and Social Influence

Generally considered an extension of

SIT, Turner's self-categorization theory (Turner 1985, 1991; Turner et al. 1987; Turner 1991) elaborates the process of categoriza- tion (Hogg et al. 1995). Turner (1985) argues that the self is a set of cognitive representa-

tions. Furthermore, these representations exist on a continuum of abstraction ranging from "personal identifications" through

"social identifications" to "superordinate identifications" (Brown and Turner 1981; Turner 1985, 1991). Personal identifications are instances of behavior that are not influ- enced by group behavior; they are idiosyn- cratic. Social identifications are instances of

social behavior that are determined by group membership. Superordinate identifi- cations are the most abstract, existing at a

4 Sherif et al. (1961) argued that group members' personality characteristics are not necessary for the development of intergroup hostilities. Instead the authors believed that competition between groups for scarce resources is sufficient to generate such hostility. Turner (1975) calls this type of competition "realistic competition." He argues, however, that realistic competition is not a necessary condition for intergroup hostility. Such hostilities can emerge from "social competition" (which occurs if two or more group identities are salient) even if no realistic com- petition exists.

global level; that is, they tend to exist at a

level beyond group comparisons, such as the

level of humanity. All social behavior resides

on this theoretical continuum. Most behav- ior is located near the middle, where both

personal and group influences are active

(Tajfel 1978). Thrner focuses mostly on the impact of group behavior or social identifi-

cations.

According to Turner, a person deter-

mines whether a collection of people is a

group by comparing them to a prototype

(Turner 1985; Thrner et al. 1987). A proto- type is a cognitive depiction of a group's defining characteristics. It can be regarded as

comprising the levels of characteristics that

an ideal-typical member of the group would

possess. Prototypes are learned or are con- structed from information in the immediate

situation. An evaluator will perceive a col-

lection of people as a group insofar as they

are similar to the prototype. The evaluator

also determines whether an individual is a member of the group by assessing his or her similarity to the prototype.

Because of the highly dynamic aspect of

a person's social identity, people in most social contexts are simultaneously members of several different groups. Self-categoriza- tion theorists, however, argue that only a

limited number of groups influence a per-

son's behavior at any time. Salient groups tend to be those which are most "accessible" to the individual and those which best "fit" perceptual input (Hogg and McGarty 1990; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994; Turner 1985; Thrner et al. 1987). A self-categoriza- tion is accessible if an individual is motivat-

ed or prepared to think in terms of the category.

A self-categorization "fits the stimulus data" insofar as (1) the categorization, given a set of relevant dimensions for comparison, minimizes intracategory differences and maximizes intercategory differences along the dimensions (comparative fit); and (2) the stereotypical content of the categorization is congruent with the behavior of the interac- tants in the setting (normative fit). For example, the categorization youth/adult is likely to become salient in a setting where the interactants tend to think of the world in

terms of these categories (accessibility);

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

100 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

where the attitudes expressed by youths and adults in the setting (a relevant dimension for comparison) can be organized by the cat- egorization such that there are greater dif- ferences between the groups and smaller differences within the groups along this dimension (comparative fit); and where the youths are behaving defiantly toward the adults who are behaving authoritatively (normative fit).

The salience of group membership (as determined by accessibility and fit) gener- ates an accentuation effect. An important result of this perceptual bias is "depersonal- ization." When depersonalization occurs, individuals shift to thinking of themselves in terms of the stereotypical attributes that define their social identity, and tend less to think of themselves as unique individuals. Depersonalization is the basis of all group phenomena including ethnocentrism, cohe- sion, cooperation, and influence.

To explain influence in particular, self- categorization theorists invoke several addi- tional assumptions (see Hogg and Turner 1987; Turner 1991; Turner and Oakes 1986, 1989). On the basis of Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory, it is assumed that people rely on agreement with similar others to determine what is true about reality. Individuals perceiving disagreement between their own opinion and that of simi- lar others experience uncertainty. The uncer- tainty produced by in-group disagreement governs a process of mutual influence among group members (in essence, the reduction of uncertainty). Because a person believes that the, opinions of in-group mem- bers are likely to match those which he or she would give, uncertainty is reduced when in-group members achieve agreement. Thus one can deduce from self-categorization the- ory that individuals will regard in-group responses as more accurate, more appropri- ate, or more desirable than out-group responses (Hogg and Turner 1987; Turner 1991; Turner and Oakes 1986, 1989). Evidence from a series of studies (Hogg and Turner 1987) supports this prediction from self-categorization theory.

Since its inception, SIT has increased our understanding of group processes. The theory explains a wide range of phenomena,

and many of its hypotheses have enjoyed considerable empirical success. At times, however, the discursive presentation of the

theory has made its domain of applicability difficult to determine. Barnum (1997) pro- vides a useful articulation of the theory's scope conditions. According to Barnum, SIT applies to contexts where a person is evalu- ating two or more others, where one of the others is in the same group as the evaluator, and where group membership serves as a

basis for discriminating actors. We refer to such contexts as evaluative contexts.

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

Both status-organizing and social identi- ty processes generate social influence. No existing research, however, systematically addresses the interplay of the two processes. One likely reason for the lack of research comparing SCT with SIT is the academic divide between U.S. and European social

psychology. Another likely reason is the fact that these theories describe (as we have shown) different processes of social influ- ence. At the micro level, the account of social influence offered by SCT is patently "individualistic" (Turner and Oakes 1986). An individual is influential insofar as she or he possesses (or is presumed to possess) valid information. In short, influence repre- sents "a change in individuals produced by [presumably more competent] individuals" (Kiesler and Kiesler 1969:26). In contrast, SIT locates influence in the transitory expe- rience of self as group member via deper- sonalization. Yet, although it may not be advisable to attempt an integration of these very different theories (Hogg et al. 1995), a comparison is warranted because SCT and SIT overlap in their domain of explanation (social influence). At this point it would be premature to conclude that the theories have nothing to contribute to one another, nor to a new theory of social influence that combines elements of both. One immediate question for research is whether status-orga- nizing and social identity processes operate concurrently to produce social influence.

To design an empirical setting that will permit examination of this question, we must clarify two issues. First, are the scope

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 101

conditions of SCT and SIT compatible? It

would appear that they are. On the one

hand, the task- and collective orientation

requirements of SCT are not violated in

evaluative contexts (required by SIT). Meeker (1990) clarifies the meaning of the scope conditions of SCT. She argues that

task orientation requires only that actors envision some point in the future when they

will know whether they have succeeded at

their task, and that actors view their present

activities as related to the future outcome.

Collective orientation requires only that

actors in a task setting attend to one anoth-

er's acts and understand that it is reasonable

to seek and give suggestions. The existence of subgroup memberships in a task setting does not entail violation of these require- ments. The crucial difference between SCT and SIT concerns the assumptions made by each theory about the information used by actors to determine which suggestions to fol- low. There is no theoretical reason to expect

that the scope of SIT precludes that of SCT. It is less obvious, however, that evalua-

tive contexts can be achieved where actors are oriented toward the successful attain- ment of a common goal. In the classic Robbers' Cave experiment, Sherif et al. (1961) found that interposing superordinate goals reduced the antagonism that had developed between two groups of boys at a summer camp. More recently, Worchel

(1986) found that the effort to achieve a superordinate goal substantially reduced the salience of the distinction between in-group

and out-group. The question, then, is whether a salient distinction between the in-

group and the out-group is maintained in settings where actors are task- and collec- tively oriented.

Here it is useful to distinguish between

superordinate goals and shared goals. A superordinate goal can be defined abstractly as an objective held in common by a set of actors that cannot be achieved by any subset of actors without the support or cooperation of the others. In the Robbers' Cave experi- ment, for example, Sherif and his colleagues disabled the system supplying water to the boys' camp. To restore the system, the two groups of boys had to work together. By contrast, a shared goal can be regarded as an

objective that a set of actors has in common. This definition makes no reference to the

necessity that actors work together in a com-

plementary fashion to achieve a goal.

The distinction between superordinate

and shared goals is subtle but important.

Although SCT requires all actors in a task

setting to be motivated to succeed at their

task and to take into account each other's suggestions, it does not require settings

where higher- and lower-status actors must

cooperate in a particular fashion in order to succeed at a given task. Expectation states

still may influence behavior in settings where actors strive to achieve a superordi- nate goal (e.g., when a lower-status actor performs his or her particular task role in accordance with suggestions from a higher-

status actor), but SCT also applies to other types of goal-oriented settings. As long as

the goal orientation of a task collectivity does not revolve around the interposition of a superordinate goal, we have no reason to believe that the salience of the distinction between in-group and out-group within a task collectivity will be reduced.

Given that the scope conditions of SCT and SIT are compatible, it is reasonable to examine the interplay of status-organizing and social identity processes. This point rais- es the second question: What is the distinc- tion between group membership and a status characteristic? As stated above, a sta- tus characteristic must have two or more

states, and each state must be associated with a culturally shared value assessment. A culture must commonly perceive it as better to possess one state of the characteristic than others. For example, intelligence oper- ates as a status characteristic if members of a culture believe it is better to be brilliant than dull (Berger et al. 1977).

By contrast, group membership need not be associated with a shared value assess- ment. In the minimal group paradigm, groups created in a laboratory constitute ad hoc or trivial group membership. In addi- tion, sociohistorical factors are eliminated in minimal group studies, or the experimenter otherwise controls social beliefs about group prestige, stability, legitimacy, and/or perme- ability. Even when these factors are elimi- nated (e.g., when categorizations are not

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

102 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

linked to a consensual status system),S trivial group membership still generates in-group favoritism (including influence) by the processes we have described. SCT presently does not account for this fact because nomi- nal characteristics, according to the theory, are not linked to shared expectations of competence.

In our initial examination of SCT and SIT, then, we compare a single diffuse status characteristic with social categories estab- lishing trivial group membership. To assess the independent and joint effects of status- organizing processes based on a diffuse sta- tus characteristic and of social identity processes based on trivial group member- ship, we must exam at least four configura- tions of the two pieces of information.

Consider a setting where an actor, p, is faced with two others, o1 and o2. In one con- figuration, o1 shares (trivial) membership in p's group, while 02 is a member of the out- group. (The status of the three actors is held

constant.) In the second configuration, ol possesses a more highly valued state of a dif- fuse status characteristic than does p, while 02 possess the less highly valued state of that characteristic relative to p. (The group mem- bership of the three actors is held constant.) In the third configuration, 0i is of higher sta- tus than p and shares membership in p's group, while 02 is of lower status than p and is a member of the out-group. In the final configuration, the status assignments of 01 and 02 are the same (relative to the third configuration), but the group membership assignments are reversed: 01 is of higher sta- tus and a member of the out-group, while 02 is of lower status and a member of p's group. Table 1 summarizes the four configurations of status and trivial group membership.

The first two configurations can be used to examine the independent effects of social identity processes based on trivial group membership, and of status-organizing processes based on a diffuse status charac- teristic. SIT predicts that actors are more likely to accept the responses of in-group members (than of out-group members) as accurate, appropriate, or desirable. Thus,

5 In SCT research, such categorizations are called "nominal characteristics" (see, e.g., Ridgeway 1991).

with reference to Configuration 1, p will accept influence more often from o1 than from o2 when disagreements among the three actors arise.

SCT predicts that actors are more likely to follow the suggestions of higher-status actors than lower-status actors. Thus, with reference to Configuration 2, p will accept influence more often from o1 than from o2 when disagreements among the three actors arise. Furthermore, if the magnitude of the effect of a diffuse status characteristic is equal to that of trivial group membership, then, with reference to Configurations 1 and 2, the in-group actor's influence will be equal to that of the higher-status actor, and the out-group actor's influence will be equal to that of the lower-status actor.

Configurations 1, 2, 3, and 4, taken together, can be used to examine whether the influence processes attending to status and social identity operate concurrently, or whether one of the processes operates to the exclusion of the other. If status operates to the exclusion of social identity, then, with reference to Configurations 2, 3, and 4, the degree to which the higher-status actor's influence exceeds that of the lower-status actor will remain constant. Alternatively, if trivial group membership operates to the exclusion of status, then, with reference to Configurations 1, 3, and 4, the degree to which the in-group actor's level of influence exceeds that of the out-group actor will remain constant.

Finally, the alternative to the exclusion hypotheses is that status-organizing and social identity influence processes operate concurrently. If the exclusion hypotheses are rejected, then we can make observational statements about the concurrent effect of the two processes by examining the influ- ence outcomes that arise from the four con- figurations of status and group membership information.

METHOD

To examine the independent and con- current effects of status-organizing processes and social identity processes on patterns of social influence, we developed an experi- mental setting in which status and group

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

110 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

initial choice to go along with that of Partner 1, p(C1). By focusing only on trials where subjects changed their initial response (either to Partner 1 or Partner 2), the proba- bility that a subject will change her initial choice to go along with that of Partner 2, p(C2), is equal to 1 - p(C1). Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on one partner or the other when using the logistic regression approach (Balkwell et al. 1992).

If a choice between the two partners- regardless of group membership and sta- tus-were tantamount to a toss-up, then the

constant ml = log(g1/g2) =log(g2/g2) 0 , because the baseline change rates summa-

rized by g, and g2 would be essentially the same. If we call the common change value

uc, then the Balkwell (1991) logic implies the following:10

p(C1) - gFt exp(qel) 1' Ut exp(qel) + gFt exp(qe2) (1)

exp[q(el - e2)]

1 + exp[q(el - e2)]

In this formula, el - e2 is Partner l's expectation advantage (calculated with the function values that appear in Fisek, Norman, and Nelson-Kilger 1992), and q is a parameter to be estimated from the data. The formula translates to a logistic regres- sion model without an intercept parameter.

We estimated Equation (1) using SPSS, and obtained a maximum-likelihood esti- mate for the beta coefficient (q). Having obtained the estimate for q, we used Equation (1) to compute expected frequen- cies (i.e., the expected number of trials on which subjects change to Partners 1 and 2 for each condition). We compared these expected frequencies with the observed fre- quencies (i.e., the actual number of trials on which subjects changed to Partners 1 and 2 for each condition), and assessed the model's goodness of fit using a likelihood- ratio chi-square test. Furthermore, we calcu- lated an R2 measure using the formula that appears in Balkwell (1991). This measure indicates the improvement in fit provided by Equation (1) over the theoretically naive

10 We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.

model assuming p(C1) = p(C2). The results of the logistic regression are reported in Table 4.

From these results, it is clear that status

characteristics theory have a very good over- all capacity to account for the observed data. The average discrepancy between the observed and the predicted responses is .0358, which is within a margin attributable to chance (LR chi-square = 4.72, df = 3, p = .19). Moreover, the fit of this model is sub- stantially better than that of a theoretically naive model (R2 = .94). These results are comparable to those obtained by Balkwell et al. (1992) for their two-partner vignette study. Most important, however, this analysis indicates that trivial group membership based on the social identity process com- bined with a diffuse status characteristic in our study in a manner consistent with the aggregation principle of status characteris- tics theory.

DISCUSSION

Our study produces four key findings. First, employing a modification of the stan- dardized experimental setting for SCT, we found support for the basic claims of both SCT and SIT. A higher-status partner exert- ed more influence over subjects than did a lower-status partner, net of trivial group membership; a partner portrayed as sharing subjects' aesthetic preference (in-group) exerted more influence over subjects than did an alternative portrayed as possessing a different aesthetic preference (out-group), net of status.

Second, from analyses of self-report items, we found that the higher-status part- ner (versus the lower-status partner) and the in-group partner (versus the out-group part- ner) derived their greater levels of influence from different sources. The higher-status partner was more influential than the lower- status partner because she was perceived by subjects to possess more meaning insight ability. By contrast, the in-group actor was more influential than the out-group actor because subjects perceived her to be more similar to themselves than was the out-group actor.

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 111

Table 4. Observed and Predicted p(C,) Scores, by Condition and Partner

Expectation

Condition State Value Observed p(C,) Expected p(C,) I Discrepancy I 1

Partner 1 .18 .63 .65 .03 Partner 2 -.18 .38 .35 .03

Partner 1 .18 .71 .65 .06 Partner 2 -.18 .29 .35 .06

Partner 1 .33 .75 .76 .01 Partner 2 -.33 .25 .24 .01

Partner 1 .00 .55 .50 .05 Partner 2 .00 .45 .50 .05

Notes: q = 1.70, LR chi-square = 4.72, df = 3,p = .19, R2 = .94

Third, even though status-organizing

and social identity processes appear to

involve different operating principles of social influence, we found that higher-status

and in-group partners in our setting pos- sessed a comparable influence advantage

over lower-status and out-group partners

respectively. The in-group partner in the group-membership-only condition was no more and no less influential than the higher-

status partner in the status-only condition. Also, the out-group partner in the group- membership-only condition was no more

and no less influential than the lower-status

partner in the status-only condition. Therefore, status-organizing processes based

on a diffuse status characteristic (level of education) and social identity processes based on trivial group membership (aesthet-

ic preference) were equally strong as causes of social influence in the task setting we

employed.

Finally, and perhaps most interesting, we

found that status-organizing and social iden- tity processes operated concurrently. One process did not operate to the exclusion of the other. The quality of occupying lower status did not diminish the frequency of sub-

jects' acceptance of influence from either in- group or out-group actors, but the quality of possessing higher status increased the fre- quency of subjects' acceptance of influence from both in-group and out-group actors.

Conversely, out-group membership did not diminish the frequency of subjects' accep-

tance of influence from either lower- or

higher-status partners, but in-group member-

ship increased the frequency of subjects'

acceptance from both lower- and higher-sta-

tus partners. Thus, status-organizing and

social identity operated concurrently in our study. Specifically, our analyses revealed that

trivial group membership based on the social identity process combined with a dif- fuse status characteristic in a manner consis- tent with the aggregation assumption of SCT.

Overall the present study is the first, as far as we know, to demonstrate the simulta-

neous operation of status-organizing and social identity influence processes. Even so,

we acknowledge the need to develop and

test theoretical arguments that would explain why it is appropriate to use SCT's aggregation assumption to examine status- organizing and social identity processes, or would otherwise account for our results.

Nonetheless, it is notable that SCT's aggre- gation assumption captured the relative con- tribution of two disparate dimensions of social influence. Could it be, however, that trivial group membership based on artistic preference is simply a diffuse status charac- teristic? Such a possibility would invite the criticism that we have not witnessed the interplay of separate influence processes. We

do not believe this is the case. Our results indicate that the higher-status partner (ver- sus the lower-status partner) and the in- group partner (versus the out-group partner) in fact derived their greater levels of influence from different sources. Unlike

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

112 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

the higher-status partner, the in-group part-

ner was not more influential because of sub-

jects' expectation that she possessed greater

task ability.

From the standpoint of social identity

theory, one interpretation of our overall results might be that subjects viewed the

artistic preference groups as relatively per-

meable (Tajfel and Turner 1979) and there- fore were prone to enhance their social

identity through either in-group or out-

group favoritism when necessary. In compar-

ison with the group-membership-only

condition, subjects granted the in-group

partner more influence when she was also

portrayed as possessing higher status

(greater in-group favoritism). Yet, the per- meability explanation leads us to expect that subjects also would have favored the higher- status out-group partner in Condition 4 (out- group favoritism), but this was not the case: subjects in Condition 4 did not favor either partner with more influence.

A simpler explanation for our results is

that status-organizing processes and social identity influence processes operate inde-

pendently. When higher status is matched up with in-group membership and lower status is matched up with out-group membership,

the effects are additive. Conversely, when

higher status is matched up with out-group membership and lower status is matched up with in-group membership, the effects are

subtractive. One problem with this interpre- tation, however, is that the quality of belong-

ing to the out-group did not diminish either

higher- or lower-status (fictitious) partners' levels of influence, nor did the quality of

occupying lower status diminish either in- or out-group (fictitious) partners' levels of influence. That is, the pure additive/subtrac- tive model does not seem to hold completely for our data.

One avenue for integrating SCT with SIT is also consistent with the overall pat- tern of our results. This approach would invoke and extend arguments about the

legitimation and delegitimation of power and prestige orders (see Berger et al. 1998; Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988). According to Berger et al. (1998), individu- als in task groups form not only perfor- mance expectations but also expectations for

the occupancy of valued positions in the group; that is, positions that are accorded

more esteem, honor, and respect. The proba-

bility that a power and prestige ordering

between any two actors in a group will

acquire legitimacy is related positively to the

degree of differentiation between them on

expectations for valued status positions. With an increase in differentiation on expec-

tations for valued status positions between

two actors, it becomes more probable that

the disadvantaged actor in the relation will

treat the advantaged actor with deference.

Legitimacy may arise when deference is vali-

dated collectively (i.e., copied or not chal-

lenged) by other group members. As a result of legitimation, higher-status group members are able to act with group support, which

enhances their ability to dominate and influ-

ence other group members.

To explain delegitimation, Berger and

colleagues restrict their analysis to delegiti- mation that results from the emergence of a

power and prestige order which is incongru- ent with the initially legitimated order: for

example, when a higher-status group mem- ber gives recommendations that impede the

group's success at their task. As incongruen- cies of this sort become more severe, so do

the "interactional costs"-in terms of achieving the group's goals-that result from adhering to the behavioral prescrip-

tions of the initially legitimated order. Berger et al. describe the processes that

are sufficient to produce legitimation and delegitimation in task groups. We add that the group memberships' "consistency" with a status order (from a given actor's vantage point) will lead to the rapid legitimation of that order, while "inconsistency" will under- mine the legitimation process and under- mine performance expectations as a basis for organizing interaction. Consistency, in our view, occurs when in-group members are perceived to occupy valued status positions in a group, and out-group members are per- ceived to occupy devalued status positions. Our theoretical reasoning is based on the assumption from social identity theory that group members seek to view their own group in a favorable light through biased

comparisons with other groups. As a further manifestation of this tendency, group mem-

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

STATUS AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 113

bers may believe that members of their own

group ought to occupy the more highly val-

ued status positions.

The "interactional costs" of adhering to

a power and prestige order when inconsis- tent group memberships are introduced are likely to be distinct from those which arise

with the introduction of information that contradicts an initially legitimated power

and prestige order. That is, actors are likely to experience any costs less in terms of achieving the group's goals than in terms of

threats to positive group distinctiveness. In

short, group members want the members of their own group to occupy the "good" posi- tions in the group.

We believe that our data tend to justify

pursuing this avenue of integration. In Table 4, the average response pattern for subjects

in Condition 4 is approximately random:

subjects went along with each partner or remained with their own initial response

about one-third of the time for each out- come. If this more or less random behavior

indicates a power and prestige order whose potential for organizing interaction has been undermined and blocked from legitimation by the introduction of inconsistent group memberships (from the subject's perspec- tive), it did not result from a reordering of performance expectations. As we recall, analyses of our post-questionnaire data indi- cate that subjects rated the higher-status partner as equally more competent than the lower-status partner across Conditions 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, we suggest that the observed increment in the higher-status in- group partner's level of influence (Condition 3) relative to that of the higher-status part- ner (Condition 2) might have resulted from the rapid legitimation of the status order in Condition 3 due to the introduction of con- sistent group memberships (from the sub- ject's perspective).

In looking toward future work, then, we suspect that the social identity process may be another way in which legitimacy can be acquired, blocked, or lost in task-oriented groups. Accordingly we believe that research on the interaction of status-organizing and social identity processes may benefit from an approach that focuses on how the two processes can be related through the central

and developing concept of legitimacy in

expectation states research. Such an integra-

tion would greatly enhance our understand-

ing of influence, and it may lead to

important intervention strategies to help

reduce the "interaction disability" (Cohen 1972; Ridgeway 1982) faced by lower-status

actors in task groups.

REFERENCES

Balkwell, James W. 1991. "From Expectations to

Behavior: An Improved Postulate for Expectation States Theory." American

Sociological Review 56:355-69. Balkwell, James W., Joseph Berger, Murray

Webster Jr., Max Nelson-Kilger, and Jacqueline Cashen. 1992. "Processing Status Information: Some Tests of Competing Theoretical Arguments." Pp. 1-20 in Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research, Vol. 9, edited by Edward J.

Lawler, Barry Markovsky, Cecilia Ridgeway, and Henry A. Walker. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Barnum, Chris. 1997. "A Reformulated Social Identity Theory." Pp. 29-57 in Advances in

Group Processes: Theory and Research, Vol. 14, edited by Barry Markovsky, Michael Lovaglia, Lisa Troyer, and Edward J. Lawler. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch Jr. 1972. "Status Characteristics and Social Interaction." American Sociological Review 37:241-55.

Berger, Joseph and Thomas L. Conner. 1974. "Performance Expectations and Behavior in Small Groups: A Revised Formulation." Pp.

85-109 in Expectation States Theory: A Theoretical Research Program, edited by Joseph Berger, Thomas L. Conner, and M. Hamit Fisek. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.

Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch Jr. 1977. Status Characteristics and Social Interaction: An Expectation States Approach. New York: Elsevier.

Berger, Joseph, Cecilia L. Ridgeway, M. Hamit Fisek, and Robert Z. Norman. 1998. "The Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders." American Sociological Review 63:379-405.

Berger, Joseph, Susan J. Rosenholtz, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1980. "Status-Organizing Processes." Annual Review of Sociology 6:479-508.

Billig, Michael. 1973. "Normative Communication in a Minimal Group Situation." European Journal of Social Psychology 3:339-43.

Billig, Michael and Henri Tajfel. 1973. "Social

This content downloaded from ��139.78.24.113 on Sat, 04 Jul 2020 15:51:50 UTC��

All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms