has its place in a time sequence; you can do that only *grosso modo*. You can say that at a particular place, at a particular time, a particular social group was caught up in such a process, and perhaps you can so to speak condense this process, covering it may be several thousand years, and say this epoch historically precedes such and such, and historically follows such and such.

Chapter 5. Myth as a Way of Thinking

Myth for Jung is not only a set of thoughts but also a way of thinking. In contrast to "directed," or "logical," thinking, which is deliberate, organized, and purposeful, mythic, or "fantasy," thinking is spontaneous, associative, and directionless. Directed thinking, which moderns equate with thinking per se, is subject to proof and evaluation. It develops slowly and is to be found above all in modern science. Fantasy thinking is unfettered. It is evinced above all in dreams and myths, in both of which anything can happen. Fantasy thinking is primitive thinking and is only gradually supplanted by directed thinking. Yet fantasy thinking continues to exist, especially in the dreams and myths of moderns. Myths carry fantasy thinking beyond dreams to the external world. Mythic thinking is thinking about the world, which is transformed into a dream-like reality.

From "Two Kinds of Thinking," CW 5, pars. 11–28

11 How is it that dreams are symbolical at all? In other words, whence comes this capacity for symbolic representation, of which we can discover no trace in our conscious thinking? Let us examine the matter a little more closely. If we analyse a train of thought, we find that we begin with an "initial" idea, or a "leading" idea, and then, without thinking back to it each time, but merely guided by a sense of direction, we pass on to a series of separate ideas that all hang together. There is nothing symbolical in this, and our whole conscious thinking proceeds along these lines.[1] If we scrutinize our thinking more closely still and follow out an intensive train of thought—the solution

[1] Cf. Liepmann, *Über Ideenflucht*; also my "Studies in Word Association" (1918/19 edn., p. 124). For thinking as subordination to a ruling idea, cf. Ebbinghaus, in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, pp. 221ff. Kuelpe (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 447) expresses himself in a similar manner: in thinking "we find an anticipatory apperception, which covers a more or less extensive circle of individual reproductions, and differs from a group of accidental incentives to reproduction only in the consistency with which all ideas outside the circle are checked or suppressed."

of a difficult problem, for instance—we suddenly notice that we are *thinking in words*, that in very intensive thinking we begin talking to ourselves, or that we occasionally write down the problem or make a drawing of it, so as to be absolutely clear. Anyone who has lived for some time in a foreign country will certainly have noticed that after a while he begins to think in the language of that country. Any very intensive train of thought works itself out more or less in verbal form—if, that is to say, one wants to express it, or teach it, or convince someone of it. It is evidently directed *outwards*, to the outside world. To that extent, directed or logical thinking is reality-thinking,[2] a thinking that is adapted to reality,[3] by means of which we imitate the successiveness of objectively real things, so that the images inside our mind follow one another in the same strictly causal sequence as the events taking place outside it.[4] We also call this "thinking with directed attention." It has in addition the peculiarity of causing fatigue, and is for that reason brought into play for short periods only. The whole laborious achievement of our lives is adaptation to reality, part of which consists in directed thinking. In biological terms it is simply a process of psychic assimilation that leaves behind a corresponding state of exhaustion, like any other vital achievement.

12 The material with which we think is *language* and *verbal concepts*—something which from time immemorial has been directed outwards and used as a bridge, and which has but a single purpose, namely that of communication. So long as we think directedly, we think *for* others and speak *to* others.[5] Language was originally a system of emotive and imitative sounds—sounds which express terror, fear, anger, love, etc., and sounds which imitate the noises of the elements: the rush-

[2] In his *Psychologia empirica*, ch. II, § 23, p. 16, Christian Wolff says simply and precisely: "Cogitatio est actus animae quo sibi sui rerumque aliarum extra se conscia est" (Thinking is an act of the soul whereby it becomes conscious of itself and of other things outside itself).

[3] The element of adaptation is particularly stressed by William James in his definition of logical thinking (*Principles of Psychology*, II, p. 330): "Let us make this ability to deal with *novel* data the technical differentia of reasoning. This will sufficiently mark it out from common associative thinking."

[4] "Thoughts are shadows of our feelings, always darker, emptier, and simpler than these," says Nietzsche. Lotze (*Logik*, p. 552) remarks in this connection: "Thinking, if left to the logical laws of its own movement, coincides once more at the end of its correct trajectory with the behaviour of objectively real things."

[5] Cf. Baldwin's remarks quoted below. The eccentric philosopher Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88) actually equates reason with language. (See Hamann's writings, pub. 1821–43.) With Nietzsche reason fares even worse as "linguistic metaphysics." Friedrich Mauthner goes the furthest in this direction (*Sprache und Psychologie*); for him there is absolutely no thought without speech, and only speaking is thinking. His idea of the "word fetishism" that dominates science is worth noting.

ing and gurgling of water, the rolling of thunder, the roaring of the wind, the cries of the animal world, and so on; and lastly, those which represent a combination of the sound perceived and the emotional reaction to it.[6] A large number of onomatopoeic vestiges remain even in the more modern languages; note, for instance, the sounds for running water: *rauschen*, *rieseln*, *rüschen*, *rinnen*, *rennen*, *rush*, *river*, *ruscello*, *ruisseau*, *Rhein*. And note *Wasser*, *wissen*, *wissern*, *pissen*, *piscis*, *Fisch*.

13 Thus, language, in its origin and essence, is simply a system of signs or symbols that denote real occurrences or their echo in the human soul.[7] We must emphatically agree with Anatole France when he says:

> What is thinking? And how does one think? We think with words; that in itself is sensual and brings us back to nature. Think of it! a metaphysician has nothing with which to build his world system except the perfected cries of monkeys and dogs. What he calls profound speculation and transcendental method is merely the stringing together, in an arbitrary order, of onomatopoeic cries of hunger, fear, and love from the primeval forests, to which have become attached, little by little, meanings that are believed to be abstract merely because they are loosely used. Have no fear that the succession of little cries, extinct or enfeebled, that composes a book of philosophy will teach us so much about the universe that we can no longer go on living in it.[8]

14 So our directed thinking, even though we be the loneliest thinkers in the world, is nothing but the first stirrings of a cry to our companions that water has been found, or the bear been killed, or that a storm is approaching, or that wolves are prowling round the camp. There is a striking paradox of Abelard's which intuitively expresses the human limitations of our complicated thought-process: "Speech is generated by the intellect and in turn generates intellect." The most abstract system of philosophy is, in its method and purpose, nothing more than an extremely ingenious combination of natural sounds.[9] Hence the

[6] Cf. Klempaul, *Das Leben der Sprache*.

[7] My small son gave me an explicit example of the subjectivity of such symbols, which originally seem to belong entirely to the subject: He described everything he wanted to take or eat with an energetic "stö lö!" (Swiss-German for "leave it!").

[8] *Le Jardin d'Epicure*, p. 80.

[9] It is difficult to estimate how great is the seductive influence of primitive word meanings on our thinking. "Everything that has ever been in consciousness remains as an active element in the unconscious," says Hermann Paul (*Prinzipien der Sprach-*

craving of a Schopenhauer or a Nietzsche for recognition and understanding, and the despair and bitterness of their loneliness. One might expect, perhaps, that a man of genius would luxuriate in the greatness of his own thoughts and renounce the cheap approbation of the rabble he despises; yet he succumbs to the more powerful impulse of the herd instinct. His seeking and his finding, his heart's cry, are meant for the herd and must be heeded by them. When I said just now that directed thinking is really thinking in words, and quoted that amusing testimony of Anatole France as drastic proof, this might easily give rise to the misunderstanding that directed thinking is after all "only a matter of words." That would certainly be going too far. Language must be taken in a wider sense than speech, for speech is only the outward flow of thoughts formulated for communication. Were it otherwise, the deaf-mute would be extremely limited in his thinking capacity, which is not the case at all. Without any knowledge of the spoken word, he too has his "language." Historically speaking, this ideal language, this directed thinking, is derived from primitive words, as Wundt has explained:

> A further important consequence of the interaction of sound and meaning is that many words come to lose their original concrete significance altogether, and turn into signs for general ideas expressive of the apperceptive functions of relating and comparing, and their products. In this way abstract thought develops, which, because it would not be possible without the underlying changes of meaning, is itself the product of those psychic and psychophysical interchanges in which the development of language consists.[10]

15 Jodl[11] rejects the identity of language and thought on the ground that the same psychic fact can be expressed in different ways in different languages. From this he infers the existence of a "supra-linguistic" type of thinking. No doubt there is such a thing, whether one elects to call it "supra-linguistic" with Jodl

geschichte, p. 25). The old word-meanings continue to have an effect which is imperceptible at first and proceeds "from that dark chamber of the unconscious in the soul" (ibid.). Hamann states emphatically (*Schriften*, VII, p. 8): "Metaphysics misuses all the verbal signs and figures of speech based on empirical knowledge and reduces them to empty hieroglyphs and types of ideal relationships." Kant is supposed to have learnt a thing or two from Hamann.

[10] *Grundriss der Psychologie*, pp. 363–64.

[11] *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, II, ch. 10, par. 26, p. 260.

or "hypological" with Erdmann. Only, it is not logical thinking. My views coincide with those of Baldwin, who says:

> The transition from pre-judgmental to judgmental meaning is just that from knowledge which has social confirmation to that which gets along without it. The meanings utilized for judgment are those already developed in their presuppositions and implications through the confirmations of social intercourse. Thus the personal judgment, trained in the methods of social rendering, and disciplined by the interaction of its social world, projects its content into that world again. In other words, the platform for all movement into the assertion of individual judgment—the level from which new experience is utilized—is *already and always socialized*; and it is just this movement that we find reflected in the actual result as the sense of the "appropriateness" or synnomic character of the meaning rendered. . . .
>
> Now the development of thought, as we are to see in more detail, is by a method essentially of trial and error, of experimentation, of *the use of meanings as worth more than they are as yet recognized to be worth*. The individual must use his old thoughts, his established knowledge, his grounded judgments, for the embodiment of his new inventive constructions. He erects his thought as we say "schematically"—in logical terms, problematically, conditionally, disjunctively—projecting into the world an opinion still personal to himself, as if it were true. *Thus all discovery proceeds*. But this is, from the linguistic point of view, still to use the current language, still to work by meanings already embodied in social and conventional usage.
>
> By this experimentation both thought and language are together advanced. . . .
>
> Language grows, therefore, just as thought does, *by never losing its synnomic* or dual reference; its meaning is both personal and social. . . .
>
> Language is the register of tradition, the record of racial conquest, the deposit of all the gains made by the genius of individuals. . . . The social "copy-system" thus established reflects the judgmental processes of the race, and in turn becomes the training-school of the judgment of new generations. . . .
>
> Most of the training of the self, whereby the vagaries of personal reaction to fact and image are reduced to the funded basis of sound judgment, comes through the use of speech.

When the child speaks, he lays before the world his suggestion for a general or common meaning; the reception it gets confirms or refutes him. In either case he is instructed. His next venture is from a platform of knowledge on which the newer item is more nearly convertible into the common coin of effective intercourse. The point to notice here is not so much the exact mechanism of the exchange—secondary conversion—by which this gain is made, as the training in judgment that the constant use of it affords. In each case, effective judgment is the common judgment. . . . Here the object is to point out that it is secured by the development of a function *whose rise is directly* ad hoc . . . *—the function of speech.*

In language, therefore, to sum up the foregoing, we have the tangible—the actual and historical—instrument of the development and conservation of psychic meaning. It is the material evidence and proof of *the concurrence of social and personal judgment.* In it synnomic meaning, judged as "appropriate," becomes "social" meaning, held as socially generalized and acknowledged.[12]

16 Baldwin's argument lays ample stress on the limitations imposed on thought by language,[13] which are of the greatest importance both subjectively and objectively, i.e., psychologically and socially—so great, indeed, that we must ask ourselves whether the sceptical Mauthner[14] was not right in his view that thinking is speech and nothing more. Baldwin is more cautious and reserved, but at bottom he is plainly in favour of the primacy of speech.

17 Directed thinking or, as we might also call it, *thinking in words*, is manifestly an instrument of culture, and we shall not be wrong in saying that the tremendous work of education which past centuries have devoted to directed thinking, thereby forcing it to develop from the subjective, individual sphere to the objective, social sphere, has produced a readjustment of the human mind to which we owe our modern empiricism and technics. These are absolutely new developments in the history of the world and were unknown to earlier ages. Inquiring

[12] Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, II pp. 145ff.
[13] In this connection I would mention the experimental "investigations into the linguistic components of association" (1908) made by Eberschweiler [q.v., Bibliography] at my request, which disclose the remarkable fact that during an association experiment the intrapsychic association is influenced by phonetic considerations.
[14] See n. 5, above.

minds have often wrestled with the question of why the first-rate knowledge which the ancients undoubtedly had of mathematics, mechanics, and physics, coupled with their matchless craftsmanship, was never applied to developing the rudimentary techniques already known to them (e.g., the principles of simple machines) into a real technology in the modern sense of the word, and why they never got beyond the stage of inventing amusing curiosities. There is only one answer to this: the ancients, with a few illustrious exceptions, entirely lacked the capacity to concentrate their interest on the transformations of inanimate matter and to reproduce the natural process artificially, by which means alone they could have gained control of the forces of nature. What they lacked was training in directed thinking.[15] The secret of cultural development is the *mobility and disposability of psychic energy.* Directed thinking, as we know it today, is a more or less modern acquisition which earlier ages lacked.

18 This brings us to a further question: What happens when we do not think directedly? Well, our thinking then lacks all leading ideas and the sense of direction emanating from them.[16] We no longer compel our thoughts along a definite track, but let them float, sink or rise according to their specific gravity. In Kuelpe's view,[17] thinking is a sort of "inner act of the will," and its absence necessarily leads to an "automatic play of ideas." William James regards non-directed thinking, or "merely associative" thinking, as the ordinary kind. He expresses himself as follows:

> Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by another, of a sort of spontaneous revery of which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should be

[15] There was as a matter of fact no external compulsion which would have made technical thinking necessary. The labour question was solved by an endless supply of cheap slaves, so that efforts to save labour were superfluous. We must also remember that the interest of the man of antiquity was turned in quite another direction: he reverenced the divine cosmos, a quality which is entirely lacking in our technological age.
[16] So at least it appears to the conscious mind. Freud (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, II, p. 528) says in this connection: "For it is demonstrably untrue that we are being carried along a purposeless stream of ideas when, in the process of interpreting a dream, we abandon reflection and allow involuntary ideas to emerge. It can be shown that all we can ever get rid of are purposive ideas that are *known* to us; as soon as we have done this, *unknown*—or, as we inaccurately say, 'unconscious'—purposive ideas take charge and thereafter determine the course of the involuntary ideas. No influence that we can bring to bear upon our mental processes can ever enable us to think without purposive ideas; nor am I aware of any states of psychical confusion which can do so."
[17] *Outlines*, p. 448.

capable. This sort of thinking leads nevertheless to rational conclusions both practical and theoretical.

As a rule, in this sort of irresponsible thinking the terms which come to be coupled together are empirical concretes, not abstractions.[18]

19 We can supplement James's definitions by saying that this sort of thinking does not tire us, that it leads away from reality into fantasies of the past or future. At this point thinking in verbal form ceases, image piles on image, feeling on feeling,[19] and there is an ever-increasing tendency to shuffle things about and arrange them not as they are in reality but as one would like them to be. Naturally enough, the stuff of this thinking which shies away from reality can only be the past with its thousand-and-one memory images. Common speech calls this kind of thinking "dreaming."

20 Anyone who observes himself attentively will find that the idioms of common speech are very much to the point, for almost every day we can see for ourselves, when falling asleep, how our fantasies get woven into our dreams, so that between day-dreaming and night-dreaming there is not much difference. We have, therefore, two kinds of thinking: directed thinking, and dreaming or fantasy-thinking. The former operates with speech elements for the purpose of communication, and is difficult and exhausting; the latter is effortless, working as it were spontaneously, with the contents ready to hand, and guided by

[18] *Principles*, II, p. 325.

[19] This statement is based primarily on experiences derived from the field of normal psychology. Indefinite thinking is very far removed from "reflection," particularly where readiness of speech is concerned. In psychological experiments I have frequently found that subjects—I am speaking only of cultivated and intelligent people—whom I allowed to indulge in reveries, as though unintentionally and without previous instruction, exhibited affects which could be registered experimentally, but that with the best will in the world they could express the underlying thought only very imperfectly or not at all. More instructive are experiences of a pathological nature, not so much those arising in the field of hysteria and the various neuroses, which are characterized by an overwhelming transference tendency, as experiences connected with introversion neurosis or psychosis, which must be regarded as constituting by far the greater number of mental disturbances, at any rate the whole of Bleuler's schizophrenic group. As already indicated by the term "introversion" (which I cursorily introduced in 1910, in my "Psychic Conflicts in a Child," pp. 13 and 16 [*Coll. Works*, Vol. 17]), this type of neurosis leads to an isolated inner life. And here we meet with that "supralinguistic" or pure "fantasy thinking" which moves in "inexpressible" images and feelings. You get some idea of this when you try to find out the meaning of the pitiful and muddled expressions used by these people. As I have often observed, it costs these patients endless trouble and effort to put their fantasies into ordinary human speech. A highly intelligent patient, who "translated" such a fantasy system for me piecemeal, used to say to me: "I know quite well what it's all about, I can see and feel everything, but it is quite impossible for me to find the right words for it."

unconscious motives. The one produces innovations and adaptation, copies reality, and tries to act upon it; the other turns away from reality, sets free subjective tendencies, and, as regards adaptation, is unproductive.[20]

21 As I have indicated above, history shows that directed thinking was not always as developed as it is today. The clearest expression of modern directed thinking is science and the techniques fostered by it. Both owe their existence simply and solely to energetic training in directed thinking. Yet at the time when the forerunners of our present-day culture, such as the poet Petrarch, were just beginning to approach nature in a spirit of understanding,[21] an equivalent of our science already existed in scholasticism.[22] This took its subjects from fantasies of the past, but it gave the mind a dialectical training in directed thinking. The one goal of success that shone before the thinker was rhetorical victory in disputation, and not the visible transformation of reality. The subjects he thought about were often unbelievably fantastic; for instance, it was debated how many angels could stand on the point of a needle, whether Christ could have performed his work of redemption had he come into the world in the shape of a pea, etc., etc. The fact that these problems could be posed at all—and the stock metaphysical problem of how to know the unknowable comes into this category—

[20] Similarly James, *Principles*, II, pp. 325–26. Reasoning is productive, whereas "empirical" (merely associative) thinking is only reproductive. This opinion, however, is not altogether satisfying. It is no doubt true that fantasy-thinking is not immediately productive, i.e., is unadapted and therefore useless for all practical purposes. But in the long run the play of fantasy uncovers creative forces and contents, just as dreams do. Such contents cannot as a rule be realized except through passive, associative, and fantasy-thinking.

[21] Cf. the impressive description of Petrarch's ascent of Mt. Ventoux, in Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, pp. 180–81: "A description of the view from the summit would be looked for in vain, not because the poet was insensible to it, but, on the contrary, because the impression was too overwhelming. His whole past life, with all its follies, rose before his mind; he remembered that ten years ago that day he had quitted Bologna a young man, and turned a longing gaze towards his native country; he opened a book which was then his constant companion, the 'Confessions of St. Augustine,' and his eye fell on the passage in the tenth chapter: 'and men go forth, and admire lofty mountains and broad seas, and roaring torrents, and the ocean, and the course of the stars, and turn away from themselves while doing so.' His brother, to whom he read these words, could not understand why he closed the book and said no more."

[22] Wundt gives a short account of the scholastic method in his *Philosophische Studien* (XIII, p. 345). The method consisted "firstly, in regarding as the chief aim of scientific investigation the discovery of a firmly established conceptual scheme capable of being applied in a uniform manner to the most varied problems; secondly, in laying an inordinate value upon certain general concepts, and consequently upon the verbal symbols designating these concepts, as a result of which an analysis of the meanings of words or, in extreme cases, a vapid intellectual subtlety and splitting of hairs comes to replace an investigation of the real facts from which the concepts are abstracted."

proves how peculiar the medieval mind must have been, that it could contrive questions which for us are the height of absurdity. Nietzsche glimpsed something of the background of this phenomenon when he spoke of the "glorious tension of mind" which the Middle Ages produced.

22 On a historical view, the scholastic spirit in which men of the intellectual calibre of St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Abelard, William of Ockham, and others worked is the mother of our modern scientific method, and future generations will see clearly how far scholasticism still nourishes the science of today with living undercurrents. It consisted essentially in a dialectical gymnastics which gave the symbol of speech, the word, an absolute meaning, so that words came in the end to have a substantiality with which the ancients could invest their Logos only by attributing to it a mystical value. The great achievement of scholasticism was that it laid the foundations of a solidly built intellectual function, the *sine qua non* of modern science and technology.

23 If we go still further back into history, we find what we call science dissolving in an indistinct mist. The culture-creating mind is ceaselessly employed in stripping experience of every thing subjective, and in devising formulas to harness the forces of nature and express them in the best way possible. It would be a ridiculous and unwarranted presumption on our part if we imagined that we were more energetic or more intelligent than the men of the past—our material knowledge has increased, but not our intelligence. This means that we are just as bigoted in regard to new ideas, and just as impervious to them, as people were in the darkest days of antiquity. We have become rich in knowledge, but poor in wisdom. The centre of gravity of our interest has switched over to the materialistic side, whereas the ancients preferred a mode of thought nearer to the fantastic type. To the classical mind everything was still saturated with mythology, even though classical philosophy and the beginnings of natural science undeniably prepared the way for the work of "enlightenment."

24 Unfortunately, we get at school only a very feeble idea of the richness and tremendous vitality of Greek mythology. All the creative power that modern man pours into science and technics the man of antiquity devoted to his myths. This creative urge explains the bewildering confusion, the kaleidoscopic changes and syncretistic regroupings, the continual rejuvenation, of myths in Greek culture. We move in a world of fantasies which, untroubled by the outward course of things, well up

from an inner source to produce an ever-changing succession of plastic or phantasmal forms. This activity of the early classical mind was in the highest degree artistic: the goal of its interest does not seem to have been how to understand the real world as objectively and accurately as possible, but how to adapt it aesthetically to subjective fantasies and expectations. There was very little room among the ancients for that coldness and disillusionment which Giordano Bruno's vision of infinite worlds and Kepler's discoveries brought to mankind. The naïve man of antiquity saw the sun as the great Father of heaven and earth, and the moon as the fruitful Mother. Everything had its demon, was animated like a human being, or like his brothers the animals. Everything was conceived anthropomorphically or theriomorphically, in the likeness of man or beast. Even the sun's disc was given wings or little feet to illustrate its motion. Thus there arose a picture of the universe which was completely removed from reality, but which corresponded exactly to man's subjective fantasies. It needs no very elaborate proof to show that children think in much the same way. They too animate their dolls and toys, and with imaginative children it is easy to see that they inhabit a world of marvels.

25 We also know that the same kind of thinking is exhibited in dreams. The most heterogeneous things are brought together regardless of the actual conditions, and a world of impossibilities takes the place of reality. Freud finds that the hallmark of waking thought is *progression*: the advance of the thought stimulus from the systems of inner or outer perception through the endopsychic work of association to its motor end, i.e., innervation. In dreams he finds the reverse: regression of the thought stimulus from the pre-conscious or unconscious sphere to the perceptual system, which gives the dream its peculiar atmosphere of sensuous clarity, rising at times to almost hallucinatory vividness. Dream-thinking thus regresses back to the raw material of memory. As Freud says: "In regression the fabric of the dream-thoughts is resolved into its raw material."[23] The reactivation of original perceptions is, however, only one side of regression. The other side is regression to infantile memories, and though this might equally well be called regression to the original perceptions, it nevertheless deserves special mention because it has an importance of its own. It might even be considered as an "historical" regression. In this sense the dream can, with Freud, be described as a modified memory—modified

[23] *The Interpretation of Dreams*, II, p. 543.

through being projected into the present. The original scene of the memory is unable to effect its own revival, so has to be content with returning as a dream.[24] In Freud's view it is an essential characteristic of dreams to "elaborate" memories that mostly go back to early childhood, that is, to bring them nearer to the present and recast them in its language. But, in so far as infantile psychic life cannot deny its archaic character, the latter quality is the especial peculiarity of dreams. Freud expressly draws attention to this:

> Dreams, which fulfil their wishes along the short path of regression, have merely preserved for us in that respect a sample of the psychical apparatus's primary method of working, a method which was abandoned as being inefficient. What once dominated waking life, while the mind was still young and incompetent, seems now to have been banished into the night—just as the primitive weapons, the bows and arrows, that have been abandoned by adult men, turn up once more in the nursery.[25]

26 These considerations[26] tempt us to draw a parallel between the mythological thinking of ancient man and the similar thinking found in children,[27] primitives, and in dreams. This idea is

[24] Ibid., p. 546.
[25] Ibid., p. 567.
[26] The passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that follows immediately afterwards has since been confirmed through investigation of the psychoses. "These methods of working on the part of the psychical apparatus, which are normally suppressed in waking hours, become current once more in psychosis and then reveal their incapacity for satisfying our needs in relation to the external world" (ibid., p. 567). The importance of this sentence is borne out by the views of Pierre Janet, which were developed independently of Freud and deserve mention here because they confirm it from an entirely different angle, namely the biological side. Janet distinguishes in the function a firmly organized "inferior" part and a "superior" part that is in a state of continuous transformation: "It is precisely on this 'superior' part of the functions, on their adaptation to existing circumstances, that the neuroses depend. . . . Neuroses are disturbances or checks in the evolution of the functions. . . . Neuroses are maladies dependent on the various functions of the organism and are characterized by an alteration in the superior parts of these functions, which are checked in their evolution, in their adaptation to the present moment and the existing state of the external world and of the individual, while there is no deterioration in the older parts of these same functions. . . . In place of these superior operations some degree of physical and mental disturbance develops—above all, emotionality. This is nothing but the tendency to replace the superior operations by an exaggeration of certain inferior operations, and particularly by gross visceral disturbances." (*Les Névroses*, pp. 386ff.) The "older parts" are the same as the "inferior parts" of the functions, and they replace the abortive attempts at adaptation. Similar views concerning the nature of neurotic symptoms are expressed by Claparède (p. 169). He regards the hysterogenic mechanism as a "tendance à la reversion," a kind of atavistic reaction.
[27] I am indebted to Dr. Abraham for the following story: "A small girl of three and a half had been presented with a baby brother, who soon became the object of well-known childish jealousy. One day she said to her mother: 'You are two Mamas. You are my Mama, and your breast is little brother's Mama.'" She had just been observing with great interest the act of suckling. It is characteristic of the archaic thinking of the child to call the breast "Mama" [so in the original—EDITORS]. *Mamma* is Latin for 'breast.'

not at all strange; we know it quite well from comparative anatomy and from evolution, which show that the structure and function of the human body are the result of a series of embryonic mutations corresponding to similar mutations in our racial history. The supposition that there may also be in psychology a correspondence between ontogenesis and phylogenesis therefore seems justified. If this is so, it would mean that infantile thinking[28] and dream-thinking are simply a recapitulation of earlier evolutionary stages.

27 In this regard, Nietzsche takes up an attitude well worth noting:

> In sleep and in dreams we pass through the whole thought of earlier humanity. . . . What I mean is this: as man now reasons in dreams, so humanity also reasoned for many thousands of years when awake; the first cause which occurred to the mind as an explanation of anything that required explanation was sufficient and passed for truth. . . . This atavistic element in man's nature still manifests itself in our dreams, for it is the foundation upon which the higher reason has developed and still develops in every individual. Dreams carry us back to remote conditions of human culture and give us a ready means of understanding them better. Dream thinking comes so easily to us now because this form of fantastic and facile explanation in terms of the first random idea has been drilled into us for immense periods of time. To that extent dreaming is a recreation for the brain, which by day has to satisfy the stern demands of thought imposed by a higher culture. . . .
>
> From this we can see how *lately* the more acute logical thinking, the strict discrimination of cause and effect, has been developed, since our rational and intellectual faculties still involuntarily hark back to those primitive forms of reasoning, and we pass about half our lives in this condition.[29]

[28] Cf. particularly Freud's "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy" and my "Psychic Conflicts in a Child."
[29] *Human, All-Too Human*, trans. by Zimmern and Cohn, I, pp. 24–27, modified.

28 Freud, as we have seen, reached similar conclusions regarding the archaic nature of dream-thinking on the basis of dream-analysis. It is therefore not such a great step to the view that myths are dreamlike structures. Freud himself puts it as follows: "The study of constructions of folk-psychology such as these is far from being complete, but it is extremely probable that myths, for instance, are distorted vestiges of the wishful phantasies of whole nations, the [age-long] dreams of youthful humanity."[30] In the same way Rank[31] regards myth as the collective dream of a whole people.[32]

[30] "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming," p. 152, mod.
[31] *Der Kunstler*, p. 36.
[32] Cf. also Rank, *The Birth of the Hero*.

Chapter 6. Kinds of Myths

(a) Myths of the Child

Jung's key essay on myth is "The Psychology of the Child Archetype." The following selection contains all but the first few pages of the essay. Scattered in other sections of this book are portions of those first few pages. Using the case of myths of the child to advance his theory of myth generally, Jung asserts that the figure of the child in mythology represents not, as for Freud, the actual child but the archetypal child, who symbolizes life's possibilities. The biography of the child in myth symbolizes both the range and the course of human psychological development. At birth, the child symbolizes the ego, but ultimately the child comes to symbolize the self, the archetype of psychological life as a whole. The course of the life of the child, who on the literal level remains a child all life long, symbolizes the course that an individual must follow to attain full psychological development.[1]

[1] "The Psychology of the Child Archetype" and the companion essay, "The Psychological Aspect of the Kore" (*The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, pp. 151–81 and 182–203), were originally published separately in German (in 1940 and 1941). Each was accompanied by an essay by the Hungarian classicist and mythographer Carl (or Karl) Kerenyi (1897–1973). In 1941 the two volumes were combined, with an added "prolegomena" by Kerényi, in a volume entitled *Einfuhrung in das Wesen der Mythologie*, which was translated into English in 1949 as *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (or, in the 1950 British edition, as *Introduction to a Science of Mythology*). Despite their collaboration, Kerényi and Jung hold different, even opposing, views of myth. Kerényi does, like Jung, espouse the universality of archetypes, for which Kerényi prefers the term "mythologems," and Kerényi does allow for the origin of mythologems in the unconscious. But his interpretation of mythologems and therefore of myths themselves is far more spiritual than psychological. While he, like Jung, dismisses the reduction of myth to the allegorizing of natural phenomena, he dismisses as well the reduction of myth to anything else either, including psychology. He stresses the link of myth to cosmic, even if not physical, reality. Like Jung, Kerényi urges moderns to rediscover myths, but the fulfillment myths provide is for him more religious than psychological. Kerényi's theory is much closer to that of Mircea Eliade or of fellow classicist Walter Otto, whom he regularly cites, than to that of Jung. For his part, Jung uses Kerényi primarily as a data gatherer, whose cross-cultural examples of mythologems/archetypes serve to support Jung's claim that they are universal. For Kerényi's theory, see, in addition to the collaborative essays with Jung, *The Gods of the Greeks*, trans. Norman Cameron, esp. chap. 1; *Archetypal Images in Greek Religion*, 5 vols., trans. Ralph Manheim and Christopher Holme (New York: Pantheon, 1959–63; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967–76), esp. *Asklepios*, vol. 3, preface.