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Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Nature of the American Indians

Author(s): José A. Fernández-Santamaria

Source: The Americas , Apr., 1975, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Apr., 1975), pp. 434-451

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/980012

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JUAN GINES DE SEPULVEDA ON THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS

J UAN GINES de Sepulveda epitomizes in many ways, both personally and intellectually, the cosmopolitanism of Spanish political thought in the sixteenth century. Educated in Italy, disciple of Pomponazzi,

translator of Aristotle, chronicler of the Emperor and mentor of his son Philip, Sepuilveda is best known-and often misunderstood as the de- fender of the more unsavory aspects of the Spanish conquest and coloniz- ation in America-for his bitter controversy with Bartolome de las Casas. To that debate Sep6ilveda brought a humanist's training and outlook an- chored in his devotion to Aristotle, but strongly tempered by his attach- ment to Saint Augustine.' It is the purpose of this paper to examine Sepuilveda's ideas on the nature of the American natives, particularly the question of whether the Indians are natural slaves.2 Considerations of space, of course, rule out the possibility of undertaking here a detailed scrutiny of the foundations upon which those ideas rest. It can be said, however, that they are typically Renaissance views, a blend of traditions characteristic of the composite nature of the age's intellectual milieu.3

If we reflect for a moment upon the conditioning and limiting nature of the religious presuppositions which define the character of European

1 Sepulveda's political ideas are fundamentally embodied in four tracts: Cohortatio ad Carolum V ut bellum suscipiat in Turcas (Bologna, 1530), Democrates primus (Rome, 1535), Democrates alter (1545), De Regno (Lerida, 1571). In parenthesis are indicated the places and dates of publication; except for the Democrates alter. Sepilveda was denied official permission to publish this treatise completed ca. 1545. It saw the light in 1892, and then only in a defective edition based on an incomplete manuscript. The definitive edi- tion is that of A. Losada, Dem6crates segundo o de las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios (Madrid, 1951). For details concerning the life and works of Sepulveda, see A. Losada, Juan Ginds de Sepuilveda a traves de su Epistolario y nuevos documentos (Madrid, 1949). Also T. Andres Marcos, Los imperialismos de Juan Ginds de SepIlveda en su Democrates alter (Madrid, 1947); A.F.G. Bell, Juan Gines de Sepuilveda (Oxford, 1925) ; J. Beneyto Perez, Gines de Sepzilveda, humanista y soldado (Madrid, 1944).

2 See the letter in which Sepulveda dedicates the Demnocrates alter to Luis de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla. "It is a transcendental problem to ascertain whether the war waged against the Indians by the kings'of Spain in order to subject them to our dominium is just or unjust, and upon what juridical grounds our imperium over these peoples is found- ed." This was also the subject discussed at Valladolid in 1550-51, when Sepuilveda and Las Casas appeared before a junta of theologians to defend their views.

3 The four principal traditions supporting Sepulveda's scheme are: the universalism of the Stoa, the Aristotelian political theory of the Greek city-state, Augustinian Christian- ity, and the civic humanism of the Italian Quattrocento. Their influence on Sepulveda is discussed in my forthcoming paper, "Juan Ginds de Sepulveda: A Spanish Humanist's Ec- lectic Blueprint for a Universal Society."

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 435

society in Sepil1veda's age, it is not difficult to understand the importance of the obstacle to be surmounted when attempting to bring into ac- cordance a social and political framework molded by the doctrine of Chris- tianity and the Indian commonwealths. Strictly speaking, medieval ex- perience offered no sure guide to those who sought to blend into an harmonious whole European society with the universe recently discovered beyond the Ocean Sea; an important consideration in an age when the authority of the past-be it that of pagan antiquity for the humanists, or the redoubtable example of the Fathers and of tradition for orthodox thought-counted for so much. Sepi61veda soon discovered, however, that the means of solving the riddle were at hand if only he would tacitly ad- mit for this particular instance the superiority of the Old Testament over the New.4 In this manner and with a single stroke, he removes the barrier standing in the way of that universal society that the discovery of America had made mandatory in the eyes of the Spanish theologians and jurists of the sixteenth century.

Rejecting the standards offered by the New Testament to cope with the novelty of the problem in question, Sepulveda finds instead a universally and eternally valid canon of conduct given by God Himself to man- the law with which those of the Christian persuasion are acquainted through the testimony of the Old Covenant. The Mosaic interpretation of the teachings contained in this Law product of the divine will is both sound and truthful. But it is not the only valid one, for "even though its precepts were given to the children of Israel, God Himself declared that they are not only divine law, but natural law as well and applicable to all peoples."5 And Aristotle is another venerable and competent inter- preter-for the Greeks as Moses was for the Hebrews-of the self-evident truths and comprehensible commands of the one universal God. Implicit here is obviously the assumption that if the Hebrews had their Moses and the ancient pagans their Aristotle, there is no reason to assume a priori that the American Indians cannot have their own sage to instruct them in the meaning of those eternal truths. In other words, the Indians are to be measured by a rod other than Christianity; a rod that Sepilveda is con- vinced is handy and infallible: natural law which, as the Old Testa- ment proves, can be comprehended by all men at all times. Knowledge of, and obedience to, natural law, then, suffices for the creation of a perfect-

4 This superiority derives from Sepulveda's discussion of the traditionally fundamental question which debates the relative merits of the vita activa and the vita contemplativa. Its importance is examined in "Juan Gines de Sep6lveda: A Spanish...."

5 Juan Gines de Sepfilveda, Democrates alter, ed. and trans. A. Losada (Madrid, 1947), p. 40 et passim. Cited hereafter as DA. See also Democrates primus (De convenientia dis-

ciplinae nilitaris cum Christiana Religione dialogus), in Opera, ed. Real Academia de la Historia (4 vols., Madrid, 1780), vol. IV, p. 234. Cited hereafter as DR.

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436 JUAN GINES DE SEPIULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

ly valid and viable society. The teachings of Christ, the New Covenant, on the other hand, only improve (making it utterly perfect) this whole- some society, and only for those who want it so. There is no denying, of course, that in Sep1lveda's mind Christian society is the apex of human accomplishment; but it is equally true that the Spanish humanist willing- ly admits that those societies which, while lacking its degree of perfec- tion, still rest their foundations upon the solid rock of natural law, are worthy of existing side by side with Christian society.

On the basis of these conclusions, Sep61veda divides the world of na- tions into two groups. In the first are included the true commonwealths; those nations (both Christian and non-Christian) in which obedience to natural law and civilization flourish. The second group encompasses those republics which, barbaric and uncivilized, shun the precepts of nat- ural law.6 Thus, in the same universe that contains perfectly mature polit- ical entities we also find groups of men living in ignorance of the basic fundamentals of civilized life-barbarians. The next question, once these new standards have been formulated, evidently suggests itself. Are the Indian polities true commonwealths, true states? Sepilveda's answer is categorically negative. The barbarian communities of the New World lack even the rudiments of culture and the most basic principles of a monetary economy; they wage war in a most brutal and uncouth manner; the inhabitants go about naked. Above all, the evil and unnatural prac- tices of cannibalism, idol-worship, and human sacrifices are widespread in those commonwealths.7

In themselves, these flaws are not excessively unusual; after all, con- cedes Sepulveda, many among the civilized commit similar or worse out- rages against nature. What is truly significant, however, is that those un- natural practices are sanctioned by the laws and public institutions of those peoples. And since the laws are the truest foundation of civil society, it is inconceivable that the legislation of man should go against the clear and explicit commands of God and still remain laws. Sepuilveda therefore concludes that the laws of "those barbarians" cannot possibly be true laws, and their states are not true states.8 But since it is equally unnat-

6 Juan Gints de Sepuilveda, De Regno et Regis officio, in Opera, vol. IV, p. 99. Cited hereafter as DR.

7 DA, 35 et sqq. In the Apologia pro libro de justi belli causis written in defense of his Democrates alter after the universities of Salamanca and Alcalh had opposed the latter's publication, Sepuilveda gives the following definition of "barbarian": "Barbarians, on the authority of Saint Thomas, are those men wanting in reason ... such men must obey those who are more civilized and prudent in order that they may be governed by better mores and institutions." Opera, vol. IV, p. 332.

8 DA, 58. Two important ideas are implied in this passage. First, as long as the laws and the institutions of a people are in harmony with natural law, Sep6lveda will concede their

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 437

ural that man should live outside a politically constituted society and the barbarians themselves are unable to create them, only one solution re- mains: the barbarian nations of the West must be subjected to the rule of a civilized commonwealth.

The significance of these conclusions can hardly be exaggerated. It is not against the complex standards of Christianity that Sepilveda con- sciously judges the behavior of the Indians individually and collectively, but against the fundamentally simple and self-evident rule that says that a man shall truly be a man only if he can discriminate between good and evil in their most elementary forms. Sepilveda, however, insists that the failure of individual men to pass this basic test is not sufficient grounds to warrant a full and sweeping condemnation of an entire society. What is perfectly inadmissible is that the laws of nature should be openly flouted by the institutions-in whose development all members of the com- monwealth have presumably participated-of a given society. Such a ne- farious act brands that society and all its members as inferior; for then we have irrefutable proof, first, that the social body exists on the basis of a permanent contravention of the divine commands; and secondly, that men living in it are not as enlightened as men should be, for, what man in full possession of his faculties would willingly choose to defy the most fundamental of principles implanted by God in his heart? Two con- clusions are evidently inescapable: on the one hand, the Indian societies of the New World are evil and therefore imperfect; on the other, the In- dians are of low intelligence and endowed with decidedly inferior attri- butes. Nature itself, then, and not the Spaniards, has determined the man- ner of governance to which the barbarians must submit their persons and their goods.9

Clearly, Sepilveda's conclusions are not merely the result of his own personal interests, national preferences and pride, or religious prejudice. They are the outcome of careful reflection; the offspring of a rationally systematic assessment of facts which when interpreted on the basis of premises widely accepted as self-evident truths by the age, yield a unique and incontrovertibly valid verdict: the Indian commonwealths are not perfect states, and their inhabitants lack the necessary prerequisites to be considered as fully civil beings.

soundness. It is solely upon this foundation-and its natural derivative, a superior culture- that he bases the Spanish claim to superiority. Secondly, Sepilveda acknowledges the supremacy of law in social and political life. Only when this supremacy is assured will justice, the highest expression of the Christian political ethic, become an attainable goal.

9 It is important to note that from the very beginning the problem is set on decidedly political foundations. As we shall shortly see, it is the political element that will crucially influence Sepuilveda's ideas on the status of the Indians.

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438 JUAN GINiES DE SEPUILVEDA AND THE INDIANS

What, then, is the precise position occupied by the Indian as an indi- vidual entity within the universal brotherhood of men? What kind of rule has nature decreed be given to the Indians as a group? Endeavoring to answer these questions Sepl1veda explains that the political status of the American natives is defined-in a very ambiguous manner, as we shall see -by their natural subjection to a form of authority lying somewhere be- tween two extremes: that asserted by the father over his sons, and the power exerted by the lord over his slaves. And it is precisely the nature of these answers that is responsible for Sep6lveda's widespread unpopu- larity and the unsavory reputation that he enjoys among some historians. His political order stands accused of openly advocating slavery as the sys- tem best fitting the nature and condition of the American natives.'o

In point of fact, the problem of ascertaining with any degree of con- clusiveness the nature of Sepilveda's answer to his own twofold question is a rather intractable one seemingly allowing for no solution clearly be- yond questioning. Four obstacles are fundamentally responsible for our difficulties, and they must be well understood before we may hope to. formulate any tentative conclusions. The first one is not strictly of Se- piilveda's own making, but results instead from the interpretation often given to his use of servus. Sepulveda's scheme contains important novel elements which make the translation, categorically and without extensive qualifications, of this word into "slave" impossible to justify. Even under the best of circumstances "slave" is a poor term to use be- cause, first, its pejorative implications are difficult to overcome since it calls to mind a system of social and, above all, economic relationships self-evident perhaps with the aid of hindsight to the mind of the twen- tieth century, but not necessarily present in the doctrines of a sixteenth- century thinker. Most important of all, however, when used in a pure and undiluted Aristotelian context, the word "slave" gives Sepuilveda's pro- nouncements on the nature of the American natives and the form of

government best adapted to their needs a lucidity and sharpness eas- ily belied by the reading of his political works; its deceptive clarity con- ceals the uncertainties of Sepilveda's scheme.

And these uncertainties must be clearly noted because they are indis- pensable evidence bearing witness to the author's efforts aimed at solv- ing a problem for which, strictly speaking, there is no precedent. The

10 Lewis Hanke maintains that Sep6lveda fully intended to translate servus as slave; an interpretation which seems to derive from Las Casas' reading of Sepilveda. See L. Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians (Chicago, 1959). This opinion, however, is not uni- versally shared, for other scholars have pointed out that servus may be taken to mean either slave or serf, and it was the latter meaning that Sepuilveda sought to convey. See Robert E. Quirk, "Some Notes on a Controversial Controversy," Hispanic American Historical Review, 34 (1954), pp. 357-364.

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 439

result of these efforts is the formulation of a socio-political status for the Indians which is new and designed to meet the imperatives suggested by a novel situation. True, it is not radically new, for its novelty does not lie in a complete break with the past or a definite formulation of first prin- ciples; rather, it derives doctrinal sustenance from the authority of tra- dition, and succeeds mostly in unveiling the utter complexity of a situa- tion in which even the terminology available is inadequate. Sepilveda's conservatism, however, should not come as a surprise if we remember how respectful the age was toward antiquity and early Christian times. But neither should the Renaissance be denied its share of originality; a circumstance having decisive bearing upon the argument-now a com- monplace through forceful reiteration-that Sepilveda, faithfully du- plicating Aristotelian doctrine, concludes that the Indians are naturally slaves. And this, Sepi'lveda's Aristotelianism, is precisely the second obstacle; for it is essential that we find out the extent of the humanist's faithfulness to Aristotle's theory of slavery.

Thirdly, we have the Augustinian inclinations of Sepilveda, which shall contribute in no small measure to the ambiguities inherent in his use of the word servus. Lastly, Sepillveda himself often blurs the per- spective of his own scheme by implicitly recognizing the existence of two kinds of Indians: those who peacefully accept Spanish dominium, and those who stubbornly refuse to abide by the decrees of nature. As we shall see, the fate of the former is very different from the latter's. Un- fortunately, however, it is often impossible to ascertain conclusively which category Sepilveda is talking about; the result is added uncertain- ty. In consequence, the remainder of this study will be substantially de- voted to exploring the impact upon Sepilveda's scheme of the difficulties suggested above, starting with an attempt to find out the nature of the debt owed by Sepilveda to Aristotle.

To begin with, it is to be noted that Aristotle develops his fundamen- tal ideas concerning slavery within the context of a domestic economy. The slave is the economic pillar of the household-"And so, in the ar- rangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments."" The slave belongs completely to his mas- ter, "hence we see what is the nature of a slave: he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave."12 A slave, therefore, is "a part of property." A slave, however, is an animate entity and con- sequently an instrument of action, not of production-"But life is action

11 Aristotle, Politics 1. 4. 1253b30. All references are to the Jowett edition and will be cited hereafter as Pol.

12 Ibid., 1.4. 1254a15.

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440 JUAN GIN'S DE SEPULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action." 3 It is clear from these ideas that the Aristotelian notion of slavery in- volves a strongly proprietary concept inseparable from the very exis- tence of the household. But the household exists to satisfy the physical needs of its members, and the slave provides the mechanism indispen- sable for the fulfillment of those needs.14 It is for this reason that there

exists no relation of reciprocity between owner and owned.15 Out of these basic economic circumstances and the premise that "there

is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects who are by nature slaves,"''16 the Aristotelian household emerges not only as an economic unit, but also as a fully mature political struc- ture ready to be expanded into the state. Two forms of paternal domin- ion appear within the domestic realm based upon the intellectual sophis- tication of its members. Slaves have no intellectual capacity whatsoever and will therefore be subject to a unique kind of dominium. 7 Over children and wife an entirely different form of authority will be exercised. In the former case it is the paternal authority, justified on the grounds that intellectual capacity exists in a less developed form in children than in adults; while in the latter matrimonial empire is in order because the woman possesses an intellect naturally weaker than that of man.

It is clear that Aristotle views the institution of slavery as essential to the existence of the household, and as one more example of the hier- archical order of nature. However, when he passes from the study of the household into that of the ideal state, the clarity that characterized his statements on slavery vanishes giving way to uncertainty. Thus, we are

13 Ibid., 1. 4. 1254a5-10. 14 "The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in

reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interests of the master..." Ibid., 3. 6. 1278b30-35. Such, it will shortly become clear, is not the case in the relations between peaceful Indian and Spaniard as advocated by Sepilveda.

15 "Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him." Ibid., 1. 4. 1254a5-15.

16 Ibid., 1. 7. 1255b15-20. 17 Natural slaves, however, are not quite like animals because although lacking reason

they are nevertheless capable of apprehending rational principles. Ibid., 1. 5. 1254b20, et sqq. "Yet he [the slave] possesses a kind of moral virtue-the kind which enables him to do his work in subordination to his master-the moral virtue, in fact, of a subordinate con- fined to humble functions, and itself of a humble type. How any form of moral virtue can subsist in the absence of the deliberative faculty, Aristotle does not explain .... There are, indeed, other indications that it was not possible for Aristotle wholly to reconcile the two aspects of the slave, as a man and as an instrument or article of property." W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (2 vols., Oxford, 1887), vol. I, p. 149. See also C. H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the WVest (New York, 1932), pp. 70 et sqq.

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 441

told that states "are composed, not of one, but of many elements,"18 and those elements number eight, from husbandmen to magistrates. But although "serfs and labourers" are included as the fourth class compris- ing the state, no mention is made of slaves. In Book III, Chapter 5, how- ever, Aristotle had already suggested that those performing "necessary services" within the commonwealth may be "either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community;" an idea which receives its final form when in Book VII, Chapter 10, he expresses his willingness to substitute serfs for slaves in the performance of farming tasks. The distinctions thus far sug- gested between Aristotelian domestic and state slavery are important because Sepuilveda will radically alter Aristotle's order. With the Spanish humanist the emphasis is not on slavery as an economic institution, but upon the political nature of the servus.

Sepuilveda retains the Aristotelian political nexus binding the house- hold to the state.

Royal rule, as the philosophers teach, is very similar to the administra- tion of the household because, according to them, the household is like the realm formed by a single house and, conversely, the kingdom is a household administrative unit consisting of one city or many.'9

This is not to be taken necessarily as evidence of an unusually strong de- votion toward Aristotle on Sepilveda's part, for it was commonplace in the sixteenth century to discuss the nature of the state on the basis of the family as the former's fundamental block. The important point to re- member, however, is that Sepuilveda does not retain Aristotle's emphasis on economics; rather, the Spanish humanist remains exclusively con- cerned with political matters.

Just as the father holds sway over a large and complex household, the king (in this case the king of Spain) must exercise various forms of authority over his different subjects. In the household we find the sons, and "servi seu mancipia," as well as servants ("ministri conditionis lib- erae"). Just and humane, the father lords it over them all; not, however, in the same manner, but in accordance with the class and condition of

each. So shall a good and just king rule. The Spaniards, who are naturally free, deserve the kind of rule that the father reserves for the sons ("reg- ium imperium"), while "those barbarians," being servi natura, shall

18 Pol., 4. 4. 1290b35-40. Mechanics and laborers are not citizens; "they may be de- scribed as necessary conditions of the state. But the answer varies from one kind of con- sitution to another: in an aristocratic constitution, mechanics and labourers cannot be citizens; in an oligarchy, a rich mechanic may." E. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Ox- ford, 1946),p. 107.

19 DA, 120.

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442 JUAN GINES DE SEP;ULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

be governed as free servants ("tanquam ministros, sed liberos") with a mixture of herile and paternal authority as their condition and circum- stances demand.20 Sepilveda, then, is fundamentally concerned with the various forms of dominium arising as a consequence of the appearance of the state.

Dominium is not always exercised in the same manner. Thus, the au- thority of the father over the sons, the husband over the wife; the power that the lord enjoys over his slaves, the magistrate over the citizens, the king over his realms and the individuals subject to his empire, are of different juridical origin.21

This passage clearly emphasizes the differences suggested by Sepuilveda between the authority exercised by the king over his subjects and the power that the master enjoys over his slaves. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that the author invariably sees the Indians as subjects of the king of Spain; a point which is again strongly brought home when, to- ward the end of the Democrates alter, he discusses the role of the multi- tude in the affairs of the republic. Sep'ilveda begins by pointing out how pleased he is that "the great philosophers who wrote about poli- tics" should have taught that in a perfectly constituted republic not only prudent men of known probity, but the multitude also should be consid- ered for political office. The reason is a simple and empirical one: good men are always few, while the numbers of the multitude are invariably great and against their will the rule of the former cannot maintain itself for long. "It is wise and advisable, therefore, to grant to the mob the privilege of occupying minor posts."22 The Spanish sovereigns, concludes Sepulveda, would do well to bear in mind the wisdom of these Aristotel- ian observations.

The kings of Spain and their advisers must remember the precepts of these philosophers because the nature of their governance over the bar- barians must be such that the latter will not be given, through the granting of a degree of freedom unwarranted by their nature and con- dition, the opportunity to return to their primitive and evil ways; on the other hand, they must not be oppressed with harsh rule and servile treat- ment, for, tired of servitude and indignity, they may attempt to break the yoke to the peril of the Spaniards.23

Consequently, the Spanish rulers must at all costs avoid the error of the Thessalians and Spartans who, having treated the Penestae and Helots dishonorably and used them "almost as servi, to cultivate their fields,"

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 20. 22 Ibid., 121. 23 Ibid.

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 443

were rewarded with formidable rebellions.24 In short, "it is clear that it

would be unjust, as well as dangerous to treat those barbarians as slaves (barbaros istos ut mancipia tractare), except those who by their perfidy, cruelty, and pertinacity in waging War become worthy of such penalty and misfortune."25

From all this it may be fairly inferred that the word servus should not be understood in the economic sense stressed by Aristotle, for Sep61veda's servus is far more than a chattel; he is, at times, even homo politicus, although not in the perfect civil sense reserved for those fated by nature to rule.26 Hence, Sepilveda's Indians, by virtue of their limited rational capacity seem to be the laborers, the amanuenses, the servants (but con- ditionis liberae) of the community, destined by nature (although not to- tally deprived of political rights) to perform those purely physical tasks essential to the continued existence of the commonwealth. This does

not necessarily give them the character of slaves, any more than in a mod- ern industrial society the labor force is ex necessitate rei a slave contin- gent. Even when their toil ministers to the needs of the individual en- comendero it is in the latter's role as a public official, not a private lord.

This last point becomes clear when we read in De Regno, a treatise already removed in time from the author's feud with Las Casas, that a herile form of government is imposed by those chosen by nature to com- mand, not for the benefit of the governed but for the profit of the ru- lers.27 In other words, the members of herile societies shall work and labor for the benefit of those whose nature makes them civil beings. But such is not exactly the position of the Indians (those of peaceful in- clinations, that is), for Sepuilveda's servi receive important benefits in

24 Ibid., 122. See also Pol., 2. 9.

25 DA, 122. The exception mentioned by Sepilveda is an essential part of my argument and will fully be dealt with when Sepuilveda's ideas on war are examined.

26 In time, when the Indians have mended their ways and adopted the Christian re- ligion, their governance, mixture of paternal and herile authority, shall give way to a "freer and more liberal treatment." Ibid., 120. The political nature of the relationship binding Indian and Spaniard is again stressed when, in the context of the just war, Sepilveda likens the dominion of Spaniards over Indians to the "imperium of the Romans over all the other peoples." Ibid., 31 et sqq. It is clear, however, that even if the Indians willingly accept the Christian religion and the suzerainty of the Spanish monarch, they must not be admitted to the same rights enjoyed by "other Christians and even Spanish subjects" of the king. For "there is nothing more opposed to the so-called distributive justice than giving equal rights to unequal people; and to equate in favors, honor, or rights those who are superior in dignity, virtue, and merits to those who are inferior." Ibid., 119. But it must be understood that this is not proposed for the benefit of the Indians alone. It is widely ac- cepted among political thinkers in the sixteenth century that although men are born free, they are not created equal; an idea which explains the general distaste for democracy as a system of government.

27 DR, 98.

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444 JUAN GINES DE SEPUILVEDA AND THE INDIANS

return for their efforts in behalf of the state which are incompatible with an unqualified herile (servile) status. Sepilveda postulates, as the in- dispensable background governing the relations between Indians and Spaniards, a political compact of mixed nature which unmistakably im- plies obligations equally binding to both sides. The mutual dependence embodied in such a system bears little resemblance to Aristotle's con- clusion, arrived at when discussing the nature of master-slave relations, that "a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor."28 Sepilveda, on the contrary, is at pains to empha- size the reciprocal character of the unwritten compact established by nature between Indian and Spaniard.

True, he concedes, the Spaniards take gold and silver from the Indians but,-in return, they give them "iron and bronze," metals which are of far greater intrinsic value to the needs of mankind. And this is not all. In ex- change for those precious metals of no use to the natives-and of very rel- ative value to civilized societies-, the latter receive goods of far greater import: "wheat . . ., horses, mules, sheep, goats, hogs, vines, and many kinds of trees... "29 Above all, however, the Spaniards bring with them what Sep'lveda-good humanist and better Christian-prizes above ev- erything else: the elements of European civilization, excellent laws and institutions, and the "knowledge of God and of the Christian religion."'3 These inseparable twins, European culture and the Christian faith, which shall more than amply compensate the Indian for the loss of his gold and silver, are the strongest and most important part of the bond which unites the Spanish Crown, through its officials, to its charges, the Indians. And this is indeed what has no parallel in the relations be- tween master and slave as described by Aristotle, for the nature of the covenant requiring to give the Indians a Christian education inevitably lifts them above the level of mere chattels, and establishes between na-

tive and Spanish administrator the important nexus of Christian caritas.31 The political barrier with which Sepiilveda surrounds the status of the

Indians in society when he insists that the only authority over the na- tives is that of the Spanish Crown, and the emphasis on Christianity which so strongly conditions the manner in which the Crown (or its offi- cials) may rightfully exercise this authority over its wards, give the rela- tions between Indian and Spaniard a complexity and significance far be- yond anything implied in the Aristotelian concept of slavery.

Under the circumstances, if we are to grasp correctly the full meaning

28 Pol. 1. 4. 1254a15 et sqq. 29 DA, 78. 30 Ibid., 79. 31 Ibid., 118-123.

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JosE A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 445

and breadth of Sepuilveda's scheme, it is imperative to remember that although an Aristotelian scholar whose mind is steeped in trust in the efficacy of reason, Sep6lveda is also a faithful disciple of Saint Augustine. It is nowadays fashionable to treat skeptically whatever moral strictures or ethical pronouncements may happen to be included in a political treatise, endeavoring instead to find the "real" intentions of the writer. While such a general outlook may be an understandable trait of the twentieth century, it is not at all clear that the inherent destructive- ness of that standard may be validly loosened against Sepfilveda and his age. Granted that the encomienda system, which in some passages Se- pilveda seems to advocate, became in the hands of unscrupulous oppor- tunists an oppressive institution aimed at the ruthless exploitation of the natives. Granted, moreover, that the fervent evangelical humanitar- ianism of Las Casas appears to contrast favorably with Sepuilveda's cold and measured intellectualism. Still, there is no reason to doubt the latter's

sincerity when he repeatedly asserts that it is not his aim to condone or sanction the actions of a few reprobates who break human and divine law; or to question the strength and sincerity of his beliefs when he re- affirms the Christian nature of the bond linking Indian and Spaniard. Indeed, the strength of Sepfilveda's commitment to Christianity will shortly become apparent, for it is at this point, when distinguishing be- tween warlike and peaceful Indians, that the shift toward Saint Augus- tine becomes most marked.

It is no easy task to determine with precision what the official position of the Early Church was in regard to slavery; what is certain, however, is that Saint Augustine did not view slavery as natural but, instead, as a re- sult of sin.32 Moreover, private property and the political order, two of the fundamental institutions that Christianity was forced to accept upon becoming the official religion of the empire, are also of unnatural origin, intimately bound to slavery, and frequently involve the use of the same word, servus. It therefore follows that it should be often difficult to ascer-

tain whether manumitted servitude, slavery, or political subjection is the correct meaning involved in a given passage. This is a handicap common to texts boasting a Latin of classical origin and certainly present throughout Sepi'lveda's political treatises. Tracts written in the vernacu- lar, however, are often free from these ambiguities, and more accurate

32 "It is only another of the institutions ordained by God to cope with man's wicked- ness. As such, however, it must be considered as an outward status and must never ob- struct the effects of God's grace; it does not deprive the slave of the character of a man nor reduce him to the level of an 'animate instrument' as Aristotle thought. Masters and slaves are fellow men and by the grace of God may become brothers in Christ, equal before God though necessarily unequal under human law while sojourners in this 'earth- ly city' ". Quoted in McIlwain, op. cit., 161.

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446 JUAN GINES DE SEPULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

distinctions are made between the various meanings of servus and its derivatives.33 Be that as it may, the significance of Saint Augustine's legacy to Sepilveda amply transcends the boundaries of terminological uncertainties. To give substance and solidity to his scheme, Sep6lveda turns to the Bishop of Hippo, and it is in the latter's theory of the just war that he will find the means of justifying, supporting, and enforcing his political doctrines.34

After explaining the nature and object of the just war, Sepilveda proceeds to consider under what conditions a war is said to be just. In the Democrates alter he appeals to the authority of Isidore of Seville who, while emphasizing that "the causes for a just war must in themselves be just," accepts three fundamental reasons for waging a just war. First, it is natural to ward off violence with violence when no other recourse re-

mains. Secondly, it is just to employ force to recover property which has been unjustly taken away from its rightful owner. Finally, the third cause lies in the imperious need to punish the offender should the proper authorities in the commonwealth of which he is a member fail to do so.35

This threefold formula, the encapsulated heart, of the medieval theory of the just war, although acceptable to Sep'ilveda, is clearly insufficient for his present purposes. He therefore hastens to add that "other reasons may also justify the waging of a war;" reasons which although perhaps of not so frequent application as those hallowed by tradition, are never- theless "just and founded upon divine law."36 And one of them, perfectly applicable to "those barbarians commonly called Indians," demands that "those whose natural condition commands that they obey others, shall be subdued by force of arms should they refuse the latter's imperium, and should no other recourse be left."''37

33 An interesting case in point is the Spanish Trinitarian monk, Alonso de Castrillo. When discussing in his Tractado de Repziblica the obedience that the citizens owe their king, Castrillo cites Book XIX, Chapter 15, of the City of God, where Saint Augustine writes on man's freedom and servitude; and he interprets the passage as explaining the origin of political authority and translates the key word servitutis as servidumbre. The same Castrillo, however, when describing the dismal and evil manner in which in his own corrupt world greed keeps justice, faith, peace, and virtue in bondage, he uses the word esclavas. In the same vein, compare Book I, Chapter V of Bodin's Ripublique in the Latin (Paris, 1586) and French (Paris, 1583) versions, and the English translation of 1606 by Richard Knolles (ed. K.D. McRae, Cambridge, 1962). On the problem of expressing sixteenth-century ideas in Latin see L. Febvre, Le probleme de l'incroyance au XVIe, sidcle: La religion de Rabelais (Paris, 1947).

34 For an extensive analysis of Saint Augustine's views on war, see H. A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of Saint Augustine (New York, 1966).

35 DA, 16-19, DR, 146-148. "A just war demands not only just cause and sound inten- tions, but also that it be waged in the right manner." DA, 27.

36 DA, 19. 37 Ibid., 19, 22. The other three are: "...Secondly, to banish the horrible crime of can-

nibalism and devil-worship.... [Thirdly] to free from serious injury the innocent who are

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JosE A. FERNJANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 447

Just, then, is the war waged upon those Indians who refuse to sub- mit to the authority of the Spaniards. In view of the serious consequences inherent in this conclusion, Sepfilveda suggests a rigid blueprint de- signed to keep developments tightly under control, both before and after the declaration of war. First, the barbarians must be advised of the need

to accept the imperium of the Spanish king, and the great benefits to be derived from their consent. Honesty and truth must rule these prelimi- naries. Neither threats nor deceit must be used; otherwise, should the outcome be war, its justice would be hopelessly compromised. Secondly, the natives must be given time to deliberate among themselves. Should the Indians then submit in peace, they shall be received within the Chris- tian fold and be given "conditions of just peace in conformity with their nature, so that, as it is written in Deuteronomy, they shall serve as tributaries."38 But it must be understood that, in truth, the crimes of the Indians (cult of idols, and human immolations) are so appalling in the eyes of nature that they might, in all justice as taught in the Old Tes- tament, be summarily punished-submission or no submission-"with the death of all sinners and the loss of their goods." Only the magnanimity of the Spanish sovereigns, born out of their respect for the counsels of the New Testament, is responsible for their desire not to punish the sins of the barbarians, but instead to strive for "the rehabilitation, salvation, and common well-being of the Indians."39

Should the barbarians, however, reject nature's commands, war must be waged against them and "once defeated, their persons and goods law- fully pass into the hands of the victor; and the latter shall freely decide their fate in accordance with the norms applicable to the treatment of the vanquished." 40 But, is it not true, questions Leopoldus, the fictional character who in this dialogue plays the role of Sepuilveda's (Democra- tes) adversary, that the righteousness underpinning this argument has been undermined beyond repair by the depredations of the Spaniards? Democrates answers that although it is true that many seek in the New World but booty, and that such an aim deprives war of its just character, turning it instead into an "impious and criminal" one, the subject of the discussion "is not the moderation or cruelty of leaders and soldiers, but the nature of this war and its relation to the just king of Spain."41

yearly immolated by these barbarians.... Fourthly, to open the way to the propagation of the Christian faith, and to facilitate the task of its preachers." Ibid., 83-93. These four ar- guments constitute one of the themes attacked by Las Casas during his disputation with Sep6lveda at Valladolid.

38 Ibid., 30. 39 Ibid., 42, 43, 79-80, 90. 40 Ibid., 30. 41 Ibid., 28-29.

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448 JUAN GINES DE SEPULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

The implications of all this are clear: Sepilveda identifies two entirely different situations growing out of the twofold manner in which the na- tives may respond to the commands of nature. On the one hand, if the Indians submit willingly to their predestined fate they should be given the political status suggested previously. On the other, those barbarians who refuse to comply with nature's will shall be reduced to obedience by force of arms. Once recourse to arms has become inevitable, the sta- tus of the Indians changes radically and their fate may then be decided in accordance with the laws of war. The reasons, Sepilveda explains, are manifest. First of all, in their rebelliousness the natives adamantly demon- strate their refusal to abandon those practices which clearly inflict in- jury upon God. In addition, when the barbarians resist the authority of the Spaniards they violate what, the reason of the philosophers tells us, is the explicit will of nature. Finally, refusal to accept Spanish rule inflicts the sort of injury on the Spanish Crown which, the jurists affirm, is pun- ishable by human law. From all this, concludes Sepilveda, it necessar- ily follows that the recalcitrant barbarians are not only servi natura but, as violators of civil law, also subject to those sanctions contemplated by human law and approved by the jus gentium (which Sep1lveda con- siders to be of natural origin): the rebellious Indians may, upon capture, be subjected to civil slavery and the loss of their wordly goods.42

Leopoldus, however, refuses to be convinced. He is appalled at the prospect of dooming a man, any man, to the loss of liberty and property; after all, "all men are born free." Answering his friend's objections, De- mocrates points out that sometimes two laws of natural origin may appear to be at odds with each other, thereby compelling man to choose between two evils. Such is the source of that universal covenant which, "grow- ing out of reason and natural need sanctioned by the tacit consent of all peoples," empowers the victor to make his own the defeated and his property.43 The subject of slavery as the result of defeat in battle had traditionally been a delicate one among Christians; for it seemingly was at odds with the most basic tenets of the faith. It is not surprising, then, that Sep6lveda, sharply goaded by Leopoldus, should take pains to ex- plain his conclusions at length and call to his support various and vener- ated authorities.

Of more significance for our immediate purpose, however, is Sepfilve- da's acceptance of man's natural freedom. Democrates, discoursing on the merits of civil slavery, does not refute-thereby implicitly granting-Leo- poldus's sweeping assertions concerning man's birthright of liberty. A

42 Ibid., 60, 90. 43 Ibid., 90 et sqq.

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Josi A. FERNAINDEZ-SANTAMARIA 449

rather incomprehensible attitude if we interpret Sep61lveda's ideas on natural servitude as slavery; for, if the subject of the discussion is the Indians and they are naturally slaves, what is the purpose of this elab- orate exchange aimed at explaining the juridical circumstances whereby transgressing natives may be lawfully enslaved? The answer is evidently a different one: the American Indians are servi natura, but not natural slaves; only when they refuse to meet their natural obligations do they become outlaws to be justly warred against. Sep6lveda himself fully appreciates the difference between the juridical position of the Indians who submit peacefully and those who resist.

The servitude contracted in a just war is legal, and the booty acquired becomes the rightful possession of the victor. But concerning these barbarians, the plight of the Indians defeated by Spanish arms in formally declared war is very different from the circumstances of those who, through prudence or fear, delivered themselves to the authority of the Christians. Just as in the former case the victorious prince may deter- mine, according to his will and right and bearing the public good in mind, the fate of the vanquished, in the latter both civil laws and jus gentium would rule unjust to deprive the natives of their goods and to reduce them to slavery; it is, however, licit to keep them as stipendiaries and tributaries (stipendiarios et vectigales) as befitting their nature and condition.44

Sepalveda has thus established the juridical foundations for the treat- ment of defiant Indians on the basis of the law of nations. But how shall

these conclusions be applied in practice? In order to answer this question, Sepuilveda feels compelled to embark upon a preliminary study of the problem of ignorance in war.45 Faithfully, Leopoldus provides the need- ed cue when he puts forth one of the questions lying at the heart of the theory of the just war: is it possible for justice to lie with both sides? Democrates explains that under no circumstances can the opposing ar- guments which support the cause of two contending parties be simultane- ously just. What may happen, however, is that one of the warring factions, "its understanding obscured by ignorance," shall be deceived into believ- ing its cause to be just. And this is precisely what has taken place in the

44 Ibid., 117. Cliens, stipendiarius, and vectigalis are words frequently used by Sepfilveda to describe the position of the Indians in relation to the Spanish state; an indication of how clearly he keeps in mind the example of the kind of authority Rome exercised over her client states. In a letter to Francisco de Argote before 1552, Sepulveda reiterates his position on the Indian question. "I do not maintain that the barbarians should be reduced

to slavery, but merely that they must be subjected to our dominion; I do not propose that we should hold herile empire over them, but regal and civil rule for their benefit." Quoted in T. Andres Marcos, Los imperialismos.... p. 184. See also A. Losada, Epistol- ario de Juan Ginds de Sepzilveda (Madrid, 1966), Letter 53.

45DA, 100 et sqq.

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450 JUAN GINES DE SEP1ULVEDA AND THE INDIANS

case of the Indians; for, "whereas the Spaniards (if their intentions were just) had a just and pious cause to wage war, the Indians also had a probable cause." After all, "[they] knew neither justice nor truth, and could not learn about them merely on the Christians' word, or a few days time, but only after prolonged contact with the reality of both truth and justice."" Bearing these circumstances in mind, the behavior of the ruler toward the vanquished foe will be a moderate one, and once victory has been achieved "he will weigh the causes that brought the enemy into the war, and shall not be swayed in his judgment by hatred or greed." Only when the interests of peace and the public welfare demand it, may the prince treat the vanquished with the rigor allowed by the jus gentium.47 Otherwise, the prince shall treat his enemies with equity and humanity. These, concludes Sep61lveda, are the cardinal principles which in prac- tice must govern the treatment of the defeated natives. After all, "the most important aim of this whole affair is to pacify these barbarians, to introduce them to a more humane mode of life, and to admit them to Christianity; and the more humanity the Christians show the barbar- ians, the more easily that aim will be fulfilled.""4

To sum up, the American natives who willingly accept Spanish rule cannot, in justice, be treated as slaves. They are not slaves by nature and must not be subjected to a pure form of herile rule. Only when their pertinacious rejection of natural law forces the Spaniards to crush them in battle will the Indians (as any other men under similar circum- stances) forfeit their juridical status as free men and become lawfully subject to the full rigors of herile government. Even then, however, the provisions of the law of nations shall be fully complied with only if their enforcement is compatible with the interests of the whole (Indians and Spaniards) commonwealth. To my mind, these are inescapable conclu- sions borne out by the evidence of Sep1lveda's writings. On the other hand, Sep6lveda seems to tell us clearly only what the Indians are not and must not become-slaves. And when it comes to a positive definition of their political role within the new scheme of things whose birth he is conscious of witnessing, the Spanish humanist wavers and refrains from drawing the conclusions seemingly warranted by his forceful scholar- ship; a clear indication of the limitations, in the context of sixteenth- century reality, of the intellectual tradition which nourishes him. And it is perhaps this lack of boldness that in the last analysis has prejudiced his case in the eyes of posterity. For Sep61veda, against his will, was drawn into a controversy with a man whose fiery character and passionate in-

46 Ibid., 118. 47 Ibid., 94-95. 48 Ibid., 118.

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Jost A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA 451

volvement sharply contrasted with his own tempered and academic out- look. It was thus in the nature of things that in a drama so forcefully dominated by Las Casas' heroic visions, Sepilveda-as he himself recog- nized in dismay-should have been cast in the role of the devil's (in encomendero garb) advocate.

Josi A. FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA California State University Hayward, California

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