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  DOI: 10.1177/0885412213512331

published online 3 December 2013Journal of Planning Literature Kathryn T. Rice, Leora S. Waldner and Russell M. Smith

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Article

Why New Cities Form: An Examination into Municipal Incorporation in the United States 1950–2010

Kathryn T. Rice1, Leora S. Waldner2, and Russell M. Smith3

Abstract Municipal incorporation can have profound impacts on the urban and political geography of the regions in which they incorporate. These impacts and declines in the rate of municipal formation lead to the question of why municipalities incorporate. The authors synthesize an overview and analysis of the historical literature with a media literature review to construct a comprehensive classification system of theories that explain municipal incorporations. Twelve new micromotives such as eligibility for govern- ment grants and economic development are identified. Moreover, the review surprisingly reveals that spatial motives, in contrast to service motives, play the largest role in new municipal incorporations.

Keywords newly incorporated municipalities (NIMs), municipal incorporation, boundary change, cities, typology, land use

Introduction

Municipal incorporation can have profound impacts on the

urban and political geography of the regions in which they

incorporate. New municipalities can impact taxes, school dis-

tricts, elected representation, and public utility services. Addi-

tionally, new cities also have external impacts on surrounding

landscapes and can lead to metropolitan fragmentation and

competition for limited financial resources amongst local gov-

ernments. Since 1950, the United States has witnessed the

incorporation of more than 3,310 new municipalities. Yet, in

the 1950s, while the United States had a new city form every

three days, by the first decade of the new century, from 2000

to 2010, the rate had dropped to a new city every twenty-four

days, or an 86.2 percent decline in new city formation

(Waldner, Rice, and Smith 2013). This precipitous decline

in municipal incorporation raises an interesting question.

Why do new cities, towns, and villages incorporate? Do

they form to fight off annexations; to provide more libraries,

parks, and other urban services; to stop racial change; or for

other reasons? This complex political, economic, social, and

geographic phenomenon warrants a better understanding,

particularly because of impacts to the planning profession.

Newly incorporated municipalities (NIMs) are of particular

interest to urban planners for a variety of reasons. First, plan-

ners are often responsible for interacting with new municipali-

ties. Planners help develop comprehensive plans for and in

response to new cities and are tasked with developing optimal

land use and zoning to manage growth. Second, planners help

evaluate the need for public services for a new municipality and

have been known to mediate disputes between existing and new

municipalities. The planning profession is also often involved

at the state level in helping to develop or change laws pertain-

ing to the incorporation of new territory. Moreover, NIMs

influence budgetary and planning responsibilities for the

remaining unincorporated county due to redistribution of prop-

erty taxes and land-use responsibilities. Ultimately, planners

are often charged with the implementation of municipal incor-

poration actions that are decided upon by elected officials and

which greatly influence the quality of life for communities in

which they serve. Of critical importance to all the tasks that a

planner must deal with is an understanding of why a commu-

nity decides to incorporate.

As a result, the purpose of this article is twofold. First, this

article provides an overview and analysis of the existing liter-

ature on municipal incorporation from a diverse array of aca-

demic disciplines. Second, a media literature review of

newspaper articles on municipal incorporations between 1997

and 2007 is analyzed and merged into the overall research on

municipal incorporation. The Introduction explains the goals

of the review and why new municipal formation is relevant

to planners. The Context section provides definitions and a

1 Building Quality Communities, Decatur, GA, USA 2 Troy University’s Atlanta Site, Atlanta, GA, USA 3 Department of Social Sciences, Winston-Salem State University, Winston-

Salem, NC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kathryn T. Rice, Building Quality Communities, PO Box 360608, Decatur, GA

30036, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Journal of Planning Literature 201X, Vol XX(X) 1-15 ª The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0885412213512331 jpl.sagepub.com

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brief background of incorporation in the United States and the

limitations of the analysis. The next section focuses on theories

that have developed on municipal formation from 1950 to

2010. Subsections from six major disciplines demonstrate the

influence of lens and how they affect the interpretation of fac-

tors that affect the creation of cities. The article then turns to the

media literature review, a content analysis of newspaper articles

on municipal incorporation from 1997 to 2007. It is here that

new categories emerge and a typology is developed. The conclu-

sion summarizes what was learned from combining the analysis

of the historical review with the media content analysis.

The analysis conducted in this study offers a fundamentally

different perspective from the traditional literature review

explaining NIM formation. The two reviews on municipal

incorporation research are synthesized into a comprehensive

classification system or typology from which planners can

easily understand the motivations surrounding municipal

incorporation. The typology reveals that spatial factors, par-

ticularly land use and growth control are the most frequent

factors explaining why new municipalities form. In addition,

the analysis uncovered twelve new factors that had not been

previously identified in research on municipal formation.

Context

Before exploring why communities incorporate, it is useful to

understand the process of incorporation, alternatives to new

city formation, and the historical and cultural context for

incorporation. The process of creating a new city, town, or vil-

lage is called incorporation. NIMs refer exclusively to the cre-

ation of a city, town, or village in a previously unincorporated

community; thus, NIMs do not include other established

forms of boundary changes such as annexations, municipal

consolidation, and so on. In the United States, the unincorpo-

rated community is part of a county (we focus exclusively on

municipal incorporation in the United States because of the

unique intergovernmental structure and values that shape Amer-

ican municipal formation). Before incorporation, the county typi-

cally governs the community’s affairs in many states and may

provide services to the community. After incorporation, the new

city assumes governance responsibilities such as land-use plan-

ning, though the new city may choose to contract with the county

or private companies for services, such as for water, sewer, fire,

and police. When cities contract with the county for services, it

is sometimes referred to as a Lakewood plan city, after Lake-

wood’s innovative and widely copied contract with Los Angeles

County in 1954 (Miller 1981). Lands not part of the new city

remain unincorporated and county-governed (though in some

states, a system of townships prevails and no unincorporated land

exists). This review focuses only on newly incorporated entities

(villages that become towns or towns that become cities are not

included). Due to various reasons explained further in this review

(stricter laws regarding population, approval and fiscal review,

and alternative forms of government such as special districts and

private owner associations [POAs]), the growth rate of new muni-

cipalities since the benchmark work of Stauber in the 1950s has

been declining (Table 1).

The formation of new local governments on the political

landscape is somewhat of a unique phenomenon, especially

when compared with Europe’s experience with local govern-

ment boundary change. Due to the federalist system of govern-

ment and its emphasis on shared governance, American states

have a much larger role in local government boundary change.

Specifically, each state determines the rules of boundary change

within its jurisdiction (Advisory Commission on Intergovern-

mental Rights 1987). As a result, local government boundary

change actions tend to be instigated at a very local geography.

Meanwhile, many Unitary states in Europe function differently

with local government boundary change power resting in the

hands of a central authority and local government boundary

change actions being generated from the top down (Glassner and

Fahrer 2004). Central decision making leads to more mergers

occurring in Europe in an attempt to capture economies of scale

at the local public service level and to provide for regional plan-

ning (Meligrana 2004). In the United States, most local govern-

ments are unwilling to part with accumulated power.

New municipalities can impact taxes, land-use decisions,

environmental regulations, school districts, elected representa-

tion, and public utility services. The creation of a new city,

town, or village can potentially enhance citizen participation

and economic efficiency as the NIMs drive down the costs of

services through competition (Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout,

and Warren 1961; Buchanan 1971; Peterson 1981; Lowery and

Lyons 1989; Stein 1987). Other scholars have identified more

Table 1. Municipal Incorporation Activity and Population Growth in the United States 1950–2010.

Decade Number of NIMS

Created per Decade %Change in

NIMs Population Growth in the United States per Decade

%Change in US Population Growth

1950–1959 1,074 28,641,498 1960–1969 810 �24.6 24,847,318 �13.2 1970–1979 677 �16.4 22,378,541 �9.9 1980–1989 338 �50.1 21,763,743 �2.7 1990–1999 263 �22.2 25,871,583 18.9 2000–2009 148 �43.7 9,481,144 �63.4

Sources: Data for 1950 obtained from Richard Stauber, New Cities in America 1965; Data for 1960–1990s used the Census Bureau Boundary and Annex Survey (BAS) with amendments by The Municipal Yearbook 1979; Data for 2000s taken from the US Census Bureau Boundary and Annex Survey excluding upward bound entities (e.g., village to town or town to city); Population data taken from US Census Bureau Population Estimates.

2 Journal of Planning Literature XX(X)

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detrimental impacts. When several cities incorporate in a

county, this may lead to metropolitan fragmentation (Cox and

Jonas 1993; Ingalls and Rassel 2005; Hogen-Esch 2001), which

may in turn contribute to sprawl (Carruthers and Ulfarsson

2002; Carruthers 2003) and racial or socioeconomic segrega-

tion (Burns 1994; Smith and Debbage 2011). Some scholars

suggest that metropolitan fragmentation may also create impe-

diments to regional governance, though recent scholarship sug-

gests that to the contrary, a multitude of local governments can

operate as a complex and functional nuanced local public econ-

omy with highly interconnected regional governance network

(Oakerson and Parks 2011). Alternatives for unincorporated

communities include annexation to an existing city (Edwards

2008), formation of a special district (Foster 1997), creation

of a sphere of influence (extraterritorial jurisdiction) around

an existing city (Anderson 2008), merger with a larger munici-

pality (Marando 1979), and creation of a homeowners associa-

tion (Glasze 2006) among other possibilities (e.g., recent work

by Rogers (2010) has highlighted the potential role of deed-

restricted subdivisions as a substitute for NIMs). As such, the

incorporation literature is part of a broader literature on bound-

ary changes and political control (Feiock and Carr 2001).

Annexation is the most often utilized form of local govern-

ment boundary change in the United States and has been linked

to municipal incorporation efforts by urban scholars for

decades. Over the last decade, almost 100,000 annexations

occurred compared to 148 municipal incorporations according

to US Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a). Annexations

are more numerous for a variety of reasons. Annexations are a

tool for the approximately 20,000 currently existing municipali-

ties to improve tax revenue and expand boundaries. These

20,000 local governments already have the legislative authority

(although annexation legislation differs from state to state) along

with professional staff and a budget to conduct annexation pro-

ceedings to varying degrees.

While annexation activity far exceeds municipal incorpora-

tion events, it does not diminish the importance of studying

municipal incorporation. Municipal incorporation proceedings

have major ramifications on the urban and political landscape

of the regions in which they are formed. Additionally, the NIMs

of the 1990s alone impacted the lives of more than 1.6 million

US citizens directly (Smith and Debbage 2011). Millions more

were indirectly impacted through the establishment of these new

municipalities and their influence on public services, funding,

and democratic representation. For the purposes of this literature

review, we focus exclusively on NIMs as opposed to other

boundary changes such as annexations or consolidations (merg-

ers) as they represent fundamentally different types of boundary

change phenomena with different motivations and effects.

Why NIMs Incorporate—A Historical Perspective

The scholarly literature suggests that the reasons for incorpora-

tion change over time. Wallis (1994) specifies three stages of

incorporation—from consolidation and annexation in the

nineteenth and twentieth century to fragmentation in the mid-

twentieth century, and finally, to the modern era where there

is a need and demand for regional governance. Covering a

shorter period of time, Burns (1994) attributes the motivations

for municipal incorporation from service provision and racial

factors in the 1950–1960s to lowering taxes in subsequent

years. This review builds upon these works to provide a more

varied and nuanced picture of societal factors influencing

incorporation. A historical literature review is presented in jux-

taposition to a media literature review of newspapers. The fac-

tors identified in the historical literature review are combined

with those identified in the media analysis to yield a compre-

hensive classification system.

Land Use, Growth Controls, and Spatial Considerations

Spatial considerations (which include perspectives on plan-

ning, land use, zoning, and management of space and people)

led to one of the first theories behind municipal incorpora-

tion—population growth and urbanization. Stauber (1965) dis-

cussed the proliferation of municipal formation in the 1950s—

1,074 new municipalities for that decade. The predominant

belief at that time was that municipalities formed where there

was new growth and this coincided with urbanization/suburba-

nization (Schmandt 1961; Wood 1961; Stauber 1965; Burns

1994). In the 1950s, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

(SMSAs) accounted for 85 percent of the increase in the

nation’s total population, with much of it occurring in the sub-

urbs (Stauber 1965, 1). The mid-century suburbanization,

brought on by federal policies (Campbell and Meranto 1976),

pent-up housing demand after World War I (Weiher 1991), and

white flight (Berry 1973; Danielson 1976; Farley 1976; Judd

1979) stimulated population dispersion and the growth of sub-

urbs in the United States.

The connection between population growth and new cities

or towns is logical—suburbanization drives people to unincor-

porated communities, driving up the demand for services and

creating an atmosphere ripe for municipal incorporations.

However, this connection, though intuitive, has yet to be fully

substantiated. Stauber (1965) noted that some evidence

existed—the total number of municipalities increased by 4.5

percent with the number of municipalities in SMSAs increasing

by 7.7 percent. Yet Schmandt (1961), while noting the impor-

tance of population expansion admitted that his statistical tests

detected no relationship between population growth and incor-

porations. Rigos and Spindler’s work (1991) also failed to find

a statistical link between urban growth and NIMs. Rigos and

Spindler along with Stauber further question this link by high-

lighting the substantial number of isolated or rural incorpora-

tions that occur.

The aforementioned studies were conducted on a national

level conflating densely populated urban areas with rural, low

population areas. Studies conducted on a more local level

yield different results. Smith (2008) discovered that 70 per-

cent of the new NIMs in North Carolina were located within

a metropolitan statistical area. Additionally, Smith (2011)

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determined that a statistical relationship existed between

municipal incorporation and a county’s population growth

rate. Ingalls and Rasel (2005) also discuss the importance of

population growth in a localized geography with their exam-

ination of annexation and incorporation in the Charlotte, NC

region. Thus, recent research on more localized examinations

supports theoretical propositions of population growth influ-

encing municipal incorporation in the United States.

Although this article does not offer a comparison to coun-

tries outside the United States, it is interesting to note that the

theory of population growth lies in contrast to the experience in

Europe. The European population has increased while the num-

ber of municipalities has declined primarily through mergers

and amalgamations of existing governments by central author-

ities (Meligrana 2004). As noted earlier, differences in the gov-

ernmental structure of the two geographies and differing levels

of urban maturity play a role in the growth of NIMs in the

United States compared to Europe.

While the literature considered the role of population

growth, the reality of sprawl (uncontrolled development into

areas extending out from the urban/suburban center) was

becoming evident. Byun and Esparza (2005) believe that

incorporation extends greater control to residents who in turn

seek restrictive growth controls (e.g., limited housing permits,

population growth caps, urban growth service boundaries,

minimum-lot zoning, and zoning for preservation of open

space). Developers seek to avoid these controls and find areas

where there are fewer to no controls, thus generating sprawl

and subsequent further incorporations. Miller (1981) dis-

cusses six new cities that incorporated to prevent tract home

development, noting that those actions might generate sprawl

in the future as suburban developers leapfrog over the new cit-

ies to greenfields with fewer restrictions. Ironically though,

Carruthers (2003, 478) also posits that ‘‘sprawl is perpetuated

through people’s pursuit of small local governments.’’ Ulfars-

son and Carruthurs (2006) further find that metropolitan frag-

mentation leads to higher property values, less developed

land, and lower densities. Razin and Rosentraub (2000), how-

ever, find that perhaps sprawl causes fragmentation instead of

the reverse. Their work uncovered a weak but significant

association between municipal fragmentation and suburban

sprawl. They conclude that the impact of residential sprawl

on fragmentation is significant but fragmentation does not

predict sprawl.

While some residents moved away from growth areas result-

ing in sprawl, those that remained used other tools at their dis-

posal to control their environment. Planners saw an increased

focus on land use and zoning as tools for community control.

Some communities incorporated to control land use and

growth, often to stop undesirable land-use proposals or

changes. In a study of incorporations since 1910, Fischel found

that the dominant motive was land-use control (Teaford 1979;

Fischel 2001). Sokolow et al. (1981) found that in California,

local control, especially planning and land use, was the single

most important reason for city incorporation. Miller (1981)

identified the role of land use in some California

incorporations. Musso (2001) also found that incorporation

proposals were more likely to rise and get voter support in

counties experiencing rapid growth. This suggests that local

land-use policy was a significant factor in new incorporations.

Residents have strong motivation to control growth and regu-

late land use in order to maintain lifestyle and property values

(and in some cases, the land-use change may result in socioe-

conomic or racial change).

Services and the Consumer Voter

Another explanation for the suburbanization trend starting in

the 1940s was sought by looking at the perspective of what

local governments were offering to residents. Political econo-

mist Charles Tiebout (1956) offered a theory of local expendi-

ture focusing on services that is one of the most widely

accepted and also debated theories regarding the formation of

municipalities. Essentially, Tiebout argued that local govern-

ments offer a ‘‘mix’’ of services that consumer-voters either

choose to accept in which case they will remain in their neigh-

borhood or reject in which case they will move to another area.

In this open market, new communities form to reflect the ser-

vice mix desired by consumers. Hence, Tiebout concludes,

consumers that reject the inner city pattern of overpopulation

and high costs may opt for suburbs, which offer more land, better

schools, more parks, and so forth (Tiebout 1956). Others have

pursued and found support for the idea of services being the rea-

son for municipal incorporation (Stauber 1965; Teaford 1979;

Miller 1981; Musso 2001). Conversely, some communities may

incorporate because they want fewer redistributional services

and the lower taxes associated with that choice (Miller 1981).

Several scholars have found fault with the public choice

model and are critical of Tiebout’s assumptions about con-

sumer or resident behavior, the information residents have,

and/or consumer’s mobility. Sharp (1986) found that municipal

services do not seem to play a large role in location decisions,

especially in comparison to personal–economic motives such

as income, job, and family considerations. Lowery and Lyons

(1989) and Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog (1992) suggest that

residents of both decentralized metro areas and consolidated

metro areas are both equally uninformed about services. Wei-

her (1991) and Scott and Corzine (1971) also note that there are

so many government services (cities, counties, school, fire,

sewage, health, and transportation) that residents may not be

able to make decisions based on an examination of municipal

offerings as public choice theorists would argue.

Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994) demonstrate that weal-

thier households may move to avoid taxation, but it is unclear

whether they move in response to local government expendi-

tures. Teske (1993), on the other hand, argues that the relevant

‘‘marginal’’ consumer is the higher-income mover, who is

more likely to be informed about local fiscal policy than

lower-income residents. Bickers and Stein (1998) expound

upon this, suggesting that high-income movers use different

heuristics or informational devices than low-income movers.

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They found that such heuristics allows these movers to sort

themselves into better school districts.

Carruthers (2003), in his study of growth patterns across

the United States and within fourteen rapid growth states

1992–1996, found that property tax was relatively insignificant

perhaps because the taxes pay for more public goods and ser-

vices, which in effect compensates owners thus reducing the

amount of attrition due to high tax rates. Instead, Carruthers

finds the noneconomic factor of race was important in predict-

ing growth along with local land-use regulations, sewage

investments, and the formation of special districts. Miller finds

that sorting occurred, but not Tiebout-like sorting due to tastes

in public goods—rather the sorting is based on ‘‘differences in

attitudes towards taxation and the scale of redistribution. The

reason for creating or moving to a Lakewood Plan minimal city

was not to signal something unique about one’s demand for

public goods, but to insulate one’s property from the burden

of supporting public services’’ (Miller 1981, 84).

Hamilton (1975), an economist, argued that Tiebout’s theo-

retical premise of jurisdictions behaving like markets was

flawed. While having several markets may create a market-

like setting, this market choice is not enough to guarantee effi-

ciency—prices are needed as well, and local public goods do

not have an adequate market-type pricing mechanisms. Thus,

the city jurisdiction will never function as a market.

Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994) conducted an extensive

review on articles analyzing Tiebout’s theory and found that

support of Tiebout’s ideas depended on the methodology and

focus of each study. Studies that examined aggregate services

levels suggest that regions with many cities seem to be more

efficient (Stein 1987; Heikkila 1996), whereas studies of the

‘‘microfoundations’’ of Tiebout’s theories questioned the beha-

vioral assumptions (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994).

Politics, Policy, and Agency

The decades following the great expansion into the suburbs and

the proliferation of municipalities found a number of new the-

ories emerging in response to the resulting impacts caused by a

number of new government entities and the increasing disparity

between suburb and city. Political and policy-oriented theories

emerged focusing on people, laws, and the relations and

impacts between groups and institutions.

An intense debate in the political arena emerged over

democracy in the form of local governments and those who

believed the proliferation of new local governments hindered

regional efforts on roads, transportation, water and sewer sys-

tems, and so forth. Porter (1922, 16) said, ‘‘The outstanding

characteristic of . . . the township is that they are, and always

have been, areas for local self-government.’’ According to the

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rights (1987),

municipal incorporations were the modern way citizens

express control over their local environment and desires

instead of the old town hall meetings. Yet, Martin (1957,

90) notes that when governments are too small they are ‘‘too

small to be truly democratic.’’

Another persistent factor is politically motivated boundary

changes and impacts such as annexation, consolidation, and

fragmentation. The number of annexations far exceeds the

number of municipal incorporations and the various concerns

and reasons behind annexation remain persistent (e.g., in 2011

there were 1,697 annexations vs. nine municipal incorpora-

tions (US Census Bureau 2012a). Municipalities often form

in response to annexation threats from other cities (Schmandt

1961; Beche 1963; Stauber 1965; Miller 1981; Fleischmann

1986; Rigos and Spindler 1991; Burns 1994; Liner and

McGregor 1996; Smith 2007; Smith and Debbage 2011).

Mumphrey, Wildgen, and William (1990, 17) found that

many incorporations are ‘‘defensive incorporations,’’ created

to stave off the threat of annexation, indicating that incorpora-

tion ‘‘is used as a political prophylactic, or preemptive, to halt

annexation’’ in many cases. Motives to avoid annexation vary

from concerns about higher taxes to a desire not to be gov-

erned by the annexing jurisdiction.

As municipalities proliferated, states felt the need to limit or

inhibit the number of new governments. Studies were con-

ducted examining the effect of policy on municipal formation

concluding that state boundary policies affect incorporation

(Beche 1963; Hill 1974; Galloway and Landis 1986; Rigos

and Spindler 1991; Facer II 2006; Smirnova and Ingalls

2007; Martin and Wagner 1978). By 1978, 60 percent of all

states had minimum population requirements; by 1990, 80 per-

cent of all states had, at minimum, some type of population

requirement and often they had additional requirements; for

example, a voting requirement for the people who would be

incorporated, and so forth (Hill 1978; US Census Bureau

2012). Since these laws were put into effect, the number of

incorporations has declined significantly (Waldner, Rice, and

Smith 2013). Martin and Wagner’s (1978) research on the

establishment of the Local Agency Formation Commission

(LAFCO) in California through legislation passed by the Cali-

fornia Legislature in 1963 is a prime example of state interven-

tion limiting incorporations. While the focus of their analysis

was local government spending, Martin and Wagner’s (1978,

425) results showed that LAFCO ‘‘can be credited with a 42

percent reduction on the formation of municipal incorpora-

tions.’’ The authors assume that this reduction in incorporation

activity is attributable to the new legislation passed as a result

of a wave of incorporation activity in the 1950s.

More recently, the passage of legislation that impacts the

financial security of communities has been of increasing rele-

vance to municipal incorporation efforts. Proposition 13 and

a revenue neutrality law that holds new municipalities respon-

sible for lost county revenues have also had an impact on

municipal incorporation activity in the state. As a by-product

of the Lakewood Plans ‘‘minimal cities’’ (cities that formed

with the intent not to increase services but to primarily avoid

higher taxes), California has been proactive in changing the

legislative framework in which new communities can incorpo-

rate. Specifically, the regulations that guide municipal incor-

poration have been altered in an attempt to measure the

impacts of new cities and to also understand the financial

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sustainability surrounding the incorporation of a new commu-

nity. Minimal cities that often provide limited services and low

taxes are under increasing scrutiny. Likewise, single land-use

communities (e.g., Industry and Commerce) are being viewed

with a much more critical eye due to the negative financial

impact these industrial/commercial enclaves can have on sur-

rounding communities. A single-land-use city (e.g., a city com-

posed of commercial property) can artificially keep property

taxes low since they do not have to provide a full assortment

of municipal services common in mixed land-use municipali-

ties that have residents. Likewise, communities near single

land-use cities may not be able to raise enough tax dollars with-

out the inclusion of the more lucrative industrial and commer-

cial properties that have been removed as a result of the

incorporation of a single land-use municipality.

It may be misleading to attribute all of Martin and Wagner’s

(1978) findings to the passage of the Knox-Nisbet Act. The

dilemma is whether the numerous incorporations of the

1950s reduced pressure to incorporate or did the legislation

truly have a profound impact on incorporations. Rigos and

Spindler’s study on incorporation activity at the national level

contradicted the conclusion of Martin and Wagner’s work.

Rigos and Spindler (1991) found that incorporation laws (i.e.,

Knox-Nisbet Act) were not of significance when they con-

ducted their national study of incorporation activity.

Interestingly, as annexation and municipal corporation laws

have become stricter, alternative forms of government such as

special districts and quasi-governmental governments such as

private residential associations or gated communities, have

experienced quantum leaps in growth. Over a twenty-year

period, from 1972 to 1992, the number of special districts

increased 39 percent while the number of municipalities

increased only 4 percent (Zimmerman 1994). Smirnova and

Ingalls (2007) found a statistically significant relationship

between strictness of annexation laws and the number of spe-

cial districts, an alternative to forming a general-purpose

municipal government.

Another innovative response to increasingly strict laws sur-

rounding incorporation has been the formation, primarily by

the more affluent and white segment of society, of POAs (Ken-

nedy 1995; Frantz 2006; Glasze 2006; McKenzie 2011) or

‘‘public club realms’’ (Webster 2002). Private Owner Associa-

tions (POAs), the majority of which are gated communities of

single-family homes, have also exploded in growth. An ACIR

report cites Community Association Institute estimates (based

on voluntary HOA reports). ‘‘In 1970, there were 10,000 [resi-

dential associations] . . . and in 1992, 150,000 covering 32 mil-

lion people or roughly twelve percent of the population,’’ an

increase of approximately 1,400 percent over twenty-two years

(Kennedy 1995, 762).

Public policy scholars, seeing the effect of fragmentation

and/or consolidation, sought to explore in more depth the

forces behind municipal incorporation. They began to look at

the actors responsible for the policy of incorporation. Some

researchers viewed incorporation as, in part, a result of political

entrepreneurship by actors or parties who personally or

institutionally benefit from the incorporation (Sokolow et al.

1981; Schneider and Teske 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Feiock and

Carr 2001; Musso 2001). Universities, civic organizations,

chambers of commerce and industrial association (Marando

1974), public officials, suburban residents, and business inter-

ests (Fleischmann 1986), manufacturers, real estate developers

(Burns 1994), and city officials (Foster 1997) are actors that

support reform in boundary changes mainly for political pur-

poses such as an increase in revenue, avoidance of local taxes,

selection of public services, and enhanced political and social

benefits. Feiock and Carr (2001) also explore the role of bound-

ary entrepreneurs as necessary to overcome the collective

action problem inherent in NIMs. These boundary actors

include an array of public officials (e.g., municipal or

county-elected officials), business associations (e.g., chamber

of commerce, manufacturers, developers), and resident/citizen

organizations (e.g., civic groups, academic organizations,

homeowner associations, etc.).

Race, Income, and Equity Considerations

The movement of masses to the suburbs and their ensuing

municipalities brought out issues of equity, racism, and income

disparity, as it related to the formation of new local governmen-

tal entities. In a sociological analysis of the intersection

between institutions, people, and their patterns, race and/or

socioeconomic exclusion appeared to be underlying factors

that stimulated incorporations (Danielson 1976; Miller 1981;

Teaford 1986; Weiher 1991; Rider 1992; Blakely and Snyder

1997; Musso 2001; Carruthers 2003; Alesina, Baqir, and

Hoxby 2004). As Orfield (1976, 381) declared, ‘‘In United

States society, physical separation is reinforced by race, a bitter

history of race relations, and an increasing tendency for polit-

ical boundaries to become racial boundaries.’’ From 1940 to

1960, African Americans could not get a loan from the bank,

the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Veterans

Administration (VA) for home ownership in suburban areas.

The end result was white flight into the suburbs and increased

minoritization of inner cities (Sclar and Hook 1993). Weiher

(1991) asserts that homogeneous communities use political

boundaries to exclude certain races or economic classes. Incor-

poration provides communities with exclusionary powers such

as land-use control (e.g., large-lot zoning; Rider 1992; Burns

1994). Moreover, formal geographic boundaries make ‘‘a place

more socially, economically and politically distinctive as well

as more geographically distinctive’’ (Downs 1973, 43). Thus,

boundaries support sorting among people who have prefer-

ences about where they wish to live, work, and learn. Potential

residents use city boundaries as a cognitive framework to

screen out unsuitable areas. Thus, political boundaries are

‘‘instrumental in creating place identity’’ (Weiher 1991, 60).

Settlers then further sort themselves into cities and produce a

landscape resembling a mosaic of race and class groups.

A rich expanding literature base continues to develop on

quasi-governmental private residential associations, commonly

known as gated communities, and their impact on new city

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formation. As noted earlier, these associations are generally

homogenous entities composed of predominantly white, afflu-

ent groups that isolate themselves primarily for security rea-

sons but also for status and privilege (Glasze 2006). Private

associations are perceived as an alternative to NIMs (Kennedy

1995) or an extension of local government (McKenzie 2011) or

a new development based on the excludability of public space

(Webster 2002) since they offer more upscale amenities, more

local control, and better safety over parts of the public realm

than local government (Blakely and Snyder 1997). Addition-

ally, these associations have often been successful in capturing

public resources and isolating them for private use; for exam-

ple, St. Louis, MI, townships chained off formerly public

streets for private use only (Kennedy 1995). However, Le Goix

(2006) identifies growing issues that are leading some of these

communities to incorporate. An aging infrastructure that is too

costly for residential repair and a system of double taxation

(residents pay association fees and taxes to the government for

services such as security, lights, street repair, maintenance,

etc.) are leading larger communities to incorporate so they can

transfer private liability to public shoulders. Hence, groups that

formed associations to isolate themselves by income and/or

race are now forming municipal incorporations to maintain

their privacy while protecting themselves from financial

liability.

While new cities have higher percentages of whites and

higher median household incomes than the United States or

metropolitan areas (Musso 2001; Smith 2007), recent studies

indicate a trend toward less isolation between minorities and

whites. While blacks are still the most severely isolated,

research indicates that segregation indexes are declining at the

metropolitan level (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004) and that

there is less isolation where there are lower percentages of

racial minorities (Lee et al. 2008).

Financial Considerations

Over the decades, scholars have studied the regional and indi-

vidual fiscal motives behind municipal incorporation. Some

cities incorporate to lower taxes. On the regional level, Miller’s

(1981) analysis of several Lakewood Plan cities in Los Angeles

demonstrated that many new cities incorporated to limit prop-

erty tax burden on homeowners and businesses, and limit the

size of government bureaucracies and welfare programs (the

new cities also wished to avoid annexation attempts by the city

of Los Angeles). Similarly, Tkacheva (2008) found that more

NIMs are formed in counties with a large volume of retail trade.

By capturing the retail trade assets, the newly formed city can

increase its service level while reducing or maintaining its

taxes (i.e., by shifting cost of services to those outside the

municipality that patronize the retail establishments).

On the individual level, the literature suggests fiscal and other

explanatory variables that may stimulate NIMs. Carruthers

(2003) suggests that the pursuit of bigger homes, lower density,

and avoidance of higher taxes (associated with cities) drive res-

idents to form new jurisdictions around growth centers in

unincorporated areas. As growth centers increase in population,

additional communities may incorporate. Rigos and Spindler

(1991) note that strong state and county functional roles, along

with low property tax limitations, also appear to encourage

incorporations (property tax limitations help reassure citizens

that they will not face significant tax increases). Musso’s

work emphasizes the relationship of wealth to NIM forma-

tion. In her model, increasing the median housing value in a

census-defined place by one standard deviation ($7,021)

raised the probability of seeking incorporation to ‘‘a whop-

ping 92 percent.’’ (Musso 2001, 147).

Patterns of Proliferation

In analyzing municipal incorporations from an anthropological

perspective of group dynamics and differences between groups

of people, there are patterns of incorporation that have contin-

ued over a significant period of time. Since the 1950s, certain

regional patterns have been persistent (Stauber 1965; Waldner,

Rice, and Smith 2013). Regionally, states in the southern part

of the country average higher number of incorporations than

any other region while northern New England states, where

there is little land to develop, average the lowest number of

new municipalities. Additionally, there are some states that

have stayed in the top ten in terms of new incorporations since

the 1950s (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Missouri, North Car-

olina, and Texas). Whether it is lenient state incorporation laws

or a regional culture that breeds incorporations, it is clear that

there are marked spatial patterns to municipal incorporation.

Stauber (1965, 14) suggests that ‘‘Municipalities, or the

forces that beget municipalities, appear to beget more munici-

palities over time within the same general area.’’ Using the

county as the unit of analysis, there is evidence of municipa-

lities incorporating as a result of municipalities forming

nearby. This cluster effect is summed up by Smith and Deb-

bage (2006) as follows, ‘‘The geography of these clustering

NIMs can be partially explained by a ‘herd mentality’ where

a local political culture is established that facilitates the diffu-

sion of a NIM ideology in response to the aggressive annexa-

tion tactics of neighboring cities’’ (Smith 2007, 111). The

herd mentality does not always occur as a result of annexation

threats. In Fulton County, Georgia, four municipalities

formed within a span of four years after incorporation laws

were relaxed with more municipalities forming in contiguous

counties. The cluster effect may be partially explained by the

increasing segregation of the affluent (Musso 2001; Fischer

et al. 2004; Peters 2012) and the finding that ‘‘wealthier com-

munities in high-growth counties are more likely to propose

formation of a city’’ (Musso 2001, 139). Other societal factors

such as race, region, urban maturity, and local issues can fos-

ter or diffuse clusters. In the rural south, Aiken (1987) docu-

mented how ‘‘underbounding’’ (exclusion of the surrounding

lower-income and lower-served population) led to the forma-

tion of a number of municipalities in Mississippi in order to

avoid giving political power to the surrounding predomi-

nantly African American areas. These findings are supported

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by studies of towns in North Carolina and long-term, low-

income, unincorporated urban areas contiguous to cities

nationwide (Moss 2004; Anderson 2008). Additionally,

regional differences in the administration of local government

boundary changes and the urban maturity of a region may

impact overall clustering activity. As has been previously dis-

cussed, the presence of local government boundary change

bodies in several states (e.g., California and Washington) can

limit clustering. Similarly, state laws that include a minimum

distance between proposed and existing municipalities can

effectively diffuse municipal clusters. Finally, the maturity

of the region in which the clustering occurs is relevant. Much

of the northeast and midwest regions of the United States have

experienced a longer period of urbanization, which has

resulted in a stagnant political geography. Meanwhile, the

south, which has more recently experienced a period of urba-

nization, has more unincorporated territory and a more lenient

philosophy in which to carry out incorporation proceedings.

This has resulted in a large clustering of new municipalities

in the South (Smith and Debbage 2006; Waldner, Rice, and

Smith 2013).

Finally, the influence of corporations causing others to form

may be due to the same forces acting upon different commu-

nities in the same environment. As the ACIR suggests, we

should think of ‘‘a cluster of local governments in a particular

region not as a fragmented maze but as a ‘local public econ-

omy’’’ (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rights

1987, iii).

Why New Cities Form—The Media Literature Review

The literature review presented thus far encompasses the major

theories on factors affecting municipal incorporation. Yet,

while many theories have been introduced, there has been no

typology or categorization by which these theories can be

grouped and assessed. This is due in part to the varying per-

spectives accounting for a new municipality. In part, it is also

due to the probability that multiple factors are at play.

Therefore, the authors extend this review by conducting a

media literature review analyzing newspaper articles on munic-

ipal incorporations formed between 1997 and 2007. The media

review captured the rhetoric behind each incorporation studied,

thus allowing a direct explanation of NIMS. The analysis

revealed twenty-two factors that stimulate NIMs, including

several mentioned in the literature such as annexation, land-

use, and services. Other previously unacknowledged factors

emerged, such as protection of rural identity or character, elig-

ibility for water or sewer grants, and more.

The media analysis captured a new set of factors because it

represents a fundamentally different lens. Content analysis is

used to review newspaper articles rather than the statistical

analyses often employed in NIM studies. By using a different

data source, the media analysis captures a novel set of factors

that stimulate new city formation, including some factors not

previously discussed in the literature.

By 2007, a noticeable cluster of new cities had emerged in

Fulton County, Georgia, thus precipitating this research effort

to more fully understand the factors involved in new municipal

incorporations. To create a time frame for the media review, we

examined a full decade of materials, thus the 1997–2007 time

frame. The selection of 2007 proved to be fortuitous as 2007

marked the year prior to the recession, when municipal incor-

porations sharply subsided. Thus, the 1997–2007 period cap-

tured an era of stable incorporation patterns as well as the

emergence of prominent new city clusters of interest. Because

the 1997–2007 time frame was selected, the results may over-

represent more recent factors (such as economic development)

or underrepresent historic factors (such as suburbanization

associated with freeway development).

The US Census Bureau Boundary Estimates database was

used to identify all new incorporations, including cities,

towns/townships, and villages (excluding upward bound

changes such as village to city). To explore why communities

choose to form new cities, we conducted a content analysis to

identify the reasons why new cities formed, as captured by the

newspaper articles discussing the new incorporation. The intent

was to create a 100 percent sample of all NIMS from 1997 to

2007 (161 cities).

ProQuest Newspaper was chosen due to its archival materi-

als from this era, specifically its full-text newspaper articles.

For each NIM, a period of two years before incorporation and

one year after was searched. Search terms such as ‘‘new city,’’

‘‘incorporation,’’ ‘‘voting,’’ the name of the city and the county

were combined and used to identify newspaper articles that

might capture the debate around incorporation or report on new

incorporations. The results captured 79 of the 161 new munici-

palities, approximately 50 percent of the new municipalities

identified. After the initial article capture, two coders indepen-

dently reviewed and coded each article to identify why the

community incorporated, with an attempt to identify the order

of importance (e.g., whether land use or annexation threat was

more important in that particular case).

The process for the newspaper analysis disaggregated the

complexity of factors that led to incorporation. Twenty-two

factors for incorporation were identified ranging from

annexation threats to tourism (see Table 2). The newspaper

analysis clearly revealed that NIM factors work in tandem

to stimulate new cities, towns, and villages. Only ten new

municipalities attributed their incorporation to only one fac-

tor—all others cited a multitude of factors in the incorporation

decision.

In support of the literature, the threat of annexation was the

most common factor cited in NIM formation. The concept of

defensive or prophylactic annexations came up frequently. As

one article explained, ‘‘As cities such as Charlotte and Wil-

mington turn to involuntary annexations as a way to help pay

for growth, many smaller communities are seeking incorpora-

tion as a way to defend themselves’’ (Morning Star 1999). In

some cases, the NIM wanted to avoid the higher taxes associ-

ated with being annexed, and in others, they simply did not

wish to be under the city’s control.

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Growth control/land use was another prevalent factor.

Municipalities in this category formed in response to perceived

undesirable growth, to promote quality of life, and to gain zon-

ing authority. One resident explained it thusly, ‘‘This village

was born because people were concerned about land use issues.

We have developers knocking on our door. We need to have a

game plan so that we know where the village is going in the

future’’ (Mannion 2001, 4SW.1). Some NIMs form to stop

undesirable land-use. Irena, MO—with a population of

twelve—incorporated to prevent a proposed hog farm from

locating in their neighborhood (Omaha World Herald 1999).

Loch Loyd MO incorporated into the Village of Loch Lloyd

in order to extend its subdivision boundary 300 feet beyond its

original border to protect itself from encroachment from nearby

mobile homes (St. Louis Dispatch 2005).

A new and frequently cited factor involved the community’s

desire to protect their rural character and/or their community

identity. In Grant Valkaria FL, ‘‘Residents still look up and see

the stars at night, not the backside of a shopping center in the

glare of 24-hour security lights’’ (Sellers 2006, 1). Note that

the rural character/identity factor may overlap somewhat with

the growth control/land-use category, as perceived land-use

change may have in some cases generated a perceived threat

to that character. However, it was perceived as a stand-alone

factor not explicitly intertwined with land-use issues.

Services, an oft-mentioned explanation for NIMs in the lit-

erature, received significant support in the newspaper analysis.

Common service desires included more street repair and police.

Services were a factor in the four new cities that formed in Ful-

ton County, Georgia (in the Atlanta metropolitan area). ‘‘We

are talking about the services that touch people’s lives every

day,’’ said a resident (Bennett 2006, D1). Generally, the com-

munities incorporating for service felt that they received short

shrift from the governing county and/or service levels not com-

mensurate with their tax contributions.

The desire to control the community’s revenue emerged as

another new and influential factor. Some residents voted for

incorporation so that ‘‘We can control our own money and con-

trol our own destiny’’ (Willon 1999). Dissatisfaction with the

county at times took a particular focus such as tax spending,

land-use, services, or political party differences. However, often

the dissatisfaction was more generalized in nature. For example,

‘‘residents frequently chafed at unpopular decisions made by

haughty officials ‘‘downtown’’’’ (Freedberg 2003, B6).

It is worth noting that eligibility for government funds was

identified as a primary reason more than a secondary reason for

city formation. Some communities incorporated largely to

become eligible for water or sewer grants. For example,

Bedias, TX, and other communities in Grimes County faced

‘‘sewage problems and incorporated as cities as a result’’

Table 2. Definitions and Frequencies of Factors Extracted from a Newspaper Review of Municipal.

Incorporation Factor # NIMs Influenced Explanation

Annexation 40 NIM created to defend community against annexation threat Growth control/land use 36 NIM formed to fight undesirable growth/ land use proposals and to gain zoning

control Rural character/identity 23 NIM incorporates to preserve rural character or protect existing community

identity Services 24 NIM forms to provide or enhance public services (policy, fire, water/sewer, etc) Revenue control 17 NIM forms to allow community to control local revenue (sales or property tax) Dissatisfaction w/ county 12 NIM form due to dissatisfaction with county governance (spending patterns,

political party affiliation, etc.). Gov’t funding eligibility 12 NIM formed to gain eligibility for federal and/ or state grant funding for water/

sewer or other projects Economic development 10 NIM formed to attract economic development/growth Race/ethnicity/cultural 8 NIM formed for exclusion purposes Political clout 6 NIM formed to increase community’s political standing in region or state. Asset capture 5 NIM formed to capture revenue from major regional asset. Influence of other NIMS 5 Nearby successful NIMs inspire other communities to incorporate Ordinance/design code 5 NIMs formed to avoid countyordinances/design codes Environmental laws 3 NIMs formed to avoid county or other environmental laws Lower property taxes 3 NIM forms to lower property taxes State law 3 Incorporation fueled by the easing of incorporation standards. Increase property values 2 Incorporation portrayed as a method to increase a community’s property

values. Single owner/profit 2 NIM forms for financial gain of a community largely owned by a single individual

or entity Water supply 2 NIM motivated by access to and control over water supplies and rights. Exit state control 1 NIM formed to exit direct state governance of the community Historical preservation 1 NIM formed to promote historic preservation within community Tourism 1 Incorporation formed to increase map visibility of community and tourism

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(Hensley 2007, 1). Government funding eligibility as a factor in

NIM formation has not been adequately considered thus far in

the scholarly literature.

Ironically, though many NIMs form to prevent or slow

growth, there are some that incorporate to promote or enhance

growth and attract revenues through economic development.

For example, Gustavus, Alaska, suffered financial losses from

fisheries closures when the federal government established a

preserve in Glacier Bay. In hopes of facilitating infrastructure

and attracting growth, the community chose to incorporate.

As the sign hanging over the heads of Gustavus City Council

members reads, ‘‘We hope our ship comes in before the dock

rots’’ (Anchorage Daily News 2004, B1). Economic develop-

ment motives have not been adequately explored in the NIM

literature.

Race, ethnicity, and culture factored into a significant num-

ber of NIMs. In some cases, it is wealthy whites seeking to

sequester themselves from other races, religions, or income

levels, as might be expected from the literature. South Bloom-

ing Grove, NY, and Woodbury, NY, incorporated, at least in

part, to stop the encroachment of a low-income Jewish popula-

tion (Santos 2006). As previously discussed, the analysis likely

underestimates the impact of race. The authors recognize some

limitations to the media literature review approach (e.g., social

mores might prevent some from stating their real reason for

incorporation if it involved race, income, or private benefit).

Other less influential factors emerged from the newspaper

analysis. These include the desire to increase the community’s

political clout; asset capture, or the desire to use revenues from

key local resources such as a shopping mall or nuclear power

plant; a cluster effect, or the influence of other new incorpo-

rated cities inspiring further incorporations; and ordinance or

design codes, which can overlap at times with the growth con-

trol/land use/zoning category. Some communities incorporated

in part to avoid ordinances and design codes: ‘‘We’re here

because we don’t want rules’’ said a council member (Kollin

2001, 1).

Additional factors included a desire to avoid environmental

laws such as erosion control laws or endangered species provi-

sions, a desire for lower property taxes and, alternatively, a

desire to increase property values. In at least two cases, the pri-

mary reason to create a new city appeared to involve individual

personal gain. For example, Creola, LA, incorporated to allow

its sole convenience store owner (also the owner of the vast

majority of land in the town) to sell liquor (Advocate 2000).

State laws requiring annexation or incorporation or easing of

incorporation provisions influenced incorporations. And

though of minimal influence, other reasons for incorporation

included desire to control water supply or water rights, historic

preservation, tourism, and avoidance of state control.

The disaggregation of factors cited by the actors involved

confirms some of the major theories and it introduces new ones

as well. Though the literature was accurate, it was incomplete.

Twelve new factors were identified from the newspaper analy-

sis (see Table 3). Seven of those factors, discussed below, each

influenced over 10 percent of the NIMs created, including (1)

rural character/community identity; (2) control of community

revenues; (3) dissatisfaction with county governance; (4) elig-

ibility for government funds, especially grants; (5) economic

development; (6) desire to avoid county ordinances or design

codes, and (7) desire to avoid environmental restrictions. The

other five new factors were less influential but still relevant.

Certain factors addressed in the literature, such as the influ-

ence of state law or the statistical role of wealth/income, did not

surface prominently in the content analysis. This in itself yields

an important insight—the difference between macromotives

and micromotives. Macromotives, as defined here, indicates

the underlying variables that set the playing field for incorpora-

tions—such as the leniency or stringency of a state’s annexa-

tion and incorporation laws, or the income level of the

incorporating community, relative strength of state/county

roles, parameters for property tax limitations, and so on. Micro-

motives, as defined here, refers to the immediate circumstances

that inspire an individual community to incorporate, such as

threat of annexation, undesirable growth, or the desire to

become eligible for grant funding. Theoretically oriented stud-

ies appear more likely to identify macromotives because under-

lying factors tend to be structural patterns over time that

predicts behavior. As a result, macromotives tend to overlook

immediate causes and specific reasons that may be just as rel-

evant but not as systemic or consistent.

The media analysis, on the other hand, excels at identifying

micromotives. Journalists conduct a different type of research

that is more grounded. The facts and evidence gathered inform

the motivating factors. Hence, reasons that are not repetitive or

similar to factors in similar events are allowed to emerge.

This is not to say that macromotives and micromotives can-

not coexist. A situation may have causal factors operating

simultaneously such as the macromotive of asset capture to

lower taxes along with the micromotive of incorporating to pre-

vent annexation. In summary, by synthesizing these two levels

of analysis, the authors are the first to emerge with a more

Table 3. Factors Identified from Literature and Media Review.

Factors Previously Identified in Literature

New Factors Revealed in Content Analysis

Service provision Rural character/community identity Annexation threats Control over community revenues Population growth/

suburbanization Dissatisfaction with county

governance Race Eligibility for govt funds/grants Lower taxes Economic development Land use control/growth Ordinances/design codes Clustering Environmental laws Protect property values Profit motive for majority

landowner State laws Water rights or supply Boundary entrepreneurs Direct state control Asset capture Historic preservation Strong state/county roles Low property tax limitations Wealth/median housing value

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comprehensive set of factors explaining new municipal forma-

tion that has not been compiled before.

A Typology of Theories on Municipal Incorporation

The perspectives that shape theories on municipal formation

provide a premise around which a classification can be built.

When the twenty-two factors uncovered in the content analysis

are grouped with the factors revealed by the literature review,

we are able to form a classification of municipal incorporation

formation theories and the frequency with which they were

cited (see Table 4). Each category within the typology has spe-

cific examples cited in the previous section. For example,

Bedias, TX, was cited as a NIM that incorporated to be eligible

for government funding for a water/sewer system. This is

included under economic or fiscally driven municipalities.

The development of this typology is important to the study

of municipal incorporations because it provides an analytical

framework that, heretofore, did not exist. For inquiries into

why municipal incorporations form, this typology serves as a

‘‘Gestalt, mapping out the terrain and potential routes to travel’’

(Thomas 2011, 511). The subject of municipal incorporations

can now be studied through the subclassifications of incorpora-

tions or in its entirety noting the comprehensive, rich, complex

interplay of factors.

The typology does not simply reorganize the literature, it

deeply informs it. As noted earlier, service-driven discussions

often dominate the discourse on why municipalities are cre-

ated. This schemata reveals that spatial reasons rather than ser-

vices, particularly land-use and growth control, lead the way in

explaining why new jurisdictions form. This, in turn, impacts,

informs, and highlights the role of planners, as they are respon-

sible for the most important motivation driving the creation of

new municipalities. The land use, zoning, ordinance and design

codes formulated by planners also affect adjoining and nearby

municipalities or counties causing planners to face intra- and

intermunicipal issues.

Finally, the typology serves the purpose of establishing

benchmarks for future inquiry. There has been a significant

decline in the rate of new municipalities (Waldner, Rice, and

Smith 2013). Based on reasons provided over the past twenty

years, land-use and spatial factors emerged as the most impor-

tant factors. Will the same reasons continue to dominate or as

growth trends occur in more densely populated areas of the

city, will economic and fiscal reasons or other reasons become

more important? This classification allows us to address this

and other questions on municipal incorporations.

Conclusion

Why do new municipalities form? In this review, we combine a

traditional literature review with an innovative use of a media

literature review focusing on newspaper analysis as a form of

grounded theoretical review. The results permit a broader and

more complete overview of factors that inform why boundary

changes in the form of municipal incorporation occur. Previous

scholarly explanations provided a correct, but markedly incom-

plete picture of the factors that stimulate NIMs.

The literature review identified the major theories that

explain why municipalities form. Explanations were often

influenced by a particular perspective; for example, a politi-

cally oriented perspective looked at the strictness of state laws,

a sociologically perspective looked at race and income, and so

forth. Theories explored in the literature review were more

reflective of macromotives—that is, researchers uncovering

underlying influences and describing and formulating variables

and motivations from a broader viewpoint. Tiebout’s theory of

services motivating consumer-voters to leave one municipality

to move to or form another municipality is a prime example of

a macromotive explanation that derived from a broad overview

of all the factors involved in consumers choosing a neighbor-

hood in which to live. While services would be identified as

a reason in newspaper articles, it is unlikely that the theory

of an efficient number of municipalities would emerge from

reasons provided in a newspaper article.

While the traditional literature review and its macromotive

approach lay the foundation for explaining why municipalities

incorporate, this review sought an innovative way to identify dis-

tinct factors. By conducting a media literature review focusing on

newspaper article analysis, a form of grounded theory evolved.

Twenty-two separate and distinct factors were identified as both

Table 4. Typology of Theories Explaining Municipal Incorporation 1950–2010.

Category Description Factor Count

Spatially driven municipalities Growth control/land use, maintain rural characteristics, ordinance/design code, environmental concerns/laws

67

Politically driven municipalities Annexation, dissatisfaction with county, political clout, state law, exit state control

62

Economic or fiscally driven municipalities Asset capture, lower property taxes, water supply, single owner profit, increase property value, tourism

54

Service driven municipalities Services 24 Sociologically driven

municipalities Race/ethnicity/cultural, historical preservation 9

Cluster-driven municipalities Influence of other NIMs 5

Note: NIMs ¼ newly incorporated municipalities.

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primary and/or influential factors and within these, twelve were

new factors that had not been identified in the traditional literature

review. New factors included eligibility for government grants,

economic development, maintenance of rural character or iden-

tity, ordinances and design codes, individual profit motive, utility

rights, control over community resources and so forth. The news-

paper analysis identified reasons that were considered micromo-

tives; that is, immediate reasons identified by individual

communities that inspired them to incorporate; for example,

profit motive, positioning to apply for grants, economic develop-

ment, and so forth. These reasons are valid but not necessarily

underlying or systemic and, hence, do not easily lend themselves

to theoretical constructs.

Together, the literature review and the newspaper review

force us to revisit our fundamental understandings of municipal

incorporation. For the first time ever, we are able to put factors

into a context that inform why municipalities incorporate. The

identified factors are not equally important; rather, some play a

more prominent role. Spatial considerations, closely followed

by political and economic considerations appear to be the

dominant reasons as to why municipalities incorporate. In gen-

eral, the results indicate that municipal incorporation events are

often the byproduct of reactionary forces (response to threat of

annexation, defensive incorporation, response to unwanted

land-use development, and response to higher property taxes)

rather than proactive events to provide an unincorporated terri-

tory with local governance in the name of democracy and the

greater good. This conclusion comes in spite of the scholarly

literature’s focus on services (the public choice theory). Ser-

vices are surprisingly not the predominant motive for the

majority of municipal incorporations.

The typology adds context to our understanding of munici-

pal incorporations. Spatial considerations remain important;

therefore, we should expect the growth of municipal incorpora-

tions to continue in areas that have issues around land use or

controlling growth or in rural areas that find a need to retain

their local community identity. We can also expect innovative

forms of government such as special districts and POAs that

arose in response to zoning and control over growth issues,

to continue to grow and be future areas of research. Following

the second and third most cited reasons, perhaps we can expect

the creation of municipalities in densely populated urban areas

where there are threats of annexation or competitive struggles

for capturing of assets. The typology provided in this article

emphasizes the role of planners as they formulate the land-

use, growth control, zoning and design codes that emerge as

new cities form and as they deal with the impact on surround-

ing jurisdictions. The literature review and the typology devel-

oped from a combination of a literature and media review lays

the foundation for us to better explain what motivates munici-

pal incorporation and the subsequent implications and impacts

on our society and environment.

Acknowledgment

The authors wish to acknowledge Mr. J. Chris Cunningham of the

US Bureau of Labor Statistics for his invaluable help with the

content analysis, including identifying, analyzing, and coding

media resources, thus leading to identification of several new fac-

tors in municipal incorporation. His contribution of time and

research expertise is greatly appreciated.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to

the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, author-

ship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biographies

Kathryn T. Rice is founder and President of Building Quality Commu-

nities, a company specializing in consulting, research and evaluation on

community and economic development. Her research and consultant

interests focus on municipal incorporation and local economic develop-

ment. Dr. Rice earned her PhD from Georgia Tech and Georgia State

University. Email: [email protected].

Leora S. Waldner is an Associate Professor of public administration

at Troy University. Her research focuses on land use, environmental

planning, and municipal incorporation. Dr. Waldner earned her mas-

ters’ degree and PhD from University of California at Berkeley.

Russell M. Smith is an Associate Professor of Geography in the

Department of Social Sciences at Winston-Salem State University,

Winston-Salem, NC 27110. Email: [email protected]. His research

interests include local government boundary change (e.g. annexation,

consolidation/mergers, municipal incorporation, and secession), land

use planning and urban sustainability.

Rice et al. 15

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/FlattenerPreset << /ClipComplexRegions true /ConvertStrokesToOutlines false /ConvertTextToOutlines false /GradientResolution 300 /LineArtTextResolution 1200 /PresetName ([High Resolution]) /PresetSelector /HighResolution /RasterVectorBalance 1 >> /FormElements true /GenerateStructure false /IncludeBookmarks false /IncludeHyperlinks false /IncludeInteractive false /IncludeLayers false /IncludeProfiles true /MarksOffset 9 /MarksWeight 0.125000 /MultimediaHandling /UseObjectSettings /Namespace [ (Adobe) (CreativeSuite) (2.0) ] /PDFXOutputIntentProfileSelector /DocumentCMYK /PageMarksFile /RomanDefault /PreserveEditing true /UntaggedCMYKHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UntaggedRGBHandling /UseDocumentProfile /UseDocumentBleed false >> ] /SyntheticBoldness 1.000000 >> setdistillerparams << /HWResolution [288 288] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice