Force Generation Briefing

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22 June 2012

Sealift Support to Joint Operations

Joint Publication 4-01.2

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for sealift in support of joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY VADM, USN Director, Joint Staff

Preface

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 4-01.2

DATED 31 AUGUST 2005

 Includes discussion of joint deployment and distribution operations center and joint movement center.

 Includes discussion of planning for retrograde/redeployment.

 Greatly expands coverage of sealift authorities and responsibilities of United States Transportation Command.

 Significantly revises coverage of force protection and operations security.

 Updates coverage of numbers and types of sealift assets including the joint high speed vessel and offshore petroleum discharge system.

 Adds discussion of joint task force-port opening and joint logistics over-the- shore.

 Adds discussion of seabasing.

 Updates the automated planning tools discussion.

 Updates naval control of shipping to naval cooperation and guidance for shipping.

Summary of Changes

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... ix

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

 General ........................................................................................................................ I-1  The Strategic Mobility Triad ...................................................................................... I-1  The Sealift Trident ...................................................................................................... I-3

CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

 General .......................................................................................................................II-1  Forces and Authority..................................................................................................II-1  Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation ...............................................II-2  Organizations and Responsibilities ............................................................................II-2  Command and Control Architecture ........................................................................II-11

CHAPTER III SEALIFT CAPABILITIES

 General ..................................................................................................................... III-1  Ship Types ............................................................................................................... III-1  Sealift Ship Programs .............................................................................................. III-9  Sealift Enhancement Features ................................................................................ III-16  Logistics Over-the-Shore ....................................................................................... III-16

CHAPTER IV PLANNING

 General ..................................................................................................................... IV-1  Execution Planning .................................................................................................. IV-2  Sealift Asset Planning .............................................................................................. IV-3  Basic Cargo Planning Concepts ............................................................................... IV-3  Protection and Operations Security ......................................................................... IV-5  Environmental Considerations ................................................................................. IV-9  Automated Planning Tools ...................................................................................... IV-9  Transition from Peace to Conflict to Stability Operations ..................................... IV-10  Other Considerations ............................................................................................. IV-12

CHAPTER V EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

 General ...................................................................................................................... V-1  Execution .................................................................................................................. V-1  Communications System Support ............................................................................. V-3

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 Logistic Support ........................................................................................................ V-5  Intermodal Operations .............................................................................................. V-5  Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations .................................................................... V-6  Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and Security Cooperation

Activities, and Humanitarian Assistance .................................................................. V-8

CHAPTER VI VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMS

 General ..................................................................................................................... VI-1  Government-Owned/Controlled (Organic) Assets .................................................. VI-2  Commercial Controlled Assets ................................................................................ VI-4

CHAPTER VII NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

 General .................................................................................................................... VII-1  Organization ............................................................................................................ VII-1  Mission and Capabilities ......................................................................................... VII-2  Implementing Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Measures for

Commercial Shipping ............................................................................................. VII-3

APPENDIX

A References ................................................................................................. A-1 B Administrative Instructions ........................................................................B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Strategic Mobility Triad .............................................................................. I-1 I-2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the

Strategic Mobility Triad .............................................................................. I-2 I-3 Phases of Strategic Mobility ....................................................................... I-3 I-4 The Sealift Trident ...................................................................................... I-4 II-1 Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets.........II-3 II-2 Responsibilities of the Commander, US Transportation Command ..........II-6 III-1 Types of Dry Cargo Ships ........................................................................ III-2 III-2 Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers ............................................................... III-6 III-3 Sealift Ship Programs ............................................................................... III-9 IV-1 Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements ................................. IV-1 IV-2 Measures of Ship Capacity ....................................................................... IV-4 IV-3 Cargo Planning Factors ............................................................................ IV-5 IV-4 Sealift Planning Factors ........................................................................... IV-6

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IV-5 Sealift Asset Availability Times ............................................................ IV-11 V-1 Seabasing ................................................................................................... V-9 VI-1 Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan ................................................... VI-2 VI-2 Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency Deployments of Common-User Ships ............................................................................ VI-5 VI-3 National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship Requisition Process .... VI-6 VI-4 Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation Process .................. VI-8

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview Sealift Support to Joint Operations • Explains Organization and Responsibilities for Sealift Support • Covers Sealift Capabilities and Sealift Enhancement Features • Explains Execution Planning, Basic Cargo Planning Concepts, Protection

and Operations Security, and Automatic Planning Tools • Describes the Employment of Sealift Forces, Including Communications

Support, Logistic Support, and Support to Seabasing • Gives Descriptions of Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs • Explains the Mission and Command Structure of the Naval Cooperation

and Guidance for Ships Organization

Sealift Support to Joint Operations Overview

The Strategic Mobility Triad Successful response to regional contingencies crisis response, limited contingency operations, and major operations and campaigns depends on sufficient strategic mobility assets in order to deploy and sustain forces in an operational area as long as necessary to meet US military objectives.

The strategic mobility triad is made up of air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioning (PREPO). Each element of the triad has its own unique advantages and disadvantages. In general, air mobility transports light, high priority forces and supplies, including personnel and equipment required to rapidly integrate units with PREPO elements’ equipment and supplies. As an operation progresses, sealift delivers the heavy units and their support equipment as well as the vital sustainment for deployed forces. In most cases, sealift accounts for the majority of the total cargo delivered to an operational area.

The Sealift Trident During large deployment operations, sealift support is typically conducted in three phases comprising the sealift trident: prepositioning, surge, and sustainment. All three portions of the sealift trident are distinct entities, and removing any segment of the trident denies joint force commanders the full range of sealift support options.

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Organization and Responsibilities Forces and Authority Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5158.04,

United States Transportation Command, designates Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) as the Department of Defense (DOD) single manager for transportation, other than Service-organic or theater-assigned transportation assets. In order to carry out its Unified Command Plan-assigned transportation responsibilities, CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises combatant command (command authority) over its Service transportation component commands.

Service-Organic or Theater- Assigned Transportation

As used in DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command, Service-organic or theater-assigned transportation includes sealift assets. Various Service-organic or theater-assigned transportation sealift assets are assigned to the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the combatant command (command authority) of a unified command (including the US Special Operations Command) other than CDRUSTRANSCOM.

Organizations and Responsibilities

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is responsible for transportation planning and operations with DOD. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) reviews and evaluates movement requirements and resources, apportions capability, and allocates capability when required. The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing the logistic support (including Service-organic transportation) of their respective forces. CDRUSTRANSCOM provides transportation and common-user port management and terminal services for DOD as well as non-DOD agencies upon request.

Executive Summary

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is a major subordinate command of the United States Army Materiel Command. As the Army component of United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), SDDC is the continental United States transportation manager and provides worldwide common-use ocean terminal services and traffic management services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. Military Sealift Command (MSC) is a major subordinate command of the United States Navy Fleet Forces Command. As the Navy component of USTRANSCOM, MSC provides common-user and exclusive use sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. The Maritime Administration is the agency within the Department of Transportation responsible for assuring that US Merchant Marine shipping is sufficient to meet the needs of national defense in times of war or national emergency, and can also support the domestic and foreign commerce of the US. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, is a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States. National defense, maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, and maritime environmental protection are the four major roles of the USCG. During joint force deployment and redeployment operations, the USCG can assist the naval coastal warfare commander in providing protection of military shipping at US seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and overseas ports of debarkation (PODs) by conducting port security and harbor defense operations.

Command and Control Architecture

Command and control (C2) of sealift assets is normally exercised in a variety of ways and is largely dependent upon the sealift asset and the program to which it belongs (PREPO, surge, or sustainment). The exercise of C2 of sealift assets

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generally applies to government-owned or government leased vessels. However, where C2 does not apply, as in the case of commercial ships (both US and foreign-flagged in liner service), protocols are in place to ensure the safe passage of vessels in high threat or contested waters. Commander, Military Sealift Command exercises operational control (OPCON) of MSC forces through five geographically organized subordinate commands. These commands include the following: MSC, Atlantic; MSC, Pacific; MSC, Europe and Africa; MSC, Far East; and MSC, Central.

Sealift Capabilities

Sealift Forces Sealift forces are those militarily useful merchant- type ships available to DOD to execute the sealift requirements of the Defense Transportation System (DTS) across the range of military operations. Called “common-user shipping,” these ships are used in the transportation of cargoes for one or more Services from one seaport to another or to a location at sea in the operational area pending a decision to move the cargo embarked ashore.

Ship Types Sealift shipping falls into three broad categories: dry cargo ships or freighters, liquid cargo carriers or tankers, and passenger ships. During joint operations, dry cargo ships transport the equipment and supplies and tankers carry the refined petroleum, oils, and lubricants required to conduct and sustain the operation. Passenger ships provide troop carrying, noncombatant, or sealift medical evacuation capability in support of the joint operation.

Sealift Ship Programs The conventional sealift assets discussed above cannot meet all strategic sealift and sealift-related requirements alone. To meet these requirements, various sealift ship programs have been established. Sealift ship programs are large medium-speed roll- on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, auxiliary crane ships, fast sealift ships, aviation logistics support ships,

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hospital ships, Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll-off ships, and afloat pre-positioning force.

Sealift Enhancement Features Sealift enhancement features (SEFs) consist of special equipment and modifications that adapt merchant-type dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions. They are typically installed on ships of the Ready Reserve Force or on ships under MSC control. The SEFs fall into three categories: productivity, operational, and survivability enhancements.

Logistics Over-the-Shore The Army and the Navy maintain an organic capability to perform logistics over-the-shore missions in support of their respective Service missions.

Planning

Operational considerations lead to a great many combinations of ships that may be considered for prompt delivery of unit equipment and other cargo to their destinations.

The actual or contemplated use of sealift assets leading up to and during a crisis or conflict involves significant operational considerations, each of which must be the subject of detailed planning. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Supporting strategic transportation requirements is a four-step process. The four steps are:  Determine the cargo and sustainment movement

requirement;  State the requirement in the appropriate units of

measure;  Simulate the deployment using available forces;

and,  Confirm that the plan is transportation feasible.

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Execution Planning The execution planning period may be weeks, days, or even hours in length depending on the political situation and scenario. During this period, USTRANSCOM and its Navy and Army component commands, MSC and SDDC, identify the sealift forces required for execution of the operation order (OPORD) and tentatively schedule the sealift to move the earliest deploying units. In general, USTRANSCOM and its component commands are responsible for ensuring that adequate transportation is available to support the OPORD when executed, developing feasible transportation schedules, establishing initial and follow-on requirements for sealift capability, resolving transportation shortfalls, adjudicating transportation allocation conflicts with the Joint Transportation Board, and publishing transportation coordinating instructions.

Sealift Asset Planning Shipping is divided into two broad categories: common-user and withhold. Common-user assets are available for joint support of all Services’ movement requirements. Withhold vessels are reserved for specific purposes and not generally available to transport joint movement requirements. Planning for ships designated as maritime PREPO force and Navy Combat Logistics Force, as well as other sealift planning factors, is covered in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Mobility Supplement.

Basic Cargo Planning Concepts Before proceeding with sealift planning, the joint planner must understand several basic concepts of cargo handling and stowage. These are: different measures of ship capacity, broken stowage, stowage factor or cargo density, and units of cargo measurement.

Protection and Operations Security

MSC ships have virtually no self-protection capability, particularly against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. The presence of CBRN contamination may preclude transit by ships. Further, unprotected ships are faced with the risk of loss of ship, cargo, and personnel while operating in any area where a credible military, terrorist, or piracy threat exists. Therefore, military forces are assigned either to

Executive Summary

eliminate the threat so ships can transit unopposed at any time, or to provide direct protection, to include ship augmentation, during transits of threat environments.

Environmental Considerations Sealift support operations should be planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of their effect on the environment in accordance with applicable US and host nation agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations.

Automated Planning Tools Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System is an automated information system that supports day-to- day operations for unit movement officers, movement controllers, staffs from battalion/separate company to theater level, mode managers, and installation transportation offices. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation is a transportation feasibility evaluation tool capable of scheduling transportation assets against a time-phased force and deployment data. This allows planners to download specific movement requirements from Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and identify specific problem areas in meeting latest arrival dates at the PODs. Integrated Computerized Deployment System is an automated information system designed to support cargo management, ship load planning, and stowage at common-user ocean terminals. Port Simulation Model (PORTSIM) is a time- stepped, discrete simulation of SPOE and seaport of debarkation events during a force deployment. PORTSIM can determine a port’s reception, staging, clearance, and throughput capabilities. Global Air Transportation Execution System is a single automated system serving management of both aerial port and surface port operations for DOD transportation, worldwide.

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Cargo Movement Operations System is a joint system that integrates computer hardware, software, and communications to effectively plan, document, and manage outbound and inbound cargo and passengers, and to plan, schedule, and monitor the execution of transportation activities in support of deployment and reception of forces.

Transition from Peace to Conflict to Stability Operations

The transition from peace to conflict represents a critical period for sealift. The transition period involves high risk due to misperceptions about the speed with which the DTS in general, and sealift in particular, can transition from a relatively small peacetime force into a major military force. The first and most obvious change in sealift during transition is that the number of ships under USTRANSCOM and MSC control will rapidly and substantially increase. The transition from conflict to stability operations can be critical to the overall success of an operation. As operations shift from sustained combat operations to stability operations, civil-military operations will facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services.

Employment of Sealift Forces

Employment Planning for the employment of sealift begins in the planning phase of the joint deployment process and is in JOPES. Employment continues until the operation is terminated by proper authority or is completed, including redeployment of forces and materiel and retrograde of equipment.

Execution The execution phase starts with the President and SecDef decision to exercise the military option for resolution of the crisis. Acting on the authority and direction of the SecDef, the CJCS issues an execute order that directs the supported combatant commander (CCDR) to carry out the OPORD. Throughout the execution of an OPORD, USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating with the supported CCDR for validating transportation requirements and developing, monitoring, and adjusting transportation schedules.

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Communications System Support The inherent worldwide dispersal of sealift forces mandates that sealift C2 systems be fully interoperable with the Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) family of systems. GCCS-J is built such that interoperability with existing systems can be attained. GCCS-J provides the means for disseminating and sharing the information necessary in order to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, redeploy, and employ sealift forces. The sealift communications system, in its simplest form, must enable the sealift operational commander to monitor the situation, conduct assessments, develop estimates, plans, and schedules, issue orders and directives, and report status to higher authority.

Logistic Support In general, merchant ships will be logistically supported by their owner and/or operators within the terms of their charters or other agreements when the ships are using commercial seaports for loading and discharge of military cargo. The exception to this is that merchant ships under MSC OPCON are generally supplied with fuel from military sources. This may take the form of direct payment for fuel from commercial sources or actual transfer of military fuels to merchant ships.

Intermodal Operations Intermodal operations provide flexibility by incorporating various combinations of sealift, airlift, rail, and trucking operations to facilitate rapid, efficient cargo movement. In the context of commercial shipping, “intermodal” operations or systems refer primarily to the efficient interchange of standardized shipping containers between ocean and land carriers, sophisticated systems of container handling and storage in marine terminals, or container freight stations and computerized tracking of shipments.

Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations

Navy elements in an amphibious task force include various types and classes of ships to include combatant and strategic sealift and support units from various warfare specialties.

Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and Security

Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of

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Cooperation Activities, and Humanitarian Assistance

joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area. Currently, sealift support to the sea base is normally accomplished indirectly by delivery of supplies to an intermediate staging base. Sealift plays an essential role in developing capabilities, interoperability, and cooperation among US allies and coalition partners. In many cases, the value of sealift support extends well beyond strictly military considerations. In providing humanitarian and civic assistance, these ships are often able to operate where combatants or support vessels would not be permitted for political reasons. Frequently, sealift support to humanitarian assistance plays an important, if not the primary role in preserving life in the immediate aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster.

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

In maritime terminology, leasing agreements are known as charters.

Government-Owned/Controlled Assets

Government-owned shipping (primarily RO/RO) is the most readily available source for quickly deploying large quantities of unit equipment. However, the number of ships in this category is limited, and they would primarily support the very early stages of a major military deployment.

Commercial Controlled Assets Commercial ships will likely be required to fill sealift requirements in major crisis situations requiring large amounts of logistics support. DOD can obtain commercial shipping from the following sources: US flag commercial charters and liner service; foreign owned charters and liner service ships, used in accordance with existing laws and policies; ships/capacity committed to Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement/voluntary tanker

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agreement; US-owned ships, registered under certain flags, known as the effective US controlled fleet; and militarily useful US flag ships which are subject to requisitioning.

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Ships

Naval cooperation and guidance for shipping provides the operational interface between the Navy and commercial shipping.

In periods of crisis, conflict, national emergency, or war, naval authorities may direct the movement of merchant ships (including routing and diversion) so that they may be better protected from hostilities and not interfere with possible active naval, joint, or combined military operations. The naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS) organization is the principal US resource to carry out this function. The purpose of NCAGS is to ensure the efficient management and safe passage of merchant ships that are not performing strategic sealift functions.

Organization Commander, US Fleet Forces, is responsible for overall program management and control of assets NCAGS. There are currently four units assigned to the NCAGS organization. Each unit is composed of 48 personnel possessing a variety of operational warfare skills as well as specialized skills relating to the civil maritime industry. Each unit provides the capabilities to: liaise with the civil maritime industry and the operational commander; deploy shipping coordination teams (SCTs) ashore or afloat; and establish or augment shipping coordination centers (SCCs) with skilled personnel.

Mission and Capabilities The NCAGS mission is to assist the geographic combatant commander/operational commander in managing risk by providing situational awareness and near real-time clarity of the merchant shipping picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant shipping and the safety of naval vessels or the nation in a crisis contingency, which may include combat operations, piracy, or foreign humanitarian assistance. The NCAGS organization provides the operational commander with the following capabilities: liaison officers, SCTs, and SCCs.

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Implementing Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Measures for Commercial Shipping

While many NCAGS techniques and procedures are employed to support the military commander, the decision to implement NCAGS measures having a direct impact on commercial shipping requires the approval of SecDef. The Chief of Naval Operations, as the NCAGS organization program sponsor, with the support of US Fleet Forces Command maintains liaison with the national shipping authority and other civilian authorities to coordinate the exchange of information concerning implementation of NCAGS measures.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for sealift in support of joint operations.

I-1

CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

1. General

This joint publication (JP) identifies, describes, and defines the sealift forces; organization for command and control (C2) of sealift forces; procedures and responsibilities for the generation of sealift force assets and requirements; and doctrine for sealift planning, employment, and transition across the range of military operations. Successful response to regional contingencies crisis response, limited contingency operations, and major operations and campaigns depends on sufficient strategic mobility assets in order to deploy and sustain forces in an operational area as long as necessary to meet US military objectives.

2. The Strategic Mobility Triad

a. The strategic mobility triad of air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioning (PREPO) is shown in Figure I-1. Each element of the triad has its own unique advantages and

“Strategic sealift is the maritime bridge to ensure that heavy ground forces are delivered and that all land-based forces are supported and resupplied in a conflict.”

Secretary of the Navy John Dalton 1994

Figure I-1. Strategic Mobility Triad

Strategic Mobility Triad

Force Protection

SealiftAir Mobility

Pre-Positioning (Afloat and Ashore)

Chapter I

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disadvantages, as shown in Figure I-2. In general, air mobility transports light, high priority forces and supplies, including personnel and equipment required to rapidly integrate units

Figure I-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad

Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad

Air Mobility

Pre-Positioning (Ashore)

Pre-Positioning (Afloat)

Sealift

Advantages Disadvantages

Rapid deployment of combat and supporting units Flexibility of employment Direct delivery capability to the warfighter, i.e., "factory to foxhole" without transload requirements

Rapid deployment of heavy combat and supporting units Reduces movements required for deployment and redeployment Reduces deployment timeline

Rapid deployment of heavy combat and supporting units Reduces movements required for deployment and redeployment Flexibility of employment Reduces deployment timeline

Sustained delivery of heavy combat and supporting units and their sustainment Flexibility of employment

Limited delivery capacity Air lane dependent May require overflight rights Dependent on availability and suitability of airfields Requires cooperation of foreign governments

Lacks flexibility Airlift dependent Fixed sites may be easily targeted for attack Requires cooperation of foreign governments Finite capability

Dependent upon suitability of port facilities and debarkation locations Dependent upon open sea lines of communications Airlift dependent Anchorages subject to attack

Seaport dependent (may be mitigated via Service/joint logistics over-the- shore operations) Speed Dependent upon open sea lines of communications

Overview

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with PREPO elements’ equipment and supplies. As an operation progresses, sealift delivers the heavy units and their support equipment as well as the vital sustainment for deployed forces.

b. In most cases, sealift accounts for the majority of the total cargo delivered to an operational area. To meet these requirements, sealift forces are employed in the three phases of strategic mobility, which are: PREPO, deployment (or surge), and sustainment. Similarly, sealift generally accounts for the majority of the cargo moved during redeployment to the home and/or demobilization stations. The relationship of each phase to the others in terms of time and quantities of material delivered is shown in Figure I-3.

3. The Sealift Trident

During large deployment operations, sealift support is typically conducted in three phases comprising the sealift trident as depicted in Figure I-4. All three portions of the sealift trident are distinct entities, and removing any segment of the trident denies joint force commanders (JFCs) the full range of sealift support options. Organic and nonorganic are the two primary categories of sealift shipping available to support these three phases. Organic vessels are owned by the United States Government (USG) or under long-term charter (lease) to a government entity. Nonorganic shipping includes all commercial vessels not

Figure I-3. Phases of Strategic Mobility

C-Day unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins

PREPO pre-positioned equipment

Legend

Phases of Strategic Mobility

D ai

ly T

on na

R eq

ui re

PRE- DEPLOYMENT (PREPO)

DEPLOYMENT (SURGE)

SUSTAINMENT REDEPLOYMENT

PREPO/deployment unit equipment

sustainment unit equipment and supplies redeployment unit equipment and supplies

C-DAY

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owned or leased by the USG, to include US-flagged, US owned but foreign-flagged (effective US control), and foreign-owned and -flagged.

a. PREPO afloat is made up of ships from the afloat pre-positioning force (APF) of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). APF ships are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, “Sealift Capabilities.” The flexibility inherent in the APF provides the combatant commanders (CCDRs) various force options to use when developing courses of action (COAs) to accomplish assigned tasks. While pre-positioned equipment and supplies aboard APF shipping are tailored to support the joint forces’ combat operations, these same assets can be used to support other types of joint military operations. On a limited basis, selected capabilities—such as production, storage, and distribution of potable water; rations; shelter; bulk fuel operations; engineer support; and transportation services—may be provided to host nation (HN), other government departments and agencies, or international organizations to support foreign humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. This occurred during the Indonesian tsunami relief efforts in 2004-2005, the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, and the earthquake relief efforts in Haiti in 2010. When providing support

Figure I-4. The Sealift Trident

The Sealift Trident

Sealift Support Options

Pre-Positioning APS/MPS/

NDAF

Surge MSC-CSS/

MARAD RRF

Sustainment US Merchant Fleet

APS afloat pre-positioning ship MARAD RRF Maritime Administration Ready

Reserve Force MPS maritime pre-positioning ship

MSC-CSS Military Sealift Command- Controlled Surge Sealift

NDAF Navy, Defense Logistics Agency, Air Force

Legend

Crisis Area

Overview

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to foreign nations, it is important to comply with applicable laws, regulations, and reporting procedures. Elements of the APF may be temporarily moved to take up position close to a potential employment area, either to signal national resolve during an evolving crisis or enhance the timely delivery of supplies and equipment upon the decision to deploy a decisive force.

b. “Surge” includes all organic ships not assigned to PREPO, but may also include nonorganic ships if readily available. Subcategories of surge sealift include the MSC-controlled fleet as well as the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force (MARAD RRF). The Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) exercises combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the surge sealift fleet. The MSC-controlled fleet are organic (US owned and long-term leased) ships, primarily large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) types, which operate under MSC administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON). MSC- controlled ships which are government-owned are typically identified by distinctive blue and gold funnel bands. Maritime Administration (MARAD) exercises ADCON of ships in the MARAD RRF, which are a mix of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels, fast sealift ships (FSSs), and special mission ships. When MARAD RRF shipping is activated, Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC), exercises OPCON. MARAD RRF vessels are typically identified by distinctive red, white, and blue funnel bands. Surge shipping types are discussed in detail in Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs.” A robust and responsive surge fleet is a critical element of US national security strategy. The ability to move forces and military equipment enables the US to defend and promote vital interests anywhere in the world. For surge sealift, MSC first looks to the US market and then the foreign market to charter ships as mandated by law. If no suitable ships are available, government-owned ships may be activated. Surge shipping delivers the heavy combat power and accompanying supplies in order to facilitate the worldwide deployment of predominantly continental United States (CONUS)-based forces.

c. Sustainment refers to nonorganic shipping provided by the US merchant fleet, mostly containerships, to deliver large quantities of resupply and ammunition to forward-deployed forces augmented as necessary by the government controlled assets. Sustainment shipping considerations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, “Employment of Sealift Forces.”

d. Finally, although not one of the sealift options specifically, JFCs need to carefully consider and plan for the eventual transition from conflict to stability/post-conflict. Sealift will play an important role in supporting redeployment/retrograde of materials back to the US for reconstitution or to another theater for subsequent operations. The majority of equipment moved during redeployment will be via the US merchant fleet.

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While most troops flew to the war [Operation IRAQI FREEDOM], 91 percent of deployment cargo traveled by sea. This figure compares favorably with the first Gulf War, when sealift accounted for 88 percent of total dry cargo. Between 1 January and 1 May 2003, 118 ships completed 141 downloads, delivering 811,169 short tons/16,342,573 square feet of unit cargo.

Of the 118 ships used, 36 belonged to the Military Sealift Command (MSC), 31 to the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force (MARAD RRF), 12 were US flag commercial ships, and 39 were foreign flag commercial vessels. The majority of vessels (99) were roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, the best for carrying most kinds of equipment because of their large size, ease of loading and unloading, and good speed. Thirty-five of these came from MSC, 30 from the MARAD RRF, and 34 from the commercial sector (7 US flag and 27 foreign flag). Thanks to adequate volunteerism by commercial US flag carriers, USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation Command] did not activate any ships under the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement [VISA]. MSC chartered 11 VISA ships, and SDDC [Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command] used 37 in liner service.

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CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General

The national security strategy depends heavily on our ability to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies worldwide. To assist Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) ability to carry out its transportation missions, CDRUSTRANSCOM provides common-user air, land (CONUS only), and sea transportation and common-user port management and terminal services to the DOD.

2. Forces and Authority

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5158.04, United States Transportation Command, designates CDRUSTRANSCOM as the DOD single manager for transportation, other than Service-organic or theater-assigned transportation assets. In order to carry out its Unified Command Plan-assigned transportation responsibilities, CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises COCOM over its Service transportation component commands (TCCs). The authority and duty to organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to CDRUSTRANSCOM and the associated programming and budgeting function remain with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.

For additional information, see DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command.

b. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) has the following responsibilities and authorities:

(1) DOD single manager for transportation (other than Service-organic, Service- controlled, or theater assigned assets) responsible for providing common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management, and aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces.

(2) DOD single manager for patient movement, providing DOD global patient movement, through the Defense Transportation System (DTS), in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs).

(3) Mobility joint force provider responsible for identifying and recommending global joint sourcing solutions to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

(4) Distribution process owner (DPO) responsible for:

“We have at this moment to distinguish carefully between running an industry or a profession, and winning the war.”

Winston Churchill Memorandum for First Sea Lord, 1939

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(a) Coordinating and overseeing the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD-wide, end-to-end distribution.

(b) Developing and implementing process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System.

For additional information on the roles and responsibilities of the DPO, see DOD Instruction 5158.06, Distribution Process Owner.

(5) Responsible for synchronizing planning for global distribution operations in coordination with other combatant commands (CCMDs), the Services, and as directed, appropriate agencies.

(6) With respect to sealift, CDRUSTRANSCOM is delegated authority to procure commercial transportation services and, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), to activate the MARAD RRF and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). Additionally, CDRUSTRANSCOM shall control the transportation accounts of the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).

3. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation

As used in DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command, Service-organic or theater-assigned transportation includes sealift assets that are shown in Figure II-1.

4. Organizations and Responsibilities

a. Traffic management and transportation single manager responsibilities must be aligned to achieve optimum responsiveness, effectiveness, and economy. Specific sealift responsibilities follow.

b. Secretary of Defense. SecDef is responsible for transportation planning and operations with DOD. Transportation-specific responsibilities include establishing and overseeing implementation of overall policy for effective and efficient use of DOD and commercial transportation resources, and establishing overall policy guidance governing the transportation account of the TWCF.

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS reviews and evaluates movement requirements and resources, apportions capability, and allocates capability when required. CJCS:

(1) Establishes procedures, in coordination with the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for the submission of movement requirements by DOD user components to USTRANSCOM and for the submission of evaluated requirements and capabilities by USTRANSCOM and its component commands.

(2) Prescribes a movement priority system in agreement with uniform materiel movement and issue priority system to meet the requirements of the supported CCDRs.

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(3) Monitors the capabilities of USTRANSCOM common-user transportation resources to provide air mobility, sealift, CONUS land transportation, common-user ocean terminal service, and aerial port service based upon the requirements of DOD components.

(4) Assigns movement priorities in support of DOD components based upon capabilities reported by USTRANSCOM.

(5) The current Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) apportions forces for planning.

(6) Adjudicates competing lift requirements as requested by USTRANSCOM or the CJCS Joint Transportation Board (JTB).

Figure II-1. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets

Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets

Assigned to the Department of the Army:

Army afloat pre-positioning (PREPO) ships (prior to the initial discharge of cargo);

Army watercraft to include, but not limited to, self-sustaining and self- deployable logistic support vessels, Landing Craft Utility 2000, and oceangoing 128 foot large tug.

Assigned to the Department of the Navy as:

The special mission support force of missile range instrumentation ships, ocean survey ships, cable ships, oceanographic research ships, acoustic research ships, and naval test support ships;

The naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunition ships, submarine surveillance ships, dry cargo, fast combat stores ships, fleet ocean tugs, ballistic missile submarine support ships, and fleet oilers;

Hospital ships;

Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity ships; or

Maritime PREPO ships (prior to initial cargo offload and if released by the combatant commander to common user status).

Assigned to the Department of the Air Force as Air Force afloat PREPO ships (prior to the initial discharge of cargo); or

Assigned to the combatant command (command authority) of a unified command (including the US Special Operations Command) other than Commander, US Transportation Command.

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(7) Acts on the recommendations of the CJCS JTB with respect to the establishment of priorities and allocations for the use of air mobility, sealift, and surface transportation capability.

d. The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing the logistic support (including Service-organic transportation) of their respective forces. In this role, the United States Army (USA), United States Navy (USN), United States Air Force (USAF), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Coast Guard (USCG), DLA, and other DOD agencies are all generically referred to as “shipper services.” Each Service is responsible for establishing transportation policy for the movement of equipment and supplies funded by the applicable shipper service and for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by CCDRs at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater. Each Service is also responsible for maintaining trained personnel who can participate in joint planning and provide Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) inputs. Specifically, with respect to sealift, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible as follows:

(1) The Secretary of the Army establishes, organizes, trains, and equips Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) as a jointly staffed major command of the USN for assignment to CDRUSTRANSCOM and establishes and controls installation and port activities as necessary for the operation and administration of SDDC. Other tasks include:

(a) Providing acquisition authority to SDDC by designating Commander, SDDC as Head of Contracting Activity for the Army to support CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(b) Providing litigation and legal support for actions arising from contracts issued or administered by SDDC in support of CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(d) Assignment of Service-unique missions, to include logistics over the shore, movement and maneuver, intratheater distribution, port denial mitigation, and C2 to Army organizations.

(e) Supports CCDR requirements through theater assignment of organizations and equipment.

(2) The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) establishes, organizes, trains, and equips MSC as a jointly staffed major command of the USN for assignment to CDRUSTRANSCOM. SECNAV obtains CDRUSTRANSCOM approval on organizational changes within MSC that may impact the ability of CDRUSTRANSCOM to carry out assigned responsibilities. In addition, SECNAV coordinates with CDRUSTRANSCOM on the assignment of new missions to MSC to ensure MSC is able to meet its assigned USTRANSCOM functions without degradation. Other tasks include:

Organization and Responsibilities

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(a) Coordinating Navy requirements for shipping support to be drawn from the MARAD RRF with CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(b) Providing acquisition authority to MSC by designating COMSC as Head of Contracting Activity for the Navy to support CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(d) Assigning to MSC Service-unique missions or assets.

e. Commander, US Transportation Command. Specific CDRUSTRANSCOM responsibilities with respect to sealift are shown in Figure II-2. As the focal point for transportation for DOD, the CDRUSTRANSCOM:

(1) Provides transportation and common-user port management and terminal services for DOD as well as non-DOD agencies upon request.

(2) Exercises COCOM of all assigned forces (including Reserve Component forces if mobilized or ordered to active duty for other than training) as authorized by the Forces for Unified Commands memorandum. (Air Mobility Command and SDDC reservists, when activated fall under CDRUSTRANSCOM’s COCOM.)

(3) Exercises responsibility for global air, land, and sea transportation planning.

(a) Providing CCDRs with the coordinated transportation planning expertise required during the deliberate planning process. This includes reviewing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking, analyzing supported CCDR requirements registered in JOPES (force and non-unit cargo and/or personnel) for transportation feasibility, and advising the supported CCDR of changes required to produce a force and sustainable deployment concept. Upon approval of the supported CCDR’s operation plan (OPLAN), support the plan review and analysis as required.

(b) Providing deployment estimates and total lift assets availability to the President, SecDef, and supported CCDRs for development of alternative COAs and optimal flow of forces during crisis action planning. CDRUSTRANSCOM will also advise the supported CCDRs and the CJCS concerning use of, or changes to, lift capabilities.

(c) Synchronizing planning for global distribution operations in coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed appropriate USG departments and agencies.

(4) Acts as DOD focal point for items in the transportation system.

(5) Exercises responsibility for intertheater (non-theater assigned) aeromedical evacuation.

(6) Oversees the responsibilities listed below:

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Figure II-2. Responsibilities of the Commander, United States Transportation Command

Responsibilities of the Commander, United States Transportation Command

Exercise combatant command (command authority) of sealift forces, to include organizing and employing forces to carry out missions in support of other unified commands.

Coordinate and implement Transportation Working Capital Fund operational procedures in association with comptrollers of Military Departments and Office of the Secretary of Defense; provide guidance for standardization of rates, regulations, operational policies, and procedures.

Apply assigned/allocated strategic sealift resources as directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensuring effective use.

Procure commercial transportation services (including lease of transportation assets) in accordance with applicable laws as necessary to conduct the US Transportation Command mission.

Establish and maintain relationship between the Department of Defense and the commercial transportation industry to develop concepts, requirements, and procedures for the Sealift Readiness Program.

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, activate strategic sealift reserve/mobilization programs including the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, and the Volunteer Tanker Agreement.

Coordinate and provide oversight for the joint logistics-over-the-shore program.

Coordinate with the Maritime Administration and provide guidance on requirements issues as necessary.

In coordination with other agencies, provide direction and oversight for all matters dealing with the transportation of hazardous material.

Have the authority to provide management support for Service-organic or theater- assigned transportation assets as requested by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the commanders of unified commands at the direction of the Secretary of Defense or when the Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) and the Service Secretary or commander concerned so agree.

Make recommendations to the Service Chiefs via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the capability, characteristics, design, and other requirements for mobility assets needed for CDRUSTRANSCOM's mission.

Designate continental United States (CONUS) seaports of embarkation and debarkation for deploying/redeploying forces and sustainment during planning and execution; make recommendations to the geographic combatant commanders for designation of seaports outside CONUS that might be used in military operations.

Organization and Responsibilities

II-7

(a) During deployment, assisting the supported CCDRs in route validated movement requirements and scheduling for maximum support. During sustainment and redeployment, the CDRUSTRANSCOM will also consider efficient use of intertheater lift resources. The CDRUSTRANSCOM assists the CJCS by recommending reallocation of intertheater assets to optimize their use and support plan execution during deployment, employment, reconstitution, redeployment, and sustainment. The CDRUSTRANSCOM refers problems with recommended COAs to the CJCS JTB for resolution or adjudication if a balance of transportation requirements and capabilities cannot be maintained.

(b) As Executive Agent for DOD Customs and Border Clearance Program, interface with the US Customs and Border Protection Service, US Department of Homeland Security, US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and state customs and agriculture officials for customs and agriculture inspections of DOD personnel, material, and equipment returning to the US.

(c) Developing policies and procedural guidance through the CCDRs, in collaboration with the DOD components, USG border clearance activities, and foreign governments, to effectively and uniformly implement the DOD Military Customs and Border Clearance Program.

(d) Developing and maintaining integrated in-transit visibility (ITV) capability for DOD. The Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence (IGC) provides that capability and is the designated ITV system for DOD. IGC also provides C2 functionality for USTRANSCOM and is integrated into the Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) family of systems and the Global Combat and Support System-Joint.

For additional information on GCCS-J, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

f. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. SDDC is a major subordinate command of the USA Materiel Command. As the Army component of USTRANSCOM, SDDC is the CONUS transportation manager and provides worldwide common-use ocean terminal services and traffic management services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. These services also include the use of common-user sealift through the VISA program. SDDC also conducts transportation engineering to ensure deployability and feasibility of present and future deployment assets. Additionally, SDDC, acting on behalf of USTRANSCOM, is the single port manager for all common-user seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs). When designated, SDDC serves as the port operator (e.g., using stevedoring services contracts of host-nation support [HNS]). In addition to these responsibilities, SDDC serves as DOD’s proponent for container management and USTRANSCOM’s Army force provider for joint task force-port opening (JTF-PO). Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency (SDDCTEA) provides policy guidance, deployment engineering, research, and analytical expertise to improve the deployability of the Armed Forces of the United States. SDDCTEA executes surface transportation engineering policy matters assigned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on behalf of USTRANSCOM and SDDC Headquarters (HQ). SDDCTEA also provides a focal point for developing DTS-

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related modeling and simulation tools. Sealift-related responsibilities, subject to the direction and control of USTRANSCOM, are as follows:

(1) Providing deliberate and crisis action planning support to CDRUSTRANSCOM to ensure effective use of CONUS common-user ocean terminals and other CONUS transportation assets.

(2) Providing traffic management, CONUS surface transportation, and CONUS common-user ocean terminal support to supported CCDRs.

(3) Negotiating ocean and intermodal rates and procuring cargo space on ships and related services to meet DOD ocean and intermodal transportation requirements.

(4) Recommending diversions of cargo and passengers within DTS.

(5) Evaluating cargo throughput capability of CONUS common-user ocean terminals to be used for unit deployment.

(6) Providing those functions necessary to control the strategic flow of cargo and information between SPOE and hand-off to the GCC. Assigning workloads to the port operator based on the CCDR’s priorities. Contracting for port services and documentation.

(7) Providing freight traffic management services and obtaining freight transportation rates and services from commercial for hire transportation companies, including inland waterway and coastal carriers. Providing routing, rates, and performance quality control.

(8) Providing ocean cargo booking and contract administrative services for sealift cargo for DOD components.

(9) Providing through SDDCTEA, deployment engineering, research, and analytical expertise to improve the deployability of the Armed Forces of the United States. SDDCTEA executes surface transportation engineering policy matters assigned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on behalf of USTRANSCOM and SDDC HQ. They also provide a focal point for developing DTS related modeling and simulation tools.

(10) Supporting the USTRANSCOM Fusion Center to synergize surface requirement planning and execution.

(11) Providing trained and ready forces in support of JTF-PO.

g. Military Sealift Command. MSC is a major subordinate command of the USN Fleet Forces Command. As the Navy component of USTRANSCOM, MSC provides common-user and exclusive use sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. MSC consists of the HQ, area commands, field offices, operational commands, and liaison offices. MSC functions include operating and maintaining MSC forces as directed and serving as the Navy administrative

Organization and Responsibilities

II-9

commander for MSC forces. MSC-specific sealift tasks, subject to the direction and control of USTRANSCOM, are as follows:

(1) Providing deliberate and crisis action planning support to USTRANSCOM ensuring effective use and control of common-user sealift.

(2) Providing organic and leased ocean transportation and support services to DOD components as required by CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(3) Ensuring effective use and control of government- and commercial-owned ocean transportation services for DOD.

(4) Informing CDRUSTRANSCOM and SDDC as to the availability of commercial and MSC-controlled lift capability.

(5) Recommending to CDRUSTRANSCOM activation of the MARAD RRF ships and activation of VISA.

(6) On behalf of CDRUSTRANSCOM, administering and executing the VISA, exercising operational oversight of the MARAD RRF in concert with MARAD and over ships requisitioned, and exercising mission control of those forces when transferred to CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(7) Preparing forecasts of ocean and maritime common-user transportation services based on DOD component requirements.

(8) Acting as CDRUSTRANSCOM scheduling authority for sealift support of DOD requirements.

(9) Coordinating MSC operations with appropriate port authorities.

(10) Providing sealift for passengers on government-owned and/or -controlled or commercial ships as required.

(11) In coordination with USTRANSCOM, developing program and budget submissions for strategic sealift system requirements.

(12) Performing missions and tasks as directed by CDRUSTRANSCOM. Keeping CDRUSTRANSCOM informed of Service assigned missions and employment use of strategic sealift assets.

h. Maritime Administration. MARAD is the agency within the Department of Transportation (DOT) responsible for assuring that US Merchant Marine shipping is sufficient to meet the needs of national defense in times of war or national emergency, and can also support the domestic and foreign commerce of the US. MARAD administers programs to meet sealift requirements determined by DOD and conducts related national security activities. MARAD functions include maintenance of ships in MARAD custody; administration of subsidy programs and other financial aids to shipping; maritime research

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and development; and training of US merchant marine officers. MARAD also functions as the national shipping authority (NSA) of the US, the emergency shipping operations agency tasked to acquire and manage merchant shipping for government service in time of war or in defense-related emergencies. MARAD also conducts national security planning, training, and operations in areas such as emergency communications, naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS), war risk insurance, and port emergency operations. In peacetime, MARAD provides ship inventory and characteristics information as well as estimates of ship forecasts for use in DOD planning. In turn, DOD provides MARAD with information on defense shipping requirements. In a contingency, DOD advises MARAD of time-phased requirements for ships by type. MARAD provides DOD with the required ships by activation of reserve vessels and through various government programs, including VISA, voluntary tanker agreement (VTA), and requisitioning. In a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) crisis, MARAD would be responsible for obtaining the NATO ships committed under the NATO Reinforcement Shipping Agreement.

i. Coast Guard. The USCG, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, is a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is specifically authorized to assist DOD in the performance of any activity for which the USCG is especially qualified. National defense, maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, and maritime environmental protection are the four major roles of the USCG. During joint force deployment and redeployment operations, the USCG can assist the naval coastal warfare commander in providing protection of military shipping at US SPOEs and overseas ports of debarkation (PODs) by conducting port security and harbor defense operations. Major cutters are deployed to participate in enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, and peace operations. The major cutters of the USCG, like Navy combatants, are self- sustaining during deployments in support of joint force operations. However, deploying port security units and supplies for sustainment must be time-phased to support Navy component operations and entered on the joint force time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) by supported CCMDs planners for scheduling of common-user lift. The Coast Guard/naval expeditionary “harbor defense package” is an ad hoc capability that has been used to provide an integrated layered defense for shipping in the SPODs. The deployable harbor defense package includes a port security unit; a harbor defense command unit; a mobile inshore underwater warfare unit; an explosive ordnance disposal team; two visit, board, search and seizure teams; two patrol boats; and a high endurance cutter with its embarked helicopter. Also, the USCG is unique among the US military forces in that it has statutory law enforcement authority. In the US, the USCG is responsible for assuring the safety and security of US ports and waterways and enforcing vessel cargo and waterfront facility regulations; inspecting vessels (including those of the MARAD RRF); licensing mariners; enforcing customs laws; establishing and servicing aids to navigation; regulating and administering bridges over navigable waterways; port emergency response; search and rescue; operation of vessel traffic services in selected ports; and establishing safety and security zones.

j. Joint Transportation Board. The CJCS JTB may be convened by the CJCS during wartime or contingencies for ensuring President and SecDef requirements for all common- user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD are apportioned and scheduled to optimize accomplishment of DOD objectives. When convened, the CJCS JTB acts for the

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CJCS to communicate President and SecDef priorities and adjudicate competing requirements for intertheater mobility lift assets and/or resolve other issues that negatively impact the DTS and which USTRANSCOM and the supported CCDRs are unable to resolve. USTRANSCOM allocates transportation assets to supported CCDRs’ validated requirements in accordance with the CJCS apportionment guidance and priority assigned to each operation and/or requirement. USTRANSCOM advises the Joint Staff operations directorate and logistics directorate when movement requirements exceed capabilities. The CDRUSTRANSCOM will refer problems with recommended COAs to the CJCS for resolution or adjudication if a balance to transportation requirements and capabilities cannot be maintained. Should additional support be required to resolve lift shortfalls, the CJCS JTB may be convened to analyze proposed solutions and develop recommended COAs for CJCS approval. CCDRs could establish a theater JTB (T-JTB) to resolve similar issues.

For further information concerning the organization, responsibilities, management, and procedures of a JTB see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System.

5. Command and Control Architecture

a. General. C2 of sealift assets is normally exercised in a variety of ways and is largely dependent upon the sealift asset and the program to which it belongs (PREPO, surge, or sustainment). The exercise of C2 of sealift assets generally applies to government-owned or government leased vessels. However, where C2 does not apply, as in the case of commercial ships (both US and foreign-flagged in liner service), protocols are in place to ensure the safe passage of vessels in high threat or contested waters. See Chapter V “Employment of Sealift Forces,” for more on C2 systems.

(1) PREPO ships. MSC currently operates PREPO ships supporting the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and DLA. Most of the PREPO ships are strategically placed around the globe and contain combat gear, supplies, and ammunition for use by deployed forces. Once off-loaded in theater and when released by the GCC, the ships become part of the common user fleet and under the OPCON of CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(2) Surge ships. The surge fleet consists of the MSC-controlled fleet as well as common-user elements of the MARAD RRF once they have been activated. When activated and ordered into service, they are placed under OPCON of COMSC in support of US wartime or humanitarian and disaster relief or civil contingency operations to offset shortages of commercial US flagged ships. Surge sealift may also be used for routine operations such as sustainment when commercial assets are not available or suitable. FSSs are normally maintained in a four or five day reduced operating status (ROS). Other MARAD RRF ships which come under USTRANSCOM control when activated may include crane ships, RO/RO ships, and others. As with the PREPO ships, MSC operates the surge shipping for USTRANSCOM and the GCCs. MSC also contracts surge shipping on the commercial market to augment existing controlled capacity. See Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs,” for more on vessel acquisition and activation programs.

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(3) Sustainment. Sustainment shipping is almost exclusively obtained from the commercial market. Sustainment shipping includes vessel charters executed by MSC (with the exception of long-term leases, which are considered organic and typically fall under the pre-positioned or surge fleets) and regularly scheduled and dedicated liner service contracts executed by the SDDC. Vessels chartered by MSC operate under the OPCON of COMSC in the same way as US Government-owned assets. COMSC normally then delegates OPCON to one of the MSC area commanders in whose area the vessel is operating. Liner service, which includes containerized and breakbulk cargo, may also include contracted intermodal service from the inland origin or the SPOE to the SPOD or inland destination, depending on the customer requirement. It is important to note that commercial ocean carriers operate in accordance with their contractual requirements and their vessels do not come under military OPCON. However, in some circumstances, when operating in a potentially high threat area, merchant shipping may voluntarily participate in NCAGS protocols to ensure safe passage. See Chapter VII, “Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping,” for details on the NCAGS program.

b. Military Sealift Command. COMSC exercises OPCON of MSC forces through five geographically organized subordinate commands. These commands include the following: MSC, Atlantic, encompassing Central and South America as well as the eastern coastlines of the US and Canada; MSC, Pacific, encompassing the west coast of North America as well as much of the Eastern Pacific west of South and Central America; MSC, Europe and Africa, encompassing the Eastern Atlantic north and west of Europe, the Atlantic west and south of Africa, as well as the Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, and North Seas; MSC, Far East, covering the mid-Pacific to the Indian Oceans and from the Bering Sea south to Antarctica; and MSC, Central, which covers the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean east of Africa to the coast of Pakistan. In certain cases when, in the opinion of the MSC commander, the threat to shipping under MSC OPCON presents an unacceptable risk to ships and cargo, the ships will be placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the Navy component commander of the responsible GCC. Upon the departure of the ships from the danger area, control over the ships will revert to MSC.

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CHAPTER III SEALIFT CAPABILITIES

1. General

a. Sealift forces are those militarily useful merchant-type ships available to DOD to execute the sealift requirements of the DTS across the range of military operations. Called “common-user shipping,” these ships are used in the transportation of cargoes for one or more Services from one seaport to another or to a location at sea in the operational area pending a decision to move the cargo embarked ashore. The sealift force is composed of shipping from some or all of the following sources:

(1) Active government-owned or controlled shipping.

(2) Government-owned reserve or inactive shipping.

(3) US privately owned and operated commercial shipping.

(4) US privately owned, foreign flag commercial shipping.

(5) Foreign owned and operated commercial shipping.

b. The precise nature of each type of shipping and how it is acquired for DOD use is discussed in Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs.” This chapter will describe those ships and ship characteristics that are most useful for DOD missions, discuss the advantages and disadvantages of common merchant ship types for military operations, and provide a general overview of DOD sealift ship and sealift support programs.

2. Ship Types

a. Sealift shipping falls into three broad categories: dry cargo ships or freighters, liquid cargo carriers or tankers, and passenger ships. During joint operations, dry cargo ships transport the equipment and supplies and tankers carry the refined petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) required to conduct and sustain the operation. Passenger ships provide troop carrying, noncombatant, or sealift medical evacuation capability in support of the joint operation.

b. Dry Cargo Ships. In general, a dry cargo ship is considered to be usable for military purposes if it has a minimum carrying capability of 2,000 long tons (LTs) of cargo and the ability to carry, without significant modification, unit equipment, ammunition, or sustaining supplies. The major types of dry cargo ships are listed in Figure III-1.

“It’s all about chartering the direct course to deliver military power in the quickest, most efficient, most businesslike manner wherever and whenever the nation calls on us to serve. The vast majority of how we get things done is through sealift.”

General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander, United States Transportation Command, March 2007

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III-2 JP 4-01.2

(1) Breakbulk. The term “breakbulk ships” refers to ships characterized by large open hatches and fitted with boom-and-winch gear or deck cranes. They are primarily used at ports which, either because of low cargo volumes or local economic factors, lack the modern facilities and inland rail/highway connections required to support efficient containership operations. In competition with containerships, breakbulk ships are no longer commercially viable. Fewer of these ships are being built each year, and none have been built for US flag owners in recent years. The military advantages of general cargo or breakbulk ships include flexibility in the load composition afforded by open decks and multiple cargo holds and the ability to discharge cargo without the use of developed port facilities. Their military disadvantages include time-consuming cargo operations, the need for dunnage to block and brace pallets, and the requirement for large numbers of trained personnel to load and unload.

(2) Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships. A RO/RO ship is specifically designed to carry vehicle cargo (i.e., wheeled and tracked vehicles) as all or most of its cargo. Vehicles are driven or towed on and off the ship by means of either the ship’s own ramps or shore-based ramps. Because it is designed to accommodate cargoes which cannot be stacked but which vary in height, below-deck space and volume utilization is generally less efficient than on a containership. RO/RO ships are thus commercially viable only in certain specialized trades. However, the RO/RO is the preferred ship type for deployment of military unit equipment. The military advantages of RO/RO ships include the capability for rapid loading and discharge of military vehicles and non-self-deployable aircraft, and open deck areas well suited to the carriage of outsized military cargo. Their military disadvantages include their relative unsuitability for carriage of sustaining supplies and ammunition (in comparison with general cargo and containerships). One type of RO/RO ship is the pure car and truck carrier (PCTC). PCTC ships are designed to transport automobiles and light trucks across the ocean. They are most commonly used by the automobile/vehicle manufacturing industry. PCTC decks and ramps are designed to facilitate ease of loading and unloading light vehicles; however, their deck strength and height between decks are often insufficient to support military vehicles. Overall, the availability of militarily-useful commercial RO/RO

Figure III-1. Types of Dry Cargo Ships

Types of Dry Cargo Ships

Breakbulk Roll-on/Roll-off Ships High-Speed Vessel

Container Ships Barge Ships: Lighter aboard ship SEABARGE Ocean-going barge

Float-on/Float-off Ships Heavy Lift Ships Dry Bulk Carriers

Sealift Capabilities

III-3

ships is decreasing and as PCTCs have superseded general-purpose RO/ROs as the preferred means of shipping light vehicles.

(3) High-Speed Vessel (HSV). HSVs are high-speed twin hull catamaran vessels designed to rapidly deliver vehicles, combat equipment, supplies, and personnel to contingency sites or within theater. Two commercially owned HSVs are under contract to MSC. HSVs and joint HSVs have limited cargo carrying capability and limited range at speed. These vessels are best suited for intratheater transportation and are not considered intertheater assets.

(4) Containerships. Containerships are specifically designed to carry all of their cargo in standard ocean shipping containers, which are loaded into vertical “cells” below deck and stacked and lashed on deck. Most rely on shore-based cranes for cargo loading and discharge. Some container ships are self-sustaining and can self-load/offload. Standard ocean shipping containers are weatherproof, made of steel or similar material, constructed to withstand the high forces and elements to which they may be subjected in heavy seas, and usually designed and sized to permit their efficient interchange for connecting with intermodal systems for inland rail or highway movement. Shipping containers are available in a variety of configurations that include end opening, side opening, half heights, open top, flatrack, refrigerated, liquid bulk (tank), and modular (quadcon/tricon). Except in highly specialized trades, cargo containers generally conform to US and international standards. The size standards for outer dimensions of shipping containers are 20 feet (ft) or 40 ft length, 8 ft width, and 8 ft or 8 ft 6 inches in height. 40 ft containers are the standard; however, there are sealift enhancement features (SEFs) such as coupling devices that can make two 20 ft containers fit into one 40 ft container slot. 20 ft containers are particularly useful in transporting high-density cargo such as ammunition. Fortunately,

Roll-on/roll-off ships such as the Military Sealift Command large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off Ship BENAVIDEZ (T-AKR 306) are the preferred ship for military deployments. The BENAVIDEZ is heading out of Souda Bay harbor carrying more than 230,000 square feet of United States Army combat equipment and supplies for the 1st Cavalry Division, deploying for service in Iraq.

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III-4 JP 4-01.2

most containerships can carry containers of mixed heights without significant difficulty. Depending on cargo density, a standard 20 ft container can carry up to 15-20 short tons or 29 measurement tons (MTONs) of cargo. Containership capacity is normally expressed in twenty-foot equivalent units, which is defined as the number of 20 ft by 8 ft by 8 ft 6 inches containers it can carry; or, similarly, in forty-foot equivalent units. There is a high likelihood of their availability due to the large number of containerships in the world. The military advantages of containerships include their large cargo capacity, excellent suitability for carriage of sustaining supplies and ammunition, and rapid and efficient cargo operations. Movements by containers also provide a greater degree of cargo security, reduce pilferage and damage to cargo, reduce cargo-handling costs, and result in faster, more efficient deliveries. Their military disadvantages include near total dependence on specialized shoreside equipment for cargo loading and discharge, and general unsuitability for carriage of large vehicles and oversized cargo unless modified to utilize heavy-duty flatracks.

(5) Barge Ships. Barge ships are designed to carry specially designed barges (lighters) or a combination of such barges and containers. Thus, they are necessarily large ships with a large heavy lift capability. Their design was intended to combine the flexibility and self-sustained cargo handling capability of the general cargo ship with the rapid port turnaround time of the RO/RO and containership. In general, these ships are becoming less common as an ever-increasing share of the cargo trade passes to containerships.

Joint High Speed Vessel-2, Swift, conducting high speed trials. The Joint High Speed Vessels provide for fast intratheater transportation of troops, military vessel and equipment. They are capable of transporting 700 short tons 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots, and can operate in shallow-draft ports and waterways.

Sealift Capabilities

III-5

(a) Sea Barge (SEABEE). The two MARAD RRF SEABEE heavy lift vessels have three decks on which the cargo barges or container flats are stowed. Cargo can be brought to each deck level by a stern elevator and are moved internally within the ship by the transporter (conveyor) system. The elevator capacity is 2,000 LTs. The SEABEE ships are the preferred means of transporting amphibious lighterage, certain types of non-self deploying watercraft, and floating causeways. As such, they are a critical enabler of joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations.

(b) Ocean-Going Barges. Ocean-going barges are specifically designed to carry a variety of cargo types over the open seas. These barges are either towed by a large ocean-going tug with a hawser or towing cable, or have an interlocking connection for a push-tug (articulated/integrated tug/barge). Some have open holds and can carry containers, rolling stock, or bulk cargo such as grains or ores. Other barge types have a solid deck with the internal compartments designated for the carriage of liquid cargoes and petroleum products, or covered holds or deckhouses for cargo protection. In most cases, ocean-going barges do not have the speed and capacity of ships. However, they are very versatile and capable of deploying into shallow draft ports and up rivers and estuaries that the larger ships are unable to navigate.

(6) Float-On/Float-Off Ships. These specialized vessels, or semisubmersible ships, provide the capability to load, transport, and off-load outsized military cargo independent of port equipment traditionally used for handling large or extremely heavy cargo, such as tug boats, barges, landing craft, floating cranes, and single anchor leg mooring systems. Lifts range from approximately 50 to as much as 45,000 tons. These ships are designed to take on ballast water in floodable tanks that partially submerge the vessel. Cargo is then floated over the submerged portion of the vessel, which then deballasts and surfaces under the cargo. After the vessel is fully afloat, the cargo is secured for transport.

(7) US Flag Heavylift Ships. Heavy lift ships are designed to carry exceptionally heavy loads such as boats, barges, cranes, trucks, passenger ferries, or other heavy cargoes.

The SS Cape May is a heavy lift ship capable of transporting oversized military cargo.

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III-6 JP 4-01.2

Cargo can be stowed aboard the ships by a lift-on/lift-off (LO/LO) method using shoreside cranes or the ship’s own cranes, or float-in, float-out where the ship partially submerges during loading and unloading. These ships are extremely useful for large, heavy, over-sized, and bulky military equipment and cargo.

(8) Dry Bulk Carriers. Dry bulk carriers are designed to carry grain or similar cargoes in bulk (i.e., material that can be dumped, sucked, pumped, or blown). Loading and discharge are normally performed at specialized terminals using cargo-handling systems that are designed for specific commodities. Gravity is often used for loading; the various discharge methods include the use of pneumatic systems, conveyors, and excavation-type machinery. Most dry bulk carriers are not considered to be militarily useful. However, some are fitted with deck cranes so that, in some cases, their characteristics are similar to those of a general cargo ship without tween decks.

c. Liquid Cargo Carriers. MSC operates ships providing worldwide point-to-point movement of DOD bulk petroleum products. Liquid cargo ships, or tankers, are specifically designed to transport liquid cargoes in bulk. Although tankers differ greatly in size, their cargo handling equipment is similar. Specific features of the cargo handling equipment differ; however, based on the intended cargo. These differences may limit the capability of the ship to carry cargo other than that for which it was designed. Tanker capacities are stated in terms of cargo deadweight tonnage (DWT) or barrels (bbl). DWT is measured in LT of 2,240 pounds and 1 bbl equals 42 US gallons. The parameters that define a militarily useful tanker are the capability of carrying POL, a capacity within the range of 2,000 to 100,000 DWT, and a sustained speed in excess of 12 knots. Tankers are classed by size and type of cargo. The major types of liquid cargo carriers are listed in Figure III-2. In general, smaller tankers carry “clean” cargoes (refined products, such as gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel), and are sometimes referred to as “product tankers.” Large tankers generally carry “dirty” (unrefined oil or crude oil) cargoes, and are often referred to as “crude carriers.”

(1) Handy Size Tankers. The handy size tanker (6,000 to 35,000 cargo DWT, or approximately 48,000 to 280,000 bbl) is the most militarily useful. These generally carry clean or refined products, although some may carry unrefined oil, chemicals and, occasionally, bulk grain. The term “handy size tanker equivalent,” refers to a tanker of

Figure III-2. Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers

Types of Liquid Cargo Ships

Handy Size Tankers

Medium Size Tankers

Large Crude Carriers

Sealift Capabilities

III-7

200,000 bbl or approximately 25,000 DWT. The military advantages of handy size tankers include their ability to enter most of the world’s tanker ports, the relatively short time required for tank cleaning when required, and their overall flexibility with regard to the numbers of different cargoes they can carry.

(2) Medium Size Tankers. The medium size tanker ranges in capacity from 35,000 to 100,000 DWT (or approximately 280,000 to 800,000 bbl). As a general rule, those under 60,000 DWT can carry “clean” cargoes while those over 80,000 DWT will, almost exclusively, carry crude oil or other “dirty” cargoes. Their military disadvantage is that it is extremely difficult and time-consuming (months) to clean the tanks and piping of tankers that have been transporting either crude oil or other “dirty” cargoes, so they can be used to transport refined POL products.

(3) Large Crude Carriers. Large crude carriers are the largest tanker class and are solely dedicated to the transportation of crude oil. Very large crude carriers range in capacity from 100,000. None of these ships are considered militarily useful.

(4) Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). OPDS provides a semipermanent, all-weather facility for bulk transfer of refined bulk petroleum (e.g., jet propulsion fuel, type 5 [JP5] and jet propulsion fuel, type 8 [JP8]) directly from an offshore tanker to a beach termination unit (BTU) located immediately inland from the high watermark. POL then is either transported inland or stored in the beach support area. There are two types of OPDS: a legacy system based on a converted tanker, offshore petroleum discharge system-legacy (OPDS-Legacy), and a follow-on system based upon commercial off-the-shelf technology, offshore petroleum discharge system-future (OPDS-Future).

(a) OPDS-Legacy. Major OPDS-Legacy components are: the OPDS tanker with booster pumps and spread mooring winches, a recoverable single-anchor leg mooring (SALM) to accommodate four follow-on tankers up to 70,000 DWT, ship-to-SALM hose lines, up to four miles of six-inch (internal) diameter conduit for pumping to the beach, and two BTUs to interface with the shoreside systems. OPDS-Legacy can support a two-line system for multiproduct discharge, but ship standoff distance is reduced from four to two miles. Amphibious construction battalions install the OPDS with underwater construction

The Motor Tanker Evergreen State is part of the Military Sealift Command’s tanker fleet which transports refined petroleum products for the Department of Defense, primarily between commercial refineries and Department of Defense storage and distribution facilities worldwide.

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III-8 JP 4-01.2

team assistance. The only remaining OPDS-Legacy ship is the MARAD-controlled SS PETERSBURG, in 10-day status on the West Coast.

(b) OPDS-Future (currently in service). OPDS-Future is a current capability employed onboard the MV VADM K.R. Wheeler that does not incorporate afloat storage of fuel, but utilizes tankers of opportunity. The system is capable of providing 1.7 million gallons per day of JP5 or JP8 from up to eight miles offshore in significantly higher sea states than OPDS-Legacy. The OPDS-Future system consists of Wheeler, a 165 foot tender vessel, two embarked lighters amphibious resupply cargo vessels which help deploy the OPDS conduit, and a beach terminal unit that receives fuel and transfers it to the holding tanks or bladders ashore. Once the conduit is deployed, Wheeler uses its dynamic positioning system to hold itself in place.

For additional guidance on OPDS, refer to JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.

d. Troop/Passenger Ships. Although government-owned national defense reserve troop ships are specifically designed to transport troops for combat missions, the mission has changed significantly. Troops are generally airlifted to safe landing areas near the combat zone. Troop ships are used for movement of military troops to and from combat and safe areas where troops embark or debark military and commercial aircraft. Passenger ships may also serve for rest and recreation for troops during long periods of combat; these ships are generally foreign flag privately owned passenger vessels equipped with amenities not available in traditional troop ships. National defense reserve troop ships are generally converted state maritime academy training vessels that have been enhanced to enable the transport of troops for combat missions. These ships have limited cargo space, and they carry between 480 to 800 troops. When the number of troops increases, the use of folding canvas cots, and berthing on deck and in designated holds is required. Commercial privately owned US and foreign flag passenger ships are traditional cruise or converted ferry vessels

The motor vesell VADM K. R. Wheeler (T-AG 5001) is part of Military Sealift Command’s pre- positioning fleet and is capable of distributing 1.7 million gallons per day of jet fuel ashore from distances up to eight miles offshore.

Sealift Capabilities

III-9

equipped with the necessary comforts for the duration of the transit; vessel capacity varies with the capability for messing and berthing.

3. Sealift Ship Programs

a. The conventional sealift assets discussed above cannot meet all strategic sealift and sealift-related requirements alone. These requirements include the rapid deployment of heavy Army combat units and Marine Corps forces, containership discharge where port facilities are damaged or nonexistent, expeditionary aviation maintenance support, state-of- the-art medical care for expeditionary forces, and PREPO of combat and support equipment and supplies. To meet these requirements, various sealift ship programs have been established as shown in Figure III-3.

The SS Empire State is one of the troop/passenger ships currently in the National Defense

Reserve Fleet.

Figure III-3. Sealift Ship Programs

Sealift Ship Programs

Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/ Roll-off Ships Auxiliary Crane Ships Fast Sealift Ships Aviation Logistics Support Ships Hospital Ships Ready Reserve Force Roll-on/ Roll-off Ships

Afloat Pre-positioning (PREPO) Force Maritime PREPO Ships Afloat PREPO Stocks Navy, Defense Logistics

Agency, Air Force Ships

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III-10 JP 4-01.2

b. LMSR Ships. An LMSR is similar to any other RO/RO ship in that it is specifically designed to carry wheeled and tracked vehicles as all or most of its cargo. An LMSR differs from most other RO/RO ships in that it is faster, larger, and has cranes and hatches to support LO/LO as well as RO/RO operations. By design, an LMSR is capable of sustaining a transit speed of at least 24 knots. LMSRs are Panamax ships (the largest ships that can transit the Panama Canal) (950 ft length, 106 ft beam, 34 ft draft), with two to three times the stowage capacity of the average RO/RO. The gross cargo space for the LMSRs range between approximately 300,000 square feet for the conversion ships and approximately 380,000 square feet for the new construction ships. Usable cargo-carrying capacity is between 225,000 square feet and 285,000 square feet respectively with 25 percent broken stowage applied. The LMSR ship type was built or converted specifically for military use. There are currently no commercial equivalents.

“One of the clearest lessons learned from the recent US-Iraq war is the need for greater speed in moving combat equipment and supplies across oceans,” said Navy Vice Admiral David L. Brewer III, head of the Military Sealift Command (MSC). The MSC has sped up its act since the first Persian Gulf War, but more needs to be done. “We may be fast, but we need to be faster,” he said. “During Desert Storm, the average speed of our ships was about 13 knots,” “Today, our large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off (LMSRs) ships can go up to 24 knots. Their average speed, during the war, was about 18 knots. When you’re going 9,000 miles, that’s a significant difference.” LMSRs are the ships of choice for cargo-carrying missions. They are 950 feet long and have more than 380,000 square feet of cargo space, making them only slightly smaller in size than the Navy’s aircraft carriers. An LMSR’s six-deck interior is larger than eight football fields. Each ship can carry an entire Army armored task force, including 58 Abrams tanks and 48 other tracked vehicles, plus more than 900 trucks and other wheeled vehicles. The ship’s decks have ample open space for lashing down helicopters, tanks, trucks and other large vehicles. A moveable stern and side ramps make it easy to drive vehicles on and off the ship. An LMSR can be loaded or off-loaded within 96 hours. Two 110-ton, single-pedestal, twin cranes make it possible to load and unload cargo even in locations without port facilities. In total, during the Gulf War, the MSC moved more than 12 million tons of tanks, helicopters, ammunition, fuel and other supplies into the theater. It took about seven months, however, for the United States to build up enough strength in 1991 to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. More than a decade later, investments in LMSRs and pre-positioning enabled the MSC to move US forces into place for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM “about 50 percent faster,” Brewer said.

SOURCE: July 2003 interview with then-Commander, Military Sealift Command

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III-11

c. Fast Sealift Ship. The FSSs are former containerships, purchased by the Navy and converted to a RO/RO configuration with on-board cranes and self-contained ramps that enable the ships to off-load onto lighterage while anchored at sea or in ports where shore facilities for unloading equipment are unavailable. The vessels are specially suited to transport heavy or bulky unit equipment such as tanks, large wheeled vehicles and helicopters. The FSSs are the fastest cargo ships in the world. They are capable of a sustained speed in excess of 27 knots. The FSSs are part of the MARAD RRF and berthed at CONUS East, West, and Gulf Coast ports in a 5-day ROS, each maintained by a crew of 10. When the FSSs are at full operational status they operate with a crew of 42.

d. Auxiliary Crane Ships. Crane ships are converted containerships on which two or three twin-boom revolving heavy-lift cranes have been mounted. These cranes are able to off-load containerships and provide a heavy lift capability in locations where port facilities are nonexistent, inadequate, or damaged. Crane ships are capable of handling lifts up to 110 LTs, containers of all sizes, and wheeled and tracked vehicles. In addition to this unique off- load capability, each crane ship is able to carry between 200 and 700 containers, and/or flatracks (depending on configuration), and its main deck is also outfitted to carry amphibious lighterage and causeways. This capability makes these ships extremely useful in supporting in-stream offload and JLOTS operations. Crane ships are part of the MARAD RRF and are berthed on the East and West Coasts.

The fleet of fast sealift ships, now part of the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, is capable of lifting four brigade combat teams.

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Large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, such as the United States Naval Ship WATSON, are

the preferred ship type for military deployments.

The auxiliary crane ship SS Cornhusker State, part of Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, deployed with her sister ship SS Gopher State, providing relief to Haiti during Operation

UNIFIED RESPONSE in 2010.

Sealift Capabilities

III-13

e. Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVBs). T-AVBs in the MARAD RRF provide dedicated sealift for critical movement of the Marine Corps aviation sustainment forces of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation combat element (ACE), upon activation. These ships transport the mobile aviation maintenance facility container, which is configured and modified to operate intermediate aviation maintenance afloat. The T-AVBs are operationally controlled by MSC and maintained in ROS-5 status. Currently, there are T-AVBs berthed in Baltimore, Maryland, and San Diego, California. Aviation sustainment personnel deploy and work in standard 8 ft by 8 ft by 20 ft International Organization for Standardization containers called mobile facilities (MFs). The MFs provide the necessary work space for personnel, support equipment, technical publications, special tools, and spare parts. The T-AVB can be deployed in three modes of operation: operational, transport, and combination. In the operational mode, approximately 300 MFs and 325 USMC personnel can be embarked to provide sea based support for the MAGTF ACE while loaded aboard ships. In the transport mode, approximately 684 MFs and minimum USMC personnel can be embarked to provide maximum land based support for the MAGTF ACE when off-loaded ashore. In the combination mode, a tailored mix of MFs and USMC personnel can be loaded aboard the T-AVB for a mix of sea based and land based support for the MAGTF ACE.

f. Hospital Ships (T-AHs). T-AHs are converted tankers equipped with 12 operating rooms and 1,000 patient beds. The primary mission of these ships is to provide expeditionary medical facilities in a major contingency or conflict however, they provide JFCs with a significant theater engagement and humanitarian assistance capability, often with embarked support from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The two T-AHs in the

Hospital ships enable medical facilities to be positioned in or near the joint force operational

area.

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III-14 JP 4-01.2

Navy inventory are berthed on the East and West Coasts and maintained in a 5-day ROS by a crew of 10 civilian personnel. The ships are operated by MSC. The US Navy Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery provides manning for the hospital facilities.

g. Afloat PREPO Force. This program, which involves the forward deploying of equipment and supplies aboard ships, improves sealift response time in a crisis. These ships are chartered commercial and government-owned vessels. Some of these ships have militarily useful features including aviation facilities, lighterage and floating hoseline systems. The APF consists of the Maritime pre-position force, Army pre-positioned stocks-3 (APS-3) ships, DLA, and Air Force ships.

(1) Maritime PREPO Force Ships. Maritime PREPO is a strategic deployment option that quickly combines the substantial PREPO equipment and supplies loaded aboard the ships of a maritime pre-positioning ships squadron (MPSRON) with a MAGTF to establish a formidable combined arms force capable of sustained operations. The MAGTF and Navy support element (NSE) personnel, selected equipment, and combat aircraft are flown into the objective area where the maritime pre-positioning ship (MPS) operations occur. The MPSs are comprised of specifically constructed or modified RO/RO ships, augmented by LMSRs and special capability ships that are forward-deployed in two self- contained squadrons. Each squadron (except for the maritime PREPO force enhanced ships, LMSRs, which have no bulk liquid capabilities) carries the unit equipment and up to 30 days of supplies for one Marine expeditionary brigade. Each ship carries a spread load of unit equipment, supplies, POL, and potable water. Additionally, each ship is outfitted with NSE equipment consisting of the camp support and lighterage needed to discharge cargo

The United States Naval Ship Seay, part of the maritime pre-positioning ships force, off-loads

tracked vehicles using joint logistics over-the-shore.

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over unimproved ports or over the beach. Currently, one swing bulk fuel tanker provides strategic stocks for any theater of operation in direct support of the MAGTF. The NSE and lighterage embarked in Maritime Security Program (MSP) squadrons constitutes the Navy’s logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) capability and is often the nucleus around which JLOTS operations are formed. MPSRON 2 is positioned in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and MPSRON 3 is positioned in the Western Pacific. MPS cargo may be discharged pierside or “in stream” by NSE personnel composed of naval beach group and cargo handling battalion personnel, as well as Marine Corps personnel airlifted to the objective area.

(2) Army Pre-Positioned Stocks-3 Ships. The APS-3 consists of government- owned and commercially chartered ships on which pre-positioned military equipment and munitions and/or supplies are stored to meet rapid deployment requirements of the USA. These ships are normally forward-deployed with heavy combat equipment, combat support (CS) equipment, and sustainment to support a USA brigade combat team for 15 days, plus a sustainment brigade to support the first 30 days of an operation. All ships are capable of limited self-discharge in the objective area, but are typically intended to be offloaded at a fixed SPOD. The APS-3 currently includes both container ships and LMSRs. These ships are under the ADCON of COMSC Washington and TACON of the MPSRON commanders.

(3) DLA and Air Force Ships. DLA and the Air Force currently operate three vessels around the world for the DLA and the USAF.

(a) COMSC has OPCON of one pre-positioned vessel for DLA. It is an OPDS vessel, MV Wheeler, that can distribute fuel from eight miles off shore. This ship reports to one of the two MPSRON depending upon its geographic location.

(b) The Air Force pre-positioned fleet consists of two ammunition carriers:

The Motor Vessel Capt. Steven L. Bennett Fisher is a container under charter to Military Sealift

Command as part of the Prepositioning Program carrying Air Force munitions.

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one under the OPCON of MPSRON Two in Diego Garcia and one under the OPCON of MPSRON Three in the Guam/Saipan area.

4. Sealift Enhancement Features

a. SEFs consist of special equipment and modifications that adapt merchant-type dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions. They are typically installed on ships of the MARAD RRF or on ships under MSC control. The SEFs fall into three categories: productivity, operational, and survivability enhancements.

b. Productivity Enhancements. A number of productivity enhancements expand the capabilities of merchant ships to carry military cargoes. Examples include militarily useful (reinforced) RO/RO ramps for commercial RO/RO vessels, the installation of 20 ft container hardpoints in 40 ft container cells, and installation of vehicle tie-downs (D-rings and cloverleafs) on deck. Other productivity enhancements provide the necessary interfaces with ship-to-shore cargo handling systems. Examples include main deck fittings and rails for the transport of amphibious lighterage and alongside lighter mooring systems.

c. Operational Enhancements. Operational enhancements are equipment and systems that enable merchant ships to operate with, and provide logistic support to, Navy warships and support units. These features include communications equipment operated by embarked military personnel, which provides the capability for classified message traffic.

d. Survivability Enhancements. Survivability enhancements include internal communications and nuclear, biological, and chemical washdown systems.

5. Logistics Over-the-Shore

Strategic sealift also includes the requirement to achieve an over-the-shore cargo discharge capability that matches cargo deliveries in an amphibious objective area or other operational area. This is known as LOTS. LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines or in ports that are inaccessible to deep draft shipping or that are damaged or otherwise inadequate. Both the Army and the Navy maintain an organic capability to perform LOTS missions in support of their respective Service missions and when directed, to support the CCDR’s requirement for a capability to perform JLOTS. USTRANSCOM has developed the JTF-PO (SPOD) capability that can be used to complement JLOTS. JTF-PO (SPOD) provides for the efficient and transparent movement of cargo from the highwater mark to a forward distribution node. JTF-PO facilitates and enables follow-on theater distribution.

Additional information on JLOTS is available in JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, and on JTF-PO in JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

IV-1

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING

1. General

a. The actual or contemplated use of sealift assets leading up to and during a crisis or conflict involves significant operational considerations, each of which must be the subject of detailed planning. Operational considerations lead to a great many combinations of ships that may be considered for prompt delivery of unit equipment and other cargo to their destinations. The amount of time available significantly influences the planning process. Supporting strategic transportation requirements is a four-step process, as shown in Figure IV-1. The four steps are:

(1) Determine the cargo and sustainment movement requirement.

(2) State the requirement in the appropriate units of measure.

(3) Simulate the deployment using available forces.

(4) Confirm that the plan is transportation feasible.

“A shipload of war material delivered safely overseas [is] wasted if half the cargo consists of filler items not needed immediately.”

Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley (on efficiency in transportation versus effective supply) Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943

Figure IV-1. Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements

Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements

Identify the Total Movement Requirements

Describe Them in Logistics Terms

Simulate the Strategic Deployment

Short Tons

Square Feet

Cubic Feet/ Metric Tons

Using Common- User Lift

Confirm Operation Plan Is Transportation Feasible

Operat ion

Plan

Time- Phased

Force a nd

Deploy ment

Data (TPFDD

)

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IV-2 JP 4-01.2

b. The planning process for deliberate and crisis action planning is described in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

2. Execution Planning

a. This execution planning period may be weeks, days, or even hours in length depending on the political situation and scenario. During this period, USTRANSCOM and its Navy and Army component commands, MSC and SDDC, identify the sealift forces required for execution of the operation order (OPORD) and tentatively schedule the sealift to move the earliest deploying units. In general, USTRANSCOM and its component commands are responsible for ensuring that adequate transportation is available to support the OPORD when executed, developing feasible transportation schedules, establishing initial and follow-on requirements for sealift capability, resolving transportation shortfalls, adjudicating transportation allocation conflicts with the JTB, and publishing transportation coordinating instructions.

b. Sealift Application. In a crisis, strategic sealift divides into three broad categories: PREPO; surge shipping during initial mobilization; and resupply and sustainment shipping. PREPO ships reduce closure times of combat and support forces needed in the early stages of a crisis. Surge shipping should be capable of handling outsized and heavy items of equipment. These include large numbers of wheeled and tracked vehicles and helicopters, for which RO/RO ships are most suitable. Containerships should not be overlooked in surge operations as they may have the capability to transport light combat, CS, and combat service support (CSS) equipment. Resupply and sustainment shipping moves the equipment, parts, and supplies necessary to sustain the force. It transports mainly containerized cargo and bulk POL products.

c. Service Requirements. The methods by which forces are introduced into an operational area vary from Service to Service. Sealift assets must be assigned based on the supported CCDR’s force closure and sustainment cargo requirements. Strategic sealift of accompanying supplies for Army and/or Air Force units is normally point-to-point unless otherwise specified by the CCDR potentially based on point of need distribution or available port facilities. However, this is not always true for Marine Corps forces. The expeditionary Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force, can influence events within the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a secure operating base. Seabasing enables forces to move directly from ship to inland objectives. It also permits Marine forces to commence sustainable operations to enable the flow of follow-on forces into theater. During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Marine forces operated over 400 miles inland while being supported from the sea. Whenever expeditionary units of a significant sized MAGTF are employed, assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) sealift provides for long-term operations; short-term or voyage charters are not sufficient. The AFOE is more fully explained in Chapter V, “Employment of Sealift Forces.”

d. Resource Capability. When arranging the duration of supporting sealift assets, it is very important to match sealift asset capabilities with Service orientation. For example, all of MSC’s RO/RO and some MARAD RRF ships are self-sustaining offshore, meaning that

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they can discharge to lighterage offshore. It follows that these ships are highly suitable for amphibious operations. Furthermore, because they are government-owned, their assured availability makes it feasible to plan and train with them in preparation for a contingency. The MSC surge LMSRs and the MARAD RRF FSSs are vessels of choice for immediate assignment to surge shipping. For example, historically surge loading of vessels results in an average of 35 percent broken stowage while PREPO vessels can achieve a broken stowage of 25 percent or less.

e. Mobility and Transportation Planning. The Logistics Supplement to the JSCP provides planning guidance to CCDRs regarding strategic sealift. Specific questions regarding asset availability and responsibilities for planning certain facets of sealift (Marine Corps AFOE, for example) can be answered by consulting the Logistics Supplement to the JSCP and the GFMIG.

3. Sealift Asset Planning

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3110.11F, Mobility Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2008, presents information and guidance on sealift assets and is further detailed in Guidance for the Development of the Force 2008. Shipping is divided into two broad categories: common-user and withhold. Common-user assets are available for joint support of all Services’ movement requirements. Withhold vessels are reserved for specific purposes and not generally available to transport joint movement requirements. Planning for ships designated as maritime PREPO force and Navy Combat Logistics Force, as well as other sealift planning factors, is covered in the JSCP Mobility Supplement.

4. Basic Cargo Planning Concepts

a. Before proceeding with sealift planning, the joint planner must understand several basic concepts of cargo handling and stowage. These are: different measures of ship capacity, broken stowage, stowage factor or cargo density, and units of cargo measurement.

b. Measures of Ship Capacity. The cargo carrying ability of a vessel may be expressed in one or more units of measure (see Figure IV-2).

c. Broken Stowage. Broken stowage is cargo space left unoccupied after the ship is considered “fully” loaded. This occurs because cargo sizes and shapes do not conform to those of the ship’s cargo compartments and because of the space required for cargo bracing and tie-down to prevent shifting and damage during the voyage. It is expressed as a percentage of the total volume available for cargo stowage (bale cubic). For RO/RO ships, the broken stowage is normally estimated to be 25-35 percent, indicating that the cargo actually occupies 65-75 percent of the total available load space, even though individual cargo spaces/holds are full. The amount of broken stowage is specific to each ship type, the cargo characteristics, the load plan, and the available load time. For example, historically surge loading of vessels results in an average of 35 percent broken stowage, while PREPO vessels can achieve a broken stowage of 25 percent or less.

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d. Stowage Factor. Stowage factor is the number of cubic feet occupied by one LT (2,240 pounds) of any given cargo, without allowance for broken stowage. The stowage factor, in combination with the estimated percentage of broken stowage, can be used to estimate either the space required for loading a given cargo, or the amount of cargo that can be loaded aboard a given ship. It also can be used to maximize the cargo space (bale cubic capacity) and weight capacity (cargo deadweight) of available shipping. General cargo ships are typically designed to be full and down when loaded with cargoes having an average stowage factor of 40 cubic feet per LT (or one MTON per LT). Cargoes with relatively high stowage factors (i.e., low densities) will fill the ship by volume before its weight capacity is reached. Conversely, cargoes with relatively low stowage factors (high densities) will bring the ship down to its deepest allowable draft before it is full.

e. Units of Cargo Measurement. In determining sealift transportation requirements, the appropriate units of measurement will vary with cargo type and stowage factor (see Figure IV-3). For vehicles and other nonstackable cargo, area square feet is the relevant measurement. For stackable cargoes, stowage factors will determine whether weight (LT) or volume (MTON) is the more appropriate measurement.

Figure IV-2. Measures of Ship Capacity

Measures of Ship Capacity

Bale Cubic

Cargo Deadweight

Square Footage

Liquid Volume

Bale cubic is the internal volume of the below-deck cargo compartments available for general or “package” cargo. It is expressed either in cubic feet (ft ) or in measurement tons of 40 ft per ton.3 3

Cargo deadweight is the weight of cargo that the ship can carry when fully crewed, fueled, and provisioned (when loaded, in salt water, to the summer freeboard marks). It is measured in long tons of 2,240 pounds.

Square footage is the total of those deck areas that are considered usable for the stowage of cargo, expressed in square feet.

Liquid volume is the total internal volume of the ship’s liquid cargo tanks, expressed in standard barrels of 42 US gallons.

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f. Sealift Planning Factors. For planning purposes, ships of various types may be assumed to have, on the average, the notional cargo capacities shown in Figure IV-4. Cargo characteristics will determine whether area, weight, or volume is the appropriate consideration in loading general purpose vessels (breakbulk ships and barge carriers). A single criterion applies to each of the more specialized designs: area, in the case of the RO/RO, and volume, for the containership.

5. Protection and Operations Security

a. MSC ships have virtually no self-protection capability, particularly against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. The presence of CBRN contamination may preclude transit by ships. Further, unprotected ships are faced with the risk of loss of ship, cargo, and personnel while operating in any area where a credible military, terrorist, or piracy threat exists. Therefore, military forces are assigned either to eliminate the threat so ships can transit unopposed at any time, or to provide direct protection, to include ship augmentation, during transits of threat environments. As directed by their GCCs, Navy component commanders are tasked with establishing and implementing plans to provide embarked security teams (ESTs), and surface and air escort for the protection of all MSC shipping. While merchant ships are under escort of military forces, TACON is delegated by the MSC area commander to the appropriate Navy component commander, who may then retain or further delegate TACON over the merchant shipping (refer to Chapter VII, “Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping”). However, throughout the escort mission, OPCON of the shipping normally remains with the MSC area

Figure IV-3. Cargo Planning Factors

Cargo Planning Factors

AREA: Vehicles and nonvehicular cargo that cannot be stacked. For example:

Tanks Trucks Generators

WEIGHT: Nonvehicular, stackable cargo with a stowage factor less than 40. For example:

Dumb bombs Artillery ammunition

VOLUME: Nonvehicular, stackable cargo with a stowage factor greater than or equal to 40. For example:

Food Spare parts



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IV-6 JP 4-01.2

commander. Protection of shipping may be loosely divided into two distinct areas; en route operations and port security.

b. En Route Protection of Shipping. The traditional, and still very effective, means of directly protecting shipping transit is escort by naval combatants and Coast Guard assets. However, protection of shipping does not consist simply of those actions required to assemble and protect groups of merchant ships. Other offensive actions that reduce threats to sealift shipping also may eliminate the need for naval escort and be a more efficient use of resources. These actions may involve other use of air, land, or naval power, as appropriate. Internal protection of ships while en route is an MSC responsibility. Consequently, MSC provides threat awareness, ensures that vessels/owners are contractually obligated to accept ESTs and crew vetting, and provides small arms training. Whatever the means, the desired end state remains the safe, uninterrupted passage of shipping and the delivery of the cargoes to their destinations.

c. Port Security. Threats to shipping in seaports are different from those found en route. While the en route threat is primarily from conventional air, surface, and subsurface units and mines, the port threat is generally from unconventional or special operations forces, as well as terrorist organizations. The USCG is responsible for the security of ports in the US, and its port security units can be employed overseas. Maritime expeditionary security group units are also conducting the port security mission overseas. Port security functions involve the safeguarding of vessels and waterfront facilities (including key assets) within the port from internal and external subversive acts, accidents, thefts, or other incidents. There may be circumstances where dispersion of vessels will be required to minimize the risk of damage from attack. This is done by reberthing vessels in the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for protection. Refer to Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-10, Maritime Expeditionary Security Operations, for

Figure IV-4. Sealift Planning Factors

DWT deadweight tonnage ft square feet ft cubic feet

Legend

MT measurement ton TEU twenty-foot equivalent unit

Sealift Planning Factors

Breakbulk:

10,000 DWT 15,000 MT

600,000 ft 3

Barge Carrier:

30,000 DWT 30,000 MT

1,200,000 ft 3

Roll-on/Roll-off Ship:

150,000 ft 2 Containership:

2,400 TEU

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information regarding the responsibilities and capabilities of maritime expeditionary security forces (MESFs). Principal port security activities include:

(1) Monitoring port operations.

(2) Conducting harbor patrols to detect suspicious activity, and determining if the level of security measures taken by vessel and facility owners and operators are sufficient to meet the threat level.

(3) Surveying waterfront facilities to ascertain capabilities that would be useful in emergency response.

(4) Establishing and enforcing security zones to safeguard vessels and port areas.

(5) Developing measures to be taken to prevent acts of maritime terrorism.

(6) Developing and maintaining maritime counterterrorism plans, and responding to maritime emergencies involving terrorism.

(7) Carrying out the Special Interest Vessel Program to safeguard US ports from external threats of sabotage and espionage.

(8) Preparing for mobilization and national defense, including providing waterside security and limited landside security if required.

(9) The Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, SDDC, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Federal Emergency Management Agency, and other agencies, as well as commands acting with and through port readiness committees, play roles in port security and harbor defense depending on the particular crisis, situation, or geographic location. USNORTHCOM closely coordinates with DOT, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Transportation Security Agency in an effort to protect DOD assets at commercial ports where DOD’s jurisdiction is limited. Protection of shipping in port also requires close coordination and cooperation among intelligence agencies and commands.

d. Considerations for Civilian-Crewed Ships Operated by or for MSC. MSC ships are civilian-manned and have legal restrictions with regards to force protection and the use of force. In accordance with their civilian status, civilian mariners may not be protected by status-of-forces agreements and are not governed by military rules of engagement. The small crew size of MSC ships and the legal status of civilian mariners generally preclude tasking crewmembers with full-time security duties. They can perform any force protection duties, armed or unarmed, while remaining on the ship. They cannot perform security/force protection duties off the ship, such as armed or unarmed pier sentry duty, armed or unarmed picket boat operations, or escort duty.

e. Defense of MSC Ships. MSC ships are unarmed with the exception of a modest complement of small arms. The civilian mariners (whether government or contractor employees) are not members of the Armed Forces. Accordingly, MSC civilian and contract

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mariners use force in accordance with the standing rules for use of force, not the standing rules of engagement applicable to the military. In some cases this will directly or indirectly provide protection for ship and/or cargo. In all cases, force protection activities would be limited to actions “within the lifelines” of the ship, however, in self-defense, they may engage from the vessel at persons or contacts beyond the lifelines of the ship. For example, civilian mariners cannot be employed to serve as a pier sentry or picket boat operator. Accordingly, operational commanders must be prepared to augment MSC ships when, in their judgment, an armed security force is required. To this end, the JFC has an array of enabling capabilities to provide protection to MSC ships under Operation VIGILANT MARINER (OVM). OVM commenced in June 2004 to meet SecDef requirement that the Navy act as the DOD Executive Agent for force protection of military sealift assets. Available capabilities under the umbrella of OVM include the analysis and dissemination of collected intelligence; C2; HNS; maritime aircraft patrols; dark-ship transits; operational risk management; and the utilization of more heavily armed ESTs at selected chokepoints, transits, and ports. ESTs are comprised of teams that provide security augmentation to MSC assets to detect, deter, and defend against waterborne and land-based terrorist attacks. ESTs are assigned to and employed by Navy Expeditionary Combat Command under Commander, US Fleet Forces Command. Tools to accomplish the mission include small arms, crew served weapons, body armor, night vision devices, and secure radios and telephones.

f. Operations Security (OPSEC). Sealift has several significant OPSEC aspects. The first, and possibly most obvious problem, is the presence of a large number of fully loaded merchant ships at anchor in a major port. Such a gathering over several days is an obvious indication that a convoy or major operation is being planned, and is almost impossible to keep secure. Somewhat more subtle, but still obvious, is the gathering of large numbers of sealift ships at a forward base, particularly those ships which can be identified with an AFOE. The key point here is that, while a large mass of merchant shipping can be regarded as a target in and of itself, the presence of certain types of merchant ships can indicate a major military operation even when the “military” end of the operation has scrupulously observed OPSEC measures. Although not an exhaustive list of OPSEC measures for sealift, the following should be considered as guidelines:

(1) Avoid massing of shipping if possible. If that cannot be avoided, minimize the assembly time involved and limit the numbers of ships in any one location.

(2) Be aware of the inferences that can be drawn from the presence of certain combinations of cargoes and specific ship types.

(3) Use deceptive routing and other techniques where possible, avoiding patterns in vessel operations, and routing shipping away from the “normal” sea lanes to avoid detection by neutral or other shipping.

(4) Establish and practice an active OPSEC program by planning and exercising OPSEC procedures.

(5) Consult with the MESF commander for all OPSEC considerations.

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6. Environmental Considerations

a. Sealift support operations should be planned and conducted with appropriate consideration of their effect on the environment in accordance with applicable US and HN agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations. A separate annex or appendix for ensuring that proper attention is given to environmental considerations should be included in each OPORD and OPLAN. The annex or appendix should address the transport of oil and hazardous substances; fuel transfers; shipboard waste disposal including hazardous waste, hazardous materials transport, and medical and infectious waste disposal; and natural and cultural resources protection including marine mammals, oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls, and water pollution prevention. In addition to coordination with other staff elements (e.g., medical and legal), coordination with other DOD agencies (e.g., DLA) and other USG departments (e.g., Department of Energy) also may be necessary.

b. Requirements related to environmental considerations may be found in numerous sources, which may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) Provisions of US environmental law applicable overseas.

(2) Execute orders (EXORDs).

(3) DOD directives, regulations, and policies.

(4) HN laws.

(5) Status-of-forces agreements.

(6) International treaties, protocols, and conventions.

Refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, for additional information on environmental considerations.

7. Automated Planning Tools

a. Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System (TC-AIMS II). TC-AIMS II is an automated information system that supports day-to-day operations for unit movement officers, movement controllers, staffs from battalion/separate company to theater level, mode managers, and installation transportation offices. It interfaces with joint and Service systems that provide intransit and total asset visibility to all Services and is the basic building block of source data. The IGC force-tracking software will translate the raw data into ITV and force tracking information.

b. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST). JFAST is a transportation feasibility evaluation tool capable of scheduling transportation assets against a TPFDD. This allows planners to download specific movement requirements from JOPES and identify specific problem areas in meeting latest arrival dates at the PODs. JFAST employs the Notional Requirements Generator, which draws from a standardized

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database, and creates notional movement requirement data for transportation analysis in a no- plan crisis situation.

c. Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES). ICODES is an automated information system designed to support cargo management, ship load planning, and stowage at common-user ocean terminals. It also supports the requirements of GCCs for oversight and management of ocean terminals. The responsibility for this function is shared within the Army between SDDC and FORSCOM, and is performed by the USN at select locations. The ICODES ship load planning function includes the development and implementation of ship’s prestow plans, hazardous cargo reports, and final ship load plans of military cargo and unit equipment. It requires strict accountability of cargo. The information developed through these processes at ocean terminals directly supports ITV of the cargo. This contributes to the DOD objective of total asset visibility from origin to destination and provides information required by supported and supporting CCDRs to accomplish their missions.

d. Port Simulation Model (PORTSIM). PORTSIM is a time-stepped, discrete simulation of SPOE and SPOD events during a force deployment. PORTSIM can determine a port’s reception, staging, clearance, and throughput capabilities. The model identifies systems or infrastructure constraints and provides port-specific, time-phased force clearance profiles. PORTSIM simulates simultaneous deployment and retrograde seaport operations and assesses the impact of JLOTS.

e. Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES). GATES is a single automated system serving management of both aerial port and surface port operations for DOD transportation, worldwide. Serving peacetime and contingency operations, GATES support includes processing and tracking cargo and passenger information while maintaining ITV. GATES also aids DOD’s capability to bill for cargo and passenger movement. GATES surface port functions include capability formerly provided by the SDDC Worldwide Port System.

f. Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS). CMOS is a joint system that integrates computer hardware, software, and communications to effectively plan, document, and manage outbound and inbound cargo and passengers, and to plan, schedule, and monitor the execution of transportation activities in support of deployment and reception of forces. CMOS provides joint forces with an end-to-end distribution capability and real time ITV during all passenger and cargo movements.

8. Transition from Peace to Conflict to Stability Operations

a. General. The transition from peace to conflict represents a critical period for sealift. Management of this transition will have a significant effect on the success of deployment and sustainment missions assigned to sealift. The transition period involves high risk due to misperceptions about the speed with which the DTS in general, and sealift in particular, can transition from a relatively small peacetime force into a major military force. Transition from a peacetime transportation role to a military deployment role requires significant changes that affect every portion of the sealift forces. The transition from

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conflict to stability operations, while not subject to the same time and capacity constraints as the transition from peace to conflict, still requires careful planning in order to ensure that gains made during the conflict are not lost during the post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.

b. Sealift Force Structure. The first and most obvious change in sealift during transition is that the number of ships under USTRANSCOM and MSC control will rapidly and substantially increase. It should be noted that the number of ships under MSC OPCON might not be an accurate measure of ships performing the sealift function. Depending on the mode of acquisition, ships may be delayed for significant time periods before they can be considered as active sealift assets. For planning purposes, the notional time periods shown in Figure IV-5 will be required to obtain shipping from each source or method of acquisition. The elapsed times represent the period between the first request for that type of shipping and the arrival of ships at berth, ready for loadout. These include the time required to take all of the actions discussed in Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs”: activation time (if in ROS, RRF, or National Defense Reserve Fleet [NDRF]), or the time necessary to make the ship ready for military cargo (if a charter, VISA, and/or VTA or requisition), and transit to the desired SPOE. In the expansion of the sealift force, several factors may further complicate the rapid accumulation of sufficient shipping, particularly the acquisition of ships from the MARAD RRF and NDRF. These are:

Figure IV-5. Sealift Asset Availability Times

MARAD RFF Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force

MSC Military Sealift Command NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet

Legend

ROS reduced operating status VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement VTA voluntary tanker agreement

Sealift Asset Availability Times

MSC ROS Shipping:

4-30 days (depending on location)

Charter:

4-30 days (depending on location)

MARAD RRF:

5 or 10 days (depending on readiness and/or location)

VISA and/or VTA:

7-45 days (depending on location)

Requisitioning:

14-45 days (depending on location)

NDRF:

45-135 days

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(1) Frequency of reserve ship test activations and exercises.

(2) Maintenance effort expended on reserve shipping.

(3) Shipyard capacity to activate large numbers of ships.

(4) Availability of trained crews, spare parts, and logistic support.

(5) Availability of militarily useful shipping on the world charter market.

(6) Restrictions on the activities of foreign-flag ships by their respective national governments or by the USG.

c. Stability Operations. The transition from conflict to stability operations can be critical to the overall success of an operation. Sealift support requirements for this phase of an operation should be considered carefully. Ideally, planning for stability operations, and the sealift requirements to support stability operations, should begin when joint operation planning is initiated. As operations shift from sustained combat operations to stability operations, civil-military operations will facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services. Initially, the military’s predominant presence and its ability to C2 forces and logistics under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. Some of the same sealift support concerns that affect the transition from peace to conflict also affect the transition to stability operations. However, as the focus changes from projecting combat power and force sustainment ashore to providing relief to civilians and preparing for transition to legitimate civil or international authority, the materiel requirements for the operation markedly change. Additionally, preparations for the expeditious transition from primarily military and contracted sealift support to sustainable commercial sealift support must be considered, especially since redeployment of forces may compete for available sealift capacity during this phase of operations.

For additional guidance concerning stability operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

9. Other Considerations

As mentioned in Chapter II, “Organization and Responsibilities,” MSC and SDDC interface in the area of water terminal operations. USTRANSCOM, with input from MSC and SDDC, selects the strategic terminals in coordination with the supported CCDRs. Selection will be based on various factors, of which the speed of the arrival, marshalling, and movement of deploying forces will be primary. Other factors include Service requirements and transportation infrastructure in proximity to the ports.

For additional guidance concerning water terminal operations, refer to JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations.

V-1

CHAPTER V EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

1. General

Planning for the employment of sealift begins in the planning phase of the joint deployment process and is in JOPES. Employment continues until the operation is terminated by proper authority or is completed, including redeployment of forces and materiel and retrograde of equipment. Errors of judgment in acquiring, scheduling, and determining C2 of sealift assets may result in late delivery of units and supplies essential to the successful conduct of the operation. A complete understanding of the organizational responsibilities for sealift employment is, therefore, essential.

2. Execution

a. This phase starts with the President and SecDef decision to exercise the military option for resolution of the crisis. Acting on the authority and direction of the SecDef, the CJCS issues an EXORD that directs the supported CCDR to carry out the OPORD. The supported CCDR then issues EXORDs to subordinate and supporting commanders directing them to execute their supporting OPORDs. During this phase, changes to the OPORD may be necessary for some or all of the following reasons: strategic, operational, tactical, or intelligence considerations; force and nonunit cargo availability; availability of shipping; CONUS transportation system throughput capabilities; and SPOE and/or SPOD throughput capabilities.

b. Execution Requirements. Because the OPORD will probably require adjustment as it is executed, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment activities are required. At the time of execution, the OPORD TPFDD should include, at a minimum, properly identified combat, CS, and CSS units. The area of movement control in joint operations is covered in JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, and JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

(1) USTRANSCOM Responsibilities. Throughout the execution of an OPORD, USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating with the supported CCDR for validating transportation requirements and developing, monitoring, and adjusting transportation schedules. USTRANSCOM reports the progress of the deployment to the supported CCDR and CJCS and identifies lift shortfalls or other transportation-related problems accordingly.

(2) Supported CCDR Responsibilities. The supported GCC should ensure that USTRANSCOM and its TCCs clearly understand theater transport requirements. While developing requirements and priorities, the supported GCC coordinates with

“Sealift is absolutely essential to deploy and sustain large military forces in hostile operations over global distances…There is no substitute for sealift in our national strategy of forward defense.”

Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics), 1989

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USTRANSCOM to ensure that the movement control system will be ready to manage strategic movement. The supported GCC has a wide range of movement control options available to allow a seamless intertheater-intratheater leg interface. A T-JTB may be established or subordinate JFCs or Service components may be directed to carry out their own movement control. However, to facilitate a fully coordinated and responsive transportation system, the GCC may assign responsibility for theater transportation movement control to the joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC). JDDOCs are established for each GCC. The premise behind the JDDOC capability is that theater expertise is combined with national-level, strategic knowledge and reachback authority within the GCC’s command structure. The JDDOC accomplishes theater joint movement responsibilities for any potential logistic organizational structure as directed by the GCC. The GCC also establishes POD support activities. These include the arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG), port support activity (PSA), and any subordinate movement control organization.

For additional information on the JDDOC and movement control, see JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

(3) Supporting CCDR Responsibilities. Certain situations may require that one CCDR support another CCDR. This support may range from the deployment of forces to the provision of sustainment. Regardless of the mission, the supporting commander should establish a movement control system similar to USTRANSCOM’s system. A JDDOC, with supporting component movement cells, manages all moves and assures compliance with the supported CCDR’s priorities. For deployments to another theater, the supporting CCDR establishes port of embarkation (POE) activities. These include the A/DACG, PSA, and movement control organization.

c. Resolution of Resource Allocation Conflicts. If several CCDR OPORDs are executed simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, resource allocation conflicts may occur. CJCS policy is to allocate support forces such as sealift in proportion to the allocation of combat forces. Through this mechanism, each CCDR is provided a share of the available resources consistent with national priorities. If the strategic situation requires the assignment of a greater percentage of assets to one supported CCDR than another, the CCDR desiring additional support may request that the CJCS reallocate resources from other CCDRs. If an agreement between the CCDRs directly involved cannot be reached, the matter will be referred to the CJCS JTB for final resolution. The CJCS JTB’s final resolution is subject to the approval of the CJCS and SecDef.

d. Command and Control. Common-user shipping is under the COCOM of CDRUSTRANSCOM with OPCON executed by COMSC. When required, protection, escort, and security are provided to USTRANSCOM from the naval component or the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) in the respective area of responsibility (AOR) in which the vessel is operating. To carry out this responsibility, COMSC or MSC area commanders give TACON to the respective JFMCCs. This concept requires close coordination between MSC and the JFMCCs to enable adequate protection of common-user sealift and merchant shipping while transiting areas of hostile activity (refer to Chapter VII, “Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping”).

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V-3

3. Communications System Support

a. The inherent worldwide dispersal of sealift forces mandates that sealift C2 systems be fully interoperable with the GCCS-J family of systems. GCCS-J is built such that interoperability with existing systems can be attained. GCCS-J provides the means for disseminating and sharing the information necessary in order to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, redeploy, and employ sealift forces. The sealift communications system, in its simplest form, must enable the sealift operational commander to monitor the situation, conduct assessments, develop estimates, plans, and schedules, issue orders and directives, and report status to higher authority.

b. GCCS-J is the DOD joint C2 system of record. It is a suite of mission applications that provides critical, joint warfighting C2 capabilities. GCCS-J is the principal foundation for dominant battlespace awareness, providing an integrated, near-real-time picture of the battle necessary to conduct joint and multinational operations. GCCS-J provides a robust and seamless C2 capability to the President, SecDef, National Military Command Center, CCDRs, JFCs, and Military Departments. In GCCS-J, components update JOPES via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Of the many elements of GCCS-J, the JOPES is of primary interest to the sealift operator.

(1) Sealift Transportation Movement. The unit move begins with an EXORD sent out by CJCS. Once notified, the installation transportation officer works with SDDC to coordinate the movement requirements for deploying units. SDDC inputs or updates movement requirements in JOPES and adds the actual departure data. SDDC uses its automated database programs to configure these requirements into shiploads along with other requirements going to the same port and having the same available to load dates. These updated and coordinated requirements and shipload information are passed through JOPES to the command in need of this information. MSC identifies a ship type based on the specific requirements for the unit. If MSC has insufficient chartered or government-owned sealift to satisfy the requirement, USTRANSCOM activates VISA Stage I. If VISA Stage I is insufficient, USSTRANSCOM coordinates with MARAD for further VISA activation or requisition of US flag and effective United States controlled (EUSC) ships.

(2) The request is received by MARAD via secure fax or Defense Message System message (not by JOPES). In the event of a NATO contingency, if no acceptable US or EUSC ship is available, then MARAD as the NSA intercedes with the Civil Sealift Group for the request of a NATO flag ship. Once the ship is found, MARAD nominates the ship to MSC HQ. After MARAD activates the vessel, MSC accepts it and assumes OPCON and the ship information is passed to the MSC area command, complete with berth availability. This happens before the unit reaches the load port, and if timed correctly, the unit moves into the seaport by road or rail and proceeds to the piers where the ship is prepared to receive unit cargo and/or personnel. As noted above, the time-phased requirements listing is updated as directed by CJCS. This enables the supported CCDR to reprioritize the forces based on the threat, and allows USTRANSCOM to adjust these requirements based on strategic lift available. The systems currently under development include those listed below.

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V-4 JP 4-01.2

c. Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence. IGC is a cooperative effort between DLA and USTRANSCOM that establishes common integrated data services for the CCMDs, Services, DOD, and other USG departments and agencies in order to manage supply, distribution, and logistics information with a global perspective. IGC replaced the legacy Global Transportation Network system and provides integration of information from a variety of DTS automated information systems to provide consolidated ITV and C2 data support. IGC extends backward compatibility to customer systems, feeds shipment status to Service and DOD agency systems, and provides joint force movement tracking and closure. IGC integrates automated data processing and information systems, electronic commerce, and electronic data interchange to track the identity, status, and location of DOD unit and non-unit cargo, passengers, patients, forces, and military and commercial air mobility, sealift, and surface assets from origin to destination.

d. Sealift Communications. Communications systems are critical to the flow of orders and directives from the sealift commander to subordinates, and to their status reports to the commander. However, the procedures for communicating with the sealift force are unique to military operations because of the heavy reliance on commercial maritime systems. Hence, commercial sealift communications are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by information operations. Communications among the military organizations involved in C2 of sealift take place through the normal military communication channels.

(1) Merchant Ship Communications Capabilities. Long-range communications capabilities in strategic sealift ships range from advanced military communications and on- line cryptographic systems on some military-owned sealift ships to the satellite aided Global Maritime Distress and Safety System, and conventional high frequency (HF) and single side band voice capabilities. The vast majority of US-owned merchant ships that would make up the sealift force are equipped with commercial satellite systems that provide both voice and data communications capability 24 hours a day. Those ships not equipped with commercial satellite systems communicate with other ships and organizations ashore through commercial coastal radio stations, using conventional HF voice communications. Merchant ships may be provided limited capability for handling classified information through use of MSC-provided secure telephone unit systems that can be interfaced with satellite communications systems.

(2) Interface Between Commercial and Military Communications Systems. For naval commands to communicate rapidly and effectively with merchant ships, interfaces between commercial and military satellite communications systems have been established. However, in most circumstances requiring direct communication between military authorities and merchant ships, unclassified messages will be transmitted via commercial channels. This requires understanding of the communications capabilities of each ship and establishes procedures for voice communications and delivery of message traffic to the ship.

(3) Naval Embarked Advisory Team (NEAT). A NEAT may be temporarily assigned aboard civilian-manned ships to provide the ship’s master with advice on naval matters, particularly on tactical maneuvering and communications. NEATs have their own transceivers and associated gear, visual communications gear, and ancillary equipment and communications publications, all of which would be carried aboard their assigned vessels.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-5

In essence, a NEAT serves as the operations department aboard a merchant ship, but with no C2 authority.

For additional discussion of sealift communications see Commander, Military Sealift Command Instruction (COMSCINST) 2000.2, Communications Policy and Procedures Manual, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Publication 117, Radio Navigational Aids.

e. OPORDs and Reports. To ensure that assigned sealift missions are accomplished efficiently and with the desired results, operational C2 is implemented through a system that relies on standard orders and reports. These orders and reports are designed to provide a complete, accurate, and timely flow of essential information in both directions in the chain of command. COMSCINST 3121.9, MSC Standard Operating Manual, specifies reporting requirements and procedures.

4. Logistic Support

In general, merchant ships will be logistically supported by their owner and/or operators within the terms of their charters or other agreements when the ships are using commercial seaports for loading and discharge of military cargo. Merchant ships are normally provisioned at the beginning of every voyage with 60 to 90 days of consumable items. This will usually be sufficient for a ship to make the round-trip between POE and POD, including the required cargo discharge time at the POD. The exception to this is that merchant ships under MSC OPCON are generally supplied with fuel from military sources. This may take the form of direct payment for fuel from commercial sources or actual transfer of military fuels to merchant ships. The latter is most likely to occur in the supported GCC’s AOR as the ships deliver their cargoes after a long voyage. On shorter voyages the ships may be able to return without refueling. Other in-theater logistic support to merchant shipping will usually be limited to assistance in treatment and repatriation of sick or injured crew members, expediting the arrival of crew replacements and high priority spare parts, mail delivery, and arranging or providing tugs, pilots, and nautical charts and publications when required. Should vessel repairs be required in-theater, commercial facilities, when available, should be used due to their familiarity with merchant ships’ requirements and to keep naval repair facilities available to naval combatants.

5. Intermodal Operations

a. Intermodal operations provide flexibility by incorporating various combinations of sealift, airlift, rail, and trucking operations to facilitate rapid, efficient cargo movement. In the context of commercial shipping, “intermodal” operations or systems refer primarily to the efficient interchange of standardized shipping containers between ocean and land carriers, sophisticated systems of container handling and storage in marine terminals, or container freight stations and computerized tracking of shipments. These are perhaps epitomized by the US “land bridge” operations in which containerized cargoes moving between Far Eastern and European seaports cross this country on dedicated “unit trains” rather than utilizing the all-water route via the Panama Canal. The advantages include savings in transit time and delivered cost, and the arrival of perishables in better condition

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V-6 JP 4-01.2

because of reduced transit times. The existence of this commercial infrastructure has promising implications for military use, particularly in moving large numbers of containers.

b. Container Requirements. Current commercial sealift trends favor a heavy emphasis on the use of containers. The supported GCC’s ability to manage containerized cargo from SPODs and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) to the troops in the field depends on the sophistication of the host country’s infrastructure and the expeditionary capability the deployed force has brought with it.

c. Theater Support Planning. During execution planning, it is particularly important to consider the theater’s existing transportation infrastructure and capabilities, so as to make maximum use of its potential for intermodal operations. Selecting SPODs and/or APODs close to major highway systems, rail networks and civilian logistic support is important even where modern, sophisticated intermodal infrastructures do not exist.

d. Sustaining the Force. Sustaining the force is as important as deploying it. For this reason, intermodal operations must be planned in depth to allow for transportation infrastructure damage from adversary action and/or sabotage. Planning also must take into account the need for additional manpower, vehicles, and other logistic support over time, especially during redeployment. Initial HNS may eventually be withdrawn as that nation attempts to reestablish normal commercial transportation operations in support of its own economy.

For additional information on intermodal containerization, refer to JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

6. Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations

a. An amphibious force consists of an amphibious task force (ATF) and landing force (LF), together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. An ATF is a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. An LF is a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. Navy elements in an ATF include various types and classes of ships to include combatant and strategic sealift and support units from various warfare specialties. The LF is normally comprised of a command element, aviation combat element, ground combat element, and a logistic combat element. The LF is divided into two echelons, assault echelons (AEs) and the AFOE. The AE is the element of the LF that is scheduled for initial deployment and employment in the objective area. The AE is those troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies required to commence operations. The AE is normally embarked in amphibious shipping. The AFOE is comprised of that echelon of troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies which, though not needed to initiate operations, are required to support and sustain the operations. In order to accomplish its purpose, it is normally required in the objective area no later than five days after deployment of the AE into the objective area. Portions of the AFOE may be required ashore sooner because of the tactical situation. As part of the LF, the AFOE also should ideally be embarked in amphibious assault shipping. Due to limitations in the number of amphibious ships, however, the AFOE is normally embarked in strategic sealift shipping. An integral part of the ATF is the NSE.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-7

The NSE consists of cargo handling, beach, and lighterage groups, equipped and trained to discharge ships in stream and at pierside.

Doctrine regarding the employment of sealift in amphibious operations is contained in JP 3- 02, Amphibious Operations, and NWP 3-02.21, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.

b. Employment of AFOE Shipping. The AFOE is not to be confused with Marine Corps units deployed by MPS, which will be addressed below. When an ATF is being formed by the supported CCDR, USTRANSCOM allocates shipping for the AFOE mission to the supported CCDR. These ships are then integrated into the Navy component commander’s operations and incorporated with the forces of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF). AFOE sealift assets are positioned and loaded at port facilities, generally where ATF support cargo and personnel can be most expeditiously and efficiently loaded to meet AFOE mission requirements. Loadout of AFOE shipping are nearly simultaneous with the loadout of AE shipping. The AFOE deploys in accordance with the CATF’s amphibious OPLAN. The AFOE needs to be discharged swiftly, safely, and in sufficient time to support the LF. When a ship of the AFOE has discharged its cargo, it may be returned by the supported CCDR to the USTRANSCOM common-user shipping pool.

c. Transfer of APF to Common-User Status. Strategic sealift in the APF will normally be transferred to common-user status when released by the supported CCDR. However, it may be necessary for the supported CCDR to retain afloat PREPO or, more probably, MPS ships as theater support assets to meet specific operational requirements. This is called “withhold shipping.” A prime example arose during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM when suitable AFOE ships could not be acquired for a Marine expeditionary brigade. Upon arrival in-theater, MPS ships were retained by the GCC for use as AFOE shipping. When the APF ships are transferred to the common-user pool, their support is coordinated through USTRANSCOM and MSC in the same manner as for all other common-user ships.

d. Logistics Over-the-Shore

(1) This section provides only general, nontechnical descriptions of various LOTS systems. Consult JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, for a more detailed discussion of LOTS/JLOTS systems, capabilities, limitations, and requirements.

(2) The major naval systems for in-stream cargo offload and discharge is the cargo offload and discharge system (COLDS). COLDS has two major subsystems; for dry cargo, the cargo off-loading and transfer system, and for liquid cargo the off-shore bulks fuel system. Navy COLDS equipment and facilities include lighterage, causeway ferries, floating piers, the RO/RO discharge facilities, and the elevated causeway system. Liquid cargo off-load is supported by the amphibious bulk liquid transfer system and OPDS.

(3) Army LOTS equipment includes self-deploying watercraft, lighterage, modular causeway systems, logistics support vessels, Landing Craft Utility 2000, Landing Craft Medium-8, causeway ferries, floating piers, Trident piers, RO/RO discharge facilities, small tugs, barge derricks, terminal service unit handling equipment, shore-based water storage

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V-8 JP 4-01.2

systems, and the inland petroleum distribution system, that includes a tactical petroleum terminal. LOTS operations can be conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed ports not accessible to deep draft vessels, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without the use of LOTS capabilities.

e. Joint Task Force-Port Opening. Although all Services have the organic capability to fully support theater opening functions, traditional Service port opening/operating forces may not be sufficient in situations that require rapid response or joint integration. JTF-PO gives the supported GCC rapid port opening capability to facilitate crisis response in austere environments and is designed to be in place in advance of a deployment of forces, sustainment, or humanitarian relief supplies. JTF-PO (SPOD) is a joint expeditionary capability that enables USTRANSCOM to rapidly establish and initially operate an SPOD and a distribution node, facilitating port throughput in support of a contingency response. SPOD forces are ready to deploy within 36 hours and are designed to operate for 45-60 days and then redeploy or be relieved by follow-on forces.

For additional information on JTF-PO, see JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

7. Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and Security Cooperation Activities, and Humanitarian Assistance

a. Seabasing. Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area (see Figure V-1).

(1) Principles. The basic principles of joint seabasing are: use the sea as maneuver space; leverage forward presence and joint interdependence; protect joint force operations; provide scalable, responsive joint power projection; sustain joint force operations from the sea; expand access options and reduce dependence on land bases; and create uncertainty for our adversaries.

(2) Considerations. The smooth flow of supplies and personnel to the sea base and into the operational area will be one of the determining factors in a successful seabasing operation. This flow has many variables, including the type and size of the operation being supported from the sea base, the amount of air and sealift available, the distance from the advanced base/advance logistic support site/forward logistic site to the sea base and operational area, the infrastructure available (airfields, port facilities, material handling equipment, etc.) in or out of the operational area, C2 of air and sealift, coordination and prioritization of supply, equipment and personnel movement, and the personnel required to execute this transportation and distribution function.

(3) Operations. Currently, sealift support to the sea base is normally accomplished indirectly by delivery of supplies to an intermediate staging base (ISB). From the ISB, Navy Combat Logistics Force vessels operated by MSC transload materiel to the sea base.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-9

Refer to NWP 3-62M/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-31.7, Seabasing, for additional information.

b. Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. Sealift can provide support to the GCC’s military engagement and theater security cooperation efforts in a variety of ways.

SEALIFT SUPPORT OF SECURITY COOPERATION EFFORTS

In 2008 and again in 2010, the USNS [United States Naval Ship] Mercy visited countries from the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia and served as an enabling platform for military and nongovernmental organizations to coordinate and carry out relationship-building work in the Republic of the Philippines, Vietnam, the Federated States of Micronesia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. During this deployment, Mercy medical teams treated more than 90,000 patients. This type of engagement builds trust between the US and partner and potential partner nations around the world.

Various Sources

Figure V-1. Seabasing

ALSS advanced logistics support site FLS forward logistics site

Legend

OA operational area OBJ objective

Seabasing

FLS

Logistics and Sustainment

Sea Base

Sea Shield

Follow- On F

orce s

ALSS

OBJ

Sea Strike

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V-10 JP 4-01.2

Sealift plays an essential role in developing capabilities, interoperability, and cooperation among US allies and coalition partners during a host of multinational exercises such as COBRA GOLD in Thailand, TALISMAN SABRE in Australia, and AFRICAN LION in Morocco, to name a few. In many cases, the value of sealift support extends well beyond strictly military considerations. Besides delivering significant medical capabilities in response to natural and man-made disasters, MSC’s T-AHs routinely complete humanitarian, civic assistance, and theater security cooperation mission deployments. In providing humanitarian and civic assistance, these ships are often able to operate where combatants or support vessels would not be permitted for political reasons.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. Frequently, sealift support to humanitarian assistance plays an important, if not the primary role in preserving life in the immediate aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster. Generally, this relief is of limited duration or scope and is designed to support and supplement HN or civil authority efforts, in coordination with a US lead federal agency, until a transition of relief efforts to HN, international, or NGOs can be completed. Sealift support in these situations may be tailored to the particular situation, depending on the unique relief requirements.

Refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for additional information on humanitarian assistance. Refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, for additional information on military support of domestic emergencies and disasters and JP 4- 01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, for additional information on JLOTS operations.

The United States Naval Ship Mercy Sealift (T-AH 19) transfers cargo to the Royal Australian

Navy heavy landing craft HMAS Labuan (L128) while anchored near Dili, Timor-Leste.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-11

US Sailors unload humanitarian aid supplies from the crane ship SS Cornhusker State (T-ACS 6) in Killick, Haiti, Feb. 13, 2010, via joint logistics over-the-shore in support of Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The SS Cornhusker State is part of the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force and comes under the operational control of the Military Sealift Command when activated.

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V-12 JP 4-01.2

SEALIFT SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in late 2004 and early 2005, provided relief to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of an earthquake and subsequent tsunamis. Although initial relief efforts came in the form of fixed wing airlift through intermediate staging bases and through organic Navy ships and Navy and Marine Corps helicopters, pre-positioned ships forward deployed in Guam also responded to the disaster and provided their water producing capability to alleviate potable water shortages caused by the tsunamis. In January 2010, during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, in addition to US Navy vessels, the maritime pre-positioning ship the United States Naval Ship 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus, was diverted during a scheduled continental United States offload to on-load and provide relief material to Haiti. In this instance, the joint task force commander was able to marry the cargo carrying capacity of the pre-positioning vessel with the offload capability of joint logistics over-the-shore to mitigate the effects of the earthquake- damaged Haitian seaport. In addition to the use of the maritime pre- positioning ship Lummus, four of Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force ships were activated to rapidly deliver sealift support to the affected area. Sealift’s ability to rapidly deliver substantial quantities of relief supplies to many population centers around the world, together with the ability to remain on station for extended periods until conditions and infrastructure on the ground permit shifting to ground-based relief efforts, make sealift support to humanitarian assistance an invaluable tool to the joint force commander.

Various Sources

VI-1

CHAPTER VI VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMS

1. General

The vast majority of vessels required to support military operations are not under DOD control during peacetime (i.e., nonorganic). To acquire these ships, some type of lease agreements or operating agreements must be executed between DOD and the owning and controlling organizations (either commercial firms or US and allied government agencies). In maritime terminology, leasing agreements are known as charters. Although their terms and conditions differ widely, charters are of three basic types: bareboat, voyage, and time. A bareboat charter is a contract whereby the charterer gets the rights and obligations of “ownership.” The fixed duration of this type of charter is generally for a number of years. The charterer pays in advance for the entire ship on a monthly or semiannual basis even if the vessel is laid up or carries less than its full capacity. Under a bareboat charter, the charterer assumes total responsibility for operating the ship, including manning, provisioning, maintenance, navigation, and logistic support. Under a voyage charter, the charterer specifies type of vessel required, cargo to be loaded, and where the vessel is to load and discharge. The charterer pays for either part or all of the carrying capacity of the vessel, usually in one payment. The shipowner provides vessel, crew, fuel, stores, and commits the vessel to being capable of making a given speed. A time charter is a contract for the service of the vessel (i.e., its cargo carrying ability), for an agreed period of time. As with a bareboat charter, the charterer pays for the entire carrying capacity of the vessel on a per-day rate, even if the vessel is laid up or carries less than its full capacity. Additionally, the charterer determines where the ship goes and what it carries while paying for port charges and the vessel’s fuel. Time and voyage charters are most commonly used to acquire sealift shipping to meet short-term military requirements. A significant amount of military cargo moves in the US flagged commercial fleet through liner agreements. SDDC moves the majority of peacetime military cargo using commercial liner service. Military cargo is offered to carriers in less than full shipload lots for a dollar per ton rate, and moves along established trade routes. This includes overseas movement of household goods and vehicles of USG employees. The sealift acquisition and activation decision flow is detailed in Figure VI-1.

“It is clear…that future force deployments will be extremely demanding and that there is clearly a requirement for additional sealift…Our experience in the Persian Gulf has clearly validated the importance of a balanced maritime program and the contribution of our maritime industry to national defense.”

Robert Moore, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics) 1991

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VI-2 JP 4-01.2

2. Government-Owned/Controlled Assets

a. Government-owned shipping (primarily RO/RO) is the most readily available source for quickly deploying large quantities of unit equipment. However, the number of ships in this category is limited, and they would primarily support the very early stages of a major military deployment.

b. Active Assets. The active government-owned (organic) and controlled sealift forces are MSC common-user point-to-point shipping and the APF. Common-user ships are government-owned or under long-term time charter to MSC and are employed in providing sealift to all DOD agencies on a nondedicated basis. In a crisis, these ships may be immediately diverted to a SPOE to load deploying military cargo. However, MSC common-user shipping involved in peacetime sealift missions may be distant from CONUS SPOEs and thus may not be immediately available. The ships of the APF will execute their

Figure VI-1. Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan

Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan

Legend * operational plan specific MARAD RFF Maritime Administration Ready

Reserve Force

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement VTA voluntary tanker agreement

Option 1 Option 2 Request VISA

and/or VTA Activation

Request Requisitioning

Authority

Request Allied

Shipping

Charter Additional

Ships

Request MARAD

RRF Activation

Compare Sealift Assets on Hand to

Requirements

How Can the Requirements

be Met? Requirements

Met

First Step Third StepSecond Step Fourth Step*

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-3

missions at the time and place required by the CCDR/JFC under whose command the specific ships have been placed.

c. Inactive Assets. Inactive or reserve sealift assets consist of organic ships (typically Navy-owned) maintained by MSC in ROS and organic ships (typically DOT-owned) maintained by MARAD for use in a contingency. The latter are known as the MARAD RRF and its larger set, the NDRF. With very few exceptions, title to MARAD RRF and other NDRF ships are vested in MARAD’s parent organization, the DOT. The exceptions are NDRF vessels owned by the Services that have been placed in MARAD custody at NDRF sites, but which the owning Service can unilaterally activate whenever required. The MARAD RRF is a quick-response subset of the NDRF but, because MARAD RRF activation procedures differ from those for the NDRF, they are addressed separately. To ensure the readiness of both the MSC inactive (ROS) fleet as well as the MARAD RRF, USTRANSCOM conducts periodic no-notice vessel activations under their sealift exercise programs.

(1) Reduced Operating Status. Because ROS ships are maintained by cadre crews in CONUS ports, they are the first sealift shipping available in a crisis and are expected to be ready to execute their mission within 96 to 120 hours of the activation order. These ships’ readiness, while measured in terms of hours, is expressed in terms of days. For example, a ROS-4 ship is expected to be under way within 96 hours. DOD is not required to coordinate with any other agency to order activation of DOD ROS ships. The Navy- owned and maintained ROS ships include the LMSRs and T-AHs. Many MARAD RRF ships are also maintained in a ROS status, but since the activation procedures are different, they will be discussed below under MARAD RRF.

(2) Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force. The MARAD RRF is a significant source of government-owned early deployment shipping in terms of both the number of ships and overall cargo-carrying capability. MARAD RRF ships are in various specified states of readiness. Many MARAD RRF ships, particularly RO/RO types, are maintained in ROS with nucleus crews in a manner similar to their MSC counterparts, although typically in 5-day versus 4-day readiness. The remainder of the MARAD RRF fleet is in ready reserve status (10-day increments). MARAD RRF vessels in ready reserve readiness status, although decrewed, are subject to regular surveys and maintenance periods to prevent deterioration. All of the MARAD RRF fleet is berthed on the three CONUS seacoasts. These ships are activated pursuant to presidential action or as otherwise authorized under law. The specific procedures are discussed below.

(a) Status. The number of ships in the MARAD RRF and their composition change frequently. The reader is advised to refer to the MSC and MARAD Web sites for the most current information about the MARAD RRF at MSC (http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/inventory.asp?var=RRF) and at MARAD (http://www.marad.dot.gov/ships_shipping_landing_page/national_security/ship_operations/ ready_reserve_force/ready_reserve_force.htm).

(b) Ship Maintenance and Upgrade. MARAD RRF ships are maintained and upgraded by MARAD using funds appropriated from Navy for that purpose.

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VI-4 JP 4-01.2

(c) Activation Process. CDRUSTRANSCOM requests the activation of MARAD RRF for contingency deployments. Upon activation, the ships are committed to CDRUSTRANSCOM and are normally under the OPCON of COMSC. The SECNAV requests Service-organic or theater-assigned ships. The ships are manned, provisioned, operated, and maintained by commercial shipping companies under agreements with MARAD. The activation process is shown in Figure VI-2. Those vessels in the highest state of readiness, ROS-5, are maintained by a civilian crew of 10 mariners, while vessels in 10- day status are unmanned and require shipyard assistance to activate. When activated to support US Armed Forces, operating authority is transferred to the MSC PM52 Sealift Dry Cargo project office. In order to ensure readiness, USTRANSCOM regularly exercises no notice activation trials to test the vessels under operating conditions. The MARAD RRF is funded from the Navy-controlled National Defense Sealift Fund.

(3) National Defense Reserve Fleet. The NDRF (excluding its quick-response subset, the MARAD RRF) contains older dry cargo ships, tankers, troop transports, and other types of vessels (tugs and other such types) that are maintained in MARAD custody under minimal preservation. Current planning considers NDRF vessels strategic sealift resources suitable for use as replacements for combat losses, for sustainment, and for economic support. Because of their relatively low level of readiness, NDRF ships would require a minimum of 30 to 120 days to activate. They are berthed at MARAD reserve fleet sites in the James River (Ft. Eustis), Virginia; Beaumont, Texas; and Suisun Bay, California.

(a) As of 30 June 2010, the NDRF consisted of 165 ships (49 in the MARAD RRF). Of the non-MARAD RRF ships, 31 ships are maintained in “retention” status (preserved in the same condition that they entered the NDRF). Of the remaining ships not in retention status 75 percent are ready for scrapping and the remainder are being prepared for scrapping. The NDRF is expected to decline further as the disposal of older ships continues. As the number and type of ships in the MARAD RRF and NDRF can change, refer to the MARAD Web site: http://www.marad.dot.gov for the most up-to-date numbers.

(b) Activation Process. NDRF ships are made available to DOD whenever the President proclaims that the security of the nation makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the President. A flow diagram of the activation process is shown in Figure VI-3.

3. Commercial Controlled Assets

a. Commercial ships will likely be required to fill sealift requirements in major crisis situations requiring large amounts of logistics support. DOD can obtain commercial shipping from the following sources: US flag commercial charters and liner service; foreign owned charters and liner service ships, used in accordance with existing laws and policies; ships/capacity committed to VISA/VTA; US-owned ships, registered under certain flags, known as the EUSC fleet; and militarily useful US flag ships which are subject to requisitioning. Registry procedures between certain nations allow EUSC ships under the registries to be available to the USG in a national emergency. Additionally, shipping may be obtained through allied agreements.

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-5

b. US Flag Ships. The US flag fleet is generally considered to be the commercial shipping sector most responsive to DOD requirements. However, the number of militarily useful US flag ships is steadily declining.

Figure VI-2. Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency Deployments of

Common-User Ships

MARAD RRF

MSC

Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force Military Sealift Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

Legend

Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency Deployments of Common-User Ships

Yes

Forward Request to MARAD RRF

MSC Requests MARAD RRF Activation

Forwards Request for USTRANSCOM

Evaluation

USTRANSCOM Reviews

and Approves Request?

MARAD RRF Ships Assigned to USTRANSCOM

and/or MSC

MARAD RRF Activates MARAD RRF Ships

Charter Enough Ships in Time?

No Action Necessary

Sealift Requirement

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VI-6 JP 4-01.2

(1) The MSP was enacted in 1996 to help slow the downward trend in militarily useful US flag shipping and to ensure that militarily useful ships are available to DOD during war or national emergency. On November 24, 2003, the President signed the

Figure VI-3. National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship Requisition Process

National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/ Ship Requisition Process

Sealift Requirement

Forwards to SecDef via CJCS

SecDef Reviews/ Approves?

Requests SECTRANS Concurrence

SECTRANS Concurs ?

SecDef/SECTRANS Forward to President

Ships Assigned to

USTRANSCOM/ MSC

Enough Ships?

No Action Required

USTRANSCOM Reviews/

Approves?

MSC Requests Requisitioning and/or

NDRF Activation

Yes

No President Reviews/Approves

Request?

MARAD Instructed to Requisition and/or

Activate NDRF Ships

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

MARAD Maritime Administration MSC Military Sealift Command NDRF National Defense Reserve

Fleet SecDef Secretary of Defense SECTRANS Secretary of Transportation USTRANSCOM United States Transportation

Command

Legend

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-7

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2004, which contained the Maritime Security Act (MSA) of 2003. The most current NDAA has authorized the MSP through FY 2025. The MSA 2003 requires that the Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS), in consultation with SecDef, establish a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements. Participating operators are required to make their ships and commercial transportation resources available upon request by SecDef during times of war or national emergency. The MSP provides military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well as a total global, intermodal transportation network. This network includes not only vessels, but logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals facilities, and US citizen merchant mariners to crew the government owned/controlled and commercial fleets.

(2) Status. Active, privately owned, oceangoing US flag ships numbered less than 200 as of August 2011, of which only a portion were considered militarily useful. Because the number and type of ships in the US flag fleet can change frequently, refer to the MARAD Web site, http://www.marad.gov, for the most up-to-date ship numbers.

(3) DOD Acquisition Procedures. DOD can acquire US flag shipping by five methods: commercial or open market charters, liner agreements for scheduled containerized service, VTA, VISA, and requisitioning.

(a) Commercial Charter. MSC frequently charters US and foreign flag ships during peacetime to provide additional sealift capacity. Chartering is a routine commercial transaction that can be accomplished in as little as two days. However, all chartered ships may not be immediately available in time of crisis. Depending on ship location, the time required to arrive at the designated loading port may be as much as 30 days.

(b) The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. VISA is the primary sealift mobilization program. It is an intermodal capacity-oriented program vice a ship-by- ship oriented program. All major US flag carriers are enrolled in VISA. This constitutes more than 90 percent of the US flag dry cargo fleet. The worldwide intermodal system provided by these carriers provides extensive and flexible capabilities to DOD. The types of ships enrolled in the VISA program includes containerships, RO/RO ships, combination RO/RO and containerships, heavy lift ships, breakbulk ships, and tugs and barges. In addition, all vessels enrolled in the MSP program are enrolled in VISA. VISA is activated upon approval of SecDef. Stage I may be activated by CDRUSTRANSCOM, with the approval of SecDef when voluntary capacity commitments are insufficient to meet DOD requirements. When Stage I assets are exhausted Stage II may be activated. CDRUSTRANSCOM may recommend the activation of Stage III to SecDef when capacity requirements from Stage I and II are insufficient and other shipping services are not available. At Stage III SecDef requests SECTRANS to allocate capacity based on DOD requirements. A Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG) is central to the successful implementation of VISA and is comprised of representatives from USTRANSCOM, SDDC, MSC, DLA, MARAD, and intermodal industrial transportation representatives. The JPAG provides USTRANSCOM and its components with recommendations as to how best to

Chapter VI

VI-8 JP 4-01.2

resolve critical transportation issues during periods of heavy demand or crisis. The decision flow for activation of VISA is shown in Figure VI-4.

Figure VI-4. Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation Process

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation Process

Movement Requirement

Adequate?

Request for Volunteers

Program Participants

Volunteers – US Flag,

Foreign Flag

Volunteers – US Flag,

Foreign Flag

Nonprogram Participants

Nonparticipant US Flag

Foreign Flag

Requirement Satisfied

Activate Stage III

Activate Stage II

Activate Stage I

Charter Service

Liner Service

Yes

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-9

(c) Liner Agreements. A significant amount of military cargo moves in US flag liner ships. Liner operators are common carriers operating ships on scheduled sailings over established trade routes. They provide service to all on a first-come, first- served basis. Military cargo offered by SDDC to liner carriers usually is offered in less-than- full shipload lots. This method helps share space with cargo shipped by private sector business. Since the advent of intermodal transportation, the most common practice is for shipments from a variety of DOD sources to be consolidated in containers under military auspices for delivery to commercial terminals. There, the containers are loaded onto container ships and carried under terms and conditions set forth in an SDDC container agreement or contract. SDDC agreements or contracts contain uniform terms and conditions for transporting military cargo between the US and foreign countries. Agreements or contracts are competitively solicited. Rates are proposed in response to requests for proposals and are finalized by negotiation between SDDC and the interested carriers.

(d) Voluntary Tanker Agreement. The VTA, established by MARAD, provides for tanker owners to voluntarily make their vessels available to satisfy DOD needs.

1. The VTA is activated, at the request of SecDef, if the MARAD finds:

a. That a tanker capacity emergency affects the national defense.

b. That defense requirements cannot be met by chartering.

c. That defense requirements can be met more efficiently by activating the VTA than by requisitioning ships.

2. Tanker capacity provided under the VTA is for point-to-point transport of military POL. The agreement is designed to meet contingency or war requirements, not to deal with shortages of capacity in connection with peacetime resupply operations. The decision flow for activating the VTA is the same as that shown in Figure VI-4.

(e) Requisitioning Shipping. SECTRANS is authorized to requisition any vessel which is majority owned by US citizens, whether registered under the US or foreign flag, whenever the President proclaims that the security of the nation makes it advisable, or during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the President (and/or concurrent resolution of the Congress). The requisitioning process is essentially the same as that for activating the NDRF, shown in Figure VI-3.

c. Effective US-Controlled Shipping. EUSC ships are majority owned by US citizens or corporations, but are registered and operated under the flags of the Marshall Islands, Liberia, Panama, Honduras, the Bahamas, or other governments that will permit their ships to be made available (by chartering or, if necessary, by requisitioning) to the USG in time of emergency. If requisitioned, these vessels could either be time chartered or bareboat chartered and require crewing.

(1) Status. The EUSC fleet numbers over 60 ships; but these are primarily tankers and dry bulk carriers and are almost entirely crewed by foreign nationals.

Chapter VI

VI-10 JP 4-01.2

(2) DOD Acquisition Procedures. EUSC ships may either be chartered commercially or requisitioned. The chartering and requisitioning process is the same as that for US flag ships. The same requisitioning authority applies to all US-owned ships registered under other flags.

d. Foreign Flag Ships

(1) As a general rule, foreign-owned and operated commercial shipping may be chartered through commercial charter during a contingency when organic and US flag or EUSC nonorganic assets are unavailable or insufficient. National Security Directive- 28, National Security Directive on Sealift, prohibits deliberate planning for the chartering of foreign flag vessels; however, there are some standing shipping agreements with US allies. Country-to-country shipping agreements can be arranged on short notice dependent on the crisis at hand. The US benefited from other country-provided shipping during Operation DESERT STORM.

(2) DOD Acquisition Procedures. After it has been determined that there is not sufficient voluntary US flag sealift capacity to meet requirements, the foreign flag ships may be chartered. The procedure is the same as for US flag ships. Country relationships and politics need to be considered when chartering foreign flag ships.

VII-1

CHAPTER VII NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

1. General

a. NCAGS has emerged from its predecessor’s missions known as naval coordination and protection of shipping (NCAPS), and naval control of shipping (NCOS). Both NCAPS and NCOS were established to meet national requirements to protect merchant shipping against a global open ocean threat through the means of military escorts, large convoys, and administrative procedures. Advancements in both the information technology, and maritime transportation and industries, coupled with changing world threats, shifted the primary concepts from “protection of merchant shipping” to “deconfliction of merchant and military vessels.”

b. In periods of crisis, conflict, national emergency, or war, naval authorities may direct the movement of merchant ships (including routing and diversion) so that they may be better protected from hostilities and not interfere with possible active naval, joint, or combined military operations. The NCAGS organization is the principal US resource to carry out this function. The purpose of NCAGS is to ensure the efficient management and safe passage of merchant ships that are not performing strategic sealift functions. NCAGS provides the operational interface between the Navy and commercial shipping.

c. The mission and command structure of the NCAGS organization are described below, as well as the procedures to implement NCAGS for commercial shipping. Additional guidance may be found in Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3450.18, US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, and Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-2 (B) Volume II, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Manual.

2. Organization

a. Commander, US Fleet Forces, is responsible for overall program management and control of assets NCAGS.

b. There are currently four units assigned to the NCAGS organization. Each unit is composed of 48 personnel possessing a variety of operational warfare skills as well as specialized skills relating to the civil maritime industry. Each unit provides the capabilities to: liaise with the civil maritime industry and the operational commander; deploy shipping

“Our Nation’s maritime interests are best served by working together across the globe with many nations to foster security and cooperation. NCAGS [naval cooperation and guidance for shipping] is a key resource in building to that endstate; building maritime domain awareness through collaboration and common technologies.”

Rear Admiral Lee Metcalf, Director, National Office, Global Maritime Situational Awareness/Director, Maritime Domain Awareness, 19 May 2008

Chapter VII

VII-2 JP 4-01.2

coordination teams (SCTs) ashore or afloat; and establish or augment shipping coordination centers (SCCs) with skilled personnel. The network of NCAGS units and SCCs allows centrally coordinated and managed groups to provide dynamic and flexible response when and where needed. NCAGS units provide leadership and primary response for their aligned fleet for contingency or crisis, supported as required by other units and available select individuals across the community in a federated model. When assigned, NCAGS components are operationally employed by either the JFMCC, or at the tactical level, by the surface warfare commander as part of a Navy carrier strike group.

c. NCAGS facilitates cooperation between the military and civil maritime industry: to minimize the economic impact as a result of commercial shipping operating in the vicinity of naval vessels engaged in military operations and to ensure the safe passage of commercial shipping, safety of naval vessels, and minimize confusion in the maritime operational environment. This is accomplished through communication, development of the common operational picture (COP), and deconflicting, and protective guidance for merchant shipping. NCAGS policy approval and coordination with other government agencies concerned with merchant shipping functions requires consideration of political and legal consequences. These functions are the responsibility of the GCC. When utilized, the NCAGS functional element should be an integral part of the operational commander’s organization. Responsibility for managing merchant shipping in accordance with approved NCAGS policy is incumbent upon the GCC/operational commander and may be delegated.

3. Mission and Capabilities

a. The NCAGS mission is to assist the GCC/operational commander in managing risk by providing situational awareness and near real-time clarity of the merchant shipping picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant shipping and the safety of naval vessels or the nation in a crisis contingency, which may include combat operations, piracy, or foreign humanitarian assistance. This mission primarily involves employing a framework and capabilities for communicating directions, advisories, concerns, and/or information among NCAGS organizational elements (e.g., SCCs, operational forces, merchant shipping, and maritime organizations); the deconfliction of merchant vessel sailings/operations, for safety or operational reasons, to preclude interference with naval or merchant ship activities; and making recommendations to the GCC/operational commander on the extent and type of protection that may be provided to merchant shipping.

b. The NCAGS organization provides the operational commander with the following capabilities: liaison officers (LNOs), SCTs, and SCCs.

c. LNOs are the senior military subject matter experts responsible for advising the military commander on all matters relating to the civil maritime industry. They are responsible for evaluating how NCAGS should be employed and recommending COAs to the operational commander, and interacting with business leaders in the civil maritime industry (for the purpose of cooperation). The LNO or SCT may operate as an NCAGS cell for the Navy component commander or JFMCC maritime operations center.

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

VII-3

d. The SCT provides an expeditionary capability to the operational commander. SCTs can both be located ashore or afloat, and provide the manpower to support a 24 hour watch section at sea or ashore. SCTs provide the capability to manage regional commercial shipping information and disseminate that information through the common operating environment. Depending on commercial traffic density and/or complexity of operations, additional SCTs can be added to meet requirements.

e. The SCCs is the foundation of the NCAGS organization. SCCs are located in Dam Neck, VA, Key West, FL, and Alameda, CA. SCCs are comprised of watch officers, maritime analysts, plotters, as well as their supporting command infrastructure. SCCs are regionally focused to support the GCC through its JFMCC in improving maritime domain awareness as it relates to merchant shipping (other than strategic sealift). SCCs are responsible for maintaining and refining commercial shipping information within the COP with a primary focus on maritime homeland defense, but also capable of providing AOR specific information to forward fleet commanders.

4. Implementing Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Measures for Commercial Shipping

While many NCAGS techniques and procedures are employed to support the military commander, the decision to implement NCAGS measures having a direct impact on commercial shipping requires the approval of SecDef. Because of the potential economic impact (delivery times, insurance rates, etc.), the NSA should be consulted when considering to implement NCAGS measures outlined in NTTP 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, and ATP-2 (B), Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and Officers, Volume II. Foreign flag commercial shipping may participate in protocols and measures set forth by the NCAGS organization on a voluntary basis, under the request of the vessel’s owner or the flag state. The Chief of Naval Operations, as the NCAGS organization program sponsor, with the support of US Fleet Forces Command maintains liaison with the NSA and other civilian authorities to coordinate the exchange of information concerning implementation of NCAGS measures.

Chapter VII

VII-4 JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

A-1

APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-01.2 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General

a. Title 10, United States Code.

b. Title 50, United States Code.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement.

b. Defense Transportation Regulation, Part III, Mobility.

c. DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command.

d. National Disclosure Policy 4, Naval Logistics.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3110.01G, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for FY 2008.

b. Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.

d. CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.

e. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats.

f. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

g. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

h. JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation.

i. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

j. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

k. JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System.

l. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations.

Appendix A

A-2 JP 4-02.1

m. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.

n. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

4. Service Publications

a. NTTP 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping.

b. NWP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

c. NWP 3-02.21, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.

d. NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, Seabasing.

e. Marine Corps Warfare Publication 3-32, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

f. Field Manual (FM) 55-50, Army Water Transport Operations.

g. FM 55-65, Strategic Deployment.

h. COMSCINST 2000.2, Communications Policy and Procedures Manual.

i. COMSCINST 3121.9A CH-2, Standard Operating Manual.

5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Publication

ATP-2 (B), Volume II, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Manual.

B-1

APPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the USTRANSCOM. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-01.2, 31 August 2005, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ5/4-PD// INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/J7-JEDD//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Support Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/Joint Education and Doctrine Division.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be in accordance with DOD Manual 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification.

Appendix B

B-2 JP 4-02.1

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System at https://jdeis.js.mil (Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network [NIPRNET]) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), and on the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the CCMDs, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD- ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the CCMDs and Services.

GL-1

GLOSSARY PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACE aviation combat element (USMC) A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control group ADCON administrative control AE assault echelon AFOE assault follow-on echelon AOR area of responsibility APF afloat pre-positioning force APOD aerial port of debarkation APS-3 Army pre-positioned stocks-3 ATF amphibious task force ATP allied tactical publication bbl barrel (42 US gallons) BTU beach termination unit C2 command and control CATF commander, amphibious task force CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CCDR combatant commander CCMD combatant command CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual CMOS cargo movement operations system COA course of action COCOM combatant command (command authority) COLDS cargo offload and discharge system COMSC Commander, Military Sealift Command COMSCINST Commander, Military Sealift Command instruction CONUS continental United States COP common operational picture CS combat support CSS combat service support DLA Defense Logistics Agency DOD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense directive DOT Department of Transportation DPO distribution process owner DTS Defense Transportation System DWT deadweight tonnage

Glossary

GL-2 JP 4-01.2

EST embarked security team EUSC effective United States controlled EXORD execute order FM field manual (Army) FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command FSS fast sealift ship ft feet FY fiscal year GATES Global Air Transportation Execution System GCC geographic combatant commander GCCS-J Global Command and Control System-Joint GFMIG Global Force Management Implementation Guidance HF high frequency HN host nation HNS host-nation support HQ headquarters HSV high-speed vessel ICODES integrated computerized deployment system IGC Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network Convergence ISB intermediate staging base ITV in-transit visibility JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation JFC joint force commander JFMCC joint force maritime component commander JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JP joint publication JP5 jet propulsion fuel, type 5 JP8 jet propulsion fuel, type 8 JPAG Joint Planning Advisory Group JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JTB Joint Transportation Board JTF-PO joint task force-port opening LF landing force LMSR large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off LNO liaison officer LO/LO lift-on/lift-off LOTS logistics over-the-shore

Glossary

GL-3

LT long ton MAGTF Marine air-ground task force MARAD Maritime Administration MARAD RRF Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication MESF maritime expeditionary security force MF mobile facility MPS maritime pre-positioning ship MPSRON maritime pre-positioning ships squadron MSA Maritime Security Act MSC Military Sealift Command MSP Maritime Security Program MTON measurement ton NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCAGS naval cooperation and guidance for shipping NCAPS naval coordination and protection of shipping NCOS naval control of shipping NDAA National Defense Authorization Act NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet NEAT naval embarked advisory team NGO nongovernmental organization NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network NSA national shipping authority NSE Navy support element NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures NWP Navy warfare publication OPCON operational control OPDS offshore petroleum discharge system (Navy) OPDS-Future offshore petroleum discharge system-future (Navy) OPDS-Legacy offshore petroleum discharge system-legacy (Navy) OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order OPSEC operations security OVM Operation VIGILANT MARINER PCTC pure car and truck carrier POD port of debarkation POE port of embarkation POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants PORTSIM port simulation model PREPO pre-positioning PSA port support activity

Glossary

GL-4 JP 4-01.2

RO/RO roll-on/roll-off ROS reduced operating status SALM single-anchor leg mooring SCC shipping coordination center SCT shipping coordination team SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command SDDCTEA Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency SEABEE sea barge SecDef Secretary of Defense SECNAV Secretary of the Navy SECTRANS Secretary of Transportation SEF sealift enhancement feature SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network SPOD seaport of debarkation SPOE seaport of embarkation TACON tactical control T-AH hospital ship T-AVB aviation logistics support ship TC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II TCC transportation component command T-JTB theater-joint transportation board TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data TWCF Transportation Working Capital Fund USA United States Army USAF United States Air Force USCG United States Coast Guard USG United States Government USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement VTA voluntary tanker agreement

GL-5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

active sealift forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

administrative landing. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

afloat pre-positioning force. Shipping maintained in full operational status to afloat pre- position military equipment and supplies in support of combatant commanders’ operation plans, consisting of the three maritime pre-positioning ships squadrons, the Army’s afloat pre-positioning stocks-3 ships, and the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Air Force ships. Also called APF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

afloat pre-positioning ships. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

afloat support. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

bale cubic capacity. The space available for cargo measured in cubic feet to the inside of the cargo battens, on the frames, and to the underside of the beams. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

capacity load (Navy). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

common operating environment. Automation services that support the development of the common reusable software modules that enable interoperability across multiple combat support applications. Also called COE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

common-user ocean terminals. A military installation, part of a military installation, or a commercial facility operated under contract or arrangement by the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command which regularly provides for two or more Services terminal functions of receipt, transit storage or staging, processing, and loading and unloading of passengers or cargo aboard ships. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

common-user transportation. Transportation and transportation services provided on a common basis for two or more Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, non- Department of Defense agencies. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

convoy schedule. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point of impact of bombs and projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. (JP 3-60) 2. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities, which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. (JP 5-0) 3. In chemical and biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. (JP 3-41) 4. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone. (JP 3-17) 5. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing of a ship in the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to minimize the risk of damage from attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

Glossary

GL-6 JP 4-01.2

effective United States controlled ships. United States-owned foreign flag ships that can be tasked by the Maritime Administration to support Department of Defense requirements when necessary. Also called EUSCS. (Approved for replacement of “effective US controlled ships” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

fly-in echelon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

government-owned, contract-operated ships. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1- 02.)

government-owned, Military Sealift Command-operated ships. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

heavy-lift ship. A ship specially designed and capable of loading and unloading heavy and bulky items and has booms of sufficient capacity to accommodate a single lift of 100 tons. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

intermediate maintenance (field). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

intracoastal sealift. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

in-transit visibility. The ability to track the identity, status, and location of Department of Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations. Also called ITV. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4- 01.2)

Joint Transportation Board. Responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Transportation Board assures that common-user transportation resources assigned or available to the Department of Defense are allocated as to achieve maximum benefit in meeting Department of Defense objectives. Also called JTB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

Maritime Administration. The Maritime Administration is the agency within the United States Department of Transportation dealing with waterborne transportation. Also called MARAD. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Maritime Security Program. A program authorized in the Maritime Security Act of 2003 requiring the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to establish a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet national defense and other security requirements. Also called MSP. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

merchant ship communications system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

merchant ship reporting and control message system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-7

mercomms system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Military Sealift Command. A major command of the United States Navy reporting to Commander Fleet Forces Command, and the United States Transportation Command’s component command responsible for designated common-user sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy United States forces on a global basis. Also called MSC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Military Sealift Command force. Common-user sealift consisting of three subsets: the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, common-user ocean transportation, and the special mission support force. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

National Defense Reserve Fleet. 1. Including the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, a fleet composed of ships acquired and maintained by the Maritime Administration for use in mobilization or emergency. 2. Less the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force, a fleet composed of the older dry cargo ships, tankers, troop transports, and other assets in Maritime Administration’s custody that are maintained at a relatively low level of readiness. Also called NDRF. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

national shipping authority. The organization within each Allied government responsible in time of war for the direction of its own merchant shipping. Also called NSA. (JP 1- 02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

naval coordination and protection of shipping. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1- 02.)

naval coordination and protection of shipping officer. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

naval coordination and protection of shipping organization. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

naval tactical data system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Ocean Cargo Clearance Authority. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

origin. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

passenger mile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

point-to-point sealift. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. Also called POE. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-8 JP 4-01.2

reduced operating status. Military Sealift Command ships withdrawn from full operating status because of decreased operational requirements. Also called ROS. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

replenishment at sea. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

safe anchorage. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

sea barge. A type of barge-ship that can carry up to 38 loaded barges and also carry tugs, stacked causeway sections, various watercraft, or heavy lift equipment to better support joint logistics over-the-shore operations. Also called SEABEE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

sealift enhancement features. Special equipment and modifications that adapt merchant- type dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions. Also called SEFs. (Approved for inclusion into JP 1-02.)

Sealift Readiness Program. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

seaport. A land facility designated for reception of personnel or materiel moved by sea, and that serves as an authorized port of entrance into or departure from the country in which located. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

shipping control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring, fueling, and refitting of transports and cargo ships as well as replenishment of mobile service squadrons. 2. A landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and shelter provided for the temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of movement from one location to another. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-01.2 as the source JP.)

stowage factor. The number that expresses the space, in cubic feet, occupied by a long ton of any commodity as prepared for shipment, including all crating or packaging. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-01.2 as the source JP.)

strategic sealift shipping. Common-user ships of the Military Sealift Command force, including pre-positioned ships after their pre-positioning mission has been completed and they have been returned to the operational control of the Military Sealift Command. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

traffic density. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment force. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment group. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-9

United States controlled shipping. That shipping under United States flag and selected ships under foreign flag considered to be under effective United States control. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

United States naval ship. A public vessel of the United States that is in the custody of the Navy and is: a. Operated by the Military Sealift Command and manned by a civil service crew; or b. Operated by a commercial company under contract to the Military Sealift Command and manned by a merchant marine crew. Also called USNS. (Approved for replacement of “United States Naval Ship” in JP 1-02.)

US commercial assets. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

US Transportation Command coordinating instructions. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.

vehicle cargo. Wheeled or tracked equipment, including weapons, that require certain deck space, head room, and other definite clearance. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1- 02 with JP 4-01.2 as the source JP.)

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. An agreement that provides the Department of Defense with assured access to United States flag assets, both vessel capacity and intermodal systems, to meet Department of Defense contingency requirements. Also called VISA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

voluntary tanker agreement. An agreement established by the Maritime Administration to provide for United States commercial tanker owners and operators to voluntarily make their vessels available to satisfy the Department of Defense to meet contingency or war requirements for point-to-point petroleum, oils, and lubricants movements. Also called VTA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

wartime load. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-10 JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED JOINT

WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

JP published and continuously assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after publication

Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front- end analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation

Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMPLANSOPERATIONSPERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICS

JP 4-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01.2 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

PREFACE
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

1. General
2. The Strategic Mobility Triad
3. The Sealift Trident

CHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General
2. Forces and Authority
3. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation
4. Organizations and Responsibilities
5. Command and Control Architecture

CHAPTER III SEALIFT CAPABILITIES

1. General
2. Ship Types
3. Sealift Ship Programs
4. Sealift Enhancement Features
5. Logistics Over-the-Shore

CHAPTER IV PLANNING

1. General
2. Execution Planning
3. Sealift Asset Planning
4. Basic Cargo Planning Concepts
5. Protection and Operations Security
6. Environmental Considerations
7. Automated Planning Tools
8. Transition from Peace to Conflict to Stability Operations
9. Other Considerations

CHAPTER V EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

1. General
2. Execution
3. Communications System Support
4. Logistic Support
5. Intermodal Operations
6. Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations
7. Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and Security Cooperation Activities,and Humanitarian Assistance

CHAPTER VI VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMS

1. General
2.Government-Owned/Controlled Assets
3. Commercial Controlled Assets

CHAPTER VII NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

1. General
2. Organization
3. Mission and Capabilities
4. Implementing Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Measures forCommercial Shipping

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A REFERENCES
APPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

FIGURES

Figure I-1. Strategic Mobility Triad
Figure I-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the Strategic Mobility Triad
Figure I-3. Phases of Strategic Mobility
Figure I-4. The Sealift Trident
Figure II-1. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift Assets
Figure II-2. Responsibilities of the Commander, United States Transportation Command
Figure III-1. Types of Dry Cargo Ships
Figure III-2. Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers
Figure III-3. Sealift Ship Programs
Figure IV-1. Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements
Figure IV-2. Measures of Ship Capacity
Figure IV-3. Cargo Planning Factors
Figure IV-4. Sealift Planning Factors
Figure IV-5. Sealift Asset Availability Times
Figure V-1. Seabasing
Figure VI-1. Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan
Figure VI-2. Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency Deployments ofCommon-User Ships
Figure VI-3. National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship Requisition Process
Figure VI-4. Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation Process