Information-Related Capabilities

U.S. ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY Sergeants Major Course (SMC)

J500: Joint Functions

Lesson J503

Fires and Information Operations

Reading G JP 3-13

Information Operations (Extract)

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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, preparation, execution, and

assessment of information operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US

military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations

and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance

for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders

(JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides

military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not

the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and

executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort

in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of

these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States law, regulations,

and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

Director, Joint Staff

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Preface

SUMMARY OF CHANGES CHANGE 1 TO JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13

DATED 27 NOVEMBER 2012

• Describes techniques for assessing information related capabilities (IRC) and techniques for assessing the integration of the IRCs in support of the joint force

commander’s objectives.

• Expands guidance for the 8-step assessment process.

• Provides additional information about private sector assessment techniques, including the theory of change.

• Expands discussion of sound assessment with a focused, organized approach that is being developed in conjunction with the initial operation plan.

• Emphasizes the need for assessments to be periodically adjusted to avoid becoming obsolete.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of Information Operations (IO) and the Information

Environment

• Describes IO and Its Relationships and Integration

• Addresses IO Authorities, Responsibilities, and Legal Considerations

• Explains Integrating Information-Related Capabilities into the Joint

Operation Planning Process

• Covers Multinational Information Operations

Overview

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The ability to share information

in near real time, anonymously

and/or securely, is a capability

that is both an asset and a

potential vulnerability to us, our

allies, and our adversaries.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic,

informational, military, and economic) provide

leaders in the US with the means and ways of

dealing with crises around the world. Employing

these means in the information environment

requires the ability to securely transmit, receive,

store, and process information in near real time.

The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are

equally aware of the significance of this new

technology, and will use information-related

capabilities (IRCs) to gain advantages in the

information environment, just as they would use

more traditional military technologies to gain

advantages in other operational environments. As

the strategic environment continues to change, so

does information operations (IO). Based on these

changes, the Secretary of Defense now

characterizes IO as the integrated

employment, during military operations, of

IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the

decision making of adversaries and potential

adversaries while protecting our own.

The Information Environment The information environment is the aggregate of

individuals, organizations, and systems that

collect, process, disseminate, or act on

information. This environment consists of three

Executive Summary

The joint force commander’s

operational environment is the

composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences

that affect employment of

capabilities and bear on the

decisions of the commander

(encompassing physical areas

and factors of the air, land,

maritime, and space domains) as

well as the information

environment (which includes

cyberspace).

interrelated dimensions, which continuously

interact with individuals, organizations, and

systems. These dimensions are known as

physical, informational, and cognitive. The

physical dimension is composed of command and

control systems, key decision makers, and

supporting infrastructure that enable individuals

and organizations to create effects. The

informational dimension specifies where and how

information is collected, processed, stored,

disseminated, and protected. The cognitive

dimension encompasses the minds of those who

transmit, receive, and respond to or act on

information.

The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the Application of

Information- Related Capabilities

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IRCs are the tools,

techniques, or activities that

affect any of the three

dimensions of the

information environment. The

joint force (means) employs

IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to

or disseminated from the target audience (TA)

in the physical and informational dimensions of

the information environment to affect decision

making.

Information Operations

Information Operations and the

Information-Influence Relational

Framework

The relational framework describes the

application, integration, and synchronization of

IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the

decision making of TAs to create a desired effect

to support achievement of an objective.

The Information Operations Staff

and Information Operations Cell

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may establish an

IO staff to provide command-level oversight and

collaborate with all staff directorates and

supporting organizations on all aspects of IO.

Most combatant commands (CCMDs) include an

IO staff to serve as the focal point for IO. Faced

with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a

geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) area

of responsibility, a JFC can establish an IO cell to

provide additional expertise and coordination

across the staff and interagency.

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Executive Summary

Relationships and Integration IO is not about ownership of individual

capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities

as force multipliers to create a desired effect.

There are many military capabilities that

contribute to IO and should be taken into

consideration during the planning process. These

include: strategic communication, joint

interagency coordination group, public affairs,

civil-military operations, cyberspace operations

(CO), information assurance, space operations,

military information support operations (MISO),

intelligence, military deception, operations

security, special technical operations, joint

electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key

leader engagement.

Authorities, Responsibilities, and Legal Considerations

Authorities

The authority to employ

information-related capabilities is

rooted foremost in Title 10,

United States Code.

Department of Defense (DOD) and Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directives

delegate authorities to DOD components. Among

these directives, Department of Defense Directive

3600.01, Information Operations, is the principal

IO policy document. Its joint counterpart,

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

3210.01, Joint Information Operations Policy,

provides joint policy regarding the use of IRCs,

professional qualifications for the joint IO force,

as well as joint IO education and training

requirements. Based upon the contents of these

two documents, authority to conduct joint IO is

vested in the combatant commander (CCDR),

who in turn can delegate operational authority to a

subordinate JFC, as appropriate.

Responsibilities Under Secretary of Defense for Policy oversees

and manages DOD-level IO programs and

activities.

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

develops, coordinates, and oversees the

implementation of DOD intelligence policy,

programs, and guidance for intelligence activities

supporting IO.

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Executive Summary

Joint Staff. As the Joint IO Proponent, the

Deputy Director for Global Operations (J-39

DDGO) serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO

and coordinates with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and

other organizations that have direct or supporting

IO responsibilities.

Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

(JIOWC) is a CJCS controlled activity reporting

to the operations directorate of a joint staff via J-

39 DDGO. The JIOWC supports the Joint Staff

by ensuring operational integration of IRCs in

support of IO, improving DOD’s ability to meet

CCMD IRC requirements, as well as developing

and refining IRCs for use in support of IO across

DOD.

Combatant Commands. The Unified Command

Plan provides guidance to CCDRs, assigning

them missions and force structure, as well as

geographic or functional areas of responsibility.

In addition to these responsibilities, the

Commander, United States Special Operations

Command, is also responsible for integrating and

coordinating MISO. This responsibility is

focused on enhancing interoperability and

providing other CCDRs with MISO planning and

execution capabilities. In similar fashion, the

Commander, United States Strategic Command is

responsible for advocating on behalf of the IRCs

of electronic warfare and CO.

Service component command responsibilities

include recommending to the JFC the proper

employment of the Service component IRCs in

support of joint IO.

Like Service component commands, functional

component commands have authority over

forces or in the case of IO, IRCs, as delegated by

the establishing authority (normally a CCDR or

JFC).

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Legal Considerations IO planners deal with legal considerations of an

extremely diverse and complex nature. For this

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Executive Summary

reason, joint IO planners should consult their staff

judge advocate or legal advisor for expert advice.

Integrating Information-Related Capabilities into the Joint Operation Planning

Process

Information Operations Planning The IO cell chief is responsible to the JFC for

integrating IRCs into the joint operation planning

process (JOPP). Thus, the IO staff is responsible

for coordinating and synchronizing IRCs to

accomplish the JFC’s objectives. The IO cell

chief ensures joint IO planners adequately

represent the IO cell within the joint planning

group and other JFC planning processes. Doing

so will help ensure that IRCs are integrated with

all planning efforts. As part of JOPP, designation

of release and execution authorities for IRCs is

required. Normally, the JFC is designated in the

execution order as the execution authority. Given

the fact that IRC effects are often required across

multiple operational phases, each capability

requires separate and distinct authorities.

Information Operations Phasing

and Synchronization

Through its contributions to the GCC’s theater

campaign plan, it is clear that joint IO is expected

to play a major role in all phases of joint

operations. This means that the GCC’s IO staff

and IO cell must account for logical transitions

from phase to phase, as joint IO moves from the

main effort to a supporting effort.

Multinational Information Operations

Other Nations and Information

Operations

Multinational partners recognize a variety of

information concepts and possess sophisticated

doctrine, procedures, and capabilities. Given

these potentially diverse perspectives regarding

IO, it is essential for the multinational force

commander (MNFC) to resolve potential conflicts

as soon as possible. It is vital to integrate

multinational partners into IO planning as early as

possible to gain agreement on an integrated and

achievable IO strategy.

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Multinational Organization for

Information Operations Planning

When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force

staff should be augmented by planners and subject

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Executive Summary

matter experts from the multinational force

(MNF). MNF IO planners and IRC specialists

should be trained on US and MNF doctrine,

requirements, resources, and how the MNF is

structured to integrate IRCs. IO planners should

seek to accommodate the requirements of each

multinational partner, within given constraints,

with the goal of using all the available expertise

and capabilities of the MNF.

Multinational Policy

Coordination

The Joint Staff coordinates US positions on IO

matters delegated to them as a matter of law or

policy, and discusses them bilaterally, or in

multinational organizations, to achieve

interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling

common requirements. Direct discussions

regarding multinational IO planning in specific

theaters are the responsibility of the GCC.

Information Operations Assessment

Information Operations

assessment is iterative,

continuously repeating rounds of

analysis within the operations cycle

in order to measure the progress of

information related capabilities

toward achieving objectives.

Assessment of IO is a key component of the

commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine

the results of tactical actions in the context of

overall mission objectives and providing potential

recommendations for refinement of future plans.

Assessments also provide opportunities to identify

IRC shortfalls, changes in parameters and/or

conditions in the information environment, which

may cause unintended effects in the employment of

IRCs, and resource issues that may be impeding

joint IO effectiveness.

The Information Operations

Assessment Process

A solution to these assessment requirements is the

eight-step assessment process.

 Focused characterization of the information

environment

 Integrate information operations assessment

into plans and develop the assessment plan

 Develop information operations assessment

information requirements and collection

plans

 Build/modify information operations

assessment baseline  Coordinate and execute information

operations and collection activities

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Executive Summary

 Monitor and collect focused information

environment data for information

operations assessment

 Analyze information operations assessment

data

 Report information operations assessment

results and recommendations

Measures and Indicators Measures of performance (MOPs) and measures

of effectiveness (MOEs) help accomplish the assessment process by qualifying or quantifying the

intangible attributes of the information environment.

The MOP for any one action should be whether or

not the TA was exposed to the IO action or activity.

MOEs should be observable, to aid with collection;

quantifiable, to increase objectivity; precise, to

ensure accuracy; and correlated with the progress of

the operation, to attain timeliness. Indicators are

crucial because they aid the joint IO planner in

informing MOEs and should be identifiable across

the center of gravity critical factors.

Considerations Assessment teams may not have direct access to a TA for a variety of reasons. The goal of

measurement is not to achieve perfect accuracy or

precision—given the ever present biases of theory

and the limitations of tools that exist—but rather, to

reduce uncertainty about the value being measured.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for the

planning, preparation, execution, and assessment

of information operations across the range of

military operations.

Executive Summary

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CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

1. Introduction

a. The growth of communication networks has decreased the number of isolated

populations in the world. The emergence of advanced wired and wireless information

technology facilitates global communication by corporations, violent extremist

organizations, and individuals. The ability to share information in near real time,

anonymously and/or securely, is a capability that is both an asset and a potential

vulnerability to us, our allies, and our adversaries. Information is a powerful tool to

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp an adversary’s ability to make and share decisions.

b. The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and

economic) provide leaders in the United States with the means and ways of dealing with

crises around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the

ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The

nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new

technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to gain advantages in the

information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to

gain advantages in other operational environments. These realities have transformed the

information environment into a battlefield, which poses both a threat to the Department of

Defense (DOD), combatant commands (CCMDs), and Service components and serves as a

force multiplier when leveraged effectively.

c. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does IO. Based on these

changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment,

during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence,

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while

protecting our own. This revised characterization has led to a reassessment of how essential

the information environment can be and how IRCs can be effectively integrated into joint

operations to create effects and operationally exploitable conditions necessary for achieving

the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives.

2. The Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems

that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three

interrelated dimensions which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and

systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive (see Figure I-1).

The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and

influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander

“The most hateful human misfortune is for a wise man to have no influence.”

Greek Historian Herodotus, 484-425 BC

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Chapter I

Figure I-1. The Information Environment

(encompassing physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) as

well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace).

a. The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of command and

control (C2) systems, key decision makers, and supporting infrastructure that enable

individuals and organizations to create effects. It is the dimension where physical platforms

and the communications networks that connect them reside. The physical dimension

includes, but is not limited to, human beings, C2 facilities, newspapers, books, microwave

towers, computer processing units, laptops, smart phones, tablet computers, or any other

objects that are subject to empirical measurement. The physical dimension is not confined

solely to military or even nation-based systems and processes; it is a defused network

connected across national, economic, and geographical boundaries.

The Information Environment

Cognitive Dimension

Human-Centric

Informational Dimension

Data-Centric

Physical Dimension

Tangible, Real World

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Overview

b. The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension encompasses where

and how information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. It is the

dimension where the C2 of military forces is exercised and where the commander’s intent is

conveyed. Actions in this dimension affect the content and flow of information.

c. The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of

those who transmit, receive, and respond to or act on information. It refers to individuals’ or

groups’ information processing, perception, judgment, and decision making. These elements

are influenced by many factors, to include individual and cultural beliefs, norms,

vulnerabilities, motivations, emotions, experiences, morals, education, mental health,

identities, and ideologies. Defining these influencing factors in a given environment is

critical for understanding how to best influence the mind of the decision maker and create the

desired effects. As such, this dimension constitutes the most important component of the

information environment.

3. The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the Application of

Information-Related Capabilities

a. IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of

the information environment. They affect the ability of the target audience (TA) to collect,

process, or disseminate information before and after decisions are made. The TA is the

individual or group selected for influence. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to

affect the information provided to or disseminated from the TA in the physical and

informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making (see

Figure I-2). The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in

some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the

desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future

operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as

operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdeception, physical

security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are

critical to enabling and protecting the JFC’s C2 of forces. Key components in this process

are:

(1) Information. Data in context to inform or provide meaning for action.

(2) Data. Interpreted signals that can reduce uncertainty or equivocality.

(3) Knowledge. Information in context to enable direct action. Knowledge can be

further broken down into the following:

(a) Explicit Knowledge. Knowledge that has been articulated through words,

diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.

(b) Tacit Knowledge. Knowledge that cannot be or has not been articulated

through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.

(4) Influence. The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA.

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Target Audiences

Information Environment

Cognitive Dimension

Human-Centric

Target Audiences

Key Influencers

Informational Dimension

Data-Centric

Physical Dimension

Tangible, Real World

Mass Audiences

Vulnerable Populations

Information Flow

Chapter I

Figure I-2. Target Audiences

(5) Means. The resources available to a national government, non-nation actor, or

adversary in pursuit of its end(s). These resources include, but are not limited to, public- and

private-sector enterprise assets or entities.

(6) Ways. How means can be applied, in order to achieve a desired end(s). They

can be characterized as persuasive or coercive.

(7) Information-Related Capabilities. Tools, techniques, or activities using data,

information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the

physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.

(8) Target Audience. An individual or group selected for influence.

(9) Ends. A consequence of the way of applying IRCs.

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Overview

(10) Using the framework, the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of

the information environment provide access points for influencing TAs (see Figure I-2).

b. The purpose of integrating the employment of IRCs is to influence a TA. While the

behavior of individuals and groups, as human social entities, are principally governed by

rules, norms, and beliefs, the behaviors of systems principally reside within the physical and

informational dimensions and are governed only by rules. Under this construct, rules,

norms, and beliefs are:

(1) Rules. Explicit regulative processes such as policies, laws, inspection routines,

or incentives. Rules function as a coercive regulator of behavior and are dependent upon the

imposing entity’s ability to enforce them.

(2) Norms. Regulative mechanisms accepted by the social collective. Norms are

enforced by normative mechanisms within the organization and are not strictly dependent

upon law or regulation.

(3) Beliefs. The collective perception of fundamental truths governing behavior.

The adherence to accepted and shared beliefs by members of a social system will likely

persist and be difficult to change over time. Strong beliefs about determinant factors (i.e.,

security, survival, or honor) are likely to cause a social entity or group to accept rules and

norms.

c. The first step in achieving an end(s) through use of the information-influence

relational framework is to identify the TA. Once the TA has been identified, it will be

necessary to develop an understanding of how that TA perceives its environment, to include

analysis of TA rules, norms, and beliefs. Once this analysis is complete, the application of

means available to achieve the desired end(s) must be evaluated (see Figure I-3). Such

means may include (but are not limited to) diplomatic, informational, military, or economic

actions, as well as academic, commercial, religious, or ethnic pronouncements. When the

specific means or combinations of means are determined, the next step is to identify the

specific ways to create a desired effect.

d. Influencing the behavior of TAs requires producing effects in ways that modify rules,

norms, or beliefs. Effects can be created by means (e.g., governmental, academic, cultural,

and private enterprise) using specific ways (i.e., IRCs) to affect how the TAs collect,

process, perceive, disseminate, and act (or do not act) on information (see Figure I-4).

e. Upon deciding to persuade or coerce a TA, the commander must then determine what

IRCs it can apply to individuals, organizations, or systems in order to produce a desired

effect(s) (see Figure I-5). As stated, IRCs can be capabilities, techniques, or activities, but

they do not necessarily have to be technology-based. Additionally, it is important to focus

on the fact that IRCs may come from a wide variety of sources. Therefore, in IO, it is not

the ownership of the capabilities and techniques that is important, but rather their

integrated application in order to achieve a JFC’s end state.

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Application of Means to Achieve Influence

Information Environment

Cognitive Dimension

Key Influencers Rules-Norms-Beliefs

Informational Dimension

Physical Dimension

Mass Audiences

Rules-Norms-Beliefs

Vulnerable Populations

Rules-Norms-Beliefs Information Flow

Target Audiences

Chapter I

Figure I-3. Application of Means to Achieve Influence

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Application of Information-Related Capabilities to Achieve Influence

Cognitive Dimension

Information Environment

WAYS

Activity Dimension Collect Physical

Process Disseminate

Act

IRCs

Informational Physical Cognitive

Key Influencers Rules-Norms-Beliefs

Informational Dimension

Physical Dimension

Mass Audiences

Rules-Norms-Beliefs

Vulnerable Populations

Rules-Norms-Beliefs Information Flow

WAYS WAYS

Activity Dimension Activity Dimension Collect Physical Collect Physical

Process Informational IRCs IRCs Process Informational Disseminate Physical Disseminate Physical

Act Cognitive Act Cognitive

IRC information-related capability

Overview

Figure I-4. Application of Information-Related Capabilities to Achieve Influence

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Influence Leads to Achievement of an End(s)

Information Environment

Objective Cognitive Dimension Ends

IRCs

Ways Activity Dimension Collect Physical Process Informational

Disseminate Physical

Key Influencers Rules-Norms-

Beliefs

Act Cognitive

Target Audiences

Ways Activity Dimension

Collect Physical Process Informational

Disseminate Physical

Mass Audiences Rules-Norms-

Beliefs

Vulnerable Populations Rules-Norms-

Beliefs

Act

IRCs

Cognitive

Information Flow

Informational Dimension

Ways

IRCs Activity Dimension Collect Physical Process Informational

Disseminate Physical

Physical Dimension

Act Cognit ive

Legend

IRC information-related capability

Chapter I

Figure I-5. Influence Leads to Achievement of an End(s)

M e a n s

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CHAPTER II INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter addresses how the integrating and coordinating functions of IO help

achieve a JFC’s objectives. Through the integrated application of IRCs, the relationships

that exist between IO and the various IRCs should be understood in order to achieve an

objective.

2. Terminology

a. Because IO takes place in all phases of military operations, in concert with other lines

of operation and lines of effort, some clarification of the terms and their relationship to IO is

in order.

(1) Military Operations. The US military participates in a wide range of military

operations, as illustrated in Figure II-1. Phase 0 (Shape) and phase I (Deter) may include

defense support of civil authorities, peace operations, noncombatant evacuation, foreign

humanitarian assistance, and nation-building assistance, which fall outside the realm of

major combat operations represented by phases II through V.

(2) Lines of Operation and Lines of Effort. IO should support multiple lines of

operation and at times may be the supported line of operation. IO may also support

numerous lines of effort when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little

relevance, such as in counterinsurgency or stability operations.

b. IO integrates IRCs (ways) with other lines of operation and lines of effort (means) to

create a desired effect on an adversary or potential adversary to achieve an objective (ends).

3. Information Operations and the Information-Influence Relational Framework

Influence is at the heart of diplomacy and military operations, with integration of IRCs

providing a powerful means for influence. The relational framework describes the

application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp

the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective.

Using this description, the following example illustrates how IRCs can be employed to create

a specific effect against an adversary or potential adversary.

“There is a war out there, old friend- a World War. And it’s not about whose got the most bullets; it’s about who controls the information.”

Cosmo, in the 1992 Film “Sneakers”

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Notional Operation Plan Phases

Plan Phases

Phase 0 Shape

Phase I Deter

Phase II Seize Initiative

Phase III Dominate

Phase IV Phase V Stabilize Enable

Civil Authority

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Phase 0 Shape

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

Global Shaping

OPLAN Approval

OPORD Activation

OPORD Execution OPORD Termination

Legend

OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order

Chapter II

Figure II-1. Notional Operation Plan Phases

4. The Information Operations Staff and Information Operations Cell

Within the joint community, the integration of IRCs to achieve the commander’s

objectives is managed through an IO staff or IO cell. JFCs may establish an IO staff to

provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting

organizations on all aspects of IO. Most CCMDs include an IO staff to serve as the focal

point for IO. Faced with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a geographic combatant

commander’s (GCC’s) area of responsibility (AOR), a JFC can establish an IO cell to

provide additional expertise and coordination across the staff and interagency.

L e v e

l o f M

il it a ry

E ff o rt

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Information Operations

APPLICATION OF INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES TO THE INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE RELATIONAL FRAMEWORK

This example provides insight as to how information-related capabilities (IRCs) can be used to create lethal and nonlethal effects to support achievement of the objectives to reach the desired end state. The integration and synchronization of these IRCs require participation from not just information operations planners, but also organizations across multiple lines of operation and lines of effort. They may also include input from or coordination with national ministries, provincial governments, local authorities, and cultural and religious leaders to create the desired effect.

Situation: An adversary is attempting to overthrow the government of Country X using both lethal and nonlethal means to demonstrate to the citizens that the government is not fit to support and protect its people.

Joint Force Commander’s Objective: Protect government of Country X from being overthrown.

Desired Effects:

1. Citizens have confidence in ability of government to support and protect its people.

2. Adversary is unable to overthrow government of Country X.

Potential Target Audience(s):

1. Adversary leadership (adversary).

2. Country X indigenous population (friendly, neutral, and potential adversary).

Potential Means available to achieve the commander’s objective:

 Diplomatic action (e.g., demarche, public diplomacy)

 Informational assets (e.g., strategic communication, media)

 Military forces (e.g., security force assistance, combat operations,

military information support operations, public affairs, military

deception)

 Economic resources (e.g., sanctions against the adversary, infusion

of capital to Country X for nation building)

 Commercial, cultural, or other private enterprise assets

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Chapter II

a. IO Staff

(1) In order to provide planning support, the IO staff includes IO planners and a

complement of IRCs specialists to facilitate seamless integration of IRCs to support the

JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS).

(2) IRC specialists can include, but are not limited to, personnel from the EW,

cyberspace operations (CO), military information support operations (MISO), civil-military

operations (CMO), military deception (MILDEC), intelligence, and public affairs (PA)

communities. They provide valuable linkage between the planners within an IO staff and

those communities that provide IRCs to facilitate seamless integration with the JFC’s

objectives.

b. IO Cell

(1) The IO cell integrates and synchronizes IRCs, to achieve national or combatant

commander (CCDR) level objectives. Normally, the chief of the CCMD’s IO staff will serve

as the IO cell chief; however, at the joint task force level, someone else may serve as the IO

cell chief. Some of the functions of the IO cell chief are listed in Figure II-2.

(2) The IO cell comprises representatives from a wide variety of organizations to

coordinate and integrate additional activities in support of a JFC. When considering the

notional example in Figure II-3, note that the specific makeup of an IO cell depends on the

situation. It may include representatives from organizations outside DOD, even allied or

multinational partners.

Potential Ways (persuasive communications or coercive force):

 Targeted radio and television broadcasts

 Blockaded adversary ports

 Government/commercially operated Web sites

 Key leadership engagement

Regardless of the means and ways employed by the players within the information environment, the reality is that the strategic advantage rests with

whoever applies their means and ways most efficiently.

J503 Reading G 24

Information Operations

Information Operations Cell Chief Functions

 Coordinate the overall information operations (IO) portion of the plan for the joint force commander (JFC).

 Coordinate IO issues within the joint force staff and with counterpart IO planners on the component staffs and supporting organizations.

 Coordinate employment of information-related capabilities and activities to support the JFC concept of operations.

 Recommend IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives.

 Determine the availability of information-related capability resources to carry out IO plans.

 Request planning support from organizations that plan and execute information- related capabilities.

 Serve as the primary “advocate” throughout the target nomination and review process for targets that, if engaged, will create a desired effect within the information environment.

 Coordinate the planning and execution of information-related capabilities among joint organizations (including components) and agencies that support IO objectives.

 Identify and coordinate intelligence and assessment requirements that support IO planning and associated activities.

 Coordinate support with the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, and other joint centers and agencies.

Figure II-2. Information Operations Cell Chief Functions

5. Relationships and Integration

a. IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those

capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many military

capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning

process.

(1) Strategic Communication (SC)

(a) The SC process consists of focused United States Government (USG)

efforts to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national

interests, policies, and objectives by understanding and engaging key audiences through the

use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the

actions of all instruments of national power. SC is a whole-of-government approach, driven

by interagency processes and integration that are focused upon effectively communicating

national strategy.

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JP 3-13

J-2 Counterintelligence OPSEC

MILDEC Civil-Military Operations

MISO

J-4

JCEWS/EWC J-5

STO

Cyberspace Operations J-7

Special Ops Task Force JIACG

Physical Security PA

Legal Joint Fires Element

Targeting Cell

J-6

MNF Services

Chapter II

Notional Information Operations Cell

J-2T Rep J-2 Rep

OPSEC Rep

MILDEC Rep

MIS Rep

J-2X Rep

J-9 Rep

J-4 Rep

EW Rep

STO Rep

Cyberspace Rep

SOF Rep

IO Cell Chief J-39

IO Cell

J-5 Rep

J-6 Rep

J-7 Rep

JIACG Rep Physical Security Rep

Joint Fires Legal

PA Rep

Rep MNF Reps

Component Liaison Officers

Rep

Legend

EW electronic warfare

EWC electronic warfare cell JCEWS JIACG

joint force commander’s electronic warfare staff joint interagency coordination group

IO information operations MILDEC military deception J-2 J-2T J-2X

J-39 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-7 J-9

intelligence directorate of a joint staff deputy directorate for targeting joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element information operations staff logistics directorate of a joint staff plans directorate of a joint staff communications system directorate of a joint staff force development directorate of a joint staff civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff

MIS MISO MNF Ops OPSEC PA Rep SOF STO

military information support military information support operations multinational force operations operations security public affairs representative special operations forces special technical operations

Figure II-3. Notional Information Operations Cell

(b) The elements and organizations that implement strategic guidance, both

internal and external to the joint force, must not only understand and be aware of the joint

force’s IO objectives; they must also work closely with members of the interagency

community, in order to ensure full coordination and synchronization of USG efforts. Hence,

the JFC’s IO objectives should complement the overall objectives in accordance with

strategic guidance. The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) representative within

the IO cell facilitates coordination to comply with strategic guidance and facilitate SC.

J503 Reading G 26

II-7

Information Operations

(2) Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Interagency coordination occurs

between DOD and other USG departments and agencies, as well as with private-sector

entities, nongovernmental organizations, and critical infrastructure activities, for the purpose

of accomplishing national objectives. Many of these objectives require the combined and

coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of

national power. Due to their forward presence, the CCMDs are well situated to coordinate

activities with elements of the USG, regional organizations, foreign forces, and host nations.

In order to accomplish this function, the GCCs have established JIACGs as part of their

normal staff structures (see Figure II-4). The JIACG is well suited to help the IO cell with

interagency coordination. Although IO is not the primary function of the JIACG, the group’s

linkage to the IO cell and the rest of the interagency is an important enabler for

synchronization of guidance and IO.

(3) Public Affairs

(a) PA comprises public information, command information, and public

engagement activities directed toward both the internal and external publics with interest in

DOD. External publics include allies, neutrals, adversaries, and potential adversaries. When

addressing external publics, opportunities for overlap exist between PA and IO.

(b) By maintaining situational awareness between IO and PA the potential for

information conflict can be minimized. The IO cell provides an excellent place to coordinate

IO and PA activities that may affect the adversary or potential adversary. Because there will

be situations, such as counterpropaganda, in which the TA for both IO and PA converge,

close cooperation and deconfliction are extremely important. Such coordination and

deconfliction efforts can begin in the IO cell. However, since it involves more than just IO

equities, final coordination should occur within the joint planning group (JPG).

(c) While the IO cell can help synchronize and deconflict specific IO-related

and PA objectives, when implementing strategic guidance that affects the adversary, care

must be taken to carefully follow all legal and policy constraints in conducting the different

activities. For example, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1, Overt

Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in

Contingencies Short of Declared War.

(4) Civil-Military Operations

(a) CMO is another area that can directly affect and be affected by IO. CMO

activities establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces,

governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian

populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to achieve US objectives.

These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military operations. In

CMO, personnel perform functions normally provided by the local, regional, or national

government, placing them into direct contact with civilian populations. This level of

interaction results in CMO having a significant effect on the perceptions of the local

populace. Since this populace may include potential adversaries, their perceptions are of

great interest to the IO community. For this reason, CMO representation in the IO cell can

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JP 3-13

Chapter II

Figure II-4. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure

assist in identifying TAs; synchronizing communications media, assets, and messages; and

providing news and information to the local population.

Habitual Links

Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure

Interagency Planners

Combatant Commander Staff

Directorates

International and Regional Planners

Joint Interagency Coordination Group

Core Element

Mission Augmentation (as needed)

Virtual

Commander, Joint Task Force (JTF),

JTF Staff

US Ambassador Country Team

Group Functions

 Participate in combatant command security cooperation, contingency, crisis, and transition planning

 Advise on civilian agency planning efforts

 Work military civilian operational issues

 Present civilian agency perspectives, approaches, capabilities, and limitations

 Provide habitual links to interagency, regional, and international planners

 Arrange interface on interagency activities

 Coordinate with regional players

Notional Core Staffing

Directory

Deputy

US Agency for International Development

Department of Commerce

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Justice

Department of State

Department of the Treasury

Department of Defense

Executive Officer

Administration

Senior Civilian

Military

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Civilian

Military

Military

J503 Reading G 28

Information Operations

(b) Although CMO and IO have much in common, they are distinct

disciplines. The TA for much of IO is the adversary; however, the effects of IRCs often

reach supporting friendly and neutral populations as well. In a similar vein, CMO seeks to

affect friendly and neutral populations, although adversary and potential adversary audiences

may also be affected. This being the case, effective integration of CMO with other IRCs is

important, and a CMO representative on the IO staff is critical. The regular presence of a

CMO representative in the IO cell will greatly promote this level of coordination.

(5) Cyberspace Operations

(a) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment

consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and

resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and

embedded processors and controllers. CO are the employment of cyberspace capabilities

where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Cyberspace

capabilities, when in support of IO, deny or manipulate adversary or potential adversary

decision making, through targeting an information medium (such as a wireless access point

in the physical dimension), the message itself (an encrypted message in the information

dimension), or a cyber-persona (an online identity that facilitates communication, decision

making, and the influencing of audiences in the cognitive dimension). When employed in

support of IO, CO generally focus on the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities

exercised in and through cyberspace, in concert with other IRCs, and coordination across

multiple lines of operation and lines of effort.

(b) As a process that integrates the employment of IRCs across multiple lines

of effort and lines of operation to affect an adversary or potential adversary decision maker,

IO can target either the medium (a component within the physical dimension such as a

microwave tower) or the message itself (e.g., an encrypted message in the informational

dimension). CO is one of several IRCs available to the commander.

For more information, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

(6) Information Assurance. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information

superiority. The JFC relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability, to

position information for influence, and for delivery of information to the adversary.

Furthermore, IA and CO are interrelated and rely on each other to support IO.

(7) Space Operations. Space capabilities are a significant force multiplier when

integrated with joint operations. Space operations support IO through the space force

enhancement functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; missile warning;

environmental monitoring; satellite communications; and space-based positioning,

navigation, and timing. The IO cell is a key place for coordinating and deconflicting the

space force enhancement functions with other IRCs.

(8) Military Information Support Operations. MISO are planned operations to

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,

motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,

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JP 3-13

Chapter II

organizations, groups, and individuals. MISO focuses on the cognitive dimension of the

information environment where its TA includes not just potential and actual adversaries, but

also friendly and neutral populations. MISO are applicable to a wide range of military

operations such as stability operations, security cooperation, maritime interdiction,

noncombatant evacuation, foreign humanitarian operations, counterdrug, force protection,

and counter-trafficking. Given the wide range of activities in which MISO are employed, the

military information support representative within the IO cell should consistently interact

with the PA, CMO, JIACG, and IO planners.

(9) Intelligence

(a) Intelligence is a vital military capability that supports IO. The utilization of

information operations intelligence integration (IOII) greatly facilitates understanding the

interrelationship between the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the

information environment.

(b) By providing population-centric socio-cultural intelligence and physical

network lay downs, including the information transmitted via those networks, intelligence

can greatly assist IRC planners and IO integrators in determining the proper effect to elicit

the specific response desired. Intelligence is an integrated process, fusing collection,

analysis, and dissemination to provide products that will expose a TA’s potential capabilities

or vulnerabilities. Intelligence uses a variety of technical and nontechnical tools to assess the

information environment, thereby providing insight into a TA.

(c) A joint intelligence support element (JISE) may establish an IO support

office (see Figure II-5) to provide IOII. This is due to the long lead time needed to establish

information baseline characterizations, provide timely intelligence during IO planning and

execution efforts, and to properly assess effects in the information environment. In addition

to generating intelligence products to support the IO cell, the JISE IO support office can also

work with the JISE collection management office to facilitate development of collection

requirements in support of IO assessment efforts.

(10) Military Deception

(a) One of the oldest IRCs used to influence an adversary’s perceptions is

MILDEC. MILDEC can be characterized as actions executed to deliberately mislead

adversary decision makers, creating conditions that will contribute to the accomplishment of

the friendly mission. While MILDEC requires a thorough knowledge of an adversary or

potential adversary’s decision-making processes, it is important to remember that it is

focused on desired behavior. It is not enough to simply mislead the adversary or potential

adversary; MILDEC is designed to cause them to behave in a manner advantageous to the

friendly mission, such as misallocation of resources, attacking at a time and place

advantageous to friendly forces, or avoid taking action at all.

J503 Reading G 30

Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element and Joint Intelligence Operations Center

JTF/J-2 Joint Intelligence Support Element

JTF/J-2 Joint Intelligence Operations Center

Legend

CIA

CSA

CSS

DFE

GEOINT

J-2

J-2X

Central Intelligence Agency

combat support agency

Central Security Service

Defense Intelligence Agency forward element

geospatial intelligence

intelligence directorate of a joint staff

joint force counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff

JTF joint task force

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NSA National Security Agency

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Information Operations

Figure II-5. Notional Joint Intelligence Support Element and Joint Intelligence Operations Center

(b) When integrated with other IRCs, MILDEC can be a particularly powerful

way to affect the decision-making processes of an adversary or potential adversary. The IO

cell provides a coordinating mechanism for enabling or integrating MILDEC with other

IRCs.

Air All-Source Analysis

Watch

Ground All-Source Analysis

Collection Requirements and

Operations

Naval All-Source Analysis

GEOINT Cell

Missile and Space All-Source Analysis

Requests for Information

Red Team/ Terrorism

Open Source Analysis

J-2X

CSA DFE, NGA,

CIA, NSA/CSS

J-3/J-5 Liaison

Air Order of Battle

Watch

Ground Order of Battle

Collection Management

Naval Order of Battle

Targets

Missile and Space Order of Battle

Requests for Information

Terrorism/WMD Analysis

Information Operations

Support

National Intelligence

Support Team

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JP 3-13

Chapter II

(c) MILDEC differs from other IRCs in several ways. Due to the sensitive

nature of MILDEC plans, goals, and objectives, a strict need-to-know should be enforced.

(11) Operations Security

(a) OPSEC is a standardized process designed to meet operational needs by

mitigating risks associated with specific vulnerabilities in order to deny adversaries critical

information and observable indicators. OPSEC identifies critical information and actions

attendant to friendly military operations to deny observables to adversary intelligence

systems. Once vulnerabilities are identified, other IRCs (e.g., MILDEC, CO) can be used to

satisfy OPSEC requirements. OPSEC practices must balance the responsibility to account to

the American public with the need to protect critical information. The need to practice

OPSEC should not be used as an excuse to deny noncritical information to the public.

(b) The effective application, coordination, and synchronization of other IRCs

are critical components in the execution of OPSEC. Because a specified IO task is “to

protect our own” decision makers, OPSEC planners require complete situational awareness,

regarding friendly activities to facilitate the safeguarding of critical information. This kind

of situational awareness exists within the IO cell, where a wide range of planners work in

concert to integrate and synchronize their actions to achieve a common IO objective.

(12) Special Technical Operations (STO). IO need to be deconflicted and

synchronized with STO. Detailed information related to STO and its contribution to IO can

be obtained from the STO planners at CCMD or Service component headquarters. IO and

STO are separate, but have potential crossover, and for this reason an STO planner is a

valuable member of the IO cell.

(13) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO)

(a) All information-related mission areas increasingly depend on the

electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). JEMSO, consisting of EW and joint EMS management

operations, enable EMS-dependent systems to function in their intended operational

environment. EW is the mission area ultimately responsible for securing and maintaining

freedom of action in the EMS for friendly forces while exploiting or denying it to

adversaries. JEMSO therefore supports IO by enabling successful mission area operations.

(b) EW activities are normally planned and managed by personnel dedicated to

JEMSO and members of either the joint force commander’s electronic warfare staff

(JCEWS) or joint electronic warfare cell (EWC). The JCEWS or EWC integrates their

efforts into the JFC’s targeting cycle and coordinates with, the JFC’s IO cell to align

objective priorities and help synchronize EW employment with other IRCs.

For more information on EW, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. For more information on

JEMSO, see JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.

J503 Reading G 32

Information Operations

(14) Key Leader Engagement (KLE)

(a) KLEs are deliberate, planned engagements between US military leaders

and the leaders of foreign audiences that have defined objectives, such as a change in policy

or supporting the JFC’s objectives. These engagements can be used to shape and influence

foreign leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may also be directed

toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders, and tribal leaders; e.g., to

solidify trust and confidence in US forces.

(b) KLEs may be applicable to a wide range of operations such as stability

operations, counterinsurgency operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, security

cooperation activities, and humanitarian operations. When fully integrated with other IRCs

into operations, KLEs can effectively shape and influence the leaders of foreign audiences.

b. The capabilities discussed above do not constitute a comprehensive list of all possible

capabilities that can contribute to IO. This means that individual capability ownership will

be highly diversified. The ability to access these capabilities will be directly related to how

well commanders understand and appreciate the importance of IO.

J503 Reading G 33

CHAPTER III AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the JFC’s authority for the conduct of IO; delineates various roles

and responsibilities established in DODD 3600.01, Information Operations; and addresses

legal considerations in the planning and execution of IO.

2. Authorities

a. The authority to employ IRCs is rooted foremost in Title 10, United States Code

(USC). While Title 10, USC, does not specify IO separately, it does provide the legal basis

for the roles, missions, and organization of DOD and the Services. Title 10, USC, Section

164, gives command authority over assigned forces to the CCDR, which provides that

individual with the authority to organize and employ commands and forces, assign tasks,

designate objectives, and provide authoritative direction over all aspects of military

operations.

b. DOD and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directives delegate authorities

to DOD components. Among these directives, DODD 3600.01, Information Operations, is

the principal IO policy document. Its joint counterpart, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, Joint Information Operations Policy, provides joint policy

regarding the use of IRCs, professional qualifications for the joint IO force, as well as joint

IO education and training requirements. Based upon the contents of these two documents,

authority to conduct joint IO is vested in the CCDR, who in turn can delegate operational

authority to a subordinate JFC, as appropriate.

c. The nature of IO is such that the exercise of operational authority inherently requires

a detailed and rigorous legal interpretation of authority and/or legality of specific actions.

Legal considerations are addressed in more detail later in this chapter.

3. Responsibilities

a. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). The USD(P) oversees and

manages DOD-level IO programs and activities. In this capacity, USD(P) manages guidance

publications (e.g., DODD 3600.01) and all IO policy on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.

The office of the USD(P) coordinates IO for all DOD components in the interagency

process.

“Well may the boldest fear and the wisest tremble when incurring responsibilities on which may depend our country’s peace and prosperity.”

President James K. Polk, 1845 Inaugural Address

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JP 3-13

Chapter III

b. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]). USD(I) develops,

coordinates, and oversees the implementation of DOD intelligence policy, programs, and

guidance for intelligence activities supporting IO.

c. Joint Staff. In accordance with the Secretary of Defense memorandum on Strategic

Communication and Information Operations in the DOD, dated 25 January 2011, the Joint

Staff is assigned the responsibility for joint IO proponency. CJCS responsibilities for IO are

both general (such as establishing doctrine, as well as providing advice, and

recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense) and specific (e.g., joint IO

policy). As the Joint IO Proponent, the Deputy Director for Global Operations (J-39 DDGO)

serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO and coordinates with the Joint Staff, CCMDs, and

other organizations that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities. Joint Staff J-39 DDGO

also provides IO-related advice and advocacy on behalf of the CCMDs to the CJCS and

across DOD. As designated in the Secretary of Defense memorandum on SC and IO, the

Joint Staff also serves as the proponent for the IRCs of MILDEC and OPSEC.

d. Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC is a CJCS-

controlled activity reporting to the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) via J-39

DDGO. The JIOWC supports the Joint Staff by ensuring operational integration of IRCs in

support of IO, improving DOD’s ability to meet CCMD IRC requirements, as well as

developing and refining IRCs for use in support of IO across DOD. JIOWC’s specific

organizational responsibilities include:

(1) Provide IO subject matter experts and advice to the Joint Staff and the CCMDs.

(2) Develop and maintain a joint IO assessment framework.

(3) Assist the Joint IO Proponent in advocating for and integrating CCMD IO

requirements.

(4) Upon the direction of the Joint IO Proponent, provide support in coordination

and integration of DOD IRCs for JFCs, Service component commanders, and DOD agencies.

e. Combatant Commands. The Unified Command Plan provides guidance to CCDRs,

assigning them missions and force structure, as well as geographic or functional areas of

responsibility. In addition to these responsibilities, the Commander, United States Special

Operations Command, is also responsible for integrating and coordinating MISO. This

responsibility is focused on enhancing interoperability and providing other CCDRs with

MISO planning and execution capabilities. In similar fashion, the Commander, United

States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is responsible for advocating on behalf of the

IRCs of EW and CO. The Commander, USSTRATCOM, is also focused on enhancing

interoperability and providing other CCDRs with contingency EW expertise in support of

their missions. For CO, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, synchronizes CO planning.

CCDRs integrate, plan, execute, and assess IO when conducting operations or campaigns.

f. Service Component Commands. Service component command responsibilities are

derived from their parent Service. These responsibilities include recommending to the JFC

J503 Reading G 35

Authorities, Responsibilities, and Legal Considerations

the proper employment of the Service component IRCs in support of joint IO. The JFC will

execute IO using component capabilities.

g. Functional Component Commands. Like Service component commands,

functional component commands have authority over forces or in the case of IO, IRCs, as

delegated by the establishing authority (normally a CCDR or JFC). Functional component

commands may be tasked to plan and execute IO as an integrated part of joint operations.

4. Legal Considerations

a. Introduction. US military activities in the information environment, as with all

military operations, are conducted as a matter of law and policy. Joint IO will always

involve legal and policy questions, requiring not just local review, but often national-level

coordination and approval. The US Constitution, laws, regulations, and policy, and

international law set boundaries for all military activity, to include IO. Whether physically

operating from locations outside the US or virtually from any location in the information

environment, US forces are required by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and

the law of war.

b. Legal Considerations. IO planners deal with legal considerations of an extremely

diverse and complex nature. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ, given the

complexity of technologies involved, the significance of legal interests potentially affected,

and the challenges inherent for law and policy to keep pace with the technological changes

and implementation of IRCs. Additionally, policies are regularly added, amended, and

rescinded in an effort to provide clarity. As a result, IO remains a dynamic arena, which can

be further complicated by multinational operations, as each nation has its own laws, policies,

and processes for approving plans. The brief discussion in this publication is not a substitute

for sound legal advice regarding specific IRC- and IO-related activities. For this reason,

joint IO planners should consult their staff judge advocate or legal advisor for expert advice.

c. Implications Beyond the JFC. Bilateral agreements to which the US is a signatory

may have provisions concerning the conduct of IO as well as IRCs when they are used in

support of IO. IO planners at all levels should consider the following broad areas within

each planning iteration in consultation with the appropriate legal advisor:

(1) Could the execution of a particular IRC be considered a hostile act by an

adversary or potential adversary?

(2) Do any non-US laws concerning national security, privacy, or information

exchange, criminal and/or civil issues apply?

(3) What are the international treaties, agreements, or customary laws recognized

by an adversary or potential adversary that apply to IRCs?

(4) How is the joint force interacting with or being supported by US intelligence

organizations and other interagency entities?

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Chapter III

CHAPTER IV INTEGRATING INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES INTO THE JOINT

OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

1. Introduction

The IO cell chief is responsible to the JFC for integrating IRCs into the joint operation

planning process (JOPP). Thus, the IO staff is responsible for coordinating and

synchronizing IRCs to accomplish the JFC’s objectives. Coordinated IO are essential in

employing the elements of operational design. Conversely, uncoordinated IO efforts can

compromise, complicate, negate, and pose risks to the successful accomplishment of the JFC

and USG objectives. Additionally, when uncoordinated, other USG and/or multinational

information activities, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective. For this

reason, the JFC’s objectives require early detailed IO staff planning, coordination, and

deconfliction between the USG and partner nations’ efforts within the AOR, in order to

effectively synchronize and integrate IRCs.

2. Information Operations Planning

a. The IO cell and the JPG. The IO cell chief ensures joint IO planners adequately

represent the IO cell within the JPG and other JFC planning processes. Doing so will help

ensure that IRCs are integrated with all planning efforts. Joint IO planners should be

integrated with the joint force planning, directing, monitoring, and assessing process.

b. IO Planning Considerations

(1) IO planners seek to create an operational advantage that results in coordinated

effects that directly support the JFC’s objectives. IRCs can be executed throughout the

operational environment, but often directly impact the content and flow of information.

(2) IO planning begins at the earliest stage of JOPP and must be an integral part

of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IRCs can be used in all phases of a

campaign or operation, but their effective employment during the shape and deter phases can

have a significant impact on remaining phases.

(3) The use of IO to achieve the JFC’s objectives requires the ability to integrate

IRCs and interagency support into a comprehensive and coherent strategy that supports the

JFC’s overall mission objectives. The GCC’s theater security cooperation guidance

contained in the theater campaign plan (TCP) serves as an excellent platform to embed

“Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning and encompasses such essential factors as IO [information operations], SC [strategic communication]…”

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011

J503 Reading G 37

specific long-term information objectives during phase 0 operations. For this reason, the IO

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staff and IO cell should work closely with their plans directorate staff as well as the JIACG

in the development of the security cooperation portion of the TCP.

(4) Many IRCs require long lead time for development of the joint intelligence

preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and release authority. The intelligence

directorate of a joint staff (J-2) identifies intelligence and information gaps, shortfalls, and

priorities as part of the JIPOE process in the early stages of the JOPP. Concurrently, the IO

cell must identify similar intelligence gaps in its understanding of the information

environment to determine if it has sufficient information to successfully plan IO. Where

identified shortfalls exist, the IO cell may need to work with J-2 to submit requests for

information (RFIs) to the J-2 to fill gaps that cannot be filled internally.

(5) There may be times where the JFC may lack sufficient detailed intelligence data

and intelligence staff personnel to provide IOII. Similarly, a JFC’s staff may lack dedicated

resources to provide support. For this reason, it is imperative the IO cell take a proactive

approach to intelligence support. The IO cell must also review and provide input to the

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), especially priority intelligence

requirements (PIRs) and information requirements. The joint intelligence staff, using PIRs

as a basis, develops information requirements that are most critical. These are also known as

essential elements of information (EEIs). In the course of mission analysis, the intelligence

analyst identifies the intelligence required to CCIRs. Intelligence staffs develop more

specific questions known as information requirements. EEIs pertinent to the IO staff may

include target information specifics, such as messages and counter-messages, adversary

propaganda, and responses of individuals, groups, and organizations to adversary

propaganda.

(6) As part of JOPP, designation of release and execution authorities for IRCs is

required. For example, release authority provides approval for the employment of specific

IRCs in support of a commander’s objectives and normally specifies the allocation of

specific offensive means and IRCs. For its part, the execution authority constitutes the

authority to employ IRCs. Normally, the JFC is designated in the execution order as the

execution authority. Given the fact that IRC effects are often required across multiple

operational phases, each capability requires separate and distinct authorities.

c. IO and the Joint Operation Planning Process

Throughout JOPP, IRCs are integrated with the JFC’s overall CONOPS (see Figure IV-

1). An overview of the seven steps of JOPP follow; however, a more detailed discussion of

the planning process can be found in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

(1) Planning Initiation. Integration of IRCs into joint operations should begin at

step 1, planning initiation. Key IO staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Review key strategic documents.

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Step 7: Plan or Order Development

Step 1: Planning Initiation

Step 2: Mission Analysis

CDR Issues Planning Guidance

Step 3: COA Development

Step 4: COA Analysis and War Gaming

Step 5: COA Comparison

COA Brief Presented to CDR

Step 6: COA Approval

Information Operations Planning within the Joint Operation Planning Process

Input

 HHQ WARNORD, PLANORD, FRAGORD, OR JSCP

Planning Step IO Cell Functions and Outputs

 Review Strategic Guidance Documents  Identify Level of Planning Detail Required (Level 1, 2, 3, 4)

 Submit RFIs (As Required)  Monitor Situation

 HHQ WARNORD, PLANORD, FRAGORD, OR JSCP  COG/CV Analysis  JIPOE and CIO

 Commander’s Intelligence Estimate SecDef IPR-A (Approved Mission)

 IO Mission Statement  IO Tasks  IO Assumptions  IO Constraints/Restraints

Initial IO Shortfalls Identified

 Initial IO-Related Recommended CCIRs

 IO Staff Estimate Commenced  Submit Recommended CDR’s IO

Planning Guidance 

 COG/CV Products  Mission Analysis Products  IO-Related CDR’s Planning Guidance

 Intel Support

 Updated IPB and CIO SecDef IPR-C (Approved Concept)

 IO Concept of Support  IO effects  IO tasks  MOEs  Target development and prioritization  IO synchronization inputs  IO concept of operations  narrative/sketch

 Identify required supplemental ROE

 Refined CCIRs  Additional IO-Related Shortfalls

(As Required)  IO Staff Estimate Continues

 CDR’s Wargaming Guidance  IO Concept of Support Refined (As Required) IO Staff Estimate

 IO Concept of Support  IO Synchronization Matrix  Target Nominations

 IO effects, tasks, moes refined  IO synchronization matrix inputs refined  Targets refined  IO-related risks refined  IO-related decision points refined

Continues

 IO Concept of Support  CDR’s Governing Factors

 Advantages & Disadvantages of IO Concept of Support  IO Staff Estimate Continues

Recommended COA to J-3/JPG 

 Submit IO-Related COA Approval Brief Inputs to JPG

 IO Staff Estimate  IO Inputs for COA Approval Briefing (As Required)

 CDR Approve COA  IO Cell Inputs to CDR’s Estimate

 CDR’s Approved COA w/Corresponding IO Concept  JPG Guidance

 Type of order to be developed

 FRAGORD, matrix, graphic, etc.

Legend (Part 1 of 2)

3 SecDef IPR-F (Approved Plan)

 Appendix-3 to Annex-C  Staff Coordination  Back-briefs from Component IO Cells, Rehearsals, etc.  Maintain Up-To-Date IO Estimate

Typical time when warning orders are issued to subordinates (may vary as directed by CDR)

Figure IV-1. Information Operations Planning within the Joint Operation Planning Process

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Figure IV-1. Information Operations Planning within the Joint Operation Planning Process (cont’d)

(b) Monitor the situation, receive initial planning guidance, and review staff

estimates from applicable operation plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs).

(c) Alert subordinate and supporting commanders of potential tasking with

regard to IO planning support.

(d) Gauge initial scope of IO required for the operation.

(e) Identify location, standard operating procedures, and battle rhythm of other

staff organizations that require integration and divide coordination responsibilities among the

IO staff.

(f) Identify and request appropriate authorities.

(g) Begin identifying information required for mission analysis and course of

action (COA) development.

(h) Identify IO planning support requirements (including staff augmentation,

support products, and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures

established locally and by various supporting organizations.

(i) Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs and RFIs, keeping in mind the long lead

times associated with satisfying IO requirements.

(j) Provide IO input and recommendations to COAs, and provide resolutions to

conflicts that exist with other plans or lines of operation.

(k) In coordination with the targeting cell, submit potential candidate targets to

JFC or component joint targeting coordination board (JTCB). For vetting, validation, and

deconfliction follow local targeting cell procedures because these three separate processes do

not always occur at the JTCB.

Information Operations Planning within the Joint Operation Planning Process (continued)

Legend (Part 2 of 2)

CCIR CDR CIO COA COG CV

commander’s critical information requirement J-3 commander JIPOE combined information overlay course of action center of gravity critical vulnerability

FRAGORD fragmentary order HHQ IPB IPR IO

higher headquarters intelligence preparation of the battlespace in-progress review information operations

operations directorate of a joint staff joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

JPG joint planning group JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan MOE measure of effectiveness PLANORD planning order RFI request for information ROE rules of engagement SecDef Secretary of Defense WARNORD warning order

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(l) Ensure IO staff and IO cell members participate in all JFC or component

planning and targeting sessions and JTCBs.

(2) Mission Analysis. The purpose of step 2, mission analysis, is to understand the

problem and purpose of an operation and issue the appropriate guidance to drive the

remaining steps of the planning process. The end state of mission analysis is a clearly

defined mission and thorough staff assessment of the joint operation. Mission analysis

orients the JFC and staff on the problem and develops a common understanding, before

moving forward in the planning process. During mission analysis, all staff sections,

including the IO cell, will examine the mission from their own functional perspective and

contribute the results of that analysis to the JPG. As IO impacts each element of the

operational environment, it is important for the IO staff and IO cell during mission analysis

to remain focused on the information environment. Key IO staff actions during mission

analysis are:

(a) Assist the J-3 and J-2 in the identification of friendly and adversary

center(s) of gravity and critical factors (e.g., critical capabilities, critical requirements, and

critical vulnerabilities).

(b) Identify relevant aspects of the physical, informational, and cognitive

dimensions (whether friendly, neutral, adversary, or potential adversary) of the information

environment.

(c) Identify specified, implied, and essential tasks.

planning.

(d) Identify facts, assumptions, constraints, and restraints affecting IO

employment.

(e) Analyze IRCs available to support IO and authorities required for their

(f) Develop and refine proposed PIRs, RFIs, and CCIRs.

(g) Conduct initial IO-related risk assessment.

(h) Develop IO mission statement.

(i) Begin developing the initial IO staff estimate. This estimate forms the basis

for the IO cell chief’s recommendation to the JFC, regarding which COA it can best support.

(j) Conduct initial force allocation review.

(k) Identify and develop potential targets and coordinate with the targeting cell

no later than the end of target development. Compile and maintain target folders in the

Modernized Integrated Database. Coordinate with the J-2 and targeting cell for participation

and representation in vetting, validation, and targeting boards (e.g., JTCB, joint targeting

working group).

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(l) Develop mission success criteria.

(3) COA Development. Output from mission analysis, such as initial staff

estimates, mission and tasks, and JFC planning guidance are used in step 3, COA

development. Key IO staff actions during this step include the following:

(a) Identify desired and undesired effects that support or degrade JFC’s

information objectives.

(b) Develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of effectiveness

indicators (MOEIs).

(c) Develop tasks for recommendation to the J-3.

(d) Recommend IRCs that may be used to accomplish supporting information

tasks for each COA.

(e) Analyze required supplemental rules of engagement (ROE).

(f) Identify additional operational risks and controls/mitigation.

(g) Develop the IO CONOPS narrative/sketch.

(h) Synchronize IRCs in time, space, and purpose.

(i) Continue update/development of the IO staff estimate.

(j) Prepare inputs to the COA brief.

(k) Provide inputs to the target folder.

(4) COA Analysis and War Gaming. Based upon time available, the JFC staff

should war game each tentative COA against adversary COAs identified through the JIPOE

process. Key IO staff and IO cell actions during this step include the following:

(a) Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective.

(b) Reveal key decision points.

(c) Recommend task adjustments to IRCs as appropriate.

(d) Provide IO-focused data for use in a synchronization matrix or other

decision-making tool.

(e) Identify IO portions of branches and sequels.

(f) Identify possible high-value targets related to IO.

(g) Submit PIRs and recommend CCIRs for IO.

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Integrating Information-Related Capabilities Into the Joint Operation Planning Process

(h) Revise staff estimate.

(i) Assess risk.

(5) COA Comparison. Step 5, COA comparison, starts with all staff elements

analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their

respective viewpoints. Key IO staff and IO cell actions during this step include the

following:

(a) Compare each COA based on mission and tasks.

(b) Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus available IRCs.

(c) Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective.

(d) Revise the IO staff estimate. During execution, the IO cell should maintain

an estimate and update as required.

(6) COA Approval. Just like other elements of the JFC’s staff, during step 6,

COA approval, the IO staff provides the JFC with a clear recommendation of how IO can

best contribute to mission accomplishment in the COA(s) being briefed. It is vital this

recommendation is presented in a clear, concise manner that is not only able to be quickly

grasped by the JFC, but can also be easily understood by peer, subordinate, and higher-

headquarters command and staff elements. Failure to foster such an understanding of IO

contribution to the approved COA can lead to poor execution and/or coordination of IRCs in

subsequent operations.

(7) Plan or Order Development. Once a COA is selected and approved, the IO

staff develops appendix 3 (Information Operations) to annex C (Operations) of the operation

order (OPORD) or OPLAN. Because IRC integration is documented elsewhere in the

OPORD or OPLAN, it is imperative that the IO staff conduct effective staff coordination

within the JPG during step 7, plan or order development. Key staff actions during this step

include the following:

(a) Refine tasks from the approved COA.

(b) Identify shortfalls of IRCs and recommend solutions.

(c) Facilitate development of supporting plans by keeping the responsible

organizations informed of relevant details (as access restrictions allow) throughout the

planning process.

(d) Advise the supported commander on IO issues and concerns during the

supporting plan review and approval process.

(e) Participate in time-phased force and deployment data refinement to ensure

IO supports the OPLAN or CONPLAN.

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(f) Assist in the development of OPLAN or CONPLAN appendix 6 (IO

Intelligence Integration) to annex B (Intelligence).

d. Plan Refinement. The information environment is continuously changing and it is

critical for IO planners to remain in constant interaction with the JPG to provide updates to

OPLANs or CONPLANs.

e. Assessment of IO. Assessment is integrated into all phases of the planning and

execution cycle, and consists of assessment activities associated with tasks, events, or

programs in support of joint military operations. Assessment seeks to analyze and inform on

the performance and effectiveness of activities. The intent is to provide relevant feedback to

decision makers in order to modify activities that achieve desired results. Assessment can

also provide the programmatic community with relevant information that informs on return

on investment and operational effectiveness of DOD IRCs. It is important to note that

integration of assessment into planning is the first step of the assessment process. Planning

for assessment is part of broader operational planning, rather than an afterthought. Iterative

in nature, assessment supports the Adaptive Planning and Execution process, and provides

feedback to operations and ultimately, IO enterprise programmatics.

For more on assessments, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

f. Relationship Between Measures of Performance (MOPs) and MOEs. Effectiveness assessment is one of the greatest challenges facing a staff. Despite the

continuing evolution of joint and Service doctrine and the refinement of supporting tactics,

techniques, and procedures, assessing the effectiveness of IRCs continues to be challenging.

MOEs attempt to accomplish this assessment by quantifying the intangible attributes within

the information environment, in order to assess the effectiveness of IRCs against an

adversary or potential adversary. Figures IV-2 and IV-3 are tangible examples of MOP and

MOE sources that an IO planner would have to rely on for feedback.

(1) MOPs are criteria used to assess friendly accomplishment of tasks and mission

execution.

Figure IV-2. Examples of Measures of Performance Feedback

Examples of Measures of Performance Feedback

 Numbers of populace listening to military information support operations (MISO) broadcasts

 Percentage of adversary command and control facilities attacked

 Number of civil-military operations projects initiated/number of projects completed

 Human intelligence reports number of MISO broadcasts during Commando Solo missions

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