Write a 5-7 pages essay about PSCI John Locke, what is political, legislative power and constitution. Citing at least 3 sources provided.

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Second Treatise on Government by John Locke(1690)

Chapter I:

§.3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with penalties of

death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property,

and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the

defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

Chapter II: Of the State Of Nature

§.4. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must

consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to

order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within

the bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any

other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one

having more than another, there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the

same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the

use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another, without

subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any

manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident

and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty…

§.6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence; though man in that

state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not

liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some

nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature

to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind

who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm

another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of

one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent

into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose

workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And, being

furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be

supposed any such subordination among us that may authorise us to destroy one another,

as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.

Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by

the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much

as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an

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offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the

liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

CHAP. IX: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

§. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of

his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he

part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the

dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though

in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and

constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man

his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of

the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to

quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not

without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are

already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties

and estates, which I call by the general name, property.

§. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and

putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in

the state of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common

consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all

controversies between them: for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all

rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of

study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to

their particular cases.

§. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with

authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in

that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to

themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much

heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too

remiss in other men’s.

§. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the

sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended,

will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such

resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to

those who attempt it.

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§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but

in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes

to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The

inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise

of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take

sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of

their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of

punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by

such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on.

And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive

power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

§. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has

two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others

within the permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all

the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other

creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there

would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and

natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided

associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes

committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so

call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any common-wealth, separate

from the rest of mankind.

§. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever be thought for the preservation of

himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society,

so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which

laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

§. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural

force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own

single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law

thereof shall require: for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many

conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community,

as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural

liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall

require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do

the like.

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§. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and

executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far

disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only

with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for

no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be

worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed

to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s property,

by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so

unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any

common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and

known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges,

who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community

at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign

injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed

to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

CHAP. XI: Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.

§. 134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being the enjoyment of their

properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws

established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all common-wealths

is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental naturallaw, which

is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as

will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the

supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the

community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever

conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law,

which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and

appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to

its being a law,*the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make

laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the

obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately

terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can

any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power,

discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting

pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or

farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to

obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.

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§. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in

being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every common-wealth; yet,

First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the

people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that

person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a

state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no

body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an

absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take

away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself

to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power

over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave

him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can

give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative

can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the

public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and

therefore can never* have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the

subjects. The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases

are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce

their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as

well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s actions, must, as well as their

own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God,

of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of

mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.

§. 136. Secondly,* The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a

power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and

decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized

judges: for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the

minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot

so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it

serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live

under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and

that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own

single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish

delinquents. To avoid these inconveniencies, which disorder men’s properties in the state

of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole

society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by

which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural

power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power

into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared

laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was

in the state of nature.

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§. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither

of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the

freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve

their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their

peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do,

to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates,

and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon

them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein

they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal

terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination.

Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and

will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of

them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the

arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to

the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has

such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times

stronger. And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power

ought to govern by declared and received laws, and nor by extemporary dictates and

undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the

state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a

multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their

sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having

any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the

government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and

at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the

people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the

rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their

hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have

known, and own not willingly.

§. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property

without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government,

and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the

people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by

entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an

absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a

right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath a

right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent:

without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which

another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a

mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any common-wealth, can do

what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them

at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists,

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wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution

of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the

rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being,

or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think

themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt

to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for

a man’s property is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and equitable laws to set the

bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects

have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use

and dispose of it as he thinks good.

§. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed,

intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their

properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the

regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a

power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their

own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us

see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute,

but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some

cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial

discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole common-wealth,

requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly

death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see,

that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a

cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier

to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for

deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his

absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier’s estate, or seize

one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the least

disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the

commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods

has nothing to do with it.

§. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit

every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his

proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i. e. the

consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by

them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own

authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental

law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that,

which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?

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§. 141.Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other

hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it

over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by

constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the

people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men,

and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the

people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen,

and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from

the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that

positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the

legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in

other hands.

§. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the

law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all

forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular

cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country

man at plough.

Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good

of the people.

Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of

the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such

governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have

not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by

themselves.

Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any

body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.

CHAP. XII.: Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Common-

wealth.

§. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the

common-wealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it.

But because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to

continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative

should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too

great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have

the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them,

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whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the

law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come

to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society

and government: therefore in well-ordered common-wealths, where the good of the

whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers

persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to

make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves

subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care,

that they make them for the public good…

CHAP. XVIII.: Of TYRANNY.

§. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny

is the exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. And this is

making use of the power any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are

under it, but for his own private separate advantage. When the governor, however

intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his commands and actions are not

directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the satisfaction of his own

ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion…