22 sociology theory questions (Durkheim, Emile ).short answers

LECTURE ONE

WHAT IS THEORY?

PEOPLE inte re s ted in the real world-and th at , I take it, is why most of you are here-a course of lectures on sociological theory might seem a bit off the point. So­

ciology, of course , is fine. It's about society, and that's why you are here . But "theory"? That sounds too much like philosophy, like ideas for their own sake. Studying theory s oun ds like it might be as dry as dust.

l want to suggest to you, however, that a course about t heory is not really as dry and abstract as you might think. True, theories are things that abstract from t he particulars of a particular time and place. So we must often talk quite abstractly when we consider them. But there is an important thing that counteracts this ab­ stracting urge. T heories , we must never forget, are written by people. So in studying theories we are looking not at free-floating abstractions but at things people do. To get to know theories, then, we must get to know a bit about the people who wrote them­ when they lived, how they lived, where they worked, and, most importa nt of all, how they thought. We have to know th ese things because we will always be trying to figure out why they said what they said, why they did not say something else, and often why th ey changed their minds. Most of the time I will try finding answers to these questions inside the theories themselves, but I will try never to forget that behind these theoretical texts are the people and t heir minds.

Moreover, these lectures are not just about any old sociological theory, but about theory in the present day. One of the attractive things 'about a course on contemporary theory is, indeed, that we get to talk about our own time. We talk about contemporary life, first of all, because it has" had such a great effect on contemporary

2 \Vhat Is Theory?

theory. In the course of my lectures, I will suggest, for example, that the Great Depression of the 1930s and the world war that followed it decisively affected sociological theory in the contem­ porary period. The utopian hopes for social reconstruction in the postwar world were vital in shaping the nature of the theory which first emerged. As the 1950s turned into the 1960s, these hopes were dashed. The anger and disappointment which followed played a major role in subsequent theoretical work, for it stimulated new theories which challenged those which were dominant in the period of postwar consensus.

I will be talking about contemporary society, however, not just because it has affected the course of contemporary theory but also because it is this contemporary society, after all, that contemporary theory is at least partly about. There is a lot about theory that is timeless, that generalizes from particulars to establish "laws" or "models" which are intended to hold good for all time. But precisely because those who create these theories are affected by their times, their theories can be read as directed toward them in turn. In discussing these th eories, I will move continually from theoretical abstractions to the empirically concrete, to the America n society you know today, to the conflicts which threaten and inspire us, to the mundane realities of our everyday lives. If my lectures do not get you thinking about empirical things-about everything from the sublime to the ridiculous-in new and intriguing ways, then I have certainly failed.

Before we can get into the "sociological" side of sociological theory, however, we must obviously enter the world of "theory" itself. At least one lecture is going to have to be pretty dry and abstract, and it is only natural that it be the first one. To begin a course you must get first things first. The first thing in a course about theory is, of course, what is theory? I will begin with a simple definition . Theory is a generalization separated from particulars, an abstraction separated from a concrete case. Let me give some examples of this process of abstraction. Economic actors are con­ crete particulars. For example, the president of Chrysler, the au­ tomobile company, is a specific person, Lee Iacoca. If we wanted to describe what Lee lacoca does at the Chrysler Corporation, we would not be doing theory. On the other hand, the "presidents

H-'hat Is Theorv? 3

of automobile companies" are a class of people. �ow we are ab­ stracting from a concrete case. If ,.,,e want to think about what "presidents" of auto companies do, we would have to generalize from particular individuals; we would be making up theories of administrative behavior in automobile companies. If we wanted to study "presidents of American co rporations," we would have still another level of abstra ction. Let's take another example closer to home. If we look at a child interacting with his or her parents, we would be studying a concrete case. If we wanted to lo ok a t many cases of children interacting with many parents, we would be generalizing away from concret e cases and making theories about child/parent intera ction. ·we would be making theories about so­ cia lization.

In this course, however, I am interested not just in theory but in general theory. Sociology is replete with special theories, for example theories about stratification, socialization, politics, a nd administration. You can study these in other, more specialized courses. What genf'ral theories do is take these specia l theories and bring them together. General theories are theories about every­ thing, about "societies" as such, about modernity ra ther than about any particular modern society, about "interaction" rather than about any particular form or genre of interaction. There are special theories about economic classes in society, abom the middle class, the working class, and the upper class. But a general class theory, for example Marxian theory, combines all the!>e special theories about classes into a single theory about economic development and class relations as such.

Now that I have defined very provisionally what theory is, l et me talk a little about its significance. There is much debate today about the role of theory in science and pa rticularly in social science. The position I take here, which will inform this entire course of lectures, is that theory is crucial, indeed that it is the heart of science. Although theories are always involved with and relate closely to factual "rea lity," in the practice of social science it is theories themselves that generate the experiments which test fac�s; it is theories, indeed, which structure the very reality-the "facts"­ which scientists study.

Let me give an exa mple. A great deal of socia l science work today is devoted to finding reasons for Japan's economic success.

4 What Is Theory?

In these studies social scientists have often discovered the high value young Japanese students place on achievement, on the "so­ cialization for achievement" which is eventually translated into hard work and discipline in the adult economic world. But how is the "fact" of such socialization actually found? Is it because the reality of thi s socialization for achievement forces itself upon the social scientific observer? Not really. Studies of socialization have been appearing because many social scientists a re imbued before they arrive in Japan with the theoretical notion that childhood sociali­ zation is decisive for determining how adults work.

Let's continue with another illustration from the Jap anese case. There is a debate raging throughout Europe and the United St at es about the historical reasons for Japan's rapid economic develop­ ment. Some scholars argue that it is the protected military position that Japan has enjoyed since World War II which has allowed it to prosper; others, in a similar vein, have cited the protectionist policies of the Japanese government. Still other scholars, however, have argued that ther-e factors are not decisive, that we must look to the cohesivenesr. of Japanese values and to the solidarity t ha t ties [binds?] workers and [to?] capitalists. These fundamental differ­ ences of scientific opinion cannot, I believe, be resolved simply from a closer look at the facts. although look closely we musl. These dif­ ferences are based upon the ge neral theories scientists hold about what motivates people to act and what kinds of forces hold society to gether. If we believe that people are naturally competitive and invariably selfish, we \'otill look more toward mate rial factors like government and military policy; if we believe, on the other hand, that feelin gs and morality are vital aspects of the social bond, we are much more likely to be led to such "ideal" factors as values and solidarity.

But the significance of theory can be brought still closer to home. American society has been undergoing the revolution called "Reaganomics." It is a practical program in the most practical of all realms, the marketplace. Yet was this practic al policy generated simply as a scientific solution for contemporary economic pr oblems? Not at all. Reaganomics is based on ideas, in the first instance on the ideas of Milton Friedman, but, in a longer time frame, on ideas that go back more than 200 years to the theories of Adam Smith

\Vhat Is Theor_v?

and, before him, to John Locke. It was actually John M ayna rd Keynes, the great economist oppo sed to such free market theori e s, who said that i deas are the most powerful economic force of all.

How are theories generated? Many scientists will admit that theories are more general than facts and are equally important in generatin g scientific ideas. Yet the most significant questi on still remains: h ow are theories produced?

Is theory induced from data, that is, from empirical facts? Ac­ cording to such a notion, we would study a lot of specific cases and gradually make generalizations based on the common quali ties between them . The theory which is so generated, a "covering law," would then be acknowledged to play a decisive role in further empirical work. Thi s notion of induction sounds good, but it is simply untrue . Theory cannot be built \·1:ithout facts, but it cannot be built only with them either. i'\ ow some philosophers of sci ence acknowledge that theory does precede any attempt at gem·raliza­ tion-that we go out into the world of facts armed with theory­ yet they maintain, nonetheless, that we use atheoretical facts to verify or falsify our general theoretical concepts. But this position is no more true than the last, especially for the kinds of general theories with which we will be concerned. Such theories cannot fina lly and conclusively be tested by facts , even though a reference to facts is a vital part of every theoretical test. Facts can challenge some specific propositions in a theory, but a purely factual challenge is limited in two ways. First, the facts ,,·hich we me to cha llenge a theory are themselves informed by theories which we are not testing at t h i s time. Second, even if we allow a specific proposi tion to be falsified, we will rarely give up the general theory of which it is only a small pa rt . Instead, we will launch some revision of the general theory to align its propositions more closely with the se new "factual" reports.

How, then, are theories actually generated? I agree, certainly, that the real world puts terribly strict limits on our theorizing. It would be hard, for example , f or a socia1 scientist to suggest that American society is undergoing a political revolution, just as "real­ ity" would make it hard to write a theory of Soviet society which said t h at it was capitalist rather than commun ist. Yet a few scientists actually have said that American society is undergoi ng a poli tical

5

6 'What Is Theory?

revolution, and others h ave sought to demonstrate that Rus sia is a capitalist, not a communist country. This shows in extremis how theoretical reasoning has relative autonomy vis-a-vis the "real world." Indeed, I have felt compelled to put this last phra s e in quotation marks. Because the limits reality places on science are always me­ diated by prior comm itments, it is impossible for us to know, at any particular time, w h a t exactly reality is.

Theories, then, are generated as much by the nonfactual or nonempirical processes that precede scientific contact with the real world as t h ey are by thi s "real world" structure . By no nfactual processes I mean such things as graduate school dogma, intellectual socializat i o n , and the imaginative speculation of the scienti st, which is based as much on his personal fa n tasy as on external reality itself. In the construction of scient i fic theories, a ll these processes are modified by the real world, but th ey a re never eliminated. There is, then, a double-sided relation between theories and facts.

I will call the nonempirical part of science the a priori element. This elemen t is carried not through observations but by tra d i t i o n s. Such a cla i m might strike you as rather odd. You would normally view science, the prototype of rational i ty a n d modernity, as an­ tithetical t o tradition. In my view, however, science-even when it is rational-vitally depends on tradition. Sociology is an empirical social science, committed t o rigorous test ing, to facts, to the d i s­ cipline of proof a nd falsifica tion. Yet al l t h e s e scientific activities, in my view, occur within t aken-for-granted traditions w hich are not subject to strictly empir i cal evaluation.

What are these scientific traditions? We can agree, no doubt, that they are most likely composed of the basic components of social science. The problem is that people conceptualize these basic components in different ways . It i s fa ir to say, indeed, that these different, often antithetical ways of conceptualizi n g the basic com­ ponent s of social science are exactly what contemporary theoretical

Diagram 1.1.

The Continuum of Scientific Thought "Nontactual"

I I "Faclual"

theoretical empirical environment en\lironment

ll'hat Is Thenn•? 7

debate is all about. Still, identify the basic components we must, for only in this way will we be able to identify the basic traditions which inform the nonempirical basis of the discipline.

This task is more difficult than it might seem, for in social science a range of nonempirical elements are important. It is n ot only beliefs about what these elements are, but which among them is more important, that is passed down from one generation of so­ ciologists to the next. I would like to conceive of these elements as forming a continuum of scientific thought (see diagram 1.2).

Different tradi tio ns of social theory usually take one level of this cont inuum as more determinate than others. They often argue, in fact, that this or that level alone is of ultimate importance. It follows, then, that the various theoretical under!>tandings of the component which is taken to be decisive are the basis for the principal sociological traditions.

Many theorists argue, for example, that it is the ideological level that is decisive. The nonem pi rical element which determines the substance of social scie n tific finding!>, they claim, is the po litical beliefs of the scientists. Sociology is seen as divided between con­ servative, liberal, and radical traditions. Though this perspective on sociological theory-like the others I will discuss-has been with us for centuries, in the postwar period it reemerged in the social con fl i cts of the 1960s. Critical sociologists came to view academic sociology as an "establishment" or "priestly" discipline, an ideological theory challenged by the revolutionary or prophetic sociol ogy of the New Left.

Diagram 1.1. The Scientific Continuum and Its Components

Metaphysical environment

""Theories'' "fads"

Empirical environment

I ------· ------i!l .. ~ .. .. .. ; "' .. ;;; ., C .; a. C C Q. C C ~ ,g ~ .!2 .. ~ ... .!2 ,:, .. ... -~ •oc VI .. 0 "' :£ ';. .. QC ";. .. l C C c 0

~ 1 -o > O·-

Cl. -~ u 'ti .., .. ..,- .;

Cl. C C c 0 Q. 0 C .. .Q a ..:! C u .c E II( :: .; ~ 0 .. -;; u ~-~ C. "' Q. C ~ .. ·;, E a. .. .!2 o e ii; .. u Cl.

C .. II 31 \J

8 ·what Is Theory?

Other social scientists argue, just as strongly, that it is the model level that determines the fundamental nature of sociological thought. Models are deliberately simplified, highly abstract pictures of the world. There are models, for example, which describe society as a functioning system, like the physiological system of the body or the mechanical system of an internal combustion engine. Other models view society as composed of separate institutions without any integral, systemic relationship to one another. For those who emphasize the model level above all else, it is the decision about functional versus institutional models that is responsible for the complexion of a social theory. Whereas the ideological approach argues that a scientist's political decisions generate models, this second group of theorists ar gues that it is decisions about functional vs. institutional models that generate ideological commitments. They have frequently argued, for example, that functionalist models lead to conservative ideology. Ideological theorists, by contrast, have often argued in the opposite way, that conservative political beliefs lead to the adoption of functional models.

Another level of the sociological continuum that has often been take n to be decisive is the methodological. It is argued that decisions about whether to pursue quantitative versus qualitative techniques, or comparative an alysis in contrast to case studies, are decisive in structuring general sociological theories. At a less technical level,' methodological disputes focus on the role of abstract theorizing versus empirical fact gathering. This, of course, is the very dispute I have just engaged in here! Adherents to different sides in these methodological debates often share a belief which I do not: they o ften believe that it is from these decisions about methodology that commitments to models and ideologies arise. It is not, they believe, the other way around.

Finally, there are a number of social theorists today who argue that a sociologist's decision about whether the world is in equilib­ rium or in conflict is the most absolute and decisive one he can make. "Conflict theory," for example, insists that if assumptions are made that society is consensual, then models will be chosen that are functional, systemic ideolo gical positions taken that are conservative, and methodologies employed that are empiricist and anti theoretical.

\.Vhal Is Theory•? 9

From what I have said, you have probably picked up a note of skepticism . I do not want you to get the idea, ho·wever, that I regard t hese discussions as irrelevant. Each of the nonempirical assumptions they focus on is, in my view, vital for sociological theorizing. I will ha\o·e occasion throughout these lectures to focus on each of these different levels-model, method, ideology, em­ pirical conflict, or consensus-and to argue for its importance in determining the shape of a particular the oretical position or the­ oretical change .

At the same time, I would like to argue that each of these strongly held theoretical positions is reductionistic. While each of these levels is significant, no single level actuatly has the determinate power often attributed to it. Ideology is important, but it is quite wrong to try to reduce the ory to the influence of political as­ sumptions. It is not at all unusual, indeed, to find that theorists with very different politi cal ideas produce theories that are similar in significan t ways. Just so, it is wrong to think of models as so decisive. Models are important, but they cannot determine the other assumptions that theorists make. Functional models, for ex­ ample, are promoted today by radical Marxists as well as by con­ servative;;. Some functionalists see system requirements as contra­ dict o r y a nd ultimately self-destructive; others see them as complementary and self-maintaining. In the same way, there are functionalists who are empiricists and others who appreciate the independence of the nonempirical side of theory. To consider another typical reduction, it seems awfully wrongheaded to attributt decisive power to methodological commitments. In the histo ry oJ sociology, the same methodology has substantiated the most radi cally conflicting positions . There are, for example, both quantitativt Marxist theories of class formation and quantitative liberal theorie: which replace class with status. The methodological commitment are the same, but the theories are very different. Finally, whethe or not a theorist takes the world to be in a state of conflict simp}: cannot, in my view, determine the other characteristics of his theor)' Marx saw society as in conflict, but so did Hegel, and few wouh put their theories into the same camp.

But the problem with these contemporary debates is not simp] that they are reductionist, thal. they conflate what are actuall

10 What Is Theory?

relatively independent levels. The pro blem is also that most of these co nt empo rary debates ignore the most gene ral nonempirical level of all. I will call this the level o f presuppositions. In the second part of this lecture, I will outline what these presuppositions are, and I will suggest that they form the dominant traditions in social thought. In my conclusion , I will finally come back to my topic of contemporary sociological the ory . I will bring this abstract discussion of traditions down to earth by discussing the intellectual and social forces which brought the center of theoretical debate to the United States in the period immediately a fter World War II.

By presuppositions, I refer to the most general assumptions that every sociologist makes-what he " presupposes" -when he en­ counters reality. It seems obvious, I hope, that the first thing a student of social life presupposes is the nature of action . When you are thinking about what action is like , you usually think about whether it is rational or not. The "problem of action," then, is whether we assume actors are rational or nonrational. N ow I do not mean to imply here the commonsense equation of rational with goo d and smart, and nonrational with bad and stupid. I do not mean, in other words, that n onrat io n al action is "irrational." In social theor y, rather, this dichotomy refers to whether people are selfish (rational) or idealistic (nonrational), whether they are nor­ mative and moral (nonrational) in their approach to the world or purely instrumental (rational), whether they act in terms of max­ imizing efficiency (rationally) or whether they are governed by emotions and unconscious desires (nonrationally). All these dicho­ tomies relate to the vital question of the internal versus external reference of action. Rationalistic approaches to action portray the actor as taking his bearings from forces outsi de of himself, whereas nonrational approaches imply that action is motivated from within.

By calling this choice presuppositional, I am suggesting that every social theory and every empirical work takes an a priori position on this problem of action. Each does not, however, necessarily have to choose one side to the exclusion of the other. Action may be portrayed, though it usually is not, as having both rational and nonrational elements.

Yet to answer the central question about action is not enough. A second major issue needs to be presupposed. I will call this the

What Is Theory? II

"problem of order." Sociologists are sociologists because they believe there a re patterns to society, that there are structures separate from the individuals who compose it. Yet while all sociologists believe this, they often disagree sharply about how such an order is actually produced. I will call this an argument between individ­ ua list ic and collectivist approaches to order.

If thinkers presuppose a collectivist position, they see social pat­ terns as existing prior to a ny specific individual act, as, in a sense, the p roduct of history. Social order confronts the newborn indi­ vidual as an established fact that is "outside " of him. Now, i f they are writing about adults, collecti.,·ists may well acknowledge that social order exists as much inside the individual as with out ; in fact, this is an important point to which we will return. The issue here, however, is that whether it is conceptualized as inside or outsid e an actor , social order from the collectivist perspective is not seen as the product of purely this-instant, this-moment considerations. Any individual act, according to collectivist theory, is pushed in the direction of preexisting structure, although this direction re­ mains only a probability for those collectivists who acknowledge that action has an element of freedom. Thus, for colle ctivist theory , it is the economy that determines the direction of individual eco­ nomic a cto rs, not entrepreneurs who create the economy; it is the religious system that determines the behavior of an individual be1iever, rather than the church which springs from faith; it is the party organizations that produce politicians, not politicians who make parties.

Individualistic theorists often acknowledge that there do appear to be such extra-individual structures in society, and they certainly recognize that there are intelligible patterns. But they insist, all the same, that these patterns are the result of individual negotiation, that they are the upshot of individual choice. They believe not simply that structures are "carried" by individuals but that they are actually produced by actors in the concrete, ongoing processes of individual i nteraction . For them, it is not only that individuals have an element of freedom but that they can alter the fundaments of social order at e.,·ery successi.,·e point in historical time. Individ­ uals, in this view, do not carry order inside of them. Rather, they follow or rebel against social order-even their own values -ac­ cording to their individual desires.

1 2 What Is Theory?

I do n ot regard t h e problems of action and order as " optional . " l believe that every theory takes s o m e position on bot h . B u t I will go even fu rth er than this. I want to argue that the logical per­ mutations a m o n g presuppos i t ions form the fun damental traditions of sociology. T h ere have been ration al- individual istic theories and r ational-co l l ectivist theories. Theories have bee n normative-indi­ vidualistic and normati v e-col lectivist . T h ere have also been some attempts i n t h e h i s tory of social t h ough t-too fe w a n d far be­ tween-to tra n scend these dichotom i e s in a multidimen sional way .

These pre suppo sitional issues are of m uch more th an academic concern. W hatever posit ion theor i s t s take , fu ndamental values are at stake . The study of soc iety revolves around the questions of freedom and orde r , and every theory is pul led between these poles . This is , I thin k , a peculiarly Western dilemma, or better yet, a peculiarly m odern o n e . As m odern m e n and women , we beli eve that individu a l s have free w i l l - i n religious term s , t h a t every human being has an i n violable soul-and beca use of t h i s , we believe, each person has the capacity to act i n a respo nsible wa y . S u c h cultural bel iefs have bee n , t o one degree or another, institutionalized in every W estern soc i e t y . The indiv idual has been set apart as a special unit . T h e re have been elaborate legal efforts to protect him or her from the group, from the state , and from oth e r , cultura lly " coercive" organs l i ke the church .

Sociolog ical t h eori sts have usually taken these developments quite seriously, and like other cit i ze n s of Western society have tried to protect this individual free dom. I n deed , soc i ology emerged as a discipline from t h i s very differe n t iation of the individual in society, for it was the i n depende n c e of the i n d i vidual , the growth of his powers to t h i n k fre ely about society , w h ic h al lowed society itself to be conceived of as a n i n depe n d e n t object of study . I t is the i ndepe ndence of the individual that makes " order" problematic, and it is this problernatizing of order that makes sociology possible. At the same time , sociologists a c k n owledge that there are pat terns even in this modern order and that the everyday l i fe of indivi duals has a deeply structured qual i t y . T h i s is j u s t what makes the values of " freedom" a n d " i ndividuality" so precious. It is t h i s tension between freedom and order that prov ides the intellectual a n d moral rationale for sociology : sociology explores the nature of soc ial order

Wh a t Is Theo ry? 1 3

in large pan because it is concerned about its implications for individual freedom.

Individualistic theories are attractive and powerful because they preserve ind ividual freedom in an overt, explicit, and complete way. Their a priori postulates assume the integrity of the rational or moral individual, tak ing for granted that the actor is free o f h i s situation defined either a s material coercion o r moral influence. Yet the freedom of the indiv idua listic pmition, in my view, is achieved at great th eoretical c ost. It gives an unrealistic and artificial voluntarism to the actor in society. I n this sense individualistic theory does freedom no real serv ice. It ignores the real threats that social structure often poses to freedom and, by the same token, the great susten ance to freedom that soc ial structures can provide. I t seems to me that the moral design of i ndi viduali stic theory encourages the illusion that individuals have no need for others or for society as a whole.

Collectivist theory , on the other hand, ack n owledges that social controls exist, and by doin g so i t can subject these controls to explicit analysis. I n this sense co llectivist t hought represe nts a great gain over indi v idualistic t h ought , both morally and theoretically. The question , of c ou rse, is whether this ga in can be ach ieved only at an unacceptable price . What does such collectivist theorizing lose? How is t h e collective force it postulates related to t h e individual w i l l , to vol u n tarism, and to sel f-co n t ro l? Before we try to a n swer t his decis:ve questi on, we mu st be clear about a vital fact : assump­ tions about order do not entail any particular assumptions about action . Because of this indeterm i n a c y , there are very different kinds o f collectivist theory.

The way I see i t , the crucial a n d decisive question of whether collective theory is worth the cost hinges on whether it presupposes instrumental or moral acti on . Many col lectivist theories assume that actions are motivated by a narrow , merely tec hnically efficient form of rationality . When this happen s , collective structures are portrayed as if they were external to individ uals in a physical sense. These seemingly external-material structures, like political or economic systems, are said to c ontrol actors from without , whether they like it or not. T hey do so by arranging pun itive sanct ions and positive rewards for an actor who i s reduced to a calculator of pleasure

1 4 Wha t Is Theo ry?

and pa i n . Because this act o r i s assumed to respond obj ective l y t o ou tside influences, " moti ves" are eliminated as a theoretical con­ cern . Subj e ctivity drops out of collectivist analysis w h en it takes a r a t ionalist form , for it is then assumed that the actor's response can be predicted from the analysis of his external environm en t . T h i s environment , not t h e nature o r extent of the actor' s personal involvement with it, is considered determ i nate . I am arguin g, t hen , t h a t rational -collectivist theories explain order only by sacrificing t h e subject, by eliminat i n g the very n o t i on of the self. In classical socio l o gy , reductionist i c forms of Marx ist t h eory presents the most

formidable example of t h is development , but i t also pe rvades the sociology of W eber and Uti l i ta rian theory as well.

I f, by contrast , col lectivist theory allows that ac tion may be n o n rational , it percei ves actors as gu ided by ideals and emotio n . I deals and e m o tion are located w i t h i n rather t h a n w ithout . I t is true, of c ourse , t h a t this internal r e a l m of subjecti v i t y i s init ial ly structu red by encounters w ith "external " objects-w ith paren ts, teachers, siblings , and boo ks, w i t h all th e varied sorts of c u l t u r a l carriers and obj ect attachments encou ntered by young "social i n­ itiates . " Yet accor ding to n o nrational collective theory , in the process of sociali zation such extra- i n d i v i d u a l st ructu res become internal to t h e self. O n l y if this process of internalization is ac­ knowledged ca n subj ec t i vity and m o t i vation become fundament al topics for social theo ry , for if i n ternalization is accepted it is obvious that som e vital relat ionsh i p exists between t h e " i n side" and the " o u tside " o f any act . Indiv idual volition becomes part of soci al order , and real soc i a l l i fe i nvolves nego t iat i on not between the asocial individual an d h is world hut between t h e social self a n d the social world . Such thin king lea ds to what Talcot t Parsons called a voluntaristic approach to ord e r , though , I should warn you , this i s not vol u n tarism i n an indiv i d u alistic sense . To t h e contrary , voluntarism m ight be sai d to be exempl ified by t h e ories w hich see in divid uals as socialized by cultural systems.

T h e dangers tha t such theori zing encou n t ers are quite the op­ posite from t h ose e ncounte red by collectivist theories of a more rationalistic sort. Moralistic and idealist theories often underesti­ mate t he ever present tension between i n dividual voliti o n a n d col lective order . There i s a strong tendency to assume an inna te

�'\!ha t Is Theory? 1 5

com plementarity betwe e n t he social self and that se ! f s world-in religious terms , between t h e indi vidual soul and the will of God , in political terms between i ndividual a n d coll ective w i l l .

I hope that this brief discuss ion of t h e stre n g t h s and the weak­ nesses of instrumen tal and moral forms of collectivist th eory gives you some idea of how importa nt a syn th e s i s between them might be . While each has its ach ie vemen ts , each by i tself tends toward a dangerous one-dimensionality w h i c h over looks v ital aspects of the human con d i t i o n . I would argue on bo th mora l a nd sci e n t i fi c grou nds that theory should interweave t h e interna l and extern a l elem e n t s of collective con trol . I w i l l not e v e n try to t e l l y o u a t th is point what such a m u l t idimensional theory m i ght look l i k e . My goa l for these l ect ures i s to o u tl i n e one . I w i l l do so through a cri t i ca l recon struc tion of sociolog i c al theor y s i nce W orld War I I .

Presupposi tions about ac tio n a n d order are the " trac ks" a l o n g w h i c h soci ology r u n s . W h ether t heo r ists or n o t , sociolog i s t s make pres uppositional de c i sion s a n d t h ey must l i ve with t h e consequences . W h a t these presu ppositions are , a n d what the i r c o n sequ ences have been , will be m y point o f de p artur e throughout this cours e .

Presu pposi t i onal choices determ i n e not on l y t heoretica l poss i b i l ­ i ties in a pos i t i ve sen se but also constr a i n t s a n d v u l n e rabi l i ties . Every presuppositional posit ion closes off ce r t a i n a ven ues even w h i l e i t ope ns up o t h e n . T heorists often h a v e second t h oughts about leav i n g some possi b i l i t i es o u t , and in this s e n se t h e i r presuppositions are stra i tja ckets from which they try to escape . The pro b l e m i s tha t if they escape to o far t h e y w i l l beco m e d i ffere n t theor i s t s altoge t h er. T h e r e are , i ndeed, often d e c i s i v e " b re a ks " in a theorist ' s wor k . T h e earl y a n d l a t e r t h ough t o f Marx is the most famous exampl e , and i n the lec tures which fo llow I wi l l talk about s i m i lar rupt u res in the th eories of Garfi n k e l and Geertz. But theorists rarely w a n t to change their i dea s so abruptly . More often , they want to mainta i n the dom i n a n t t h r mt of their ideas while avoidi n g some o f their con sequ e n c e s . T h e resu l t is that they i n troduce re v i s ions only in an ad h oc way. The new concepts become am­ bigu o u s . s o t h e ';ol d " th eory c a n s t i l l be s u stained . I will call th ese ad hoc c o ncepts "resi d u a l categories" because they are o u tside the theo r i st 's explicit and syst e m a t ic l i ne o f argume n t . You m i g h t t h i n k of residual categories a s theo retical afterthough ts: a t heor ist i n v e n t s

1 6 Wh a t Is Theo ry ?

them to respond to nagging worries that he has ignored some crucial point.

I n the course of these lectures we will find that even master theorists move uneasily between ambiguous revisions and the reas­ sertion of their original presuppositional position "in the last in­ stance. ' ' I will suggest that these options form the poles of a dilemma from which theorists cannot easily escape . Every theoretical position , I believe , produces its own particular dilemma . I t is often the followers of master theorists w ho are particularly sensitive to the dilemmas they faced. They want to defend them selves against

criticism , but they also want t o be loyal to the orthodox work . A s a result, they may seize on a tradition ' s residual categories and try to work them up i n a more systematic way . Sti l l , they have not escaped from the original th eoretical dile m m a . If they want to remain loyal to the master's tradition , they can rework his residual categories only u p to a certain point. In the end , they must be allowed to retain their residual status , for only in this way can the " typica l " elements of the origi n a l theory be p reserved.

Just as I will focus i n the fol l o w i n g lectures on the presuppositions which determine the tracks along which various theories run , I w i l l also try to show you how every presupp o s i t i onal position leads to strains which can derail i t . I will describe the residual categories which i nvariably appear and the theoretical dilemmas wh ich are typical of sociological theory in the con t e m porary period. In this way I should be able to trace not just the basic structures of contemporary theory , but its i n ternal dynamics as wel l , the strains and conflicts which lead to subtraditions, countertraditions, and to theoretical change .

I w i l l not , however, focus on presuppositions alone. At some point i n the course of these l ectures every differen t level of the sociological continuum will emerge as i m portant, sometimes as decisive. It would be foolish to i gnore, for example , the vast ram ifications of ideology. Sociological theories are not simply at­ tempts to explain the world , b u t also efforts to evaluate it, to come to terms with broader questions of meaning. Because they are existential s tatements and not just scientific ones, they invariably h ave enormous political implication s . For this reason , they must

always be read against the pol itics of their day. How a theorist

Wha t Is Th eo n ? 1 7

reso l v es the p resu ppositional tension be tw een fr eedom and contr o l is re l a ted t o -th ough not de term i n ed by-the ideologi cal response h e makes to this tension as i t a p p ea r s , for example, in the political conflict between capitalism and soc ialism .

N o r will I neglect the enorm ous i mpact on more general as­ sumptions of c h a n ges in the organ i zation of the empirical world i tself. If a theory cannot be usefu l for concre te empir i ca l analysis, it fa i l s . I f a theory is perc eiv ed as depen d i n g upon empirical propositions that are wro ng, it i s discred ited. I t i s for this reason that the changing empir ical e n vironmen t of sociological theory­ the ebb and flow of war and peace , th e i n c reas i n g d i fferen t i a t i o n and rat ional i zation o f po l i tics a nd e con o m ic s , t h e con fidence o r disillu sion in public l i fe-have had a n enormous i m pact on t h e development o f con temporary soc i a l theory i tself.

So far I have spent a great dea l of time on a fe w ex tremely abstract theore tical issues. This is the end of the " dry a s dust" i n troduct i o n that is n ecessary for our d i scussion t o proceed . I t is time to come back to eart h . The t ransition is easy to m a k e , because the " logical possi b i l i t i e s " I have descri bed are concretized i n the history o f soc ial thought by spec i fi c i n tellec tua l tradi t i o n s . Each logical positi o n , indee d , was arti c u lated by one of the sociological traditio n s which d e fi n ed the " cl a ss i c a l " period of sociology between 1 8 50 and 1 92 0 . These concrete e m bod i m e n t s of a n a l y tical possi­ bili ties fo rmed the reso u rces from w h i c h sociological t h eory in the conte mpora r y per iod h as drawn .

Karl Marx assumed that t h e e x p l o i t a tive eco nomy of capital ist society produced alienated , instrume n tally m ot i vated men and women who had no access to nonratio nal feel i n gs and ideals . Oppressed by the overarch i n g structures of the capitalist economy, these very collect ive struct ures would lead th e m , r ewar d them , and p u n ish them into revolt against capitali s m a n d t oward soci a l is t reco nstruc­ tion . Emi le Durkheim theorized i n an opposite way . H e ten ded to view society as a cultural and symbo l i c rea lm in which the most tellin g social ties are those of sol i d a r ity and affect . I n con trast to a world of explo i t ation, he descr ibed a kind of secularized religious world in w h i c h so ciall)· structur ed voli tion was the real stuff of social l i fe . Max "-'eber someti mes tried to combi n e th ese material ist and idealist positions . H e beli eved , fo r exampl e , that the h istorical

1 8 What Is Theory?

ori gins of m odern ratio nality coul d be traced t o no n ration a l e t h ical and religious be l i e fs . Yet his t heory of modern society e nded up developin g a political version of rational-coll ect i v i st t heory . N ot ju s t economics-here he departed empirically from M arx-but the state , the law , and b u reaucracy were v iewed as stru ctu res that dom inated modern individual s from w i thou t .

I n m y v iew , these are th e ma i n th read s , the dom in a n t traditions , which constitute the i n h e r itance of contemporary soc iological the­ ory . Yet th ere are other classical tra d i t ions as we l l , a nd we must be aware of these, too , if we are t o understa nd the fu l l ra n ge of resources with which contemporary theory began . Adam S m ith wrote lon g before the major for m ul ators of the m o d er n soc iological discipli n e , yet h i s " c lassica l economic t heory" of market rationa lity and cost max i m i zation has conti n ued to form an i m po r tant ref­ erence po i n t for a l l attempt s at soc i a l theory w h ich seek an i ndi­ vidual i stic and ra t i o nalist ic form . T h e th eories of S i m me l , M ead , and Freud also h a d i ndividu al i stic e l e m e n t s , but t h ese w ere muc h more ambiguously form ulated tha n were A d a m S m i t h ' s . I nd eed, in my v i ew their theories s h o u l d be seen more in terms of m i cro­ scopic versus macroscopic e m p i rica l foci t h a n i n terms of in d ivid­ ualistic versus c o l lectivist presupposi t i o n s . They studied i n div i duals and groups-a " m icro" empha sis- rath er than " m a cro " t h i n gs l i ke i n stitutions or soc ieties as a wh o l e . Y et t h e traditions t h ey es tabl ished did contain i n d ividualis tic ele m en ts , and these prov ided i mportant reference points for conte mporary efforts to m a i n t ai n such a pre­ suppositional stance.

Sociological theory , then , exists in time and space a n d not j ust alo n g some abstract scientific co n t i n u u m . I t is carried by trad i tions and made up by real h u man bei n g s . I n t h i s last part of my lectu re, l would l i ke to talk a bit abou t the t i m e and place i n which c ontem porary sociolo gical theory be ga n .

The c l assica l traditio ns of sociology w e re formed m ore or les s by the end of W orld War l . T h i s first period of world war , and the tw ilight zone w hich interceded between it and the next , were decisive in affecti n g the chara c t er of con temporary thou gh t . But if this establishes t h e time re fere n c e for theory , what about its " space " ? In the beg i n n i n g , th ese c l a ssical tradi t i o n s were , w i th t he exception of Mead and pragmatis m , e ntirely Europea n . I n th e post-

Wh a t Is Theo r_v ? 1 9

W o rld W ar I I per i o d , t heory underwe n t a sea c h ange. I t moved d ecisiv ely towa rd A meri c a .

W h y d i d the Europea n traditions o f sociological theory not con­ tinue i n the i m mediate, p ost-World War II peri od? Its orig i n a tors p rodu ced great ide a s . Why this temporal hia tus and ge ogra p h i cal s h i ft?

Euro pean sociolo gy s u ffered greatly in the period b e tween the two world w a r s. The stor;.-· of thi s interlude has never been told i n a satisfactory w a y , bu t I think cert a i n basic poin t!'. are c l ear. T h ere were , first of a l l , intellectual and i n s t i tutional prob l e m s . Enorm o us organi zatio n a l barriers to so c i o logy e x i sted in Eu ropean u n iversities, w h ich were old and venerable i n sti tutions c o m m i tted to classica l schola r ship and hum a nities . D u r k he i m , for examp l e , w a s for a good part o f h is caree r unable to a c q u i re a " ch a i r " in sociology, and when he finally did so it was a profe ssorsh ip in sociology and educa t io n . S i m m el cou ld not fi n d a major positi on u n t i l t h e end of h i s c a re e r , a lthough t h i s had as much to do w ith anti-Semitism as i n s t i t u t i o n a l opposi t ion . W h i l e the re were idiosyn ­ crati c reas ons for Webe r ' s failure to h o ld a n i m portant un i v ers ity posi tion as w e l l , it is n ot a cci den tal tha t he w a s r e garded as m uch as a historica l eco nomist a s a sociologist for most of his l i fe .

A s f o r the int el lectual ba rriers to E u ropean sociolo gy , th ere e x i sted in Euro pe fe w s t ron g trad i t i o n s of em pirical research to legitimate and concre t ize soc ial t heory . ln pa r t t h i s was beca use of the i n tellectua l hege m o n y of cla ss i cis m and h u m a n ism , bu t it was a l s o because o f t h e radical cu ltural an d intel lec t u a l antago n is m among many European i nt e l lectuals lO co n tem porary so ciety itself. The Europea n alt e r n a tiv e to soci ology w a s � a rx i sm , and though Marxism certa inl y flourished it often assu m ed a practi cal , pol i ti ci z ed form t hat was opposed to th e ra ri fied discussions of " high" intel­ lectual life. T h e most im porta n t a n d soph ist ica t ed M ar x i s t i n t el­ lectua l s , moreov er , were for poli ti cal reaso n s often deta c h e d or exclu ded from soc iology as a n aca de m i c discipline.

There w ere also soc ial and ideologic al forces behind th e diffi­ culties of European socio logy in t h e inter w a r period. T h e se c an , rathe r melodramat ical l y , be des c ribed a s the crisis of Eu ropean civil ization itself. Europe b e tween the yea r s 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 4 5 was inh ospitable to t h e c o nt i n u i ty o f any intel l ectual tra d itio n s . Soci-

2 0 What Is Theory?

ological theories , moreover, were not just any traditions but tra­ di ti o ns of a very particu lar type . Classical sociological th eory was i nspired by an opti m i s t i c faith that reasonable solutions could be foun d for th e proble m s of secular i ndustrial society. I t was p rem ised upon the assumpt ion that, despit e soc ial upheaval , i m portant ele­ m en ts of individua l ity and reason would be preserve d . True , some of the c lassical theorists were m o re pe s s i m istic about the cha nces for reform than o ther s : M a r x demanded a th orou gh reconstruction if h i s faith and hope were to be redeemed . O ther classical theorists seemed-from o u r presen t perspec tive-much too o p t i mistic about ach ieving rationality and freedom i n t h e i r own t i m e . One t h i n k s here of M ea d , and sometimes of Durk h ei m . B ut o n l y W eber was a truly pessimistic m a n . Still , h e was l ibe ral , if a liberal i n despai r . C lassical theory w a s wri tten n o t simply w i t h the hope b u t t h e expectation t h a t p e o p l e could gain control over t h e i r s o c i e t y a n d maintain freedom as well. Th ese i m m i n e n t cha n ges-whether re­ form or revolution- would m i x reaso n w i t h social con trol .

I n Europe between t h e w a r s , however, th ese hopes of the soci­ o l o gical founders were dash ed . The lead i n g members of D u r k heim ' s school were ki lled during World W a r I . D u r kh eim and W eber, indeed . both died a t relatively early ages from causes related to the war itself. In this period as wel l , the E n l i gh ten ment hopes of M arxism were sharply set back. W ith t h e o n set of t h e war Eu ropean w o rki n g class movements abandoned i n t e r nationalism and pac i fi sm for the m i l itan t pa t r i o t i s m of their respec tive national strugg les . By the 1 9 3 0 s . Europea n civilization w a s engulfed by the grow ing tide of irrationalism and instability. Som etimes European intellec­ tuals did not see the extent of the pr ob lem . When they did , they u sually fel t h elpless to prevent i t . M a n y of the lead i n g stu dents of the great sociological founders eve ntual ly fled Europe for the U nited States .

I n America the situation was entire l y differe n t , and sociology came to have a very d i fferent place. I ntellectually and institutionally, American sociology was able to avoid the debilitating forces ex­ perienced by its European counterpart . Because American univer­ sities were relative ly new, without sharply differentiated status groups or established i n stitutional cores, the new d iscipl i ne of sociol ogy w as given more of a c h ance. Often it was r eceived with open arms.

\-Vh a t Is Th eo ry:? 2 1

Politi cally , sociology was associated n ot with a radical tradition but with a more socially i n tegra t i v e and refor mist on e . T h e relat i vely progressive and l ibe ral character of A merican society made " a n ti­ socio l o gica l " i n tellectual m o v e m e n ts like �·l a rx i s m less likely to emerge.

Socially and ideologica l l y , m o r e o ver , A m erica remained rel a t i ve ly u n affected by the growing c r i s i s of European ci v i l i zatio n . American i ntellectual l i fe , i n fl uenced dec i sively by pragm a t i s m , re m a i n e d op­ t i m i s t i c and se l f-confident about rec onstructi n g the \'\r estern wor l d . "Chicago soc iology , " w h ich fl o urished i n t h e M id d le West from the b e g i n n i n g of the century , produced coun tless em p i r i c a l s t u d i es oriented to t h e liberal c o n trol a n d r efo r m of soc i a l conflict .

Yet American soc iology i n t h e i nt e r w ar p e r i od , th ough m ore secure than its Eu ropean counterpa r t , was not e n t i r e l y u n troubled. American soc iology i n general a n d Chicago soc iology i n part icular were, by a n d large, a l a r m i n g l y atheoretical and deep l y e m p i r i c i s t . T h e y w e r e h a u nted by theories of insti n c t u a l i s m a n d v estiges o f Social D an--: i n i s m , by i n dividua l istic for m s of pragmati sm , and b y a n endu r i n g an ti-p h i l o s o p h ic a l b i a s t h a t m a d e the c reat i o n o f sys­ tematic sociol o g i c a l t h eory next t o i m possibl e .

B y the l a t e r 1 9 3 0s , the situat i o n of soc i o l ogy m i g h t be desc r i bed as fol l ow s . O n the one h a n d , t h e re were theore t i c a l tradi tions w i thou t a n a t i o n ; on the o t h er , th ere was a n a t i o n w i t h o u t a theory . This paradox set t h e background for the e m e r g e n ce of Talcott P arsons , the figure w h o , I w i l l argue , c r e a t ed the frame work for co n t e m porary debate .

The theoreti cal l e gacy of classical thought and the ins titutional and cu ltural situat i o n of the first t h i r d of the t w e n t ieth c e n t u ry provide t h e t i m e and s p a c e for Parsons' emergence as a m aj or figure . As a theoris t , he was bent on t h e recon structio n of European sociology, pro v i d i n g a s y n t h e s i s \\· h i c h would e l i m i n a t e the warrin g schools which had d i v ided i t . As an Ameri can, he w a s confident enough to thi n k t h a t i n d o i n g so h e could fi n d a path to restore reason to culture and individual control to society. Tha t h e w as n ot e n t irely s u c c es s fu l in doi n g e i ther does not detract fro m the greatness of h i s effort, though i t c erta i nly explai n s t h e su ccess of the "a nti-Parso n i a n " movemen ts w h ich eventua l ly suc c e e ded i t .

TWENTY LECTURES

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY SINCE WORLD WAR II

JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK

Library of Conve•• Catalogiag·in-PubJication Data Alexander, Jeffrey C.

Twenty lectures. Includes index.

1. Sociology-Methodology. I. Title. II. Title: Sociological theory since World War II.

HM24.A466 1986 301'.09 86-17106 ISBN 0-23 I -06210-9 ISBN 0-231-0621 I-7 (pbk.)

cl098765432 pi098765

&oft design by Laiying Chong.

Columbia University Press New Yorfc

Copyright © 1987 Columbia University Press All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

CONTEi\TS

Preface and A.cknowledgments lX LECTURE I. What is Theory? 1 LECTURE 2. Parsons· First Synthesis 22 LECTURE 3. Structural-Functionalism 36 LECTURE 4. Structural-Functionalism in Its .\1iddle

Phase 52 LECTL'RE 5. The Theory of Successful Modernity 73 LECTURE 6. Parsons' Later Theory 89 LECTURE 7. The Revolt Against the Parsonian

Synthesis Ill LECTURE 8. Conflict Theory (I): John Rex's

Strategy 127 LECTURE 9. Conflict Theory (2): Rex and the

Problem of Coercion 140 LECTURE 10. Exchange Theory ( 1 ) : George

Homans' Insights 156 LECTURE ll. Exchange Theory (2): Homans and

the Individualist Dilemma 172 LECTURE 12. Symbolic Interactionism (I):

Pragmatism and the Legacy of George Herbert Mead 195

LECTURE 13. Symbolic lnteractionism (2): Individualism and the Work of Blumer and Goffman 215

vm Contents

LECTURE 14. EthnomethodoJogy ( 1): The Legacy of Edmund Husser1 238

LECTURE 15. Ethnomethodology (2): Harold Garfinkel's Rebellion again st Norms 257

LECTURE 16. Cultural Sociology ( 1 ): The Hermeneutic Challenge 281

LECTURE 17. Cultural Sociology (2): Clifford Geertz's Rebellion Against Determinism 302

LECTURE 18. Marxism ( 1 ) : The Legacy and the Revival 330

LECTURE 19. Marxism (2): The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse 349

LECTURE 20. Sociological Theory Today 374

Index 381

...