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Communication, Culture & Critique ISSN 1753-9129

O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E

Between Support and Confrontation: Civic Society, Media Reform, and Populism in Latin America

Silvio Waisbord

School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, USA

This article calls for a critical examination of the media politics of civic society in new democracies. The analysis discusses the media policies of populist administrations and the role of civic groups in contemporary Latin America. The analysis shows the complex relations between civic actors and governments in processes of media reform. Contra visions that approach civic society as an autonomous space of resistance, these cases call for a nuanced analysis of the politics of coalition-building between civic actors and governments. More than a common project of media reform, civil society emerges as a heterogeneous space for the articulation of different political priorities and ideologies. The theoretical and research implications for further global media research are discussed in the conclusions.

doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2010.01095.x

Theories about civil society provide both the theoretical scaffolding and normative direction for recent arguments about progressive media reforms. Just like in the social sciences in general, civil society has been the ‘‘big idea’’ (Edwards, 2009) in contem- porary debates about the promotion of public access, participation, and diversity in media systems. It is central to recent scholarly works on media democracy (Castells, 2007; Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nodernstreng, & White, 2009; Couldry & Curran, 2003; Dahlgren, 2009), global communication movements (Calabrese, 2004; Hintz, 2009; Padovani & Pavan, 2009; Thomas, 2006), international media assistance pro- grams (Peters, 2010; Waisbord, 2011), and civic mobilization around media policies (Hackett & Carroll, 2006; Milton, 2001; Mueller, Page, & Kuerbis, 2004; Napoli, 2007).

Given the power of market interests and government elites in media systems, strengthening civic presence has been the rallying cry of media reformists around the globe. Civic society appears as the necessary antidote against the reduction of media communication to market dynamics and authoritarian impulses. At the core of this position is the notion that civic society is the backbone of democratic

Corresponding author: Silvio Waisbord; e-mail: [email protected]

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communication, the necessary safeguard to hold the influence of states and markets at bay. To effectively act as a communicative space for public deliberation, civil society needs to be autonomous from states and markets. These goals underpin oppositional actions aimed at expanding boundaries for critical expression as well as policies to promote pluralism and citizenship.

Recent studies, however, suggest that the ideal of civil society as the site of progressive media politics clashes with the messy dynamics of ‘‘real existing’’ civil societies. The ideal consistency of civic interests uneasily fits the challenges of practical politics. Research on new democracies and political transitions outside the West show that the heterogeneity of civil society is crystallized in media outlets that represent particular and oppositional interests as well as a myriad of contradictory demands for media policy changes (Hall, 2009; Ismail & Deane, 2008; Keane, 2001; Khiabany, 2007). These studies do not only remind us of competing understandings of civil society (Hall & Trentmann, 2006). They also invite us to conceptualize civil society as the space for contestation of dominant powers, reasoned participation, the project of communicative democracy, and a cacophonous realm of passionate conflicts and dissonant voices pursuing narrow interests. Whereas the ideal of civil society may have universal value and provide guidelines for media policies, it is important to analyze the particular configuration of civil societies as well as the relations between civil society, the market, and the state.

Within this line of inquiry, this article calls for a critical examination of the media politics of civic society in new democracies. The analysis discusses media policies promoted by populist administrations and the reactions of civic groups in contemporary Latin America. Here my interest is not to propose a specific model of civil society that should inform the analysis and the politics of media democracy. Instead, my goal is to draw attention to the need to study specific ‘‘images and visions’’ of civil society (Keane, 1988) underlying proposals for media reform. The heated debates about populism’s media politics reflects its peculiar understanding about civil society, as well as the absence of unifying models of civil society.

Latin America offers a range of interesting experiences to discuss the links between media and civil society under populism. It has a long tradition of populism and civic mobilization aimed at democratizing media systems. Civic movements have pioneered alternative media intended to carve out spaces removed from the influence of governments and commerce (Rodriguez, 2001). Today, this tradition is continued by both a vibrant diversity of community-based experiences as well as citizens’ mobilization in processes of media policy change (Waisbord, 2010b). Also, the region has a tradition of populist administrations, which have historically sought to reform media systems. In the past, the goals of those policies were to curb the power of selected private companies, and enlarge the media power of governments.

During the 2000s, populist administrations came to power in several coun- tries. They include the governments of Nestor Kirchner (2003 – 2007) and his spouse Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007 – present) in Argentina, Evo Morales (2006 – present) in Bolivia, Rafael Correa (2007 – present) in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega

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(2007 – present) in Nicaragua, and Hugo Chavez (1999 – present) in Venezuela. Just like their predecessors, they put in motion ambitious projects to change fundamental aspects of media systems. Such level of legislative activity is remarkable considering the relative inertia in media legislation since the return of democracy in the region in the 1980s and 1990s (Fox & Waisbord, 2002).

Unsurprisingly, populist policies generated much controversy among civic society and market actors. Media policies under populism have been the touchstone for business and civic activism during the past decade. Whereas some groups applauded the process of media reform, others have strongly criticized it. Some populist reforms dovetail with longstanding demands by civic groups, namely, the need to restrict the power of large media corporations and diversify media ownership. Other civic groups, however, have been concerned about populism’s lack of accountability in media policies, penchant for building a media arsenal under direct control by the Executive, reluctance to promote official transparency, and permanent diatribes against dissenting views. Populist policies have triggered a vibrant yet belligerent debate about media reform, which has reinvigorated old discussions in the region about the desirable role of states, market, and civil society in media systems.

Populist media policies in contemporary Latin America provide a rich set of cases to refine our understanding about the articulation between civic society and the media. They show the complex relations between civic actors and governments in processes of media reform. Contra visions that approach civic society as an autonomous space of resistance to dominant media, these cases suggest the need for a nuanced analysis of the dynamic politics of coalition-building between civic actors and governments. They reflect civic perspectives that refuse to embrace either antistatist positions or the politics of resistance to promote change. Instead, the cases here examined show the political divides and the realpolitik of media politics of civil society. More than a common project of media reform, civil society emerges as a heterogeneous space for the articulation of different political priorities and ideological views.

Populist media policies

Despite longstanding scholarly attention, we still lack a parsimonious model of media policies during populism. Obviously, part of the difficulty is the perennial conceptual ambiguity of the notion of Latin American populism (Conniff, 1999; Panizza, 2005; Weyland, 2001). Despite continuous attempts to produce categorical definitions, putting conceptual discussions to rest seems impossible (de la Torre, 2009). Populism is frequently associated with a certain style of political leadership and a political ideology and mobilization during specific historical periods. Latin American populism is not identified with right-wing, nationalistic, xenophobic parties and movements, as it is conventionally understood in the contexts of European politics. Nor is it simply associated with distributionist economic and social policies. Scholars have made convincing calls to disentangle the economic and political dimensions of populism (de la Torre, 2009). Both ideologically and politically, populism is more complex than what economicistic definitions contend.

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What is distinctive about media policies under populism? Here I propose an ‘‘ideal type’’ based on five key characteristics found in contemporary populism.

First, populism’s view of the media reflects its broader view of democracy and its institutions. As Peruzzotti (2009) has convincingly argued, populism espouses an antagonistic worldview of society and politics that echoes Carl Schmitt’s trenchant critique of parliamentary democracy. Similar to Schmitt’s distinction between friend and foe, populism views the media as neatly divided between news organizations and journalists who support the government, and those who do not. The media are not conceived as independent actors with constitutional rights to scrutinize power; instead, they are seen as organizations with economic and political positions in favor of or against the government. Populism reduces the complexity and multilayered nature of the media to ‘‘our’’ media (entirely supportive of the government) and ‘‘their’’ media (characterized as the façade of antipopular, antigovernment interests).

Liberalism’s conviction that the press should provide ‘‘checks and balances’’ on the government is absent in populism. Its disregard for the press as ‘‘the fourth estate’’ is symptomatic of its tout court rejection of central principles of liberalism. Instead, populism approaches the media as organizations that advance interests that match or contradict the government. Embedded in a framework that sees politics as necessarily antagonistic, the media are not viewed as vehicles for deliberation or mediation of public interests. Rather, they are vehicles for particular, narrow interests.

A Schmittian view on media politics underlies both media policies and news management that are typical of populism. It explains why strengthening the media as autonomous mediators of social interests is missing in populism’s ambitious agenda of media reform. By the same token, news management practices also reflect such friend/foe logic. Practices such as refusing to hold open press conferences, providing information to sympathetic journalists, and reprimanding reporters for asking critical questions, which are common under populism, reflect the belief that governments should only engage with loyal news organizations. The underlying belief is that public officials do not have the duty to meet the press, but rather the prerogative to decide with whom to talk.

Second, populist leaders frequently fulminate against selected private media companies (Kitzberger, 2009). Populist leaders generally take advantage of unfiltered access to sympathetic media to criticize dissident media and journalists. For example, daily and weekly broadcasting addresses such as Chavez’s ‘‘Alo Presidente’’ (Morales & Parra, 2005) and Correa’s ‘‘Diálogo con el Presidente’’ (Conaghan, 2008) have been filled with verbal attacks against ‘‘the media.’’

There is no shortage of examples illustrating the belligerent discourse of populist leaders targeted at oppositional media and journalists. In Bolivia, President Morales has frequently accused media companies of being ‘‘anti-revolutionary’’ and represent- ing ‘‘landowning interests.’’ Ecuador’s Rafael Correa accused the media of acting like ‘‘feral beasts’’ and representing the interests that caused the 1999 financial crisis, called TeleAmazonas and newspaper El Universo (two leading media organizations with open anti-Correa positions) ‘‘information terrorists,’’ and referred to oppositional

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journalists as ‘‘human misery.’’ In Venezuela, Chavez has called the then-dominant private television networks ‘‘the four raiders of apocalypse,’’ and commonly referred to the oppositional press as ‘‘the oligarchy’’ and ‘‘counterrevolutionary.’’ Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortega has accused leading private media groups of being financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and expressing elite interests. Ortega has labeled journalists ‘‘Goebbels’ children’’ and ‘‘enemies of the Nicaraguan people.’’ In Argentina, the late President Nestor Kirchner as well as his wife President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner have accused ‘‘media monopolies’’ during their confrontation with media giant Clarin. Among repeated accusations, Kirchner charged that Clarin’s negative coverage of his wife’s administration was based ‘‘on the fear of losing its hegemony and monopoly of communications.’’ Such attacks reflect old populist discursive themes (de Ipola, 1982; Laclau, 2005): the exaltation of ‘‘the people’’ against the ‘‘oligarchy,’’ the opposition between national and foreign interests, and the condemnation of particular interests at the expense of the ‘‘common good.’’

Third, populist governments have aimed to limit the power of selected media companies. Without exceptions, media systems in the region have been dominated by private corporations with extensive interests in media and key industries (e.g., banking, mining, agriculture) (Fox & Waisbord, 2002). They have consistently defended conservative politics and market economics. Just like in the past, the majority of those companies have rabidly opposed populist administrations. Their targets have been some of the most controversial decisions affecting media ownership and economics. For example, the Chavez administration decided not to renew the license of Radio Caracas Television, one of the oldest television networks, after it expired in 2007. Also, it brought legal actions against the other three networks, and revoked the licenses of over 200 radio stations.1 In Argentina, the Fernandez de Kirchner administration pushed to reform the broadcasting industry through a law that, most notably, restricted the cross-media interests of the Clarin Group.2 In Bolivia, the Morales administration has confronted United and other private television networks, and brought lawsuits against newspaper La Prensa and other leading dailies. The government of Rafael Correa expropriated two television networks, Gama TV and TC Television, after it took over the bankrupted financial corporation that owned them. Both stations were put up for auction in May 2010. The government also brought lawsuits against oppositional television station TeleAmazonas and the daily La Hora.

Populist administrations typically justify the decisions to curb the power of political and economic elites on the grounds that they help to democratize the media, and punish companies unconcerned with ‘‘the people.’’ When his government submitted the bill to reform the media system in April 2007, President Correa argued that the purpose was ‘‘to democratize media ownership, so they do not respond to narrow and private interests.’’ He also justified the bill on the basis that ‘‘certain companies do not meet their obligation to inform but to influence citizens on the basis of their interests. We can’t allow it. Probably, we need more severe laws so the media can fulfill their true social role’’ (Ayala Marin & Calvache, 2009).3

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Yet it would be mistaken to conclude that populist administrations have waged all-out attacks against private media or championed full expropriation. Instead, they have confronted selected media companies while building alliances with some owners. Their goal has been to revamp the private media landscape rather than to overturn it. Populist administration has tried to refashion the private media sector through pulling critical levers in the hands of the Executive (e.g., discre- tionary management of public advertising, licenses) to castigate and reward specific groups.

Fourth, populism aims to strengthen state-controlled media networks under direct supervision by the Presidency. Historically, national governments owned a handful of radio and television stations in media systems dominated by private and commercial principles. Just as past populist administrations, current populism set out to expand the size and reach of government-owned media. The methods range from assigning generous budgets to state-owned media (print, broadcast, and digital) to acquiring media companies through assigning broadcasting licenses to relatives and business partners (Bisbal, 2003a,b). In addition to direct and indirect ownership, governments have beefed up state-owned media with technological and human resources. This media infrastructure provides the backbone for unabashedly official reporting as well as unfiltered and frequent presidential speeches.

After a decade in power, the Chavez administration secured a network of state- owned and -run print and broadcasting outlets. When he took office, the state owned the televisión network Venezolana de Televisión (VTV), two radio stations, and the press agency Venpres. Today, the state controls six television networks (including VTV and the Televisora Venezolana Social which occupies the signal formerly assigned to Radio Caracas Television), two radio networks, and the news agency Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias. Likewise, Ecuador’s Correa has strength- ened the power of government-owned media. His administration established Radio Nacional in 2008. The online newspaper El Telegrafo and television stations that were expropriated in 2008 became part of the official network, which includes over a dozen broadcasting stations and print media. In Bolivia, the Morales government controls Channel 7, the news agency Agencia Boliviana de Información, the new daily El Cambio, and has provided financial support to the Red Patria Nueva, a rural radio network which currently has more than 30 stations throughout the country. In 2009, his government decided to bring Patria Nueva under the newly created Community Radio Network under the National System of Radio of Indigenous Peo- ples. In Argentina, the Kirchner administration directly controls the National System of Public Media, which includes outlets that have historically been state-owned (Channel 7, National Radio, and news agency Telam).

Given that governments in the region have historically showed a tendency to keep leading media outlets on a short leash (Fox & Waisbord, 2002), what is unique about populism? Populism is characterized by an aggressive strategy to expand the number of media organizations under direct control of the Executive and increase the budgets of government media. Strategies have ranged from granting broadcasting permits to

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sympathetic owners to taking over companies on the grounds that previous owners had committed legal transgressions, evaded taxes, or operated with expired licenses.

Fifth, populist governments support legislation strengthening the regulatory power of the Executive on media content. This includes regulation on a range of issues, from programming quotas to news content. Such decisions are justified on the notion that legislation is needed to promote the social responsibility of the media. This underlies, for example, the 2004 ‘‘RESORTE’’ law in Venezuela, which the Chavez government justified to promote domestic production and protect children. The issue of social responsibility has also been invoked to regulate speech related to government acts. In early 2010, President Morales espoused such argument when he justified the need for ‘‘ethical recommendations’’ to prevent the press ‘‘from lying’’ after a major daily published information about alleged corruption in his administration.

To recapitulate, populism embraces antagonistic media politics, engages in dis- cursive skirmishes with the private sector, enacts policies to weaken selected media companies, strengthens state ownership, and intends to regulate specific forms of media content.

These media politics have taken place amidst political polarization and the crisis of traditional political parties in democracies (Ellner & Hellinger, 2003). To say that populist politics has created such polarized politics would be wrong. Rather, they exacerbate polarization in democracies already deeply divided along partisan, class, ethnic, and racial cleavages.

Not surprisingly, just as has happened during previous populist governments, leading media groups have rabidly attacked governments. Domestic and regional media owners’ associations have condemned government policies under the ban- ner of ‘‘freedom of expression.’’ Private media owners hold that official policies are intended to stifle critical journalism and build a government-run propaganda machine. Populist presidents have rejected such charges by arguing that media associations are not truly concerned with freedom of expression, but rather with protecting their own business interests.

Media corporations have been at the forefront of the opposition against populist governments. Their editorial positions have been unmistakable in news coverage, particularly during key political events. In Venezuela, the three leading television net- works played a decisive role during the failed 2002 coup against Chavez. They enacted a virtual news blackout of pro-Chavez voices (Gottberg, 2004; Linares Rodriguez, 2006). Anti-Chavez bias was also evident in the news coverage of the initiative to pass a constitutional amendment to allow Chavez’s re-election. A similar pattern of one-sided coverage was found in the election for the Constitutional Assembly in 2006 in Bolivia (Grebe, 2007; Peñaranda, 2007). The Morales government confronted the fiery opposition from leading media groups, particularly those organizations based in the resource-rich, eastern provinces (ONADEM, 2009; Villegas, 2008). In Argentina, leading news organizations, including Clarin and La Nación, have unequivocally taken a critical position vis-à-vis the Kirchner administration’s proposal for a tax hike on farm exports during 2008 (Becerra & Mastrini, 2010). As the government held

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a protracted battle with a broad coalition of farming interests, leading newspapers offered a one-sided coverage. Amidst the growing polarization of public opinion, other media (such as the daily Página/12 and the state-owned broadcasting stations) similarly abandoned any pretense of journalistic fairness and evenhandedness and, instead, defended the government’s proposal.

Why ‘‘populist’’ media politics?

Why should the combination of those five characteristics be called ‘‘populist’’ media politics? Should they, instead, be labeled ‘‘socialist’’ or ‘‘progressive,’’ given that those governments are widely seen as prime exemplars of the recent ‘‘left’’ turn in Latin American politics (Arnson et al., 2009; Beasley-Murray, Cameron, & Herschberg, 2009; Castaneda, 2006)? Using ‘‘populist,’’ ‘‘left,’’ ‘‘progressive,’’ or ‘‘socialist’’ is obviously fraught with problems given their perennial conceptual ambiguity. Con- stant efforts to produce consensus definitions have not been successful. Nor have recent arguments to distinguish ‘‘two lefts’’ (French, 2009; Petkoff, 2005; Weyland, 2009) and between ‘‘right-wing’’ and ‘‘left-wing’’ populism in contemporary Latin American politics dispelled existing confusion.

Even if most leaders have frequently identified their administrations as ‘‘21st century’’ and ‘‘creole’’ socialism, their media policies, just like their politics in general (De la Torre & Peruzzotti, 2008), have more in common with old-fashioned populism rather than with Latin American or global socialism.4 They fit neither Cuba’s post- 1959 regime nor Chile’s Salvador Allende’s ‘‘democratic path to socialism’’ in the early 1970s. Neither the model of complete state-run media monopolies (under classic communism) nor the mixed model of public broadcasting and private ownership characterizes media systems under populism. Instead, they reflect typical themes of classic populism in the region. The distrust of liberal democratic institutions (including the press), the dichotomous vision of the media, the reliance on discursive oppositions between ‘‘the people/nation’’ and ‘‘the oligarchy’’ to justify media policies, targeted battles with private owners, and state intervention in media systems to strengthen the government’s information power are all found in the media policies of the classic cases of populisms from the 1940s through the 1960s.

The ideal type of ‘‘media populism’’ presented earlier should help to be more rigorous when using the adjective ‘‘populist’’ to describe media politics and policies. Some terms often used to describe ‘‘media populism’’ are not essential components of populism, specifically, media patrimonialism, antiprivate/market policies, antipress violence, and charismatic/personalistic communicative styles. None of these features are unique to populism.

Consider media patrimonialism, the discretionary use of public resources to strengthen the media power of the Executive. Patronage practices have included the unaccountable management of public resources affecting media systems (e.g., adver- tising, licenses, newsprint) to reward allies and punish critical voices. Patrimonialism has been a constant during democratic and authoritarian regimes as well as

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conservative and liberal administrations (Waisbord, 2010a). In this sense, populism perpetuates, rather than creates, the politics of media patrimonialism. Nor should we make antipress violence an essential element of populism. Neither verbal tirades against critics nor the persecution of dissident reporters are unique to populism. Sadly, violence against the press has been a constant across countries and administra- tions with different ideological leanings (Waisbord, 2007).5 Also, identifying populist policies with a fundamental opposition to private media is misguided. Media owners’ associations have vigorously reacted against populist policies claiming that they deal a blow to press freedom. Resting on a conventionally liberal notion that views any kind of government intervention as necessarily toxic for media democracy, they have argued that those policies undermine constitutional rights. They have tried to characterize populist policies as aimed at the private sector as a whole.

The reality, however, is more complex. First, specific companies, not the entire private sector, have been the target of presidential verbal salvos and decisions. Presidential decisions and media bills were aimed at restricting the business prowess of certain companies. Second, governments confronted some media companies with whom they had previously enjoyed quid pro quo relations. Certainly, some administrations have been the target of relentless criticisms by some leading media companies, but they have not confronted a solid private media bloc unanimously opposed to their policies. President Chavez had enjoyed favorable coverage from television networks Venevision and Televen, most notably during the 2008 elections. President Fernandez de Kirchner as well as her husband enjoyed favorable coverage from media corporations that have significantly expanded their interests during their mandates. During the presidency of Nestor Kirchner, the government and media giant Clarin had an amicable relationship. This relationship underpinned the application of the law 27750, which prevented the buy-out of media companies by foreign creditors.6 Additionally, two other decisions benefitted Clarin: the 10-year extension of the licenses of the two leading television stations (the Clarin Group owns Channel 13), and the removal of restrictions on cable and Internet ownership, which allowed the merger of the largest cable systems in the country in Clarin’s hands.

Finally, we should not assimilate populism’s media policies with the use of certain campaigning techniques (Boas, 2005). The use of opinion polls and television, charismatic leadership, and discursive appeals to ‘‘the people’’ are ingredients of styles of electoral and presidential communication. They are not media policies. Furthermore, such communicative styles are not unique to so-called ‘‘populist’’ politicians who champion certain politics and economic policies (Waisbord, 2003). In media ecologies dominated by entertainment and popular narratives, they have been extensively utilized by candidates and presidents from different political stripes.

Divided civic society

Populist media policies have met different responses from civic society. Civic responses as well as the relations between populism and civil society cannot be easily

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summarized in Manichean terms. ‘‘Civil society’’ has neither supported nor opposed populism. Rather, it has been fractured. Civic associations have offered different responses to government initiatives. The oft-used notion of ‘‘civil society’’ to criticize or celebrate populist policies masks the profound ambiguity of the concept as well as populism’s particular vision of civil society as a space for democratic communication (Cañizalez, 2004).

A range of civic groups, including grassroots and community media, left-wing journalists’ associations, and human rights organizations, have welcomed populist policies (Mastrini & Marino, 2008; Parra, 2009). Whereas they are ideologically mixed, drawing on nationalism, communitarian, Marxism, indigenismo and human rights principles, they agree that the excessive power of large corporations is the central problem of media systems in Latin America. Although commercialism has been a permanent feature throughout the media’s history, the runaway growth of media corporations has become the central challenge for communicative democracy. During the past decades, the politics of privatization, liberalization, and deregula- tion promoted by neoconservative administrations cemented the power of media corporations (Becerra & Mastrini, 2009). Media concentration narrows down the spectrum of issues and perspective in the media. Furthermore, the editorial agenda of dominant corporations is closely intertwined with dominant business interests both at the national and regional level. The majority of dominant newspapers and broadcasting stations are strategic arms of the most powerful corporations in key economic sectors. The domination of commercial principles and private ownership leaves out a diversity of views, particularly the voices of ethnic minorities, local organizations, and progressive actors.

These groups have applauded actions to curb the power of media corpora- tions and diversify media ownership. In Argentina, for example, the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting supported the media bill sent to Congress by President Fernandez de Kirchner in 2009. The Coalition represents more than 300 civic groups, including human rights, professional, and nongovernment organizations; political parties; unions and universities. It held town hall meetings to present and discuss early drafts of the bill. Among its most salient aspects, the law puts limitations on vertical and horizontal ownership, and assigns a third of broadcasting frequencies to community media.7 President Fernandez de Kirchner and the late President Nestor Kirchner frequently mentioned civic participation during the drafting of the bill to legitimize the democratic origins and objectives of the law. Civic groups also praised official initiatives in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to pass ownership limitations and legalize the situation of community media.8

In contrast, populist media policies have been criticized by a different set of civic groups including nongovernment organizations, and journalists’ and lawyers’ associ- ations. In their view, populist administrations do not only leave untouched, but also deepen the basic problems of media systems, such as the discretionary management of public resources, lack of citizens’ access to government information, and weak legal

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support to criticize governments. Populism shows absolute contempt for actions to correct longstanding deficits of government transparency and accountability.

Such groups argue that legislative reforms to facilitate public access to government information have not been a top priority for populism. All countries have legislation that, in principle, guarantees public access to information (Inter-American Dialogue, 2009). National freedom of information acts were passed in Bolivia and Ecuador in 2004, and in Nicaragua in 2007. Although Argentina and Venezuela still lack national laws, the right to petition access to public information is recognized in their national constitutions (Risley, 2006).9 Research has found that the enforcement of information laws is weak. Public requests are rarely responded to given that government staff are not properly aware of procedures and obligations, lack resources to attend requests, and, more importantly, are not properly monitored. Given these problems, critics accuse governments of ignoring such problems, and shutting off efforts to strengthen the application of the law (Coalición Pro Acceso, 2007; Fundación Chamorro, 2010; Garrido, Braguinsky, & Araujo, 2010).

The application of the legislation has been a point of contention between governments and civic groups. In Argentina, civic organizations criticized the government’s decisions to remove a website that featured official information (www.mejordemocracia.gov.ar) and cancel a high-profile meeting on freedom of information legislation. In Nicaragua, civic organizations that spearheaded the 2007 law criticized the Ortega administration for not addressing some controversial clauses. The law contains clauses that stipulate that the press should report in a ‘‘responsible manner’’ and ‘‘respect the honor and good name of those persons likely implicated in journalistic investigations.’’ For critics (Chamorro, 2008), this language leaves the door open for libel and insult laws which historically muzzled coverage of government officials.

Such concerns are related to the argument that populist governments not only have shown little interest in repealing ‘‘insult’’ laws, but they have also tried to gag the press with new legislation.10 For example, a range of civic groups condemned the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television (the RESORTE law, as it is known by its Spanish acronym) and the bill of ‘‘media crimes’’ sponsored by the Chavez government (Morales & Parra, 2005; Olivera Soto, 2007). Critics included journalists’ associations (Colegio Nacional de Prensa, Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Prensa), press freedom organizations (Reporters sans Frontiers, Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad, Human Rights Watch, Expresión Libre), and other nongovernment organizations (including SINERGIA, Transparency International, Espacio Público, and PROVEA). They viewed both bills as evidence of the government’s intention to tighten news control. In contrast, other groups such as the Movimiento por el Peri- odismo Necesario (Movement for a Necessary Journalism), Periodistas por la Verdad (Journalists for Truth), and the Bloque Bolivariano de Medios Socialistas Alternativos y Comunitarios (Bolivarian Bloc of Socialist, Alternative, and Community Media) have supported official policies.

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In Bolivia, civic groups have criticized President Morales on various occasions (see Torrico Villanueva, 2010). The Asociación de Periodistas de Bolivia and the Asociación de Periodistas de La Paz rejected the announcement of a new media bill. They characterized the proposal as a government’s attempt to control the media. Community radio organizations, which represent the country’s long tradition of grassroots media, have questioned the use of ‘‘community radio’’ to call the government-run network. They argue that the network basically functions as a transmitter of official and centralized information, which contradicts basic principles of community media. The Confederación de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Bolivia regretted the derogatory remarks about journalists made by Morales who said that only ‘‘ten percent of journalists are honest.’’

Some civic groups have also accused populist governments of perpetuating secrecy and discretionalism in media policy-making (Marenco, 2009). Whereas some admin- istrations have made calls for government-based media observatories to monitor the performance of private media, such as the cases of Presidents Rafael Correa and Hugo Chavez, they have not been equally interested in supporting autonomous mechanisms for citizens to oversee government media. For critics, such disregard for strengthening accountability in government and the oversight role of the media patently reflect populism’s equivocal commitment to media democracy.

The allocation of official advertising has been a point of contention between civic groups and governments. In Argentina, for example, civic organizations have docu- mented not only the substantial increase in the amount of official media advertising during the administrations of Kirchner and Fernandez de Kirchner. They claim that government policies are plagued by arbitrariness and secrecy to facilitate the expan- sion of the official media apparatus. The government has not only increased the size of official advertising, but it has also assigned the lion’s share to sympathetic media (O’Donnell, 2007). A survey shows that reporters consider government advertising one of the top problems for practicing journalism (FOPEA, 2005). Scholarly research has documented the negative impact of government advertising on news coverage about official corruption: News organizations that receive larger amounts of official advertising are less likely to report wrongdoing (Di Tella & Franceschelli, 2009).

Another target of criticisms has been presidents’ verbal tirades against media and journalists. Groups have criticized populist leaders for regularly castigating oppositional media owners and journalists (Bisbal, 2003a,b). In their view, constant rants about the press have a chilling effect for they reinforce a climate of self-censorship and fear in societies with a tradition of antipress violence.

It would be wrongheaded to suggest that the dissimilar reactions of civil society are simply a byproduct of populist policies. Different reactions reflect the two dominant strands of media movements in contemporary Latin America (Waisbord, 2010b). Questions of transparency and accountability as well as ownership and access have been atop civic mobilization throughout the region during the past decades. To view these positions as neatly divided or even opposed is wrong. Given the challenges for media democracy in the region, they address different yet complementary issues.

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Indeed, in cases such as in Argentina, civic groups with contrasting positions vis-à-vis the Kirchner administrations have participated in broad coalitions pushing for the same media reforms (e.g., the repeal of gag laws, the passing of national freedom of information legislation) in the past.

One could argue, however, that populism deepens ideological divides as it vigorously drives its ambitious agenda of media reform. Just as it forces divisions among ‘‘sympathetic’’ and ‘‘oppositional’’ media business, it heightens divisions among competing projects of media reform in civil society. During populism, civil society is particularly fragmented and conflictive, as governments actively seek to build coalitions with (or co-opt) some civic actors while confronting others. Polarized politics are inevitably inscribed in populist politics. They are intrinsic to populism’s view of media politics.

Civic society and the problems of media democracy

Different civic reactions to populist media policies bring up important questions for the analysis of civic society in processes of media reform. This issue is relevant not only to discuss media democracy in Latin America, but also to theorize the articulation between civil society, the state, and the media.

These experiences raise a question that has not been central in the literature: How is media pluralism possible in countries with weak traditions of democratic government? Recent writings on both sides of the North Atlantic assign the state a crucial role in the promotion of media reforms. Such calls are intellectually anchored in the history of state intervention in print and broadcasting in European democracies to support the diversification of media ownership and content. U.S. scholars (McChesney & Nichols, 2010; Downie & Schudson, 2009) have recently invoked the need to draw lessons from that tradition to strengthen the prospects of journalism and the media amidst the crisis of newspapers and the press. The idea that state intervention is necessary is at the core of old and new proposals to democratize media systems through diversified ownership, subsidies, taxation, funding mechanisms, management structures, and other mechanisms. Those proposals draw upon a longstanding tradition of democratic governance and liberalism in the West, which are crucial to ensure that the principles of accountability, transparency, pluralism, and representation undergrid state intervention.

This Western blueprint of media democratization awkwardly fits with the history of media politics in Latin America (Cañizález, 2009). There is a weak tradition of constitutional rule as countries have been subjected to cycles of authoritarianism and democracy. Instead, there is a strong tradition of unchecked government intrusion on media affairs, and the utilization of government-owned media as political patronage and propaganda (Waisbord, 2010a). Furthermore, contemporary party systems, particularly in countries governed by populism, are often described in terms of being in ‘‘disarray’’ and ‘‘crisis’’ given the notorious difficulties of political parties to articulate and represent social interests. Nor does Latin America have a similar

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historical development of civil society. As several authors (Garreton, 2006; Olvera, 1999) have convincingly argued, civil society in the region did not evolve as an autonomous, countervailing power to the State or as the backbone of Tocquevillean associational life. Instead, it evolved largely as a result of mobilization from above to pursue specific political, state-linked projects. Consequently, to talk about ‘‘civil society’’ as a separate space at arm’s length from the State deeply misreads the region’s political history. The centripetal tendencies of state policies coupled with the recurrent cycles of authoritarianism laid a feeble basis for civil society to act as an independent counterpower to the state. In sum, key conditions that underlied the elaboration and implementation of Western models of media democracy are missing in Latin America.

These differences are important to understand dissimilar reactions from civil society to populist media politics. At the core of these positions of civic groups lie different diagnoses and priorities about the problems of media democracy. Whereas one position believes that ownership patterns and runaway commercialization are the main challenges for media democratization, the other is primarily concerned about the role of the media in the improvement of the quality of democratic governance. The former supports populism out of the conviction that its policies effectively regulate the power of business corporations and strengthen public access to the media. The latter, instead, believes that populism aggravates the consuetudinary deficit of government transparency and accountability in Latin American politics.

Underlying these two positions are opposite views about the ideal relation between civil society and media democracy. Both believe in the need of statist policies to reorganize media order as well as the central role of civil society in media systems.11

Yet their different positions reflect differences in the conceptualization of civil society and the state.

Critics question whether populism, given its skepticism if not straightfor- ward opposition to liberalism, can promote media systems embedded in demo- cratic – liberal principles. They doubt populism has the right credentials to spearhead reforms based on dissent, criticism, and the unfettered freedom of expression. Com- mon media management practices, as shown in the discretionary management of public resources, media favoritism, and quid pro quo dealings with private media owners, do not suggest a firm commitment to democratization. Populism’s checkered record makes it necessary to retain the notion of civic society as an autonomous space of opposition to the state, especially given its chronic weakness in the region’s convo- luted political history. Civil society needs to remain a countervailing power to the state.

The other position believes that populism offers a viable alternative to break the stranglehold of private corporations on media systems that perpetuates communica- tion inequalities. Given the historical collusion between conservative media business and politicians, populism provides a path for democratizing media systems. Put in Gramscian terms, it views populism as a counterhegemonic force to develop an alternative to the ruling order, and the linchpin between civil society and the state in processes of political change (Laclau, 2005).12

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Different civic reactions to populist policies reveal more than just the divisions of civil societies, an issue already discussed by classic political theorists (Edwards, 2009; Held, 1987). They suggest that irreconcilable visions of civil society and democratic politics underlie different models of media reform. One position, heir to the liberal tradition, distrusts the state and believes that civil society should remain a protected communicative space for debate and criticism. Populism’s ardent statism is worrisome, if not plainly dangerous, to civic expression. It confirms liberal suspicions about the proclivity of the state to arbitrariness as well as the tenet that civil society (and the press as a civic institution) should remain vigilant.

The other position, instead, espouses a Gramscian approach by which civil society and the state are inseparable in processes of domination and counterhegemony. A unified civil society representing subaltern groups is necessary to lead the process of state and media transformation. Populism’s statism is a viable political path to champion the principles of pluralism and community and reorganize media orders dominated by commercialism. Populism seems responsive to demands to curb corporate power, institutionalize the voice of marginalized communities, and undo the legacy of neoconservative media politics. Populism’s media politics are viewed as representative of its broader goal to resist and transform neo-liberalism into a more egalitarian social order.

Underlying the hyper-charged media environment under populism, charac- terized by constant presidential sniping at big media companies and ferocious antigovernment opposition from traditional media companies, are two visions of civil society. The sharp rhetoric and aggressive actions of presidents coupled with the fiery responses from large media business typically make national and global headlines. It is the focus for endless debate. Such intense attention may give the impression that the fundamental divide is about state and markets — that populism basically represents another battle of the war between states and markets in media systems. Yet populism cannot be simply interpreted as the opposition between states and markets, a dichotomy that does not quite capture the complexity of political alliances and conflicts. The point is not to minimize the conflicts between state and market interests, but, rather, to highlight that contrasting views about media reform and models of civil society are at stake in the turmoil swirling populist media politics.

Conclusion

The cases here examined suggest the need to refine the analysis about civil society and media democracy. Just to view civil society as a communicative space of opposition to the state and the market is insufficient. It may be normatively valuable in situations of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, where, typically, civic groups repudiate state policies and push for democratic communication. It is analytically too blunt, however, to analyze media politics across democracies. Multiple experiences of citizens’ activism in support or opposition to populism suggest that civil society is hardly the expression

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of unified interests. Civil society encompasses heterogeneous and contradictory interests about desirable media systems, policy priorities, and paths to reform.

This heterogeneity should make us more cautious about making categorical generalizations about ‘‘civic society’’ or ‘‘civic engagement with the state.’’ Who are we talking about? What are their priorities? How are civic actors positioned vis-à-vis competing state interests? What alliances are formed between civic and state interests? What views of civil society inform policy debates and proposals? Asking these questions is necessary to understand ideological and political divides in civil society as well as the articulation between civic groups and political elites.

The cases of populist media policies in Latin America have important implications for the study of civic mobilization and media reform in global and national settings. The fissures of civil society under populism make it necessary to take analytical approaches that are sensitive to the contrasting politics of civil groups as well as the particular incarnations of the state. In democracy, civic society is hardly the unified counterpower to the state generally described (and exalted) in situations of regime transition. Rather, it is the realm of topsy-turvy politics, special interests, and coalitions amidst the unpredictability of democratic politics. Current populist media policies show the complexities of public-minded media reforms when the principles of civil society run into the contentious business of democratic politics. Just as we should keep in mind that populism has a paradoxical relationship with democratic politics (Arditi, 2007), we should also be sensitive to the complex media politics of civil society.

Future studies on civic mobilization and media reform should continue to tease out the plurality of public interests, and the dissonant politics of civil society. This requires a close examination of the articulation of civic interests and political elites, as well as political alliances around media policies. The cases discussed here, hopefully, may encourage further exploration of civil society and the politics of media reform in different contexts.

Notes

1 Whereas the government basically justified the decision on the basis of the illegal status of the stations, critics (including media owners) pointed at the anti-Chavez orientation of the station as the motivation.

2 The law was passed in October 2009, and replaced the 1980 law enacted by the last military dictatorship. As of the time of this writing, the law has not been implemented yet. Upon request from a parliamentarian, federal judges decided to suspend several of its articles at the end of 2009. On June 15, 2010, the Supreme Court decided to annul the judges’ decision.

3 The bill was supported by the Foro Ecuatoriano de la Comunicacion, a coalition of universities, unions, and indigenous, human rights, faith-based, professional, and nongovernment organizations. As of the time of this writing, the bill is under debate in Congress.

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4 Presidents Chavez, Correa, and Morales have frequently invoked socialism in their calls to sympathetic media and journalists to ‘‘join the battle against capitalism.’’ In line with Peronism’s historical distance from left-wing labels, the Kirchners have avoided making references to socialism in their confrontations with private media organizations, but, instead, chose to make ‘‘media monopolies’’ the discursive bête noire during their conflict with the Clarin Group.

5 Over the years, the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters sans Frontiers, as well as several local press freedom groups have extensively documented a variety of forms of intimidation against the press. Tactics have included mob attacks on the buildings of oppositional news organizations, anonymous denunciations of critical journalists plastered on city billboards, raids of media offices by the police and tax authorities, pressures against media owners to take critical journalists off the air, physical violence, and telephone threats. Critics contend that governments failed to conduct thorough investigations and often remained silent about those incidents.

6 Like many other leading companies in the country, Clarin emerged heavily indebted out of the 2001collapse of the Argentine economy.

7 The law includes several points that fit the agenda of several groups such as the limitations on the number of radio and television stations that can be owned by the same company, the ban of cable and over-the-air television cross-ownership, and the decision to force owners whose media interests do not comply with law to sell assets within a year. The law was lauded by various global organizations such as the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters and the UN Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.

8 In Venezuela, the Chavez government passed the 2002 law to legalize nonprofit, community media. The situation, however, remains largely undefined as many stations are still in precarious situations both legally and economically. In Bolivia, a country with a long tradition of grassroots media, there are more than 120 registered community radio stations. In 2006, the Morales administration enacted a law to provide a legal framework for rural and community stations.

9 In both countries, some states and municipalities have legislation authorizing public access to official information.

10 It is worth mentioning that not all populist governments have adopted a similar position on this issue. Notably, Argentine President Fernandez de Kirchner submitted a bill to repeal ‘‘insult’’ laws. The Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, a leading human rights organization founded during the last military dictatorship, was the lead advocate for the bill, which was passed by Congress in November 2009.

11 It is important to keep in mind that official media policies in Latin America have always been ‘‘statist’’ (Fox & Waisbord, 2002). Military and civilian governments provided the economic and technological foundations for commercial media systems. Governments have been leading actors in media economics as they supported the production or importation of newsprint, equipment, advertising, and other inputs through various means (e.g., tax breaks, subsidies, preferred loans on government-owned banks). Neither industry nor civic actors have manifested wariness about state meddling in media economics. Business, certainly, has greatly benefited as state support allowed their expansion and consolidation.

12 Not accidentally, sympathetic voices have used Gramscian language to characterize populist politics as ‘‘the crisis of hegemony’’ in which the old conservative order is under threat (Romero, 2009; Torrico, 2008). President Chavez himself, who frequently

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refers to Simon Bolivar and other 19th century-Latin American national heroes as the intellectual inspiration of his ‘‘Boliviarian revolution,’’ approvingly cited Antonio Gramsci to describe Venezuela’s situation as a ‘‘truly organic crisis’’ during the 2007 constitutional referendum campaign.

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在支持与对质之间：拉丁美洲的公民社会、媒体改革和人民党主义

Silvio Waisbord

乔治华盛顿大学媒体与公共事务学院

【摘要：】

本文呼吁在新民主政治中对公民社会的媒体政治进行批判的审视。本文讨论了人民党主

义机构的媒体政策和民间团体在当代拉丁美洲的作用。分析表明了在媒体改革进程中公民参

与者和政府之间的复杂关系。与将公民社会作为抵抗的自治领域的观点相反，这些情况要求

对公民行为者和政府之间的联合政治进行细致入微的分析。公民社会作为一个阐释各种政治

优先权和意识形态的异构空间而出现，而非仅仅是一个媒体改革的普通项目。最后本文就对

理论和对进一步研究全球媒体的意义进行了讨论。

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Entre soutien et confrontation : société civile, réforme médiatique et populisme en Amérique

latine

Cet article appelle à un examen critique de la politique médiatique de la société civile dans les

nouvelles démocraties. L’analyse discute les politiques médiatiques des administrations

populistes et le rôle des groupes de citoyens dans l’Amérique latine contemporaine. L’analyse

montre les relations complexes entre les acteurs civils et les gouvernements lors de réformes

médiatiques. Contre des visions approchant la société civile comme un espace de résistance

autonome, ces cas appellent à une analyse nuancée de la politique de la construction d’une

coalition entre acteurs civils et gouvernements. Plus qu’un projet commun de réforme

médiatique, la société civile émerge comme un espace hétérogène d’articulation de différentes

priorités politiques et d’idéologies. Les conséquences théoriques et pratiques pour la recherche

future sur les médias mondiaux sont discutées en conclusion.

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Zwischen Unterstützung und Konfrontation: Zivilgesellschaft, Medienreform und Populismus in Lateinamerika Silvio Waisbord Dieser Artikel fordert eine kritische Betrachtung von Medienpolitik in der Zivilgesellschaft neuer Demokratien. Die Analyse diskutiert die Medienpolitik von populistischen Verwaltungen und die Rolle von Zivilgruppen im heutigen Lateinamerika. Die Analyse zeigt die komplexen Beziehungen zwischen zivilen Akteuren und Regierungen in Prozessen der Medienreform. Entgegen bestimmter Sichtweisen, die Zivilgesellschaft als einen autonomen Raum des Widerstands verstehen, fordern diese Beispiele eine nuancierte Analyse einer Politik der Koalitionsbildung zwischen zivilen Akteuren und Regierungen. Über das allgemeine Projekt Medienreform hinaus, tritt die Zivilgesellschaft als ein heterogener Ort für die Artikulation verschiedener politischer Prioritäten und Ideologien hervor. Implikationen für Theoriebildung und Forschung zu globalen Medien werden in der Zusammenfassung diskutiert.

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지지와 대결사이: 라틴 아메리카에서의 시민사회, 미디어 개혁, 그리고 포풀리즘

Silvio Waisbord

School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University

본 연구는 새로운 민주주의하에서의 시민사회의 미디어정치에 대한 비판적인 조사이다.

본 논문은 현재 라틴 아메리카내에서의 대중에 영합하는 행정부들의 미디어 정치와

시민집단들의 역할에 대해 논의했다. 본 연구는 미디어 개혁과정에서 시민행동가들과

정부들사이에서는 복잡한 관계들이 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 저항의 자동적

공간으로서 반대의 비젼들이 시민사회에 나타났으며, 이러한 경우들은 시민행위가들과

정부들 사이의 협조체제 형성의 정치에 대한 조심스러운 분석을 요구한다. 미디어개혁의

일반적 프로젝트보다 시민사회는 상이한 정치적 우선순위들과 이데올로기들의 조율함에

있어 이질적인 공간으로 나타났다. 글로벌 미디어 연구를 위한 이론적 그리고 연구적

함의들이 토론되었다.

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Entre el Apoyo y la Confrontación: La Sociedad Civil, la Reforma de los Medios, y el Populismo en América Latina

Silvio Waisbord School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052,

USA Resumen

Este ensayo llama a una examinación crítica de la política de los medios sobre la sociedad civil en las nuevas democracias. El análisis discute las políticas de los medios de las administraciones populistas y el rol de los grupos civiles en la Latino América contemporánea. El análisis muestra la complejidad de las relaciones entre los actores civiles y los gobiernos en los procesos de reforma de los medios. Las contra-visiones que enfocan a la sociedad civil como un espacio autónomo de resistencia, estos casos llaman a un análisis matizado de las políticas de construcción de coalición entre los actores civiles y los gobiernos. Más que un proyecto común de reforma de los medios, la sociedad civil emerge como un espacio heterogéneo para la articulación de las prioridades e ideologías políticas diferentes. Las implicancias teóricas e investigativas para la pesquisa global de los medios son discutidas más aún en las conclusiones. .

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