National Program of Depth
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Chapter 6
Depth
Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
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• Any layer of defense can fail at any time, thus the introduction of defense in depth
• A series of protective elements is placed between an asset and the adversary
• The intent is to enforce policy across all access points
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Introduction
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Fig. 6.1 – General defense in depth schema
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• Quantifying the effectiveness of a layered defense is often difficult
• Effectiveness is best determined by educated guesses • The following are relevant for estimating
effectiveness – Practical experience – Engineering analysis – Use-case studies – Testing and simulation
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Effectiveness of Depth
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Fig. 6.2 – Moderately effective single layer of protection
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• When a layer fails, we can conclude it was either flawed or unsuited to the target environment
• No layer is 100% effective—the goal of making layers “highly” effective is more realistic
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Effectiveness of Depth
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Fig. 6.3 – Highly effective single layer of protection
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Fig. 6.4 – Multiple moderately effective layers of protection
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• A national authentication system for every citizen would remove the need for multiple passwords, passphrases, tokens, certificates, and biometrics that weaken security
• Single sign-on (SSO) would accomplish this authentication simplification objective
• However, SSO access needs to be part of a multilayered defense
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Layered Authentication
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Fig. 6.5 – Schema showing two layers of end-user authentication
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Fig. 6.6 – Authentication options including direct mobile access
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Layered E-Mail Virus and Spam Protection
• Commercial environments are turning to virtual, in- the-cloud solutions to filter e-mail viruses and spam
• To that security layer is added filtering software on individual computers
• Antivirus software helpful, but useless against certain attacks (like botnet)
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Fig. 6.7 – Typical architecture with layered e-mail filtering
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• Layering access controls increases security • Add to this the limiting of physical access to assets • For national infrastructure, assets should be covered
by as many layers possible – Network-based firewalls – Internal firewalls – Physical security
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Layered Access Controls
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Fig. 6.8 – Three layers of protection using firewall and access controls
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• Five encryption methods for national infrastructure protection – Mobile device storage – Network transmission – Secure commerce – Application strengthening – Server and mainframe data storage
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Layered Encryption
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Fig. 6.9 – Multple layers of encryption
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• The promise of layered intrusion detection has not been fully realized, though it is useful
• The inclusion of intrusion response makes the layered approach more complex
• There are three opportunities for different intrusion detection systems to provide layered protection – In-band detection – Out-of-band correlation – Signature sharing
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Layered Intrusion Detection
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Fig. 6.10 – Sharing intrusion detection information between systems
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• Developing a multilayered defense for national infrastructure would require a careful architectural analysis of all assets and protection systems – Identifying assets – Subjective estimations – Obtaining proprietary information – Identifying all possible access paths
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National Program of Depth