Socy 100 - Deviant Behavior

Issues in the Study of Deviance

Author(s): Edwin M. Lemert

Source: The Sociological Quarterly , Spring, 1981, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1981), pp. 285- 305

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106323

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The Sociological Quarterly 22 (Spring 1981):285-305

Issues in the Study of Deviance*

Edwin M. Lemert, University of California, Davis

Several issues in the study of deviance are discussed: the definition of deviance; the significance of the deviant act; cultural relativism; the influence of social structures and causation. By using departures from rules to define deviance, sociologists may repeat fallacies of formalistic jurisprudence. Deviance is best left undefined, and preferably delimited ontologically in terms of middle range theory. Spector and Kitsuse's revisionist theory is judged insufficient for macro-analysis of deviance be- cause they fail to reconcile the influence of objective and subjective factors. Cottrell's choice and feedback model is advocated as a means to study the dynamic process wherein values are aggregated in the social definition of deviance. The problem of bringing objective factors into this analysis is solved by showing how changing costs alter the order in which values are satisfied and thus change the overt pattern of so- cietal reaction.

In the past decade and a half a substantial amount of commentary and criticism has been directed at the societal reaction and labelling theories of deviance. The quality of the criticism has often been uneven and some has not shown careful consideration of what those credited with developing the prevailing theories of deviance have in fact said. In many instances complex ideas about deviance have been restated so simplistically that their criticism becomes a spurious exercise in logic, or it is followed by citing data whose relevance is questionable. In the con- text of controversial and sometimes polemic discussions, labelling theory often appears to be a creation of its critics bent on destruction of that which never was (see Hirschi 1973; Gove, 1975).

Criticisms of the "new" conceptions of deviance can be understood best in terms of their basic assumptions or the grounds of knowledge from which they derive. Some of the criticisms predictably have come from those identified with positivism, best represented in the field of traditional criminology, whose advo- cates have sought to discover the causes of crime in the attributes of individuals or in measurable aspects of their environments. Other critical voices have been raised among writers associated with functionalism, who adhere to social system views of structurally induced deviant behaviors. The most extreme critics are among a newer coterie of radical sociologists who argue that deviance theory is state-subservient, narrowly liberal in ideology and at most reformistic. Finally, a kind of revisionist criticism can be found among friendly critics who accept in a general way the labelling conception of deviance but recognize the need for its more explicit formulation.

The number of specific criticisms of the theories in question is quite large and so diverse that to sort them out or reply to them all would be an overwhelming

?1981 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/81/1300-0285$00.75 *Edwin M. Lemert's address is: Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, Davis, Cali-

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286 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

if not a self-defeating task. For this reason, my discussion will be focused around several issues whose resolution is crucial to the clarification and development of a heuristic model for the study of deviance. This attempt should reduce some of the confusion now pervading the field-confusion which stems in large part from differences in definitions of appropriate subject matter, and in models or para- digms which underlie related research, if not opposing conceptions of the nature of social science itself.

The Issue of Definition

Gibbs (1966) more or less inaugurated criticism of the new conceptions of de- viance in a carefully phrased analysis to expose a serious flaw in the fourfold schema which Becker (1973) used to define the subject matter of his labelling theory. The scheme included two kinds of rule-breaking. One was designated as "secret deviant" despite Becker's pivotal idea that deviance is behavior which groups perceive and label as such. On its face, this type poses a contradiction for it admits the existence of secret deviance apart from, or independent of, that con- stituted by those who apply the rules. Thus deviance is defined as perceived be- havior but the term also is applied to behavior not perceived. Further ambiguity lies in Becker's illustrations of secret deviance: sado-masochistic fetishism and homosexuality do not seem well chosen for the purpose because in our society most sexual behavior is concealed or hidden from others. Logically this compels recognition that there is secret conformity and so the term "secret" further loses its discriminating value. A similar confusion is in Becker's category of "falsely accused"-perceived as deviant behavior but subsumed as conformity because no rule-breaking occurs.

The Norm Based Definition of Deviance

Gibbs' (1966) critique of Becker, also given attention by Pollner (1974), reveals that there is less of a break and discontinuity between labelling theory and the traditional positivist conception of deviance than ordinarily believed. The diffi- culty created lies in the continued reliance upon a rule or norm based definition of deviance while proposing to study it as a process (Lemert, 1975). This con- tradiction raises the important question of whether to study rules as members of a community use them in pursuing their everyday purposes, or whether to study rules as they are deduced or inferred by the methods of positivist social science. Put somewhat differently, the question is whether to inquire into how acting members of a community conceive rules or to study their actions with a concep- tion of rules devised by sociologists and imposed on their actions. Presumably, the answer will depend on which is the better basis for explaining that which in a large sense I here call moral differentiation.

Gibbs favored the positivist view of deviance mainly on grounds that labelling theory is ambiguous and fails to deal sufficiently with the causes and incidence of deviant acts (Gibbs 1966:231). He stated his conclusion as a ". . . preference to identify deviant acts by reference to norms and treat reactions as a contingent property." The opposing view is well put by Kitsuse (1975:278):

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Study of Deviance 287

If we follow Gibbs' proposal that deviant acts be identified by reference to norms independent of the reactions to those acts, sociologists may find that (community) members ignore, dismiss and even applaud acts that sociologists classify as unam- biguously clear violations of norms.

Some Realism About Norms and the Definition of Deviance

The issue which exists among sociologists over the importance of rules in defining deviance is strongly reminiscent of the controversy carried on in years past in jurisprudence by the legal realists, who attacked the long held assumptions that the decisions of judges were determined by legal rules having an independent existence which they "discovered" by logic and analysis. Today the contention of the legal realists is taken for granted that rules are problematical influences in the administration of the law and that the law is largely what judges, legislators, lawyers and others do. Sociologists who prefer to study rules as separate subject matter risk erring in the direction of the older discredited jurisprudence. Evidence for this hazard lies in the tendency of sociologists to reify norms, in effect treating them as entities causing people to conduct themselves in certain ways (Lemert, 1942, 1972:95 f]). This view conjures up an image of people who carry on their daily routines by consulting rule books, codes or laws, and then direct their be- havior accordingly.

All of this ignores the patent fact that human beings make rules, change them as they deem fit, use them in many ways and even get along without them, de- pending on how they evaluate them in relation to their ends. If this postulate is accepted, above all that human beings are evaluating creatures, then an important intervening process is introduced into the study of deviance which distinguishes it from the methods of positivism. This distinction refers to human choice and the influence of values.

The variable and contingent influence of rules is best clarified by considering the nature of values' entering into the process of evaluation and the choices people make when confronted with alternative means of reaching their ends. While such alternatives were comparatively few in small, isolated, low energy societies of the past, they have increased greatly in modern industrial societies, whose cultures and social organization have become vastly differentiated. Much of this is due to innovations in science and technology which have contributed to widespread secularization of values.

These changes have altered greatly the relationship between rules and values, which in simpler societies were more frequently fixed. Many values once regarded as sacred have become secularized, or the processes of differentiation have made them so remote and artificial that many persons are willing to consider them merely as alternate means to their ends, or as negotiable and expendable costs of attaining goals. These changes have been uneven and distributed in different ways so that what is deemed an inviolate truth, a God-given right, or sacred morality by one person or group may be held low in importance by others, dis- missed from consideration or regarded as outmoded prejudice. This has important consequences for the kind of acts people are willing to engage in and what they will tolerate by others. Trying to predict the invocation of rules based on the

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288 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

aggregation of values becomes a complex exercise in social dynamics rather than one of structured responses.

There is still another cogent reason for doubting that rules alone can be the basis for defining deviance in modern society, namely their great proliferation-a veritable avalanche in the form of regulations, standards, official guidelines, ordi- nances, statutes and judicial decisions. Much of this overwhelming accretion has grown out of regulatory or administrative laws, among which, for example, can be found rules for meat inspection by the U.S. Department of Agriculture crammed into a book so thick no inspector can ever hope to master them (Sch- nuck, 1972). Likewise, penal codes grow apace, as do those for health, education and welfare. For this reason, as early as the 1930s, the legal realists insisted that the problem of modem-day judges is not how to reach a conclusion from a rule but rather what rule to select from a plethora of legal precedents. This confusion is dramatically illustrated in a modern Ohio case which involved the violation of a restrictive covenant concerning the sale of Dance Training courses by those who have purchased them (Arthur Murray Dance Studios vs Ohio).

This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary, there is so much authority that it drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything if he lives so long. This deep and unsettled sea pertaining to an employee's covenant not to compete with his employer after termination of employment is really seven seas. ...

And then follow 83 periodical citations, 21 annotations, 15 encyclopedia sources, 20 treatises, seven digests, two restatements, plus a separate selection from all of these for the state of Ohio.

This comes close to saying that judges can arrive at any finding they wish-a conclusion also applicable to a California deputy district attorney, who pointed to a copy of the state penal code and said, "That's a wonderful book, you can do almost anything you want to with it." But this exuberance ignores the fact that there are other persons, individuals and groups in the justice system with whom prosecutors and judges interact and share the power to decide which suspects and how they are charged with the commission of crimes. Any portrayal of indi- viduals acting alone to interpret or apply criminal law is misleading because the final action is usually the result of a series of choices in which the values of dif- ferent individuals and groups are aggregated.

What has been said emphasizes the multiplicity of rules at hand in modern society as well as the diverse and provisional nature of their use. But this emphasis does not justify an extreme conclusion that rules do not exist or that they play no part in the process of defining deviance, or perhaps better, socially designating it. Rules may be either important or unimportant influences in the outcome of the process. They become subordinate factors in a more generic model of explana- tion, present in some instances, absent in others, used for one purpose at one time and for a different purpose at another, sometimes invoked by human beings as ends in themselves-even as the absolutes that the positivists see.

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Study of Deviance 289

Leaving Deviance Undefined

The difficulty of defining deviance by reference to rules and norms plus the need to begin with a more generic conception of deviance suggests that it is much better to leave it undefined rather than to try to agree on its meaning by stipulation. While this alternative defies scholarly convention, it has a precedent in the work of Karl Llewellyn (1973), who chose to avoid any definition of law in his numer- ous writings. Instead he elected to write about legal matters, leaving it to others to supply the connotative limits of his term. There are some very good reasons for this strategy, among them: (1) definitions are nearly always vulnerable to exceptions, (2) they can lead to contradictions and paradoxes, and (3) they in- vite reification and tautologies. Llewellyn's chief reason for bypassing definition, and that emphasized here, however, lay in his broad conception of law as part of social control and in his conviction that definitions are likely to exclude things we may want to study.

Analogously the study of deviance can proceed best by identifying bodies of data through primitive, ontological recognition rather than by formal definition. In this larger sense "deviance matters" deal with the process of differentiation, how people become differentiated and what moral significance attaches to their differences. The center of concern is moral ideas, their rise and fall, their invoca- tion and application either as informal social designations or as administrative categories by agencies of social control. While moral evaluations and judgments may do no more than express "moral indignation," they are part and parcel of informal and formal social control that make up the societal reaction to deviance. Whenever persons and their actions mutually differentiate through processes of stigmatization, rejection, isolation, segregation, punishment, treatment or rehabili- tation, the persons, their actions and the processes are data for study of deviance. The concepts chosen for the related research and the mode of analysis necessarily will be oriented to particular bodies of data under investigation.

The Deviant Act as an Issue

Much controversy over the current conceptions of deviance has centered around the significance of the deviant act. Societal reaction and labelling theorists in some instances have been charged with slighting its importance and leaving the impression that persons are arbitrarily selected by agents of social control and fixed with a deviant label. A closely related objection to labelling theory is that it pays no attention to the problem of the etiology of deviant acts. Further, some writers contend that by ignoring deviant acts and dwelling on the variation in their social definitions the deviance theories revive an outmoded cultural rela- tivism which makes no recognition of possible universal or transcultural forms of deviance.

While Gibbs (1966) indicated a preference for concentrating on the study of norm-defined deviant acts because of the lack of clarity in labelling theory, Merton and Nisbet (1971) adhere more unequivocally to a functionalist view that the sociologist conceives deviant actions differently from the way the "social system does" and that he is concerned with deviant behavior, not persons. In

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290 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

particular, the Merton-style sociologist wants to discover how differing rates and forms of deviant behavior are produced by characteristics of social structure. Accordingly, explaining these and the social reactions to them are two separate questions, and merging the two abandons the basic question of why particular acts vary from one population to another, why certain persons engage in the acts, and why an act is deviant in one society but not in another. Consistent with these statements, Merton uses interchangeably the terms deviant behavior, rule-break- ing and "acts."

Merton's insistence that social structure produces rates of deviance is made without any real refutation of Kitsuse and Cicourel's (1963) thesis that persons or social organizations generate statistics about deviance by defining, recording and tabulating cases for political and administrative rather than purely technical purposes. This restates in a somewhat different context the issue already dis- cussed, namely whether sociologists or the active participants in the ongoing activities of society decide if deviance exists and to what degree. It is significant to add here that in many instances those sociologists who have undertaken the more objective-type analysis of rates of deviance have relied on data taken from the records of public agencies. The unreliability of such data for measuring the kind of highly abstracted "acts," which Merton and others give an independent existence, has received considerable comment. The post-functionalist theories of deviance do not reject necessarily the importance of investigating such rates, but rather insist that they are measures of past social interactions rather than of ab- stracted acts in a technical sense.

It is true that labelling and societal reaction theorists have not shown much interest in trying to discover rates of deviance. The criticism that they disregard the importance of the deviant act, however, does not stand up well in the light of their commitment to descriptive methods which stress appreciation of its spe- cific, diverse and contextual nature. This assumes that human acts cannot be understood fully apart from their meaning or evaluation, which in turn are under- standable only in terms of present and past social interactions. Societal reaction theory includes observations of deviance, namely values and valuation, which positivists ordinarily refuse to acknowledge or insist are not scientifically know- able.

The wisdom of making such observations is demonstrated in those areas of deviance where it can be understood only by focusing on their "value added" or reactional aspects. Physically handicapped persons do not become deviant be- cause of particular acts which break rules-a conclusion especially conspicuous in cases of persons who have cosmetic defects, such as scars, birthmarks, mis- shapen features or uncoordinated bodily movements. Much the same is true of stuttering, which so far has defied research efforts to show that any particular kinds of speech precedes its social definition. Again, to date, efforts at defining problem drinking or alcoholism by measures of the quantity and frequency of alcohol consumption have been unavailing. Finally, although there is some fervid disagreement about the matter, it seems doubtful that any classifiable acts or symptoms can be identified consistently as mental disease.

The best evidence that specific acts are not prerequisites of deviance and that the status of deviant can be purely ascribed is brought out by materials on witch-

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Study of Deviance 291

craft and sorcery, phenomena whose existence good positivists must surely deny. Gluckman (1965:xix) noted:

Not all disturbances of social relations arise from breaches of rules of right conduct. A marked characteristic of tribal society is that natural misfortunes are ascribed to evil wishes of witches or sorcerers, to the anger of spirits affronted by neglect of them- selves . . . and to rightful curses by appropriate persons.

Selby (1974) asserts that witchcraft among the Zapotec is a test case of the idea that inherent qualities of behavior are not required in order for persons to be labelled deviant. The people in question typically are curers who under certain conditions are subject to ostracism as witches: ". . . the villagers say that 'some- times they are witches,' but there is no one in the village who performs witch- craft either by sticking pins in dolls or muttering incantations" (Selby, 1974:92).

Deviant Acts and the New Criminology

Some of the strongest objections to labelling and societal reaction theories for their assumed neglect of deviant acts have come from those in the field of de- linquency research and criminology, often appearing in debates over the "new criminology," which grew out of deviancy theory in Britain. Those aligned with a more traditional positivist methodology in the field generally hold that crime is a violation of law and that actions of police or courts are substantially accurate certifications of homogeneous acts which transgress consensual norms. A quali- fied position taken by some writers recognizes ambiguities in the definitions of crimes but claims that there are certain acts, such as robbery, which "everyone knows" is a crime, and which are universally recognized. From this it is reasoned that societal reaction theory, because it takes the definition of crimes to be problematical, revives and propagates a form of naive cultural relativism.

Contrary to these claims it can be pointed out that there are quite a few legally defined transgressions which do not require the commission of specific actions, for example: the so-called status offenses of juveniles, incorrigibility, running away, truancy and "being in moral danger." But more significantly there are also adult crimes without specific behavioral correlates: the most obvious is con- spiracy, in which no overt act need be committed for someone to be accused or found guilty. American anti-trust laws do not forbid acts as such but rather "combinations" in restraint of trade, so that something as conventional as carry- ing a briefcase to lunch at a restaurant may be taken as criminal if a judge or a jury determine that it signified intent to set prices illegally on a manufactured product.

When scrutiny is turned from American society to those societies which have experienced socialist revolutions it is abundantly clear that specificity of acts is not an absolute requirement for the designation of crimes. While these nations as others have penal codes, they usually have contained some generalized provision for the punishment of counterrevolutionary crimes. These, called crimes by analogy, are illustrated by the following excerpt from a Chinese communist code (Li, 1970:86; Lubman, 1969:558): Those with a counterrevolutionary purpose

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292 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

who commit crimes not covered in this act may be given punishments which are comparable to the crimes committed.

In Russia, during the Stalinist era, the possession of foreign postage stamps was sufficient for arrest and punishment as a counter-revolutionary wrecker (Gilksman, 1954). In Czechoslovakia, after Communists took power, an acci- dent damaging another vehicle became a crime if it belonged to the State but not if it belonged to a private person. While the Czechs had no law against bestiality, nevertheless in one case a man in their country was convicted for sexual inter- course with a cow because it was an undignified use of state property (Ulc, 1972).

It is possible to argue, as Fuller does (1968), that such occurrences do not re- flect law, or that they are "bad" law or pathology of law and that no "true" crimes were committed. Nevertheless, the fact remains that large numbers of peo- ple at one time or another in such societies have been charged, tried, convicted and imprisoned as criminals on such grounds. Only in a highly ideal "ought" sense can political influences be excluded from the study of the criminal law. Where courts and law enforcement are directly subordinated to political author- ity and official ideology, it is much easier than it is in our society to see how crime may be ascribed through such influences in the absence of specific charges.

The insistence that there always must be discernible acts before there can be crime comes close to absurdity when it is recalled that failure to act, as well as describable acts, can be forbidden by law. Non-support of dependents, failure to answer a summons, negligence in operating machinery, failure to register for mili- tary duty, failure to report taxable income and even failure to file census reports are instances. Some writers try to evade this illogicality, that is, making both acts and non-acts crimes, by referring to "acts of omission."

Cultural Relativism and Deviant Acts

The belief that certain forms of conduct are more or less inherently criminal or that they are universally recognized as such in different cultures is an old one. Recently this idea reappeared in criticisms Walker (1974) makes of the New Criminology. He grants that there are some conditions under which the passage of new laws and their enforcement create deviance, such as England's imposition of a tax on tea drunk by Americans and missionary laws forbidding nudity and adultery among South Sea natives. He continues, however: "This Eden ideology is quite inapplicable to crimes such as murder, rape, robbery and burglary, which have been serious crimes in every civilized culture-and most uncivilized ones- for many generations" (Walker, 1974:61).

Literally, this says little more than that certain crimes have been crimes, leav- ing it unclear whether the writer means conceptions of crimes or the actions and behavior they presume to represent. If he merely means the conceptions then there is some support for his claim, but if he means the actions and behavior they subsume, a heavy weight of opinion runs to the contrary. This counter trend is well summarized in Znaniecki's (1952:332) discussion of attempts to discover the substance of universalistic crimes:

Can these classifications of transgression be scientifically tested and validated by com-

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Study of Deviance 293

parative analysis .. .? Quite a few cultural scientists believe that they can, especially those criminologists who accept the system of criminal law maintained by their own society and assume its generalizations were originally based on a comparative study of the actions therein classified as crimes. . . . Nevertheless attempts-like that of Garafalo-to discover essential similarities between actions classified as crimes in all societies at all periods have failed. The reason for this is clear. All prohibitive rules define and classify actions as experienced and evaluated by those who promulgate the rules from the point of view of standards and norms they consider binding. Hence, the agents who perform such prohibited actions ex definitions do not conform with these standards and norms, such a classification by itself contains no information as to what the actions really are from the standpoint of the agents themselves.

To be sure, anthropologists agree that universal moral standards or ethics exist; all societies recognize and disapprove of such things as homicide, theft, lying, adultery, sexual promiscuity and incest. But while evidence of such universalistic ethics can be found, nevertheless, as Kluckhohn (1955:672) made clear, the likenesses are primarily conceptual in nature, and to draw on his words: ".... vari- ation rages rampant as to details of proscribed instrumentalities and sanctions." Illustrating the point: taking the life of another human being is universally con- demned but at different times and in different cultures infanticide, uxoricide and parricide have been socially tolerated solutions to human problems, as well as killing in self defense, in duels and in instances where adulterers are caught en flagrante.

It may be objected that there are merely "exceptions to the rule," but detailed examination makes it doubtful that actions or interactions claimed to be the same type of crime in different cultures ever have the common elements necessary to provoke similar societal reactions. Theft in the Cook Islands usually has involved taking coconuts from the trees of others and under certain circumstances, usu- ally drunkenness, helping one's self to food in an underground oven, neither of which is ever likely to be experienced by Americans. Moreover, kinship lines among the Cook Islanders were so ramified that the ownership of coconuts, in reality only a right to the product of the trees, often could be challenged by legiti- mate claims to the "stolen" property. Theft in such instances was made even more ambiguous by the importance which Polynesians attach to the values of sharing and hospitality. This emphasizes what is generally true, namely that more than one value ordinarily comes into play in the human judgments which produce deviance.

While it is possible to say that universal values exist, nevertheless the relation of such values to specific acts, the persons involved, and the surrounding situa- tions making for deviance, is highly variable between and also within cultures. An important corollary is that while different societies may have a number of similar values the order in which these values can be satisfied varies greatly. Likewise, the orders of value satisfaction varies with time. Thus, although homicide presently in our society is considered to be among the most serious of crimes, there have been localities in the past where the theft of a horse was more likely to result in hanging than would killing another human being. Finally it has to be said that in most, if not all societies, the constraints of value orders (whatever they may be) usually are applicable only to the recognized members of the society, the "in-

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294 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

group." So while homicide may be forbidden within the group, killing a member of a different tribe or even an opposing clan in the same society may be permissi- ble or even applauded.

Trying to determine the order in which values are likely to be satisfied in par- ticular situations is very much at the center of the study of deviance. Thus far, I have emphasized the dynamic interactional process by which such value orders are reached. Parenthetically, it must be acknowledged that value orders may have been established by past interactions and incorporated into relatively stable pat- terns of action, guarded by rules and ideology and transmitted as part of a culture. Deviance from such patterns is readily perceived and deviants dealt with routinely by established means of social control. The description of such patterns in small, slowly changing societies has long occupied anthropologists, who usually refer to them as structured or as part of social structure. Few will deny the reality of such structured patterns but the degree to which they exist and their linkage into larger configurations taken to be social systems is an unsettled issue. This uncertainty is particularly true for highly differentiated industrial societies. In order to em- phasize the problematical nature of such linkages between patterned actions, I will use structure in its generic sense, confining use of the term to its plural form.

Social Structures and Deviance

Functionalists understandably have been affronted by labelling theory because it pays scant attention to questions of how social structure generates deviant acts and why their incidence or rates vary between populations and societies. Unfor- tunately such questions do not carry inquiry into the relationship between social structures and the societal reaction in its processual or interactional aspects. But much the same criticism is applicable to labelling theory, which throws little light on the possible connections between interaction, process and structures. The shortcoming in reality is a more general shortcoming of sociology and the diffi- culty in large part inheres in the notion of process itself. Despite the lengthy his- tory of its use in sociolgy, the process concept as Bain (1933) noted years ago, has never been satisfactory. This resulted from the study of process or processes formally, as separate phenomena minus cultural content. While the shift to a symbolic interactionist conception of process brought meanings into analysis the associated concepts of "self," "me," and "other" are insufficient for the study of social structure (Lemert, 1974).

The theoretical gap between process and social structure has been an unmis- takable weakness of a number of the studies carried out by sociologists of devi- ance. This comes out in their narrow preoccupation with the interaction between deviants and agents of social control, in a failure to locate them historically within particular social structures and in reporting their results in the ethnographic pres- ent. These tendencies have prompted the criticism that labelling theory is both astructural and ahistorical (Davis, 1975). Many of the studies in question do not give the provenience of their data and the time period for which their conclusions are applicable. In some instances provenience has been deliberately concealed and it must be learned informally or guessed at.

Without detracting from the merit of Goffman's (1961) contributions to devi- ance study, nevertheless it must be said that his conclusions about total institu-

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Study of Deviance 295

tions and deviance which came from research at St. Elizabeth's hospital failed to consider the possible effects of its special organizational features. Yet this is the hospital where the notorious "Whitehouse cases" (persons arrested and detained by the U.S. Secret Service for threats to the President of the United States) were sent, where Ezra Pound was held virtually as a political prisoner for many years; and this hospital lies in the area of the Third U. S. District Court of Appeals when came the Durham rule modifying the grounds of insanity pleas in criminal cases. The hospital also has had close administrative ties with the National Institute of Mental Health in the Federal capitol. Taken together, these facts suggest that a larger organizational analysis of "asylums" might have been worth pursuing, if for no other reason than to discover the limits within which generalizations about total institutions are valid.

The Radical Critique

Among the more strident protests that prevailing deviance theory disregards the larger organizational implications of deviance are those aired by radical sociolo- gists. They carry forward the burden of C. Wright Mills' (1943) ideas which condemned the social pathologists of his day for their fragmentary, non-theoreti- cal treatments of social problems and for their failure to reckon with structural phenomena of stratification and concentration of power. Latter day radical soci- ologists claim that deviance sociologists misdirect their research efforts by focus- ing on the interaction between deviants and agents of social control who are no more than middle or lower management people having little influence in making laws and policies which define and are used to control deviants. The radical soci- ologists assert that acceptance of a state definition of crime (by law) restricts in- quiry to visible forms of deviance and overlooks what is in their estimation more serious deviance (Liazos, 1972; Taylor et al., 1973; Quinney, 1975; Bierne, 1979).

Sociologists on the sinestral side insist that the ideological commitments of those in power and antagonisms due to class differences are the causes of devi- ance. These they define as the violations of politically defined human rights: to food, shelter, dignity and self-determination. Specifically such violations are caused by imperialism, racism, sexism and inequality. Sociologists, the radicals urge, should be studying such things as political corruption, deception and geno- cide. The objective of their work should be demystification of law and the revolu- tionary transformation of society.

According to the radical ideology, deviants ordinarily studied by sociologists are victims of an oppressive social system. Paradoxically, however, this same pas- sive portrayal of deviants has been cited by some critics as one of the major faults of labelling theory (Gouldner, 1968). The counter theme is that deviants are or are becoming active, self-determining rebels against oppressive social structures Their transformation theoretically comes from cultivation of a collective con- sciousness of their exploited status and by the deliberate politicizing of their devi- ance, for example, using the commission of crimes or other visible deviance as a means to attack the established political order (Hills, 1980).

Collective action to change the status of deviants on closer scrutiny proves to have been most apparent in the United States among homosexuals, the physically

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handicapped, prison inmates and prostitutes. In each case social action has been less radical than libertarian in its goals, less unified than pluralistic and any con- nections these movements may have with the Black civil rights and Women's Lib- eration movements appear to be tenuous at best.

Politicization and liberation are terms easily used, but unfortunately little effort has been made to clarify their meanings or to discover their organizational ramifications. Media presentations of deviants as politicized or liberated need considerable discounting and the assertions of social scientists who describe devi- ant behavior as "alternative life styles" need empirical demonstration. That politi- cal movements may degenerate and become cloaks for crime and other deviance is an everpresent possibility (Dillon and Lahane, 1973). It is also true that liber- tarian representations in media and in social science writings may ignore the pos- sibility that, seen in its full context, much deviance is merely banal or pathetic rather than political (Taylor and Taylor, 1968).

A more generic basis for discussing this issue can be found in the comments of Matza (1969) on pathos. He noted the tendency in "naturalistic" presentations to romanticize deviance in contrast to the older absolutist tendency to designate it as pathology. Recognizing that there is diversity in deviance carries the respon- sibility to give equal recognition to its non-romantic, sordid and destructive as- pects as well as to those aspects which, in Matza's words, are socially tenable. Some theoretical means is needed to relate the variable quality and tenability of deviance to its patterned context or social structure.

Weighed in the balance, the radical critical conception of deviance appears more as an ideology of activism than as scholarly analysis, more rhetoric than substantial conceptualization suited to sustained empirical inquiry and research. The imputed existence of ideologically homogeneous elites or classes with dis- guised or conspiratorial purposes and endowed with widespread power to exploit deviants is difficult to prove or disprove. A similar reservation applies to state- ments that sexism, racism and inequality cause deviance, which tend to be simple assertions with few explicit formulations to show how this happens.

Structures of the Middle Range

The most that can be said for radical sociology at this point in time is that it does a modest service in recalling the need for the historical study of deviance and re- emphasizing the necessity to place it in a larger sociocultural and political con- text. It remains to be determined, however, at what level of social structure in- quiries into deviance can be pursued and still be manageable as research enter- prises. Some of the features of modern society suggest the answer. One is the sali- ence of large scale associations which are organized around a limited set of pur- poses and making no effort to satisfy a full range of human values. This speciali- zation is no less true of agencies dealing with deviants than it is of business and industrial corporations.

While the predominance of large public associations can be assumed, the nature and extent of their interorganizational ties and their connections with small groups and individuals is problematical, that is, they must be discovered by empirical research. Moreover, because of the specialized way in which they are

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Study of Deviance 297

organized the particular issues arising in their interaction and the values at stake are crucial in trying to foretell whether such organizations will become involved in the social control of deviance. So for example, a taxpayers' association may try to influence public policies affecting police and correctional organizations in order to try to keep down the costs of government, but are unlikely to spend funds and staff time on issues irrelevant to the interests of property owners, such as re- pealing laws against sex offenses.

For this and related reasons the study of deviance can best start with concep- tual orientations to bodies of data dealing with visible social structures rather than begin by assuming the existence of an overarching social system or pervasive ideological influences binding groups and individuals together in a common mor- ality. The path of analysis begun in this fashion may ramify into various levels of governmental or economic structures, such as can be demonstrated by studies of public policy and the social control of narcotic drugs (McCoy, 1972; Newsday Staff, 1973). It is easier to propose such research than to carry it out, however, problems of access to data, inference and proof tend to grow with the magnitude of the social structures postulated as significant.

Interim Conclusions About Social Structure and Deviance

Although I have taken a stand against structural or functional theories of devi- ance as they are conventionally understood, none the less, social structures in the sense of the position of groups and individuals at the point of their interaction is of great significance in any attempt to predict the pattern of action in which devi- ance emerges. Values of people who are filled with moral indignation over the acts of others may have little importance if they are not organized and brought to bear in situations where they can influence the societal reaction. Conversely, per- sons and groups, even though they count as no more than a minority, may be so situated that their specialized values rather than those of others shape new moral ideas or preserve the old.

The aspects of social structures which are relevant for the study of deviance in- clude codes specifying the place and manner of determining laws and policies, arrangements designed to stop the flow of some kinds of information and facili- tate others, rules for control over meetings and methods of communication which create or impede effective group action. Such features are part of the power struc- ture of every community and society (Cottrell, 1972).

The ideological importance given law in American society, its apotheosis of "sacred rights" and assumed inviolability of its procedures means that courts, judges and lawyers are strongly positioned to forge criminal sanctions for devi- ance and control their administration. One effect is to obscure the problematical nature of law, in which informal interaction, the "law in action," or negotiation take precedence over vaunted formal procedures. Another effect is to conceal how much law comes to rest on indeterminate concepts, such as "reasonable," "due process," and "good faith," all receiving their substance from human evalua- tion. More accurate appraisal of legal structures recognizing such "realities" can be made from comparisons across societies and cultures.

The special limited meaning given to the concept of social structure is heuristic.

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The main conclusion to be left at this point is that social structure does not cause deviance nor does it from my view produce rates of deviance. This assertion, how- ever, is not merely a denial of the large assumptions of a theory of functionalism so much as it is an assertion about the nature of causation itself. It raises a final issue in deviance studies, more fundamental than any so far examined.

The Issue of Causation-Revisionist Views

Kitsuse (1972) insightfully pointed out a confusion in Becker's (1963) theory of deviance that in effect takes rule-breaking as an apriori fact which is then con- verted into deviance by the application of rules, presumably through a process of symbolic interaction. Rules not only have to do double duty in Becker's formula- tion, but they also have an independent existence apart from their creation. A similar kind of confusion or "subtle shift in emphasis" was detected by Kitsuse in my early (Lemert, 1951) statement of the societal reaction theory: I postulated the independent or empirically verifiable existence of modalities or norms of be- havior and deviations from them, to which there are societal reactions ranging from social approval through social disapproval. This view stood in contrast to my other statements that deviance shoud be studied as a process of moral differ- entiation and individuation.

The ambiguity in societal reaction theory so ably detected by Kitsuse speaks of the difficulties those striving for innovative ideas have in disengaging themselves from the issues, questions and methodologies of their eras. Becker unwisely got caught up by the attractive symmetry of the fourfold table, while I was beguiled by the behavioral studies of conformity conducted by psychologists and legal real- ists of the time.

On behalf of Becker and myself, although we acknowledged the prior or sep- arate existence of "something out there"-rule-breaking or variation from norms -nevertheless we made process the starting point for analysis, labelling for Becker, social control for myself. Unfortunately, the ambiguities in both theories allowed or encouraged critics, friendly and unfriendly, to cast them into the for- mat of normal science. Process was ignored or paid lip service while some single aspect or referent of social control, such as arrest, dishonorable discharge from the armed forces, or referral of shoplifters to police by store detectives, was se- lected as an independent variable to be related by conventional quantitative methods to the occurrence or magnitude of deviance. Needless to say, not much unequivocal validation has emerged. At the same time, responsible critics admit that few studies have been designed specifically to test societal reaction theory and some conclude that no theory worthy of the term has been developed. Thus Tittle (1975:176) states, "Labelists must get down to serious theoretical busi- ness. Evasiveness, lauding of ambiguity and hiding behind a facade of sensitizing concepts will no longer suffice."

Theory or Non-Theory

The validity of this last charge may be settled partially by looking at the way la- belists have characterized their writings. Tannenbaum (1938) called his formu-

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Study of Deviance 299

lation of delinquency and crime a "point of view"; Becker (1973:181) spoke of his ideas as a perspective which tells how something becomes other than what it was, and that the value of labelling theory will be gauged by "increased under- standing of things formerly obscure." Scheff (1975) called his labelling theory of mental illness a sensitizing theory originated to discount the medical model and to "clear the air"; he conceded that it is not literally true but that it can be used to evaluate evidence in a provisional way and is the best way to interpret existing studies in his area. Although I cannot recall having stated the purpose of societal reaction theory, I have always believed that the ultimate purpose of social science is prediction or some rough estimate of what is going to happen next. Spector and Kitsuse (1977), the chief revisionists of societal reaction and label- ling theories, believe that their purpose should be to describe and explain the definitional process (of deviance and social problems) and the collective activi- ties that get organized around these assertions or claims.

Obviously ambiguity still lurks here, clouding any effort to determine just what form these characterizations of the respective scholarly works amount to: human- ism? social philosophy? speculative theory? or science? All of which recalls an older and wise observation by MacIver (1942:375) that, "The perplexities of social causation have fostered a tendency to resort to modes of explanation that avoid or seem to avoid the causal challenge."

The Need for an Analytical Model

Schur (1975:287) another revisionist of labelling theory, comes closest to agree- ing that the societal reaction perspective or its sensitizing concepts need to be developed or "become parts of genuine theories that serve the ends of science." He also notes what I take to be the main stumbling block to such a task, namely the unquestioned insistence of its critics that the societal reaction orientation "should prove its worth as a theory of deviance causation in the traditional sense." Unfortunately Schur does not pursue this line of thought and simply ar- gues for a change in subject matter from micro-analysis of the origins of deviant identity to the study of rule-creation and rule-change at "various levels," thus adopting what Mankoff (1971) terms macro-labeling analysis.

The revisionist position taken by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), like Schur's, seeks to shift the study of deviance (and social problems) to "macro-sociological concerns" arrived at from a direction different from a functionalist route. As al- ready noted this means that deviance theory should describe and explain the process by which morally objectionable conditions or behavior are asserted to exist. These writers leave it unclear, however, whether in carrying out such a task sociologists perform in the capacity of scientists.

While Mankoff, Schur, Spector and Kitsuse and also Rains (1975) have de- marcated new areas for deviance study and indicated what should be explained, they have not in my estimation provided a theoretical model for doing so. Davis (1975) lists formal requirements for developing a model to study social control, including "causal structure" but at the same time she "disavows" the existence of deviance. Despite her disavowal, deviance is defined in a rather formal way as a form of conflict. Furthermore, causation becomes statements about relation-

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300 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

ships between variables-how they co-vary. Thus while labelling theorists bypass the causal question, a formal statement of conflict theory returns to a traditional mechanical model of causation.

An important reason why labelists may have failed to originate a working model for the study of deviance is that the symbolic interactionist concept of process derived from G. H. Mead, to which I assume that Schur, Spector and Kit- suse and others give their allegiance, is by its nature insufficient for macro- sociological analysis. I have given my reasons for this belief elsewhere (Lemert, 1974) but here I will only say that Mead dwelled primarily on interindividual interaction and socialization; he never developed a conception of groups or of society other than as generalized extensions of self consciousness or as that of the "larger self."

It is also likely that labelling theorists distort the idea of interaction; by adopt- ing the perspective of the individual or of the so-called "underdog" social control is described unilaterally and social interaction takes on an asymmetrical quality which precludes appreciation of its mutuality. Full interactional analysis must show how individual and aggregate responses of deviants through resistance, de- flection, mitigation and negotiation become influences which reshape the societal reaction (Rogers and Buffalo, 1974; Cohen, 1965).

The Subjective and the Objective

Spector and Kitsuse (1977) say that labelling theorists and value conflict theorists have been sensitive to this last issue, the charge of subjectivism made by their critics. Labelists have recognized the importance of objective conditions or of ob- jective behavior as well as the definitional processes involved in the production of deviance and social problems. Spector and Kitsuse refer to this, however, as the "balanced approach" and reject it on the following grounds: "It reduces the social construction of reality, an accomplishment of members of society, to a mere me- chanical reaction to exterior forces" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977:53). Instead, they say that individuals and groups define, respond and act towards putative conditions, that is, those commonly thought or reckoned to exist.

Whether by this means these writers escape the dilemma of subjectivism in de- viance study is questionable. Their difficulty becomes clearer in another of their statements: ". . . it is not such an extreme position to urge that sociologists of social problems set aside the issue of the objective basis of alleged conditions, even to the extent of remaining indifferent to their existence" (Spector and Kit- suse, 1977:78). Here is a "subtle shift" by the authors from concern with people to concern with sociologists. Most certainly the people or agents of social control neither set aside questions of the existence of objective conditions in making judg- ments about deviance, nor do they ignore questions of the creditability and conse- quences of their judgments about objective conditions.

If it is accepted that theoretical models must reflect the reality they represent, then a model must be devised for the study of deviance which reveals how people take objective conditions into account in making judgments about deviance by others and by themselves. This pertains not only to external social facts but also to physical and biological facts. Their inclusion is imperative if the study of devi-

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Study of Deviance 301

ance is to move beyond static, cross-sectional researches to that of emergence and dynamics inherent in its conception as a process of differentiation.

A Choice and Feedback Model

There is good reason to believe that Cooley's (1966) conception of social inter- action is superior to Mead's for the kind of macro-sociological work towards which Schur, Mankoff, Davis and others say deviance study is or should be mov- ing. This because Cooley's formulations dealt with groups and institutions, their differentiation, expansion, contraction and disappearance, all as part of a tenta- tive process in which influences move back and forth between groups and indi- viduals as well as between mutually influencing groups. Furthermore, Cooley (1966:398-99) clearly distinguished between generalizations about certain kinds of recurrent social phenomena which resulted in more or less constant rates: mar- riages, divorces, suicides, plus the proportion of income spent on food, and gen- eralizations applicable to situations in which social and physical influences get organized into some new and emergent form. These latter take place through human agency in which evaluation occurs in a context of group interaction. Specifically Cooley recognized the importance of social intelligence in deliberat- ing, calculating, weighing and sorting out values leading to choices for individual and collective action. Toulmin (1970:21) clarifies further the nature of this evaluational process in which things called factors or variables in mechanical models of causation are modified and reduced to influences, thus making possible the use of a different kind of model of causation:

Everything has causes; some of the things we do have reasons too. When our actions are done for reasons, these reasons enter into the causal explanation of our actions. But they do so indirectly by way of the "rational arts"-moral reflection, practical deliberation and intellectual calculation . . . and they do so without losing their ration- al character of "having force for us rather than forcing us," or "carrying weight with us" rather than overpowering us, of being "compelling" rather than compulsive.

It is evaluation in this sense which provides the core of a model for studying devi- ance that considers how influences are organized, that shows the interplay be- tween objective and subjective factors, and that leaves room for human choice without leaving scientific ground.

Cottrell's Use of the Concept of Feedback

However valuable they are, it is necessary to go beyond Cooley's early notions of evaluation and social intelligence to show in more detail what consequences human choices have on the process by which deviance emerges. Much is owed to W. F. Cottrell (1972) for his novel use of the concept of feedback to explicate more precisely what Cooley meant by the tentative social process. Feedback, a term coming from engineering and mathematical model making, refers to the use of a small amount of energy to convey back to a machine the ongoing direction, speed and other physical aspects of its operations, which can through a servo- mechanism energize self corrective adjustments. Cottrell uses the term, however,

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302 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

in a descriptive way meaning to convey back to individuals or groups the conse- quences of prior choices, which is to say whether their choices produced results according to their expectations or not. In general, when they do, an emergent or preexisting pattern of action is reinforced or the tentative social process is ex- tended. When they do not, then subsequent choices become problematical, espe- cially over the long run. Cottrell emphasized that human choices are not invariate in a mechanical sense, to which may be added that they are not analogues of stimulus behavior of experimental animals as often portrayed by behavioristic psychology.

The possibilities or consequences of human choice are several at least: (I) the choice may perpetuate a pattern of action-a set of rules, or the persistence of deviance; (2) it may alter the pattern of action-rules are changed; (3) it may weaken, undermine or erode the pattern; (4) it may so change the pattern and situation that choice is no longer possible; and finally (5) it may destroy the per- son or persons making the choice.

While Cottrell's model emphasizes choice it does not presume rationality. Peo- ple may persist in patterns of action which are meaningless, fantastic or even destructive for long periods of time. Discoveries of their deleterious effects of behavior, however, can lead to social control which selects it out of the culture. Whether this happens and how depends on new feedback, but also on differential perceptions and responses to its content. Changes in social control are affected by changing costs which may be perceived symbolically or directly from experience. How values becomes costs is crucial in understanding this process.

Values and Costs

Cottrell's model distinguishes between the act of evaluation and the pattern of action which expresses the order in which values get satisfied. Value is defined as that which within physical and biological limits influences choice, hence values are observed or inferred from the choices which people make. Presumably, values exist in a hierarchy but the opportunity for individuals to satisfy them in some ideal or free-choice order seldom occurs because persons must seek their ends in a world of limited means and usually through the instrumentality of organized groups. Consequently, a give and take occurs in group interaction in which indi- viduals sacrifice some values in order to satisfy others. Those values sacrificed be- come costs of particular choices or costs of achieving preferred ends.

It is here in the consideration of costs that "objective factors," such as time, energy, monetary expenditures and stress enter into individual evaluations and collective interaction. The most important observation to make is that while ob- jective conditions do not directly "cause" human choices or action, they can nevertheless change the costs of satisfying an existing order of values and so alter choices and a pattern of action. For example, greater driving time needed by police to deliver drunks to a detoxification center may reduce the number of ar- rests for intoxication even though police still hold to an order of protective and charitable values which previously led to larger numbers of arrests. The need for increased court appearances by police, choked court calendars, lack of jail space, accelerated demands on the county budget all can alter choices and change pat-

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Study of Deviance 303

terns of action by law enforcement people without any changes in the value sys- tems of the individuals and groups involved.

A final point, no less important than the previous one, is that while changed or increased costs may be perceived or learned through symbolic interaction, they also may be perceived through direct experience with the material world and the human body, and sometimes they cannot be perceived in any other way. It is doubtful whether the deeper meaning of a craving for alcohol or for heroin can be communicated symbolically, although others who have experienced them may certify their existence. In an opposite vein it can scarcely be said that the resis- tance encountered in nurses and in some physicians to acceptance of alcoholism as a disease is learned symbolically; rather it comes from direct appreciation of the untenability of the alcoholic's reactions in a medical treatment setting.

If it is accepted that there is perception of deviance through direct feedback from the physical environment and from the biological organism then objective and subjective facts may be brought together in an analytical model which is still within the bounds of social science. The reality of deviance no longer will need to be conceived exclusively as social reality. Likewise a solution to the problem raised by the "oversocialized conception of man" (Wrong, 1961) in sociology may be dealt with other than by simply ignoring it.

A Concluding Note on Application of The Model

Cottrell developed his analytical model primarily for better understanding of how energy and technology affected railroading. Questions may remain as to whether it is applicable to other areas of human action, particularly to changing moral ideas, deviance and social control. First, note that Cottrell did apply his model to the study of the political aspects of aging, touching on the administrative cate- gories which affected perceptions of the aged and their problems. I likewise used his type of analysis in my study of change in the California juvenile court law (Lemert, 1970). My attempt to use the model in its most explicit form can be found in my article on "Choice and Change in Juvenile Justice" (Lemert, 1976) which compared changes in the British and American juvenile courts. Bottoms (1974) also took note of this kind of analysis in his paper on decriminalization of the British juvenile courts. Finally to be noted is the study by Ross (1973) of the British Road Safety Act of 1967, which examined consequences and counter consequences of the use of scientific tests to determine the crime of drinking and driving. While this makes no reference to Cottrell, nevertheless the data and its interpretation lend themselves well to his analytical method and can be easily recast in his conceptual format.

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