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Critical Studies on Terrorism

ISSN: 1753-9153 (Print) 1753-9161 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rter20

Is the Animal Liberation Front morally justified in engaging in violent and illegal activism towards animal farms?

Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues

To cite this article: Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues (2016) Is the Animal Liberation Front morally justified in engaging in violent and illegal activism towards animal farms?, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 9:2, 226-246, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2016.1142797

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1142797

Published online: 12 Apr 2016.

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Is the Animal Liberation Front morally justified in engaging in violent and illegal activism towards animal farms? Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues

CLEA, University of Fort Hare, East London, South Africa

ABSTRACT The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is an activist group, mainly focused on violent and illegal direct action, including destruction of property, the rescuing of animals and the clandestine filming of animal cruelty on animal farms. Here, I engage with three argu- ments that are often raised against the ALF’s actions, namely these actions are not morally justified because: (a) they are not measures of last resort; (b) they are excessively violent and do not discrimi- nate targets; and (c) they have no reasonable probability of suc- cess. I contend that clandestinely filming animal cruelty is morally justified, the destruction of property is not and that rescuing animals is morally justified, if the ALF incorporates some changes as to how this is done.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 9 May 2015 Accepted 25 December 2015

KEYWORDS Animal Liberation Front; just war theory; terrorism; direct action; activism

Introduction

The world that exists at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century is experiencing an acute environmental crisis with the Earth and its living beings facing possible extinction (Best 2014). Over the last decades, and as a response to this scenario of environmental destruction, various radical1 environmentalist groups have been formed (Pellow 2014). Examples include the Animal Liberation Front, the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Rights Militia. Despite the differences between these groups, what they do have in common is the belief that illegal, violent direct action is justified in order to stop the various ecological threats that face the earth and the life it sustains.

In this article, I analyse whether the actions of one of these groups, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), are morally justified in engaging in illegal and violent campaigns against animal farming.2 In order to respond to this question, I engage with three just war theory arguments normally raised against terrorist acts, assessing whether these can be applied to the ALF. These arguments state that acts of terrorism are not morally justified because: (a) they are not measures of last resort; (b) they are excessively violent and do not discriminate targets; and (c) they have no reasonable probability of success (Walzer 2004, 2006).

These three arguments are routinely used to contend that terrorism is unjustified (Kaplan 2009; Walzer 2004, 2006). Notice, however, that little research has been done on

CONTACT Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues [email protected]

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM, 2016 VOL. 9, NO. 2, 226–246 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2016.1142797

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

whether these arguments apply specifically to the ALF. Lisa Kemmerer (2008) has been one of the few philosophers to conduct such an analysis. Moreover, notice that many philosophers and academics have challenged the idea that the ALF is a terrorist organisation.3 Taking this on board, the pertinence of using these arguments to analyse the ALF’s actions may be questioned.

However, despite the fact that little research has been done on this, and that characterising the ALF as a terrorist organisation is contestable, carrying out such an analysis is important for at least four reasons. First, as explained, terrorist acts are usually dismissed as immoral using these arguments; given that the ALF is classified as a terrorist organisation in many states, including the United States, it is pertinent to analyse the ALF’s actions in relation to what the critics of terrorism and the ALF usually contend. Second, and related to the previous point, because terrorism is inevitably intertwined with the discourse on terrorism (Ditrych 2014), in order to assess the validity of counterterrorist strategies against the ALF, it is important to assess the validity of those dismissing the ALF’s actions from within their own discourse. Third, engaging with these arguments is itself a form of resistance, to the extent that it shows a lack of coherence in anti-ALF discourses. As Tom Reagan contends (2004), the activism of groups like this will never be taken seriously and respected unless they engage more directly with, and comprehend, mainstream discourses on violence and terrorism. Hence, an effective way of challenging the green scare4 strategies against the ALF and the animal rights movement, in general, would be to address the coherence and consistency of the arguments offered against the ALF’s actions (Kemmerer 2014).

Finally, it is pertinent to use just war theory arguments because the ALF’s actions and the state’s response are analogous to a guerrilla war. This is because, as in a guerrilla war, combatants are underground individuals who are dispersed into anonymous cells, and who try to sabotage property and intimidate their enemies, which is exactly what the ALF does (Best 2014). Moreover, the state’s response to the ALF’s actions has been similar to how states respond to guerrillas. The United States, for example, has engaged in tactics to end the ALF, including tactics such as infiltrating, intimidating and impri- soning ALF members in order to dismantle it (Pellow 2014). Just war theory is, therefore, ideal for addressing such issues because it has been used to discuss the legitimacy of war at least since the time of the ancient Roman Empire (Kemmerer 2008). For example, the Romans used just war theory to justify war against who they classified as barbarians and rebels (Hardt and Negri 2000; Kemmerer 2008).

Thus, despite the objections to the application of just war theory to the actions of the ALF, there are plausible reasons to do so. Taking this on board, my objective is to presume the plausibility, moral validity and consistency of just war theory and attempt to tease out the implications of this presumption for the ALF.

My answer to the question of whether the actions of the ALF are morally justified is that, broadly speaking, if one assumes the veracity of these just war theory arguments, clandestinely filming animal cruelty on farms is morally justified, the destruction of property is not, and the rescuing of animals can be morally justified, if the ALF makes some changes in how they undertake it. The reason why rescuing and clandestine filming can be morally justified is because they are a measure of last resort, they do not use excessive violence and they do not attack individuals indiscriminately; addition- ally, they have a reasonable probability of success. Contrastingly, the reason why the

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destruction of property is unjustified is that, despite the fact that it is a measure of last resort and it is neither excessively violent nor indiscriminate, it does not have a reason- able probability of success.

This analysis starts with two assumptions. First, I assume, following philosophers like Steven Best (2014) and Gary Francione (1996), as well as the ALF itself, that there is no morally relevant difference with regard to the sentient experiences of humans and animals. For this reason, a bias in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species, and against members of other species, is morally unjustified. This, in turn, entails that animal farming is morally wrong, and that campaigning against it is a just cause. Notice, however, that being a just cause does not automatically entail that violence is justified – and that is what I am analysing in this article. Second, I assume that the members of the ALF are sincere and well-intentioned about their actions; that is, they do not engage in these actions to gain any personal benefit or profit.5

This article is divided into five sections. In the first section, I outline the ideology and praxis of the ALF. The second section provides an outline of the three arguments mentioned earlier. The third, fourth and fifth sections analyse the arguments outlined in the second section.

The ideology and praxis of the ALF

In this section, I wish to outline the context in which the ALF was created, their ideology and their actions. My contention is that there are three core features that need mention- ing when characterising the ALF. The core features that characterise the ALF are as follows: (a) direct action tactics; (b) a philosophy of animal rights; and (c) the objectives of the activism (Monaghan 1997, 1999, 2013; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014).6

The ALF was founded in Great Britain in the 1970s. Today, it consists of small autonomous groups of people all over the world who carry out direct action campaigns that follow ALF guidelines. Many members remain anonymous to avoid being arrested, but research suggests that many of them are dissenters from mainstream groups like Greenpeace, who became disenchanted with the progress (or otherwise) of the animal rights movement (Pellow 2014). Broadly speaking, ALF members became disenchanted because they felt that mainstream tactics were ineffective (Best 2014; Joosse 2007; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014). Specifically, these individuals have come to believe that democratic and legal means are inevitably corrupted by economic interests, power relations and privilege (Bernstein 2004; Molland 2004; Nocella II and Best 2011).

Therefore, according to ALF members, liberating animals from various forms of oppression (like farms and laboratories) cannot be achieved solely through education, persuasion, political campaigns and legal action; indeed, these methods of campaigning are controlled by animal exploiters (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). Thus, they suggest direct action combined with civil disobedience, with tactics that range from sit-ins, strikes, boycotts and tree-sits, to hacking websites, email and phone harassment, home demonstrations and arson (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014; Young 2010). The three most common practices in relation to animal farming, which will be analysed in this article, consist of rescuing farm animals, destroying property (the physical and tangible damage that is done to prop- erty, such as burning farming installations and equipment), and clandestine filming of

228 L. CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

animal cruelty on farms (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Monaghan 1997, 1999, 2013; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014).

Although the ALF normally engages in illegal action, and they do destroy property, they also contend that all members should follow what they call a strict code of non- violence. What this means in practice is that they should avoid causing any kind of physical injury to any sentient being – human or non-human (Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). In fact, the ALF has routinely demarcated their actions from those of the Animal Rights Militia (ARM); broadly speaking, this is a group with many members who consider it morally justifiable to inflict physical violence on those humans who exploit animals (Monaghan 1999, 2013).

However, the ALF’s renunciation of violence against sentient beings does not consider, according to them, the destruction of property, the rescuing of animals and the inflicting of economic damage as violent. Violence is, for them, defined as an act when “one individual or group intentionally and aggressively causes physical harm or death to another individual or group without justification and adequate cause” (Best 2014, 60–61).7 In their view, this definition of violence cannot therefore include the ALF’s actions, as ALF members consider they are not causing physical harm or death to another individual or group. According to them, property itself cannot be the subject of violence because it is not sentient (Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). Put differently, only sentient beings can be the victims of violent acts, and the ALF’s acts are not intended to physically harm humans directly; therefore, they are not, according to the ALF, violent (Monaghan 1999).

Additionally, the ALF considers their actions non-violent because they have a justifi- cation and an adequate cause. According to their definition, the term “violence” can only be used to label acts that do not have an adequate cause. Hence, because the ALF considers that animal exploitation is unjust, it is not an act of violence to destroy property in the name of a higher value, namely, the rights of animals. In other words, according to the ALF, there is an adequate cause for their actions and this rules out their actions as violent (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). On the ALF website, they contend that:

The basic premise is that if someone’s property is used to inflict pain, suffering, and death on innocent animals’ lives, then the destruction of that property is morally justified. It is not unlike freedom fighters in Nazi Germany destroying the gas chambers. The ALF believe that life is more important than things. (Animal Liberation Front 2015)

A second reason why members of the ALF became disenchanted is because of the view that mainstream groups are effectively “sleeping with the enemy”; that is, they have stopped defending animal rights, and instead, have started collaborating with the animal exploiters. For example, ALF members routinely accuse Peter Singer of being one of these collaborators (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Nocella II and Best 2011). After writing Animal Liberation in the 1970s, in 2006, Singer wrote a letter on behalf of his organisation to John Mackey, CEO of the Whole Foods grocery chain. In this letter, he expressed appreciation and support for the fact that his company was only selling animal products that were produced humanely. Many animal rights activists, including ALF activists, still perceive this as a betrayal, due to the philosophy of animal rights underlying their ideology.

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The ALF holds an abolitionist approach to animal rights (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014). According to the ALF, all practices involving the use of animals should be abolished, not merely regulated. From their point of view, any kind of animal exploitation is immoral and should be immediately abolished. Therefore, they oppose animal welfarists (a term that refers to the group of activists that maintain it is acceptable to use non-humans, as long as they are treated “humanely”). ALF members contend that there is no moral justification for using non-humans for human purposes. Thus, the ALF refuses all reformist approaches that simply seek better human treatment (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Best 2014; Monaghan 1997; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014). Policies that aim at humane treatment rather than abolition are, from the ALF’s viewpoint, speciesist. Speciesism is defined here as the position whereby non- human species exist to serve the needs of the human species, and that accordingly they have an inferior moral status (Best 2014). The rationale behind this abolitionist and anti- speciesist approach is that all sentient beings have morally relevant interests that corre- spond to rights. According to the ALF, all animals hold these rights, with animals having the right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and to not be considered property (Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). In practice, this means that humans are not free to use animals for food, clothing, scientific experimentation, entertainment and other practices.

A third relevant characteristic of the ALF’s ideology and praxis pertains to their objectives. The general objective of the ALF is to find a strategy that is more effective than the use of reformist, insider tactics. In particular, they have three sub-objectives. First, they wish to save as many animals as possible. In their view, all animal lives count and, for that reason, it is crucial to try to save as many as they can. Second, they wish to destroy the animal farming industry by using strategies of economic sabotage. Basically, they wish to put animal farms out of business. Indeed, ALF supporters contend that it is estimated that since the 1970s, the ALF has caused about $100 million of damage to animal exploiters (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Best 2014; FBI 2015a, 2015b; Nocella II and Best 2011; Pellow 2014). Third, the ALF has a commitment to try to sensitise the public to the atrocities suffered by animals, so that more people become vegan or vegetarian (Animal Liberation Front 2015; Monaghan 1997).

In this section I have outlined the key elements of the ALF’s ideology and praxis. Of course, when writing about social movements, depending on the kind of analysis one is making, different elements may stand out (Baumgarten, Daphi, and Ullrich 2014). However, for the purpose of this article, there are three defining ALF features that are important: first, direct action is a core element of their tactical and philosophical repertoire; second, theirs is a strict abolitionist philosophy of animal rights that rejects any form of animal use; and third, the ALF’s objectives (to save as many animals as possible, to destroy the animal farming industry, and to sensitise the public to the suffering of animals), when it engages in these campaigns, are also a crucially important element of the overall ALF organisation.

Three arguments against ALF activism

In this section, I wish to summarise three arguments rooted in just war theory that are routinely used to argue against terrorist acts so that I can test whether these can aid in assessing the ALF’s actions as morally unjustifiable or not. Before summarising these

230 L. CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

arguments, however, the concepts of “violence” and “terrorism” should be defined because they play such an important role in the debate, due to the fact that the ALF’s actions are routinely considered violent acts of terrorism (Butler 2002; Kemmerer 2008; Regan 2004).

I use the term “violence” in this context to refer to any form of behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill someone, or cause harm to his/her property. As can be concluded from the previous section, the ALF would disagree that this is an accurate definition of violence, and of course, this definition of violence is not free from contestation. Best (2014), for example, argues that this definition is too broad and vague to be meaningful and useful. Nevertheless, Best is incorrect. Indeed, the definition offered here has proven to have practical relevance. In particular, this defini- tion is used in various legal systems to protect individuals from domestic violence (Bird 2015). Routinely, victims of domestic violence see their property being burned, stolen or barred from them (Bird 2015). By following this definition, the courts are able to convict individuals who substantially damaged their partners’ lives with acts of domestic violence.

Thus, the definition I endorse is not vague and does have practical applicability. On top of this, this definition is a plausible one because it recognises what tends to be an important aspect of human well-being: the possibility to appropriate external objects (Sen 1999), an important characteristic of the human condition. Humans constantly interact with the world and the objects around them, and as such, these objects make up an essential part of their lives. Being able to secure property tends, therefore, to be essential for exerting control over one’s environment, which, in turn, is an essential aspect of well-being (Sen 1999).8

Equally, there are some problems with defining terrorism and applying it to the ALF. As John Sorenson (2009) points out, the term “terrorism” is increasingly being misap- plied in order to stigmatise and delegitimise the actions of groups whose ideologies do not fit with the interests of corporations and/or the state. That is, it is a term loaded with a specific ideology and is instrumentalised by those who hold power (Chomsky 2002; Sorenson 2009). Moreover, the definition of terrorism used in the United States (and the one I endorse in this article) where the ALF is more active, does not seem to fit the ALF’s actions.9 The FBI has defined the ALF as a group of domestic eco-terrorists. Domestic eco-terrorists, according to the FBI’s definition, are groups that have the following characteristics:

Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or transcend national bound- aries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (FBI 2015a)

Accordingly, a terrorist is an individual who engages in illegal, violent and coercive actions, such as assassination, to further political goals by intimidating or coercing the government and the civilian population, especially by targeting civilians in such attacks.

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However, this definition does not fit the ALF’s actions, as the ALF does not intention- ally threaten or endanger human life, does not perceive their targets as the civilian population and does not wish to engage in acts of mass destruction, assassination and kidnapping. Rather, the ALF’s actions are focused on fighting specific practices carried out by those individuals who the ALF perceives as combatants,10 and they have a strict code of not endangering human life, including a vehement rejection of assassination or kidnapping. Furthermore, they do not wish to carry out acts of mass destruction; rather, the ALF intends to destroy only the property (for example, farming installations) used to exploit animals.

Taking this on board, and owing to the fact that the discourse around the ALF is routinely linked with the discourse of terrorism, especially the US discourse on terrorism, in order to engage with the relevant literature, I assume that the definition of violence I have given is correct. For this purpose, even though it is not assumed here that the ALF is a terrorist group, I will analyse the three arguments against terrorism that are most commonly used in the philosophical literature (Kaplan 2009).

First, it is normally contended that these illegal, violent forms of activism are unjus- tified due to the fact that they should only be used as a last resort. In this context, last resort is meant to indicate that non-violent strategies for settling the conflict have all been tried but have failed and for that reason, only violence is left as a solution (Kemmerer 2008). The argument suggests that not all peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question will have been exhausted (Regan 2004). The critics contend that the animal rights movement has not yet exhausted all alternatives (Regan 2004).

In particular, this argument makes four different claims. First, it is by undertaking the same campaigns over and over again that objectives are achieved (Walzer 2004). So, even though non-violent campaigns may not have had the desired impact yet, this is simply part of the process and it does not mean that activists have run out of alter- natives (Walzer 2004). Second, there are a variety of tactics that have not yet been tried, like lobbying politicians and the media (Regan 2004). Third, critics of terrorism contend that terrorists do not truly seek out any negotiated resolution, and simply wish to tyrannically impose their own solutions (Walzer 2004, 2006). In the case of the ALF, it is sometimes contended that they continue to reject any kind of negotiation and, therefore, their strategies are not a last resort, as they have yet to pass through the negotiation process. Fourth, the only case where terrorism may be the last resort is when the oppression to which the terrorists claim to be responding is so extreme that activists are not morally required to go through legal means of political opposition. These include outrageous violations of equal liberty or acts of a genocidal character (Finlay 2010; Rawls 1999; Walzer 2004). Hence, those who oppose the ALF’s actions contend that these radical activists are not opposing a kind of situation that is of this character.

A second argument commonly raised against such actions is that the violence used by the ALF is excessive and that there is no discrimination in terms of who they attack (Butler 2002; Regan 2004). Thus, this criticism of the ALF is subdivided into two other arguments. First, the targets of the ALF are not legitimate targets. According to this argument, groups like the ALF normally target individuals who are not combatants and are innocent. It is, therefore, unfair to use war tactics on non-combatants or innocents who stand outside the field of war proper. Second, critics of the ALF contend that the

232 L. CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

group’s use of offensive action does not remain strictly proportional to the objectives desired. Therefore, according to this view, the ALF use excessive violence to the extent that they do not try to minimise destruction, casualties and sabotage, and this lack of care does not help in saving or protecting animals. As Regan (2004, 234) contends, “The vast majority (I estimate 98 percent) is property destruction, pure and simple.”

A third reason why critics of terrorism normally consider that violent and illegal acts such as those carried out by the ALF are unjustified is because these acts have, according to them, a low probability of success (Regan 2004; Walzer 2004, 2006). This argument can be set out in three steps. First and generally, there is a duty to respect the law and to not be violent. Second, because there is a duty to respect the law, in providing a moral excuse for this violation one has to give a set of circumstances that offer enough reasons to override the moral principles that affirm that breaking the law and the use of violence are not acceptable (Kaplan 2009). Third, one of these circum- stances has to be the probability of success for a certain action; for, if there is a violation of what is normally considered impermissible, this violation has to be effective, other- wise the transgression of law and violence is futile (Finlay 2010; Rawls 1999). Having taken this argument into consideration, what critics of terrorism and the ALF normally contend is that these actions are normally ineffective, and have no reasonable prob- ability of success. In particular, it is contended that such actions: (a) have no power to influence public opinion or state policies (Regan 2004; Walzer 2004, 2006); and (b) make no significant impact on the animal farm industry (Francione 1996).

To sum up, the ALF is usually perceived as a terrorist group (Kemmerer 2008; Monaghan 1999; Sorenson 2009). I have outlined three arguments that are routinely used to delegitimise terrorism and, thereby, to delegitimise the ALF’s activism. The three arguments that are commonly raised against the ALF’s actions are: (a) that they have not yet explored non-violent and legal alternatives; (b) their actions are ineffective; and (c) that the methods used are excessive and inappropriate for a particular campaign.

Are the ALF’s actions against animal farming a measure of last resort?

In this section, I wish to analyse whether acting violently and illegally with regard to animal farming is a last resort measure or not. To recall, by last resort I mean that all other peaceful alternatives for resolving the conflict, such as diplomatic negotiation, have failed and that no other means to settle the dispute are available (Kemmerer 2008). I wish to argue that it is indeed, a last resort measure and, therefore, ALF members are justified in engaging in violent and illegal activism on these grounds. In support of this view, I present three arguments.

The first argument addresses the idea outlined in the last section that illegal and violent action by the ALF is not morally justified because animal farming is not an outrageous violation of equal liberty or an act of genocidal character. Nevertheless, contrary to what the arguments against the ALF’s actions say, the oppression which its members are reacting against is extreme, and of a genocidal character. Worldwide, about 308 million tonnes of meat is consumed every year, which corresponds to about 55,000,000,000 animals being slaughtered per year (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2014). Therefore, animal farming is of a genocidal character to the extent that it engages in the systematic and deliberate mass killing of all

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or a significant part of a large group. Thus, if one agrees with the argument outlined in the previous section that violence can only be justified in extreme situations, like genocide, then violence is justified in the case of the ALF’s actions because animal farming has a genocidal character.11

This idea that animal farming is of a genocidal character and an outrageous violation of liberty is reinforced, if one looks into how animals on farms are currently used. The extreme cruelty that these animals suffer justifies the activism of the ALF. To be precise, the liberty of animals used on farms is substantially curtailed by animal farming, which is undertaken using extremely cruel methods. To begin with, US animal laws exempt animals used for food from animal welfare protection (Schaffner 2010). Therefore, if the rationale of just war theory is that violence is justified when its purpose is to stop a substantive violation of liberty, then the ALF’s actions are justified as this is the kind of problem they are addressing.

To understand this, take the case of chickens: the majority of chickens spend their whole lives crammed in dirty, windowless sheds, alongside thousands of other similarly suffering chickens. This intense crowding and confinement leads to a variety of diseases. Most individuals are not aware that on the modern industrial farm, cows, pigs, chickens and other animals are kept in conditions of overcrowding and intensive confinement. Most often, they cannot engage in natural behaviours such as foraging, stretching, walking or turning around. They are genetically, chemically and environmentally manipulated in order to produce a maximum amount of flesh or eggs or milk in a minimum amount of time in order to increase profits. They are made to reproduce (usually through artificial insemination) continuously so that humans can consume their milk or eat or raise their offspring for food. When their productivity declines, they are shipped to slaughter, having lived only a small portion of their natural lives.

A similar situation happens with turkeys. Turkeys raised on factory farms are hatched in large incubators and then moved to windowless sheds with thousands of other turkeys. This overcrowded setting leads many animals to kill each other; turkey’s toes are often broken and cut off as well, as are their snoods (Cochrane 2012; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013; Francione 1996; Newkirk 2009; Singer 1995). Thus, animal farming involves a significant and outrageous violation of these animals’ well-being and liberty. To the extent that illegal and violent actions are justified if they aim at addressing extreme situations, the ALF is justified to intervene because animal farming is an extreme example of systematic cruelty.

The second set of ideas I wish to contest are the ideas that the ALF’s actions are not a measure of last resort because there are still non-violent strategies available. There are three sets of ideas here. The first is that animal rights activists, including the ALF, have not yet tried all non-violent strategies. The second is that even if they did, repeating the same strategies is the most efficient way to achieve positive results. The third is that the ALF does not truly seek out any negotiated resolution and just imposes their view.

Against these arguments, I contend that the ALF’s actions are indeed a measure of last resort, because their actions are motivated by the fact that animal rights activists have been trying to eliminate the consumption of meat for many years with a variety of non-violent and legal forms of activism that have proven to be ineffective. The advocacy for a higher moral status and better treatment of animals goes back to 200 BCE, when philosophers such as Pythagoras advocated vegetarianism and animal compassion on

234 L. CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

spiritual grounds (Molland 2004). Organised social movements that have campaigned in favour of animal rights, however, have existed for about 200 years (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013; Francione 1996). In particular, in the nineteenth century, movements for the improvement of the treatment of animals on farms, and for the abolition of farms, began campaigning (Harris 2009). Since then, animal rights activists have tried a variety of methods, including: educating the public, negotiating with stakeholders, influencing politicians and the media, and entering into debates (Bernstein 2004; Best 2014). The most popular animal rights groups in the United States are Farm Sanctuary, PETA and Vegan Outreach.12 These groups’ strategies consist mainly of negotiating with stake- holders, non-violent protest, influencing the media, and so forth (Ball 2009; Newkirk 2009).

However, these campaigns have been extremely unsuccessful. Worldwide, the con- sumption of meat has gone from 78 million tonnes in 1963 to a current total of 308 million tonnes per year (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013; Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2014; North American Meat Institute 2012). Hence, the forms of activism used so far have not been successful in fighting the consumption of meat.

This disproves the three sub-arguments raised earlier about last resort. First, it disproves the idea that by repeating the same actions again and again, activists see results. There is no empirical evidence that suggests that this is the case and, indeed, it seems that activism has not been able to stop the growth of meat consumption (Francione 1996). Second, throughout 200 years of activism, many strategies have been tried and exhausted, as is shown by the lack of success by mainstream groups’ campaigns. Third, ALF members, who are mainly former members of mainstream groups (Pellow 2014), wish to engage in negotiations; however, it is because these negotiations did not work that they are now engaging in more radical strategies (Bernstein 2004; Best 2014; Nocella II and Best 2011). Therefore, it is not the case that ALF members simply wish to tyrannically impose their own solution.

The final argument I wish to offer is that the ALF’s actions are a measure of last resort (and therefore justified) and that one should be sceptical about achieving a better life for animals through legal means, because legal means are exercised within the current system of domination. Consequently, they simply do not work (Kheel 2006). In particular, animals, for obvious reasons, do not fully enjoy the benefits of a legal system, whereby they are able to defend themselves from oppression. Democracy is exclusionary to the extent that its instruments are not available for the animal population and, conse- quently, animals are excluded from the democratic process. Animals, due to their characteristics, obviously cannot vote or run for any legislative, or judicial or executive office (Bernstein 2004; Best 2014; Khan 1994; Kheel 2006).

As a result, such a system has unlimited potential to perpetuate oppression because the ones in power are the oppressors. First, those holding these powers can enact laws that enslave further animals and perpetuate animal suffering. Second, because animals are excluded from the democratic process, animals never have the power to change their condition. Thus, legal processes that flow directly from democratic authority inevitably offer a way of oppressing those who cannot make use of democracy or who have limited democratic power (Khan 1994). Put differently, law and order, in relation to animals, is a tool of oppression because it is not an instrument animals can

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 235

make use of and, therefore, law and order maintains the oppressor’s control over the legal means and maintains the status quo (Khan 1994; Singer and Spira 2005).

My claim is not an empirical claim about how legal systems have historically failed to address the oppression of those who do not hold power. Rather, the point being made is that it is inherent to the legal system that some individuals will be excluded, and if one is solely reliant on this system, changes will not occur. The reason is pragmatic; if the legal power to change someone’s situation is in the hands of the oppressor, and if legal power is the only means to change someone’s situation, then those holding power have unlimited tools for perpetuating oppression, and whatever reforms that may arise will always be shaped by the oppressor’s decisions.

Against this argument about the limitation of legal means, it could be argued that parliament could provide special representation for animal advocates that represent animals and, therefore, the interests of animals could be defended within the system. However, this would require willingness on the part of those in power to concede seats; and there is no evidence that this would happen, especially given that animal exploita- tion has increased since the 1960s, suggesting that there is in fact less interest in animal welfare today. Additionally, if individuals in power were willing to concede seats for the sake of animal representation, they would surely also be willing to concede other rights. But this is not the case. So there is no empirical evidence to suggest that special seats in parliament are an achievable goal.

To sum up, in this section I have argued that the ALF’s actions are, indeed, a last resort. Animal rights activists have been trying to stop the consumption of animals for food for many years, and have used a variety of non-violent strategies that have proven to be ineffective. Furthermore, legal means are not suitable for this kind of campaign because animals cannot make use of them to subvert the system.

Does the ALF use excessive violence and attack individuals indiscriminately?

The argument that the ALF uses excessive violence and does not discriminate is inaccurate. The ALF’s guidelines are very strict in regard to who should be harmed, and it is explicitly expressed that whoever claims to be an ALF member must follow these guidelines. In particular, they repeat twice in their guidelines that: “activists should take all precautions not to harm any animal (human or otherwise)”, and that it is required for members “To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human” (Animal Liberation Front 2015).

The ALF also requires that members target the oppressors when they undertake their actions. In particular, the ALF argues for the need “To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc., and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering” (Animal Liberation Front 2015). Hence, this means that not everyone should be targeted, only those who are actively involved in the oppression and exploitation of animals. What these guidelines indicate is that it is not the case that the ALF does not discriminate with regard to their targets; indeed, it is quite the reverse. ALF members meticulously avoid bodily harming any humans. These procedures are not just theory; that is, it is not just the case that they have these guidelines but then in practice act differently. To date, no individuals have

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been bodily harmed by the ALF’s actions (Ackerman 2003; Monaghan 2013; Pellow 2014).

It is also not true that the ALF engages in violence that is disproportional to the ends to be achieved. The ALF does not engage in gratuitous violence against exploiters. Rather, it aims at putting exploiters out of business, and the only kind of violence that is acceptable within the ALF’s standards is the one that achieves the objective of bank- rupting, denouncing and sabotaging animal exploiters (Animal Liberation Front 2015). Indeed, to date, no ALF action has had a collateral effect on humans (Ackerman 2003; Monaghan 2013).

However, it could still be contended that selected targets have been non-combatants – that is, members of the general public – and therefore, the violence used against animal exploiters is excessive. Nevertheless, if the moral status of animals is taken seriously, farmers should be perceived as combatants (Best 2014; Kemmerer 2008; Nocella II and Best 2011). To recall, a combatant is an individual who voluntarily engages in violence in a situation of war or a situation analogous to a war.

Taking this on board, if it is true that there is no morally relevant distinction between the sentient experiences of humans and those of animals, and that any differences that may exist between humans and animals are morally irrelevant, then farmers hold a position analogous to the Nazis who ran concentration camps (Best 2014; Patterson 2002). This is the case to the extent that in both cases, the oppressor is treating a certain being below its moral status. In addition to that, there are a variety of parallels between the treatment of Jews during the Holocaust and animals on farms (Patterson 2002; Sztybel 2006). To be more precise, a parallel between animal farming and concentration camps can be drawn along three lines, namely, there is comparable use and destruction, comparable apparatus and comparable discourse (Sztybel 2006).

In terms of comparable use and destruction, both animals and Jews have been murdered en masse, both have been used as slave labour, both displaced from their homes and both incarcerated in overcrowded conditions where disease easily spreads (Sztybel 2006). Regarding similarities in the apparatus, these are comparable in three areas. First, both non-human animals and Jews remain nameless in order for the oppressor to maintain a distance from the objects of exploitation. Second, both the Nazis and animal farmers have a preoccupation with the efficiency of killing. In the case of Jews in concentration camps, gas was used because it killed them speedily and cheaply. The techniques used on farms are also designed to kill animals quickly and without needing to exert any extra effort. Third, both animal farmers and concentration camp Nazis have weapons or devices that can be (and are) used to torture, exploit and murder a group of beings, and whose moral status makes it immoral for them to be subject to that kind of treatment (Kemmerer 2008; Patterson 2002). The kind of dis- course on the dehumanisation of Jews and animals is also similar. In both cases, their subjectivity is veiled, and they become the subject of objectification (Sztybel 2006).

Therefore, it is the case that both situations are comparable to the extent that farmers and Nazis are seriously violating the moral status of a being, treating him/her below what he/she is entitled to, and also because the mistreatment of Jews in concentration camps shares many similarities with the mistreatment of animals on farms (Kemmerer 2008; Patterson 2002).13 Taking this on board, if one accepts that (a) there is no morally relevant distinction between humans and animals that justifies the way animals are

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treated on farms, (b) Nazis are combatants, (c) animal farmers’ actions are analogous to the ones of Nazis at concentration camps, therefore (d) animal farmers can indeed be considered combatants (Kemmerer 2008).

The ALF’s actions: a reasonable probability of success?

In this final section, I examine the third group of arguments against the actions of the ALF, namely the arguments that suggest their actions are not justified due to the fact that it is unlikely they will succeed. In order to address this set of arguments, two points need to be clarified. First, what constitutes success, and second, how to measure success? I take a successful act to be an act that furthers its objectives; an act can be said to be unsuccessful if it undermines the aims that it is supposed to achieve. Thus, in the case of the ALF, a successful action is one that furthers the ALF’s objectives, specifically: having a negative economic impact on the farm industry, influencing the public so as to change their perspectives on animals’ moral status, and saving individual animals’ lives. The question of how to measure success is more difficult to determine. In particular, in relation to positively influencing the public to change their views about animals, how can one affirm that it has not been successful, especially if education takes time to become effective? In other words, owing to the fact that there is a time variable in the assessment of the educational effect of the ALF’s actions, it is difficult to be objective about whether their actions are successful or not.

I offer three criteria that I believe are a reasonable way to assess this. First, to measure success one has to use the available data to determine if a certain measure is successful or not. However, because this is also dependent on time, one should also analyse the inherent characteristics of a certain action. That is, one can evaluate success theoretically by looking at whether, due to its nature, a certain action will lead to success or not. Notice that these are two different criteria: the former relies on empirical evidence, whereas the latter relies only on a theoretical analysis of the nature of the action. The third criterion is that whatever the action is it should not undermine the other objec- tives. Therefore, an action is successful to the extent that it does not undermine the success of the other actions of the group. Underlying this latter criterion is the idea that consistency is a central tool of analysis for the moral assessment of situations. The reason why it is so important is because “Inconsistency leads to unintelligibility, to a lack of credence, to moral confusion” (Kemmerer 2014, 45).

Broadly speaking, I argue that the clandestine filming of animal cruelty has a reason- able probability of success, whereas destroying property does not. Rescuing animals is a more complicated case: most of the known cases have not been successful, but if this strategy was combined with the clandestine filming of animal cruelty, then it may be successful. The reasons underlying these arguments rely on whether these strategies further or not the ALF’s objectives.

In terms of the economic impact of the three main forms of activism, I contend that the ALF’s actions do not have a reasonable probability of success. The economic impact that the ALF’s actions have had on the farm industry is thus far insignificant. Indeed, it is true that the ALF’s tactics have been successful in achieving some objectives. They have shut down laboratories and animal farms and have bankrupted a number of businesses, causing about $100 million in damages to animal exploiters (Animal Liberation Front

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2015; Best 2014; FBI 2015a, 2015b; Nocella II and Best 2011). However, these actions have made almost no impact on the overall industry, even though they may have impacted particular businesses. In the United States alone, the sale of meat brings in, on average, $154.8 billion per year in revenue, which suggests that $100 million damage worldwide, to include laboratories and not just farms, has very little economic impact on such a massive industry (North American Meat Institute 2012). Although such actions may sometimes impact a specific company, ultimately, the industry itself remains unaffected. Moreover, those running the industry will be insured, which means that the damages are covered.

Another reason why the ALF’s actions have no economic impact on the industry is because the meat market, like most agricultural markets, is close to perfect competitive markets (Colman and Young 1989; Saccomandi and Ploeg 1998; Schrimper 2001). In practice, this means that there is a very large number of sellers and the exit or entry of one or more company therefore has almost no effect on the market (Schrimper 2001). Furthermore, it is relatively easy to enter the industry without incurring great costs. Consequently, it makes no difference if some companies are run out of business as a result of bankruptcy, because not only will there be numerous other sellers of meat, but other meat sellers can easily enter the market.

On top of this, there will be little impact on the industry because the demand for meat is relatively inelastic (Colman and Young 1989; Saccomandi and Ploeg 1998; Schrimper 2001); that is, the demand for meat does not change significantly in relation to the price.14 Hence, assuming that as a result of the ALF’s actions, the price of meat increases due to there being fewer animals available, and the costs of producing meat also increase, this will have no impact on the actual demand for meat.

In terms of the objective of changing the way the public sees animals, I argue that the clandestine filming of animal cruelty can be successful, but that the public disapproves of the destruction of property, mainly due to the way this is portrayed by the media. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability of such actions educating the masses about animal rights. Rescuing animals is normally perceived negatively too, but I wish to contend that this could be overcome.

The main reason why there is no reasonable probability of success for property destruction is empirical. Violent strategies normally miscommunicate to the public the message of the activist (Abrahms 2006, 2012). An important aspect for the success of violent actions in terms of influencing public opinion is that these are rightly commu- nicated to the public. If these actions are miscommunicated, the public will not endorse the actions or support them (Abrahms 2006; Schelling 1990, 2008). Nevertheless, violent activist groups often miscommunicate their groups’ objectives (Abrahms 2006, 2012). Usually, the public perceives violent attacks as proof that the perpetuators are out to destroy their societies (Abrahms 2006). In the case of the ALF’s actions, it is generally the case that property destruction is publicly perceived as irrational terrorist attacks carried out by human haters (Dawn 2004; Webb 2004).

This lack of success is inherent to the strategy. That is, the strategy itself has no reasonable probability of success because in itself it does not have the potential to influence the public; that is, it is unable to send a clear message. Individuals perceive the world as a result of how they are socialised; in a speciesist world like ours, individuals will perceive action using speciesist concepts (Pellow 2014). Therefore, an action that

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clashes with established societal prejudice will simply be interpreted as an attack on a form of institution that it is considered common sense to accept as normal. In order for a certain action to have an impact, it has to offer evidence that challenges the established prejudice. Destruction of property does not offer such evidence; it is simply an instance of a violent clash with established prejudice, rather than an evidence-based challenge. As a consequence, such actions inevitably miscommunicate their message because the receiver has a specific ideology through which to interpret such information as that being passed on by the ALF.

Contrastingly, clandestine filming has a different impact, and also different character- istics. Such actions are not necessarily perceived as immoral attacks on innocent animal farmers. Often, these actions are perceived as the actions of well-intentioned animal lovers (Dawn 2004). The difference between reactions to clandestine filming and the other strategies is not accidental; rather, it is related to the way that such a strategy can inform the public and prevent distorted views of the actions carried out by animal activists, in this case, the ALF.

This strategy has the potential to inform the public to the extent that it uncovers evidence of extreme animal abuse, thus awakening public understanding about the plight of animals (Singer 1995). Broadly speaking, the meat industry makes it acceptable to eat meat by hiding the cruelty shown towards animals on farms; if most people were aware of what happens on these farms, many would be less willing to eat meat (Adams 2010). Thus, the industry tries to make the animal as absent as possible, disconnecting it from what individuals are actually eating (Adams 2010; Cole and Stewart 2014). Filming and denouncing animal cruelty has the potential to influence people, and turn them against the meat industry because it reveals the atrocities happening on animal farms. This, consequently, has the potential to prevent the victimisation of farmers and the dehumanisation of activists because of the images showing where the real cruelty is taking place.

The possibility of distorting the ALF’s actions is substantially diminished because activists can use the film as evidence of how animals are actually being treated through the use of social media like YouTube, Twitter or Facebook. Corporations may still own the media and may try to distort the actions; however, having filmed evidence that can be spread using social media can help counter these distortions. In particular, activists can avoid unwanted victimisation of animal farmers by showing that, in fact, the farmers themselves inflict substantial cruelty on the animals that they rear. Furthermore, despite the destruction of property involved in breaking into facilities to film animal cruelty, these campaigns are normally perceived as non-violent. Repressing campaigns that are perceived as non-violent may backfire as being unjust (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

The rescuing of animals offers an interesting case when evaluating if it helps the public to change their views. Routinely, rescuing animals is usually perceived as stealing, rather than saving animals. This is mainly because the media tends to portray such actions negatively. The media passes on the message that the owners of the animal farms are the victims rather than the animals; in fact, animal suffering on farms is almost never mentioned (Sorenson 2009; Yourofsky 2004). Therefore, at first glance, it seems that these campaigns have little hope of success because they are not likely to gain sufficient support. Nevertheless, if the rescuing of animals is combined with clandesti- nely filming animal cruelty, this perception may change. If rescuing is filmed and

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individuals see that animals were saved from cruel situations, then the rescuers will be perceived as animal lovers rather than thieves. Consequently, there will be a clear message that the animal was removed because of the suffering involved.

Notice, however, that this strategy will not have the same effect if it involves the destruction of property. As explained earlier, the destruction of property inevitably miscommunicates the message of the ALF, because, currently, the public uses a specie- sist ideology through which to interpret such destruction. This is not the same with animal rescue; as explained, most individuals are unaware of the way that animals are treated and if they were, they would likely disapprove of such mistreatment. Hence, rescuing does not go against the current ideology of caring for the welfare of animals. Consequently, by using society’s preoccupation with the welfare of animals, and by showing that farm animals’ welfare is being violated, filmed rescuing is promoting animal rights. Contrastingly, the destruction of property goes against most individuals’ intuitions that violence should be kept to a minimum and that individuals are entitled to have their property protected.

Regarding the success of the ALF’s actions in rescuing individual animals, the ALF has been successful to the extent that it has saved a significant number of animals’ lives. As Best (2014) points out, mainstream groups have been significantly inert in terms of being able to save the actual lives of individual animals, whereas the ALF has success- fully removed thousands of animals from the hands of animal exploiters. Nevertheless, these actions can be considered unsuccessful in some cases because they fail to meet the criterion of not interfering with other ALF objectives. In the specific case of arson, the setting fire to farms, even though animals that are suffering exploitation are saved, involves a side effect for various animals that live in the roofs, walls, and so forth, of these buildings. For example, there are many rats and birds living in these places which will probably die if the building is set on fire and, the ALF has no way to control how many of these animals are living in such places. Therefore, arson interferes with the broader objective of saving animals’ lives.

To summarise, in this section I have argued that there is a reasonable hope of success for clandestine filming and little reasonable hope of success for property destruction. I have also contended that despite the fact that rescuing animals has not been successful so far, this strategy could be successful if the ALF changes the way that it carries this out. In particular, the ALF should rescue animals and film these rescues so that the public understands the reason why this is being done.

Conclusion

I started this article with the following assumptions. The first assumption was that there are no morally relevant differences between the sentience of non-human and human animals, and for that reason, speciesism should not be a criterion for moral decision- making. Therefore, the cause of campaigning for animal rights is a just cause. The second assumption was that ALF activists are sincere about their actions and they do not have some secret and subversive intention. Third, I assumed that the arguments of just war theory were morally valid and consistent. With these assumptions in mind, I posed the question: is the organisation, the ALF, morally justified in engaging in violent activism in order to stop the atrocities that occur in animal farming?

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 241

To answer this question, I engaged with three common criticisms against terrorist acts and applied these to the ALF’s actions. The three criticisms were that the ALF’s actions are unjustified because: (a) they are not a last resort measure; (b) they are excessively violent and do not discriminate between targets; and (c) they do not have a reasonable hope of success. In broad terms, I made two main arguments in response. The first was that (a) and (b) are false, and for that reason, the claim that rescuing, clandestine filming and destruction of property are morally unjustifiable is false on these grounds. Nevertheless, my second main argument was that although there is a reason- able hope of success for clandestine filming, there is no hope of success for the destruction of property strategy. In the case of rescuing animals, there is hope of success if the ALF slightly changes the way it carries out these actions. Consequently, if we accept that these three conditions should all be satisfied in order to justify an act of violence, then property destruction is not justified, while the other two actions are. To conclude, acts like the destruction of property should not be part of the ALF’s agenda; however, the ALF should, if we accept the conditions for violent and illegal actions discussed in this article, be involved in the clandestine filming of cruelty on animal farms and the rescuing of animals.

Further research on radical activism should focus on two related topics. First, it should explore in more detail why public reactions to clandestine filming are more positive than to other forms of activism. Second, further research should focus on whether the actions of other radical activist groups like the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Rights Militia are morally justified.

Notes

1. I use the term “radical” here to refer to those groups that have as their objective the aim of substantially changing social structures through revolutionary means and changing value systems in fundamental ways. In particular, these groups use illegal and unconventional methods of campaigning (they destroy property and rescue animals, rather than engage in campaigns like legal protests) and their actions are motivated by the possibility of a substantial immediate change in the way that humans treat other animals and the environment (Walter and Murphy 1992).

2. The reason why I only engage with animal farming is because other animal practices raise slightly different normative questions. For example, Peter Singer (1995) contends that some animal experiments are morally justifiable, whereas animal farming is less justifiable, due to the fact that animal experiments may bring greater benefit to more individuals. This does not mean that in this article the idea that animal experiments are morally justifiable is endorsed. Rather, the point is that there are normative questions at play and this issue needs to be addressed separately.

3. The classification of the ALF as a terrorist organisation has been contested by some authors. See, for example, Sorenson (2009), Best (2014), Nocella II and Best (2011) and Monaghan (2013).

4. “Green scare” is a term used by animal and environmental activists to refer to the legislation of American government against activism that tries to use direct action against those who damage the environment and exploit animals.

5. These two assumptions avoid addressing two debates, namely the question of whether animals have rights or not, and whether ALF members have other secret self-interests besides protecting the rights of animals. The reason why I wish not to address the first question is because that would require a defence of an animal rights theory, which is not

242 L. CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

the objective of this article. I do not wish to address the second question for two further reasons. First, there is no sufficient empirical evidence about ALF’s members so one cannot state whether there are other intentions or not. Second, the objective of this article is whether the cause justifies violent and illegal actions and not whether the individuals who practice it are of good character.

6. Other key characteristics may stand out, depending on the context of the analysis being made. David Pellow (2014), for example, also points out that the ALF has an anti-capitalist and anarchist ideology.

7. Note that I disagree with this conception of violence, as will become clear in the next section.

8. It is worth mentioning here that this right to hold property is limited and does not imply owning other animals.

9. I endorse this definition for two reasons. First, it captures the essential aspects of the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism. In particular, this definition includes the idea that terrorism is a violent act of coercion that targets civilians. Violence and targeting civilians are two of the features that many theorists use to define terrorism (Kemmerer 2008). The second reason why I use it is because, as in the case of using just war theory arguments, it is important to address those who dismiss the ALF’s actions from within their justice paradigm. That is, due to the fact that discourses of terrorism and justice/ violence are inevitably intertwined, and to be able to resist the Green Scare, it is critical to demonstrate the incoherence of those who hold these views. It is important to bear in mind, however, that this definition of terrorism, as any other such definition, is fluid and contestable.

10. A combatant can be defined as an individual who voluntarily takes direct part in the use of violence in the hostilities that occur within a war conflict situation or a conflict situation that is strongly analogous to war. The ALF only targets combatants in the sense that they only target those who participate willingly in the exploitation of non-humans (Kemmerer 2008).

11. Some critics have contested the idea that this analogy is sound because there is a mass slaughter of animals, but without the genocidal intent of doing away with the species entirely, like there was in genocides such as the Holocaust. Nevertheless, as Steven Best points out, there is still a genocidal character in mass slaughtering, but with the additional perverse objective of raising animals just for killing them.

12. I focus on the example of the United States because this is where animal rights activism, including the ALF, is stronger.

13. Although there are strong important similarities, it is crucial to point out that while Nazis wanted to eradicate Jews, farmers do not want to eradicate animals but reproduce them.

14. This inelasticity may seem to contradict the high increase in consumption of meat men- tioned earlier. However, it is important to emphasise that this contradiction is only apparent. The reason for the increase in meat consumption is not because of the changes in price, but because meat has started to become available in more locations; as a result of the globalisation of meat distribution, more consumption has occurred.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank for their very helpful comments on this article Chris Allsobrook, Rianna Oelofsen, Abraham Olivier, Fil Maj, Motsamai Molefe, Richard Twine, Beth Khan, Lee Ronald, Les Mitchell and the three anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 243

Notes on contributor

Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues is a postdoctoral research fellow at CLEA, the University of Fort Hare. His research interests are anti-racism, animal rights, multiculturalism and African moral philosophy. He has published in various journals, such as Theoria, The South African Journal of Philosophy and The Journal for Critical Animal Studies, among others.

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