Managerial Economics: Comprehensive Learning Assessment

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Issues in Economics Today Eighth Edition

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The McGraw-Hill Economics Series

ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS Brue, McConnell, and Flynn Essentials of Economics Third Edition Mandel M: Economics, The Basics Third Edition Schiller and Gebhardt Essentials of Economics Tenth Edition

PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS Asarta and Butters Connect Master: Economics First Edition Colander Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Tenth Edition Frank, Bernanke, Antonovics, and Heffetz Principles of Economics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics Sixth Edition Frank, Bernanke, Antonovics, and Heffetz Streamlined Editions: Principles of Economics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics Third Edition Karlan and Morduch Economics, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics Second Edition McConnell, Brue, and Flynn Economics, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics Twenty-First Edition Samuelson and Nordhaus Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Nineteenth Edition Schiller and Gebhardt The Economy Today, The Micro Economy Today, and The Macro Economy Today Fourteenth Edition

Slavin Economics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics Eleventh Edition

ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL ISSUES Guell Issues in Economics Today Eighth Edition Register and Grimes Economics of Social Issues Twenty-First Edition

ECONOMETRICS Gujarati and Porter Basic Econometrics Fifth Edition Hilmer and Hilmer Practical Econometrics First Edition

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS Baye and Prince Managerial Economics and Business Strategy Ninth Edition Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture Sixth Edition Thomas and Maurice Managerial Economics Twelfth Edition

INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS Bernheim and Whinston Microeconomics Second Edition Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz Macroeconomics Twelfth Edition Frank Microeconomics and Behavior Ninth Edition

ADVANCED ECONOMICS Romer Advanced Macroeconomics Fourth Edition

MONEY AND BANKING Cecchetti and Schoenholtz Money, Banking, and Financial Markets Fifth Edition

URBAN ECONOMICS O’Sullivan Urban Economics Eighth Edition

LABOR ECONOMICS Borjas Labor Economics Seventh Edition McConnell, Brue, and Macpherson Contemporary Labor Economics Eleventh Edition

PUBLIC FINANCE Rosen and Gayer Public Finance Tenth Edition

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS Field and Field Environmental Economics: An Introduction Seventh Edition

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Appleyard and Field International Economics Ninth Edition Pugel International Economics Sixteenth Edition

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Issues in Economics Today

Eighth Edition

ROBERT C. GUELL Indiana State University

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ISSUES IN ECONOMICS TODAY, EIGHTH EDITION Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2018 by McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2015, 2012, and 2010. No part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in any network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.

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Guell, Robert C., author. Issues in economics today/Robert C. Guell, Indiana State University. Eighth edition. | New York, NY : McGraw-Hill Education, [2018] LCCN 2017003633 | ISBN 9781259746390 (alk. paper) LCSH: Economics. LCC HB87 .G83 2018 | DDC 330—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017003633

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mheducation.com/highered

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To Susan, Katie, Manny, Angel, Matt, and Lilly

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vi

About the Author Dr. Robert C. Guell (pronounced “Gill”) is a professor of economics at Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana. He earned a B.A. in statistics and economics in 1986 and an M.S. in economics one year later from the University of Missouri–Columbia. In 1991, he earned a Ph.D. from Syracuse University, where he discovered the thrill of teaching. He has taught courses for freshmen, upper-division undergraduates, and graduate students from the principles level, through public finance, all the way to mathematical economics and econometrics.

Dr. Guell has published numerous peer-reviewed articles in scholarly journals. He has worked extensively in the area of pharmaceutical economics, suggesting that the private market’s patent system, while necessary for drug innovation, is unnecessary and inefficient for production.

In 1998, Dr. Guell was the youngest faculty member ever to have been given Indiana State University’s Caleb Mills Distinguished Teaching Award. His talent as a champion of quality teaching was recognized again in 2000 when he was named project manager for the Lilly Project to Transform the First-Year Experience, a Lilly Endowment–funded project to raise first-year persistence rates at Indiana State University. He was ISU’s Coordinator of First-Year Programs until January 2008, when he happily stepped aside to rejoin his depart- ment full time.

Dr. Guell’s passion for teaching economics led him to request an assignment with the larg- est impact. The one-semester general education basic economics course became the vehicle to express that passion. Unsatisfied with the books available for the course, he made it his calling to produce what you have before you today—an all-in-one readable issues-based text.

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Brief Contents Preface xviii Issues for Different Course Themes xxviii Required Theory Table xxx

1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost 1

2 Supply and Demand 19 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer

and Producer Surplus 40 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue 56 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and

Economic versus Normal Profit 68 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You

Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression 79

7 Interest Rates and Present Value 98 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate

Supply 107 9 Fiscal Policy 119 10 Monetary Policy 131 11 Federal Spending 145 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the

National Debt 155 13 The Housing Bubble 168 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes

and Policy Responses 177 15 Is Economic Stagnation the

New Normal? 186 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An

Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities 193

17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs? 201

18 International Finance and Exchange Rates 213

19 European Debt Crisis 222 20 Economic Growth and Development 231 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO:

Are Trade Agreements Good for Us? 238 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal

Goods 248 23 Natural Resources, the Environment,

and Climate Change 258 24 Health Care 271 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance:

Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 283

26 The Economics of Prescription Drugs 296 27 So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics

and the Law 304 28 The Economics of Crime 310 29 Antitrust 319 30 The Economics of Race and Sex

Discrimination 327 31 Income and Wealth Inequality:

What’s Fair? 339 32 Farm Policy 349 33 Minimum Wage 358 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping 366 35 Rent Control 373 36 The Economics of K–12 Education 379 37 College and University Education: Why Is

It So Expensive? 390

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viii Brief Contents

38 Poverty and Welfare 400 39 Head Start 411 40 Social Security 418 41 Personal Income Taxes 429 42 Energy Prices 440 43 If We Build It, Will They Come?

And Other Sports Questions 455 44 The Stock Market and Crashes 467

45 Unions 478 46 Walmart: Always Low Prices

(and Low Wages)—Always 488 47 The Economic Impact of Casino

and Sports Gambling 494 48 The Economics of Terrorism 499

Index 505

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Table of Contents Preface xviii Issues for Different Course Themes xxviii Required Theory Table xxx

Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost 1 Economics and Opportunity Cost 1

Economics Defined 1 Choices Have Consequences 2

Modeling Opportunity Cost Using the Production Possibilities Frontier 2 The Intuition behind Our First Graph 2 The Starting Point for a Production Possibilities Frontier 3 Points between the Extremes of a Production

Possibilities Frontier 3 Attributes of the Production Possibilities Frontier 5

Increasing and Constant Opportunity Cost 5 Economic Growth 6

How Is Growth Modeled? 6 Sources of Economic Growth 7

The Big Picture 7 Circular Flow Model: A Model That Shows the

Interactions of All Economic Actors 8 Thinking Economically 8

Marginal Analysis 8 Positive and Normative Analysis 8 Economic Incentives 9 Fallacy of Composition 9 Correlation ≠ Causation 10

Kick It Up a Notch: Demonstrating Constant and Increasing Opportunity Cost on a Production Possibilities Frontier 10 Demonstrating Increasing Opportunity Cost 11 Demonstrating Constant Opportunity Cost 11

Summary 11

Appendix 1A Graphing: Yes, You Can. 15 Cartesian Coordinates 15 Please! Not Y = MX + B . . . Sorry. 16

What on God’s Green Earth Does This Have to Do with Economics? 18

Chapter 2 Supply and Demand 19 Supply and Demand Defined 20

Markets 20 Quantity Demanded and Quantity Supplied 20 Ceteris Paribus 22 Demand and Supply 22

The Supply and Demand Model 22 Demand 22 Supply 23 Equilibrium 24 Shortages and Surpluses 25

All about Demand 25 The Law of Demand 25 Why Does the Law of Demand Make Sense? 25

All about Supply 26 The Law of Supply 26 Why Does the Law of Supply Make Sense? 26

Determinants of Demand 27 Taste 28 Income 28 Price of Other Goods 28 Population of Potential Buyers 29 Expected Price 29 Excise Taxes 29 Subsidies 29 The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of Demand

on the Supply and Demand Model 29 Determinants of Supply 31

Price of Inputs 31 Technology 32 Price of Other Potential Outputs 32 Number of Sellers 32 Expected Price 32 Excise Taxes 33 Subsidies 33 The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of

Supply on the Supply and Demand Model 33 The Effect of Changes in Price Expectations on the

Supply and Demand Model 35

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Kick It Up a Notch: Why the New Equilibrium? 35 Summary 37

Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus 40 Elasticity of Demand 41

Intuition 41 Definition of Elasticity and Its Formula 41 Elasticity Labels 42

Alternative Ways to Understand Elasticity 42 The Graphical Explanation 42 The Verbal Explanation 43 Seeing Elasticity through Total Expenditures 44

More on Elasticity 44 Determinants of Elasticity of Demand 44 Elasticity and the Demand Curve 44 Elasticity of Supply 46 Determinants of the Elasticity of Supply 47

Consumer and Producer Surplus 49 Consumer Surplus 49 Producer Surplus 49 Market Failure 50 Categorizing Goods 50

Kick It Up a Notch: Deadweight Loss 51 Summary 52

Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue 56 Production 57

Just Words 57 Graphical Explanation 58 Numerical Example 58

Costs 59 Just Words 59 Numerical Example 60

Revenue 62 Just Words 62 Numerical Example 63

Maximizing Profit 64 Graphical Explanation 64 Numerical Example 64

Summary 65

Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit 68 From Perfect Competition to Monopoly 69

Perfect Competition 69 Monopoly 70 Monopolistic Competition 70 Oligopoly 71 Which Model Fits Reality 71

Supply under Perfect Competition 73 Normal versus Economic Profit 73 When and Why Economic Profits Go to Zero 73 Why Supply Is Marginal Cost under Perfect Competition 74 Just Words 74 Numerical Example 74 Graphical Explanation 75

Summary 76

Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression 79 Measuring the Economy 80

Measuring Nominal Output 80 Measuring Prices and Inflation 81 Problems Measuring Inflation 83

Real Gross Domestic Product and Why It Is Not Synonymous with Social Welfare 86 Real Gross Domestic Product 86 Problems with Real GDP 86

Measuring and Describing Unemployment 87 Measuring Unemployment 87 Problems Measuring Unemployment 89 Types of Unemployment 90

Productivity 90 Measuring and Describing Productivity 90

Seasonal Adjustment 91 Business Cycles 92 Kick It Up a Notch: National Income and Product

Accounting 94 Summary 95

Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value 98 Interest Rates 99

The Market for Money 99 Nominal Interest Rates versus Real Interest Rates 99

Present Value 100 Simple Calculations 100 Mortgages, Car Payments, and Other Multipayment

Examples 101

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Future Value 102 Kick It Up a Notch: Risk and Reward 104 Summary 104

Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply 107 Aggregate Demand 108

Definition 108 Why Aggregate Demand Is Downward

Sloping 108 Aggregate Supply 109

Definition 109 Competing Views of the Shape of Aggregate

Supply 109 Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate

Supply 110 Variables That Shift Aggregate Demand 110 Variables That Shift Aggregate Supply 113

Causes of Inflation 114 How the Government Can Influence

(but Probably Not Control) the Economy 115 Demand-Side Macroeconomics 115 Supply-Side Macroeconomics 115

Summary 116

Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy 119 Nondiscretionary and Discretionary

Fiscal Policy 119 How They Work 119 Using Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand

to Model Fiscal Policy 120 Using Fiscal Policy to

Counteract “Shocks” 121 Aggregate Demand Shocks 121 Aggregate Supply Shocks 122

Evaluating Fiscal Policy 123 Nondiscretionary Fiscal Policy 123 Discretionary Fiscal Policy 123 The Political Problems with Fiscal Policy 124 Criticism from the Right and Left 125 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of

Discretionary Fiscal Policy 125 The Obama Stimulus Plan 126 Kick It Up a Notch: Aggregate Supply

Shocks 128 Summary 128

Chapter 10 Monetary Policy 131 Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy 132

Goals of Monetary Policy 132 Traditional and Ordinary Tools of Monetary Policy 132 Modeling Monetary Policy 133 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism 134 The Additional Tools of Monetary Policy Created

in 2008 135 Central Bank Independence 137 Modern Monetary Policy 138

The Last 30 Years 138 Summary 143

Chapter 11 Federal Spending 145 A Primer on the Constitution and Spending Money 146

What the Constitution Says 146 Shenanigans 146 Dealing with Disagreements 147

Using Our Understanding of Opportunity Cost 148 Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending 148 Where the Money Goes 149

Using Our Understanding of Marginal Analysis 151 The Size of the Federal Government 151 The Distribution of Federal Spending 151

Budgeting for the Future 151 Baseline versus Current-Services Budgeting 151

Summary 152

Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt 155 Surpluses, Deficits, and the Debt: Definitions

and History 156 Definitions 156 History 156

How Economists See the Deficit and the Debt 159 Operating and Capital Budgets 159 Cyclical and Structural Deficits 159 The Debt as a Percentage of GDP 160 International Comparisons 160 Generational Accounting 161

Who Owns the Debt? 161 Externally Held Debt 162

A Balanced-Budget Amendment 162 Projections 165 Summary 166

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Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble 168 How Much Is a House Really Worth? 168 Mortgages 170 How to Make a Bubble 172 Pop Goes the Bubble! 173 The Effect on the Overall Economy 174 Summary 175

Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses 177 Before It Began 177 Late 2007: The Recession Begins as Do the

Initial Policy Reactions 180 The Bottom Falls Out in Fall 2008 181 The Obama Stimulus Package 182 Extraordinary Monetary Stimulus 183 Summary 184

Chapter 15 Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal? 186 Periods of Robust Economic Growth 187 Sources of Growth 187 Causes and Consequences of Slowing

Growth 187 Causes 187 Consequences 188

What Can Be Done to Jump-Start Growth, or Is This the New Normal? 189

Summary 191

Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities 193 What Is the Source of the Problem? 193 How Big Is the Social Security and Medicare

Problem? 194 How Big Is the State and Local Pension

Problem? 196 Is It Possible That the Fiscal Sky Isn’t

About to Fall? 198 Summary 199

Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs? 201 What We Trade and with Whom 201 The Benefits of International Trade 204

Comparative and Absolute Advantage 204 Demonstrating the Gains from Trade 205 Production Possibilities Frontier

Analysis 205 Supply and Demand Analysis 206 Whom Does Trade Harm? 206

Trade Barriers 207 Reasons for Limiting Trade 207 Methods of Limiting Trade 208

Trade as a Diplomatic Weapon 209 Kick It Up a Notch: Costs of Protectionism 210 Summary 210

Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates 213 International Financial Transactions 213 Foreign Exchange Markets 215 Alternative Foreign Exchange Systems 217 Determinants of Exchange Rates 219 Summary 220

Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis 222 In the Beginning There Were 17 Currencies

in 17 Countries 222 The Effect of the Euro 223 Why Couldn’t They Pull Themselves Out?

The United States Did 226 Is It Too Late to Leave the Euro? 228 Where Should Europe Go from Here? 229 Summary 229

Chapter 20 Economic Growth and Development 231 Growth in Already Developed Countries 231 Comparing Developed Countries and Developing

Countries 233 Fostering (and Inhibiting) Development 234

The Challenges Facing Developing Countries 235 What Works 236

Summary 236

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Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us? 238 The Benefits of Free Trade 239 Why Do We Need Trade Agreements? 239

Strategic Trade 240 Special Interests 240 What Trade Agreements Prevent 240

Trade Agreements and Institutions 241 Alphabet Soup 241 Are They Working? 242

Economic and Political Impacts of Trade 243 The Bottom Line 245 Summary 245

Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods 248 An Economic Model of Tobacco, Alcohol,

and Illegal Goods and Services 249 Why Is Regulation Warranted? 249

The Information Problem 249 External Costs 250 Morality Issues 252

Taxes on Tobacco and Alcohol 253 Modeling Taxes 253 The Tobacco Settlement and Why Elasticity

Matters 254 Why Are Certain Goods and Services

Illegal? 254 The Impact of Decriminalization on the Market

for the Goods 254 The External Costs of Decriminalization 255

Summary 255

Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change 258 Using Natural Resources 259 How Clean Is Clean Enough? 259 The Externalities Approach 260

When the Market Works for Everyone 260 When the Market Does Not Work for Everyone 260

The Property Rights Approach to the Environment and Natural Resources 262 Why You Do Not Mess Up Your Own Property 262 Why You Do Mess Up Common Property 262

Natural Resources and the Importance of Property Rights 262

Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions 263 Environmental Problems 263 Economic Solutions: Using Taxes to Solve

Environmental Problems 265 Economic Solutions: Using Property Rights

to Solve Environmental Problems 265 No Solution: When There Is No Government

to Tax or Regulate 267 Summary 268

Chapter 24 Health Care 271 Where the Money Goes and Where

It Comes From 271 Insurance in the United States 272

How Insurance Works 272 Varieties of Private Insurance 273 Public Insurance 273

Economic Models of Health Care 274 Why Health Care Is Not Just Another Good 274 Implications of Public Insurance 275 Efficiency Problems with Private Insurance 276 Major Changes to Insurance Resulting from PPACA 277 The Blood and Organ Problem 279

Comparing the United States with the Rest of the World 279

Summary 281

Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 283 Medicaid: What, Who, and How Much 284 Why Medicaid Costs So Much 285

Why Spending Is Greater on the Elderly 286 Cost-Saving Measures in Medicaid 287

Medicare: Public Insurance and the Elderly 287 Why Private Insurance May Not Work 287 Why Medicare’s Costs Are High 288

Medicare’s Nuts and Bolts 289 Provider Types 289 Part A 289 Part B 290 Prescription Drug Coverage (Part D) 290 Cost Control Provisions in Medicare 291

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The Medicare Trust Fund 292 The Relationship between Medicaid and

Medicare 293 Children’s Health Insurance Program 293 Summary 294

Chapter 26 The Economics of Prescription Drugs 296 Profiteers or Benevolent Scientists? 297 Monopoly Power Applied to Drugs 297 Important Questions 299

Expensive Necessities or Relatively Inexpensive Godsends? 299

Price Controls: Are They the Answer? 301 FDA Approval: Too Stringent or Too Lax? 301

Summary 302

Chapter 27 So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law 304 Private Property 304

Intellectual Property 305 Contracts 305 Enforcing Various Property Rights and Contracts 305 Negative Consequences of Private Property Rights 306

Bankruptcy 306 Civil Liability 306 Summary 308

Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime 310 Who Commits Crimes and Why 310 The Rational Criminal Model 311

Crime Falls When Legal Income Rises 311 Crime Falls When the Likelihood and Consequences

of Getting Caught Rise 312 Problems with the Rationality Assumption 312

The Costs of Crime 312 How Much Does an Average Crime Cost? 313 How Much Crime Does an Average Criminal

Commit? 313 Optimal Spending on Crime Control 314

What Is the Optimal Amount to Spend? 314 Is the Money Spent in the Right Way? 315 Are the Right People in Jail? 315 What Laws Should We Rigorously Enforce? 315 What Is the Optimal Sentence? 316

Summary 317

Chapter 29 Antitrust 319 What’s Wrong with Monopoly? 319

High Prices, Low Output, and Deadweight Loss 319

Reduced Innovation 320 Natural Monopolies and Necessary Monopolies 320

Natural Monopoly 320 Patents, Copyrights, and Other Necessary

Monopolies 321 Monopolies and the Law 322

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 322 What Constitutes a Monopoly? 323

Examples of Antitrust Action 323 Standard Oil 323 IBM 324 Microsoft 324 Apple, Google, and the European Union 325

Summary 325

Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 327 The Economic Status of Women and Minorities 327

Women 327 Minorities 328

Definitions and Detection of Discrimination 330 Discrimination, Definitions, and the Law 330 Detecting and Measuring Discrimination 331

Discrimination in Labor, Consumption, and Lending 332 Labor Market Discrimination 332 Consumption Market and Lending Market

Discrimination 333 Affirmative Action 334

The Economics of Affirmative Action 334 What Is Affirmative Action? 335 Gradations of Affirmative Action 335

Summary 336

Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair? 339 Measurement of Inequality 339

Income Inequality 339 Wealth Inequality 342

The Shrinking Middle Class 343

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Causes of Household Income and Wealth Inequality 344 Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality 345 Summary 347

Chapter 32 Farm Policy 349 Farm Prices Since 1950 349

Corn and Gasoline 350 Price Variation as a Justification for Government

Intervention 351 The Case for Price Supports 351 The Case against Price Supports 352

Consumer and Producer Surplus Analysis of Price Floors 352 One Floor in One Market 352 Variable Floors in Multiple Markets 353 What Would Happen without Price Supports? 353

Price Support Mechanisms and Their History 353 Price Support Mechanisms 353 History of Price Supports 355

Is There a Bubble on the Farm? 355 Kick It Up a Notch 356 Summary 356

Chapter 33 Minimum Wage 358 Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum

Wage 359 Labor Markets and Consumer and Producer Surplus 359 A Relevant versus an Irrelevant Minimum Wage 360 What Is Wrong with a Minimum Wage? 361 Real-World Implications of the Minimum Wage 361 Alternatives to the Minimum Wage 362

Rebuttals to the Traditional Analysis 362 The Macroeconomics Argument 362 The Work Effort Argument 363 The Elasticity Argument 363

Where Are Economists Now? 363 Kick It Up a Notch 364 Summary 364

Chapter 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping 366 Defining Brokering and Scalping 367 An Economic Model of Ticket Sales 367

Marginal Cost 367 The Promoter as Monopolist 367 The Perfect Arena 368

Why Promoters Charge Less Than They Could 369 An Economic Model of Scalping 369 Legitimate Scalpers 370 Summary 371

Chapter 35 Rent Control 373 Rents in a Free Market 373 Reasons for Controlling Rents 374 Consequences of Rent Control 375 Why Does Rent Control Survive? 377 Summary 378

Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education 379 Investments in Human Capital 379

Present Value Analysis 380 External Benefits 380

Should We Spend More? 381 The Basic Data 381 Cautions about Quick Conclusions 383 Literature on Whether More Money Will Improve

Educational Outcomes 385 School Reform Issues 385

The Public School Monopoly 385 Merit Pay and Tenure 386 Private versus Public Education 386 School Vouchers 387 Collective Bargaining 387

Summary 388

Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive? 390 Why Are the Costs So High? 390 Why Are College Costs Rising So Fast? 392 Why Have Textbook Costs Risen So 

Rapidly? 393 What a College Degree Is Worth 395 How Do People Pay for College? 396 Summary 398

Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare 400 Measuring Poverty 400

The Poverty Line 401 Who’s Poor? 401

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Poverty through History 402 Problems with Our Measure of Poverty 403 Poverty in the United States versus Europe 404

Programs for the Poor 404 In Kind versus In Cash 404 Why Spend $789 Billion on a $96 Billion

Problem? 406 Is $789 Billion Even a Lot Compared to

Other Countries? 406 Incentives, Disincentives, Myths,

and Truths 406 Welfare Reform 407

Is There a Solution? 407 Welfare as We Now Know It 408 Is Poverty Necessarily Bad? 408

Summary 408

Chapter 39 Head Start 411 Head Start as an Investment 411

The Early Intervention Premise 411 Present Value Analysis 412 External Benefits 412 The Early Evidence 412 The Remaining Doubts 412

The Head Start Program 413 The Current Evidence 414

Evidence that Head Start Works 414 Evidence that Head Start Does Not Work 415 More Evidence Is Coming and Some Is In 415

The Opportunity Cost of Fully Funding Head Start 416

Summary 416

Chapter 40 Social Security 418 The Basics 418

The Beginning 418 Taxes 419 Benefits 419 Changes over Time 419

Why Do We Need Social Security? 420 Social Security’s Effect on the

Economy 421 Effect on Work 421 Effect on Saving 421

Whom Is the Program Good For? 422 Will the System Be There for Me? 424

Why Social Security Is in Trouble 424 The Social Security Trust Fund 424 Options for Fixing Social Security 425

Summary 426

Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes 429 How Income Taxes Work 429 Issues in Income Taxation 434

Horizontal and Vertical Equity 434 Equity versus Simplicity 434

Incentives and the Tax Code 434 Do Taxes Alter Work Decisions? 435 Do Taxes Alter Savings Decisions? 435 Taxes for Social Engineering 435

Who Pays Income Taxes? 435 The Tax Debates of the Last Two Decades 436 Summary 437

Chapter 42 Energy Prices 440 The Historical View 440

Oil and Gasoline Price History 440 Geopolitical History 441 A Return to Irrelevancy 442

OPEC 445 What OPEC Tries to Do 445 How Cartels Work 445 Why Cartels Are Not Stable 445 Back from the Dead 446

Why Do Prices Change So Fast? 446 Is It All a Conspiracy? 447 From $1 to $4 per Gallon in 10 Years? 447

Electric Utilities 449 Electricity Production 449 Why Are Electric Utilities a Regulated Monopoly? 450

What Will the Future Hold? 451 Kick It Up a Notch 452 Summary 453

Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions 455 The Problem for Cities 455

Expansion versus Luring a Team 455 Does a Team Enhance the Local Economy? 457 Why Are Stadiums Publicly Funded? 458

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The Problem for Owners 458 To Move or to Stay 458 To Win or to Profit 459 Don’t Feel Sorry for Them Just Yet 460

The Sports Labor Market 461 What Owners Will Pay 461 What Players Will Accept 461

The Vocabulary of Sports Economics 461 What a Monopoly Will Do for You 464

Summary 465

Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes 467 Stock Prices 468

How Stock Prices Are Determined 468 What Stock Markets Do 469

Efficient Markets 470 Stock Market Crashes 470

Bubbles 470 Example of a Crash: NASDAQ 2000 471

The Accounting Scandals of 2001 and 2002 472 Bankruptcy 473 Why Capitalism Needs Bankruptcy Laws 473 The Kmart and Global Crossing Cases 473 What Happened in the Enron Case 474 Why the Enron Case Matters More Than

the Others 475 Rebound of 2006–2007 and the Drop

of 2008–2009 475 Summary 476

Chapter 45 Unions 478 Why Unions Exist 478

The Perfectly Competitive Labor Market 478 A Reaction to Monopsony 479 A Way to Restrict Competition and Improve Quality 480 A Reaction to Information Issues 481

A Union as a Monopolist 481 The History of Labor Unions 482

Where Unions Go from Here 485 Kick It Up a Notch 486 Summary 486

Chapter 46 Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always 488 The Market Form 488 Who Is Affected? 490

Most Consumers Stand to Gain—Some Lose Options 490 Workers Probably Lose 491 Sales Tax Revenues Won’t Be Affected Much 491 Some Businesses Will Get Hurt; Others Will Be

Helped 491 Community Effects 491

Summary 492

Chapter 47 The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling 494 The Perceived Impact of Casino Gambling 494 Local Substitution 494 The “Modest” Upside of Casino Gambling 495 The Economic Reasons for Opposing Casino

Gambling 495 Sports Gambling and Daily Fantasy 496 Summary 497

Chapter 48 The Economics of Terrorism 499 The Economic Impact of September 11th and

of Terrorism in General 499 Modeling the Economic Impact of the Attacks 500

Insurance Aspects of Terrorism 501 Buy Insurance or Self-Protect or Both 502

Terrorism from the Perspective of the Terrorist 502 Summary 503

Index 505

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Preface This book is designed for a one-semester issues-based general education economics course, and its purpose is to interest the nonbusiness, noneconomics major in what the discipline of economics can do. Students of the “issues approach” will master the basic economic theory necessary to explore a variety of real-world issues. If this is the only economics course they ever take, they will at least gain enough insight to be able to intelligently discuss the way eco- nomic theory applies to important issues in the world today.

Until the first edition of this book was published, instructors who chose the issues approach to teaching a one-semester general economics course had to compromise in one of the follow- ing ways: they could (1) pick a book that presents the issues but that is devoid of economic theory; (2) pick a book that intertwines the issues with the theory; (3) ask students to buy two books; or (4) place a large number of readings on library reserve.

Each of these alternatives presents problems. If the course is based entirely on an issues text, students will leave with the incorrect impression that economics is a nonrigorous discipline that assumes that all of the issues are relevant to all students in the course. In fact, some issues are not relevant to some students and others are relevant only when the issue makes news. For example, at Syracuse my students never understood why farm price supports were interesting, whereas at Indiana State no student that I have met has ever lived in a rent-controlled apartment. The prob- lem associated with using multiple books is the obvious one of expense. Having multiple reserve readings, still a legitimate option, requires a great deal of time on the part of students, teachers, and librarians and is usually not convenient to students.

The eighth edition of this book meets both student and instructor needs simultaneously. By making the entire portfolio of chapters available for instructors to select and include in a print book as they see fit within McGraw-Hill’s CREATE platform, we allow instructors maximum flexibility to design a product that keeps students interested.

HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

Issues in Economics Today includes 8 intensive core theory chapters and 40 shorter issues chapters. The book is designed to allow faculty flexibility in approach. Some colleagues like to intertwine theory and issues while others like to lay the theoretical foundation first before heading into the issues. Some faculty will choose to set a theme for their course and pick is- sues consistent with that theme while others will let their students decide what issues interest them. There is no right way to use the book except that under no circumstances is it imag- ined that the entire book be covered.

McGraw-Hill CREATE To address the recommendation that no instructor should assign the entire book to be cov- ered in their course, the eighth edition takes advantage of the capabilities in McGraw-Hill’s CREATE platform (www.mcgrawhillcreate.com) to give instructors the flexibility to easily design a print product customized to their issues course: instructors can easily add chapters to their product in the same way someone might add purchases to their cart when online shop- ping. Once the table of contents is set, the instructor can easily view the net price of their

gue46399_fm_i-xxxii.indd 18 16/03/17 2:50 PM

Preface xix

course text (often much lower once extraneous chapters have been removed). When the prod- uct is approved by the instructor, the system will generate an ISBN for the customized product, which can be provided to the bookstore. Once an order is placed, the copies will be printed on demand for each institution. The process is very straightforward; however, a McGraw-Hill representative can assist instructors or build products based on syllabi if required. This work- flow makes it feasible for an instructor to revisit their product and make tweaks every time they teach the course. It also makes it a possibility for me to author and make available chap- ters that address current economic issues in a timely manner as events arise.

Organization of the Issues Chapters There are 40 issues chapters that I have divided into the following categories: Macroeco- nomic Issues (Chapters 9–16), International Issues (Chapters 17–20), Externalities and Market Failure (Chapters 22–23), Health Issues (Chapters 24–26), Government Solutions to Soci- etal Problems (Chapters 27–31), Price Control Issues (Chapters 32–34), and Miscellaneous Markets (Chapters  36–48). These groupings will be helpful as you navigate through the Contents looking for a particular topic. To help you decide which issues chapters to cover, see the table on pages xxx–xxxi, entitled “Required Theory Table.” It shows at a glance which theory chapters need to be covered before pursuing each of the issues chapters. On pages xxviii–xxix, the table entitled “Issues for Different Course Themes” includes my recommendations for courses that focus on social policy, international issues, election year issues, or business. Within the CREATE platform these different course structures are al- ready assembled into ready-made Express Books to make it easy for you to customize your text according to these themes.

CHANGES TO THE EIGHTH EDITION

Due to the CREATE-delivery of the eighth edition, issues chapters that have previously been hosted on the website have now moved back within the table of contents so instructors can more easily add them to custom products. These chapters include:

• Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us? • Chapter 28 Antitrust • Chapter 35 Rent Control • Chapter 39 Head Start • Chapter 48 The Economics of Terrorism

Furthermore, many instructors have requested with previous editions that we provide assign- able material within Connect, McGraw-Hill’s online assessment platform. We are happy to report that Connect is now available with the eighth edition including an adaptive reading ex- perience, assignable homework (with additional quantitative and graphing problems beyond what is found at the end of each chapter), test bank content, and a host of instructor resources. For more information, please review the Connect portion of this preface.

Chapter 1: An entire section has been added on modeling economic growth using a pro- duction possibilities frontier. Both generalized and specialized growth are depicted in both a world of increasing and constant opportunity cost. In addition, the sources of economic growth are explicated.

Chapter 2: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

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Chapter 3: Added to the discussion of substitutes by describing the inclination to use goods already in our possession longer when newer substitutes increase in price. Added an entire section on the determinants of elasticity of supply. Added a description of network goods.

Chapter 5: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Textbox added to illustrate the importance of exit and entry using oil drilling.

Chapter 6: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Added textbox that answers frequently asked questions regarding how particular situations (products made in one year and sold in the next, used cars, equities, and illegal drugs) are handled in GDP accounting.

Chapters 7–9: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 10: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current infor- mation available. Added a section that described the monetary policies of other countries and how the unprecedented actions of the Federal Reserve can be undone when the times comes to do so.

Chapter 11: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 12: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Added World Bank measures of debt-to-GDP measures.

Chapter 13: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Added a comparison of home affordability in 2006 vs. 2015 for selected major markets.

Chapter 14: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 15: The chapter reshapes the “Japan” chapter from the previous edition to take on the broader question of economic stagnation in the U.S. and other western economies.

Chapter 16: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Extensively revised the section on state and local pension problems using updated information. Focused particular attention on the intractability of the pension problem in Illinois.

Chapters 17–18: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most cur- rent information available.

Chapter 19: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Reference made to ECB stimulus and to Brexit.

Chapter 20: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 21: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. References also made to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Chapter 22: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The impact of the availability of e-cigarettes as substitutes for tobacco is discussed, particularly as it relates to tobacco elasticity.

xx Preface

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Chapter 23: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The responsiveness of average temperatures to changes in CO2 concen- trations is also discussed in the context of climate change.

Chapter 24: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most cur- rent information available. Clarifications are included regarding the impact of the PPACA on Medicaid expansions. International comparisons for five-year survival rates of various cancers are included.

Chapter 25: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current in- formation available. The Congressional action to address the perpetual “Docfix” is discussed.

Chapter 26: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Issues involving expensive life-saving drugs (Harvoni, Vivitrol, etc.) and their coverage (or lack thereof) by Medicaid are discussed.

Chapter 27: A discussion of class-action lawsuits and the example of Takata airbags was inserted.

Chapter 28: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Significant modifications to the impact of various crime policies on crime was added stemming from a Brennan Center for Justice report that showed diminishing returns to increasing levels of incarceration.

Chapter 29: A discussion of the Apple and Google cases before the EU anti-trust agencies was included.

Chapter 30: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 31: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. A Pew Charitable Trusts monograph on the state of the middle class is examined. A discussion regarding the economic and political consequences of the shrinking middle class is offered.

Chapter 32: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available.

Chapter 33: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The textbox on state and local minimum wage statutes is completely redone. The difference, in terms of consequences, between modest and large increases in the minimum wage are examined in the context of efforts to raise wages to $15/hr.

Chapter 34: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The secondary market for tickets is examined through the examples of StubHub, Ticketmaster, and NFL Ticket Exchange.

Chapter 35: No substantive changes.

Chapter 36: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most cur- rent information available. A discussion of the decline in inflation-adjusted K–12 per-student spending is offered.

Chapter 37: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current in- formation available. Notes drawing attention to the fact that tuition increases at state institutions or higher education have slowed at the same time that state subsidies to those schools have also

Preface xxi

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decreased. Attention is also drawn to the fact that young adults in the United States are now no longer the likeliest to have a college education. In fact, the United States is now eighth on that list.

Chapters 38–40: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most cur- rent information available.

Chapter 41: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The reform of the AMT is discussed.

Chapter 42: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Hydraulic Fracturing and directional drilling and the impact of these tech- nologies on the elasticity of supply of crude oil are examined. The impact of these technologies and the increase in U.S. capabilities on OPEC are discussed. Data shows the link between U.S. rig counts and prices is displayed.

Chapter 43: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. The relocation of the Rams to L.A. is discussed. The fact that fewer constraints on soccer talent exist is related to the dominating position of Spain’s Barcelona and Real Madrid and the Premier League’s top five teams.

Chapters 44–46: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most cur- rent information available.

Chapter 47: Content and data updates have been made as needed to reflect the most current information available. Daily Fantasy gambling is discussed.

Chapter 48: More recent terror attacks in France, Belgium, and San Bernardino included.

FEATURES • A conversational writing style makes it easier for students not majoring in economics to

connect with the material. The book puts students at ease and allows them to feel more confident and open to learning.

• Chapter Outline and Learning Objectives set the stage at the beginning of each chapter to let the student see how the chapter is organized and anticipate the concepts that will be covered.

• Key Terms are defined in the margins and recapped at the end of the chapters. • Summaries at the end of each chapter reinforce the material that has been covered. • Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now are found at the end of each theory chapter, so

students can go straight to the issues chapters that interest them once they’ve mastered the necessary theoretical principles.

• Quiz Yourself presents questions for self-quizzing at the end of each chapter. • Think about This asks provocative questions that encourage students to think about how

economic theories apply to the real world by putting themselves in the economic driver’s seat. For example, one Think about This asks, “Suppose you buy a new car. What is the opportunity cost of doing so?” This feature facilitates active learning so that the students will learn the concepts more thoroughly.

• Talk about This includes questions designed to trigger discussion. • For More Insight See sends the students to websites and publications to find additional

material on a given topic. Since economic issues are particularly time-sensitive, this

xxii Preface

gue46399_fm_i-xxxii.indd 22 16/03/17 2:50 PM

feature not only helps students learn to do research on the web but also keeps the course as fresh and current as today’s newspaper.

• Short Answer Questions are included so that faculty may ask students questions that will help faculty assess student understanding of complex economic phenomena.

RESOURCES TO SUPPORT LEARNING

The content and reliability of supplements is of primary importance to the users of the book. Because of this, I am personally involved in crafting and checking all of the following an- cillaries, which are available for quick download and convenient access via the instructor resource material available through Connect.

Instructor’s Manual In addition to a traditional outline of each chapter’s content and updated we references to data sources for each chapter, the Instructor’s Manual offers key-point icons to emphasize the im- portance of particular concepts. Another distinctive feature is that each figure is broken into subfigures with explanations that can be offered at each stage. Solutions to the end of chapter questions are also provided.

Test Bank The test bank includes 80–200 multiple-choice questions for the core theory chapters and 60–100 multiple-choice questions for the issues chapters. These questions test students’ knowledge of key terms, key concepts, theory and graph recognition, theory and graph application, and numeracy, as well as questions about different explanations given by economists regarding particular economic phenomena.

Computerized Test Bank TestGen is a complete, state-of-the-art test generator and editing application software that al- lows instructors to quickly and easily select test items from McGraw-Hill’s test bank content. The instructors can then organize, edit, and customize questions and answers to rapidly generate tests for paper or online administration. Questions can include stylized text, symbols, graphics, and equations that are inserted directly into questions using built-in mathematical templates. TestGen’s random generator provides the option to display different text or calculated number values each time questions are used. With both quick-and-simple test creation and flexible and robust editing tools, TestGen is a complete test generator system for today’s educators.

PowerPoint Presentations An extensive set of editable PowerPoint slides accompany the text to support instructor lectures.

Assurance of Learning Ready Many education institutions today are focused on the notion of assurance of learning, an important element of some accreditation standards. Issues in Economics Today supports as- surance of learning objectives with a simple, yet powerful solution.

Instructors can use Connect to easily query for learning outcomes/objectives that directly relate to the learning objectives of the course. You can then use the reporting features of Con- nect to aggregate student results in similar fashion, making the collection and presentation of assurance of learning data simple and easy.

Preface xxiii

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Required=Results

McGraw-Hill Connect® Learn Without Limits Connect is a teaching and learning platform that is proven to deliver better results for students and instructors.

Connect empowers students by continually adapting to deliver precisely what they need, when they need it, and how they need it, so your class time is more engaging and effective.

Connect Insight® Connect Insight is Connect’s new one- of-a-kind visual analytics dashboard that provides at-a-glance information regarding student performance, which is immediately actionable. By presenting assignment, assessment, and topical performance results together with a time metric that is easily visible for aggregate or individual results, Connect Insight gives the user the ability to take a just-in-time approach to teaching and learning, which was never before available. Connect Insight presents data that helps instructors improve class performance in a way that is efficient and effective.

73% of instructors who use Connect require it; instructor satisfaction increases by 28%

when Connect is required.

Analytics

Using Connect improves retention rates by 19.8%, passing rates by 12.7%, and exam scores by 9.1%.

©Getty Images/iStockphoto

gue46399_fm_i-xxxii.indd 24 16/03/17 2:50 PM

SmartBook® Proven to help students improve grades and study more efficiently, SmartBook contains the same content within the print book, but actively tailors that content to the needs of the individual. SmartBook’s adaptive technology provides precise, personalized instruction on what the student should do next, guiding the student to master and remember key concepts, targeting gaps in knowledge and offering customized feedback, and driving the student toward comprehension and retention of the subject matter. Available on tablets, SmartBook puts learning at the student’s fingertips—anywhere, anytime.

Adaptive

Over 8 billion questions have been answered, making McGraw-

Hill Education products more intelligent, reliable, and precise.

THE ADAPTIVE READING EXPERIENCE DESIGNED TO TRANSFORM THE WAY STUDENTS READ

More students earn A’s and B’s when they use McGraw-Hill Education Adaptive products.

www.mheducation.com

gue46399_fm_i-xxxii.indd 25 16/03/17 2:50 PM

AACSB Statement McGraw-Hill Global Education is a product corporate member of AACSB International. Un- derstanding the importance and value of AACSB accreditation, Issues in Economics Today has sought to recognize the curricula guidelines detailed in the AACSB standards for business accreditation by connecting questions in the test bank and end-of-chapter material to the gen- eral knowledge and skill guidelines found in the AACSB standards.

It is important to note that the statements contained in Issues in Economics Today are provided only as a guide for the users of this text. The AACSB leaves content coverage and assessment within the purview of individual schools, the mission of the school, and the fac- ulty. While Issues in Economics Today and the teaching package make no claim of any spe- cific AACSB qualification or evaluation, we have labeled questions according to the general knowledge and skill areas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This text would not have been possible but for the efforts of a number of people. I thank Indiana State University and its Department of Economics for their continued support of this project. In particular, I thank my chair, John Conant, for his unflagging support, both moral and material. I am indebted to the personnel of McGraw-Hill Education for their work in gathering and compiling peer reviews. Katie Hoenicke, Senior Brand Manager, Jamie Koch, Product Developer, and Christina Kouvelis, Senior Product Developer, were always encouraging and willing to help at every stage. Finally, I want to thank Kelsey Darin. Kelsey, an undergraduate student at Indiana State, spent countless hours updating each data reference, table, and graph. Her careful and unending attention to detail helped me put together this edition in a way that I will be relying upon for editions to come. She cheerfully completed each task at a time when the University (almost inexplicably) assigned me to chair a department in another college. I will forever be in her debt.

I thank the many participants in McGraw-Hill Symposia who happily offered great insight on the best way to teach interesting issues. Finally, I thank the following peer reviewers whose insight substantially enhanced this book:

Alex Aichinger Northwestern State University Thomas Andrews West Chester University Michael Araujo Quinsigamond Community College Lee Ash Skagit Valley College Robert J. Bartelli Labette Community College Daria J. Bernard University of Delaware Roberta Biby Grand Valley State University Ann Marie Callahan Caldwell College

R. Edward Chatterton Lock Haven University Russ Cheatham Cumberland University Joab Corey Florida State University Ann M. Eike University of Kentucky Herb Elliott All Hancock College John A. Flanders Central Methodist University Holly Fretwell Montana State University Neil Garston CSULA

xxvi Preface

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E. B. Gendel Woodbury College Glenn Graham SUNY–Oswego Abbas P. Grammy California State University, Bakersfield Sheryl Hadley Johnson Community College Suzanne Hayes University of Nebraska, Kearney Rolf Hemmerling Greenville Technical College John S. Heywood University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Richard Hoogerwerf Marian College Scott Hunt Columbus State Community College Hans Isakson University of Northern Iowa Debra Israel Indiana State University Allan Jenkins University of Nebraska, Kearney Dick Johnson Skagit Valley Community College Gary Langer Roosevelt University Tom Larson California State University–Los Angeles Raymond Lee Benedict College Gary D. Lemon DePauw University Alston Lippert University of South Carolina Patrick McMurry Missouri Western State University Tom Means San Jose State University Kimberly Merritt Oklahoma Christian University Daniel Morvey Piedmont Technical College Richard Newton Augusta Technical College

Inge O’Connor Syracuse University Nathan Perry University of Utah Chris Phillips Somerset Community College Patrick Price University of Louisiana at Lafayette Taghi Ramin William Patterson University Michael Ryan Western Michigan University John Sabelhaus University of Maryland Sue Lynn Sasser University of Central Oklahoma Brenda M. Saunders Somerset Community College Robert D. Schuttler Marian University Millicent M. Sites Carson-Newman College Rebecca Smith Mississippi State University Arun K. Srinivasan Indiana University Southeast Frank Tenkorang University of Nebraska, Kearney Tara Thornberry Maysville Community and Technical College Michelle Villinski DePauw University Darlene Voeltz Rochester Community and Technical College William Walsh University of St. Thomas Wendel Weaver Oklahoma Wesleyan University Janet L. Wolcutt Wichita State University Derek K. Yonai Campbell University Ben Young University of Missouri, Kansas City Johnson County Community College

Preface xxvii

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xxviii

Social Policy 22. The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods 24. Health Care 25. Government-Provided Health Insurance:

Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

26. The Economics of Prescription Drugs 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 31. Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair? 33. Minimum Wage 36. The Economics of K–12 Education 37. College and University Education: Why Is It

So Expensive? 38. Poverty and Welfare 47. The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports

Gambling

Election Year 9. Fiscal Policy 11. Federal Spending 14. The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy

Responses 15. Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal? 16. Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling? An Examination of

Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

17. International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

23. Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

24. Health Care 27. So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and

the Law 28. The Economics of Crime 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 33. Minimum Wage

37. College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

40. Social Security

International Issues 12. Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the

National Debt 15. Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal? 17. International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American

Jobs? 18. International Finance and Exchange Rates 19. European Debt Crisis 20. Economic Growth and Development 22. The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods 23. Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate

Change 32. Farm Policy 42. Energy Prices

Business Issues 10. Monetary Policy 11. Federal Spending 13. The Housing Bubble 14. The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy

Responses 17. International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American

Jobs? 24. Health Care 26. The Economics of Prescription Drugs 34. Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping 41. Personal Income Taxes 42. Energy Prices 44. The Stock Market and Crashes 45. Unions 46. Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low

Wages)—Always

Issues for Different Course Themes

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Issues for Different Course Themes xxix

Social Justice 14. The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes

and Policy Responses 15. Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal? 23. Natural Resources, the Environment,

and Climate Change 24. Health Care 25. Government-Provided Health Insurance:

Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

26. The Economics of Prescription Drugs 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 31. Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair? 33. Minimum Wage 35. Rent Control 36. The Economics of K–12 Education 37. College and University Education: Why Is It So

Expensive? 38. Poverty and Welfare 39. Head Start 40. Social Security

Health and Education Policies 11. Federal Spending 16. Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of

Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

23. Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

24. Health Care

25. Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

26. The Economics of Prescription Drugs 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 31. Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair? 36. The Economics of K–12 Education 37. College and University Education: Why Is It So

Expensive? 38. Poverty and Welfare 39. Head Start 40. Social Security

The Most Popular Issues Chosen by Students 14. The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and

Policy Responses 17. International Trade: Does It Jeopardize

American Jobs? 22. The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods 23. Natural Resources, the Environment,

and Climate Change 24. Health Care 28. The Economics of Crime 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination 33. Minimum Wage 42. Energy Prices 43. If We Build It, Will They Come? and Other

Sports Questions 44. The Stock Market and Crashes 47. The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling

gue46399_fm_i-xxxii.indd 29 16/03/17 2:50 PM

xxx

Required Theory Table Core Theory Required

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

X X X 9. Fiscal Policy

X X X 10. Monetary Policy

X 11. Federal Spending

X X 12. Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

X X X 13. The Housing Bubble

X X X 14. The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses

X X X 15. Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?

X X X 16. Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

X X X 17. International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

X 18. International Finance and Exchange Rates

X X X X X 19. European Debt Crisis

X X X 20. Economic Growth and Development

X X X 21. NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?

X X X 22. The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

X X X X X X 23. Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

X X X 24. Health Care

X X X 25. Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

X X X X X 26. The Economics of Prescription Drugs

X X X X 27. So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law

X X X 28. The Economics of Crime

X X X X 29. Antitrust

X 30. The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

X X X 31. Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

X X X 32. Farm Policy

X X X 33. Minimum Wage

X X X 34. Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping

X X 35. Rent Control

X X 36. The Economics of K–12 Education

X X X X X X 37. College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

X 38. Poverty and Welfare

X X 39. Head Start

X 40. Social Security

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Required Theory Table xxxi

Core Theory Required

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

X 41. Personal Income Taxes

X X X 42. Energy Prices

X X 43. If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

X 44. The Stock Market and Crashes

X X X X 45. Unions

X X X X X 46. Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always

X X X X 47. The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling

X 48. The Economics of Terrorism

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1

C H A P T E R O N E

Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Define the key terms of economics and opportunity cost and understand how a production possibilities frontier exemplifies the trade-offs that exist in life.

LO2 Distinguish between increasing and constant opportunity cost and understand why each might happen in the real world.

LO3 Analyze an argument by thinking eco- nomically, while recognizing and avoiding logical traps.

Chapter Outline

Economics and Opportunity Cost

Modeling Opportunity Cost Using the Production Possibilities Frontier

Attributes of the Production Possibilities Frontier

Economic Growth

The Big Picture

Thinking Economically

Kick It Up a Notch: Demonstrating Constant and Increasing Opportunity Cost on a Production

Possibilities Frontier

Summary

This chapter lays the foundation for understanding how to think like an economist. It begins by defining the discipline of economics and its most basic concept: opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is modeled and further explained through the use of a diagram called a production possibili- ties frontier. A road map to the economy and to the remainder of the book is presented in the form of a circular flow diagram. The chapter continues with a discussion of what “thinking economi- cally” means. To understand this concept, we look at why economists use marginal analysis, ex- plore the difference between positive and normative analysis, and examine economic incentives. We conclude by examining logical traps that obstruct our path to such economic thinking.

Economics Defined Some define economics as a hard requirement for general education or a major; others, a “dis- mal science”; and still others, the study of the allocation and use of scarce resources to satisfy unlimited human wants. The reality is that economics is all three. It deserves its reputation as a difficult course, its practitioners are always disappointing the public by insisting that there is a cost to everything, and it really is a social science dealing with the fact that humans want more than resources are capable of satisfying.

Economics and Opportunity Cost

economics The study of the alloca- tion and use of scarce resources to satisfy unlimited human wants.

gue46399_ch01_001-018.indd 1 16/03/17 11:37 AM

2 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

On another level, the study of economics is the application of complicated jargon and graphs to common sense. You already know a lot of economics. You know, for instance, that choices have consequences; that having more money is more fun than having less; and that even though you are rich relative to a starving refugee, you are less rich than you would like to be. Of course, there are many other economic lessons that you learn simply by being alive. What you do not have is a systematic way of thinking about those economic ideas, and that is what this course and this book provide.

In this book all jargon with special meaning to economists will be in bold, with its defini- tion, sometimes also in jargon, close by in the text as well as in the margin. If the definition is in “econ-speak” rather than commonsense English, you will also find an English translation nearby. Two terms in our definition of economics need clarification because they have special meaning to economists. First, you find the word scarce. Something is scarce when there is not a freely available and infinite source of it. Second, a resource is anything we either consume directly or use to make things that we will ultimately consume.

There are four basic resources that society can allocate: land, labor, capital, and the entre- preneurship of its people. Any other resource, like oil, steel, or corn, is made available to a society when it allocates one or more of the basic resources to uncover, create, or harvest it.

Choices Have Consequences In this course and with this book you will be faced with a choice: Do you read and study, or do you sleep and party? This choice illustrates the first and most basic concept of economics: opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is the forgone alternative of the choice made.

Translated into English, opportunity cost is “what you would have done had you not done what you did.” It is important to keep in mind that the “forgone alternative” is the next best choice. It is not all the things “you could have done had you not done what you did,” but it is the best of these alternatives because presumably that is “what you would have done.”

If, for example, you decide at some point before finishing your assigned reading to put down this book, you will be implicitly saying that you would rather do something other than read this book. In terms of the course you are taking, the “opportunity cost” of such a poor decision could well be the lower grade that results from lost understanding.

Unfortunately, no matter what you do, you cannot escape opportunity cost. If you stay responsible and continue to read your text, the opportunity cost would be what you would do with the time saved. You are giving up the opportunity to watch something on Netflix, play the latest Call of Duty, Halo, or Assassin’s Creed game, sleep, or study something else. To you, the preferred one of these would be the opportunity cost of reading the text.

As an aside, professors today see many students trying to avoid opportunity cost by multi- tasking. Scanning your Facebook account, reading your English, texting your significant other, or studying your biology during your economics class may seem like you are simply using time that has no opportunity cost. It is not. Students who attempt it frequently miss details, instructions, or concepts when they are only partially tuned in. The opportunity cost of the multi-tasking attempt is the lost understanding that could have been gained had you focused your attention in class.

The Intuition behind Our First Graph The concept of opportunity cost can be further illustrated by looking at something called a production possibilities frontier. This graph, Figure 1.1, is the first of more than 100 that you will see in this book. It is an example of a model, a simplification of the real world that we

scarce Not freely available and lacking an infinite source.

resource Anything that is con- sumed directly or used to make things that will ultimately be consumed.

opportunity cost The forgone alternative of the choice made.

production possibilities frontier A graph that relates the amounts of different goods that can be pro duced in a fully employed society.

model A simplification of the real world that can be manipulated to explain the real world.

Modeling Opportunity Cost Using the Production Possibilities Frontier

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Modeling Opportunity Cost Using the Production Possibilities Frontier 3

can manipulate to explain the real world. This particular one relates the amounts of different goods that can be produced in a fully employed society.

Because chalkboards and book pages have only two dimensions, our explanation is limited. This gives us the first opportunity to introduce something called a simplifying assumption. A simplifying assumption is one that may, on its face, be silly but allows for a clearer explana- tion. A good one also has the characteristic that the conclusions that spring from it are valid in its more complicated scenario. For our produc-

tion possibilities frontier we will make several simplifying assumptions. We will assume that there are only two goods in the world, that these goods are pizza and soft drinks, and that these goods will be produced with a fixed number of resources and fixed technology.

For another simplification, suppose that there are five types of people in the world: (1) those really good at producing pizza but lousy at producing soda; (2) those pretty good at producing pizza and not so good at producing soda; (3) those sort of OK at both; (4) those good at pro- ducing soda and not so good at producing pizza; and (5) those really good at producing soda but lousy at producing pizza.

The Starting Point for a Production Possibilities Frontier If we imagine that our resource is the time of our workers, it can be consumed directly in the form of their leisure or it can be combined with other resources to produce goods and services. This resource is also scarce because there is not an infinite number of people to work, those people can do only so much work, they will not work without being paid, and there is only so much soda that can be produced—even if all the people on the planet devote their lives to the production of soda. Of course this point also holds if we apply the scarce resource to the production of pizza. There is only so much pizza that can be produced even if everyone on the planet is producing pizza. This notion of scarcity gives us a starting point and an ending point for Figure 1.1.

Point S in Figure 1.1 represents the situation where all resources are devoted to the produc- tion of soda; point P represents the situation where all resources are devoted to the production of pizza. In both cases all the resources in the world are devoted to the production of a specific good and production is still limited. It is limited by the ability of people and by the number of people and machines we have to help those people do their jobs. So that it is clear, remember that the production possibilities frontier is giving us a series of choices. We can pick only one of them. We cannot have both S sodas and P pizzas; thus, it is an either–or situation.

Points between the Extremes of a Production Possibilities Frontier We can have some soda and some pizza, so many points between S and P are possible; we need to determine them. To proceed, assume you want something to eat with your soda, and ask yourself what kind of people you would remove from soda production to foster pizza production. Clearly, you would remove those who are not contributing much to the soda pro- duction but would contribute greatly to pizza production. That is, those with the attributes of people in group 1 above: really good at pizza, lousy at soda.

Figure 1.2 shows us what happens if we go ahead and move that group. As you see, this increases pizza production to a respectable level while not costing society much soda. Point X in Figure 1.2 represents that new soda–pizza combination. There everyone except those whom

simplifying assumption An assumption that may, on its face, be silly but allows for a clearer explanation.

S

P

Pizza

S o

d a

FIGURE 1.1 Production possibilities frontier: the starting point.

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4 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

we will call the “pizza chefs” are still making soda, and the pizza chefs are efficiently crank- ing out as many pizzas as they can on their own. The thing is, though we gained a great deal of pizza production, we lost some soda production. That’s why point X, while to the right of point S, is also lower than point S.

If we continue this process further, we are not blessed with a similar effect. The reason is that if we move toward greater pizza production, we do not have those pizza chefs to call on; instead we have our group 2, who are pretty good at pizza and not so good at soda. What that means is that even though pizza production rises, it does not rise as much as it did before. On top of that, our soda production falls more than it had before because when we moved the pizza chefs, they were “lousy” at soda. Now we are moving workers who are simply not so good at soda. Our soda losses are growing at an increasing rate. Thus we have point Y in Figure 1.3.

Going further, point M in Figure 1.4 results from moving the workers from group 3 (OK at both) from soda to pizza, point Z results from moving group 4 workers to pizza, and point P results from moving group 5 workers to pizza.

Connecting points like this creates Figure 1.5: a production possibilities frontier. This curve represents the most pizza that can be produced for any given amount of soda or, interpreted differently, the most soda that can be produced for any given amount of pizza.

XS

P

Pizza

S o

d a

FIGURE 1.2 Production possibilities frontier: moving pizza chefs to their rightful place.

X

Y

S

P

Pizza

S o

d a

FIGURE 1.3 Production possibilities frontier: moving to even more pizza production.

X

M

Z

Y

S

P

Pizza

S o

d a

FIGURE 1.4 All points on a production possibilities frontier.

Unemployment ( just inside the curve)

Unattainable (outside the curve)

S o

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Pizza0

Attainable (on the curve and on the inside)

FIGURE 1.5 A fully labeled production possibili- ties frontier: the case when people are different.

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Attributes of the Production Possibilities Frontier 5

Of course, if you can produce on the curve, you can produce less than that as well. If you do produce at points inside a production possibilities frontier, there are unemployed resources, or unemployment for short. Therefore, all points on or inside the production possibilities frontier are attainable.

Conversely, since the production possibilities frontier represents the maximum amount of one good that you can produce for a given level of production of another, those points outside the production possibilities frontier are unattainable. This means that currently available re- sources and technology are insufficient to produce amounts greater than those illustrated on the frontier. On the graph, everything beyond the frontier is unattainable.

The preceding discussion illustrates something you need to be wary of in this book. Words you think you know may mean something entirely different to economists. Thus far we have at least three such words: unemployment, frontier, and good. You think of unemployment as the condition of someone wanting a job but not having one. Economists do not disagree but expand that defini- tion to resources other than labor. For example, on the interior of the production possibilities fron- tier there is unemployment, but that unemployment may be of capital. The word frontier is used to describe the boundary of production, not a wooded area with bears to avoid. The word good, to an economist, is a generic term for anything we consume. In the example, soda and pizza are goods.

In the soda and pizza example there were people of different talents at soda and pizza production. The pizza chef had far different skills from the soda master. If, on the other hand, everyone were identical in their soda and pizza production capabilities, then points would fall on the line, as seen in Figure 1.6.

Increasing and Constant Opportunity Cost Figures 1.5 and 1.6 have important similarities and differences. In both, the points on the production possibilities frontier are the most of one good that can be produced for a given amount of the other good. In both, the points on the curve and inside it are attainable and those on the outside of it are unattainable. In both, the opportunity cost of moving from one point

Attributes of the Production Possibilities Frontier

unemployment A situation that occurs when resources are not being fully utilized.

attainable Levels of production that are possible with the given resources.

unattainable Levels of production that are not possible with the given resources.

S o

d a

0

Unemployment ( just inside the curve)

Unattainable (outside the curve)

Pizza

Attainable (on the curve and on the inside)

FIGURE 1.6 A fully labeled production possibilities frontier: the case when people are the same.

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6 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

to another is the amount of one good you have to give up to get another. They differ in one important way, however: whether opportunity cost is increasing or constant.

If the production possibilities frontier is not a line but is bowed out away from the origin, then opportunity cost is increasing. The reason for this is that as we add more resources to the produc- tion of pizza, we are using fewer resources to produce soda. Compounding that problem, at each stage as we take the resources away from soda and put them into pizza, we are moving workers who are worse at pizza production and better at soda production than those moved in the previous stage. This means that the increase in pizza production is diminishing and the loss in soda pro- duction is increasing. An economist would call this an example of increasing opportunity cost.

If the production possibilities frontier is a straight line that is not bowed out away from the origin, then opportunity cost is constant. If every worker possesses identical skill, though you still have to give up some soda to get pizza, this is not compounded by anything. The resources you put into producing more pizza are just as good as the resources used to get you to that point, and the resources taken away from the soda are similarly just as good as the resources used up to that point. An economist would call this an example of constant opportunity cost.

How Is Growth Modeled? We can use the production possibilities frontier to model economic growth. In the top-left frame of Figure 1.7 we see what happens when there is increasing opportunity cost between pizza and soda, and a new process allows more soda to be produced from the same resources when that process doesn’t apply to pizza. In the top-center frame the reverse is true: Techno- logical progress allows for greater pizza production but doesn’t impact soda. The bottom-left and bottom-center frames show the same thing when there is constant opportunity cost. These four cases show the result of specialized growth, where there is an increase in the ability to produce a particular good because there is an increase in, or an increase in the ability of, re- sources to produce a particular good that does not generalize to other goods.

When there is generalized growth, that is typically the result of an increase in, or an increase in the ability of, resources to produce all goods. Generalized growth is depicted on the top-right and lower-right frames of Figure 1.7 for when there is increasing and constant opportunity cost, respectively.

Economic Growth

Specialized Growth

S o

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S o

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S o

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S o

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S o

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Generalized Growth

0 Pizza0 Pizza0 Pizza

0 Pizza 0 Pizza 0 Pizza

FIGURE 1.7 Modeling Economic Growth.

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The Big Picture 7

Sources of Economic Growth In terms of productive capacity of a society, economic growth results from either an increase in the availability of resources or an increase in the ability of resources to produce goods and ser- vices. In the first case, a newly discovered source of energy, or a source of energy that had, under previous technology, not been exploitable would constitute a newly available resource. Reaching not that far back in our history, having women enter the labor force in large numbers during the 1960s through the 1990s increased the availability of labor. In the second case, sometimes the resources remain the same but the ability to utilize them to produce goods and services increases. For instance, when computers and lasers are added to saw mills, the same logs, saw blades, and labor can produce more lumber. That is, technology makes resources more productive. Similarly, education makes labor more productive and can be a source of generalized growth in capacity.

Now that we have looked at our first “simplified” model of the economy, it’s time to get an idea of the “Big Picture.” Think of Figure 1.8 as your road map to the book. This circular flow model is designed to put all of the pieces that follow in perspective. It has firms, workers, investors, savers, buyers, and sellers all interacting in markets and dealing with government. It

The Big Picture

circular flow model A model that depicts the interactions of all eco- nomic actors.

Factor Markets

Goods and Services Markets

GovernmentFirms Households

Foreign Exchange Markets

The Rest of the World

The Rest of the World

Natural Resources and the Environment

Natural Resources and the Environment

Payments (rent, wages, etc.)

Payments (rent, wages, etc.)

Payments (rent, wages, etc.)

Labor, Savings

Labor, Savings

Labor, Savings

Taxes

Taxes

Transfer Payments, Services

Services

Goods and Services

Goods and Services Goods and Services

Payments for Goods and Services

Payments for Goods and Services

Payments for Goods and Services

Exports Imports

Wastes

WastesResources

Natural Beauty

$ $

£

£

FIGURE 1.8 The Circular Flow Model.

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8 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

has humanity taking natural resources from the environment, combining them with domestic and foreign financial and human resources to produce goods and services, and then buying and selling those goods and services in domestic and foreign markets.

Circular Flow Model: A Model That Shows the Interactions of All Economic Actors The ovals in the diagram represent entities of specific kinds: There are households, firms, and governments. Households provide labor for wages. They use those wages to buy goods and services and pay their taxes. They receive services from government. Some save, some bor- row, and many do both. Firms provide wages to households and pay taxes to government while getting labor from their workers and services from the government.

The rectangles in the diagram represent markets of various kinds: There are factor markets, foreign exchange markets, and goods and services markets. Factor markets are where workers and firms, and borrowers and savers interact to set wages and interest rates. Foreign exchange markets are where holders of various currencies interact to facilitate international trade. Goods and services markets are where consumers and producers interact to negotiate exchange of goods like cars, and services like dry cleaning.

Surrounding the whole thing are “The Rest of the World” and “Natural Resources and the Environment.” The former allows us to explicitly think about foreign trade and foreign exchange while the latter lets us think about the use of natural resources and the implications of economic activity on the environment.

Marginal Analysis One of the central tools of economics is marginal analysis. Economists typically look at prob- lems by analyzing the costs and benefits of various solutions. When people buy something, they have to compare the value of what they purchase to the value of what they give up. When companies produce goods for sale, they have to compare the money they generate from sales to the costs they will incur from the production process. When you clean up your dorm room, you weigh the cleanliness gained against the time required to clean it.

Economists generally make an optimization assumption. This is an assumption that sug- gests that the person in question is trying to maximize some objective. For example, consum- ers are assumed to be making decisions that maximize their happiness subject to a scarce amount of money. Companies are assumed to maximize profits. People are assumed to clean things until the benefits of cleaning more are not worth the time or effort.

Economists see that all of these problems can be looked at using the same framework. Economists compare the marginal benefit of an action with its marginal cost. Something is worth doing only if the increase in benefits equals or exceeds the increase in costs. If the marginal benefit of an action steadily decreases and the marginal cost of an action steadily increases, then a person maximizes net benefit by doing that action until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. This is the essence of marginal analysis, and we will see it in action throughout this book.

Positive and Normative Analysis When people look at the world they often see things as they are and compare the way things are to the way they think things should be. They see a major league shortstop sign a con- tract for a quarter of a billion dollars over 10 years while their high school teachers make

market Any mechanism by which buyers and sellers negotiate an exchange.

factor market A mechanism by which buyers and sellers of labor and financial capital negotiate an exchange.

foreign exchange market A mechanism by which buyers and sellers of the currencies of various countries negotiate an exchange.

goods and services market A mechanism by which buyers and sellers of goods and services negotiate an exchange.

optimization assumption An assumption that suggests that the person in question is trying to maximize some objective.

marginal benefit The increase in the benefit that results from an action.

marginal cost The increase in the cost that results from an action.

net benefit The difference between all benefits and all costs.

Thinking Economically

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Thinking Economically 9

less than $40,000 a year. Economists, and social scientists in general, distinguish views of “the way things are” from “the way things should be,” calling the former positive analysis and the latter normative analysis. Although there are economists who utilize both forms of analysis, more economists are comfortable explaining why things are the way they are than are comfortable suggesting the way things should be. Some critics look at this as self- delusion on the part of economists, using the argument that we choose which information to weigh more heavily based on normative beliefs.

Economic Incentives What kinds of choices we make as individuals and as a society depend on our preferences. Returning to the soda and pizza example, whether we like soda or pizza, or in what combina- tions we most like them, will have an important impact on what we choose to produce and consume. But also high on the list of things that determine what combinations of things we will produce and consume are incentives. Something is an incentive if it influences a decision we make. Some incentives are part of a market, like prices. Others are put on by an outside force like a government, and they can positively reinforce behaviors that are desired or deter behaviors that are not. What this means is that you are still able to produce and consume what you want, but something—perhaps a tax or a government regulation—is encouraging a par- ticular choice. For example, by taxing beer and not soda, the government encourages you to steer toward soda and away from beer.

On a deeper level, an incentive may motivate you to do something you would not or- dinarily do. For instance, many incentives are offered in the tax system. Tax credits and deductions for college tuition are considered incentives that will persuade people to get an education. For many people who would go to college anyway, these are not incentives. However, to some people who were perhaps considering college but had not made a de- cision, any influence these tax benefits would have on the decision would constitute an incentive.

An important and sometimes unfortunate aspect of incentives is that they create unintended consequences. Taxes are an area where some argue that the unintended consequences can be predicted from the incentives that arise out of programs. If welfare payments were reduced when the recipient found part-time employment, some predict the result that the recipient would not look for part-time employment.

Fallacy of Composition One of the key traps to thinking economically is assuming that the total economic impact of  something is always and simply equal to the sum of the individual parts. The fallacy of composition is an important logical trap to avoid because invalid economic conclusions will inevitably be drawn.

Outside of economics, cake constitutes a famous illustration of why the fallacy of composi- tion is just that—a fallacy. Imagine a cake. Now imagine the ingredients that go into making the cake. Imagine eating the cake and the satisfaction you get from that. Now compare that level of satisfaction to what you would have if you separately poured flour, sugar, and bak- ing powder down your throat, washed it down with a couple of raw eggs and some cooking oil, and then stuck your head in an oven. The baked combination is obviously better than its individual parts.

As an example within economics, we will learn in Chapter 5 that when many farmers are making high profits, others will want to join in. If they do join in, will all of the old and new farmers be making high profits? We will see that the new farmers’ extra production will ul- timately drive prices down so far that neither the older nor the newer farmers make money.

positive analysis A form of analysis that seeks to understand the way things are and why they are that way.

normative analysis A form of analysis that seeks to understand the way things should be.

incentives Something that influences a decision we make.

fallacy of composition The mistake in logic that suggests that the total economic impact of something is always and simply equal to the sum of the individual parts.

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10 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

What this means is that when we are making economic judgments, we must do so with care. The sums of the individual parts must not be confused with the whole. The two can be, and often are, different.

Correlation ≠ Causation When people are attempting to think economically, another trap they may fall into is assuming that because two variables changed simultaneously, one caused the other to happen.

For instance, if you weighed all people under age 30 and also asked them how many dates they had had in their lifetime, you would find a direct correlation, meaning that it appears that the more people weigh, the more dates they have had. This does not imply causation. Heavier people do not necessarily get more dates and dating does not make us gain weight. In this case the two variables happen to be correlated with age. People in their twenties weigh more and have had a longer opportunity to have dates than have teens, preteens, and young children.

When politicians attempt to take credit for good economic times with the claim that their policies caused the good economic times to happen, we must be suspicious. Of course, we must be equally suspicious if they attempt to pin the blame on their incumbent opponent if bad economic times existed in their opponent’s time in office. While their claims may be true, it is perfectly plausible that the policies and the economy were unrelated, or that the economy did well or did poorly despite the policies.

When economists look at cause and effect, they frequently attempt to generate a counter­ factual. A counterfactual is an educated guess about what would have happened had a policy or an event not occurred. A well-constructed and convincing counterfactual can help deter- mine whether a policy (like the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP) made things better than they otherwise would have been. It is not enough to say that the economy lost mil- lions of jobs after a policy was passed and therefore the policy was bad. You have to be able to construct a scenario of what would have happened had the policy not been enacted. This is often the reason why economists will disagree and seem absolutely convinced that those with whom they are disagreeing are wrong. Whether the Bush administration’s TARP program, the Federal Reserve’s lowering of interest rates through unprecedented purchases of long-term debt, or the Obama stimulus package made the economic downturn of the time better than it would have been depends entirely on what your counterfactual is.

Sometimes two variables move in opposite directions. This inverse correlation can also be misinterpreted as being causal. If you were to get season tickets to your college’s football games and observe the amount of skin (bare arms, legs, and midriffs) showing on the fans and compare that to the amount of hot chocolate sold during the game, you would find that when people show more skin they also consume less hot chocolate. If you came to the conclusion that one caused the other to happen you would, of course, be wrong. Obviously, the weather caused each to occur.

direct correlation A higher level of one variable is associated with a higher level of the other variable.

causation A change in one variable makes another variable change.

counterfactual An educated guess as to what would have happened had a policy or an event not occurred.

inverse correlation A higher level of one variable is associated with a lower level of the other variable.

DEMONSTRATING CONSTANT AND INCREASING OPPORTUNITY COST ON A PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES FRONTIER

Economists use the production possibilities frontier to show the concepts of increasing and constant opportunity cost. If we start with no pizza and only soda but then move in increments to change our mix, there is opportunity cost. Just how much depends on whether it is increas- ing or constant.

Kick It Up a Notch

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Summary 11

S o

d a

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

0 1 2 3 Pizza

FIGURE 1.9 Illustrating increasing opportunity costs.

S o

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9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1 2 3 Pizza

FIGURE 1.10 Illustrating constant opportunity costs.

Demonstrating Increasing Opportunity Cost For example, in Figure 1.9, if we go from the point on the graph where we are producing no pizza to the point where we are producing a single unit, a unit whose numbers could be in the billions, our opportunity cost would be characterized by lost units of soda. On Figure 1.9, the opportunity cost of going from 0 units of pizza to 1 unit of pizza is 1 unit of soda. Moving from 1 unit of pizza to 2 units has an opportunity cost that is 3 units of soda. Similarly, moving from 2 to 3 units of pizza has an opportunity cost of 6 units of soda. As is visually obvious, the opportunity cost of going from 0 to 1 is smaller than going from 2 to 3. This is why we say that the opportunity cost is increasing.

Demonstrating Constant Opportunity Cost Similarly, we can use Figure 1.10 to show constant opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of moving from producing no pizza to 1 unit is 3 units of soda. Moving from 1 unit to 2 units and from 2 to 3 units also has an opportunity cost of 3 units of soda. In this case the opportunity cost of going from 0 to 1 is the same as going from 2 to 3. This is why we say that the oppor- tunity cost is constant.

What this all means is simple: Choices have consequences. Sometimes those consequences are great and sometimes they are small. If studying for five hours moves you from an F to a B on a test, then the higher grade has a low opportunity cost in terms of lost television watching. Viewed from the other side, the opportunity cost of another five hours of television watching (instead of studying to get a good grade) could be substantial. Opportunity cost is everywhere and is a consequence of every decision you make.

In this chapter we learned the definition of economics, that choices have consequences, and that those consequences are called opportunity cost. We learned how to model choices using a production possibilities frontier. We also learned that, depending on our assump- tions, opportunity cost can be increasing or constant. We created a road map to the entire

Summary

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12 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

economy and to the rest of this book by creating a circular flow diagram with all the various markets, individuals, firms, and governments interacting in society. Last, we explored the meaning of thinking economically by examining marginal analysis, positive and normative analysis, incentives, and the flaws of logic that may get in the way of economically accurate thinking.

Key Terms attainable causation circular flow model counterfactual direct correlation economics factor market fallacy of composition foreign exchange market goods and services market

incentives inverse correlation marginal benefit marginal cost market model net benefit normative analysis opportunity cost optimization assumption

positive analysis production possibilities

frontier resource scarce simplifying assumption unattainable unemployment

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

Federal Spending Poverty and Welfare If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

Quiz Yourself 1. Scarcity implies that the allocation scheme chosen by society can a. not make more of any one good. b. always make more of any good. c. typically make more of a good but at the expense of making less of another. d. always make more of all goods simultaneously.

2. A production possibilities frontier is a simple model of a. scarcity and allocation. b. prices and output. c. production and costs. d. inputs and outputs.

3. The underlying reason that there are unattainable points on a production possibilities frontier diagram is that there a. is government. b. are always choices that have to be made. c. is a scarcity of resources within a fixed level of technology. d. is unemployment of resources.

4. The underlying reason production possibilities frontiers are likely to be bowed out (rather than linear) is a. choices have consequences. b. there are always opportunity costs. c. some resources and people can be better used producing one good rather than another. d. there is always some level of unemployment.

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Summary 13

5. The optimization assumption suggests that people make a. irrational decisions. b. unpredictable decisions. c. decisions to make themselves as well off as possible. d. decisions without thinking very hard.

6. Imagine an economist ordering pizza by the slice. When deciding how many slices to order she would pick that number where the enjoyment of the equals the enjoyment she could get from using the money on another good. a. first slice b. last slice c. average slice d. total number of slices

7. Of course, all individual students are better off if they get better grades. If you were to conclude that all students would be better off if everyone received an A you would a. have fallen victim to the fallacy of scarcity. b. be right. c. have fallen victim to the fallacy of composition. d. be mistaking correlation with causation.

8. If you were to conclude, after carefully examining data and using proper evaluation tech- niques, that a tax credit for attending college benefits the poor more than a tax deduction (of equal total cost to the government) would, you would have engaged in analysis to reach that conclusion. a. negative b. positive c. normative d. creative

Short Answer Questions

1. Suppose you buy a new car. What is the opportunity cost of doing so? 2. Suppose you decided to study all last week for this exam instead of doing anything fun.

What was the opportunity cost of doing so? Why might the opportunity cost (defined in terms of fun lost) be expected to increase?

3. Suppose you hear a political candidate claim credit or lay blame for an economic outcome. How can you tell whether the candidate is correct? What would you need to know?

4. If you get a 25 percent pay increase, you are better off. Explain why some people would not be better off if their employer gave them a 25 percent pay increase.

5. Suppose you were to analyze the state and the economy at the moment. You say to your friends, “The economy has been growing more slowly in the last 10 years than it did in the previous 20 years. The government should cut taxes to stimulate the econ- omy.” What portion of that statement is “positive” and what portion of that statement is “normative”?

Think about This What was your opportunity cost of attending college? Think about the most expensive thing you have ever purchased. What could you have done with the money? Which outcome would have made you better off—what you did or what you could have done?

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14 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

Think about the last time you took a series of tests during a short period of time (high school or college finals work here). How did you decide how much time to spend on each subject? How might the study of economics help you make that allocation decision in the future?

Talk about This Discuss whether you believe people make rational decisions based on the optimization assumption. Discuss what kinds of noneconomic (something you would normally not think of as an eco- nomic decision) trade-offs could be modeled with a production possibilities frontier?

gue46399_ch01_001-018.indd 14 16/03/17 11:37 AM

A P P E N D I X 1 A

Graphing: Yes, You Can. Whether you like it or not, graphing is an important part of “getting” economics. If you have ven- tured to this appendix it is likely that your instructor agrees and wants you to have a firm founda- tion for what you are about to do. This appendix is geared to the student who never understood what a graph was trying to tell them; to those poor souls who look at a complex diagram and see a bunch of stray lines that have no meaning. In the movie Jerry Maguire, Tom Cruise bursts into his home to offer a long, heartfelt apology to his wife, who finally interrupts him to say, “You had me at ‘Hello.’ ” Those of us who teach economics have often lost our students at “Hello,” or at least at the moment we went to the board, overhead projector, or computer display to draw a graph. Let’s get off on the right foot with learning what a graph is and what it can tell us.

CARTESIAN COORDINATES As the subheading suggests, Cartesian coordinates are named for their inventor, Frenchman René Descartes. As the legend goes, he was staring at the ceiling and began following the path of a fly. He discovered that he could use just two numbers to pinpoint the placement of the fly on the ceiling every time it landed. So lie back for a moment and look at the ceiling.

Now pick a corner of the room where the ceiling meets two walls; that will be your refer- ence point. (In math it is called the origin.) Assuming the walls are square to one another, call the wall that runs on your left the y­axis and the wall on your right the x­axis. Now find a spot on the ceiling that stands out; a spider, a small stain, a vent, anything. Draw the shortest pos- sible imaginary line from your spot to the ceiling to the wall on the right. Call that point A. Do the same thing for the wall on the left and call that point B. You can identify that point on the ceiling using just two numbers. The first number is the distance along the x-axis from the cor- ner to A and the second is the distance along the y-axis from the corner to B. In Figure 1A.1 the point that is marked is 9 units along the x-axis and 11 along the y-axis, so it is shown as (9,11).

origin The point on the graph where both the variables are zero (0,0).

y­axis The vertical axis.

x­axis The horizontal axis.

y- ax

is

9

10

11

12

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

x-axis Origin

(9,11)

FIGURE 1A.1 Graphing a point.

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16 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

PLEASE! NOT Y = MX + B . . . SORRY. Whether you want to recall the experience or not, you were first exposed to the slope, x­intercept, and y­intercept of a line and the dreaded y = mx + b form of the line in your first algebra class. Whether that was in 7th, 8th, 9th, or 10th grade, enough time has passed that a refresher on the ideas is in order. The equation y = mx + b is a line because if you get all of the x, y combinations that come about from plugging in random values of x and computing what you get for y and then graph them, they end up in a line. That line will cross the y-axis at b, because if you plug in 0 for x in the y = mx + b equation, mx is 0 (because anything times 0 is 0), so all you are left with is b. Therefore, b is the y-intercept. It will cross the x-axis at −b/m. Therefore, the x-intercept is −b/m. As you will (perhaps not so vividly) recall, the slope is the “rise over the run.” That means it is the amount by which y rises divided by the amount by which x rises. Suppose we let x start at 3 and rise to 4. If that happens, then y goes from m3 + b to m4 + b. Therefore, y rises by m. The rise is m, the run is 1, so the slope is m. There is nothing magic about the choice of 3; we could have used any number and we would have gotten the same result. The slope is m.

If m and b are positive, you get a graph like Figure 1A.2. If m is positive and b is nega- tive, you get something like Figure 1A.3. If m is negative and b is positive you get a graph like Figure 1A.4, and finally, if they are both negative, you get something like Figure 1A.5. If m is large and positive, that means the line is upward sloping and steep; small and posi- tive means that it is upward sloping and relatively flat. If m is really negative, then the line is downward sloping and steep, and if it is slightly negative, then the line is downward sloping and flat.

slope The increase in the value of the y-axis variable for a 1-unit increase in the value of the x-axis variable.

x­intercept The value of the x-axis variable when the y-axis variable is zero.

y­intercept The value of the y-axis variable when the x-axis variable is zero.

y

y

x x

FIGURE 1A.2 Graphing a line y = mx + b m > 0, b > 0.

gue46399_ch01_001-018.indd 16 16/03/17 11:37 AM

Please! Not Y = MX + B . . . Sorry. 17

y

y

x x

FIGURE 1A.3 Graphing a line y = mx + b m > 0, b < 0.

y

y

x x

FIGURE 1A.4 Graphing a line y = mx + b m < 0, b > 0.

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18 Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost

WHAT ON GOD’S GREEN EARTH DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH ECONOMICS? To simplify things some, the only things that matter on our graphs will be those things that happen in the first quadrant (where both x and y are positive). We will have downward-sloping lines and upward-sloping lines. We will have some lines that are steep and some that are flat. Often, what we graph will not be a line at all but a curve (such as Figures 1.5 and 1.8). That is less important than this: An upward-sloping line or curve means that as the variable on the x-axis increases, so does the variable on the y-axis; a downward-sloping line or curve means that as the variable on the x-axis increases, the variable on the y-axis decreases.

This will become apparent when we talk about supply and demand in Chapter 2 and costs of production in Chapter 4. As you will see in Chapter 2, economists put price on the vertical axis (the y-axis) and the amount people want to buy or firms want to sell on the horizontal axis (the x-axis). The upward-sloping line will be supply and will suggest that companies will produce more stuff if you pay them more for each one, and the downward-sloping line will be demand and will suggest that consumers will buy less stuff when the price per unit rises.

We will also make a big deal out of two lines or curves crossing. When supply crosses demand in Chapter 2, when marginal revenue crosses marginal cost in Chapter 5, and when aggregate demand crosses aggregate supply in Chapter 8, this is going to have particular significance. It is important that when you get there and you don’t understand why two lines crossing matters at all . . . ASK!

y

y

x x

FIGURE 1A.5 Graphing a line y = mx + b m < 0, b < 0.

gue46399_ch01_001-018.indd 18 16/03/17 11:37 AM

19

C H A P T E R T W O

Supply and Demand Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Illustrate and explain the economic model of supply and demand.

LO2 Define many terms, including supply, demand, quantity supplied, and quantity demanded.

LO3 Utilize the intuition behind the supply and demand relationships as well as the variables that can change these relationships to manipulate the supply and demand model.

Chapter Outline

Supply and Demand Defined

The Supply and Demand Model

All about Demand

All about Supply

Determinants of Demand

Determinants of Supply

The Effect of Changes in Price Expectations on the Supply and Demand Model

Kick It Up a Notch: Why the New Equilibrium?

Summary

This is the make-or-break chapter of the book: You cannot understand economics without understanding supply and demand. Only if you understand this topic will you be able to read the issues chapters with a good level of comprehension.

You probably are familiar with the words supply and demand through television, newspa- pers, or conversation. The phrase frequently is used by people in a way an economist would not use it. This chapter is intended to show you what economists mean when they use the phrase and how they use the model behind the phrase so you understand the supply and demand model enough that you will be able to use both the model and the jargon correctly when we discuss a variety of economic issues.

Arriving at that level of understanding will take some time. We begin by setting out some of the language we will be using. It may be tempting for you to read too fast, to skim through, figuring that you have heard all the words before. Don’t. As we discussed in Chapter 1, the language has precise meaning to economists, and it is not necessarily the same as the meaning you have associated with it before.

Our next move is laying out the supply and demand model itself, starting with brief expla- nations of the term demand and then the term supply. We then put them together on one graph to form our first look at the model and our first look at what economists call equilibrium. We then step back a moment to examine in detail demand and then supply.

With a rudimentary understanding of the supply and demand model, we explore what happens in it when demand changes and then explore what happens in it when supply changes. Our last step shows why supply or demand changes require a change in the equilibrium.

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20 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

Supply and Demand Defined

Markets Supply and demand is the name of the most important model in all of economics. Economists use it to provide insight into the movements in price and output. Remember from Chapter 1 that a model is a simplification of a complicated real-life phenomenon. This model assumes that there is a market where buyers and sellers get together to trade. Consumers are assumed to bring money to the market, whereas producers are assumed to bring goods or services to the market. Consumers want to exchange their money for goods or services while producers want to exchange the goods or services they have for money.

It is important that you understand that the word market has a very specific meaning to economists and that it is very different from the business idea of “marketing.” A market exists anywhere that buyers and sellers negotiate price and perform an exchange. There- fore, they have to be able to communicate and they have to be able to exchange. Take, as an example, the market for used midsized sedans. There are people who are looking to buy them and people who are looking to sell them. Prior to the Internet, most of the com- munication was geographically constrained. Buyers went to used-car lots or read ads in the newspaper. People who wanted to unload a car advertised by word of mouth, by newspaper, or sold to a dealer. With the Internet, the market is greatly expanded because communica- tion (autotrader.com; craigslist.com, etc.) is easier, but you still are unlikely to buy a car in Seattle if you live in Miami because the cost of getting the car from Seattle is prohibitive. Finally, “marketing” is what the used-car sales staff does to convince you to buy their cars. Try not to confuse the two.

The supply and demand model assumes that there are many consumers and producers, so that no one of them can dictate price. There is a price at which neither consumers nor produc- ers leave with less value than they came with; no consumers wish they could have purchased more goods at the price; no producers wish they could have sold more at that price—in short, everyone is better off for participating. Economists call such a price an equilibrium price and the amount that consumers buy from producers an equilibrium quantity. The nuts and bolts of this model are the supply and demand curves. The demand curve shows the relationship between the price consumers have to pay and how much they “want to buy,” whereas the sup- ply curve shows the relationship between the price firms receive and how much producers “want to sell.” Economists refer to the amount that consumers want to buy at any particular price as the quantity demanded and the amount that firms want to sell at any particular price as quantity supplied.

People participate in markets because markets make their participants better off. Mar- kets evolved because our ancestors recognized that self-sufficiency, though possible, did not allow people to take advantage of their particular skills. A social creation of humans, markets have been shaped by humankind to bring people together to exchange goods and ser- vices and, because these exchanges have always been voluntary, participants have always left them content that they have gained from the market’s existence. Thus markets have endured as a useful social institution because they continue to advance our individual and societal standard of living.

Quantity Demanded and Quantity Supplied This is one place where everything you have read, heard, or seen in the media will con- fuse you because economists use these terms very differently from the way they are used outside of economics. Economists insist on highlighting the difference between demand and quantity demanded. If you look carefully at the paragraph that is two above, paying

supply and demand The name of the most important model in all of economics.

price The amount of money that must be paid for a unit of output.

output The good or service produced for sale.

market Any mechanism by which buyers and sellers negotiate an exchange.

consumers People in a market who want to exchange money for goods or services.

producers People in a market who want to exchange goods or services for money.

equilibrium price The price at which no consumers wish they could have purchased more goods at the price; no producers wish that they could have sold more.

equilibrium quantity The amount of output exchanged at the equi- librium price.

quantity demanded The amount consum- ers are willing and able to buy at a particular price during a particular period of time.

gue46399_ch02_019-039.indd 20 16/03/17 11:38 AM

Supply and Demand Defined 21

particular attention to the last sentence, the quantity demanded is how much consum- ers are willing and able to buy at a particular price during a particular period of time. Demand, on the other hand, shows how much consumers want to buy at all prices. Demand is a relationship, whereas quantity demanded is a particular point on that relationship. An identical distinction exists with supply. Quantity supplied is how much firms are willing and able to sell at a particular price during a particular period of time, whereas supply alone shows how much firms want to sell at all prices.

quantity supplied Amount firms are will- ing and able to sell at a particular price during a particular period of time.

Markets exist whether the underlying economic sys- tem is capitalist, socialist, or communist. A capi- talist economy is so-named because in addition to there being free markets in most goods and services, there are free markets in financial capital. Whether people have money to lend because they have saved it or inherited it, in a capitalist system they control it. The profit that the capital generates goes to the owner of the capital. In a communist system, capital and the profit that it generates are controlled by a government authority. The government authority de- cides how the money is used. In a socialist system, a significant part of the profit generated by financial capital goes to the government in the form of taxes. The government then uses the tax money to counter

the wealth impacts of the distribution of profit. No country is completely capitalist and few (possibly North Korea) are completely communist. Each coun- try exists along a spectrum. The politically conser- vative Heritage Foundation, in conjunction with the Wall Street Journal, developed an Index of Economic Freedom that measures the degree to which coun- tries have free capital flows, minimal government regulation of business and labor, minimal limits on trade, and a legal system conducive to business. Selected countries are listed in the table below.

It is also worth noting that this is the first, but cer- tainly not the last time that this text will use a source with a political agenda. That usage, however, will be balanced.

capitalist economy An economic system where markets, in particular markets for financial resources, are free.

socialist economy An economic system where a significant part (but not all) of the decisions regarding the allocation of financial resources is made by a governmental authority.

communist economy An economic system where governmental authorities determine the allocation, use, and distribution of financial resources.

M A R K E T S B O X

Index of Economic Freedom Table

Top 20 Bottom 20 Other Countries and their Rank

Hong Kong Ecuador South Korea 27 Singapore Bolivia Austria 28 New Zealand Solomon Islands Norway 32 Switzerland Ukraine Colombia 33 Australia Congo, Dem. Rep. Israel 35 Canada Chad Uruguay 41 Chile Kiribati Spain 43 Ireland Uzbekistan Belgium 44 Estonia Timor-Leste Peru 49 United Kingdom Central African Republic Mexico 62 United States Argentina France 75 Denmark Equatorial Guinea Saudi Arabia 78 Lithuania Iran Italy 86 Taiwan Congo, Republic of Brazil 122 Mauritius Eritrea India 123 Netherlands Turkmenistan Greece 138 Germany Zimbabwe China 144 Bahrain Venezuela Russia 153 Luxembourg Cuba Iceland Korea, North

Source: www.heritage.org/index/Ranking

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22 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

Ceteris Paribus Social scientists in general, and economists in particular, believe in something called the “sci- entific method,” one aspect of which suggests that to isolate the effect of one variable on another you have to separate out the impacts of everything else. Unlike chemistry or biology, though, economists are rarely able to put their subjects (people) into a lab and experiment on them. For instance, economists cannot create a capitalist system in one area of town, a socialist system in another, and a communist system in a third so as to test which economic system serves society best. Economists have to observe in the context of their models. So, even though life does not progress one change at a time, our model allows us to focus on one change at a time. This brings us to the Latin most commonly used by economists: ceteris  paribus, which means “other things equal.” This phrase, when added to a definition or a conclusion, means that though there are many other factors that could affect a phenomenon in real life, this is focusing on the impact of one while holding those other factors constant.

Demand and Supply For our demand curve we want to know what the relationship is between price and quantity demanded. Determining this relationship is difficult because the relationship depends on such things as whether people are rich or poor, whether the good is in or out of fashion, or how much rival goods cost. To get around this we assume we are looking at the relationship be- tween price and quantity demanded in such a way that none of the other things are changing. Thus, demand is the relationship between price and quantity demanded, ceteris paribus.

Precisely the same logic applies to supply. There are many things upon which the relation- ship between price and quantity supplied depends: how much workers must be paid, the cost of materials, or the availability of technology. Again we assume these things do not change, so supply is the relationship between price and quantity supplied, ceteris paribus.

The Supply and Demand Model

Demand We have put it off long enough—let’s look at the model. To plot a demand curve, let’s first tell ourselves a reasonable story and put the relevant information in a table. In many city downtown areas, there are vendors selling food and drink from stands. To simplify the issue, let’s suppose we are looking at the market for bottled orange juice sold by these street vendors and that the customers buy the bottles of orange juice from those vendors and consume the juice throughout the day in their downtown offices. There are obviously lots of things that will affect the supply and demand for these bottles of orange juice, but for the moment we are going to assume they are held constant.

We start this inquiry with the price of a bottle of orange juice at zero and ask how many will be wanted. Probably a lot, but not as many as you might think. People get tired of drink- ing the same thing over and over again, and even if they were going to get a bunch to save for later, they still have to carry it to their offices. Suppose, for mathematical simplicity, that there are only 10,000 people in this downtown area and that at a price of zero each person wants only five bottles per day. That would mean that, at a price of zero, there would be a quantity demanded of 50,000 drinks.

Suppose the price were raised to 50 cents per bottle. Each individual would have to weigh whether they wanted a bottle of orange juice or 50 cents. Let’s say the average person decides to buy only four per day at that price. As a result of the price increase, the quantity demanded for the market would be 40,000. Suppose another 50-cent increase would decrease the amount

ceteris paribus Latin for “other things equal.”

demand The relationship between price and quantity demanded, ceteris paribus.

supply The relationship between price and quantity supplied, ceteris paribus.

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The Supply and Demand Model 23

wanted by the average person to three. Quantity de- manded in the market would fall to 30,000. Without belaboring the point further, price increases would decrease the amount the average  person would buy until at $2 per bottle the average person wanted only one, and at $2.50 the average person would buy none. Table 2.1 depicts the options we have just suggested in the form of what is called a demand schedule. A demand schedule presents the price and quantity de- manded for a good in a tabular form.

This information can also be displayed on a graph. As a matter of fact, that is how you will nearly always

see it from now on. Figure 2.1 is a graph of a demand curve. Note that the vertical axis is labeled P for price per unit and the horizontal axis is labeled Q/t for quantity per unit time. You probably anticipated the first label, but the second may require a short explanation. Quan- tity per unit time is that number of orange juice bottles that the 10,000 people will want per day. There always has to be a time reference for quantities demanded and for quantities sup- plied. The dark dots represent the points from our demand schedule, and when we connect the dots we have a demand curve.

Supply Now, using the same example, let’s think about the sellers of orange juice bottles. Sup- pose for the sake of this example that there are 10 completely independent street vendors selling orange juice bottles, and that there aren’t any brand names of the vendors or for the orange juice. Now ask yourself how many orange juice bottles a business would at- tempt to sell at various prices. Obviously they would not want to give any away, so at a price of zero, quantity supplied would be zero. Even at a very low price, such as 50 cents a bottle, they might not want to sell any because the cost to the vendor of either buying or filling the bottle might be more than the 50 cents per bottle they would get. As prices go up, they would probably be willing to put forth more and more effort to make more and more money. For the sake of this example, we will assume that at $1.00 per bottle each business will sell a bottle to anyone who would come up to them but won’t go out of their way to sell more than that. They will station themselves where there are a lot of people and simply sell to them.

Suppose that as the price people are willing to pay rises, the vendors hire people to hawk the orange juice bottles to drum up sales. Let’s say that at $1.50 they will each want to hire enough hawkers to sell 2,000 bottles per day and that at $2.00, they will hire enough to sell

demand schedule Presentation, in tabular form, of the price and quantity demanded for a good.

TABLE 2.1 Demand schedule for bottles of orange juice.

Price ($)

Individual Quantity Demanded

Market Quantity Demanded (10,000 people)*

0 5 50,000 0.50 4 40,000 1.00 3 30,000 1.50 2 20,000 2.00 1 10,000 2.50 0 0

*This is ceteris paribus at work, holding the number and type of people constant.

$2.50

$0.50

0

$1.00

$1.50

$2.00

10 20 30 40 500

Demand

P

Q/t

FIGURE 2.1 The demand curve.

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24 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

3,000 per day. Finally, suppose that at $2.50 per bottle, they will hire enough hawkers to sell 4,000 per day. Table 2.2 displays this information in what is called a supply schedule, which presents in tabular form the price and quantity supplied for a good.

This information can also be displayed on a graph. Figure 2.2 shows the supply curve with the axes labeled the same as Figure 2.1: price and quantity over time. Here the dark dots represent the points from our supply schedule. When we connect the dots we have a supply curve.

Equilibrium Table 2.3 combines the supply schedule and the demand schedule into a single schedule, and Figure  2.3 combines the supply curve and demand curve on one diagram. They both show us that at prices below $1.50 con- sumers want more orange juice bottles than vendors are willing to provide and that at prices above $1.50 they want fewer bottles than vendors are willing to sell. Where the supply and demand curves cross, the amount that consumers want to buy and the amount firms want to sell are the same. This is called an equilibrium.

supply schedule Presentation, in tabular form, of the price and quantity supplied for a good.

equilibrium The point where the amount that consum- ers want to buy and the amount firms want to sell are the same. This occurs where the supply curve and the demand curve cross.

TABLE 2.2 Supply schedule for bottles of orange juice.

Price ($)

One Vendor’s Quantity Supplied

The Market’s Quantity Supplied (all 10 concession vendors)

0 0 0 0.50 0 0 1.00 1,000 10,000 1.50 2,000 20,000 2.00 3,000 30,000 2.50 4,000 40,000

TABLE 2.3 Supply and demand schedules with shortage and surplus.

Price ($)

Individual Quantity Demanded

Market Quantity Demanded

One Vendor’s Quantity Supplied

Market Quantity Supplied

Shortage (excess demand)

Surplus (excess supply)

0 5 50,000 0 0 50,000 0.50 4 40,000 0 0 40,000 1.00 3 30,000 1,000 10,000 20,000 1.50 2 20,000 2,000 20,000 2.00 1 10,000 3,000 30,000 20,000 2.50 0 0 4,000 40,000 40,000

Supply$2.50

$0.50

0

$1.00

$1.50

$2.00

10 20 30 40 500

P

Q/t

FIGURE 2.2 The supply curve.

FIGURE 2.3 The supply and demand model and equilibrium price and quantity.

Supply

Demand

Equilibrium

Equilibrium quantity

Equilibrium price

$2.50

$0.50

0

$1.00

$1.50

$2.00

10 20 30 40 500

P

Q/t

gue46399_ch02_019-039.indd 24 16/03/17 11:38 AM

All about Demand 25

Shortages and Surpluses When the price is too low we have a shortage. Firms do not want to sell as many goods as consumers want to buy. When the price is too high we have a surplus. Firms want to sell more goods than consumers want to buy.

Imagine that the vendors start to run out of bottled orange juice. There is an obvious short- age. According to the model of supply and demand, this will have occurred because the price was too low. With long lines of people wanting to buy bottles in front of them, the vendors will see that in the face of a shortage, or excess demand, they can raise the price and still sell their product. The opposite will occur if there is a surplus, or excess supply. If the price is too high, the vendors will want to sell more bottles than consumers will want. Instead of long lines, there will be excess inventory and firms will see that in the face of a surplus they should lower the price to get rid of it.

With self-interested sellers, shortages and surpluses are short-lived. Firms react to changes in inventories by changing the price they charge. They react to shortages with price increases and surpluses with price cuts, and as a result either situation is temporary.

All about Demand

The Law of Demand We know from this chapter’s section on definitions that demand is the relationship between price and quantity demanded, ceteris paribus, and we followed a reasonably believable story about orange juice vendors. That story implied that there was a negative relationship between price and quantity demanded. Because of the relationship, the demand curve we drew was downward sloping. The negative relationship between price and quantity demanded is called the law of demand. This “law” is not really a law but is common sense applied to the following rather constant observation: When prices are higher, we tend to buy less.

Why Does the Law of Demand Make Sense? Why do we see this negative relationship so often? There are three distinct reasons. First, when you go to the store and find that the good you want is highly priced, you search for an acceptable substitute that costs less. If you buy something else, you are substituting another good for the one that you originally wanted because its price was too high. Economists say that this is a substitution effect. You buy less of what you originally wanted when its price is high because you use something else instead.

Second, suppose you cannot find an acceptable substitute. In this case, you are stuck buy- ing less of the good because you cannot afford as much. What has happened is that your real buying power has fallen (even though the money you have in your wallet is the same) because prices have risen. This does not necessarily work for all goods (especially basic necessities like water), but generally economists call this a real-balances effect because when a price increases, it decreases your buying power, causing you to buy less.

The third reason we see a negative relationship between price and quantity demanded can be explained with either great detail, or a useful, though not always completely accu- rate, shortcut. You are in this course and your professor has chosen this book because you do not need the great detail, so you will get the shortcut. It starts from the premise that what you are willing to pay for something depends on how many you have recently had. With this in mind, consider the following very silly but illustrative example. Suppose I give you $10 and I want to know how much you would pay for pizza slices at lunch. Suppose further that as part of this experiment you are given truth serum so you have

shortage The condition where firms do not want to sell as many goods as con- sumers want to buy.

surplus The condition where firms want to sell more goods than consumers want to buy.

excess demand Another term for shortage.

excess supply Another term for surplus.

law of demand The statement that the relationship between price and quantity demanded is a negative or inverse one.

substitution effect Purchase of less of a product than origi- nally wanted when its price is high because a lower priced product is available.

real-balances effect When a price increases, your buying power is decreased, causing you to buy less.

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26 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

to honestly tell me two things: (1) on a scale from 1 to 10, how happy your belly is; and (2) how much you valued each slice in terms of money. Starting hungry at a belly happiness index of 1, suppose that you eat one slice and tell me that it was worth $3 and rated a 5 on the belly happiness index. Now you eat another slice and tell me it wasn’t worth as much because you were not as hungry, so you say it was worth $2 and your belly happiness index rose to 8. You eat the third slice and tell me that, because you were somewhat full at the time you ate the third slice, your belly happiness index only rose to 9 and the slice was only worth $1.

In this scenario, each time you consume a slice, the value you place on the next slice falls. This means that the value you place on a good depends on how many you have already had. Economists refer to the amount of extra happiness1 that people get from an additional unit of consumption as marginal utility and say that it decreases as you consume more. This law of diminishing marginal utility suggests that the amount of additional happiness that you get from an additional unit of consumption falls with each additional unit. Stated more simply, because each additional slice increases your happiness less than the previous slice, the most you would be willing to pay for each additional slice is less than before. The third reason why a demand curve is downward sloping, then, is that for most goods there is diminishing marginal utility.

It is often helpful to view the demand curve as more than a way of finding how much of a good a person wants at a particular price. In addition, you can use it to find out how much a person is “willing to pay” for a particular amount of the good. Whenever you come across this phrase, think “the most they would be willing to pay.” Of course you would always want to pay less, but looked at this way the demand curve also represents the most you would be willing to pay for different amounts of the good, ceteris paribus.

All about Supply

The Law of Supply We also know from our section on definitions that supply is the relationship between price and quantity supplied, ceteris paribus, and we followed a story about how many orange juice bottles a vendor would want to sell in a city. That story implied that there was a positive relationship between price and quantity supplied. Because of that the supply curve we drew was upward sloping. The positive relationship between price and quantity supplied is called the law of supply. Like all other laws in economics, this one isn’t a law either but is more like a hypoth- esis that is supported by nearly all the evidence nearly all the time. Stated more simply: When prices are higher, firms tend to want to sell more.

Why Does the Law of Supply Make Sense? Although believable intuitively, the technical reason that a supply curve is upward sloping takes up much of Chapters 4 and 5. What follows is a simplified (though probably not simple) explanation that will be repeated and expanded in Chapters 4 and 5.

Suppose the downtown area where the vendors are selling orange juice bottles has varying areas of population density. It is relatively easy to sell where there are more people, like at a subway exit, and progressively more difficult to sell as you get away from those population centers. As a result, even if vendors hire hawkers to go out and sell orange juice bottles, it is

marginal utility The amount of extra happiness that people get from an additional unit of consumption.

law of diminishing marginal utility The amount of ad- ditional happiness that you get from an additional unit of con- sumption falls with each additional unit.

law of supply The statement that there is a positive relationship between price and quantity supplied.

1 This is why this discussion has been an intellectual shortcut. Most economists do not believe that you can measure happiness in the same way that you measure distance or temperature. This means that though you can say you are happier in one circum- stance than in another, you cannot say how much happier you are. All is not lost, though, because we can get the same idea through the concept of indifference. The reason no one-semester course textbooks explain the downward-sloping nature of demand using the concept of indifference is that it takes too long and gets you no further in your understanding than the last two paragraphs have. Thus the shortcut of marginal utility nets the same result in a lot less time and is judged by most teachers of one-semester economics courses as useful.

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Determinants of Demand 27

going to get harder and harder to sell a lot when they spread out. Even though it is harder to sell, as the price rises, it is still possible and even likely that it would be worth it for vendors to hire hawkers. So even when the last hawkers sent out sell far fewer bottles than the ones sent out originally, the vendors hire them because they make money doing so. So when the price is low, the high-cost sales methods aren’t worth it, and when the price is high, they are worth it. There might even be a price high enough that the vendors would be willing to deliver individual bottles to individual offices. While this would be very inefficient relative to simply standing at a subway exit, if the vendors have sold all they can this way and the price is high enough, it could still be profitable to the vendors to do so.

What this means, and what Chapters 4 and 5 attempt to demonstrate in detail, is that the reason the supply curve is upward sloping is that it costs more per unit to sell more units. In this example, the orange juice bottles were not any more expensive, but the cost of hawking them or transporting them was higher when we sold to more remote areas.

In addition, when firms decide which good to produce, they will want to produce the one that makes them the most money. Suppose our orange juice vendors have only so much space in the coolers in their carts. In this case, the vendors do not care whether they sell orange juice or water; they simply want to make a profit. If consumers are willing to pay more for bottled water, the vendors will stock their carts with bottled water. What this means is that relative to water, when orange juice prices are higher, the vendor is willing to take water out of the cart and replace it with orange juice. When orange juice prices are lower, the vendor does the opposite.

Determinants of Demand

In the previous section we talked about holding other things constant. Now is the time to con- sider what happens when things change. As we alluded to in the section on definitions, there are many things that affect the demand relationship for a good. These include how much the good is liked, how much income people have, how much other goods cost, the population of potential buyers, and the expectations of the price in the future. These variables will change how much of the good is wanted as well as how much someone is willing to pay for it. Again “willing to pay” is shorthand for the most someone is willing to pay. If people want more of the good, this also translates into willingness to pay prices that they would not have paid before.

Taste Determinant of whether the good is in fashion or whether con-

ditions are right for many people to want the good.

Income Inferior goods: You buy less of a good when you have more

income.

Normal goods: You buy more of a good when you have more income.

Price of other goods Substitute: Goods used instead of one another.

Complement: Goods that are used together.

Population of potential buyers The number of people potentially interested in a product.

Expected price The price that you expect will exist in the future.

Excise taxes A per unit or percentage tax on a good or service that must be

paid by consumers.

Subsidies A per unit or percentage subsidy for a good or service that is

granted to consumers.

D E T E R M I N A N T S O F D E M A N D

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28 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

Taste Taste is the word that economists use to describe whether the good is in fashion or whether conditions are right for many people to want the good. A high level of taste means that the good is in fashion or highly desired; a low level of taste means that few people want it. It works on demand in an obvious way: The more people like the good (the higher the taste for the good), the more they are willing to pay higher prices for any particular amount and the more of it they will want. Going back to the orange juice example, the taste for orange juice would rise during cold and flu season as people were trying to boost their immune systems believing that orange juice would aid in keeping viruses at bay.

Income For most goods, an increase in income will lead to an increase in the amount that consumers want. In cases where you buy more of a good when you have more income, economists call the good normal. If the good is normal and your income rises, you are able to buy more and you want to buy more of the good and you are willing to pay more for it.

How much income people have to buy the good also matters but not always in a positive way. Consider a couple of staples in the college diet, instant ramen noodles and macaroni and cheese. No matter which of these you eat, you can fill your belly for under a dollar. Now ask yourself how many pouches, boxes, or bags of this stuff you would buy if your grandmother died and left you $25,000. Answer: not many, particularly if you have been eating them because you could not afford other things to eat. This example shows you that it is not always the case that the more you make, the more you buy. In cases where you buy less of a good when you have more income, economists call the good inferior. If the good is inferior and your income rises, you are able to buy more, but you want to buy less of the good and you will need lower prices to induce you to buy any particular quantity.

Returning to our orange juice example, if people consume more bottles of orange juice as their incomes rise, then orange juice is a normal good. If they consume fewer bottles of orange juice when their incomes rise, it is an inferior good.

Price of Other Goods Similarly, there is no straightforward answer to the question of how you will change your willingness to purchase a good if the price of another good rises. It is possible that if the price of a good like Pepsi rises, you will switch to Coke. In that case, you would be willing to pay more for Coke and want to buy more of it. Likewise, if the price of hot dogs increases, you will decide to buy fewer of them. Since hot dog buns have little good use other than to surround hot dogs, you will need fewer of these too. Economists say that goods used instead of one another (e.g., Coke and Pepsi) are substitutes and that goods that are used together (e.g., hot dogs and hot dog buns) are complements.

Examples of substitutes and complements abound. Peanut butter and jelly are often consid- ered complements because they are typically used together to produce sandwiches. Pepperoni and sausage might be considered substitutes because they are alternative meats for a pizza. To confuse matters, though, goods can be substitutes to some and complements to others. My father-in-law considers peanut butter and jelly to be equally good bagel spreads, so to him they are substitutes. The Meat Lover’s Pizza by Pizza Hut includes both sausage and pepperoni, so to people who like this pizza the two may be complements.

Once again, returning to orange juice bottles: Orange juice and grapefruit juice are likely substitutes for one another while orange juice and vodka are likely to be complements because people (of legal drinking age) may mix them together to form a “screwdriver.”

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Determinants of Demand 29

Population of Potential Buyers The number of people potentially interested in a product will clearly have an impact on the demand for the product. So, as the downtown population rises, more are potentially interested in buying bottles of orange juice. Clearly the larger the city, the more people come downtown to work and shop, and the more people will buy orange juice. Or, for instance, in the dark ages of the 1970s, when there were only a few computer-literate people, only a few people were interested in buying computers. Then schoolchildren, and especially college students, began to rely on computers for their schoolwork, creating a group of potentially interested customers when they graduated. Economists shorten this concept of the number of people potentially interested in a product to call it the population.

Expected Price When the expected price of a good rises, this induces a stock-up effect. Let’s suppose that a winter freeze destroys a large number of the orange groves. Forward-thinking consumers will see the impending increase in orange juice prices and be motivated to stock up now before the price increase takes hold. Similarly, smokers stock up on cigarettes when a tax increase is expected. Frugal drivers buy gas on Wednesdays, before the nearly universal weekend price increase. If there is an expectation that an increase in price is imminent, consumers will be willing to pay more and they will want to buy now rather than later.

Excise Taxes Sometimes governments want to discourage the consumption of a good and will place a tax on that good. Such a tax would mean that consumers would have to pay more per unit than they otherwise would have to and as a result would decrease the amount that they wished to purchase. Suppose that a city wanted to encourage the recycling of plastic bottles and that consumers had to pay $1 extra per orange juice bottle that they purchased. That would mean that the new demand curve would be $1 lower at every quantity than the old one.

Subsidies Sometimes governments want to encourage the consumption of a good and will create a sub- sidy for that good. Such a subsidy would mean that consumers would have to pay less per unit than they otherwise would have to and as a result would increase the amount that they wished to purchase. Suppose that a city in Florida wanted its citizens to be seen by tourists drinking Florida orange juice. To encourage consumers to do so it would allow them to pay $1 less per orange juice bottle that they purchased. That would mean that the new demand curve would be $1 higher at every quantity than the old one.

The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of Demand on the Supply and Demand Model Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize how the determinants of demand work on the supply and demand diagram. Table 2.4 indicates the impact of increases in the variables listed above, whereas Table 2.5 indicates the impact of decreases in those variables. The final column of each table refers to the figure corresponding to the change. Figure 2.4 shows the impact of an increase in demand while Figure 2.5 shows the impact of a decrease in demand. In each figure, the original supply and demand curves are shown in black and the new demand curve is shown in the gold color. The original equilibrium is shown with the big black dot, and the new equilibrium is shown with the big gold-colored dot.

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30 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

TABLE 2.4 Movements in the demand curve: increases in the values of the determinants.

An Increase in Causes Demand to Causes the Demand Curve to Move to the

And Is Shown in Figure

Taste Increase Right 2.4 Income, normal good Increase Right 2.4 Income, inferior good Decrease Left 2.5 Price of other goods, complement Decrease Left 2.5 Price of other goods, substitute Increase Right 2.4 Population Increase Right 2.4 Expected future price Increase Right 2.4 Excise Tax Decrease Left 2.5 Subsidy Increase Right 2.4

TABLE 2.5 Movements in the demand curve: decreases in the values of the determinants.

A Decrease in Causes Demand to Causes the Demand Curve to Move to the

And Is Shown in Figure

Taste Decrease Left 2.5 Income, normal good Decrease Left 2.5 Income, inferior good Increase Right 2.4 Price of other goods, complement Increase Right 2.4 Price of other goods, substitute Decrease Left 2.5 Population Decrease Left 2.5 Expected future price Decrease Left 2.5 Excise Tax Increase Right 2.4 Subsidy Decrease Left 2.5

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FIGURE 2.4 The effect of an increase in demand on the supply and demand model.

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FIGURE 2.5 The effect of a decrease in demand on the supply and demand model.

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 as they apply to Figures 2.4 and 2.5 may seduce you into thinking the best way of using this information is to memorize it. As the verb seduce suggests, that is a very bad learning strategy. The best use of these tables and figures is to use them as a check against your economic intuition. As an example, suppose you are tasked with drawing a supply and demand diagram for hot dog buns showing the impact of an increase in the price of hot dogs. First, you would recognize hot dogs and hot dog buns as complements and that when the price

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Determinants of Supply 31

of a complement rises, you will consume fewer hot dogs (because the demand for hot dogs is downward sloping) and so you would need fewer hot dog buns. Second, you would recognize that as a decrease in the demand for hot dog buns. Third, you would draw a supply and demand diagram for hot dog buns showing a leftward movement in demand for hot dog buns because a decrease in demand shows up as demand shifting to the left. You would then check that against the information in Table 2.4 (because it is an increase in the price of hot dogs impacting hot dog buns); look down to the “Price of other goods, complement” row then across to see that your intuition that demand should move left was correct and that the drawing of a figure like Figure 2.5 is correct.

Determinants of Supply

Again, the definitions section alluded to the types of things that can change the supply re- lationship. They include changes in the price of inputs, technology, price of other potential outputs, the number of sellers, and expected future price. Again we are assuming that other things are held constant.

Price of Inputs The price of inputs refers to the costs to firms of all the things necessary to produce output. If an input is used to make a product, then the input costs money and therefore has a price even though its name may change. Obvious examples of inputs are raw material, labor, and equipment. The price of a raw material is simply its price. (Though this sounds like a circular definition, think about our orange juice bottles example. The bottles, the orange juice itself, and coolers to keep the bottles in each have a price.) The price of labor is the wage + benefit cost to employers associated with hiring a person. (Everything that employ- ers pay for that is not paid directly to workers—health insurance, unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, and so on—is defined as benefits.) The price of equipment can affect supply, but just as often, what matters is the rental cost of leased equipment or the interest + depreciation rates that must be paid on the equipment bought with borrowed money. (Interest is the price of borrowed money, and depreciation is the rate at which machines lose value owing to wear and tear.)

Price of inputs Costs to firms of all the things necessary to produce output.

Technology The ability to turn input into output.

Price of other potential output When firms have to decide which good to produce, they will want

to produce the one that makes them the most money.

Number of sellers The number of firms competing in the same market.

Expected future price Firms want to hold back sales to wait for higher prices and

unload inventory before prices fall.

Excise taxes A per unit or percentage tax on a good or service that must be

paid by producers.

Subsidies A per unit or percentage subsidy for a good or service that is

granted to producers.

D E T E R M I N A N T S O F S U P P L Y

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32 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

Technology Within economics, the word technology refers to the ability to turn input into output. In our previous example of selling bottles of orange juice in a city, a technological advance that would allow vendors to keep the bottles fresh without ice or refrigeration would reduce costs. This technology would increase output and lower costs. As we are using it here, the technol- ogy variable can change because of increases in the ability of employees to work harder and smarter, or it can change because new devices make employees more efficient.

Another example of how increases in technology change markets can be seen in the very illegal term-paper business. If you wanted to buy term papers in the 1960s, you would have had to pay people to go to the library to look stuff up in card catalogs of alphabetized index cards and indices of periodicals to find source material. Because access to copy machines was limited, they would have then had to read the material in the library. Finally, they would have had to type the paper on a typewriter, and they would have been able to fix mistakes only with a pasty liquid called Wite-Out®. Paying people to do this would have been expensive.

In the 1970s, all the steps were the same except copy machines would have allowed the people you hired to read source material in their homes. In the 1980s, primitive computers would have allowed them to gather limited quantities of source material on a computer and to write the paper using a hard-to-use, not very flexible word processor. By the 1990s, writers of term papers could look up material on the Internet, print it, read it, and write the paper, all from the comfort of their own bedrooms. In each of these periods, producers of such con- traband had to find a way to sell their papers. Often informal networks had to be created and payment had to be in cash. Today, you can go to any number of term-paper sites on the Internet and download a paper by simply entering a credit card number. You, of course, would never do this because your college can easily catch you and throw you out of school. But because it is easier to produce papers in less time than used to be the case, sellers of term papers can charge lower prices and produce more papers.

Price of Other Potential Outputs The price of other potential outputs refers to the same idea that we referenced when indicating why the supply curve is upward sloping, except now we focus on what happens to the exist- ing supply curve when the price of the other good changes. As we said, vendors have only so much space in the coolers in their carts. During a hot summer’s day they may discover that they sell out of bottles of water and have plenty of leftover bottles of orange juice. If consum- ers are willing to pay more for bottled water, the vendors will stock their carts with bottled water. They will stock those carts with the combination of water and orange juice that makes them the most money. As the price of water rises, the supply of orange juice will fall because vendors want to stock water.

Number of Sellers The number of sellers, that is, the number of firms competing in the same market, is important because the more firms there are, the greater is total market production. Using the orange juice example, we assumed that there were 10 different vendors. If these vendors are all mak- ing a significant profit, it is likely that other entrepreneurs will want to set up their competing stands. This raises total market supply. Similarly, if there were losses, some of those vendors may quit the business, reducing total market supply.

Expected Price The expected future price should sound familiar because it is also something that will change demand. In the context of supply, it refers to a firm’s desire to hold back sales to wait for

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Determinants of Supply 33

higher prices and its desire to sell its goods and thus lower its inventory before prices fall. Firms want to sell their goods when they can make the most money regardless of when that time is. A warning that a hurricane is coming will bid up the current price of gas-powered generators because firms will want to retain those they have in stock to sell at high prices after the hurricane hits. Conversely, if firms figure that the goods they hold will be out of fashion soon, they will want to get rid of them now.

Let’s return to the example of the freeze that decimated the orange groves. Not only will buyers of orange juice be motivated to stock up to avoid the increase in price, sellers will know that a price increase is coming and will want to hold on to what they have. As a result, the ex- pected future price not only changes demand for a good, it changes supply as well. Of course, it also works in the other direction. If a bumper orange crop is expected, orange juice prices will be expected to fall and those currently holding orange juice will be motivated to sell their current inventories before the price falls too much.

Excise Taxes As we indicated in the context of demand, sometimes a government wants to discourage the consumption of a good. In so doing it can tax producers or consumers. If it wants the tax to be collected on the production side, it will place a tax on that good and compel firms to pay the tax. It should be noted here that it doesn’t matter whether the tax is on the demand side or the supply side; the impact will be the same and will depend on the Chapter 3 concept of elastic- ity, not the intention of policy makers. In any event, this tax is modeled by moving the supply curve vertically higher by the amount of the tax. So a city can encourage recycling of plastic bottles by charging firms $1 extra per orange juice bottle that they sell. That would mean that the new supply curve would be $1 higher at every quantity than the old one.

Subsidies Similarly, subsidies can be applied to the firm producing the good rather than the consumer. A $1 subsidy would be modeled with the new supply curve $1 lower at every quantity than the old one.

The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of Supply on the Supply and Demand Model Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarize how determinants of supply work on a supply and demand model. Table 2.6 indicates the impact of increases in the variables listed above, whereas Table 2.7 indicates the impact of decreases in those variables. It is important to understand that on the supply side, an increase in supply is shown by a movement to the right in the sup- ply curve and that a decrease in supply is shown by a movement to the left in the supply

TABLE 2.6 Movements in the supply curve: increases in the values of the determinants.

An Increase in Causes Supply to Causes the Supply Curve to Move to the

And Is Shown in Figure

Price of inputs Decrease Left 2.7 Technology Increase Right 2.6 Price of other potential outputs Decrease Left 2.7 Number of sellers Increase Right 2.6 Expected future price Decrease Left 2.7 Excise Tax Decrease Left 2.7 Subsidy Increase Right 2.6

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34 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

curve. As with Tables 2.4 and 2.5 the final columns of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 refer to the figures corresponding to the changes. Figure 2.6 shows the impact of an increase in supply while Figure 2.7 shows the impact of a decrease in supply. Just as it was for Tables 2.4 and 2.5 and Figures 2.4 and 2.5, the original supply and demand curves are shown in black and the origi- nal equilibrium is shown with the big black dot. This time the new supply curve is shown in the gold color with the new equilibrium shown with the big gold-colored dot.

After having read the admonition against memorizing regarding the demand shifts, you can guess what’s next: Don’t try to memorize Tables 2.6 and 2.7 as they apply to Figures 2.6 and 2.7. The best use of these tables and figures is to use them as a check against your eco- nomic intuition. As an example, suppose you are tasked with drawing a supply and demand diagram for gasoline showing the impact of an increase in the price of crude oil. First, you would recognize that crude oil is the primary input to gasoline so that, when crude oil prices rise, refineries would have to increase their gasoline prices to make up for those higher pro- duction costs. Second, you would recognize that as a decrease in the supply of gasoline. Third, you would draw a supply and demand diagram for gasoline showing a leftward movement in supply for gasoline because a decrease in supply shows up as supply shifting to the left. You would then check that against the information in Table 2.6 (because it is an increase in the price of crude impacting gasoline); look down to the “Price of inputs” row then across to see that your intuition that supply should move left was correct and that the drawing of a figure like Figure 2.7 is correct.

TABLE 2.7 Movements in the supply curve: decreases in the values of the determinants.

An Decrease in Causes Supply to Causes the Supply Curve to Move to the

And Is Shown in Figure

Price of inputs Increase Right 2.6 Technology Decrease Left 2.7 Price of other potential outputs Increase Right 2.6 Number of sellers Decrease Left 2.7 Expected price Increase Right 2.6 Excise Tax Increase Right 2.6 Subsidy Decrease Left 2.7

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FIGURE 2.6 The effect of an increase in supply on the supply and demand model.

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FIGURE 2.7 The effect of a decrease in supply on the supply and demand model.

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The Effect of Changes in Price Expectations on the Supply and Demand Model 35

The Effect of Changes in Price Expectations on the Supply and Demand Model

If you have not already noticed, expected future price shows up in both the determinants of demand and the determinants of supply. This means that if the expected future price changes, both the supply and demand curves change as well. If the expected future price rises, con- sumers will want to stock up, thereby increasing demand. Firms, on the other hand, will want to hold back their inventory to wait for the price increase, thereby decreasing supply. In this case, we do not know what will happen to equilibrium quantity because the demand shift will, by itself, increase quantity, whereas the supply shift will, by itself, decrease quantity. Whether there is a net increase or decrease in equilibrium quantity depends on which shift is greater. On the other hand, the effect on price is known, and it amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy because a credible prediction of a future price increase will lead to an actual current price increase.

When expected prices rise, we know that the current price will rise, but we do not know what will happen to the quantity. This is because we do not know whether firms’ desire to wait for price increases will be stronger than consumers’ desire to stock up. When the price is expected to fall, firms will want to get rid of their inventory and consumers will want to wait for the new lower prices.

When expected prices fall we know that the current price will fall, but we again, do not know what will happen to the quantity. This is because we do not know whether firms’ desire to unload inventory will be stronger than consumers’ desire to wait for lower prices.

WHY THE NEW EQUILIBRIUM?

When either the supply curve or the demand curve shifts, the equilibrium has to change. If it does not, one of two things will happen: There will be a shortage where consumers want to buy more than firms want to sell, or there will be a surplus where firms want to sell more than consumers want to buy.

To show that this is the case, imagine that there is an increase in the demand for a good and firms do not increase the price. As shown in Figure 2.8, keeping the price at the old equi- librium would set up a situation where consumers would want more (40) than firms would be willing to sell (20). The resulting shortage would not be eliminated unless there was an increase in the price.

A somewhat different problem would happen if firms did not lower their price in the face of decreased demand. Figure 2.9 shows that keeping the price at the old equilibrium with a decrease in demand would set up a situation where consumers would want fewer (0) than firms would be willing to sell (20). The resulting surplus would not be eliminated unless there was a decrease in the price.

Just as we needed a new equilibrium when there was a change in demand, we need one when there is a change in supply. Figure 2.10 shows that keeping the price at the old equilib- rium when supply increases sets up a situation where consumers want fewer (20) than firms are willing to sell (40). The resulting surplus will not be eliminated unless there is a decrease in the price.

Finally, if firms do not raise their prices in the face of decreased supply, there will be a shortage. Figure 2.11 shows that keeping the price at the old equilibrium in the face of de- creased supply sets up a situation where consumers want more (20) than firms are willing to sell (0). The resulting shortage will be eliminated unless there is an increase in the price.

Kick It Up a Notch

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36 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

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FIGURE 2.8 The shortage that is created when demand increases if price and quantity do not.

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FIGURE 2.9 The surplus that is created when demand decreases if price and quantity do not.

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FIGURE 2.10 The surplus that is created when supply increases if price and quantity do not.

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FIGURE 2.11 The shortage that is created when supply decreases if price and quantity do not.

What lesson can you draw from all of this? A change in either the supply or demand curve will change the price at which the quantity consumers want to buy equals the quantity that firms want to sell. If the price does not change, either a surplus or a shortage will ensue.

There are circumstances when a new equilibrium will not be achieved. For instance, price gouging is the name given to the situation in which a rapid increase in demand is followed by a rapid increase in price. When demand increases, firms do not have to raise prices to cover costs; they raise prices because they can. Laws preventing price gouging are relatively common.

If you sell ice and have a freezerful to sell, in many states you are not allowed to raise the price of it more than a specified percentage if your community loses electrical power. Econo- mists call the maximum price allowed by law a price ceiling. Once the price hits that level, it cannot rise further and you have a shortage for that good. Other examples of price ceilings involve rent control and laws that prevent ticket scalping.

Similarly, equilibrium will not be achieved if there is a price floor. This exists when a price may not fall below a certain legally proscribed level. In that circumstance, there is a surplus of the good. Examples of this include farm price supports and the existence of the minimum wage.

Detailed descriptions of the effects of price ceilings and floors are left to their applications in the chapters on rent control, ticket scalping, farm price supports, and the minimum wage.

price gouging The pejorative term applied to the circum- stance when firms raise prices substantially when demand increases unexpectedly.

price ceiling The level above which a price may not rise.

price floor Price below which a commodity may not sell.

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Summary 37

Key Terms capitalist economy ceteris paribus communist economy consumers demand demand schedule equilibrium equilibrium price equilibrium quantity excess demand excess supply

law of demand law of diminishing marginal

utility law of supply marginal utility market output price price ceiling price floor price gouging

producers quantity demanded quantity supplied real-balances effect shortage socialist economy substitution effect supply supply and demand supply schedule surplus

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

International Finance and Exchange Rates

The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

Quiz Yourself 1. The supply and demand model examines how prices and quantities are determined a. in markets. b. by governments. c. by churches. d. by monopolists.

2. A change in the price of eggs will impact a. the demand for eggs. b. the supply of eggs. c. the quantity demanded and quantity supplied of eggs but neither demand nor supply. d. both the supply and demand for eggs.

3. When an economics student draws a supply and demand diagram to model an increase in the income, she is assuming this change happens a. semper fidelis. b. ceteris paribus. c. ipso facto. d. de facto.

Summary The supply and demand model is the single most important model in economics. More than half the issues that you deal with in the latter part of this book will rely on your ability to put an economics problem into the context of this model. In the course of this chapter we explained the supply and demand model by providing all of the language up front. We explained both supply and demand in isolation and then put them together in the form of a coherent model. We then talked about what variables might change demand and then which ones might change supply. We showed that prices and quantities sold would have to change to maintain an equilibrium.

gue46399_ch02_019-039.indd 37 16/03/17 11:38 AM

38 Chapter 2 Supply and Demand

4. If the supply and demand curves cross at a price of $2, at any price above that there will be a. an equilibrium. b. a surplus. c. a shortage. d. a crisis.

5. If the supply and demand curves cross at a quantity of 100, then the price necessary to get firms to sell more than that will have to be equilibrium. a. above b. at c. below d. within 10 percent either way of

6. An increase in which of the following determinants of demand will have an ambiguous (uncertain) effect on price? a. Taste b. Price of a complement c. Income d. Price of a substitute

7. Which of the following will impact both supply and demand? a. A change in price b. A change in quantity c. A change in expected future price d. A change in income

8. An increase in the income of consumers will cause the a. supply of all goods to rise. b. demand for all goods to rise. c. supply of all goods to fall. d. the demand for some goods to rise and for others to fall.

9. Without an increase in price, an increase in demand will lead to a. a shortage. b. a surplus. c. socialism. d. equilibrium.

10. The underlying reason for the upward-sloping nature of the supply curve is that a. the production of most goods comes with increasing marginal benefits. b. the production of most goods comes with increasing marginal costs. c. the consumption of most goods comes with decreasing marginal utility. d. the consumption of most goods comes with increasing marginal utility.

11. If Midwestern grain farmers can plant either soybeans or corn on their land with equal profitability and there is an increase in the price of soybeans, which of the following will result? a. A movement to the right in the demand for corn b. A movement to the left in the demand for corn c. A movement to the right in the supply of corn d. A movement to the left in the supply of corn

gue46399_ch02_019-039.indd 38 16/03/17 11:38 AM

Summary 39

12. Part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act involved a tax on indoor tanning that tanning salons are required to collect from tanners and send to the federal govern- ment. Which of the following would be the predicted result? a. A movement to the right in the demand for tanning b. A movement to the left in the demand for tanning c. A movement to the right in the supply of tanning d. A movement to the left in the supply of tanning

13. As the baby boom generation (born between 1946 and 1964) ages, which of the following is a likely outcome? a. A movement to the left in the demand for nursing home beds b. A movement to the left in the supply of nursing home beds c. A movement to the right in the supply of nursing home beds d. A movement to the right in the demand for nursing home beds

Short Answer Questions

1. Use your own demand for pizza to illustrate the notion of diminishing marginal utility. Explain why that concept means your demand for pizza-by-the-slice is downward sloping.

2. Suppose you have been given money by your friends and sent to get beverages for a party. Use your demand for those beverages to illustrate why the concept of the “real balance effect” will mean your demand is downward sloping.

3. If there is an alteration to the price of a complement to a good, why is that a change in demand when an alteration in the price of the good itself is a change in the quantity demanded?

4. If there is an alteration in the price of an input used to produce a good, why is that a change in supply when an alteration in the price of the good itself is a change in the quantity supplied?

Think about This Using simple supply and demand analysis, think about the system of allocating human kid- neys. The law that forbids the sale of human organs, but allows their voluntary donation, means that there is a bigger shortage of kidneys than there otherwise would be. Does this fact alter your view of the law forbidding the sale of human organs? How about blood?

Talk about This Are markets always right? List some markets that you think get the production or price of a good wrong. What do these goods have in common?

gue46399_ch02_019-039.indd 39 16/03/17 11:38 AM

40

C H A P T E R T H R E E

The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Define elasticity as the responsiveness of quantity to changes in price, recognize its importance in economics, and apply the con- cept to various real-world goods and services.

LO2 Connect the relationship between the concept of elasticity and the appearance of the demand curve.

LO3 Illustrate that a market equilibrium provides both buyers and sellers with benefits. Con- sumers pay less than they are willing to pay and producers make a profit. Economists call the former consumer surplus and the latter, producer surplus.

LO4 Define deadweight loss as the measure of inefficiency that exists when prices are too high or too low and apply this to various policies.

Chapter Outline

Elasticity of Demand

Alternative Ways to Understand Elasticity

More on Elasticity

Consumer and Producer Surplus

Kick It Up a Notch: Deadweight Loss

Summary

We now change gears a bit and reconsider the individual supply and demand curves. Our focus here is on the ability of consumers and producers to react to price changes with changes in the amounts they wish to buy or sell. That ability to react, called elasticity, will be very important to us as we prepare to use the supply and demand model for issues. We will see how differently shaped demand curves will reflect the degree to which price changes affect quantity.

The last third of the chapter is central in our analysis of several issues. We will see how the supply and demand model can be used to explain why markets are effective in pleasing both consumers and producers. Though we know that consumers long for low prices and producers for high prices, we will see that when a consumer buys something from a producer, both can be pleased with the outcome. We will also see why the net benefit to society is lower when prices are not at equilibrium than it would be if equilibrium were at work.

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Elasticity of Demand 41

Elasticity of Demand

Intuition In the previous chapter, we saw that a change in supply or demand changes the equilibrium price–quantity combination, but we did not discuss which one changes more. For instance, if costs to a firm go up, it is reasonable to ask whether the firm will pass that price increase on to consum- ers or be willing to accept lower profits. Exploring this question brings in the concept of elasticity.

If the good is one that you need to survive and that has no good substitutes, or if it is one that you spend very little money on, the firm may be able to pass on its increased costs to you in the form of higher prices. On the other hand, if it is a luxury, that is, a good you can do without, if there are many other things that will serve just as well, or if you already spend a lot of your income on it and could not afford a price increase, you may buy a lot fewer. In this case the firm’s profits are eaten up.

Definition of Elasticity and Its Formula There are many kinds of elasticity. In general, elasticity is the responsiveness of quan- tity to a change in another variable. The two most commonly referred to elasticities are the price elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of supply. Respectively, these are the responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price and the responsiveness of quan- tity supplied to a change in price. Other elasticities include the income elasticity of demand and the cross-price elasticity of demand. The former measures the responsiveness of quan- tity to changes in income, and the latter measures the responsiveness of quantity to changes in the price of another good.

The price elasticity of demand is measured by looking at how a percentage change in price affects the percentage change in quantity demanded. The formula for elasticity is:

Elasticity = %ΔQ

_____ %ΔP

= ΔQ∕Q*

_______ ΔP∕P*

where,

% = percent Δ = change

P* = price (read as “P star”) Q* = quantity (Q star)

The other elasticities are similar in that the percentage change in either quantity demanded or quantity supplied is in the numerator and the percentage change in the price, income, or other price, is in the denominator. Because the bulk of the issues that deal with elasticity deal with price elasticity of demand, we focus here on this particular form of the concept.

From here there are two ways of proceeding: We can explain everything in a great deal of mathematical detail or not. Guessing that the chorus is singing “not,” we will skip the math. You will need now to follow the “English” explanations to understand and accept the conclu- sions about elasticity.

When you use the elasticity of demand formula, you will always get a negative number for it. For our purposes we will simplify things by ignoring the negative sign. The negative sign appears because the demand curve is downward sloping, and an increase in price will therefore cause a decrease in quantity. To illustrate, if a 5 percent increase in price leads to a

elasticity The responsiveness of quantity to a change in another variable.

price elasticity of demand The responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price.

price elasticity of supply The responsiveness of quantity supplied to a change in price.

income elasticity of demand The responsiveness of quantity to a change in income.

cross-price elasticity of demand The responsiveness of quantity of one good to a change in the price of another good.

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42 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

1

0

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

P

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Q/t

D1

FIGURE 3.1 At a given price, a flatter demand curve is more elastic than a steeper one.

1

0

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

P

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

D2

Q/t

FIGURE 3.2 At a given price, a steeper demand curve is more inelastic than a flatter one.

10 percent decrease in quantity, the elasticity fraction is –0.10∕.05. Since the important thing about elasticity is the value of the fraction itself, it is acceptable and less complicated for us to ignore the minus sign.

Elasticity Labels This brings us to an important distinction that will be vital when we look at issues that hinge on whether demand is elastic or inelastic—for example, whether increasing the tax on cigarettes leads to decreases in teen smoking. Economists say that demand is elastic when the percentage change in quantity is larger than the percentage change in price and inelastic when the percentage change in quantity is smaller than the percentage change in price. Looking at the formula, if the computed elasticity is greater than 1, then demand is elastic; when it is less than 1, then demand is inelastic. When the percentage change in quantity is the same as the percentage change in price (the computed elasticity is exactly 1), demand is unitary elastic.

Alternative Ways to Understand Elasticity

To see this more clearly let’s look at it using three different thought processes. First we look at elasticity using the graph of our demand curve. Then we look at it using only words. Last, we look at it in terms of how much money is spent on the good.

The Graphical Explanation We first examine the elasticity phenomenon using graphical skills. Figure 3.1 shows that the flat- ter the demand curve, the greater the elasticity. This is not to say that slope and elasticity are the same thing; it just means that slope matters. To see that slope matters look at Figures 3.1 and 3.2.

elastic The circumstance when the percentage change in quantity is larger than the percentage change in price.

inelastic The circumstance when the percentage change in quantity is smaller than the percentage change in price.

unitary elastic The circumstance when the percentage change in quantity is equal to the percentage change in price.

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Alternative Ways to Understand Elasticity 43

Though they are in separate diagrams, both go through the point P = $8, Q = 4. Suppose you were to ask how much price would have to rise in order to induce a reduction in quantity demanded to 3. In Figure 3.1, you can see that it would take an increase to $9, whereas in Figure 3.2 it would require an increase to $12. What that implies is that on the steeper curve (Figure 3.2) demand is less elastic and on the flatter one ( Figure 3.1) it is more elastic. In Figure 3.1, a 12.5 percent increase in prices results in a 25 percent reduction in quantity.1 In Figure 3.2 it takes a 50 percent increase in price to generate a 25 percent decrease in quantity.

Figure 3.3 shows that the higher the price, the greater the elasticity. The price increase from 2 to 3 causes a decrease in quantity from 10 to 9. The same size

increase in price from 8 to 9 causes the same size decrease in quantity from 4 to 3. This is because the slope of this demand curve is the same at all those points. Looking at the formula again, we see it is the percentage changes that matter and not just the size of those changes. Even though the price increases and quantity decreases are the same, the percentage changes are very different.

From point D to C the percentage change in price from 2 to 3 is a sizable 50 percent while the percentage change in quantity from 10 to 9 is negligible, only 10 percent. Since the percentage change in the price is greater than the percentage change in the quantity, demand is inelastic here (elasticity is low). On the other hand, from point B to A the percentage change from 8 to 9 is only 12.5 percent, whereas the percentage change in quantity from 4 to 3 is large (25 percent, visually about 33 percent). As a result, demand here is elastic (elasticity is high).

The Verbal Explanation Although the graphical explanation of elasticity is highly accurate, if it does not make sense to you, it is useless. Recall the original definition of elasticity (the reaction of quantity to a change in price). If you really need a product because there are no good substitutes (like insulin to a diabetic), you will hardly change the amount you buy when the price changes. Thus there is little, if any, reaction of quantity to changes in price. The demand curve for a good you “need” is going to be rather steep. If the good is a luxury item, you are more likely to eliminate it from your budget if it becomes overly expensive. In this case, there is a substantial reaction of quantity to a change in price. The demand curve for a luxury is likely to be flatter.

In addition, price changes for goods that take up little of your income (like drinking water) are not likely to lead to big quantity changes. This is because even if their price increases greatly, you can easily afford those price increases. Goods that take up a significant portion of your income are more likely to have elastic demand because you are less able to afford large price increases. In this case, goods with low prices are likely to have inelastic demand and goods with high prices are likely to have elastic demand.

1

0

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

P

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

A

B

C

D

Q/t

Demand

FIGURE 3.3 The higher the price, the greater the elasticity.

1 A price increase from 8 to 9 is a 12.5 percent increase because it is the fraction 1∕8. It is a 25 percent decrease in quantity because it went from 4 to 3 (1∕4).

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44 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

Seeing Elasticity through Total Expenditures If we wanted to, we could use math to show that if the price and the amount you spend both go in the same direction, then demand is inelastic. If they go in opposite directions, however, demand is elastic. This total expenditure rule of elasticity also allows us to quickly judge whether demand is elastic or inelastic. For instance, when the price of cigarettes goes up, smokers usually have to spend more on them. When the prices of luxuries go up, many of us spend less on them (because we do without them). In this way, we can find out for ourselves whether our demand for a good is elastic or inelastic. All we need to do is to ask ourselves whether a price increase will cause us to spend more on that good.

More on Elasticity

Determinants of Elasticity of Demand Key factors of the three elasticity explanations are important in determining whether a good is elastic or inelastic. The first is the number and closeness of substitutes. When there are many substitutes that all serve nearly as well as the good in question, demand is likely to be more elastic, because price increases induce changes to other goods. Whether price increases can be easily absorbed into a person’s budget also matters. If price increases can- not be absorbed—which is likely to be the case if the good takes up a significant portion of the budget of consumers—when they occur, significant quantity reductions will follow. And although timing was not mentioned above, given time, close substitutes can be found or invented, or methods to avoid the price increase will be developed.

One of those substitutes could be the continued use of something the consumer already has. Cars, for instance, have greater elasticity than razor blades because owners can easily continue to drive the cars they have until a sale price induces them to buy a replacement, whereas shav- ers can stretch the use of a razor for only a limited number of days.

Elasticity and the Demand Curve Elasticity is important because supply changes will have very different results depending on the elasticity of demand. As you can see from the figures on the next page, an identical supply change can affect only price (Figure 3.4), only quantity (Figure 3.5), price much more than quantity (Figure 3.6), or quantity much more than price (Figure 3.7).

total expenditure rule If the price and the amount you spend both go in the same direction, then demand is inelastic, whereas if they go in opposite directions, demand is elastic.

Number and closeness of substitutes The more alternatives you have, the less likely you are to pay

high prices for a good and the more likely you are to settle for an adequate alternative.

Portion of the budget When a good takes up a significant portion of a consumer’s

budget, it is more likely to be elastic.

Time The longer you have to come up with alternatives to paying

high prices, the more likely it is you will shift to those alternatives.

D E T E R M I N A N T S O F E L A S T I C I T Y O F D E M A N D

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More on Elasticity 45

Q1 = Q2

P

Q/t

D

P1

P2

S2

S1

FIGURE 3.4 Perfectly inelastic demand.

D

Q1Q2

P1 = P2

P

Q/t

S2

S1

FIGURE 3.5 Perfectly elastic demand.

D

P1

P2

Q1Q2

P

Q/t

S2

S1

FIGURE 3.6 Inelastic demand.

D P1

P2

Q1Q2

P

Q/t

S2

S1

FIGURE 3.7 Elastic demand.

In Figure 3.4 demand curve is perfectly inelastic because price changes have no ef- fect on quantity. In Figure 3.5 the demand curve is perfectly elastic because price cannot change. As we saw in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, a linear demand curve is elastic at high prices and inelastic at low prices. In Figure 3.6 demand is inelastic over the entire range shown because at every point the percentage change in price is larger than the percentage change in quantity. This will be true when the demand curve is nearly vertical. In Figure 3.7 demand is elastic over the entire range, because at every point the percentage change in price is smaller than the percentage change in quantity. This will be true when the demand curve is nearly horizontal.

If we look back at the elasticity formula, we can use this explanation to compute the ap- propriate elasticity numbers for each of these elasticity labels. For perfectly elastic demand the computed elasticity is ∞ (infinity), while for perfectly inelastic demand the computed elastic- ity is 0 (zero). Remembering that unitary elastic demand computes to 1 (one), it makes sense that elastic demand will compute to greater than 1 but less than ∞ and inelastic demand will compute to less than 1 but greater than 0.

perfectly inelastic The condition of demand when price changes have no effect on quantity.

perfectly elastic The condition of demand when price cannot change.

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46 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

Sometimes it is easier to see the importance of elasticity with partic- ular goods. There are economists who spend their days and nights estimating the elasticity of demand for particular goods. This is not because they have nothing else to do. It is because the elasticity of demand for a good is important information to have if you are interested in the impact of a price increase or a tax on that good. For instance, if you take up the chapter on tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and prostitution later in the course, you will find that the question of how much impact a tax on cigarettes will have in decreasing smoking depends greatly on the elasticity of demand for cigarettes.

Consider the goods listed in the following table and their elastici- ties. You should be able to tell a story about why short-run gasoline demand is less elastic than long-run gasoline demand. You should be able to figure out why demand for foreign travel is quite elastic while demand for food is not. The key to the question of whether a good is elastic or not is whether there is an acceptable substitute.

SAMPLE STORY 1 There are few substitutes to driving to and from work. Though you may or may not be able to take public transportation or carpool, though you may or may not be able to trade in your SUV for a fuel-efficient car, it would take a substantial change in the price of gasoline to cause you to make the substitution immediately upon seeing an increase in gas prices. This is especially true if you did not anticipate that prices would remain high. On the other hand, if you did see that gasoline prices were going to remain high, you might, over the next year or so, consider trading in the gas guz- zler for something more miserly. Similarly, you cannot easily change your electric bill, but over time you can replace an inefficient electric forced-air furnace with an efficient heat pump, and you can decide to put electronic devices that draw electricity even when they look

like they are off (such as TVs, coffeepots, and even cell phone char- gers) on switches.

Type of Good Price Elasticity

Inelastic Goods Consumer electricity (short-run) 0.13 Eggs 0.06 Food 0.21 Health care services 0.18 Gasoline (short-run) 0.08 Gasoline (long-run) 0.24 Highway and bridge tolls 0.10 Unit Elastic Good (or close to it) Shellfish 0.89 Cars 1.14 Elastic Goods Luxury car 3.70 Foreign air travel 1.77 Restaurant meals 2.27 Consumer electricity (long-run) 1.89

Sources: Variety of sources combined by author

SAMPLE STORY 2 Suppose you wanted to take your family on an interesting vaca- tion. Suppose further that your family had narrowed its choices to hiking in the Grand Canyon or seeing the sights in Paris. Given the acceptability of the substitute, a relatively small change in the price of flights and accommodations for the trip to France would have a significant impact on your choice.

E L A S T I C I T Y : S O M E I L L U S T R A T I V E E X A M P L E S

Elasticity of Supply Before moving on, we need to stop and say that nearly everything we have just said about the price elasticity of demand can also be said about the price elasticity of supply. Firms selling goods may be in a situation where they have already brought goods to market that are quite perishable and, therefore, must be sold regardless of their price. We may have other situa- tions where producing more of the goods can be accomplished but only at a sharply increased price. We can imagine a third circumstance where prices do not have to rise much in order to motivate further sales and, finally, it is possible that firms may be willing to produce as many goods as buyers want at the current market price. In the first scenario, the supply curve would be vertical. In the second and third scenarios, the supply curve would be upward sloping, with the second being a steeply sloped supply curve, and the third being a relatively flat one. The final scenario would likely result in a horizontal supply curve. Some examples of goods with varying elasticities might be helpful here. In the very short run, the elasticity of supply of fresh fruit at a farmers’ market is perfectly inelastic as long as the fruit will spoil if it goes unsold. In the relatively short run and in the United States, the supply of gasoline is inelastic because

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More on Elasticity 47

Q/t

D1 Q1 = Q2

P1

D2

P2

P S

FIGURE 3.8 Perfectly inelastic supply.

Q/t

P

P2

Q1 Q2

D2 D1

P1

S

FIGURE 3.9 Inelastic supply.

Q/tQ2

D1

D2

S

Q1

P1

P2

P

FIGURE 3.10 Elastic supply.

Q/tQ2

D1

D2

S

P

Q1

P1 = P2

FIGURE 3.11 Perfectly elastic supply.

most refineries are not easily capable of expanding or contracting output. They run 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and are brought offline only for maintenance. In the longer run, there are myriad goods where producers can bring new production online. A relatively small increase in the profit margin on a good can motivate significantly greater production. There are very few real-world examples of perfectly elastic supply.

Replicating the idea of Figures 3.4 through 3.7 where we had a constant shift in supply and saw what happened with varying elasticities of demand, Figures 3.8 through 3.11 show what happens when demand shifts with varying elasticities of supply. In Figure 3.8 the supply curve is perfectly inelastic and is vertical. As a result of an increase in demand, price rises greatly, but quantity does not change at all. In Figure 3.9, the supply curve is inelastic and steeply sloped so the change in demand causes prices to rise quite a bit and quantity to rise, albeit not very much. If supply is elastic, such as it is in Figure 3.10, the demand increase causes prices to rise only a little and quantity to rise substantially. Finally, in the case where supply is per- fectly elastic, as it is in Figure 3.11, the increase in demand causes only an increase in quantity and no effect is seen on price.

Determinants of the Elasticity of Supply Just as with demand, supply elasticity has key factors that are important in determining whether a good has elastic or inelastic supply. The first is the degree to which the relevant resources used for production are available. That availability can be achieved either by their

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48 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

When there are win–win scenarios such as the case outlined, econo- mists generally favor uninhibited exchange. When there are losers, economists look to consumer surplus–producer surplus analysis to weigh the gain to the gainers against the loss to the losers. To you, whether free trade is a good thing or not depends on whether you are a Kia owner who saved several thousand dollars on your car or an unemployed United Auto Workers union member. Whether a new Walmart Supercenter is good for your town depends on whether

you are a consumer paying lower prices for steak or a meat cutter unemployed because the Kroger that you worked for closed. Gener- ally, but by no means universally, economists favor market outcomes because they make the calculation that the gain to the gainers out- weighs the loss to the losers. Whether it is trade between the United States and Korea or Walmart outcompeting Kroger, free-trade econ- omists insist that lower prices generate a gain in consumer surplus that is greater than the net loss in producer surplus.

C O M P A R I N G T H E G A I N T O T H E G A I N E R S W I T H T H E L O S S T O T H E L O S E R S

development or by the ability to attract those resources into the industry. For a natural resource where the location is known and the prospect for finding new deposits is low, supply elasticity will be smaller than for a resource where finding new deposits is common. Similarly, if higher prices motivate firms to raise wages and that results in many new applicants for positions, productive capacity can increase quickly in response to price changes.

The second is the degree to which an industry exhibits some agility in their production or has the time to respond appropriately to price changes. An industry that requires long periods of time to increase production will have a lower supply elasticity than one that can quickly bring in new labor and capital to exploit minor price changes. Here, the energy industry is a good example in that it took many years to develop the technology associated with hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and horizontal drilling. As a result, the supply elasticity of oil was low for many years. When that new technology was on full display, in particular during the doubling of U.S. oil production in the 2008 to 2015 time frame, supply elasticity increased markedly.

The final determinant of supply elasticity is the degree to which a firm is close to its production capacity combined with the degree to which it can easily and cheaply use inven- tories as a buffer. An industry that is always running at full capacity and can’t cheaply store their output will have very low supply elasticity. The clearest and most frequently observed example of this is in the gasoline-refining business. Refineries are always running at full capacity—24/7/365. The only exception to that is when they are down for maintenance, which they are during the required switch from winter blends to summer blends (in March) and back again (in October). You see the price at the pump rise in those months because there is no spare capacity in that business and the cost of storage is quite high.

Availability of Relevant Resources The easier it is for relevant resources to be developed or attracted into an industry, the greater will be the supply elasticity.

Time and Agility of Production The longer an industry has to adjust production, or the ease with which it can do so, the greater will be the supply elasticity.

Capacity and Inventories The farther away an industry is to its production capacity combined with the degree to which it can easily and cheaply use inventories as a buffer, the greater will be the elasticity of supply.

D E T E R M I N A N T S O F E L A S T I C I T Y O F S U P P L Y

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Consumer and Producer Surplus 49

Consumer and Producer Surplus

Consumer Surplus Most people think that when consumers buy goods, only the firm is better off for the exchange. They do not often acknowledge that consumers are also better off. It turns out that consum- ers often get much more value than they part with. Look back to “All about Demand” in Chapter 2 and recall that the demand curve represents the marginal utility of the good. This means that the amount each additional unit of the good is worth to the consumer can be read from the demand curve.

Figure 3.12 demonstrates how it is that consumers win in this exchange and provides a measure of the degree to which they win. The value the consumers place on each unit of the good is their marginal benefit for that unit. That is how much they would have paid for that unit. As a result the total value to the consumer is simply the sum of those marginal benefits for each unit and is the area under the demand curve from O to Q*. It looks like and is bounded by the letters OACQ*. The total amount of money they pay for these goods is the price, P*, times the amount they buy, Q*, so it looks like and is bounded by the letters OP*CQ*. The difference between the areas is the triangle that represents the value to the consumers minus the amount they pay the producer. Economists call that consumer surplus; it looks like and is bounded by the letters P*AC.

Producer Surplus Firms also benefit from exchange. In the Chapter 2 section “All about Supply” the supply curve is upward sloping because it is the marginal cost curve and marginal cost is increasing. Just as we added together marginal benefits to get the value to the consumers in Figure 3.12, we now add together marginal costs for each unit in Figure 3.13 to get the total variable cost to the producer (which is the difference between all its costs and those it needs to start up its business). As a result we can measure the total variable cost as the area under the supply curve from O to Q*, which looks like and is bounded by the letters OBCQ*. The amount consumers pay producers is the same OP*CQ* rectangle it was in Figure 3.12, . The dif- ference is what economists call producer surplus; it looks like and is bounded by the letters BP*C.

consumer surplus The value you get that is in excess of what you pay to get it.

producer surplus The money the firm gets that is in excess of its marginal costs.

Q/tQ*

P*

A

C

O

B

Consumer surplus =

Value to the consumer

Amount consumer pays producer

minus

Supply

Demand

=

FIGURE 3.12 Consumer surplus.

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50 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

Producer surplus =

P

P* C

A

Variable cost to producer

Amount consumer pays producer

B

O Q* Q/t

= minus

Supply

Demand

FIGURE 3.13 Producer surplus.

Q/t

Supply

Demand

C

Q*O

B

P*

A

P

Consumer surplus

Producer surplus

FIGURE 3.14 Net benefit to society.

The net benefit to society, shown in Figure 3.14, is the consumer surplus plus the pro- ducer surplus. That is, if the market did not exist, consumers would lose their consumer surplus and the producers would lose their producer surplus. Because the market exists, both are better off.

Market Failure Reread the last sentence of the preceding paragraph. It seems to suggest that the market works perfectly and that there is never cause for government to intervene. Intuitively you know that is not true. A market can fail for a number of reasons: The actions of a consumer or producer can harm an innocent third party, a good may not be one for which a company can profit from selling even though society profits from its existence, the buyer may not be able to make a well-informed choice given the complexity of the decision, a buyer or a seller may have radi- cally different information about a good or service, or a buyer or seller may have too much power over the price. Each of these problems leads to market failure—the circumstance where the market outcome is not the economically efficient outcome. In the issue chapters to come, you will explore each of these types of market failures.

When market failure exists, economists use consumer and producer surplus to analyze the degree of the problem as well as to show how the problem can be solved through the proper application of taxes, regulations, or subsidies. Whether this is a tax discouraging the consump- tion or production of a good, a subsidy designed to encourage its production or consumption, or a regulation against monopoly pricing, economists are not always for or always against these mechanisms. Most economists favor policies that maximize the sum of producer and consumer surplus, however that occurs.

Categorizing Goods Broadly speaking, goods can be classified into four categories on the basis of the degree to which the consumption of the good can be restricted by a seller to only those who pay for it—called exclusivity, and the degree to which one person’s consumption reduces the value of the good for the next consumer—called rivalry. A slice of pizza has a high degree of both qualities; the pizza joint can easily prevent you from consuming their pizza if you do not pay for it, and once you have eaten a pizza, that particular pizza is not available to others. As a result, economists would label pizza as a purely private good. On the other hand, the army

market failure The circumstance where the market outcome is not the economically efficient outcome.

exclusivity The degree to which the consumption of the good can be restricted by a seller to only those who pay for it.

rivalry The degree to which one person’s consump- tion reduces the value of the good for the next consumer.

purely private good A good with the charac- teristics of both exclu- sivity and rivalry.

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Consumer and Producer Surplus 51

protects all citizens from foreign invasion regardless of how much they pay in taxes, and their success at doing so is not diminished at all by how many people they have to defend. Economists label national defense as a purely public good because it is one for which there is neither rivalry nor exclusivity.

In addition to those extremes, there are goods that have a high degree of one characteristic and a low degree of the other. Cable companies can easily exclude their consumers from get- ting HBO, but one consumer’s viewing of HBO does not affect another’s viewing. HBO is excludable, but there is no rivalry. Economists call such goods excludable public goods. Simi- larly, a city street is an example of a good for which it would be nearly impossible to prevent usage by citizens and one for which rivalry is common (think traffic jams).2 Such goods are what economists call congestible public goods.

There is another type of good for which you actually need other people consuming it for it to have any use to you. Economists call this type of good a network good. The first landline telephones were an early example of this type of good. Social media apps such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, as well as the more nefarious ones like Yik-Yak, Tinder, and Kik all require other users to be active in order for the apps to have any value.

2While you may think license plates allow for exclusivity, they do not serve the entire function in that once you have a licensed car it is very difficult to charge you based on usage. As technology increases, GPS receivers and transmitters may make it pos- sible to charge drivers based on where and when they drive.

purely public good A good with neither of the characteristics of exclusivity or rivalry.

excludable public good A good with the char- acteristic of exclusivity but not of rivalry.

congestible public good A good with the charac- teristic of rivalry but not of exclusivity.

network good a type of good for which you need other people consuming it for it to have any use to you.

Kick It Up a Notch

DEADWEIGHT LOSS

When the market is not at equilibrium, the consumer surplus plus the producer surplus will not be as large. This triangle, ABC, is as big as it can be. If consumption is more than Q*, then consumers are paying more than they think a product is worth, or producers are not meeting their marginal costs, or both. If consumption is less than Q*, the consumers wish they could buy more (and they would get more consumer surplus), or firms wish they could sell more (and they would get more producer surplus), or both. If the triangle is smaller than ABC, then there is deadweight loss. This deadweight loss is the measure economists use to discuss the inefficiency of markets when a problem like air pollution exists or when government estab- lishes an impediment to a free floating price, such as the minimum wage.

To see how deadweight loss fits our supply and demand diagram, suppose that for some reason the price cannot be at P* but is instead at Pʹ (pronounced “P prime”). Figure 3.15 shows the impact of this when Pʹ is greater than P*, and Figure 3.16 shows the impact when Pʹ is less than P*. In either circumstance, the new quantity will be less than equilibrium because consumers will not be willing to buy more than Qʹ (pronounced “Q prime”) at the higher Pʹ in Figure 3.15 and producers will not be willing to sell more than Qʹ in Figure 3.16 at the lower Pʹ.

In Figure 3.15 the price is higher than P*. At that higher price, though producers will want to sell many more than the previous equilibrium quantity, consumers will want to buy fewer. Unless the consumers are compelled to buy things they do not want, they will buy only Qʹ.

Given that, we can find the consumer and producer surplus in this market and compare it to what it was in Figure 3.14. The area under the demand curve represents the value to the consumer of Qʹ goods and this is OAEQʹ. The price Pʹ times the quantity Qʹ is the amount of money consumers will pay to get Qʹ, and this is represented by the area OPʹEQʹ. The difference

deadweight loss The loss in societal welfare associated with production being too little or too great.

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52 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

O

Demand

Supply A

B

P *

C

F

E

Q*Qʹ

P

Q/t

FIGURE 3.15 Deadweight loss with a price higher than P*.

O

Demand

Supply A

B

P *

C

F

E

Q*Qʹ

P

Q/t

FIGURE 3.16 Deadweight loss with a price lower than P*.

between these, PʹAE, is the consumer surplus. It costs the producer OBFQʹ in terms of variable costs to make these goods. The difference between the money consumers pay them and their costs, BPʹEF, is the producer surplus. The sum of consumer and producer surplus in this case is BAEF, but this is less than ABC, which is what this sum was in Figure 3.14. This means that the area FEC is lost as a result of being at Pʹ instead of P*, and this is what economists call the deadweight loss of being at Pʹ instead of P*.

In Figure 3.16 the price is lower than P*. At that lower price, though, producers will not want to sell as much as they did at the previous equilibrium and consumers will want to buy more. Unless producers are compelled to sell things they do not want to sell, they will produce only Qʹ. Again we can find the consumer and producer surplus in this market and compare it to what it was in Figure 3.14. The area under the demand curve still represents the value to the consumer of Qʹ goods and is still OAEQʹ. The price Pʹ times the quantity Qʹ is still the amount of money consumers will pay to get Qʹ, but this is now represented by the area OPʹFQʹ. The difference between these, the consumer surplus, is now PʹAEF. Whereas the costs of the producer, OBFQʹ, remain the same, the revenue has fallen so the producer surplus falls to BPʹF. The sum of consumer and producer surplus in this case is also BAEF, and this is still less than it was in Figure 3.14. The deadweight loss is again represented by the area FEC.

This chapter expanded on the supply and demand model by showing the importance of the responsiveness of quantity to changes in price and how the model can be used to show that market exchange results in mutually beneficial results for consumers and producers.

In discussing elasticity we began by introducing the formula, defining the terms elastic and inelastic, and exploring why demand for some goods may be elastic while others may be inelastic. We then considered how elasticity of demand is determined by the number of close substitutes and the time available to generate them.

To conclude the chapter, we discussed how we could use the supply and demand model to show that consumers and producers each benefit from a market transaction, and we showed how to measure the benefit each gets by defining consumer and producer surplus. Finally, we showed how we measure the inefficiency of being away from equilibrium by defining and illustrating the concept of deadweight loss.

Summary

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Summary 53

Key Terms congestible public good consumer surplus cross-price elasticity of

demand deadweight loss elastic elasticity excludable public good

exclusivity income elasticity of demand inelastic market failure network good perfectly elastic perfectly inelastic price elasticity of demand

price elasticity of supply

producer surplus purely private good purely public good rivalry total expenditure rule unitary elastic

1. The elasticity of demand is related to the slope of the demand curve a. and only the slope of the demand curve. b. but also the (price, quantity) position on the demand curve. c. but also the slope of the supply curve. d. and whether the good is normal or inferior.

2. Suppose a firm cannot figure out whether the demand for the good it sells is elastic or inelastic but discovers that every time it raises its price, its total revenue declines. Their a. demand is unit elastic. b. demand is elastic. c. demand is inelastic. d. demand is perfectly inelastic.

3. Suppose you observe that minor changes in supply seem to cause dramatic changes in price. You would conclude that a. demand is unit elastic. b. demand is elastic. c. demand is inelastic. d. demand is perfectly inelastic.

4. The fact that the demand for eggs is inelastic should not surprise you because a. they are a very cheap food. b. the demand for nearly all food products is inelastic. c. the supply of eggs is inelastic. d. they are so expensive.

5. Combined, the consumer surplus and producer surplus at equilibrium is a. lower than it would be at prices below equilibrium. b. lower than it would be at prices above equilibrium. c. typically negative. d. as big as it can get.

6. If supply and demand are lines, then at equilibrium both consumer and producer sur- plus are a. equal. b. shown as squares.

Quiz Yourself

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

Health Care Government-Provided

Health Insurance Farm Policy

Minimum Wage

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54 Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus

c. shown as trapezoids. d. shown as triangles.

7. When looking at the impact of a change in trade policy, economists use consumer and producer surplus to look at the winners and losers. Free-trade economists insist that a. no one loses. b. everyone loses. c. there are winners and losers but that the gain to the winners is greater than the loss to

the losers. d. there are winners and losers but that the loss to the losers is greater than the gain to

the winners. 8. When a satellite television company gains a subscriber, there is no impact on existing

subscribers. That is, there is no rivalry in the consumption for their service. This is an example of a a. purely private good. b. purely public good. c. congestible public good. d. excludable public good.

9. Policy makers have considered putting computer chips in cars that would allow tax col- lectors to charge people on the basis of how often they drive during rush hours. These policy makers are dealing with the fact that public roads are a. purely private goods. b. purely public goods. c. congestible public goods. d. excludable public goods.

Short Answer Questions

1. Give an example of a good that you believe has perfectly inelastic demand for most people. Then explain why you believe that is the case.

2. Give an example of a good that you believe has inelastic demand (not perfectly inelastic) for most people. Then explain why you believe that is the case.

3. Give an example of something you hate to do, and imagine that you could pay someone else to do that thing for you. Explain why both you and the person you pay could end up better off.

4. Give an example of a situation where the government compels you to do something you do not want to do. Why might that be a reasonable requirement? When might it be unreasonable?

5. Suppose you hear the following: “They just increased taxes on cigarettes and on high- priced cigars.” Use the concept of elasticity to describe who will be hurt by those taxes. Is a change in the price of the good itself a change in the quantity supplied?

Think about This Suppose both gasoline supply and demand are highly inelastic. Knowing that a change in the expected price of gasoline will shift both supply and demand, explain how these combined facts can lead you to an understanding of wildly changing gasoline prices.

Talk about This Talk about your alternative choices for colleges. What schools did you consider? Was tuition a consideration? Does your college’s proximity to other schools imply anything about your school’s ability to raise revenue by raising tuition?

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Summary 55

Behind the Numbers Hirschman, Ira, Claire McKnight, and John Pucher, “Highway and Bridge Toll Elasticities,” Transportation 22 (May 1995). Food Demand and Nutrient Elasticities, www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tb1887/tb1887.pdf Schaller, Bruce, “Transportation Elasticities,” Transportation 26 (1999), pp. 283–297. Gasoline Elasticities: Hughes, Jonathan E., Christopher R. Knittel, and Daniel Sperling. Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand (September 5, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://www.nber.org/papers/w12530

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56

C H A P T E R F O U R

Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Demonstrate the relationship between produc- tion and costs and the relationship between sales and revenues.

LO2 Explain that models of production are based on the assumption that firms seek to maximize profit.

LO3 Demonstrate how profit maximization dictates that firms set production so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue.

Chapter Outline

Production

Costs

Revenue

Maximizing Profit

Summary

The business of business is making money, and the money business makes is called profit. How it makes that profit is by selling its goods for more than it costs to make them. For this chapter (and for most of this book) we make the simplifying assumption that nothing influ- ences business other than maximizing profit. Although this is an exaggeration, it is reasonably close to the truth, and accepting it as the truth simplifies our task considerably. Nothing about this chapter is simple, but you may be comforted by the knowledge that it could be more com- plicated (of course you may not be).

With the simplifying assumption of myopic profit maximization in place, we can break things down into the cost side and the revenue side. Cost is the expense that businesses must incur to produce goods for sale. Revenue is the money that comes into the firm from the sale of the goods.

It is important to understand why economists focus on costs that are incurred rather than simply those costs that must be paid. Accountants focus only on expenses that must be paid for a business to produce, but economists also consider the opportunity cost of choices. To fully understand the concepts of economic cost and accounting cost, consider an upstart business whose owner quits a $50,000 a year job and cashes in a $100,000 CD (earning 6 percent) to get it off the ground. An accountant would not consider the $50,000 of forgone job-related income or the $6,000 per year in forgone interest as costs of the business. An economist would. For the remainder of this chapter and all of the next, all costs refer to economic costs.

profit The money that a firm makes: revenue – cost.

cost The expense that must be incurred to produce goods and services for sale.

revenue The money that comes into the firm from the sale of goods and services.

economic cost All costs of a business: those that must be paid as well as those incurred in the form of forgone opportunities.

accounting cost Only those costs that must be explicitly paid by the owner of a business.

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Production 57

With that said, since profit is the difference between revenues and costs, we will be able to use what we have developed in these areas to find how much production our profit-maximizing firm will choose. We then explore the production process and the costs that it generates, move on to discuss the revenue side, and then put the two together to show how, under different cir- cumstances, firms choose their production levels. To pull all that off, we carry one example from the beginning of this explication to the end. Let’s assume that the industry we are talking about is the computer memory industry, the industry that makes the chips that enable com- puters to use and quickly access information. Let’s suppose that the production of computer memory requires three things: expensive machines, highly trained people, and very inexpensive plastic and metal from which the chips are made. To make things even easier, let’s assume that the plastic and metal used to make the chips are free.

So far we have had a section entitled “Kick It Up a Notch” in every chapter. The problem with this chapter is that material presented is already “kicked up” plenty. Complicating mat- ters further, some students need a verbal explanation, some need to “see” it in the form of a graph, while still others can only get their arms around a concrete numerical example. To deal with that, we go through each of them once using just words, once using graphical explana- tion, and then again with a numerical example.

Production

Just Words To get a handle on costs we need to know how much money it takes to produce goods. First we need to know what resources are necessary for production. Then we can construct an input– output relationship called a production function, and we will do this in the form of a graph. Our graph will show how many resources we need to produce various amounts of output. From that production function we can find out how much various amounts of production cost. From this resulting cost function we will be able to figure out how much each one costs on average and how much each additional one costs.

Of course, this is putting the cart before the horse. Before the firm decides how many to produce, it has to decide what to produce. In our example, the memory chip firm did not decide to make chips for the fun of it. Early computer designers decided that their computers would work better if they had a short-term place to store and quickly retrieve information. Chip-making companies came into existence to provide the computer industry with the parts to make short-term storage of data possible. For the remainder of this section and this chapter we assume that the firm is up and running and is simply trying to figure out how many chips to make at any given time.

To make any product, you typically have fixed and variable inputs. That is, you have resources that you cannot change and resources that you can. In our example, the plant and the equipment in the plant are called fixed inputs because they are not easily changed, added to, or subtracted from. On the other hand, the person power to operate those machines is eas- ily changed. You can hire and fire more easily and quickly than you can replace a machine. People and other resources that can be easily changed are called variable inputs.

The first step in our process of figuring out how many memory chips to make is to map out how many resources are needed to produce various numbers of these chips. Of course, without any personnel there is no production. If there are only a few workers, as at point B in Figure 4.1, production is not very great because workers are not able to specialize in particular parts of the production process. They waste time moving from one part of the process to another, and they take time to build momentum, working at each stage of production only to find that when they get good at it, it is time to move on to another stage.

production function A graph that shows how many resources are needed to produce vari- ous amounts of output.

cost function A graph that shows how much various amounts of production cost.

fixed inputs Resources that do not change.

variable inputs Resources that can be easily changed.

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58 Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue

The addition of a few more workers solves that problem and production levels increase greatly. Workers divide the tasks in such a way that each can build momentum and does not have to switch jobs. This specialization is called the division of labor, and its impact is such that for a small increase in labor we can get a dramatic increase in output.

At some point, though, there are enough workers to get the job done, as at point D, and more workers do not add much to production. Some jobs, too, just cannot be easily divided. Although it is usually the case that having more workers increases output, workers find that the existing plant and equipment are too limiting for them to get the most out of new employees. As a result, output increases but not as fast as it had before. This phenomenon, referred to by economists as diminishing returns, is a central assumption of this chapter as well as the next.

Graphical Explanation Using the same ideas just presented, let’s walk through Figure 4.1. Point A begins at the origin because, as was pointed out in the preceding section, if you have no workers you have no out- put. Where there are too few workers to staff the plant, they have to waste time moving from one stage of production to the next, so the increase in production associated with the first group of workers is relatively low. That gives us point B. The curve is bowed to the right between points A and C because of the division of labor. That is, as you add the same number of workers, you get the benefits from those workers specializing and production increases at an increasing rate. Once you get to point C, though, there is not enough plant and equipment to accommodate more workers efficiently. The curve is then bowed to the left because of diminishing returns to the existing plant and equipment.

Numerical Example Now, let’s consider the same concept using the numbers that comprise Table 4.1. Continuing with the memory chips example, suppose the first column represents the groups of workers, the second column represents the total output produced, and the third column represents the extra output added with the inclusion of the group. Because memory chips cannot make them- selves, zero labor corresponds to zero output. Suppose that the first group of workers hired initially produces 100 units, but when a second group is added a total of 317 units is produced. That is, the second group adds 217 units to production. Suppose the third group adds some- what less, 183 units, so that the total becomes 500. If it takes 5 groups of workers to produce

division of labor Workers divide the tasks in such a way that each can build momen- tum and not have to switch jobs.

diminishing returns The notion that there exists a point where, because there are some fixed inputs like plant and equipment, the addition of resources increases production, but does so at a decreasing rate.

FIGURE 4.1 A production function.

Workers

O u

tp u

t

Production function

D

C

A

B

Labor Total Output

Extra Output of the Group

0 0 1 100 100 2 317 217 3 500 183 4 610 110 5 700 90 6 770 70 7 830 60 8 870 40 9 900 30 13 1,000

TABLE 4.1 Numerical example: production function.

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Costs 59

700, 9 to produce 900, and 13 to produce 1,000, then we have a story similar to what we saw in the graphical explanation. That is, as we added workers we got more production. The first group of workers was not very efficient because they could not specialize, whereas the second group was efficient because they could. In each case as more groups were added, efficiency waned because the workers were limited by the existing plant and equipment.

We have now explained production in terms of how a varying number of workers can be combined with a fixed amount of plant and equipment to make computer memory chips. We work next on how much it costs to hire those workers and pay for that machinery.

Costs

Just Words Once we know how many workers it takes to produce our memory chips, we can find out how much it costs to make those chips. The first thing to consider is that there are costs of production that we cannot change. In our example these fixed costs are the costs of the plant and equipment that we own. Costs that we can change, like the number of workers we hire for our plant, are called variable costs. The task now is to compare the number of memory chips we make against the costs of making those chips.

To accomplish this we need four cost concepts: marginal cost, average total cost, average variable cost, and average fixed cost.

Marginal cost (MC) is the increase in cost associated with a one-unit increase in produc- tion. Because total cost always rises, marginal cost is always positive. Because total cost rises quickly at low levels of output, marginal cost is high at low levels of output; however, total cost rises much more slowly at moderate levels of output, so marginal cost is much lower there. Last, because a rapid rise in total cost resumes at high levels of output, marginal cost is high in this range. Thus marginal cost starts high, decreases for a while, and then increases again.

Average total cost (ATC) is the per unit cost of production. Because this includes fixed cost, which can be very high, average total cost will be high at low levels of production. It will shrink as production gets more efficient and the fixed costs become spread over greater levels of output. As production rises to higher levels where marginal costs are increasing, these two effects will begin to counteract each other and the drop in average total costs will slow. Even- tually the increases in marginal cost will overwhelm the effect of spreading fixed costs over higher levels of output and average total cost will rise again.

The average variable cost (AVC) is dictated by the same changes in efficiency that gave us the marginal cost curve. Because it is an average, however, the movements are dampened; the highs are not as high and the lows are not as low.

Average fixed cost (AFC) falls continuously because the fixed costs of production are being spread over greater and greater levels of production. In addition, graphically, average fixed cost is the vertical distance between average total cost and average variable cost.

These cost concepts serve as the basis for much of what follows in this chapter, the next one, and our subsequent study of issues.

Looking back at Figure 4.1, you can see that at point A we will not have to pay anything to our workers (because we have no workers to pay), but we still have to pay fixed costs. As a result, point A in Figure 4.1 corresponds to point A in Figure 4.2. We have workers at point B whom we have to pay, and they are not all that productive. Remember that this is not their fault, because there are too few of them to allow specialization. Point B in Figure 4.2 is therefore higher than point A (because we have to pay them) but not much farther to the right (because they are not making that many chips).

fixed costs Costs of production that cannot be changed.

variable costs Costs of production that can be changed.

marginal cost (MC) The addition to cost as- sociated with one addi- tional unit of output.

average total cost (ATC) Total cost divided by output, the cost per unit of production.

average variable cost (AVC) Total variable cost divided by output, the average variable cost per unit of production.

average fixed cost (AFC) Total fixed cost divided by output, the average fixed cost per unit of production.

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60 Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue

Point C in Figure 4.1 indicates that the workers were quite productive; so for the same amount of an increase in our costs we see a significant increase in production. Thus, point C in Figure  4.2 is also higher than point B but is significantly farther to the right. Point D in Figure  4.1 shows us where extra workers did not add much to production. Again they cost money, so point D in Figure 4.2 is higher than point C, but is not that much farther to the right. Connecting these points, we have a total cost function. Our graph shows how the function helps us understand and make decisions about the cost of production and the amount produced.

Thus far we have focused on finding the total cost of producing various amounts of output. When we get total revenue, we will be able to find the profit. Before we go there, though, we are going to need four other cost functions: marginal cost, the average variable cost, the average fixed cost, and the average total cost. In higher-level economics courses, students are required to derive these other cost functions from the total cost function. When you derive one function from another, you graphically manipulate the parent function (in this case total cost) to draw its descendants (in this case marginal cost, average variable cost, and average total cost).

Numerical Example Again we are dealing with concepts that may be easier to comprehend when there are numbers attached. Following the numerical example used in Table 4.1, consider Table 4.2 (on the next page). The first column represents output. The second, Total Variable Cost, is based on the $2,500 per unit of labor from Table 4.1 that is required to produce that output. The third, Total Fixed Cost, is the cost of plant and equipment and is unchanging. The fourth, Total Cost, is the sum of total variable cost and total fixed cost. The fifth, Marginal Cost, is the increase in total cost from each level of production. The sixth, Average Total Cost, is the per unit cost; the seventh, Average Variable Cost, is per unit variable cost; and the eighth, Average Fixed Cost, is per unit fixed cost.

These derivations take economics majors several class periods to understand. We’ll skip that but outline why Figure 4.3 looks the way it does. Starting with the easiest one, average fixed cost, it is constantly decreasing because the same costs are being spread over more and more output. Marginal cost, average total cost, and average variable cost all start high, decrease, and then increase. The manner in which they do that, though, is somewhat complicated.

Marginal cost is the increase in costs associated with a one-unit increase in production. That means it is the “rise over the run” in the total cost curve, which means it is the slope of the total cost curve. You can see in Figure 4.2 that total cost rises rapidly at the beginning, flattens out, and then rises rapidly again.

FIGURE 4.2 Total cost function.

To ta

l c o

st

Output

Total cost function

D

C

A

B

P

FIGURE 4.3 Marginal cost, average total cost, and average variable cost.

AFC

AVC

ATC

MC

P

Q/t

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Costs 61

Average total cost and average variable cost are both U-shaped because they start high and decrease. The difference between the two curves is average fixed costs. Because average fixed cost diminishes as production increases, the gap between the two curves diminishes. They are both cut from below by the marginal cost curve at their respective minimums. This happens when, because of diminishing returns, marginal costs increase to the point where, first, aver- age variable cost, then average total cost, starts to rise as well.

TABLE 4.2 Numerical example: cost functions.

Output

Total Variable Cost

Total Fixed Cost

Total Cost

Marginal Cost*

Average Total Cost

Average Variable Cost

Average Fixed Cost

0     0 8,500 8,500 100 2,500 8,500 11,000 25 110 25 85 200 3,800 8,500 12,300 13 62 19 43 300 4,800 8,500 13,300 10 44 16 28 400 6,000 8,500 14,500 12 36 15 21 500 7,500 8,500 16,000 15 32 15 17 600 9,500 8,500 18,000 20 30 16 14 700 12,500 8,500 21,000 30 30 18 12 800 17,000 8,500 25,500 45 32 21 10.6 900 22,500 8,500 31,000 55 34 25 9.4 1,000 32,500 8,500 41,000 100 41 32.5 8.5

*Change in total cost/change in output.

TABLE 4.2 Numerical example: cost functions.

Output

Total Variable Cost

Total Fixed Cost

Total Cost

Marginal Cost*

Average Total Cost

Average Variable Cost

Average Fixed Cost

0     0 8,500 8,500 100 2,500 8,500 11,000 25 110 25 85 200 3,800 8,500 12,300 13 62 19 43 300 4,800 8,500 13,300 10 44 16 28 400 6,000 8,500 14,500 12 36 15 21 500 7,500 8,500 16,000 15 32 15 17 600 9,500 8,500 18,000 20 30 16 14 700 12,500 8,500 21,000 30 30 18 12 800 17,000 8,500 25,500 45 32 21 10.6 900 22,500 8,500 31,000 55 34 25 9.4 1,000 32,500 8,500 41,000 100 41 32.5 8.5

*Change in total cost/change in output.

If you are inclined to replicate Figure 4.3 yourself (or are required to in your course) try the following:

1. Draw a sweeping check-shaped MC curve.

2. Draw a symmetrical U-shaped AVC curve that bottoms out on MC.

3. Draw an asymmetrical U-shaped ATC curve that also bottoms out on MC (a bit higher than the AVC curve bottoms out) where the vertical distance between ATC and AVC is longer on the left than it is on the right side of the diagram. (For the mathematically inclined among you, this is what you get if you have a cubic total cost function.)

D R A W I N G T H E A T C - A V C - M C D I A G R A M

MC

Step 1

P

Q

Step 2

AVC

MC

P

Q

Step 3

AVC

ATC

MC

P

Q

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62 Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue

To see how each column in Table 4.2 is computed, let’s look at a production increase from 400 to 500. The variable costs associated with producing 400 are $6,000. Variable costs rise to $7,500 when output rises to 500. Fixed costs are $8,500 in both cases. That means that total cost is $14,500 ($6,000 + $8,500) for 400 and rises to $16,000 ($7,500 + $8,500) for 500. The increased cost for the increase of 100 units is $1,500, so each one increased cost by $15, so marginal cost is $15. Average total cost for 400 units is $36 ($14,500/400) and $32 ($16,000/500) for 500 units. The average fixed cost is $21 ($8,500/400) for 400 units and $17 ($8,500/500) for 500 units.

If you plot the last four columns against output, you will see that the curve for marginal cost is indeed check-shaped, that those for average total cost and average variable cost are both U-shaped, and that average fixed cost decreases steadily. You can also see that at 300 units of output marginal cost is at its minimum. Further, you can see that the curve depicting marginal cost cuts average variable cost at its minimum (at 500 units of out- put) and that the marginal cost curve cuts the average total cost curve at its minimum (at 700 units of output).

Revenue

Just Words The other side of any production decision is the amount of money that will come in from the sale of the goods. To get a handle on this revenue side we will need to know whether the business has competition and, if so, how much. For instance, if a business faces many other competitors that produce goods like the ones it produces, its behavior will be different from what it would be if it had the market to itself.

In some industries, like agriculture, the price that the firm receives remains unchanged regardless of how much it has to sell. In other industries, like those that supply electric power, the amount sold affects the price. To explore this difference let’s first assume our memory chip maker is one of many chip makers. Then we will see what happens when we assume that it is the only one.

If our chip-making firm has many competitors, the price is set in a market that it cannot control. The supply of and the demand for chips determine how much the firm can charge for its chips. To see the futility of trying to set its own price, imagine that it tried to have a price higher than the market price. If it did, computer makers could and would buy all their chips from our firm’s competitors. The firm could, of course, set a price lower than the market price. If it did, it would get to sell all it produced. On the other hand, it could do that at the market price. Because our firm wants to maximize profit and because it can always sell as much as it wants at or below the market price, it will always want to charge the market price.

Figure 4.4 shows how the market generates the price for the firm. This price also hap- pens to be the additional revenue the firm receives from the sale of each unit. To see why this marginal revenue (MR) is the same as the price, consider a thought experiment. If the market price is 5, how much will revenue be if our firm sells one? Answer: 5. How much will revenue be if it sells two? Answer: 10. The increase in revenue associated with any sale is therefore 5. This is true whether you let the price be 5, 10, or 600; the price is the marginal revenue.

If, on the other hand, we are the only ones selling computer chips, computer makers have to buy their memory chips from our firm. This situation is quite different from the case where there were many competitors. Instead of just taking a price given to it by the market, it is setting the price. Instead of being a small, insignificant part of the market, it is the market.

marginal revenue (MR) Additional revenue the firm receives from the sale of each unit.

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Revenue 63

TABLE 4.4 Numerical example: revenue when there are no competitors.

Q Price TR MR*

0 75 0 100 70 7,000 70 200 65 13,000 60 300 60 18,000 50 400 55 22,000 40 500 50 25,000 30 600 45 27,000 20 700 40 28,000 10 800 35 28,000 0 900 30 27,000 –10

1,000 25 25,000 –20

*Change in total revenue/change in output.

Unfortunately, to sell more, the firm has no recourse other than lowering the price it charges. For instance, if it is currently selling 1 million chips a week and it wants to increase its sales to 2 million a week, it must lower the price to everyone, even those who would have bought 1 million at the higher price. This means that in Figure 4.5 the marginal revenue is not graphed with a flat line; it falls as we increase sales.

Numerical Example Using the same numerical example that we have been using, suppose that our firm is one of many and has no control over price. Suppose further that the price in the market for memory is $45 per unit. This means that the total revenue (TR) increases by $45 for each unit sold and the marginal revenue is thus $45 for each unit sold. This is illustrated in Table 4.3.

If there are no competitors, then the market demand for memory is simply the demand for our firm’s memory. This means that our firm must lower its price to induce consumers to buy more memory. Another way of looking at precisely the same thing is to notice that a firm without competition can force the price higher by restricting its output. As before, total rev- enue is price times quantity, but because price does not remain the same, the marginal revenue falls. This is illustrated in Table 4.4.

P* P* = Marginal revenue

Output

Market for memory

Output

Our firm

P P S

D

FIGURE 4.4 Setting the price when there are many competitors.

P

MR

Output

D

Market for memory

FIGURE 4.5 Marginal revenue when we have no competitors.

TABLE 4.3 Numerical example: revenue when there are many competitors.

Q Price TR MR*

0 45 0 100 45 4,500 45 200 45 9,000 45 300 45 13,500 45 400 45 18,000 45 500 45 22,500 45 600 45 27,000 45 700 45 31,500 45 800 45 36,000 45 900 45 40,500 45

1,000 45 45,000 45

*Change in total revenue/change in output.

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64 Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue

Maximizing Profit

Graphical Explanation As mentioned, the level of output for the business that will maximize profit very much depends on whether the business is in perfect competition—that is, one of many producing the same thing—or is a monopoly—that is, it has no competitors. Regardless of whether it has many competitors or it has the market to itself, we assume firms produce and sell the amount that will make them the most money possible. In economic terms this ends up mean- ing that every firm should produce an amount such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost (MR = MC). Recall the Chapter 1 concept of marginal analysis; this is our first oppor- tunity to see it at work.

This is not as difficult as it seems. Remember that marginal revenue is the amount the firm brings in from selling one more, and the marginal cost is the amount of money that it costs to produce one more. To illustrate, suppose you start by selling a fixed number, say, 10. If you sell an eleventh and you make money on that sale (MR > MC), you should do it again and sell at least one more. If you sell an eleventh and you lose money on that sale (MR < MC), you should reduce sales by at least one. Since marginal revenue is less than marginal cost for the eleventh chip, you should not have produced it. To maximize profit you could repeat this one-by-one process until you have found the production that makes the most money. On the other hand, you now know that it is only when marginal cost equals marginal revenue that you have exhausted the profit potential on the good you are trying to sell.

Of course it is possible that our entire business is a loser. In the age of word processors and cheap personal computers, the manual typewriter business would be a loser even if ours were the only firm in this industry. The exception to the rule that a firm should produce where marginal cost equals marginal revenue occurs when the best alternative is to do noth- ing; that is, sometimes the best decision is to shut down the business. This occurs when the amount that you sell a good for is not enough to cover the variable costs that went into the production of the good. The firm should shut down if the price is less than the average variable cost (P < AVC).

Numerical Example To illustrate profit maximization when there are many competitors, we need to combine the information in Tables 4.1 and 4.3; when there are no competitors, we need to combine the information in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In either case we need to pick a quantity to maximize profit. This is done where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Table 4.5 illustrates this for the case where there are many competitors, and Table 4.6 does it for the case where there are no competitors. In Table 4.5 we see that the firm that has many competitors has its profit

perfect competition A situation in a market where there are many firms producing the same good.

monopoly A situation in a market where there is only one firm producing the good.

A firm should produce an amount such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost (MR = MC).

A firm should shut down if the price is less than the average variable cost (P < AVC) at the quantity where mar- ginal revenue equals marginal cost.

T H E R U L E S O F P R O D U C T I O N

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Summary 65

maximized at $10,500, and this happens when the firm produces 800.1 In Table 4.6 we see that the firm that has no competitors has its profit maximized at $9,000, and this happens when it produces 600.

Q Price TR TC MR MC Profit

0 45 0 8,500 0 0 −8,500 100 45 4,500 11,000 45 25 −6,500 200 45 9,000 12,300 45 13 −3,300 300 45 13,500 13,300 45 10 200 400 45 18,000 14,500 45 12 3,500 500 45 22,500 16,000 45 15 6,500 600 45 27,000 18,000 45 20 9,000 700 45 31,500 21,000 45 30 10,500 800 45 36,000 25,500 45 45 10,500 900 45 40,500 31,000 45 55 9,500 1,000 45 45,000 41,000 45 100 4,000

TABLE 4.5 Numerical example: profit maximization when there are many competitors.

Q Price TR TC MR MC Profit

0 75 0 8,500 0 0 −8,500 100 70 7,000 11,000 70 25 −4,000 200 65 13,000 12,300 60 13 700 300 60 18,000 13,300 50 10 4,700 400 55 22,000 14,500 40 12 7,500 500 50 25,000 16,000 30 15 9,000 600 45 27,000 18,000 20 20 9,000 700 40 28,000 21,000 10 30 7,000 800 35 28,000 25,500 0 45 2,500 900 30 27,000 31,000 −10 55 −4,000 1,000 25 25,000 41,000 −20 100 −16,000

TABLE 4.6 Numerical example: profit maximization when there are no competitors.

Key Terms accounting cost average fixed cost (AFC) average total cost (ATC) average variable cost (AVC) cost cost function diminishing returns

division of labor economic cost fixed costs fixed inputs marginal cost (MC) marginal revenue (MR) monopoly

perfect competition production function profit revenue variable costs variable inputs

This chapter has illustrated production, costs, revenues, and profit maximization. For each concept and relationship, we considered both graphical explanations and numerical examples. We assumed that businesses choose production to maximize profit and that, as a result, they set it where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.

Summary

1In the next chapter we will see that firms with many competitors see their profits disappear because new firms enter, thereby increasing market supply and lowering the price.

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66 Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue

1. When firms add workers and get more efficient, they are benefiting from a. the division of labor. b. diminishing returns. c. the law of large numbers. d. diminishing marginal utility.

2. When firms add workers and find that the additional workers add less to output than their predecessors did, they are experiencing a. the division of labor. b. diminishing returns. c. the law of large numbers. d. diminishing marginal utility.

3. Suppose a firm has $1,000,000 in fixed costs and variable costs equal to $100; for every unit they produce, a. their marginal costs are decreasing. b. their fixed costs are decreasing. c. their average costs are decreasing. d. the marginal costs are increasing.

4. The average total cost curve will be cut by the marginal cost curve from below as long as a. fixed costs are rising. b. average costs are decreasing. c. marginal costs eventually increase. d. marginal costs continually decrease.

5. Whether marginal revenue is constant or decreasing depends on a. whether the firm is benefiting from the division of labor. b. whether the firm is dealing with diminishing returns. c. how much the firm sells. d. whether the firm faces competition.

6. When a firm chooses to shut down, it is a. making a poor decision because it should always produce where marginal cost equals

marginal revenue. b. making a poor decision because it should always produce where average costs exceed

average revenue. c. making a good decision as long as the price it is getting is less than its average costs. d. making a good decision as long as the price it is getting is less than its average

variable costs. 7. The result that a firm should produce where MC = MR except when the shutdown con-

dition is met is based on the assumption that it is attempting to a. maximize profit. b. maximize market share. c. minimize marginal costs. d. minimize average costs.

Quiz Yourself

1. What key assumption for perfect competition would lead you to believe that fast food is not a perfectly competitive industry? Explain why.

2. Suppose your favorite sports team is losing by an insurmountable score. What does the shutdown condition suggest the team should do? Explain why.

Short Answer Questions

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Summary 67

3. Does raising the price always increase revenue for the firm raising the price? 4. If your college leadership sought your advice on setting tuition, why would it matter if

your college was the only college for miles?

Think about This Why is it that when a firm has no competition it typically must lower the price to all consum- ers in order to sell more? What would have to happen for it to be able to lower the price only to new consumers?

Talk about This We assume that the price to all consumers is the same. List the cases where the price to one person is different from the price to another. Why might a firm do this?

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68

C H A P T E R F I V E

Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Distinguish between perfect competition and monopoly and between normal and economic profit.

LO2 Demonstrate and explain why economic profit disappears under perfect competition but not under monopoly.

LO3 Illustrate why, under perfect competition, the supply curve from Chapter 2 is marginal cost.

Chapter Outline

From Perfect Competition to Monopoly

Supply under Perfect Competition

Summary

This chapter builds on Chapter 4 to describe firms in different competitive situations; it shows why, when there are many firms competing against one another, substantial profits are unsus- tainable; and it concludes by demonstrating why the supply curve from Chapter 2 was upward sloping.

Some firms, such as family farms, are among millions of firms in an industry, whereas other firms completely dominate their industry. In the middle of this continuum are numer- ous firms with definable sets of competitors. Some industries lend themselves to many competitors while others lend themselves to only a few; we explore examples along this continuum.

In Chapter 4 we operated under the assumption that firms were out to maximize profits. What we want to do now is to determine how well various-sized firms will manage. For instance, we may want to know why it is that family farmers cannot seem to make consis- tently high profits, whereas Microsoft can. We approach this by separating profit into two categories: the profit that is necessary for firms to stay in business and the profit that is above that level.

Last, we see that the supply curve laid out in Chapter 2 was indeed upward sloping for a reason. We will show that under perfect competition, an upward-sloping supply curve stems from the check-shaped marginal cost curve from Chapter 4.

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From Perfect Competition to Monopoly 69

From Perfect Competition to Monopoly

As we discussed in Chapter 4, the shape of the marginal revenue curve depends on whether there are many competitors or no competitors. Figure 5.1 lays out these extreme cases. On the left, the cost curves from Figure 4.3 are applied to the marginal revenue curve from the case where there are many competitors. On the right, we see the same for the case where there are no competitors. The amount they pick in each case is labeled Q*. The price they charge is labeled P*.

Perfect Competition The key difference between the cases just outlined is the number of competitors. When the number of competitors is large, the firm (e.g., a dairy farm) simply has to take the market price as given but can sell as many goods as it wants at that price. When there are no competitors, the firm (e.g., Microsoft) can set any price it wants but can sell only the number that consumers want to buy at that price. Of course, not every firm is faced with the stark either–or difference. Some firms (e.g., Exxon) have only a few competitors in markets of similar or identical prod- ucts, and other firms (e.g., McDonald’s) have many competitors in markets where each has its own signature brand.

When a firm faces a large number of competitors, such that no one firm can influence the price, when the good a firm sells is indistinguishable from those its competitor sells, when firms have good sales and cost forecasts, and when there is no legal or economic barrier to its entry into or exit from the market, then we have what economists call perfect competition. This may seem like an odd name given that the best examples of it are of sellers that do not really “compete” in the way noneconomists normally think of “competition.” Whether it is Midwestern grain farmers; Western ranchers; Florida or California vegetable growers; Wis- consin, New York, or California dairy operations; or Georgia peach growers, the common conception of competition does not seem to apply. As individuals, they do not advertise. A conversation with any of these farmers would reveal that their best friends are their neighbor farmers. When one farm’s equipment breaks down or a farmer has a significant health crisis at a critical planting or harvesting time, the neighborhood farmers come to help. That sounds more like cooperation than competition. So why do economists call this “perfect competition” when there does not seem to be any true competition? The reason this is “perfect” goes back to the first characteristic of perfect competition: No one firm has any control over price. No farmers, or any farm product, have any control over the price of their produce when they sell it on the wholesale market.1

P

QQ*

P* P* = MR

ATC AVC

MC

Many competitors

QQ*

P*

P

MR Demand

No competitors

ATC AVC

MC

FIGURE 5.1 Picking the quantity to maximize profit.

1 Though they may be able to charge any price they want at a local farmers’ market, they are not perfect competitors there. In that setting they are one of a few farmers selling that particular produce.

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70 Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit

Monopoly Monopolies exist at the other end of the spectrum, when we have markets in which there is only one firm. The important thing to know about the concept of monopoly is that the exis- tence of many firms does not necessarily mean the firms are in competition. For instance, Consolidated Edison was the exclusive provider of residential electrical power to New York City, and Commonwealth Edison still is the exclusive provider of residential electrical power to Chicago. There are hundreds of power companies in the United States, but very few of them compete with one another. They are not competitors because they cannot sell in another’s area. Another way of looking at this is to say that while there are many power companies, they are not competing in the same market. The reason is that it costs the companies too much to get the electricity to the consumer in the distant market. Just as a cement contractor in Little Rock, Arkansas, is not competing with a cement contractor in Miami for roadwork in south Florida because of transportation costs, electric companies do not compete with one another because they cannot access the same buyers. For monopoly, all that is necessary is that one firm and only one firm sells to the customers in a given market.

Some firms get their monopoly power because the law prevents others from entering the market. An example of a legal barrier to entry is a patent. For example, the manufacturer of Clarinex is the only firm that can produce and sell this drug. On the other hand, some firms get their monopoly power by attaining such a huge size that competing against them is impossible. The frustration that consumers have with monopolies is the lack of choice that results from there being only one seller. While many may understand and accept the lack of choice when the good being sold is a utility with very high fixed costs, and others may understand and ac- cept the need for patents and copyrights to motivate innovation, monopolies where the barriers to entry are simply associated with the size of the one monopolizing company often create anger and frustration. Consider the PC operating system business. Microsoft developed DOS in the early 1980s and various iterations of its Windows operating system after that. There have been at least two operating system genres (IBM’s OS2 and Linux) that were considerably more stable, more secure, and less glitchy than the Windows version against which they at- tempted to compete. Without question, had Microsoft not been the dominant firm when these competitors entered the market, either of these operating systems would have easily beaten Windows to become the preferred platform for personal computing. Because Microsoft had the leading position, it could maintain the position. Whether or not all of Microsoft’s tactics were legal has certainly been questioned, but its ability to keep people buying its products has not. It maintains a dominant position because it has a dominant position.

Monopolistic Competition One of the areas of middle ground is monopolistic competition, in which many firms sell slightly different products. In the fast-food market there are quite a few firms (McDonald’s,

monopolistic competition A situation in a market where there are many firms producing similar but not identical goods.

• A large number of competitors, so that no one firm can influence the price.

• The good a firm sells is indistinguishable from those its competitor sells.

• Firms have good sales and cost forecasts.

• There is no legal or economic barrier to entry into or exit from the market.

C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F P E R F E C T C O M P E T I T I O N

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From Perfect Competition to Monopoly 71

Wendy’s, Burger King, etc., in burgers; KFC, Taco Bell, etc., in various niches), but they do not sell exactly the same good. McDonald’s has a monopoly on the Big Mac and Happy Meal, but its competitors offer many close substitutes. This means that each firm has a monopoly on its particular menu, but the demand curve for the product is quite elastic. (Remember from Chapter 3 that the number of close substitutes determines elasticity.)

Oligopoly Another area of middle ground between perfect competition and monopoly is oligopolistic markets, in which there are very few discernible competitors. In the cell phone business, for example, there are major companies like AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon Wireless. In the soft drink business there are Coke and Pepsi. In some markets firms sell exactly the same thing, whereas in other markets firms sell close substitutes. In either case, firms are acting in oli- gopolistic ways and referred to as oligopolies.

Which Model Fits Reality Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize these market forms by providing examples and distinguishing characteristics of each type. That does not mean we will spend a great deal of time in the issues chapters worrying about market forms. Recall that in Chapter 2 we implicitly assumed that all markets were perfectly competitive. It turns out that very few markets meet the extreme criteria necessary to be labeled perfect competition. Most of the products that meet the criteria of perfect competition are agricultural; few products outside this area can make that claim. It may strike you, then, as somewhat curious that we will assume that most markets are perfectly competitive when we move into the issues. We do this because the supply and demand model is simple enough so that it can be used to explain and describe most markets where there are several competitors and the products are similar. You should understand that your instructor and I (the author) make this simplifying assumption reluctantly but knowingly.

Finally, you should be prepared for a high level of ambiguity in how particular markets fit into these forms. For instance, long-distance telephone service used to be a monopoly, became an oligopoly in the 1980s, and saw significant expansion in the number of companies offering service in the 1990s. Perhaps now it fits best under monopolistic competition. The personal

oligopolistic market A situation in a market where there are very few discernible competitors.

TABLE 5.1 Examples of different market forms. Perfect Competition

Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Monopoly

Agricultural products Fast food Smartphones Operating systems Lumber Clothing Soft drinks Local residential

electric power

TABLE 5.2 Distinguishing characteristics between market forms.

Characteristic Perfect Competition

Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Monopoly

Number of firms Many (often Several* Few* (usually One thousands or two to five) even millions)

Barriers to entry None Few Substantial Insurmountable, at least in the short run

Product Identical Similar but Similar or NA similarity not identical identical

*There is dispute about the line that separates monopolistic competition and oligopoly.

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72 Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit

computer business is similar in that there was only one firm, IBM, for many years, but today there are a dozen or more selling laptops and desktops. They all sell essentially the same thing but have a monopoly over their brand. The smartphone operating system industry is domi- nated by Apple and Google, with the device industry being dominated by HTC, Apple, and Samsung. Similarly, if you want to fly from New York to Los Angeles, you have a number of alternatives, perhaps not so many that it would be perfect competition but certainly enough to classify this service as monopolistic competition. On the other hand, if you want to fly directly from Indianapolis to Atlanta, you have two choices for nonstop flights (Southwest and Delta). If you want to fly directly from Syracuse to Detroit, you have only one choice (Delta). Where airline travel fits depends greatly on to where, and from where, you are traveling. In particular, it depends on who has a hub in the respective airports.

Further, there is no magic line that separates oligopoly from monopolistic competition. Economists who study these things will often look to something called a concentration ratio that measures the percentage of total market sales for the top firms (from 4 firms to 100 firms). So even though there are several tobacco companies selling cigarettes, one company, Philip Morris, holds nearly half the market, and the top four hold all but 1 percent of the market. Sev- eral equally competitive firms would suggest monopolistic competition, but these concentra- tion ratio data suggest that oligopoly may be a better fit. Table 5.3 presents 4-, 8-, and 50-firm concentration ratios for specific industries.

Another index that economists, particularly those in the antitrust division of the Depart- ment of Justice, use is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Instead of just adding together the market shares of the largest firms, this adds the square of the market shares. What that does is distinguish a market where five firms have equal shares from one in which the big firm has a large proportion of sales and the others simply split the rest. If the market share is between 0 and 100 percent and there are N firms, the HHI ranges between 10,000/N and 10,000. A number between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered moderately concentrated while an index value greater than 1,800 is considered highly concentrated. The index value for break- fast cereals is above 2,500 and the one for cellular service is so high that the census bureau (that regularly published the statistics) must suppress the actual number to “protect the iden- tity of any business. . . .” Essentially the industry is so concentrated that reporting how much provides the largest businesses information on others.

concentration ratio A measure of the market power held by the top firms in an industry. For a specific number of firms (n), it is the per- centage of total sales in the industry accounted for by top n firms.

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index A measure of market concentration developed by adding the sum of squared market shares.

TABLE 5.3 Concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for various industries, 2012.

Concentration Ratios

Industry Group 4 Largest Firms 8 Largest Firms 50 Largest Firms Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

Breakfast cereals 79.2 93.7 100.0 2,332.5 Ice cream 45.9 64.6 94.0 665.8 Beer 87.8 90.8 95.9 3,560.7 Wine 45.3 58.0 75.2 785.3 Clothing 10.3 15.0 38.3 54.0 Computers and peripherals 31.5 46.0 80.6 421.9 Furniture 23.7 30.9 52.8 233.7 Automobile manufacturing 60.2 88.7 99.7 1,177.90 Cellular service 89.1 95.2 98.8 *

*This industry is so concentrated that the Census Bureau cannot report exactly how concentrated it is because doing so would provide competing firms with sales information of their individual competitors.

Not published for service providers.

Source: United States Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov/ ID: EC1251SSSZ6.

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Supply under Perfect Competition 73

Supply under Perfect Competition

Normal versus Economic Profit Let’s return to the example we used in Chapter 4: the business of selling memory chips. If we are one of many firms competing in this industry, it stands to reason that making money will be difficult. Because of our assumption of free entry into and exit from this market, any time there are abnormally large profits, other firms will want to start making memory chips. Remember that Chapter 2 presented evidence that an increase in the number of sellers will move the supply curve to the right, thus lowering market price. If that happens, our marginal revenue curve will fall. As a matter of fact, it will fall all the way to where profit is normal. Normal profit is the level of profit that business owners could get in their next best alternative investment. The next best alternative would be whatever investment an owner would choose if he or she decided to go out of business. Any profit above normal profit is called economic profit.

If business owners do not make their normal profit, they will quit the business and move into another. This means that we might think of normal profit as the salary the business owners pay themselves and, as such, part of the “cost of doing business.” If they make less than normal profit, then the salary they can pay themselves is too low to keep them in the industry. On the other hand, if profits are routinely more than that, others will want to enter the industry. This means that in the long run profit will shrink to normal levels.

When and Why Economic Profits Go to Zero Fortunately for our chip maker, although the firm cannot make long-run economic profits, it is not going to lose money for long either. When firms lose more money than their fixed costs, they shut down. In the short run firms will continue to produce when they lose less than their fixed costs, but as time passes these firms will also want to shut down. So, though our chip maker can make economic profit in the short run and lose money in the short run, the effect of free entry and exit in this market will cause the marginal revenue curve to settle at

normal profit The level of profit that business owners could get in their next best alternative investment.

economic profit Any profit above normal profit.

A nearly perfect example of the importance of entry and exit in ex- plaining why and when economic profits go to zero is the crude oil industry and the experience from 2014 to 2016. Prior to mid-2014, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, though invented, hadn’t had a dramatic impact on world oil supplies. Because of that, OPEC countries had tight control over supplies and the market was largely oligopolistic (with OPEC operating like one enormously powerful firm and few other large producers). The benefits to them were high prices and enormous profits. Further, without the new technology, those high prices and profits could not generate profit-killing entry.

Starting in August of 2014, that technology created a boom in production levels. North Dakota’s production took off and once-idled

oil fields in Texas and Oklahoma resumed production. The result was a dramatic decline in crude prices. From $107 per barrel in mid- 2014, to below $30 per barrel in early 2016, the economic profit was completely wrung out of the industry. Economic losses replaced economic profits. Exit started to occur as firms ceased production from unprofitable wells.

When entry is possible, as it is now in oil, economic profits mo- tivate it. When production increases too much, economic losses motivate exit. When entry is impossible, economic profits can go on forever—a state of the world that OPEC nations can now only look back upon as their “good old days.”

A N E A R LY P E R F E C T E X A M P L E O F T H E I M P O R T A N C E O F E N T R Y A N D E X I T

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74 Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit

the minimum of the U-shaped average total cost. What this means in everyday English is that any short-run profit or loss will evaporate in the long run because new competitors will come in or old ones will leave. This will drive the price toward the minimum of average total cost where profit is normal.

Though profit also shrinks to its normal level under monopolistic competition, there is no mechanism for profits to shrink to normal levels under oligopoly or monopoly. This is because the mechanism that shrinks profit is entry. Because entry is almost insurmountable under monopoly and substantially difficult under oligopoly, new firms do not come in to put the pressure on the price to fall.

At this point we need to back off our discussion to define more explicitly what economists mean by short run and long run. To an economist the distinction between the two centers on the ability of a firm to change its fixed inputs. We have assumed all along that we cannot change things like plant and equipment, and this is true in what we call the short run. In the long run there is enough time to change plant and equipment. We can either buy more plant and more equipment, or we can sell what we have. The distinction is thus not one of time but of flexibility; in the long run we are more flexible and in the short run less flexible.

Why Supply Is Marginal Cost under Perfect Competition Showing that, under perfect competition, supply and marginal cost are interchangeable is important for several of the issues that follow, but it is also notoriously difficult. That is why we will go back to the three approaches used in Chapter 4. We’ll do the “Just Words,” and “Numerical Example” approaches first and end with the “Graphical Explanation.”

Just Words In order to see that, under perfect competition, supply and marginal cost are interchangeable, you need to recall two key facts from Chapter 4: (1) All profit-maximizing firms will choose to produce where marginal cost equals marginal revenue (as long as price is greater than average variable cost); and (2) under perfect competition price and marginal revenue are the same. With that in your head, imagine that a firm is trying to decide how much to produce. It will take the price that is given to it by the market (which is also the firm’s marginal revenue) and set produc- tion where that price equals its marginal cost. If the price rises or falls, it will do the calculation again. In every case, the quantity at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost is the same as the quantity at which price equals marginal cost. That means that in every case the relationship between quantity produced and the marginal cost of producing it (the marginal cost curve) is the same as the relationship between the quantity produced and the price at which it is sold (the supply curve). So, under perfect competition, supply and marginal cost are interchangeable.

Numerical Example Using the memory chips example again, you can see from Table 4.2 that the average variable cost reaches a minimum at $15 per unit at the quantity of 500 units. This is important because at any price below $15 the firm will choose not to produce. To see that, suppose the price were $12 per unit. Marginal cost equals marginal revenue ($12) at 400 units, but at 400 units the firm’s total revenue will be $4,800 ($12 × 400) while its total cost will be $14,500, and it will lose more money ($9,700 = $14,500 − $4,800) than it would if it simply shut down ($8,500).

At every price above $15 the firm either makes money or at least loses less than $8,500, and therefore it makes sense for the firm to produce where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. If the price were exactly $15, the firm would produce 500 units, have $7,500 ($15 × 500) in total revenue, $16,000 in total cost, and lose exactly its fixed costs. If the price were $20, the

short run The period of time where a firm cannot change things like plant and equipment.

long run The period of time where a firm can change things like plant and equipment.

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Supply under Perfect Competition 75

firm would produce 600 units, bringing $12,000 in revenue while costing $18,000, and the loss is $6,000. The firm would rather lose $6,000 than $8,500, so it produces 600 units.

As the price rises to $30, it produces 700 units, has both revenue and cost of $21,000, and breaks even. At a price of $45 it produces 800 units, has revenue of $36,000, costs of $25,500, and makes a profit. At a price of $55 it produces 900 units, has revenue of $49,500, costs of $31,000, and its profit increases. Finally, at a price of $100, it produces 1,000, has revenue of $100,000, costs of $41,000, and its profit increases further. Putting it all together, the firm’s supply curve is its marginal cost curve (out of the minimum of average variable cost) because it sets production by noting the price and using the marginal cost figure to set production. Therefore, the relationship between its marginal cost and its production (its marginal cost curve) is the same as the relationship between the price it will receive and its production (its supply curve).

Graphical Explanation Figure 5.2 shows our ATC-AVC-MC cost curve diagram with four potential marginal revenue curves. For each, if there is pressure on the price to change in the short run, this is indicated with a short arrow in the direction of the pressure. If there is long-run pressure, this is indi- cated with a long arrow. At the first price–marginal revenue, MR1, the loss is so big that firms want to leave in both the short and the long run. This will reduce the number of sellers and the market price will rise in both the short run and the long run. At MR2 the chip maker is losing money but not enough for it to close down. So, though the firm does not want to shut down in the short run, it will want to shut down rather than invest money in new equipment as the old equipment wears out. Therefore, the long-run pressure is for the price to rise. At MR4 our chip maker is making an economic profit. If this happens, others will want to join the chip-making industry and there will be short- and long-run pressure for the price to fall. It is only when the price is at MR3 that there is no pressure on the price.

Now to why under perfect competition a firm’s supply curve is its marginal cost curve out of the minimum of its average variable cost. In Figure 5.3 the arrows from Figure 5.2 have been taken away and the points where the firm will produce are indicated by a dot. These points appear where marginal cost crosses marginal revenue, a circumstance that will come about only if firms do not shut down.

MR1

MR2

MR3

MR4

MC

ATC

AVC

P

Q

FIGURE 5.2 In perfect competition the market price is under pressure to move to where economic profit is zero.

MR1

MR2

MR3

MR4

MC

ATC

AVC

P

Q

FIGURE 5.3 Points where MC = MR in perfect competition.

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76 Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit

This chapter built on the previous one in which costs and revenues were defined and illus- trated. We saw the distinction between perfect competition and monopoly and that they are the endpoints of a continuum. We said that most markets operate somewhere in the middle of this continuum. Further, we distinguished between normal and economic profit, and showed why economic profit disappears under perfect competition but not under monopoly. Last, we saw that under perfect competition, the supply curve from Chapter 2 is the part of the check- shaped marginal cost curve from Chapter 4 that is above average variable cost and is therefore upward sloping.

Summary

Key Terms concentration ratio economic profit Herfindahl-Hirschman

Index

long run monopolistic

competition 

normal profit oligopolistic market short run

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

The Economics of Prescription Drugs

Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping

The Economics of K–12 Education

Energy Prices Unions Walmart: Always Low

Prices (and Low Wages)—Always

The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling

In our final manipulation of the figure we get one of the most important implications of perfect competition. Connecting the dots of Figure 5.3 makes clear the relationship between the price of the chips our firm is selling and the number of chips our firm is willing to produce. If that sounds familiar, it is because that is exactly the definition of supply. As a result we now know that sup- ply, under perfect competition, is marginal cost out of the minimum of average variable cost. This, of course, also demonstrates why the supply curve is upward sloping: Mar- ginal cost is increasing.

Although more difficult to show than it is worth, it is important to state that there is no supply curve under monopolistic competition, oligopoly, or monopoly. To understand the reason, note that Figure 5.4 generates the supply curve by finding the production levels with a variety of different prices. Recall from Figure 4.4 that these horizontal price lines also represent perfectly elastic demand curves for a particular firm’s output. This same derivation does not work for the other market forms because the elasticity of demand for a firm’s output is not perfectly elastic and demand curves of different elasticities result in different profit-maximizing firm output.

MC

Supply

ATC

AVC

P

Q

FIGURE 5.4 Derivation of supply: marginal cost out of the minimum of average variable cost.

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Summary 77

1. An industry in which there are many competitors with specific marketing niches is likely to be characterized by a. monopoly. b. oligopoly. c. monopolistic competition. d. perfect competition.

2. An industry in which there are a very limited number of large firms is likely to be char- acterized by a. monopoly. b. oligopoly. c. monopolistic competition. d. perfect competition.

3. Owing to its usefulness and relative simplicity, the supply and demand model is often used a. because nearly every major industry in the United States is governed by perfect

competition. b. because nearly every major industry in the United States is governed by monopoly. c. even though, strictly speaking, few industries in the United States are governed by

perfect competition. d. even though it has no connection to economic reality.

4. Whether a firm stays in business or shuts down depends heavily on the concept of a. economic profit. b. actual profit. c. market share. d. concentration ratios.

5. Economic theory would suggest that the profitability of an industry would be a. directly related to the number of firms competing in the industry. b. inversely related to the number of firms competing in the industry. c. unrelated to the number of firms competing in the industry. d. zero in the long run, regardless of market structure.

6. Under perfect competition, the supply curve is a. the marginal cost curve for all price quantity combinations. b. the marginal cost curve, but only that portion that is downward sloping. c. the marginal cost curve, but only that portion that is upward sloping. d. the marginal cost curve, but only that portion that is above the minimum of average

variable cost. 7. An indicator of the degree of competition in an industry is the concentration ratio. It measures

a. the percentage of sales in the industry by the largest firms. b. the percentage of profit in the industry by the smallest firms. c. the sales in the industry as a percentage of all consumption in the United States. d. the profitability of the industry.

8. Local telephone service was once an area in which consumers had no choices. Many young people today no longer use “landlines,” preferring instead to use their cell phones. This means that the market has moved toward a. monopoly. b. oligopoly. c. perfect competition. d. monopsony.

Quiz Yourself

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78 Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit

1. Imagine an owner of a firm is thinking about raising prices. Describe the consequences of doing so as a monopolist, oligopolist, monopolistic competitor, and perfect competitor.

2. What are the key differences between monopolistic competition and perfect competition? 3. Describe why there is pressure on the price to fall when P > ATC. Is there a long- and

short-run distinction in the answer? 4. Describe why there is pressure on the price to fall when P < ATC. Is there a long- and

short-run distinction in the answer?

Think about This One of the concerns about Walmart’s entry into the grocery business in the latter part of the 1990s was that it would set low prices, drive little stores out of business, and then raise prices to monopoly levels when it had no competition. That hasn’t happened, but that doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen. Under what conditions, and in what industries, might such a strategy work?

Talk about This List the monopolies that used to exist when you were growing up that are now facing increased competition. Compare that list to a list provided by your instructor (who is presumably older than you). What current monopolies are likely to be threatened with entry in the future?

Behind the Numbers Concentration ratios for largest 4, 8, and 50 firms in various industries— www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html

9. In a diagram of perfect competition, the marginal revenue line moves up and down when there is exit and entry, respectively, because a. the market demand for the good rises and falls when there is exit and entry,

respectively. b. the market demand for the good rises and falls when there is entry and exit,

respectively. c. the market supply for the good rises and falls when there is exit and entry,

respectively. d. the market supply for the good rises and falls when there is entry and exit,

respectively. 10. If MR > MC, then when an additional unit is sold, the firm’s

a. profit will be positive. b. profit will increase. c. profit will be negative. d. profit will decrease.

Short Answer Questions

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79

C H A P T E R S I X

Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Define the basic vocabulary of macro economics.

LO2 Describe how the economy is measured.

LO3 Describe how gross domestic product, our national measure of output, is calculated.

LO4 Calculate inflation using a price index.

LO5 Describe real gross domestic product as the inflation-adjusted value of economic activity and judge its use as the measure of the economy’s health.

LO6 Describe how unemployment is measured and enumerate the types of unemployment that economists recognize.

LO7 Define and apply the vocabulary of the business cycle.

Chapter Outline

Measuring the Economy

Real Gross Domestic Product and Why It Is Not Synonymous with Social Welfare

Measuring and Describing Unemployment

Productivity

Seasonal Adjustment

Business Cycles

Kick It Up a Notch: National Income and Product Accounting

Summary

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80 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

We shift gears now to talk about the economy as a whole rather than the consumption or pro- duction of specific goods. What we covered in Chapters 2 through 5 is called microeconomics, because it deals with individual markets and firms. The prefix micro, meaning small, applies here because of the narrow scope of microeconomics. The opposite prefix, macro, means large, so macroeconomics deals with the economy as a whole. When you read or hear “eco- nomic news” you more often than not get macroeconomic news. In that context you hear the same words over and over again. This chapter attempts to define and explain the vocabulary of macroeconomics.

We begin the chapter by examining the methods by which we measure the macroeconomy. In that process we define and explain gross domestic product, inflation, and how and why the gross domestic product is adjusted for inflation. We move from there to explain how un- employment is measured, and we finish with a discussion of the business cycle. You will see that all of these economic measures have flaws that economists recognize and study and that, though real gross domestic product is an accepted measure of the economy’s health, it is not a perfect measure of our nation’s overall health.

This is by far the most easily understood chapter of all the theory chapters, but you should make sure that you understand the terms and the concepts behind them thoroughly. Chapter 8 and the more macro-oriented issues chapters rely on them heavily.

Measuring the Economy

Measuring Nominal Output To keep tabs on how well or how poorly the economy is doing, we measure economic ac- tivity by adding up the dollar value of all of the goods and services produced for final sale in the United States in a year. The gross domestic product (GDP) is the primary measure of the health of the economy, and some important concepts within this definition need to be highlighted:

1. This measure is a dollar measure that is subject to price variability. 2. Only “final” sales are counted. 3. The goods that are studied must be goods produced within the United States.

The fact that the GDP is influenced by changes in prices must be dealt with at length, but this discussion must be delayed until we explore inflation at length. Moreover, besides infla- tion, two other fairly straightforward issues should be addressed. The first of these is the issue of double-counting intermediate sales; the second is how to count the production of multi- national companies.

To avoid the double-counting of certain economic activity, only final sales are counted. Suppose that you are talking about the production and sale of two loaves of bread. Suppose the first loaf is produced by a woman who grows and grinds the wheat, mixes the dough, bakes the loaf, and sells it all by herself. Suppose another loaf begins with a farmer who grows the wheat and sells it to a miller, who grinds it into flour and sells the flour to a baker, who mixes the dough, bakes the loaf, and sells the loaf to a retailer, who sells the loaf to a customer. If both loaves are of equal quality, then both should be sold for the same price: say, one dollar. Clearly both loaves contribute the same to the amount of bread available to society, so both should count the same when we measure economic activity. If you summed all sales along the way, however, the second loaf would count more than the first.

The other aspect of this measure is that it counts production only if it takes place within the borders of the United States. This means the Fords produced in Mexico are not counted in the U.S. GDP, but the Hondas produced in Ohio are.

microeconomics The part of the disci- pline of economics that deals with individual markets and firms.

macroeconomics The part of the disci- pline of economics that deals with the economy as a whole.

gross domestic product (GDP) The dollar value of all of the goods and serv- ices produced for final sale in the United States in a year.

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Measuring the Economy 81

The actual computation of the GDP is done in two distinct ways. One way is to count all those things for which people pay money. This is called the expenditures approach. The expen- ditures approach adds up all of the following: consumption, investment, government spending on goods and services, and exports; then it subtracts imports. The other approach, which counts all those ways in which people earn money, is called the income approach. This approach adds up employee compensation, interest, rents, profits, and depreciation and then subtracts income earned in other countries and indirect business taxes (such as sales taxes). Both approaches yield the same result because the money that the buyer “spends” is, by definition, the seller’s “income.” Therefore, adding up everyone’s income and everyone’s spending yields the same sum.

The sources that the government uses to compute this information are wide and varied. They are known as the National Income and Product Accounts, and compiling them is com- plicated and time-consuming. For instance, while the government knows quickly and reliably how much it spends on goods and services, nearly every other piece of information included in the GDP has to come from forms that businesses send to the government: tax forms, un- employment insurance forms, reports of sales and sales taxes, and other documentation. It is therefore obvious, but it warrants noting, that trying to produce the final GDP quickly is difficult. What actually happens is that government economists use sampling techniques to produce preliminary estimates that are repeatedly updated as more information is submitted. When all information is in, sometimes more than a year after the first preliminary estimate is made, a final GDP value is published.1

1 Even then, some components are estimates.

Measuring Prices and Inflation As we said in the previous section, measuring price changes is important. Whether price changes account for changes in the GDP or whether actual production changes account for those changes is vital to the question of whether we are better off in one period than we were

H O W D O E S I T C O U N T I N G D P ?

Issue How It Counts in GDP (C + I + G + X − M)

A product made in one year but sold a later year

GDP counts the value of the product made but not yet sold as an increase to business INVESTMENT (I), of which inventories are a part. So if it is made in December, investment goes up. When it is sold, investment drops but either CONSUMPTION (C) or EXPORTS (X) goes up. Typically a good goes into inventories at its wholesale value so when it is sold, the increase in consumption or exports is greater than the decrease in inventories.

A used car is sold The only part of a used car sale that counts is the markup from its purchase price from the previous owner to the sale to the next owner. That is the value the used car dealer created in cleaning and preparing the car for sale.

Stock sold in a stock market

Personal investment and business investment are two different things. It is only when a business uses the sale of (initial public offering) stock to raise money to buy equipment and inventory that there is any crossover.

How illegal drug sales are counted

The simple fact is they aren’t, and it isn’t because they shouldn’t be. Only recorded sales that are part of the system of business reporting to state and federal governments count.

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82 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

in a previous period. A GDP number that increases because prices rise is less desirable than a GDP that increases because people are actually buying products in greater quantities. For instance, let’s make the simplifying assumption that there is only one good in society, cheese, we produce 10 trillion tons of cheese in one year, and cheese is sold at a price of $1/ton. That is vastly better than if we produce only one ton of cheese and it is sold at a price of $10  trillion. Clearly, to discuss the value of production we have to discuss how we measure prices.

The way that government economists measure prices is intricate. Under their direction, employees of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) go shopping for a market basket of goods and services in an effort to see if the total cost of that market basket has changed in the cur- rent year from what it was in the previous year. To do this they have to establish what should go into that market basket through a process of figuring out what average people buy and in what quantities they buy it. This market basket then makes up a kind of “grocery list” of things that government employees go out and find prices on. With the rapid expansion of available products, the BLS has recently chosen to update the market basket every two years. Their old practice of updating the market basket only every 10 years led to significant problems.2

The “list” of items for which government employees go out every month to find prices is very specific, not only indicating what model number or UPC code to look for but also specifying stores in which the goods need to be located. Frequently, especially with electronic equipment, the item that the employee is supposed to find no longer exists or no longer exists at the specified store. In that case employees must use their best judgment to find a suitable substitute and record key attributes of the good.3

For each month for which the list is in effect, including the first month of the first year, called the base year, Bureau of Labor Statistics employees find the prices of everything on the list. When they finish, a national average is computed. The result constitutes the first key piece of information necessary to compute future inflation: It is the national average of the total cost of the market basket. It is called the price of the market basket in the base year. In succeeding months a revised national average is generated on the basis of new information on prices.

To use this information to measure any inflation that may have arisen in any given year, we have to go through three distinct steps: 1. We find the price of the market basket in the relevant years. 2. We compute a price index for the relevant years. 3. We compute the percentage of change in the relevant price indices.

After arriving at the price of the market basket in the base year, we also have to get the price of the market basket in any of the other years in question. For instance, if you ultimately wanted to know the inflation rate for 2015, you would need the price of the market basket in the base year, 1998, the price of the market basket at the beginning of 2015, and finally the price of the market basket at the beginning of 2016.

Next, a price index, which centers the price of the market basket around 100, is computed for the beginning of 2015 and 2016. For instance, the consumer price index (CPI) for 2015 is

CPI in 2015 = Price of the market basket in 2015 __________________________________________ Price of the market basket in the base year of 1998 × 100

market basket Goods that average people buy and the quantities they buy them in.

base year Year to which all other prices are compared.

price of the market basket in the base year National average of the total cost of the market basket.

price index A device that centers the price of the market basket around 100.

consumer price index (CPI) The price index based on what average consumers buy.

3 The BLS then constructs a “hedonic price” for these goods. A hedonic price is an educated guess at what the price of the original good would have been given its characteristics. The BLS constructs hedonic prices for clothes dryers, microwave ovens, refrigerators, camcorders, consumer audio products, DVD players, and college textbooks.

2 In 1996, the Boskin Commission established that measuring inflation the original way overstated the true inflation rate by 1.1 percentage points. In response to this criticism and in recognition of these problems, the Bureau of Labor Statistics corrected some of these flaws by going to a two-year cycle on market basket updates.

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Measuring the Economy 83

This formula can be interpreted to mean that in the base year the CPI is 100. At other times, as prices rise, the CPI will rise above 100. If prices eventually become twice what they were in the base year, the CPI will be 200.

The last step is to compute the percentage change in the price index. To do this, you take the CPI at the beginning of the year and the CPI at the beginning of the next year and plug them into the formula

Inflation during 2015 = CPI on January 1, 2016 − CPI on January 1, 2015 CPI on January 1, 2015

× 100%

As a practical matter the CPI is important for another reason. For economists it is important because it is used to generate not only an inflation rate, the percentage increase in the CPI, but also the cost-of-living adjustment, or COLA. This adjustment compensates people for the fact that changes in inflation also change the spending power of their income. For social security recipients and others on pensions that pay a COLA, as well as union members with contracts that are tied to a COLA, this represents the extra income they get each year to compensate them for inflation.4 Table 6.1 presents a historical picture of the CPI.

Problems Measuring Inflation We now have a measure of inflation that gives us helpful information on how the total price of a given market basket changes. For several reasons, however, it does not do a very good job in measuring the true impact of inflation. The first way in which the CPI can estimate inflation inaccurately derives from the two-year period between changes in the market basket. Specifically, large price decreases that occur in the first two years after the introduction of a product are ignored. For instance, the iPhone was originally marketed for $600 and two years after its introduction sold for less than $200 at Walmart. When the market basket updates were

inflation rate The percentage increase in the consumer price index.

cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) A device that compen- sates people for the fact that changes in inflation change the spending power of their income.

Year CPI Inflation Rate (%) Year CPI

Inflation Rate (%) Year CPI

Inflation Rate (%)

1920 19.4 1988 120.7 4.4 2002 181.8 2.5 1930 16.1 1989 126.3 4.6 2003 185.5 2.0 1940 14.1 1990 134.2 6.3 2004 191.7 3.3 1950 25.0 1991 138.2 3.0 2005 198.1 3.3 1960 29.8 1992 142.3 3.0 2006 203.1 2.5 1970 39.8 1993 146.3 2.8 2007 211.4 4.1 1980 86.4 12.4 1994 150.1 2.6 2008 211.4 0.0 1981 94.1 8.9 1995 153.9 2.5 2009 217.4 2.8 1982 97.7 3.8 1996 159.1 3.4 2010 220.5 1.4 1983 101.4 3.8 1997 161.8 1.7 2011 227.1 3.0 1984 105.5 4.0 1998 164.4 1.6 2012 231.1 1.8 1985 109.5 3.8 1999 168.8 2.7 2013 234.7 1.5 1986 110.8 1.2 2000 174.6 3.4 2014 236.3 0.7 1987 115.6 4.3 2001 177.4 1.6 2015 237.8 0.7

Note: CPI is year-end figure. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (Series ID: CUSR000SA0)

TABLE 6.1 CPI and inflation in selected years, 1920–2015; base years 1982–1984.

4 Social Security uses the end of June CPI to compute the COLA. By law, Social Security checks to individuals cannot fall, which means that if prices fall, the Social Security Administration simply does not increase benefits until the CPI rises to above its previous higher level. Because the June 2008 to June 2009 CPI fell and because the June 2010 level did not rise to the June 2008 level, Social Security recipients received no COLA for two years. The same thing happened in 2015 when plummeting gasoline prices held the CPI down so much that overall inflation was zero.

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84 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

on a 10-year cycle, VCRs, personal computers, cell phones, DVD players, iPods, flat-screen TVs, and TiVo boxes/DVRs did not come into the market basket until several years after their introduction. In all of these cases large price decreases and significant quality improvements occurred long before their inclusion. Flat-screen TVs used to be priced at more than $10,000 and can be found now for less than $300. Though the CPI methodology will eventually pick up the final fall in prices once they are included, it will fail to pick up the initial drop in price.

The second way in which the CPI may assess inflation inaccurately relates to quality im- provements in electronics, which may occur so quickly that by the end of the final year of the market basket, the good that was originally included no longer exists. The best example of this is the personal computer. Recognizing this, in 2006 the BLS began to adjust for quality improvements in certain goods.

Third, people have significantly changed the places in which they buy goods. For instance, in the 1950s television sets were, by and large, purchased in department stores or small appli- ance stores. Although the personal service customers received during this period undoubtedly exceeded the level of service we now get at large discount stores or warehouse clubs, the price we pay when we make our purchases at discount stores is also much lower. Today we buy from stores where service is low but prices are also very low. If you remember, the government em- ployees who go looking at prices do so at the specific stores designated at the beginning of the life of the market basket. Because they change the store to match consumer behavior only when they change the market basket, they may fail to capture a significant source of price decreases. In this way, the BLS has lagged behind actual behavior regarding Internet shopping.

Fourth, when prices change dramatically people look for substitutes. Because the market basket is fixed for a two-year period, it is implicitly assumed that people mindlessly buy ex- actly the same amount of everything, every period, regardless of prices. This is surely a silly assumption for economists to make, given that much of Chapter 2 was devoted to how people react to price changes. For an example of how failing to account for substitution can overstate the effects of an increase in the price of one good, consider energy prices. In 2008, gasoline

An interesting aspect of inflation is that it creates its own set of winners and losers. People living on fixed incomes will be highly sensitive to inflation, and because people who borrow money are paying it back with dollars that are less valuable than  the money they borrowed, both they and the lending in- stitutions from whom they borrow will have a stake in the rate of inflation.

Anyone receiving a fixed amount of money per month or per year through an investment or having a fixed amount of cash that they must stretch over a long period of time will be unambiguously hurt by inflation. They will see their buying power drop incremen- tally over time. To see how important that is, suppose a 65-year-old new retiree sets up an annuity so that she gets $20,000 a year until she dies. If she lives 20 additional years and inflation is run- ning at 5 percent per year, the buying power of that money will be 62 percent lower. Even if inflation is running at a modest 2 percent per year, her buying power will be 33 percent lower. While good financial planners will account  for this when setting up such

annuities for their clients, retirees who forgo investment advice can get caught in this trap.

In the arena of borrowing and lending there are also winners and losers. Here the important question is not necessarily whether there is inflation but whether inflation is greater than was expected by the respective parties. If inflation is greater than was expected when the interest rate on the loan was established, then borrowers are winners because they are paying the loan back using less valu- able dollars than they anticipated. If borrowers are the winners, then lenders are clearly the losers in that they are receiving less valuable dollars in return. Of course, each “dollar” is still worth a dollar, but with inflation running above expectations, each dollar buys less than it was expected to be able to buy when the loan was set up.

On the other hand, if inflation runs less than was expected, the lender is the winner and the borrower is the loser. The borrower is paying the loan back with dollars that have more spending power than they were anticipated to have and the lender is receiving those more valuable dollars.

I N F L A T I O N ’ S W I N N E R S A N D L O S E R S

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Measuring the Economy 85

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Because inflation is damaging to an economy and extreme inflation can be very dangerous, the Federal Reserve Board keeps close tabs on it. As we will see in Chapters 8 and 12, the Fed, for short, adjusts short- term interest rates to keep inflation in check. If you look behind the numbers of the CPI you find that it is highly variable. That is why the Fed looks at two more stable price indices. Both are called the core rates because they eliminate the impact of highly volatile food and energy prices. The core CPI is based on the traditional CPI, while the core PCE strips out the costs

of food and energy from a different price index, called the Personal Consumption Expenditures deflator. You can see from Figure 6.1 that the core CPI and the core PCE are much more stable than the CPI itself. Because the Fed does not want to overreact to rapid changes in volatile sectors, it focuses its attention on these core measures.

Finally, there is also an index of input items for firms, called the Producer Price Index. It is often useful as a look ahead at what inflation will be in a few months as firms turn those inputs into goods that they sell.

prices climbed from $2 per gallon to more than $4.20 per gallon. Many people sold their SUVs and bought more fuel-efficient cars, or simply drove less.

In response to this criticism and in recognition of these problems, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began an effort to correct some of these flaws. First, as mentioned above, they make an explicit effort to account for the consumer electronics quality problem. Second, they now reestablish the market basket every 2 years rather than every 10 years. This allows for new goods to enter the market basket much more quickly and have at least a portion of the initial drops in price count. It also allows the BLS to account for substitution between goods when there are long-term changes in prices, such as the increase in gas prices that began in 1998 and culminated in $4.20 gasoline in 2008. This chain-based index represents progress as far as economists are concerned.

chain-based index A price index based on an annually adjusted market basket.

core CPI The consumer price index that has had the impact of food and energy costs removed.

core PCE The Personal Con- sumption Expenditures deflator that has had the impact of food and energy costs removed.

Personal Consumption Expenditures deflator A chain-based price index that adjusts for the substitution problem.

Producer Price Index A price index based on what firms buy.

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86 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

Still, these efforts have not solved the problem entirely. In a summary of the issues, David Lebow and Jeremy Rudd reported that the degree of error in the consumer price index has been cut to less than a percentage point. Though better than before, their 0.8 percentage point estimate for the overstatement is significant. Over the course of 30 years, tax brackets and CPI-adjusted benefits will be overadjusted by 27 percent.

Real Gross Domestic Product and Why It Is Not Synonymous with Social Welfare

Real Gross Domestic Product Having examined inflation and how it is measured, we can now come back to gross domestic product. As we said, one of the concerns with GDP measurement is that changes in prices can  affect the GDP just as easily as changes in output. To cleanse our GDP measure of the price changes, we use a price index called a GDP deflator (GDPDEF). This inflation-adjusted mea- sure of GDP is called the real gross domestic product (RGDP). Real GDP is computed by taking current production of goods and services and multiplying those by their previous year prices and then adding these up across different goods and services. The current production of new goods and services is then added to this figure. This process is different from that which creates the CPI in that the market basket changes from year to year so the choice of a base year is somewhat arbitrary. Still, it allows for a comparison of total production from one year to the next while eliminating the effects of inflation. Further, many economists feel more comfortable computing inflation using the GDP deflator approach (which is the annual percentage increase in the GDP deflator) than the CPI approach (which is the annual percentage increase in the CPI). Figure 6.2 shows the trajectory of real GDP since World War II using 2009 as the base year.

Problems with Real GDP Even with its adjustments, real GDP does not do everything right. Besides having the GDP deflator suffer from many of the problems that the CPI suffers from, real GDP has several other problems.

First, it does not give your mother or father much credit. When either one does things around the house—laundry, cooking, yard work, and the like—the value created in the process is not

GDP deflator (GDPDEF) The price index used to adjust GDP for infla- tion, including all goods rather than a market basket.

real gross domestic product (RGDP) An inflation-adjusted measure of GDP.

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FIGURE 6.2 Post–World War II real gross domestic product by quarter, billions of 2009 dollars.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov

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Measuring and Describing Unemployment 87

counted in GDP. It is not counted because it is not sold. Much work gets done and much value is created without sales. I, for instance, installed a large wooden fence around my backyard. Had I gotten a contractor to do it, it would have cost $8,000. Since I built it myself, it cost only $3,000 for supplies and the GDP missed as much as $5,000 of the value that was created.

Second, real GDP does not see that leisure is valuable. If we all worked ourselves to the bone and never took days off, we would cause GDP to rise, but we would be worse off for it. Clearly, in a fully employed society, people who retire voluntarily reduce GDP by the amount of work they would have done. Just as clearly, people retire voluntarily because they are happier fishing, golfing, lollygagging, or volunteering than working.

Third, what people buy is not considered important in the computation of GDP. The sub- stantial increase in government spending on homeland security that resulted from the terrorist attacks of 2001 and beyond was quite likely necessary given the threat, but we are not better off as a society for having to spend this money. We spend it in an attempt to re-create the old sense of security. Spending more money on something that used to require less does not make us better off.

Fourth, the population of the United States is always growing. If real GDP does not grow at the rate that the population does, then the per capita real GDP (the inflation-adjusted goods and services going to the average person) will fall.

Fifth, we can sacrifice environmental quality of life for economic gain, but again we would not necessarily be better off. There is untapped crude oil under the coral reefs off the coast of Florida and under the vast tundra of northern Alaska. As the summer of 2010 made clear, drilling for oil in environmentally sensitive areas comes at a cost. When the process of “fracking” opened up vast quantities of natural gas for use throughout western Pennsylvania in 2008–2011, GDP was clearly and positively affected. In 2012, President Obama rejected the path of the Keystone pipeline and was criticized by Republicans for doing so. Their argument was that he was con- straining GDP. In both cases, both sides are essentially correct. More drilling does increase GDP and reducing that new drilling does decrease GDP, but in both cases those concerned for the environment have a serious point. If the environmental concerns expressed turn out to be valid, this increase in GDP should be offset by the impact on the environment. No one in the govern- ment makes this adjustment. We would increase real GDP if we pumped this oil and gas, but the price of doing so would have to include its impact on the environment.

Sixth, just as the laundry and yard work your parents do does not count because the service does not get sold in a market, goods or services sold under the table do not get counted either. The illegal drugs that people buy do not get recorded anywhere. Similarly, if you mowed lawns or babysat as a teenager, it is unlikely you reported any of that income to the government. If you do not report the income on your taxes and your employer does not either, this economic activity does not appear as part of the GDP. This omission is especially important when it comes to the effect of higher tax rates. Studies reflect the obvious: When taxes are higher, people do more of their work under the table.

For all of these reasons, real GDP cannot be considered a perfect measure of social welfare. Still it remains the primary measure of the economic health of the country. Any attempt to account for the problems outlined above would subject the measure to value judgments about the intrinsic worth of certain goods for which there is little agreement. Therefore, economists generally accept real GDP for what it can tell us while remaining aware of its limitations.

Measuring and Describing Unemployment

Measuring Unemployment Losing one’s job is the most traumatic thing that a person can go through short of the loss of a loved one. Economists therefore consider the unemployment rate to be one of the most important indicators both of the economy and of well-being in general. When people who want and need to work cannot find suitable employment, they lose not only income but also self-esteem. The

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88 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

problem for economists is distinguishing in a meaningful way between stay-at-home parents who might work outside the home if they were paid $50,000 a year and unemployed auto workers who refuse to go from $20 an hour assembling cars to the minimum wage flipping burgers. At what point does the lack of a job go from being the economy’s fault for not gen- erating good jobs to being the person’s fault for not having realistic expectations? This is an important question, but it is nearly impossible to answer.

The government measures unemployment by conducting phone surveys. The first thing the people making the surveys do is to make sure they are speaking to a person age 16 or over. (This is because people under 16 are not counted, whether they are working or not.) Second, they ensure that the person they are talking to is not in the military. (Those in prison, in mental health facilities, and in the active duty military do not count.) Third, they ask if the person has done work for pay or worked more than 15 hours a week in a family business during the previ- ous week. If the answer to that question is yes, then the person is considered employed. If the answer to that question is no, then the person is asked if he or she looked for work during the week, that is, whether he or she filled out an application or made a job inquiry. If the answer to that question is yes, then the person is considered unemployed.

As mentioned previously, not everyone counts. For instance, the total U.S. population in 2013 was 317 million. Of those, 66 million were under the age of 16, 1.4 million were in the military, 2.2 million were incarcerated, and 1.8 million were institutionalized in mental health facilities (with about half of those being over 85 years old and in homes for the aged). As a result the civilian, noninstitutionalized population of working age was 246 million.

The percentage of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population that is either employed or searching for a job—called the labor force participation rate—increased substantially between the end of World War II and the turn of the century. Figure 6.3 shows that the rate increased from 59 percent after the war to 67.3 percent in 2000. While there were multiple causes, the biggest cause dwarfed all others: women. In 1948 the labor force participation rate for men in their prime working ages (25–54) was 98 percent, while it was only 34 percent for women. By April of 2000 when the aggregate number peaked, the rate had fallen to 91 percent for men but

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Source: http://www.bls.gov/cps/

labor force participation rate The percentage of the civilian, noninstitution- alized population that is either employed or searching for a job.

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Measuring and Describing Unemployment 89

had risen to 77 percent for women. At the end of 2015, the aggregate labor force participation rate was 62.6 percent, the rate for men ages 25–54 had fallen further to 88 percent and the rate for women in that age group had fallen to 74 percent.

From those surveys the government creates two numbers, the labor force and the unem- ployment rate. The labor force is generated by adding the employed to the unemployed. The unemployment rate is the unemployed divided by the labor force and should be interpreted as the percentage of people in the workforce who do not have jobs and are actively seeking them. Both of these numbers are announced on the first Friday of every month.

Problems Measuring Unemployment This measure of the unemployment rate has some flaws. First, it does not count as unemployed any people who are so discouraged that they stop looking for work. Second, it counts as un- employed those people who are (correctly or incorrectly) encouraged by positive economic news to look for work before there really is any work. Third, it fails to recognize the plight of workers who are working significantly below their skill level or those who would like to work full time but are stuck in part-time jobs. Those suffering from either of these last two problems are referred to as underemployed.

The first two flaws are important because they subject the unemployment rate to incorrect interpretation. For example, if there are 10 people, 8 who work and 2 who are looking, then the unemployment rate is 20 percent. If things turn bad, so that one of the two decides to stop looking, the unemployment rate falls to 11 percent (1/9). Thus, bad news in this case causes the unemployment rate to fall. This is called the discouraged-worker effect, a process that can be reversed. That is, good news causes people to look for work before there is any, and the unem- ployment rate rises back to 20 percent. This is called the encouraged-worker effect. Figure 6.4 offers a historical perspective on unemployment.

These two effects were prominent during the 2007–2009 recession and beyond. The clear- est examples of the discouraged-worker effect were in the January and February 2011 reports (for December and January unemployment, respectively). During that two-month period, three-quarters of a million people left the labor force, due in large part to the fact that their unemployment compensation had run out. The unemployed are required to look for work while they collect unemployment compensation. Once the benefits ran out, with no opportunities

labor force All those nonmilitary personnel who are over 16 and are employed or are unemployed and actively seeking employment.

unemployment rate The percentage of people in the workforce who do not have jobs and are actively seeking them.

underemployment The state of working significantly below skill level or working fewer hours than desired.

discouraged-worker effect Bad news induces peo- ple to stop looking for work, causing the unem- ployment rate to fall.

encouraged-worker effect Good news induces people to start looking for work, causing the unemployment rate to rise (until they succeed in finding work).

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90 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

out there, many unemployed simply gave up their search. When they did, the unemployment rate fell dramatically (from 9.6 percent to 9.0 percent).

Toward the end of a long employment dry spell, there is a predictable phenomenon where good news causes a significant increase in job seekers. In May 2003, as the economy started picking up after a slow “jobless” recovery, 500,000 people joined the labor force and only 250,000 got jobs. The result was, although this was a better-than-average month for new job creation, the unemployment rate rose from 6.1 percent to 6.3 percent.

Types of Unemployment Economists further divide the unemployed by reasons for unemployment. If people lose their jobs because of a temporary downturn in the economy, economists call them cyclically unemployed. The seasonally unemployed are those people who lose their jobs predictably every year at the same time, like lifeguards in Michigan.

A third type of unemployment is more problematic and permanent. If people lose their jobs because of a change in the economy that makes their particular skill obsolete (either because the industry ceases to exist or because it moves to another country), they are referred to as structurally unemployed. These are typically the most difficult people to re-employ because their wage expectations are higher than the positions that remain in the economy that they can fill.

Conversely, a fourth type of unemployment often results from good things in the economy. If things are going well and people get better jobs or at least are encouraged to go out and look for bet- ter jobs, they sometimes add to the unemployment rate. For instance, if people hear there are better jobs out there and quit their jobs to devote time to looking for them, they might be surveyed when they are unemployed. Still others may be part of a two-earner family where one gets a promotion that requires that the family move to another city and the spouse who does not get promoted quits to find work in the other city. During the time that such people are looking for work, they are categorized as frictionally unemployed. These people are unemployed for a short time, but they have skills that employers will want. It just takes time to find the appropriate job. Thus, this type of unemployment exists in any smoothly functioning economy as long as it takes time to find similar or better work.

Typically between a quarter and a third of unemployed people are laid off subject to re- call (cyclically unemployed), an equal number voluntarily leave their jobs (frictionally unem- ployed), and the remainder are let go involuntarily without being subject to recall (though not all of this latter group should be referred to as structurally unemployed).

Productivity

Measuring and Describing Productivity As described in Chapter 1, an economy can grow because more resources are available or be- cause the ability to turn those resources into output has improved. Productivity speaks to the latter source of growth. Labor force productivity is the total amount of output per worker hour, whereas total factor productivity, otherwise known as multifactor productivity, is the increase in output that cannot be explained by an increase in labor, capital, or materials. It is measured as the difference between actual output and what output would have been had inputs remained constant. For this reason it is called a “residual” and is named for the Nobel Prize–winning economist Robert Solow, who came up with the measure.

The annual changes are displayed in Figure 6.5 as dashed lines. Because those annual changes are so clearly volatile, the five-year moving average of those changes is displayed in solid lines and it is those that are more valuable to inspect. What is clear is that the rapid increase in productivity that occurred during the post–World War II period up to the late 1960s was dramatically higher

cyclical unemployment State that exists when people lose their jobs because of a tempo- rary downturn in the economy.

seasonal unemployment State that exists when people lose their jobs predictably every year at the same time.

structural unemployment State that exists when people lose their jobs because of a change in the economy that makes their particular skill obsolete.

frictional unemployment Short-term unemploy- ment during a transition to an equal or better job.

labor force productivity Output per labor hour.

Multifactor productivity/ Total factor productivity The increase in output that cannot be explained by an increase in labor, capital, or materials.

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Seasonal Adjustment 91

FIGURE 6.5 Annual Changes (AC) and Five-year Moving Averages (5 yr MA) of Labor Productivity and Multifactor Productivity. Sources: www.bls.gov/bls/productivity.htm; www.bls.gov/mfp/trends_in_multifactor_productivity.pdf

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than that which occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. A brief spike in productivity occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s when manufacturing firms began to utilize robotic produc- tion and many service-based firms began to substitute automation for human interactions (e.g., ATMs and phone-trees). During and after the Great Recession those productivity gains evaporated.

Seasonal Adjustment

Almost all economic data published by the U.S. government comes in two forms, season- ally adjusted and nonseasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment takes into account predict- able, calendar-based changes. For instance, in the run-up to the Christmas shopping season, employment increases. First it increases at those manufacturing facilities that produce goods and then through the wholesale and retail trade sector as those goods are transported for sale and ultimately sold. When the season ends there is typically a one-percentage point increase in the nonseasonally adjusted unemployment rate from December to January. The seasonal adjustment takes that into account. The good thing about seasonal adjustment is that it allows you to better understand what the change in the unemployment rate is telling you about the state of the economy. Without it, you may hear that the unemployment rate increased by half a percentage point from December to January and mistakenly view that as a troubling sign

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92 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

regarding the economy. If the typical increase is a full percentage point and the actual increase is less than that, that is actually a good sign.

The same thing is true regarding prices. Fresh fruits and vegetables are cheaper when they are in season and more expensive when they are out of season. When they are out of season, they must be imported from another country where they are in season or, at the very least, brought in from a warm-climate area like California or Florida. Gasoline prices are typically higher in March and October because that is when refineries are required to switch from pro- ducing winter formulations to summer ones or vice versa. The dip in refining capacity during that time creates temporary price spikes. Seasonal adjustment takes that into account.

Business Cycles

Over the years there has been such a regular pattern of ups and downs in the economy that economists have put a name to it: the business cycle. Figure 6.6 shows the general pattern of the economy over time. Though the general trend is up, you can see that the path is rarely a straight line. With real gross domestic product on one axis and time on the other, you can see that a busi- ness cycle has five main components. The trough is the lowest point in the business cycle. The recovery is the period of growth in RGDP from the trough to the previous peak, that is, the period where RGDP gets back to where it was before the recession began. The expansion is the period of growth in RGDP from the previous peak to the new peak. The peak is the period where the growth in RGDP slows and eventually stops. Traditionally, a recession has been defined as a pe- riod of at least two consecutive quarters when the RGDP falls. This definition has, at times, been ignored as the National Bureau for Economic Research’s Business Cycle Dating Committee has attempted a more commonsense approach to establishing the beginning and ending dates for recessions. The 2007–2009 recession, for instance, was determined to have begun in late 2007 despite there being a slightly positive first quarter and significantly positive second quarter of 2008. This was because the downturn clearly started in late 2007 and the first half of 2008 was aided by a stimulus package that provided rebate checks to millions of Americans. By the time those rebates worked their way through the system and the financial crisis of fall 2008 took hold, it was apparent to these economists that the recession began in late 2007.

Between 1950 and 2011 there were nine recessions that lasted an average of nine and a half months. Some economists have argued that absent a major precipitating event, such as the Sep- tember 11 terrorist attacks, the potential for a recession has been lessened by the globalization of the U.S. economy. Typically, a recession is accompanied by a steep rise in the unemployment rate, a moderation in the inflation rate, and a reduction in real gross domestic product in the range

of 2 percent to 3 percent. Many times in the last half-century economists wondered whether the business cycle had been “repealed” only to find that it had not. With the possible exception of the recession of 2007–2009, the worst recession since World War II occurred in the early 1980s. At that time the unemployment rate went from around 7 percent to nearly 11 percent and the inflation rate went from 13 percent to less than 4 percent. The recession that occurred in 1990 as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had muted effects, in that it lasted only eight months. Its effect on un- employment, inflation, and output was not nearly as stark as that of the recession of 1981–1982.

business cycle Regular pattern of ups and downs in the economy.

trough The lowest point in the business cycle.

recovery The part of the growth period of the business cycle from the trough to the previous peak.

expansion The part of the growth period of the business cycle from the previous peak to the new peak.

peak The highest point in the business cycle.

recession The declining period of at least two consecutive quarters in the business cycle.

R G

D P

Time

Peak Recession

Trough

Recovery

Expansion

Peak

FIGURE 6.6 The business cycle.

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Business Cycles 93

The recession of 2001 began with the uncertainty of the 2000 presidential election and ended in November of 2001. At this writing, the length and depth of the recession that began in late 2007 has not yet been determined. However, it clearly ended the string of short and shallow recessions. Figure 6.7 shows the three business cycles from 1981 to 2008.

The potential for a recession has been lessened in some economists’ eyes by the globaliza- tion of the U.S. economy. Those who argue from this point of view suggest that with greater international trade, countries moving into recessions are bolstered by international demand for their products. Conversely, countries that are in strong recoveries have that impact damp- ened because purchases that were once domestic often are made from foreign sources.

On the other hand, other economists warned that the Asian–Russian–Latin American finan cial crisis of the late 1990s shows how one region’s economy can begin a domino effect that is destabilizing. Just as a string of dominoes is more stable when barriers are strategically placed between dominoes, economies may be more stable if the troubles in one country are insulated from the troubles in another. The health of the U.S. economy during the period did, in the end, stabilize the world economy.

Unfortunately, there were few corners of the globe that stood in the way of the 2007–2009 recession. Begun by declining demand in the United States and rapidly increasing world en- ergy prices, it got an unwelcome shot in the arm with the collapse of real estate markets around the world and the subsequent foreclosure-induced financial crisis of late 2008. Whether

From 1970 through the late 1990s, the predominant concern over prices was their propensity to rise too rapidly. Inflation concerns reached their peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s as prices were rising at or near 10 percent per year. Given that, why would it be a problem for prices to decline? The answer is actually somewhat simple. People delay buying big- ticket items when they are certain it will be cheaper if they are patient.

When inflation is running between 1 and 2 percent per year, it is not in anyone’s interest to not buy things in hopes that prices will decline, because they won’t. On the other hand, if prices are falling, then there is such a motivation. If consumers do not buy goods in anticipation of price declines, then the people who make those goods will see demand fall. They cut costs by cutting wages and benefits, or worse, by laying people off. When profits decline, the value of stocks declines. With less wealth, stockhold- ers spend less on consumer goods. The final straw is when housing prices start to fall. When that happens, people can easily owe more on their house than their house is worth. That results in a dramatic contraction in their willingness to maintain it and the elimination of their ability to borrow money against its equity (since they now have none).

From the late 1980s until 2003 Japan experi- enced a significant deflation in asset prices with the Japanese stock market, as measured by its principal index, the Nikkei 225, falling from nearly 40,000 to less than 8,000. Beginning in 2003 it recovered so that by early 2007 it was above 18,000. During that 13-year period, Japanese real estate values also plummeted. So, though Japan’s economy was once the envy of the Western world, its deflation-led eco- nomic slump lasted much longer than a typical re- cession. More recently, the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States in 2007, the demise of the commercial real estate market, and the dramatic drop in world oil prices from mid-2008 through 2009 caused many economists to worry that this same fate would strike the United States.

It was precisely this concern that kept the Federal Reserve focused on ensuring that the frag- ile recovery of 2010 and 2011 kept going. The Fed’s overriding fear was that a deflationary spiral would be nearly impossible to stop. This led the Fed to policies, like the much discussed second round of quantitative easing (dubbed QE2), that under normal circumstances would have been viewed as disas- trously inflationary. The goal of these policies was to prevent deflation.

deflation A general reduction in prices.

I F I N F L A T I O N I S B A D , H O W C A N D E F L A T I O N B E W O R S E ?

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94 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

globalization dampened or amplified the recession will be a matter for future macroeconomic historians to determine.

A phenomenon that has not visited the United States in nearly 60 years is depression. Although there is no formal economic distinction between a recession and a depression, there certainly is little doubt that we have not experienced a depression since the 1930s. Depressions are severe recessions usually characterized by any one of the following problems: financial panic and bank closures, unemployment rates exceeding 20 percent, prolonged retrenchment in RGDP on the magnitude of 10 percent or more, and significant deflation.

Lessening the likelihood of depression are the economic and social safety nets (e.g., unemployment insurance, welfare) that exist in most modern economies. The recessions that occur when people lack the confidence to buy things can be prevented from becoming de- pressions by governments that move to alter interest rates and government spending poli- cies. Further, as things worsen and unemployment rises, unemployment insurance and other policies exist now to lessen the effect. Thus people who are unemployed at the beginning of the 21st century have much more spending power than those unemployed at the beginning of the twentieth century. This in turn lessens the likelihood that a recession will turn into a depression.

depression Severe recession typically resulting in a financial panic and bank closures, unemploy- ment rates exceeding 20 percent, prolonged retrenchment in RGDP on the magnitude of 10 percent or more, and significant deflation.

Year

19 8

1

19 8

2

19 8

3

19 8

4

19 8

6

19 8

7

19 8

8

19 8

9

19 9

1

19 9

2

19 9

3

19 9

4

19 9

6

19 9

7

19 9

8

19 9

9

2 0

0 1

2 0

0 2

2 0

0 3

2 0

0 4

2 0

0 6

2 0

0 7

2 0

0 8

R G

D P

$ b

ill io

n s

(2 0

0 0

)

Peak

Peak

Peak

Recovery

Recovery

Recovery

Expansions

Recessions

Trough

Trough

Trough

11,500

12,500

10,500

9,500

8,500

7,500

6,500

5,500

4,500

FIGURE 6.7 An example of three business cycles: 1981 to 2008.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov

NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTING

All the data described in this chapter come from multiple sources and can be accessed from a variety of government and academic web pages. Whether from tax reports, sales tax records, surveys, or reports firms are required to supply the government, the data are collected, analyzed, and published. As we saw early in this chapter we can get to GDP using the expenditures approach or the income approach. The formulas are complicated and needlessly tedious for a book such as this, but you can get an idea of what is needed for GDP from the table below. You should also note that for a variety of statistical and methodological reasons the numbers don’t add up to be precisely equal, so a “statistical discrepancy” is always present.

Kick It Up a Notch

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Summary 95

Alternative Calculations for Gross Domestic Product in Billions, 2014.

Expenditures Approach Amount Income Approach Amount

Personal consumption 12061.4 Employee compensation 9434.7 Gross private investment 2937.2 All profits 4489.4 Government consumption and

investment expenditures 3162.5 Indirect business taxes 1169.5 Net exports −545.2

Depreciation 2784.2 Statistical discrepancy −261.8

Gross domestic product 17615.9 Gross domestic product 17,616*

Expenditures Approach: Table 1.1.5; Income Approach: Table 1.10. * Rounding error Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov

This chapter presented the basic vocabulary of the macroeconomy and explored many of the measures of it—measures that are not without flaw. We saw that the measure of output is gross domestic product, that prices and inflation are measured using a price index, and that the most frequently referred to price index is the CPI. Moreover, we discussed why GDP is adjusted for inflation to create real GDP and that this, though also flawed, is a key measure of economic health. Further, the chapter explained how unemployment is measured, that this measure is subject to some concern, and that economists divide the unemployed into types depending on how they got that way. We concluded by discussing the language of the business cycle.

Summary

Key Terms base year business cycle chain-based index consumer price index (CPI)  core CPI core PCE cost-of-living adjustment

(COLA) cyclical unemployment deflation depression discouraged-worker effect  encouraged-worker effect expansion frictional unemployment

GDP deflator (GDPDEF)

gross domestic product (GDP)

inflation rate labor force labor force participation rate labor force productivity macroeconomics market basket microeconomics multifactor productivity peak Personal Consumption

Expenditures deflator

price index price of the market basket in

the base year Producer Price Index real gross domestic product

(RGDP) recession recovery seasonal unemployment structural unemployment total factor productivity trough underemployment unemployment rate

Quiz Yourself 1. In measuring gross domestic product, goods produced by foreign firms in the United States are a. counted, and so are goods produced by American firms in foreign countries. b. counted, but goods produced by American firms in foreign countries are not counted. c. not counted, but goods produced by American firms in foreign countries are counted. d. not counted, and goods produced by American firms in foreign countries are also

not counted.

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96 Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression

2. Gross domestic product is counted using two methods: one that counts all the ways people money and another that counts all the ways people

money. a. earn, spend b. spend, save c. earn, save d. loan, borrow

3. Inflation is measured using in a price index. a. the absolute increase b. a multiyear weighted average increase c. the percentage year-to-year increase d. logarithm-adjusted absolute increase

4. In early 2005, inflation increased unexpectedly because of an increase in oil prices. This helped a. borrowers. b. lenders. c. people on fixed incomes. d. workers.

5. The consumer price index (CPI) is a heavily criticized measure of inflation because a. the government does nothing to fix its known deficiencies. b. it consistently understates the increase in the cost of living. c. it consistently overstates the increase in the cost of living. d. the government constantly makes adjustments in it without warrant.

6. One problem with using real gross domestic product as a measure of social welfare is that a. it fails to count home production. b. it fails to count services, a growing part of the economy. c. it double, triple, and sometimes quadruple counts goods that are produced in stages. d. it fails to account for imports, a growing part of the economy.

7. In 2005, General Motors announced a 20 percent reduction in its staffing levels and the closure of many assembly plants. Those laid off as a result would likely be classified as a. seasonally unemployed. b. cyclically unemployed. c. frictionally unemployed. d. structurally unemployed.

8. On a graph of real gross domestic product over time, recessions appear as a. relatively short and shallow drops on an otherwise increasing path. b. long, sharp declines on an otherwise increasing path. c. the dips on a path that increases and decreases equally. d. the periods where the rate of growth, while still positive, slows.

9. Of these, economists consider this the worst: a. inflation of 5 percent. b. recession. c. deflation of 5 percent. d. depression.

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Summary 97

Short Answer Questions

1. Explain why an economist would focus on real GDP rather than nominal GDP. 2. Suppose you walked into an unemployment office and found the following people: a laid-

off mall Santa Claus, an unemployed auto-industry worker (who is subject to callback by their company), a woman who lost her job at a manufacturer because the company relo- cated to Mexico, and a nurse who just moved to town because his wife recently started a new job. Assign the following labels to the people above: cyclically unemployed, friction- ally unemployed, structurally unemployed, and seasonally unemployed. Then, explain your assignment of the terms to each person.

Think about This Economists have argued for many years that the CPI overstates the cost of living. The degree of that overstatement has been the subject for significant economic research. Part of the prob- lem in resolving the agreed-upon problems is that any correction has the effect of reducing Social Security checks and increasing taxes. Should economic measures be subject to political debate?

Talk about This Economist Joseph Schumpeter once argued that people are too often lulled into an unpro- ductively comfortable state when they have continuous employment. His conclusion was that recessions (more accurately, depressions, in his era) were good because they forced people to be creative and entrepreneurial. He labeled this “creative destruction.” Do you agree with the premise of his argument? Do you agree with his conclusion?

For More Insight See Hausman, Jerry. “Sources of Bias and Solutions to Bias in the Consumer Price Index.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1, pp. 23–44. Lebow, David E., and Jeremy B. Rudd. “Measurement Error in the Consumer Price Index: Where Do We Stand?” Journal of Economic Literature XLI, pp. 159–201. “Measuring the Economy”—www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipa_primer.pdf

Behind the Numbers U.S. Gross Domestic Product and Recessions—www.bea.gov Unemployment rate—www.bls.gov/cps

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98

C H A P T E R S E V E N

Interest Rates and Present Value Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe what interest rates are and differentiate nominal from real interest rates.

LO2 Describe the use of present value calculations in determining the value of a payment stream.

LO3 Apply the tool of present value when thinking about economic decisions where the costs and benefits of decisions happen at different times.

Chapter Outline

Interest Rates

Present Value

Future Value

Kick It Up a Notch: Risk and Reward

Summary

Many economic decisions take place over time. That is, the time at which the benefits of a given decision are gained is different from the time the costs are incurred. For instance, when you save money, you put off the ability to buy something now so that you have even more money to spend in the future. When you borrow, you get to consume a good before you have sufficient means to pay for it. Thus we agree to give up a single sum now for a larger amount that we will receive later, or we agree to pay a certain amount per month over a series of months rather than pay a single sum now. In this market, as in any market, there is a price and there is a quantity, and there is a buyer and there is a seller. In this chapter we explore borrow- ing, lending, investing, and saving decisions.

We begin by exploring interest rates, the price of money, and how they are determined. We look at the importance of anticipated inflation in this decision so as to draw a distinction between nominal and real interest rates, a distinction that is important to economists.

We conclude by looking at financial decisions. We will see that any particular decision to borrow, save, lend, or invest depends on what economists call present value. We will examine scenarios in which we save or borrow a sum of money now in order to get a larger sum of money later. We will also provide more complicated examples in which the payments we make or receive are spread over time.

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Interest Rates 99

Interest Rates

The Market for Money When people lend or borrow money, we call the price at which they do this the interest rate. A useful way to think of this market for money is to imagine yourself renting a moving van. When you rent such a vehicle, the owner is letting you use it for a predetermined period of time at a predetermined price. Now, instead of renting a van, think about renting money. The owner of the money is letting you use the money for a period of time at a predetermined price. The period of time is typically denoted per year and so the price is an annual interest rate. This means that when you are borrowing money to buy a car or home or seeking money from investors, you must pay interest.

Of course you could be on the other side and be the owner of money that you put in a bank or use to buy a bond. You are now “renting” the money to someone else. In all cases the rate of interest is an important component in your transaction. In this market that we are discussing, the seller is the one with money and the buyer is the one seeking the money.

Figure 7.1 depicts a market like one we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. Here, though, the price is the interest rate and the quantity is the amount that the lender/saver extends to the borrower. The supply curve is upward sloping because the lender/saver will be motivated to lend more if he or she can get a higher return, and the demand curve is downward sloping because at higher interest rates the borrower will view borrowing as less advantageous. As in any other market, an equilibrium interest rate and amount borrowed or lent will result.

The equilibrium interest rate will depend on a number of factors. For instance, the inter- est rate for people with good credit histories is typically lower than it is for people with poor ones. The bank interest rate for car loans is usually higher than the interest rate for home loans. Credit card interest rates are very high. The reason for this is the degree of risk. A lender can- not assume that a borrower will pay every loan back in full. Lenders are taking a risk and part of what goes into their decisions is the likelihood that the borrowers will pay back the loans and the consequences if they do not. Credit cards are typically not secured by anything, and, as a result, credit card interest rates are higher than home loans. If a buyer defaults on a home loan, the lender can take possession and ultimately sell the house.

Nominal Interest Rates versus Real Interest Rates When the interest rate for a certificate of deposit (CD) or car loan is advertised publicly, that is referred to by economists as the nominal interest rate. Though this is the rate of in- terest referred to in Figure 7.1, it is not as interesting to economists as what they refer to as the real interest rate. The real interest rate is the rate of interest after inflation expectations

have been taken into account. Inflation, which was explained in Chapter 6, is the increase in prices in percentage terms. Inflation matters for our discussion of interest rates because both borrowers and lenders consider the benefits and costs of their decisions in terms of the consumption gained and lost. Since the borrower is presumably going to take the money to buy something now and pay the money back later to a lender who will then buy something with the money, the change in prices is important. Let’s consider a concrete example.

Suppose you agree to lend a friend $500 if he agrees to pay you back next year with 10 percent interest. This

interest rate The percentage, usu- ally expressed in annual terms, of a balance that is paid by a borrower to a lender that is in addition to the original amount borrowed or lent.

nominal interest rate The advertised rate of interest.

real interest rate The rate of interest after inflation expectations are accounted for; the compensation for wait- ing to consume.

FIGURE 7.1 The market for money.

r*

$*

Demand

Money borrowed /saved ($)

In te

re st

r at

e r

Supply

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100 Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value

means that next year you will get $550. Suppose that both of you will end up buying iPads with the money and that today it costs exactly $500. If the price of these devices goes up to $600 by the time you get your money, then you have lost out. He got his iPad and you did not have enough for one even after waiting a year to get it. On the other hand, if iPads increased only to $525, then you could afford one when you got your money and would have $25 extra for waiting the year to get it. What this means is that inflation matters in this borrowing/ lending decision. This is especially true if we know what the rate of inflation will be.

Although no one knows for sure what inflation will be in the coming year, people are able to use recent experience as a guide. As a result borrowers and lenders form inflation expectations. If you require $25 compensation for waiting a year to buy your iPad and you expect the price to increase by $25, then you will require $550 be paid to you. The first $25 compensates you for the higher prices that will exist when you go to buy yours, and the second $25 compensates you for waiting the year to buy it.

What this means for economists is that the nominal interest rate is equal to the sum of infla- tion expectations and the real interest rate.1

Present Value

It is easy to see that $100 is more than $50. It is much more difficult to compare $50 today against $100 six years from now. To put dollar values on an even playing field, we compare monies using a concept called present value. Using an appropriate interest rate, though, you can compare money paid at two different times. We say that two amounts paid apart from one another in time are equal in present value if the money paid now could be invested at an appropriate interest rate and generate an amount that turns out to be equal to a higher amount that is paid later.

Simple Calculations The math required to fully understand present value is somewhat complicated and is displayed below:

Present value = Payment

________ (1 + r)n

where

payment = payment to be received in the future r = interest rate n = number of years before payment is received

Fortunately, the concept and its conclusions are not as complicated as the math. The idea is that the payment in the future needs to be deflated by a factor equal to 1 plus the interest rate for every year that is to pass before the payment is made. If the interest rate is 10 percent and 10 years are to pass, then the payment is deflated 10 times by 1.10.

To use a particular example, consider what $200 paid 10 years from now is worth in present value if the interest rate is 10 percent. To compute this we need to multiply 1.1 by itself 10 times. The result is 2.5937, so the present value is $200/2.5937, or approximately $77.11. This means that if you had $77.11 today, and you invested it at 10 percent interest for 10 years, you would have $200. Stated differently, if 10 years from now you were going to receive $200 and wanted to borrow against it and the going rate was 10 percent, you could borrow only $77.31.

present value The interest-adjusted value of future payment streams.

1 There is a mathematical cross-product term as well, but it is very small when the inflation and real interest rates are low.

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Present Value 101

As mentioned, the factor 2.5937 was computed by multiplying 1.1 by itself 10 times (a pro- cess called compounding). Table 7.1 provides factors for several different interest rates for sev- eral different periods. The interest rate appears at the top, and the left column indicates the number of years between the time when the borrower gets the money and the time he or she pays it back. The body of the table displays how much money the borrower will have to pay back for every dollar borrowed. For instance, every dollar you borrow on a 20 percent credit card that you fail to pay back within five years costs you $2.49, the original dollar plus $1.49 interest.

Mortgages, Car Payments, and Other Multipayment Examples We can use this concept to calculate how much house or car we can afford. Here, instead of borrowing a single sum and paying it off with a single payment, we are borrowing a single sum and paying it off in small increments. Of course we could think of situations where we save in small increments to generate a single sum, like saving for a vacation, or situations where we save in small increments to generate other increments, like saving for retirement and getting a monthly check in retirement. These are simply extensions of the same principle.

For each of these examples there is a wonderfully elegant formula that would allow us to plug in various numbers and get results. These formulas, while interesting to those who study financial management issues, are not necessary for us to understand how we might use the present value idea in these other contexts.

For that, let’s turn to Table 7.2, where we will try to evaluate whether a particular business deal is a good idea. Suppose that an investment of $100 each year for five years will, starting in the sixth year, return a payout of $100 a year that will continue for the next seven years.

Though the total of benefits is greater than the total of costs, whether this is a good business deal depends on the interest rate. If the interest rate is 5 percent, the present value of benefits is larger than the present value of costs. At 8 percent and 10 percent the present value of benefits is less than the present value of costs. That means that a business whose goal was to maximize profit would go ahead with the investment if interest rates were 5 percent and not if the inter- est rate was 8 or 10 percent. The interest rate where the present value of costs and benefits are equal is called the internal rate of return. In this case it is about 5.8 percent. Generally, when the interest rate that must be paid is less than the internal rate of return, then the present value of benefits exceeds the present value of costs.

All mortgages and car payments are similarly calculated, though these are somewhat more simple because there is only one up arrow, the value of the house or car loan, and the multiple down arrows, the payments that are required. To give you some perspective on how much you would have to make in monthly payments on a variety of loans, consider Table 7.3, a very abbreviated set of present value factors. Again at the top are the various yearly interest rates and in the left column are the various loan durations. Thus a $1,000 computer purchased on a 20 percent interest credit card will cost the buyer $26.49 every month for five years. This translates into $1,589.63 in total payments over the five-year loan.

internal rate of return The interest rate where the present value of costs and benefits is equal.

Interest Rate (%)

Year 20 10 5 2 1

30 237.38 17.45 4.32 1.81 1.35 10 6.19 2.59 1.63 1.22 1.10 5 2.49 1.61 1.28 1.10 1.05 1 1.20 1.10 1.05 1.02 1.01

TABLE 7.1 The amount payable for every dollar borrowed for several interest rates and several loan durations.

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102 Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value

We can use Table 7.3 to figure out what typical monthly payments will be on purchases that you might make in the coming years. We just saw that if you purchase a $1,000 computer using a typical credit card, you will have to pay $26.49 per month for five years to pay off the loan. If you buy a $30,000 car with a five-year payoff period and get a 10 percent interest bank loan, you will have monthly payments of $637.50 (30 × $21.25). If you buy the same car during a financing promotion when the car company loans you the cost of the car at only 2 percent interest, your payments will be only $525.90 (30 × $17.53) per month. Last, if you purchase a $100,000 home with a 30-year mortgage at 5 percent interest, it will cost you $537 (100 × 5.37) per month.

Future Value

The present value formula can be algebraically rearranged to become a future value formula. Future value is the interest-adjusted value of past payments. Using the same variables from the present value formula,

Future value = Payment × (1 + r)n

This calculation is useful when you are looking to save an amount now for an expense that will occur at a later time. If, for instance, you had $10,000 and wanted to save it to give to your newborn daughter upon her high school graduation, you might put it in an 18-year certificate of deposit earning 4 percent. If you plug in those numbers (n = 18, r = .04), you will find that she could cash it in for $20,258.17.

future value The interest-adjusted value of past payments.

TABLE 7.2 Present value of costs and benefits at alternative interest rates.

Year Cost Benefit PV Cost @5%

PV Benefit @5%

PV Cost @8%

PV Benefit @8%

PV Cost @10%

PV Benefit @10%

1 100 100.00 100.00 100.00 2 100 95.24 92.59 90.91 3 100 90.70 85.73 82.64 4 100 86.38 79.38 75.13 5 100 82.27 73.50 68.30 6 100 78.35 68.06 62.09 7 100 74.62 63.02 56.45 8 100 71.07 58.35 51.32 9 100 67.68 54.03 46.65 10 100 64.46 50.02 42.41 11 100 61.39 46.32 38.55 12 100 58.47 42.89 35.05

500 700 454.59 476.04 431.20 382.69 416.98 332.52

Interest Rate (%)

Year 20 10 5 2 1

30 16.71 8.78 5.37 3.70 3.22 10 19.33 13.22 10.61 9.20 8.76 5 26.49 21.25 18.87 17.53 17.09 1 92.63 87.92 85.61 84.24 83.79

TABLE 7.3 Monthly payments required on a $1,000 loan for various interest rates and various loan durations.

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Future Value 103

Spreadsheet programs, such as Microsoft’s Excel®, allow for quick and easy processing of complicated financial calculations. For in- stance, the PMT function allows users to calculate the payment that, when made over several periods, will pay off a loan. The PV function allows users to calculate how much they can borrow to buy a home or car when they can afford a particular payment. The FV function allows users to know how much money they will have when they retire or when they are ready to put a child through school if they

were to save a particular amount per pay period. The IRR function allows users to calculate the internal rate of return on an investment that takes the form of a flow of uneven payments. The RATE function allows users to calculate the rate of return they are earning on an investment that promises to pay a particular amount in the future should the user save either a fixed amount now or follow a regular savings plan.

Function Form of the Function Example Problem Example Solution

Payment (PMT)

@PMT (r,N,PV,FV) How much would you have to pay per month on a four-year $30,000 car loan when the bank charges you 5%?

@PMT (.05/12,4*12,30000)

How much would you have to save per month if you wanted to have $20,000 for a car five years from now if you could earn 3% interest?

@PMT (.03/12,5*12,0,20000)

Present Value (PV)

@PV (r,N,PMT,FV) How much could you borrow if you could afford $500 per month payments on a house on a 30-year 4% mortgage?

@PV (.04/12,30*12,500)

How much could you borrow at 7% if you were going to receive $10,000 in two years and use that money to pay all of your loan at that time?

@PV (.07,2,0,10000)

Future Value (FV)

@FV (r,N,PMT,PV) How much would you have in an account in 20 years if you saved $1,000 per month and earned 1% on those savings?

@FV (.01/12,20*12,1000)

How much would you have in an account in 15 years if you put $15,000 into an account that earned 9%?

@FV (.09,15,0,15000)

Internal Rate of Return (IRR)

@IRR (range on the sheet)

What is the internal rate of return for an investment that costs $100 the first year, $50 the second, but earns $200 in the third year and $40 in the fourth?

–100

@irr(C1:C4)

200 40

–50

C

@Rate (N,PMT,PV,FV) What is the internal rate of return for an investment that costs $10,000 but returns $4,000 for three years?

@Rate (4,4000, −10000)

What is the internal rate of return for an investment that costs $1,000 per year but returns $15,000 after 10 years?

@Rate (10, −1000,0,15000)

S P R E A D S H E E T S M A K E C O M P L I C A T E D C A L C U L A T I O N S Q U I C K A N D E A S Y

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104 Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value

Both present value and future value calculations are central to problems in business, the discipline of finance in particular. They require a calculator with a yx key or a spreadsheet pro- gram to make the exponential calculations. Before calculators and computers were common, car dealers and real estate agents used a shortcut, called the Rule of 72, which allowed them to estimate these calculations in their head relatively quickly. Note from the preceding calcula- tion that the $10,000 CD roughly doubled when saved at 4 percent for 18 years. The Rule of 72 allows you to estimate the time it would take for an investment to double by dividing 72 by the annual interest rate (72/4 = 18).

Rule of 72 A shortcut that allows you to estimate the time it would take for an investment to double by dividing 72 by the annual interest rate.

RISK AND REWARD

Investing is risky business. Some investments do not pay off as expected. Economists look at risk as the possibility that the investor will not get those anticipated payoffs. There are two basic types of risk, the default risk, where the borrower doesn’t pay the debts, and market risk, where the market value of a stock or bond changes in an unanticipated manner. To compensate the investor, a greater reward is offered. Economists call that greater reward the risk premium. Because longer-term predictions are often less accurate than shorter-term ones, there is also a relationship between the reward an investor receives and the length of time the investor must wait to get that reward. Economists call that relationship between reward and the time you have to wait to get it the yield curve. A sample yield curve for loaning money to the federal govern- ment is shown in Figure 7.2.

risk The possibility that the investor will not get anticipated payoffs.

default risk The risk to the investor that the borrower will not pay.

market risk The risk that the market value of an asset will change in an unantici- pated manner.

risk premium The reward investors receive for taking greater risk.

yield curve The relationship between reward and the time until the reward is received.

Kick It Up a Notch

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FIGURE 7.2 Yield curve for U.S. treasuries, January 2016, with maturities to 2046.

This chapter introduced the concept of interest rates and showed that the market for money is no different conceptually from the market for any other good. The interest rate was explained as the price of borrowing money. The difference between real and nominal interest rates was explained, highlighting the notion that real interest rates account for anticipated inflation. These concepts were expanded to explain present value and future value and how those concepts can be used to evaluate economic decisions where payments are made or received over a span of time.

Summary

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Summary 105

Key Terms default risk future value interest rate internal rate of return

market risk nominal interest rate present value real interest rate

risk risk premium Rule of 72 yield curve

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

The Economics of Crime The Economics of K–12

Education

College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

Social Security

Personal Income Taxes The Stock Market and

Crashes

Quiz Yourself 1. When evaluating a business decision, an economist will often resort to the use of present value because a. the profits may not be large enough to warrant the time and attention of the investor. b. the investment occurs in one time period and the profits in another. c. the investment is often in one currency and the profits in another. d. the investment is often under one set of managers and the profits under another.

2. In the market for loanable dollars, an increase in the profitability of investments overall will be revealed in a. an increase in the supply of loanable dollars. b. an increase in the demand for loanable dollars. c. a decrease in the supply of loanable dollars. d. a decrease in the demand for loanable dollars.

3. When evaluating whether or not to make an investment, one should focus on the __________ because doing so takes into account anticipated inflation. a. nominal interest rate b. real interest rate c. exchange rate d. junk bond rate

4. Suppose your grandmother told you (today) that she had set aside an amount of money in a savings account bearing 3 percent interest that was sufficient to give you a $5,000 graduation present in exactly four years. How much would she have had to set aside? a. $5,000 b. $5,000 × (1.03)4 c. $5,000/(1.03)4 d. $5,000/(1 + 0.034)

5. Using an interest rate of 5 percent, which figure has the largest present value? a. $5,000 b. $5,050 to be received two years from now c. $5,075 to be received three years from now d. $5,500 to be received 10 years from now

6. Using an interest rate of 5 percent, which figure has the smallest present value? a. $5,000 b. $5,050 to be received two years from now c. $5,075 to be received three years from now d. $5,500 to be received 10 years from now

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106 Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value

7. The present value of a $1,000 payment received two years from now at 5 percent annual interest will be less than $900 because of a. taxes. b. compounding. c. withholding. d. double jeopardy.

8. A 60-month car loan (where no down payment was made) with a 6 percent interest rate and a monthly payment of $500 would allow the borrower to buy a a. $35,500 car. b. $30,000 car. c. $25,863 car. d. $28,200 car.

Short Answer Questions

1. Why is the present value of money to be paid in the future less than the amount to be paid, but the future value of money invested now and withdrawn later is greater than the original investment?

2. Why is it that $400 per month paid over five years will not be enough to buy a $24,000 car?

3. Why is there usually a positive relationship between the time a bond will mature (how long the investor has to wait to get her money) and the interest rate on that bond?

Think about This The amount of principal paid in the early stages of a mortgage is relatively modest. On a $100,000 loan, at 6 percent for 360 months, the first payment is almost exactly $600 with $500 going for interest and $100 going toward principal. Before 2008’s financial meltdown, many new homebuyers were getting “interest-only” mortgages. (They paid $500 per month for the first five years and then $644 per month thereafter.) Do you think this was a good idea?

Talk about This College students and young people generally get themselves into credit problems because they do not fully understand the consequences of borrowing and overestimate their ability to pay loans back. Should your college censor campus bulletin boards and remove credit card offers from mail you receive in residence halls? Bankruptcy laws prevent people from defaulting on student loans, which means even if you do declare bankruptcy on your credit card debt, you cannot get out from money you owe in student loans. Were you aware of this when you took out a student loan, and would that impact your decision to take out a student loan?

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107

C H A P T E R E I G H T

Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply and manipulate the aggregate supply and aggregate demand model of macroeconomics.

LO2 Explain why the aggregate demand curve is downward sloping and why there is controversy over the shape of the aggregate supply curve.

LO3 List the variables that shift these curves and understand how the shifting translates into price and output impacts.

LO4 Discriminate between demand-pull and cost-push inflation.

LO5 Summarize what is meant by supply-side economics.

Chapter Outline

Aggregate Demand

Aggregate Supply

Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

Causes of Inflation

How the Government Can Influence (but Probably Not Control) the Economy

Summary

Now that we have laid out the language of macroeconomics and some of the measurement issues, it is time that we turn our attention to modeling the macroeconomy. Just as we used the supply and demand model in Chapter 2 to help us understand what would happen in a particu- lar industry if certain variables changed, we use the aggregate supply and aggregate demand model to help us understand how other variables affect the economy as a whole.

Remember that models are not perfect. They rest on simplifying assumptions that allow us to boil down the essentials of what we are looking at in a way that clarifies the big picture. In microeconomics, supply and demand is a well-understood and relatively well-accepted framework with which to look at particular industries. Regrettably, in macroeconomics no such comparable model exists.

The closest we come to finding a workable model that is relatively easy to use and that is flex- ible enough to encompass a variety of differing viewpoints is the aggregate supply and aggregate demand model. It also has the virtue of mirroring the supply and demand model that we studied in Chapter 2, so the concepts are less foreign than they would be with a completely new model.

The reason for caution with regard to macro models is that, unlike microeconomic models, where there is only one market, many interrelated goods and services are combined.

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108 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

Whereas we can readily list five important things that influence the price of apples, we would need more than five pages to list the important things that affect the economy as a whole. The macro economy is just much bigger and much more complex than any particular market. With this caution in mind we proceed in this chapter with the aggregate supply– aggregate demand model knowing that, although not perfect, it is reasonably suited to the purpose at hand.

Following the method of presentation in Chapter 2, we explain this model by first exam- ining aggregate demand and aggregate supply individually. Then we look at them together, as part of one model. Just as in Chapter 2, where we then looked at why supply and demand might change, we examine why aggregate supply and aggregate demand might change and what happens when they do. Last, we use the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model to explain, albeit very briefly, supply-side economics.

Aggregate Demand

Definition Aggregate demand (AD) is a measure of the amount of goods and services that will be pur- chased at various prices. It shows the quantities of real domestic output that domestic consum- ers, businesses, governments, and foreign buyers collectively will desire to purchase at each possible price level. As a practical matter we map this on a graph (Figure 8.1) with our mea- sure of real goods and services sold, real gross domestic product (RGDP), on the horizontal axis and our measure of all prices, the price index (PI), on the vertical axis.

Just as in Chapter 2, when we asserted that the demand curve was downward sloping and then discussed why this makes sense, we do the same now. As shown in Figure 8.1, the aggre- gate demand curve does, in fact, relate all prices to real output in a negative or inverse manner. This makes sense for three reasons: the real-balances effect, the foreign purchases effect, and the interest rate effect.

Why Aggregate Demand Is Downward Sloping The real-balances effect is the idea that any wealth that you may have in the form of cash or securities becomes less valuable as prices rise. Also, if you have less ability to buy real goods and services when prices are higher, then the two are negatively related.

The second reason why the aggregate demand curve is downward sloping is the foreign purchases effect. The argument here is that as prices rise in the United States, Americans will be more willing to buy imports and less willing to buy American-made goods. Foreigners will also be less willing to buy U.S. goods, thus reducing our exports to them. If you remember the

expenditures approach from Chapter 6, you will recall that any increase in imports reduces U.S. GDP.

The interest rate effect is that higher prices lead to in- flation. This in turn leads to less borrowing and a lowering of RGDP. The definition of aggregate demand will help explain the significance of interest rates as they relate to the downward-sloping nature of the aggregate demand curve. Recall from Chapter 6 that, using the expenditure approach, aggregate demand is calculated by adding total consumption, business investment, government spending on goods and services, and exports and then subtracting imports from that sum. Two of those items, consumption

aggregate demand (AD) The amounts of real domestic output that domestic consumers, businesses, governments, and foreign buyers col- lectively will desire to purchase at each possible price level.

foreign purchases effect When domestic prices are high relative to their imported alternatives, we will export less to for- eign buyers and we will import more from for- eign producers. There- fore, higher prices lead to less domestic output.

real-balances effect Because higher prices reduce real spending power, prices and output are negatively related.

interest rate effect Higher prices lead to inflation, which leads to less borrowing and a lowering of RGDP.

PI

RGDP

AD

FIGURE 8.1 Aggregate demand.

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Aggregate Supply 109

and business investment, are interest-sensitive. When people buy homes, cars, home furnishings, or any good expected to last longer than three years (what economists call durable goods), they often do it by borrowing the money. When interest rates are high, the payments people can expect to make on the consumption of these goods will be higher than they are when interest rates are lower. When businesses borrow money to build a new plant or buy new equipment, the payments they must make to their creditors are also determined by the interest rate. Any time the interest rate rises, the volume of both large-dollar-item consumption and business investment will fall because the interest rates have caused costs to be greater. Recall from Chapter 7 that inflation increases in- terest rates, so if prices rise, inflation rises; if inflation rises, interest rates rise; if interest rates rise, consumption and investment fall; if consumption and investment fall, then RGDP falls.

Aggregate Supply Definition Aggregate supply (AS) is a measure of the level of real domestic output available at each possi- ble price level. The accommodations for differing viewpoints take place in the aggregate sup- ply curve. The differing viewpoints hinge on what is called full employment. Most economists say that full employment exists when cyclical unemployment is zero, so that there are still unemployed people at “full employment.” Specifically, the so-called structurally unemployed, the people whose industry has moved or no longer exists, are without work. In addition, the frictionally unemployed, those who quit because they are looking for better jobs or because their spouse found a better job in a new location, are out of work during what is referred to as “full employment.” These differences of opinion are displayed in the various ranges of the aggregate supply curve shown in Figure 8.2.

Competing Views of the Shape of Aggregate Supply We have a serious divergence of opinion among macroeconomists on several important defi- nitions. The following questions separate the two main camps of economists: What constitutes full employment and how are voluntary unemployment and involuntary unemployment de- fined? While what follows may seem like “airing out dirty laundry in public,” it also serves as an excellent “teachable moment” in your general education curriculum. Profound differences of opinion exist in all disciplines, and one of the most profound differences of opinion in mac- roeconomics centers on these issues. Accepting that there is not a single right answer to every question is an important step in becoming an educated person. So, given that caution. . . .

Classical economists believe in the ability of all markets to generate good outcomes with- out government involvement. They believe that if minimum-wage jobs are available and un- employed steel workers choose not to take them, they are not involuntarily unemployed, just

deluded about their prospects. As a result, they believe that cyclical unemployment is zero and therefore we will, by definition, always be at full employment be- cause changes in the labor market will ensure that each person who wants a job will have one. If people are not willing to work for the market equilibrium wage, then they do not count anyway—at least within the defini- tion of full employment held by classical economists.

Keynesian economists take the opposite view. These economists, followers of the early 20th-century econo- mist John Maynard Keynes, argue that there are always more people willing to work than there are jobs available

aggregate supply (AS) The level of real domestic output available at each possible price level.

PI

RGDP

Keynesian range

Classical range

Intermediate range

AS FIGURE 8.2 The aggregate supply curve.

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110 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

and that, as a practical matter, we have never actually reached full employment. To Keynesians the concept of full employment is irrelevant. Thus, however many people are employed, Keynesians argue there could always be more and increases in aggregate demand are needed to employ them.

To depict these differing views on a graph, classical economists believe that the aggregate supply curve is vertical all the time. They believe that prices and wages will constantly equili- brate all markets, so increases in aggregate demand will only bid up prices, and the underlying real gross domestic product will remain unchanged. As an example, recall the memory chip– making firm we studied in Chapters 4 and 5. Suppose it has many competitors that are identi- cal to it. If aggregate demand increases, leading to an increase in demand for computers and therefore memory chips, our firm will want to expand output. Classical economists argue that since all markets are at full employment to begin with, our firm will have to raise the wage it pays to attract more employees to produce those extra chips. Whether or not the firm succeeds in luring away the workers from the competition, total industry output will remain the same, since the total number of workers will not have changed. The only thing that will change if the classical economists are right is that prices will rise.

On the other hand, Keynesian economists believe that prices and wages are rigid and that unemployment results from that fact. The only way to employ these people, so the Keynesians’ argument goes, is to increase aggregate demand. Moreover, since prices do not change, the aggregate supply curve should be thought of as horizontal. Again, using our chip maker as an example, if there are many unemployed workers available for hire into the chip-making business, then increasing output to meet increased demand does not require that wages rise.

A reasonable middle ground between these two models is that some industries are at full employment while other industries are not. If this is the case, an increase in aggregate demand may simply bid up prices in some industries and simply increase output in others. Thus, in the aggregate, real GDP rises a little and prices rise a little. If some industries, like computer chip makers, are at full employment and others, like steel, are not, then an increase in aggregate demand that increases demand for these two products will cause only inflation in the chip industry and only an increase in output in the steel industry.

The aggregate supply curve and the differences among economists are shown in Figure 8.2. As you can see, the vertical portion corresponds to what classical economists believe and is so indicated because any increase in aggregate demand will simply increase prices and not out- put. Similarly, the horizontal region corresponds to what Keynesian economists believe and is labeled as such because any increase in aggregate demand will simply increase output and not prices. The middle ground, labeled the intermediate range, connects the two ideological extremes and does so on the assumption that the classical economists may be right for some industries and the Keynesians for others.

You should understand that the representation of aggregate supply in Figure 8.2 is not one that most economists would embrace as perfect. For our purposes, though, it allows us to deal with the differences of opinion among the major schools of thought within macroeconomics in a way that is as uncomplicated as it can be. (This is not to say that you will necessarily find it to be uncomplicated.)

Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

Variables That Shift Aggregate Demand Just as we saw in Chapter 2, where there were factors that shifted demand, there are factors that will shift aggregate demand. If you look at the elements of aggregate demand, you will find clues to what these might be. Anything that affects people’s willingness to consume,

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Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply 111

government’s desire or need to spend money on goods and services, a business’s desire to in- vest in new plant and equipment, or net exports (exports minus imports) will affect aggregate demand.

For instance, taxes on personal or business income will affect consumption and investment, respectively. With higher tax rates, consumers have less take-home income to spend on things. With higher business or corporate tax rates, prospective business ventures are not as attractive as they might otherwise be. Thus any increase in personal or business taxes will lower aggregate demand, shifting it to the left on the graph, and any decrease will raise it, shifting it to the right on the graph.

Any increase in interest rates will have a similar effect. As we saw in Figure 7.1 and as we described in the previous discussion on the interest rate effect, increases in interest costs diminish individuals’ and businesses’ willingness to borrow money. The result is that aggregate demand decreases and moves to the left on the graph.

Any increase in business and consumer confidence will be followed by an increase in, and a movement to the right in, aggregate demand. This result occurs because as consum- ers become more confident in their own financial situation, they are more willing to take on

There is something vaguely unpatriotic about saying there are prob- lems with a “strong dollar.” Nevertheless, it is true. As an example take the euro (€)–dollar ($) relationship and apply it to the hypo- thetical case where a German and an American are car shopping. Suppose each person is looking to buy a midsized sedan and each is comparing a German-made car with an American-made alterna- tive. Each, after extensive research, has decided they are of equal quality and overall appeal and that each will simply buy whichever one is cheaper.

Keeping in mind that the euro was created in the 1990s to replace various European currencies and its value was originally pegged to equal one U.S. dollar, then if they are of equal value, the exchange rate is 1–1 (one euro equals one U.S. dollar). That would mean that if each of the cars was equally priced in both the United States and Germany, both cars would cost $30,000 in the United States and both cars would cost 30,000€ in Germany.

Now suppose that American dealers of German cars must buy those cars from Germany for 25,000€ and that German dealers of American cars must buy those cars from the United States for $25,000. That means that American dealers pay $25,000 to a bank to get 25,000€ and German dealers pay 25,000€ to a bank to get $25,000.

If the dollar gets substantially stronger so that the exchange rate moves to 1.00–0.75 (one euro equals 75 cents), then German dealers of American cars would have to pay 33,333€ to a bank to get $25,000 to buy the car from America. To maintain the 5,000€ margin they had been making at the old exchange rate, they would have to raise the price of American cars in Germany to 38,333€. The American dealer of German cars would now need only $18,750 to

get the 25,000€ and could therefore maintain the $5,000 margin by charging a price of $23,750 for German cars. Thus, the American is now more likely to buy the imported (German) car and the German is more likely to buy the domestic (German) car. Thus, a stronger dollar increases imports and decreases exports in the United States.

Before the United States, as well as the rest of the world, plunged into a deep recession in 2007–2009, the dollar was very weak rela- tive to the euro ($1 equaled around 0.64 euros). This was one rea- son why, until fall 2008, it seemed possible the United States might avoid a recession. American exports were rising at such a rapid pace that it seemed possible that the United States might avoid the deep recession that had already begun in Europe. When the financial crisis of fall 2008 arrived, that hope faded. Though the crisis began with American banks buckling under the weight of massive home foreclo- sures, the United States was still seen as a safer place to ride out the recession. Foreign investors sought out dollars to invest in United States government bonds. This resulted in a rapid strengthening of the dollar relative to the euro. In the course of 80 days between August and November, the dollar rose to being worth 0.81 euros, a nearly 25 percent appreciation. While this may have been good for American morale, it was not at all helpful to American exporters.

As the recoveries in Europe and the United States plodded along through the first half of the next decade, the value of the dollar con- tinued to fluctuate relative to the euro. It fell to as low as $1 equaling 0.68 euros only to rise to $1 equaling 0.81 euros during the first crisis over Greek debt. As the U.S. tightened its monetary stimulus between 2014 and 2016, the Europeans were doing the opposite such that the euro fell in value to near par with the dollar. That, in turn, dampened American exports to Europe.

W H Y A S T R O N G D O L L A R I S N ’ T N E C E S S A R I L Y G O O D

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112 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

debt to buy durable goods. As businesses have more confidence in their ability to sell their products, they will invest more in their productive capacity. Any reduction in that confidence will, of course, have the opposite effect. It will lessen aggregate demand and move the curve to the left on the graph.

The effect of foreign exchange rates on aggregate demand is complicated by the fact that though exchange rates are widely published, the fashion in which they are published is often confusing. The Japanese yen typically is expressed in terms of how many yen it takes to buy a U.S. dollar, whereas the British pound typically is expressed in terms of how many dollars it takes to buy the pound. It is as if you went into one bakery looking to buy a dozen donuts and they quoted prices in terms of the number of donuts you can buy for a dollar and another bakery quoted prices in terms of the money you needed to buy a single donut. With a bit of arithmetic you can do the comparison; it just takes a minute. This aside, we can say that if the dollar becomes stronger, exports will fall and imports will rise. Thus a strong dollar reduces aggregate demand, moving it to the left on the graph. Of course, a weaker dollar has the opposite impact. Aggregate demand increases and moves the curve to the right on the graph.

The only variable that impacts aggregate demand directly, one that needs little explanation, is government spending. Because government spending on goods and services is a direct part of the addition that makes up aggregate demand, the impact is direct. An increase in govern- ment spending causes an increase in aggregate demand, and a decrease in government spend- ing causes a decrease in aggregate demand. Therefore, an increase in government spending will move the aggregate demand curve to the right and a decrease in government spending will move the curve to the left.

These impacts are summarized in Table 8.1. The effect of an increase in aggregate demand is shown in Figure 8.3, and the effect of a decrease in aggregate demand is shown in Figure 8.4.

Recall, if you will, the Chapter 2 admonition against trying to memorize Table 8.1 as it ap- plies to Figures 8.3 and 8.4. Here, as it was in Chapter 2’s discussion of supply and demand determinants and curve shifts, the advice is to use these tables and figures as a cross-check against your own intuition and understanding. For example, if you were faced with the problem of analyzing a tax increase, you would understand that taxes take money out of the hands of consumers and business and thereby reduce the ability of these groups to buy goods and ser- vices. That decreases aggregate demand. An aggregate demand decrease is depicted as leftward movement of aggregate demand. Were you to follow that intuition and understanding, you could check your conclusion against Table 8.1 and Figure 8.4.

Variable Part of Aggregate Demand Affected

Effect of an Increase in Variable on the Movement of Aggregate Demand

Effect of a Decrease in the Variable on the Movement of Aggregate Demand

Taxes Consumption Investment

Decreases AD so curve moves left

Increases AD so curve moves right

Interest rates Consumption Investment

Decreases AD so curve moves left

Increases AD so curve moves right

Confidence Consumption Investment

Increases AD so curve moves right

Decreases AD so curve moves left

Strength of the dollar

Exports and imports

Decreases AD so curve moves left

Increases AD so curve moves right

Government spending

Government spending

Increases AD so curve moves right

Decreases AD so curve moves left

TABLE 8.1 Determinants of aggregate demand.

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Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply 113

Variables That Shift Aggregate Supply Just as there are factors that will change aggregate demand, there are important factors that will change aggregate supply. These are factors that are important to business. Any change that increases business costs will be important in terms of aggregate supply. Other factors that matter are government regulations and factors affecting productivity.

Any factor that will increase costs of production will hurt aggregate supply. That is, an in- crease in labor costs or other input costs will decrease aggregate supply and shift the curve to the left, whereas a decrease in those costs will increase aggregate supply and move the curve to the right. Along with any or all other costs of doing business, interest rates also impact the aggregate supply curve in that they affect borrowing costs on lines of credit used to keep cash- flow problems at a minimum.

Similarly, if government regulations increase costs of production in some way, then ag- gregate supply will decrease and the curve will shift to the left. Deregulation will have the op- posite impact because firms can eliminate costs of complying with regulations. Last, if firms become more productive perhaps through the use of better technology, then aggregate supply will increase and the curve will shift to the right.

Table 8.2 summarizes these impacts; Figures 8.5 and 8.6 summarize the impacts of these shifts on an aggregate supply–aggregate demand diagram. Figure 8.5 shows the impact of an increase in aggregate supply, and Figure 8.6 shows a decrease in aggregate supply.

Now apply the admonition against memorization to Table 8.2 as it applies to Figures 8.5 and 8.6. For example, if you were faced with the problem of analyzing a productivity increase, you would understand that productivity increases enhance the ability of firms to produce goods and services. That increases aggregate supply. An aggregate supply

Variable

Effect of an Increase in the Variable on the Movement of Aggregate Supply

Effect of a Decrease in the Variable on the Movement of Aggregate Supply

Input prices Decreases AS so curve moves left

Increases AS so curve moves right

Productivity Increases AS so curve moves right

Decreases AS so curve moves left

Government regulation Decreases AS so curve moves left

Increases AS so curve moves right

TABLE 8.2 Determinants of aggregate supply.

PI

AD

PIʹ

PI*

ADʹ

AS

RGDPRGDPʹ RGDP*

FIGURE 8.4 Aggregate demand decreases, causing it to move to the left on the graph.

PI

PIʹ

ADʹ

PI*

AD

AS

RGDPRGDP* RGDPʹ

FIGURE 8.3 Aggregate demand increases, causing it to move to the right on the graph.

gue46399_ch08_107-118.indd 113 16/03/17 11:40 AM

114 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

increase is depicted as a movement down and to the right for aggregate supply. Were you to follow that intuition and understanding, you could check your conclusion against Table 8.2 and Figure 8.5.

Causes of Inflation

As can be seen in Figures 8.3 and 8.6, increases in prices can result from demand-side impacts or supply-side impacts. Anything that causes the aggregate demand curve to move to the right increases prices. Economists refer to the inflation caused for this reason as demand-pull inflation. Anything that causes the aggregate supply curve to move to the left also increases prices. Economists refer to the inflation caused for this reason as cost-push inflation.

Many of the things that move the aggregate demand curve to the right are things that government manipulates. If government spending is increased or taxes are decreased, aggre- gate demand is increased and demand-pull inflation occurs. In addition, monetary policy— government decisions about the money supply—purposefully influences interest rates. If the impact of that policy is the lowering of the rates, then the aggregate demand increases as a result of the increase in interest-sensitive consumption and investment.

During the 1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson was simultaneously carrying on the Vietnam War and attempting to wage a war on poverty, there was a substantial concern of demand-pull inflation. Government spending was increasing rapidly, and though taxes during this period also increased, inflation increased from 1 percent in 1965 to 6 percent in 1970.

Input costs are important influences on the aggregate supply curve. For example, an in- crease in wages that comes about because of either market actions or legislation will move the aggregate supply curve to the left, thereby increasing prices. Increases in such things as oil prices will have a similar effect on the aggregate supply curve.

The inflation of the late 1970s was largely attributable to increases in oil prices. Oil, a significant input to production throughout the economy, increased from $5.21 per barrel in 1973 to $35.15 per barrel in 1981. This, in turn, contributed to inflation rising from 3 percent in 1972 to 18 percent in the first quarter of 1980. Similarly, the short spike in inflation during 2007 through early 2008 was due, in large part, to the tripling of world oil prices during the same period. The impact of the revolutions in the Middle East during early 2011, from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere, caused many to be concerned that oil-related inflation would choke off the slow recoveries taking place in the United States and Europe.

demand-pull inflation Inflation caused by an increase in aggregate demand.

cost-push inflation Inflation caused by a decrease in aggregate supply.

PI

PIʹ

AD

PI*

ASʹ AS

RGDPRGDP* RGDPʹ

FIGURE 8.5 Aggregate supply increases causing it to move to the right on the graph.

PI

PIʹ

AD

PI*

ASʹ AS

RGDPRGDP*RGDPʹ

FIGURE 8.6 Aggregate supply decreases causing it to move to the left on the graph.

gue46399_ch08_107-118.indd 114 16/03/17 11:40 AM

How the Government Can Influence (but Probably Not Control) the Economy 115

How the Government Can Influence (but Probably Not Control) the Economy

In looking at the determinants of aggregate demand and the determinants of aggregate supply, it is clear that government can influence the economy in a number of ways. Taxes, interest rates, the strength of the dollar, and government spending make up four of the five determi- nants of aggregate demand outlined in Table 8.1, and these are quite clearly areas where the government can exert influence. Input prices and government regulation show up as deter- minants of aggregate supply in Table 8.2. The latter is quite obviously under the control of government, and there are aspects of the former in which influence is possible.

Demand-Side Macroeconomics While Chapters 9 and 10 offer more detail on how government policy makers can influ- ence the economy via the demand side, it is worth mentioning here as well. By raising or lowering taxes or by raising or lowering spending, Congress and the president can influence aggregate demand and thereby influence prices and output. Similarly, by raising or lowering target interest rates, the Federal Reserve can influence aggregate demand. To a lesser extent, governments—through their ability to buy or sell world currencies—can influence the value of their own currency. These are the means by which government can steer an economy out of a recession. The rapid reductions in interest rates that occurred between January 2001 and summer 2003, the cut of short-term interest rates to nearly zero in late 2008, the large-scale purchase of mortgage-backed securities by the Federal Reserve in 2008 and again from 2010 into 2013, the tax rebate checks generated in 2001, 2003, and 2008, as well as the Obama-era stimulus plan were all attempts to jump-start the economy on the demand side.

Supply-Side Macroeconomics During the late 1970s a new way of thinking about government’s ability to influence the economy began to arise. Basically, the new way of thinking involved policy actions that would influence the aggregate supply curve. We have already seen that government spend- ing and interest rate policy influence the aggregate demand curve. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show that any movement in the aggregate demand curve will either increase RGDP but also in- crease inflation, or decrease RGDP but also decrease inflation. Movements in the aggregate supply curve to the right have only good consequences: Inflation is reduced and RGDP is increased.

Supply-side economics involves influencing the aggregate supply curve by lowering input costs, reducing regulation, and increasing incentives for hard work and innovation. Though advocates of supply-side economics usually advocate for changes in the tax code, such changes are not necessary. Only some of the actions the Reagan administration (1981–1989) took are properly understood as supply-side actions: Tax cuts aimed at businesses (the in- vestment tax credit and accelerated depreciation schedules), tax code changes that signifi- cantly reduced marginal tax rates, attempts at deregulation and lax enforcement of existing regulations, and vetoing of increases in the minimum wage are clearly supply-side policies. These policies, advocates suggest, increased the incentive to innovate, take risks, and work hard by increasing after-tax rewards or by removing impediments. On the other hand, de- tractors argue, the large part of the tax cuts to individuals that resulted from higher standard deductions, and the even larger defense buildup, are properly thought of as typical aggregate demand-side policy.

The biggest supply-side impact in the 1980s was that the price of a barrel of oil fell from $40 to less than $10. More recently, the tax cuts proposed by President Bush in

supply-side economics Government policy intended to influence the economy through aggregate supply by lowering input costs and reducing regulation.

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116 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

2003 to eliminate the taxation of corporate dividends are properly thought of as supply- side economics. The argument he was making was that eliminating the double taxation of corporate dividends would stimulate businesses to invest in productivity increasing assets. Whether or not his logic was on target or flawed, the 2003 tax cut did not eliminate double taxation, though it did reduce the top tax rates on capital gains, an objective of supply-side economists. These tax cuts were a major point of difference between President Obama and Senator McCain during the 2008 campaign and between him and Governor Romney during the 2012 campaign. When Republicans won significant electoral victories in 2010, Obama agreed to extend those cuts through 2012—all because he believed that allowing taxes to rise at that time would have negative supply and demand–side impacts. When the president won reelection in 2012, he had his way with tax rate increases for certain high- income earners.

This chapter introduced the aggregate demand and aggregate supply model that we will use when discussing the macroeconomy and macroeconomic issues. We first examined aggregate demand and aggregate supply in isolation, explaining why aggregate demand is downward sloping. We also looked at the shape of the aggregate supply curve in the context of the differ- ences between classical and Keynesian views of both aggregate supply and full employment. When they were combined as one, we were able to show what happens when certain macro- economic variables change. In that way we used them to explain the concepts of cost-push and demand-pull inflation and of supply-side economics.

Summary

Key Terms aggregate demand (AD) aggregate supply (AS) cost-push inflation

demand-pull inflation foreign purchases effect interest rate effect

real-balances effect supply-side economics

1. Any event that creates a “crisis in confidence” is likely to lead to a. higher aggregate prices. b. higher aggregate output. c. lower aggregate prices. d. inflation.

2. Use the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model to determine which of the following will lead to higher prices. a. A tax increase b. A fall in world oil prices c. An increase in interest rates d. An increase in government spending

Quiz Yourself

Issues Chapters You Are Ready for Now

Fiscal Policy Monetary Policy

Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

The Housing Bubble

Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?

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Summary 117

3. Use the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model to determine which of the following will lead to higher aggregate output. a. A tax increase b. A spike in world oil prices c. A cut in interest rates d. A cut in government spending

4. Congress and the president have control of the tax system and government spending. As a result, their policies will directly impact a. aggregate supply. b. aggregate demand. c. residual demand. d. the demand for loanable dollars.

5. The Federal Reserve has indirect control over short-term interest rates, and, as a result, their ability to control economic activity is through a. aggregate supply. b. aggregate demand. c. residual demand. d. the exchange rate.

6. An economist worrying about the economic impact of environmental regulations would model that impact with a a. decrease in aggregate supply. b. increase in aggregate supply. c. decrease in aggregate demand. d. increase in aggregate demand.

7. Disagreements about the shape of the aggregate supply curve focus on the degree of ___________ in the economy. a. unemployment b. inflation c. fraud d. confidence

8. The use of a backward L–shaped aggregate supply curve allows us to _______________ in a way that other shapes would not. a. consider various levels of prices b. consider different macroeconomic points of view c. deal with shifting curves d. create an equilibrium

Short Answer Questions

1. Of the reasons that the aggregate demand curve and the demand curve are downward sloping, each has one labeled the “real balance effect.” How are they different?

2. If we want our president to “do something” about the economy, what do we usually have in mind? How can we use the aggregate demand–aggregate supply model to show that what we have in mind will work?

3. Suppose a president says: “We are in a crisis and on the verge of another Great Depres- sion. We need to increase government spending to give the economy a boost.” What determinant of aggregate demand is the president counting on to keep us out of that depression? What determinant of aggregate demand is the president hoping you do not respond to?

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118 Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply

4. Explain the chain of events that connect an overall price increase to a decrease in aggre- gate demand using the interest rate effect.

5. Define aggregate demand. Then, list and explain the intuitive reasons why aggregate demand is downward sloping.

6. Discuss the shape of the aggregate supply curve by listing and explaining the reasons behind the various ranges.

7. List and explain the three ways that the Federal Reserve controls the money supply (i.e., tools of the monetary authority).

Think about This President Harry Truman once lamented that he wanted a “one-handed economist” because we economists have a tendency to say “on the one hand . . . but on the other hand. . . .” Economists have never made very good presidential aides because we respect the uncertainty of things; we rarely give straight answers because there are rarely simple, straight answers to give. Macro- economics generally, and the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model specifically, embrace that uncertainty. If you were a political leader, would you want a “one-handed” economist?

Talk about This The aggregate supply–aggregate demand model can be useful in predicting macroeconomic consequences of policy actions (like tax cuts, government spending increases, regulatory ac- tions, interest rate adjustments). It does not tell you about the distributional aspects of policy actions. For instance, a regulatory requirement that all employers offer health insurance would shift the aggregate supply curve to the left, increasing prices and decreasing real GDP. Does that make it a bad idea? Would the impact of such a regulation on health care availability counteract these macroeconomic consequences in your mind?

gue46399_ch08_107-118.indd 118 16/03/17 11:40 AM

C H A P T E R N I N E

119

Fiscal Policy Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe and model discretionary and nondiscretionary fiscal policy using an aggregate supply and aggregate demand diagram.

LO2 Distinguish between aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks.

LO3 Acknowledge and enumerate the problems associated with discretionary fiscal policy.

LO4 Describe nondiscretionary fiscal policy as the mainstay of our current macroeconomic system.

Chapter Outline

Nondiscretionary and Discretionary Fiscal Policy

Using Fiscal Policy to Counteract “Shocks”

Evaluating Fiscal Policy

The Obama Stimulus Plan

Kick It Up a Notch: Aggregate Supply Shocks

Summary

When you want government to “do something” about the economy, you are typically referring to fiscal policy, which was considered a vital tool in macroeconomics at one time. Fiscal policy is the purposeful movements in government spending or tax policy designed to direct an economy. In the United States, fiscal policy is deter-

mined by the Congress and the president.

Fiscal policy is not simply one idea; it is really two. Dis- cretionary fiscal policy consists of actions taken at the time of a problem to alter the economy of the moment. Nondiscretionary fiscal policy is that set of policies that are built into the system to stabilize the economy when growth is either too fast or too slow.

Discretionary and nondis- cretionary fiscal policy are de- scribed first. Then we consider the benefits of nondiscretionary fiscal policy and explain why

some argue that discretionary fiscal policy cannot claim similar benefits. We use that discussion to examine why policy makers had abandoned discretionary fiscal policy for many years. We finish by discussing the two Bush tax cuts, and specifically the child-credit rebates, in the context of reviving discretionary fiscal policy.

Nondiscretionary and Discretionary Fiscal Policy

How They Work The difference between nondiscretionary and discretion- ary fiscal policy is that one is automatic and the other is not. Nondiscretionary fiscal policy, for example, in- cludes government policies that stimulate the economy when it needs stimulus and dampen it when it needs to be dampened. Under discretionary fiscal policy, Congress and the president agree on a course of action to stimulate or dampen the economy at a specific time.

Nondiscretionary fiscal policy is at work every day as a result of policies enacted years ago. Every time you get a raise, move to a better job, or make a killing in the stock market, the government takes a portion of

fiscal policy The purposeful move- ments in government spending or tax policy designed to direct an economy.

discretionary fiscal policy Government spend- ing and tax changes enacted at the time of the problem to alter the economy.

nondiscretionary fiscal policy A set of policies that are built into the system to stabilize the economy.

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120 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

your improved income in taxes. The effect on your as- sets becomes more pronounced as you advance in the tax brackets, because when you make more money you pay a higher percentage of that income in taxes. If you happened to have been a welfare recipient and you have found a job, the effect is even greater. Not only is the government now not providing you with money, but also is withholding taxes from your pay. In both cases, the effect of nondiscretionary fiscal policy is dampening the increase in your income.

Of course, nondiscretionary fiscal policy can have the opposite effect as well. If you lose your job, get demoted, or lose a lot of money in the market, your tax burden falls. If you lose your job and go back on welfare, the effect is again magnified. The government is not taking money from you but is giving money to you. This stimu- lates the economy somewhat, and it thus has the effect of helping to counteract the loss you incurred.

Because our progressive income tax system in- creases the percentage that you pay in taxes as you make more money and because federal and state pro- grams are in place that offer economic assistance when you need it, nondiscretionary fiscal policy is constantly working to stabilize the economy. No one has to use any discretion—that is, make any decisions—to make it work. Therefore, it is called nondiscretionary fiscal policy. Because the actions are built into the system, nondiscretionary fiscal policy is often referred to as a built-in stabilizer.

With discretionary fiscal policy, on the other hand, action is required by Congress and the president. When each decides that the economy is in need of a specific ac- tion that will properly stimulate or dampen it, the usual actions that they consider involve changes in taxes or spending policies. Historically, fiscal policy has been used to stimulate an economy in recession but rarely to dampen an economy that is running too hot.1

The specific policy actions used in the past were tax cuts and funding of public works projects to give jobs to people who were unemployed. In the middle 1970s, for example, President Gerald Ford sought to provide each taxpayer with a tax rebate of $50. During the Great De- pression many unemployed workers found jobs in gov- ernment programs that built roads, dams, and bridges.

During his 2008 campaign, President Barack Obama promised a middle-class tax cut while promising to re- peal tax cuts passed during the prior administration that

went primarily to those wealthy Americans earning more than $250,000. President Obama’s election in the midst of the financial crisis of fall 2008 was quickly followed by the worst holiday shopping period in 40 years. In this context, the incoming Obama administration spent considerable time during the transition contemplating a fiscal stimulus package. What emerged was a package that included tax cuts for individuals, an extension of and an increase in unemployment benefits, aid to state and local governments both to account for the expected in- creases in Medicaid enrollment and to forestall the need for significant state and local budget cuts, spending on a series of projects that were priorities for Democrats, and spending on what were called “shovel-ready” infrastruc- ture projects.

The individual tax cuts were structured differently from the 2001, 2003, and 2008 rebates in that they were implemented through short-term changes to withholding tables. The Bush rebates came first with paper checks, then with a combination of paper checks and direct de- posits to banks. With each rebate there was a period of time from the passage of the package to the time when the money was in the hands of the consumer. The econ- omists advising President Obama were convinced that there were two significant problems with the Bush-era rebates. They took too long to get into taxpayers’ hands and too much of the money was saved rather than spent. They believed that by changing withholding tables they could speed up the process as well as induce more spend- ing by giving average taxpayers smaller amounts per week rather than a large amount at once.

Using Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand to Model Fiscal Policy Our aggregate supply and aggregate demand model is a useful tool for examining the effect of both forms of fiscal policy. Both discretionary and nondiscretion- ary fiscal policy work to move the aggregate demand curve. Figure 9.1 shows the effect of expansionary fiscal policy and Figure 9.2 shows the effect of contraction- ary fiscal policy. Expansionary fiscal policy options, such as increased government spending and decreases in taxes, are reflected in an aggregate demand curve that moves to the right. Contractionary fiscal policy options, including decreased government spending and increases in taxes, are seen in an aggregate demand curve that moves to the left.

It should be noted that there is considerable debate over whether any fiscal policy will have a real impact

1A one-year 10 percent surtax was added to income taxes in the Lyndon Johnson administration. Some justified this action as an effort to combat inflation.

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Using Fiscal Policy to Counteract “Shocks” 121

on the economy. A useful but relatively simplistic way of thinking about this argument is to frame it in terms of where on the aggregate supply curve the economy lies. Those who believe that we are on the vertical portion of the curve argue that any expansionary fiscal policy will be completely ineffective. It will merely create inflation without bolstering output.

It is worth mentioning that the money necessary to engage in expansionary fiscal policy does not come out of thin air. The increased government spending and the reduced tax revenue generate a shortfall that must be made up with either borrowing or printing the requisite money. Economists do not consider the latter option a good one in that inflation is nearly always the result. Thus deficits financed through borrowing money tend to be the result of expansionary fiscal policy.

Using Fiscal Policy to Counteract “Shocks”

Aggregate Demand Shocks Neither expansionary nor contractionary actions happen in a vacuum. They happen because the economy moves unexpectedly to make RGDP much higher or much lower than policy makers think is healthy. Figures 9.3 and 9.4

show the impact of these shocks, or unexpected moves. In each we suppose that aggregate de- mand is what moves unexpect-

edly, and in each we start with it at AD1. Because of a shock it unexpectedly moves to AD2. If a slump in ag- gregate demand causes a recession, like Figure 9.3, then

shock Any unanticipated economic event.

FIGURE 9.1 Expansionary fiscal policy.

PI

PIʹ

ADʹ

PI*

AD

AS

RGDPRGDPʹRGDP*

FIGURE 9.2 Contractionary fiscal policy.

PI

PIʹ

AD

PI*

ADʹ

AS

RGDPRGDPʹ RGDP*

FIGURE 9.3 A negative aggregate demand shock.

Pl

Pl*

Shock

AS

RGDPRGDP*

AD1

AD2

FIGURE 9.4 A positive aggregate demand shock.

Pl

Pl*

Shock AS

RGDPRGDP*

AD 1

AD2

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122 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

the aggregate demand curve moves from AD1 to AD2. When people lose their jobs, welfare spending will have to rise and tax revenue will fall. As Figure 9.5 shows, this nondiscretionary fiscal policy moves the aggregate demand curve partially back to AD3. Expansionary dis- cretionary fiscal policy (either increases in government spending or decreases in taxes) can move aggregate demand all the way back to AD1.

If a jump in aggregate demand causes an overheated economy, like Figure 9.4, then the aggregate demand curve moves from AD1 to AD2. When people get bet- ter jobs or raises, welfare spending will fall and tax revenue will rise. As Figure 9.6 shows, this nondiscre- tionary fiscal policy moves the aggregate demand curve partially back to AD3. Contractionary discretionary fis- cal policy (either decreases in government spending or

increases in taxes) can move aggregate demand all the way back to AD1.

Nondiscretionary fiscal policy (NDFP) moves it back toward AD1 to AD3, and discretionary fiscal pol- icy (DFP) can move it all the way back to AD1 again. In theory, whether the economy experiences a positive demand shock or a negative one, the government can use both discretionary and nondiscretionary fiscal policy to return us to a healthy economy.

We need to ask at this point how it is that aggregate demand can move unexpectedly. There are a number of reasons and each involves the reaction of people to their predictions of the future. If people’s positive view of the health of the economy spurs them to buy new cars or fur- nishings, an aggregate demand curve will move to the right. If the opposite happens and people decide to delay buying these expensive items because of negative feel-

ings about the economy, the ag- gregate demand curve will move to the left. Tracking the “feeling” that people have about the econ- omy is not easy and therefore large, unexpected swings can

upset the economy. Economists call these swings aggregate demand shocks.

Aggregate Supply Shocks Along with aggregate demand shocks, we must also deal with the problem of aggregate supply shocks. Usu-

ally an aggregate supply shock involves an important natural re- source. It should come as no sur- prise that recent supply shocks have all involved the price of oil.

During the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, for example, the price of oil climbed dramatically. During the Iran–Iraq war, the price of oil fell dramatically as both sides increased pro- duction to pay for war material. The tripling of world oil prices from 2007 to mid-2008 and the dramatic plummet- ing of those prices from summer 2008 through early 2009 each had dramatic aggregate supply impacts.

Even more recently, the early 2011 uprisings through- out the Middle East illustrated the uncertainty effect of these supply shocks. Crude oil prices, which were below $80 per barrel in January 2011, rose above $100 per bar- rel with the Libyan uprising, even though Libya itself is a relatively minor producer of oil (3 percent of world production).

Whether drastic changes are positive or negative, pol- icy makers are frequently called upon to do something to

aggregate demand shock An unexpected event that causes aggregate demand to increase or decrease.

FIGURE 9.5 Nondiscretionary and discretionary fiscal policy as it combats a recession.

PI

PI*

AD1 AD3AD2

NDFP

DFP

Shock

AS

RGDPRGDP*

FIGURE 9.6 Nondiscretionary and discretionary fiscal policy as it combats an overheated economy.

PI

PI*

AD1

AD3

AD2

NDFP

DFP

Shock

AS

RGDP

aggregate supply shock An unexpected event that causes aggregate supply to increase or decrease.

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Evaluating Fiscal Policy 123

counter that aggregate supply shock, and, because they very frequently have little control over the events that cause those shocks, they may wish to use discretionary fiscal policy to mitigate the economic impact.

Evaluating Fiscal Policy

Nondiscretionary Fiscal Policy Nondiscretionary fiscal policy serves to get output mov- ing back toward the desired level, RGDP*, but it works much better when the shock is to aggregate demand rather than to aggregate supply. In addition, even though previous Congresses and presidents developed tax and spending policies to get the country out of a recession, such discretionary fiscal policy just does not work as well as does nondiscretionary policy.

Since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the U.S. economy has successfully avoided the sorts of boom and bust cycles that plagued the 19th century. The degree to which the built-in stabilizing effect of a welfare state and a progressive tax system generated this state of affairs is debated by economic historians. The two most significant post–World War II recessions, the one in 1982 and the one that extended from late 2007 to mid-2009, were far less onerous than any of the financial panics of the 1800s.

Discretionary Fiscal Policy You might think that discretionary fiscal policy would work as well. If you did, you would be wrong, but you would be in good company. By the 1950s and 1960s, most economists were confident that discretionary fis- cal policy would essentially eliminate the instability of recessions. By 1980 most economists had given up on discretionary fiscal policy. Coincidentally or not, during the 20 years that followed, the United States experienced half the usual number of recessions.

What transformed economists from overconfident dis- cretionary fiscal policy champions in the 1960s to ardent detractors in the 1980s was the very poor performance of these policies during the 1970s. The preceding aggregate demand and aggregate supply analysis is nice to look at, and the nondiscretionary fiscal policy part does work as advertised, but discretionary fiscal policy was more of a fantasy of economists. In the 1950s and 1960s, econo- mists were confident that Congress could know exactly how much stimulus or dampening would be necessary to get the economy back to a desired level of RGDP. Con- gress would then pass a bill that the president would sign

to implement that policy. As a practical matter, it just did not work in the ways economists predicted it would.

The reasons discretionary fiscal policy does not work as well as advertised (or perhaps at all) are threefold. First, the failures can be attributed to lags in recognizing, administering, and operating fiscal policy. Second, the failures can result from political motivations overwhelm- ing economic reason, and third, there can be immediate counter-effects with both aggregate demand and aggre- gate supply, which partially or completely eliminate the positive intent of the policies.

On the issue of the lags, the first of these is the recognition lag, which means that the econ- omy in general, and RGDP in particular, is measured with a considerable lag. The second, the administrative lag, results because it takes time for Con- gress and the president to agree on a course of action. The third, the operational lag, results be- cause it takes quite awhile for the full impact of a government program or tax change to have its effect on the economy.

The recognition lag results from the fact that gross do- mestic product is not easily and immediately measured. Quarterly GDP is first estimated using reasonably good predictors that are available soon after the end of the quarter. Later, more data are brought to bear and GDP is reestimated. Only after many months is a final GDP fig- ure given. Thus we do not know for sure whether we are in a recession until months after it begins. Similarly, we do not know when we are out of a recession until months after it ends. The problem this creates was highlighted by the 2007–2009 recession. It was late fall 2008 before the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee identified fall 2007 as the beginning of the recession. While it was clear by late summer 2008 that the economy was slowing dramatically, it was a full year after the recession began before it was universally acknowledged. At the end of the 2001 recession, the economy was growing so slowly that it took until sum- mer 2003 for economists to declare the recession had actually ended in the fall of 2001. This meant that by the time they had declared a recession had started, it was almost over and by the time they had declared it over, it had actually been over for a year and a half. The reces- sion of 2007–2009 was not declared to have ended in

recognition lag The time it takes to measure the state of the economy.

administrative lag The time it takes for Congress and the president to agree on a course of action.

operational lag The time it takes for the full impact of a govern- ment program or tax change to have its effect on the economy.

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124 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

June 2009 until September 2010. The stimulus package had not yet spent more than 10 percent of the allocated funds by that time.

The administrative lag results from the inherent inef- ficiency of American democracy. We have two legisla- tive bodies that must first agree with each other and then must agree with the president. The president, the House, or the Senate can delay or derail fiscal policy. Even if they choose to work on a given problem, Congress never solves a problem without disagreements. They may agree, for example, that we are in a recession but will not be able to decide whether to engage in discretionary fiscal policy through tax cuts or through spending programs. Even when they agree on that, they may argue over the kinds of tax cuts to make, who should get them, what kinds of spending programs would be appropriate, and the con- gressional districts that should be benefited. By the time they finally agree, of course, more time has passed.

This is quite well illustrated by the political wrangling over the 2008 financial system rescue plan and the 2009 stimulus package. Both presidential candidates were in agreement that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was necessary, but it took nearly a month for the plan to pass. Even with significant majorities in both houses and two and a half months from his election to his swearing in, it took President Obama five additional weeks to get a stimulus plan through Congress. Much of the disagreement surrounded the size and composition of the package. Conservative economists and members of Congress were concerned about the budget deficit impli- cations of the package. Liberal economists and members of Congress were concerned that the package would be of insufficient size to have the desired impact. These are perfectly legitimate differences of opinion, but the debate took time.

The operational lag offers the final roadblock to ef- fective discretionary fiscal policy. Even supposing that Congress and the president agree on time that a policy is needed and they agree on the type of policy, it takes months, if not years, for discretionary fiscal policy to have its desired effects.

If the discretionary fiscal policy takes the form of increases in highway construction, a program that in- creases the numbers of jobs available, federal contracts usually do not pay the entire amount up front. Contrac- tors are paid in the stages of building, and it takes quite awhile to go from the beginning of a large construction project to its end. To avoid this delay, the Obama stimu- lus package hoped to include mostly “shovel-ready” in- frastructure plans. The idea was to take plans that had

already gone through the design phase. In so doing, the hope was to get these projects started the moment funds became available. It bears repeating that when the reces- sion of 2007–2009 ended in June 2009, less than 10 per- cent of the stimulus funds from the bill that had passed that February had been spent.

As for the tax aspects of fiscal policy, the vast major- ity of the money going to taxpayers went to them well after it was needed. The 2001, 2003, and 2008 summer rebate checks and the change to withholding tables in 2009 are evidence that tax cuts can make their way into the economy somewhat more quickly. In the pre-2009 cases, the laws generating the rebates were passed at least six months before the money was fully in the hands of consumers. The downside to these relatively quick tax cuts is that their impacts are often muted by those who use the extra money to save or to pay down existing debt.

The Political Problems with Fiscal Policy Another argument against discretionary fiscal policy is that even if it worked, vote-obsessed politicians would not use it properly. Aside from the bias toward expan- sionary fiscal policy alluded to in the introduction, there is the question of who will be affected by any changes in taxation or spending policies. In addition, there is the complication caused by politicians too concerned with re- election. They seek to expand the economy in presidential election years only to act responsibly after the election.

The first of these issues raises questions of political motivation. Whether large-scale, federally funded build- ing projects are needed is one question; where they will go is quite another. For instance, whether the revamped Boston mass transit system, referred to by many as the “big dig,” was motivated by purely engineering reasons or because influential members of Congress lived in the area is debatable. Similarly, critics have charged that political influence alone was behind the placement of a majority of highway demonstration projects in the early 1990s in West Virginia. While these are examples of Democrats engaging in steering tax dollars, Republicans too have engaged in such practices. Between 1995 and 2001, the GOP majority leader and the chair of the Sen- ate Appropriations Committee made certain that dispro- portionate dollars were spent in their home states. The infamous “bridge to nowhere” in Alaska provides an excellent example of politically motivated infrastructure projects. Noted economist James Buchanan and others have suggested that all federal spending, but in particular that spending that is done in the name of fiscal policy, is susceptible to this kind of problem.

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Evaluating Fiscal Policy 125

There is also the problem of the political business cycle. It is suggested that politicians, particularly presi-

dents, will add new spending and tax policies to their pre- election-year budgets to boost the economy in time for their own or their party’s reelection.

Table 9.1 suggests that this might be the case, given that the average of growth rates in the fourth year of presi- dential terms of office is slightly higher than that of first- year growth rates.

Criticism from the Right and Left There were many economists, mainly on the conserva- tive end of the spectrum, who advised against a fiscal stimulus of any kind and then were only too happy to say “I told you so” when, by their calculations, the impact of the 2009 stimulus package was less than the Obama ad- ministration had predicted. John Cogan, John Taylor, and others argued that the impact was, if anything, small and temporary, and quite possibly negative. They argued that the only way to truly stimulate consumption and invest- ment is to make long-term structural changes to tax rates in ways that consumers and businesses can confidently predict that their future after-tax income will be higher.

Liberal (and Nobel Prize–winning) economist Paul Krugman was just as derisive of the stimulus package as

political business cycle Politically motivated fiscal policy used for short-term gain just prior to elections.

these conservative economists, yet his point of attack was that it was predictably too small to have any of its desired impacts. While dismissing the conservative economists’ estimation of the importance of, as he called it, “the con- fidence fairy,” he and others argued as early as December 2008 that policy makers were understating what was nec- essary by a factor of at least two. Since that time Krugman repeatedly pointed to the fact that total government spend- ing declined in 2010 and 2011 because state and local governments were cutting back on spending by more than the federal government was increasing spending.

The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Discretionary Fiscal Policy In the 1970s it became apparent to policy makers that discretionary fiscal policy was not up to the task of sta- bilizing the economy. The lags were just too important to ignore, and the recessions of the 1970s had been too short for these recessions to be recognized, laws to be passed, and money spent in time to have any effect on them.

Despite the preceding cautions about the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy, its arguments have been used to bolster particular programs. President Clinton used the discretionary fiscal policy argument in 1993 to bolster a $16 billion investment program. Critics defeated his proposal, suggesting that we were already out of the recession and its size was too small to have any impact.

President First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year

Truman −0.5 8.7 8.1 4.1 Eisenhower I 4.7 −0.6 7.1 2.1 Eisenhower II 2.1 −0.7 6.9 2.6 Kennedy/Johnson 2.6 6.1 4.4 5.8 Johnson 6.5 6.6 2.7 4.9 Nixon I 3.1 0.2 3.3 5.2 Nixon II/Ford 5.6 −0.5 −0.2 5.4 Carter 4.6 5.6 3.2 −0.2 Reagan I 2.6 −1.9 4.6 7.3 Reagan II 4.2 3.5 3.5 4.2 Bush GHW 3.7 1.9 −0.1 3.6 Clinton I 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.8 Clinton II 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.1 Bush GW I 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 Bush GW II 3.3 2.7 1.8 −0.3 Obama I −2.8 2.5 1.6 2.2 Obama II 1.5 2.4 2.4 Average 2.9 2.8 3.5 3.7

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov

TABLE 9.1 Real growth rates by presidential terms.

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126 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

An odd coincidence happened on the way to the grave for discretionary fiscal policy. When the 2001 Bush tax cut passed in May of that year, it was not known then that we were already in a recession. In addition, instead of implementing the tax cut prospectively, it was made ret- roactive to the beginning of the year, and instead of hav- ing taxpayers wait until they filed their tax forms in 2002 to claim their money, rebate checks were sent out in an- ticipation of those cuts. These checks started arriving in August and September of that year and were nearly fully dispersed when the terrorist attacks of September 11 oc- curred. Together with a series of interest rate cuts, these tax cuts had the fortunate coincidence of stimulating the economy at precisely the time the stimulus was needed.

When the economy had not picked up much steam through early 2003, President Bush proposed another tax cut. What he proposed was not at all what passed, but what did pass was remarkably similar to what had passed in 2001. Again, rebate checks began arriving in taxpayers’ mailboxes in late summer 2003.

The Obama Stimulus Plan

The clearest sign that discretionary fiscal policy was back as a policy tool under active consideration came with the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States. Prior to that, it had been more than 30 years since policy makers actively sought to increase aggregate de- mand through increases in government spending rather than through tax rebates.

As shown in Table 9.2, the plan itself had four basic elements. The first was to shore up the state-run un- employment, welfare, and Medicaid systems. Though the money had to be appropriated through an act of

Congress, this is best labeled as nondiscretionary fiscal policy as it is a regular part of the federal government’s response to economic difficulty. The second element in the plan is not as readily categorized because though it was “discretionary” in that the federal government could have chosen to let states ride out the recession on their own, it was intended to allow states to make it through the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years without having to cut budgets and raise taxes. In essence, this portion was designed to allow states—that often are constitution- ally prevented from borrowing—to engage in their own form of nondiscretionary fiscal policy. The remainder was clearly discretionary as it was motivated by a desire to speed a recovery rather than to simply mitigate the impact of it. It remains to be seen whether the stimulus package passed in 2009 was too large, too small, solved the problem, or created other problems. It also remains to be seen, after the 2010 political season when “stimu- lus” became a dirty word to many across the political spectrum, whether discretionary fiscal policy goes back into the hole it was in between 1980 and 2000.

Stimulus Plan Element Amount in $ Millions

Nondiscretionary $135,832 fiscal policy: Unemployment, welfare, Medicaid Aid to states 53,600 Discretionary fiscal policy: 301,135 Tax cuts Discretionary fiscal policy: 300,047 Spending increases

Source: www.recovery.gov/Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx

TABLE 9.2 The Obama stimulus plan as originally enacted.

The question of whether the Obama stimulus package worked or not depends entirely on what you assume the counterfactual to be. Recall that a “counterfactual” to a policy is a story associated with what the result would have most likely been had there been no change in policy. Had there been no stimulus package of any kind, had there been no assistance to states to cover higher unemploy- ment and Medicaid claims, had there been no extension of Bush- era tax rates, had there been no “Making Work Pay” credit, had

there been no money for shovel-ready projects, Cash-for-Clunkers, or for alternative energy development, what would have been the result? The judged effectiveness of the stimulus package as a whole, therefore, depends on how you create the counterfactual.

There are, generally speaking, two branches of counterfactu- als: Keynesian ones and Ricardian equivalence ones. Keynesian counterfactuals assume that the $787 billion stimulus was all new money being spent and was not displacing any money that would

D I D T H E O B A M A S T I M U L U S W O R K ?

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The Obama Stimulus Plan 127

have been spent elsewhere, by someone, even perhaps by another level of government. Ricardian equivalence counterfactuals assume that people foresee that current and temporary increases in the defi- cit will ultimately necessitate future tax increases or spending cuts to pay for it, or that federal grants received by states are offset by reductions in what states would have otherwise borrowed. In this way, currently higher deficits and the private and other level govern- ment reactions to those deficits completely wipe out any effect of the policy.

For instance, if you assume that people only bought the cars they did because of the Cash-for-Clunkers program so that all spending on those cars, including the subsidy, was induced by the program, you would, by the evidence, be wrong. In fact, most of the cars purchased during that period were by people who happened to be in the market for a new car anyway and had a “clunker” to trade in. Similarly, if you assume that states would have chosen not to borrow money to provide for Medicaid cover- age for those people who were forced on to the program because of their lost jobs, you would count the extra money provided to the states for that purpose by the federal government as extra money that was spent that wouldn’t have been. That is probably wrong in some states and correct in others.

However, sometimes the money spent as part of the stimulus was clearly new money that resulted from the stimulus. Even the most strident anti-stimulus economists acknowledge that unem- ployment benefits were extended and made more generous using federal money and that money was available only through the stimu- lus. The fact that almost all that money was spent by relatively poor recipients has a stimulatory impact. Some economists would still

quibble with this as stimulus because they would argue that those who were unemployed and receiving long-term benefits were less likely to accept the reality of lesser jobs at lower wages and that the benefits merely extended their ability to convince or even de- lude themselves that their old jobs would reappear at their old wage levels.

The stimulus plan’s supporters point to the relatively short period of economic distress in the United States relative to ongo- ing challenges in Europe where there was relatively little appe- tite for stimulus. They argue that the United States emerged from the Great Recession to rates of growth that were, while slow, generally more brisk than were European nations’. Detractors simply point to the very slow recovery in real GDP and very slow drop in unemployment in the United States. They point to invest- ments in companies that ultimately went bankrupt or to shovel- ready projects that had little infrastructure-enhancing purpose. They point to large decreases in the percentage of the population working or seeking work, the primary driver for reduced rates of unemployment.

There is no consensus on this topic. Noble Prize winners are on both sides of the debate. If the measure to be used to judge its overall effectiveness is the median estimate of its ultimate im- pact, then the impact was modestly effective. Several economists have prepared estimates of the impact of the stimulus. A simple summary of the studies done on the topic is included below. Given that the term stimulus became a political “dirty word” shortly after the package’s passage, it appears that academic economists have a greater appetite for discretionary fiscal policy than does the public.

Study Authors Conclusions

“Did the Stimulus Stimulate? Real Time Estimates of the Effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act”

James Feyrer, Bruce Sacerdote Significantly positive

“Does State Fiscal Relief during Recessions Increase Em- ployment? Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act”

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, Laura Feiveson, Zachary Liscow, and William Gui Woolston

Significantly positive

“Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Rein- vestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from January 2011 through March 2011”

Benjamin Page and Felix Reichling

Mostly Positive

“Targeted Transfers and the Fiscal Response to the Great Recession”

Hyunseung Oh and Ricardo Reis

Mildly Positive

“The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Public Sector Jobs Saved, Private Sector Jobs Forestalled”

Timothy Conley and Bill Dupor No Impact

“An Empirical Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activism in the 2000s”

John B. Taylor No Impact

A more detailed summary of these and other papers can be found at www.washingtonpost.com under the title “Did the Stimulus Work? A Review of the Nine Best Studies on the Subject.” It was authored by Dylan Matthews.

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128 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

AGGREGATE SUPPLY SHOCKSKick It Up a Notch

In both Figures 9.7 and 9.8 we start out with AS1 crossing AD1 so that prices are at PI* and output is at RGDP*. A hypothetical shock moves aggregate supply to AS2. If the supply shock is negative and it raises input prices sub- stantially, as in Figure 9.7, people will lose their jobs as RGDP falls. Nondiscretionary fiscal policy will kick in at this point, though, because the loss of jobs will mean an increase in welfare spending and a decrease in taxes. This will cause aggregate demand to shift to the right to AD2. If the president and Congress then decide to go further with discretionary fiscal policy in an effort to get out- put back to RGDP*, they will have to cut taxes or raise

spending to do so. The problem is that the shock itself and the nondiscretionary fiscal policy that was imple- mented have already created high inflation. Discretion- ary fiscal policy can only serve to worsen the problem. On the other hand, if the supply shock is that input prices have fallen, as depicted in Figure 9.8, output increases. Nondiscretionary fiscal policy is such that taxes go up and welfare spending goes down. When this happens, aggre- gate demand falls to AD2. In this case there is no need for discretionary fiscal policy because, even though there is a shock, it is only for the good. Both the shock and the nondiscretionary fiscal policy also serve to calm inflation.

PI

PI*

AD1

AD3

AS1AS2

AD2

NDFP

DFP

Shock

RGDPRGDP*

FIGURE 9.7 Nondiscretionary and discretionary fiscal policy in the wake of a negative aggregate supply shock.

FIGURE 9.8 Nondiscretionary fiscal policy in the wake of a positive aggregate supply shock.

PI

PI*

AD1

AS1

AS2

AD2

NDFP

Shock

RGDPRGDP*

Summary You now understand the difference between discretion- ary and nondiscretionary fiscal policy and know how to model them using an aggregate supply and aggregate demand diagram. You understand that different policies are used to counteract aggregate demand and aggregate

supply shocks. You also now understand that though there are considerable problems associated with discre- tionary fiscal policy, it has seen a recent revival. Still, nondiscretionary fiscal policy remains a mainstay of our current macroeconomic system.

Key Terms administrative lag aggregate demand shock aggregate supply shock discretionary fiscal policy

fiscal policy nondiscretionary fiscal policy operational lag political business cycle

recognition lag shock

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1. The existence of the federal income tax and the welfare system serve as the primary elements of a. discretionary fiscal policy. b. nondiscretionary fiscal policy. c. monetary policy. d. exchange rate policy.

2. Adjustments to tax and spending policies serve as primary elements of a. discretionary fiscal policy. b. nondiscretionary fiscal policy. c. monetary policy. d. exchange rate policy.

3. Discretionary fiscal policy is the purview of a. Congress only. b. the president only. c. Congress and the president collectively

through law. d. the Federal Reserve.

4. Nondiscretionary fiscal policy has its impact by a. magnifying the economic ups and downs

already occurring. b. purposefully adjusting interest rates. c. congress focusing its constant attention. d. dampening the economic ups and downs

already occurring. 5. The aggregate demand–aggregate supply model

examines the impact of discretionary fiscal policy and nondiscretionary fiscal policy by focusing on movements of a. interest rates. b. aggregate supply. c. aggregate demand. d. regulatory policies.

6. One typical response to a recession for those interested in discretionary fiscal policy is to a. raise taxes and cut spending. b. lower taxes and cut spending. c. raise taxes and increase spending. d. lower taxes and increase spending.

7. One typical response to an overheated economy for those interested in discretionary fiscal policy is to a. raise taxes and cut spending. b. lower taxes and cut spending. c. raise taxes and increase spending. d. lower taxes and increase spending.

Quiz Yourself 8. Discretionary fiscal policy as a tool for making things better is a. universally applauded as being helpful. b. universally derided for never being effective. c. considered by many to be effective but subject

to several concerns over timing and motive. d. inconsistent with the aggregate demand–

aggregate supply model. 9. The oil price increases of 2002–2005 are an exam-

ple of a a. positive aggregate demand shock. b. negative aggregate demand shock. c. positive aggregate supply shock. d. negative aggregate supply shock.

Short Answer Questions 1. Which lag described in this chapter is the concept of

“shovel-ready” intended to combat. 2. Explain how the built-in economic stabilizers work

in the U.S. economy. 3. Assign the correct label to the corresponding events/

policy actions that occurred during the 2007–2011 time period. Events/policy actions: TARP, the 2009 stimu- lus package, the 2010 extension of the Bush tax cuts, the reduction in taxes most Americans paid because they had less income than they would have had. Label: discretionary fiscal policy, nondiscretionary fiscal policy.

Think about This Concerns over the recognition, administrative, and op- erational lags as well as the concern that discretionary fiscal policy is subject to political biases have caused some economists to believe Congress and the president should do nothing in the face of a recession. Even if they are correct, is it realistic to expect the public to embrace elected officials who do nothing?

Talk about This The third and fourth years of presidential terms have higher average rates of real growth than the first and second years. Do you think this is a coincidence or is it a reflection of political reality that politicians are more concerned about reelection than about creating long-run economic growth?

Summary 129

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130 Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer

2000). See articles written by Alberto Alesina, John B. Taylor, Alan Auerbach, and Daniel Feenberg, and Douglas Elmendorf and Louise Sheiner.

Any textbook entitled Intermediate Macroeconomics will have a chapter on fiscal policy.

Behind the Numbers Gross domestic product. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; gross domestic

product; historical data—www.bea.gov Early estimates of GD. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; news release—

www.bea.gov/newsreleases/rels.htm

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C H A P T E R T E N

131

Monetary Policy Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the role of the Federal Reserve of the United States.

LO2 Define macroeconomic stability as the Fed’s primary goal while noting that controlling inflation has typically been the means by which it has measured its success.

LO3 Integrate an understanding of the tools of monetary policy with their application utilizing an aggregate supply– aggregate demand model.

LO4 Describe the recent history of monetary policy and the Federal Reserve’s role in the 2007–2009 recession.

Chapter Outline

Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy

Central Bank Independence

Modern Monetary Policy

Summary

Throughout the 2007–2009 recession and beyond, the role of the Federal Reserve—usually called the Fed— in shaping the economy of the United States has grown from mysterious yet important to absolutely central, with politicians, the media, and, on some days, ordi- nary Americans glued to its actions. No more impor- tant aspect of our daily lives is run by people with as little accountability as those who are its executive offi- cers. The Federal Reserve began in 1913 as a response to the boom and bust nature of the financial world of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It has become a government institution every bit as important in the lives of people as the three branches of government we learn about in school. In a matter of a couple of hours, one person, the chairman of the Federal Re- serve Board, can influence stock prices by 5 percent, cause mortgage interest rates to rise or fall by a full percentage point, and set in place a course of action that will raise or lower the unemployment rate by a point or more. The chairman can do this, moreover, without the approval of or even consultation with any elected person. Fortunately, the chairmen appointed by presidents and confirmed by the Senate have all been

people of impeccable character. Even if their wisdom has been clouded at some points, a hint of corruption in this area of government would be devastating to world financial markets in particular and, by extension, to the whole world economy.

We will use the context of the 2007–2009 reces- sion, and the very slow recovery from it, to explore the goals of monetary policy and then move to discuss the tools the Federal Reserve has to meet those goals. We will begin the discussion of those tools by first focus- ing on the traditional and ordinary tools of monetary policy and then discuss the extraordinary ones that were first employed in 2008 as the Federal Reserve at- tempted to stabilize first the financial markets and later the overall economy. As we move through the chap- ter, we will consider why the Fed exists and why its independence from political winds is important. Next we review some of the history of the pre-2008 use of monetary policy and then move to an examination of Fed policy during and after the 2007–2009 recession. We conclude by describing the process by which the Fed is likely to unwind those policies and return to its traditional function.

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132 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

the late 1970s, targeting the federal funds rate proved to be impossible. Keeping the rate down required a continuous increase in the supply of money. As more money chased limited goods, those increases created even greater infla- tion. This caused interest rates to rise rather than fall. In October 1979, as the rate of inflation continued to rise, the Fed formally gave up on the federal funds rate as its target and shifted to targeting M2. M2 is what is known as a monetary aggregate. M2 is a broader measure of money because it includes cash, checking accounts, sav- ings accounts, and small certificates of deposit (CDs). M1 includes only cash and checking accounts.1 By the summer of 1982, inflation had subsided just as M2 be-

came unstable and too difficult to target. In response the Fed reverted to targeting the federal funds rate.

The European Central Bank currently targets inflation rather than a monetary aggregate or interest rate. Inflation target- ing is relatively new as a con- cept and involves publishing a desired range of a specified inflationary measure and then using the tools of monetary policy to bring that measure of inflation into that desired range. Many argue that from the time Benjamin Bernanke took over as Fed chair in 2006 to the begin- ning of the financial crisis in the fall of 2007, the Fed engaged in de facto inflation targeting. The Fed made clear through its regu- lar announcements that it was closely monitoring the core PCE deflator described in Chapter 6.

Whatever is targeted, the mechanism by which the Fed

keeps day-to-day tabs on the target is open-market operations. Open-market operations result when the Fed buys and sells government debt. The Fed owns approxi- mately half a trillion dollars of the national debt, and it sells a portion of that reserve of bonds when it wants to get money out of the system. It buys bonds when it wants to add to the money that is in circulation.

Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy

The Federal Reserve has never had a “tool” that would directly impact the economy. Its goals have to be met using an intermediate target with the hope and expecta- tion that the end result of hitting the intermediate target will be satisfaction of the ultimate goal. What follows then is a description of the goals of monetary policy, the tools of monetary policy that until 2008 were considered adequate to the task of meeting those goals, and a model that explains why the tools work under typical circum- stances. We proceed to an explanation of why those tools failed in 2008 and then to a discussion of the extraordi- nary tools that the Federal Reserve, under Chairman Ben Bernanke, created to deal with the 2007–2009 recession and the tenuous recovery in 2010 and 2011.

Goals of Monetary Policy The most important historical role for monetary policy and its implementing institution, the Federal Reserve, has been to prevent boom and bust cycles by regulat- ing banks and other financial institutions. While the role of dampening the boom and bust cycle remains an important part of the job, the mechanism has changed dramatically. At first the Fed simply ensured the finan- cial soundness of institutions. Now it also directly ma- nipulates interest rates to change the borrowing habits of banks, businesses, and consumers. In this way it seeks to maintain low levels of inflation and sustainable levels of real GDP growth.

Traditional and Ordinary Tools of Monetary Policy For the better part of the last 50 years, the Federal Re- serve and other similar central banks around the world have been conducting monetary policy by picking an intermediate target variable and utilizing the basic tools at their disposal to hit that target. If the target variable was outside the desired range, the Fed used its tools to nudge the variable back within the range. At times the Fed has had to abandon its target because the policies necessary to stay within the desired range had undesir- able effects.

In the 1970s the target was the federal funds rate—the rate at which banks borrow from one another to meet reserve require- ments. As inflation heated up in

federal funds rate The rate at which banks borrow from one another to meet reserve requirements.

M2 M1 + saving accounts + small CDs.

monetary aggregate A measure of the quan- tity of money in the economy.

M1 Cash + coin + checking accounts.

inflation targeting A policy whereby a central bank publishes a desired range of a specified inflationary measure and then uses the tools of monetary policy to bring that measure of inflation into that desired range.

open-market operations The buying and sell- ing of bonds, which, respectively, increases or decreases the money supply, thereby influ- encing interest rates.

1In 2006 the Fed abandoned its use of M3 as a useful measure as it was becoming unstable and therefore an unreliable measure.

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Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy 133

Banks can also borrow directly from the Fed rather than borrowing from each other. Banks with sufficient creditworthiness can borrow unlimited amounts from

the Fed at the primary credit rate. The primary credit rate or discount rate is typically one percentage point higher than the federal funds rate. Banks with lesser credit ratings face higher rates.2

The last way that the Federal Reserve can impact interest rates is by altering the proportion that the bank can lend from the de- posits it takes in. The reserve

ratio, at 10 percent in 2011, requires that a specific per- centage of every dollar deposited be placed in a Federal Reserve bank. If the ratio is lowered, the bank has more money to lend, whereas if the ratio is raised, the bank has less money to lend.

Modeling Monetary Policy The way monetary policy is supposed to work is through what is called the monetary transmission mechanism. The Federal Reserve can use any of its tools to impact the left panels of Figures 10.1 and 10.2. That is, through

an increase or decrease in the supply of loanable funds, it can have a decisive impact on short-term interest rates. The only real question is whether the causation arrow that connects the left and right panels of these two dia- grams is operating.

Let’s begin by showing that each of the Fed’s tools can impact interest rates. If the Federal Reserve uses open market operations to buy bonds, it increases the amount of money that banks and other financial institutions can loan. This increases the supply of loanable funds in Figure 10.1 and decreases the interest rate in this market. The Fed can just as easily have an opposite desire and want to increase interest rates. The left panel of Figure 10.2 shows what happens when the Fed sells bonds in an effort to increase interest rates. The increase in interest rates is accomplished when the Fed reduces the supply of loanable funds.

2Prior to 2003 the Federal Reserve utilized another key interest rate to sig- nal its intentions, the discount rate. This was the interest rate at which the Fed itself loaned money to banks, usually buying a portion of a bank’s loan portfolio. The discount rate was below the federal funds rate, but banks were reticent to use this service too often because it brought with it the potential for extra scrutiny from auditors.

FIGURE 10.1 Expansionary monetary policy: buying bonds, lowering the discount rate, or lowering the reserve ratio.

RGDPLoanable funds

r

S

D

Price level AS

AD1

AD2

Interest rates

One of the lessons that economists routinely teach students in courses designed for economics and business majors is the notion of “money creation.” The banking system can create more “money” than physically exists in the form of coin and cash. This was implied in our definitions of the monetary aggregates (M1, M2, etc.) because if money were only currency, then there would be no need to add checkable accounts and CDs.

The banking system creates money by a series of loans. To see how, let’s assume that there are several people (John, Paul, George, Ringo, Simon, Randy, and Paula) and several banks (1st  National, 2nd National, 3rd National, and 4th National [the Midwest is home to an actual bank called “Fifth-Third”]). Suppose

John makes a $1,000 deposit at 1st National, and that bank loans Paul $900 (10 percent, or $100, must be held as part of the re- quired reserve). Suppose Paul buys something from George, who deposits that $900 at 2nd National. Then suppose that Ringo borrows $810 (again 10 percent, or $90, must be held at the Fed) from 2nd National to buy something from Simon, who deposits that money in 3rd National. If Randy borrows $729 (10  percent, or $81, must be held at the Fed) from 3rd National to buy some- thing from Paula and Paula deposits that money in 4th National and . . . You get the point—this could go on forever. In the end there are deposits totaling $10,000 ($1,000 + $900 + $810 + $729 + . . .) that resulted from that initial $1,000.

M O N E Y C R E A T I O N

primary credit rate or discount rate The rate at which banks with excellent credit can borrow from the Federal Reserve.

reserve ratio The percentage of every dollar deposited in a checking account that a bank must maintain at a Federal Reserve branch.

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 133 16/03/17 11:41 AM

134 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

rise as a result of increases in investment and interest- sensitive consumption. This is shown in the right panel of Fig ure  10.1. An identical but opposite story can be told concerning a tightening of the money supply. Less is available for banks to lend, a circumstance that allows them to raise the interest rates they charge to ordinary borrowers. Raising such rates causes a reduction in in- vestment and interest-sensitive consumption. This in turn causes aggregate demand to fall, as is shown in the right panel of Figure 10.2.

The Monetary Transmission Mechanism Now we get to the question of whether changing short-term interest rates impacts the overall econ- omy in the desired fashion. That is, does the change in the left panel of Figure 10.1 cause the change in the right panel of Figure 10.1, and does the same

work for Figure  10.2? The process by which the use of a monetary policy tool impacts the overall economy is called the monetary transmission mechanism.

Economists disagree about the effectiveness of mon- etary policy, especially its effectiveness in the long run and in circumstances of extreme economic uncertainty. Let’s take the first of these two concerns. Whereas there is some doubt among economists about whether the Fed has the ability to alter short-term economic outcomes in normal economic circumstances, the doubt is much more widely held concerning its long-term ability to in- crease output through sustained increases in the money supply. The underlying reason for the skepticism is that sustained increases in the money supply will be factored in by investors, who will anticipate that substantial infla- tion will result from such a policy. Thus, though it may look as if the Fed could use the logic from Figure 10.1 to continuously foster long-run rapid growth, not many economists believe the Fed has this power. As a result, Figures 10.1 and 10.2 should be taken as relevant only in the short term.

The reason conventional monetary policy is less effective in times of extreme economic uncertainty than Figures 10.1 and 10.2 suggest is that borrowers’ confidence is so shaken by actual unemployment, the threat of unemployment, or slack demand that any small modifications to borrowing costs are trivial compared to these underlying problems. This was certainly the case during the Great Depression, but you don’t have to go back that far for a clear example of what economists call

Because the federal funds rate is determined by mar- ket forces between banks and is not determined directly by the Fed, the way the Fed can influence that rate is by increasing or decreasing the supply of generally available funds for loans. Its rationale is that this action will indi- rectly influence the federal funds rate. There is enough linkage between the quantity of money that is generally available for loans and the interest rate that banks charge each other so that this seems to work fairly well.

As we noted, the Federal Reserve can impact interest rates by changing the reserve ratio. If the ratio is lowered, the bank has more money to lend and the supply of loan- able funds moves to the right, as it does in the left panel of Figure 10.1. If the ratio is raised, the bank has less money to lend and the supply of loanable funds moves to the left, as is indicated in the left panel of Figure 10.2.

As you saw in Chapter 8, one of the determinants of ag- gregate demand is interest rates. The influence of interest rates stems from the fact that investors want to borrow more to buy plant and equipment when interest rates are lower. In addition, consumers are more willing to buy expensive durable goods like cars and home furnishings when interest rates are lower. For the person who pays cash, the lower interest rate effect is indirect in that buyers sacrifice less interest income when they take money out of savings to buy something. The person who buys a car and gets a shiny new payment book with the shiny new car is more likely to buy that car and more likely to buy a nicer, more expensive car because of the lower interest rate.

A loosening of the money supply or a lowering of the federal funds or discount rate allows banks to make more loans. These are loans that they can make only if they lower interest rates to ordinary borrowers. The lowering of interest rates causes the aggregate demand curve to

FIGURE 10.2 Contractionary monetary policy: selling bonds, raising the discount rate, or raising the reserve ratio.

RGDPLoanable funds

S

D

r

Price level AS

AD1

AD2

Interest rates

monetary transmission The process by which the use of a monetary policy tool impacts the overall economy.

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 134 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy 135

Reserve paid a modest interest rate on these deposits, the risk-adjusted profits the banks could earn by depositing their excess reserves with the Federal Reserve were suf- ficient to have them do that rather than loaning it to busi- nesses and consumers.

The Additional Tools of Monetary Policy Created in 2008 The Federal Reserve recognized before many the poten- tial severity of the 2008 financial crisis, and well before it became evident to others, the Fed began contemplating other tools it might use to fight a global slowdown. First, it created a new discount window for investment banks, and second, it began buying corporate paper, effectively lending money directly to nonbank corporations. Finally, it contemplated buying longer-term debt such as 30-year treasuries and mortgage-backed securities from banks and other institutions in a frantic attempt to lower long-term interest rates and halt the slide of the housing market.

Investment banks were a creation of post–Great Depression policies that sought to separate commer- cial banks, which took deposits and made loans from those deposits, from investment banks, which simply served as intermediaries to large financial transac- tions. These investment banks were capitalized with their own equity and their own borrowing and did not take deposits. The discount window that was created for investment banks allowed these entities to borrow money from the Fed in much the same way that com- mercial banks do through the discount rate or primary credit rate facility. The effort was for naught as the fi- nancial crisis of 2008 sent one, Lehman Brothers, into liquidation and threatened the health of the remaining two, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. In the end, the Federal Reserve needed both entities to become commercial banks so that they could assist the Fed in saving other commercial banks.

a liquidity trap. A liquidity trap exists when even zero or near zero interest rates do not stimu- late borrowing.

With a global economic slow- down under way in 2008 and 2009, firms had more than adequate capital to produce the significantly reduced volume of goods and services consumers were ready to purchase. As a result, the reduction in interest rates that might have motivated them to borrow money to buy new capital in 2006 and 2007 did not motivate them in the slightest. Furthermore, consumers who might have been persuaded to borrow money to buy cars, homes, or home furnishings were more concerned about the likelihood that they would keep their jobs. Moreover, the bursting of the housing bubble, which reduced home prices by an average of more than 20 percent, gave many pause when it came to taking on more debt.

The supply side of the liquidity trap can be demon- strated with the help of the data on required and excess reserves of banks (see Figure 10.3). As previously de- scribed, large banks are compelled to hold 10 percent of their deposits in the form of required reserves at the Federal Reserve. They can loan the other 90 percent as they see fit. During normal economic times, that is ex- actly what they do. With the quite obvious and notable exception of September of 2001, bank reserves were what were required. Upward of 95 percent of their reserves were required while the remainder were simply viewed as a cushion against unusual daily activity. The excess reserves were loaned overnight in the federal funds mar- ket. In late 2008, as the financial crisis hit in full force, the proportion of reserves that were considered “excess” went from 5 percent of the total to 90 percent of the total, and this occurred over a short three-month window. That these proportions did not revert to normal through mid- 2013 suggests that, at least from the banks’ perspective, the liquidity trap was in full effect. Because the Federal

liquidity trap A situation where zero or near zero interest rates do not stimulate borrowing.

Imagine a world without money. While you may think that would be utopian, it would actually be a pain in the neck. Money allows us to exchange the goods or services we have to offer so that we may get the goods or services we want. Without it we would have to barter. Money allows us to avoid this by serving as a medium of exchange.

Money also holds its value. Suppose the good you had to offer was subject to spoilage. If you could not find someone who had a good you wanted and wanted what you had to offer within a short period of time, your good would be worthless. With money you can sell your goods and hold on to the cash until such time that you find the goods you want to buy.

T H E R O L E O F M O N E Y

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136 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

FIGURE 10.3 Proportion of bank reserves held by banks that are required and excess.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/statisticsdata.htm

100

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

90

Required reserves Excess reserves

2 0

0 0

-0 1

2 0

0 0

-0 5

2 0

0 0

-0 9

2 0

0 1-

0 1

2 0

0 1-

0 5

2 0

0 1-

0 9

2 0

0 2

-0 5

2 0

0 2

-0 9

2 0

0 2

-0 1

2 0

0 3

-0 5

2 0

0 3-

0 9

2 0

0 3

-0 1

2 0

0 4-

0 5

2 0

0 4-

0 9

2 0

0 4

-0 1

2 0

0 5

-0 5

2 0

0 5

-0 9

2 0

0 5

-0 1

2 0

0 6

-0 5

2 0

0 6

-0 9

2 0

0 6

-0 1

2 0

0 7-

0 5

2 0

0 7-

0 9

2 0

0 7-

0 1

2 0

0 8

-0 5

2 0

0 8

-0 9

2 0

0 8

-0 1

2 0

0 9

-0 5

2 0

0 9

-0 9

2 0

0 9

-0 1

2 0

10 -0

5 2

0 10

-0 9

2 0

10 -0

1

2 0

11 -0

5 2

0 11

-0 9

2 0

11 -0

1

2 0

12 -0

5 2

0 12

-0 9

2 0

12 -0

1

2 0

13 -0

5 2

0 13

-0 9

2 0

13 -0

1

2 0

14 -0

5 2

0 14

-0 9

2 0

14 -0

1

2 0

15 -0

5 2

0 15

-0 9

2 0

15 -0

1

Additionally, the Fed began buying corporate paper when even well-capitalized and well-run corporations were having difficulty finding buyers for their short-term debt. Corporate paper is the name given to short-term

debt offered by large corpora- tions. These corporations rou- tinely borrow billions of dollars for inventory- building purposes

or to deal with uneven sales knowing that they will eas- ily be able to pay off the debt with the proceeds of future sales. Without this market, many corporations could not operate. Because the financial system was not working properly in the fall of 2008, the Fed stepped in to make these loans possible.

At times during this 2008– 2013 period, the Federal Re- serve began buying long-term debt in a process called quan- titative easing. This process referred to making much more money available to the economy through the purchase of 20- and

30-year U.S. treasuries and mortgage-backed securities. A mortgage-backed security is a financial asset that is the aggre- gation of mortgages where the holder of the security is paid from the combined mortgage payments of homeowners. This

was done to directly impact long-term interest rates to stimulate business investment and to re-ignite the hous- ing market.

For perspective on the relative importance of the traditional tools and the new tools of monetary policy, consider Figure 10.4. The traditional security hold- ings of short-term treasuries, the result of open-market operations and the lending to financial institutions via the discount window, constituted the entirety of the $860 billion Federal Reserve holdings. In very late 2008, the Federal Reserve began its still tradi- tional loaning of large amounts to financial institu- tions, but when that was insufficient to prevent the panic in the financial markets, it followed up only a

corporate paper Short-term debt offered by large corporations.

quantitative easing The process by which the Federal Reserve buys long-term securi- ties in order to decrease long-term interest rates to directly stimulate business investment and housing markets.

mortgage-backed security Financial asset that is the aggregation of mortgages where the holder of the security is paid from the combined mortgage payments of homeowners.

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 136 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Central Bank Independence 137

FIGURE 10.4 Federal Reserve holdings 2007–2015.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/statisticsdata.htm F

e d

e ra

l R e

se rv

e h

o ld

in g

s (m

ill io

n s

o f

d o

lla rs

)

35,00,000

45,00,000

40,00,000

50,00,000

30,00,000

25,00,000

20,00,000

15,00,000

10,00,000

500,000

0

Liquidity to key credit markets

Federal agency debt mortgage-backed securities purchases

Lending to financial institutions

Traditional security holdings Long-term treasury purchases

1/3 /2

00 7

1/3 /2

00 8

1/3 /2

00 9

1/3 /2

01 0

1/3 /2

01 1

1/3 /2

01 2

1/3 /2

01 3

1/3 /2

01 4

1/3 /2

01 5

matter of weeks later with nontraditional purchases of short-term commercial paper. Beginning in 2009, the Federal Reserve tried to overcome the liquidity trap by embracing the nontraditional tools fully. From early 2009 through 2013, it was buying both long-term trea- suries and mortgage-back securities in such volume that by March 2013, the total Federal Reserve hold- ings had nearly tripled. In order to avoid the percep- tion that this was simply flooding credit markets with cheap money, “operation twist” was employed during 2011 and 2012 in which the Federal Reserve sold tra- ditional short-term securities while using the proceeds to purchase long-term treasuries. This can be seen clearly in that the bottom two portions of Figure 10.4 total roughly the same amount ($1.6 trillion) from mid- 2011 through all of 2012 while the total holdings held steady at $2.75  trillion. The pause was broken in late 2012 when the Fed restarted the purchase of mortgage- backed securities in order to keep the economy from sliding back into recession.

Central Bank Independence

The Fed’s power over the economy is substantial because it can do what it thinks is best without fear of being con- tradicted. Its independence from political control gives it awesome power and awesome responsibility to use that power judiciously. The Fed is so independent that it can slow growth or even put the nation into a recession in an effort to stamp out inflation. Economists generally agree that the Fed must be free from political control in order to take the necessary action to fight inflation. Experience across nations in the latter half of the 20th century pro- vides rather powerful evidence that this is true.

Long-run economic growth requires that the financial markets have faith that money invested in a country will not lose value as a result of excessive inflation. When people are concerned about inflation, interest rates in- crease. Higher interest rates make investments more ex- pensive. Since growth occurs only when investments in the future take place, long-term growth depends on the

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 137 16/03/17 11:41 AM

138 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

individual private bank. With its authorizing of the printing of money during and after the Civil War, prices fluctuated so fast that three significant financial panics in the span of 60 years convinced Congress to create the Federal Reserve. If Congress became sufficiently motivated, it could return to the business of controlling the supply of money and, indi- rectly, interest rates. Under ordinary circumstances, the con- tinuous consultations between Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Paulson, and then New York Federal Reserve Bank Chairman and Obama Treasury Sec- retary designate Geithner that occurred in the fall of 2008 would have raised concerns about the degree to which this independence might have been compromised. Clearly, the circumstances were anything but ordinary at the time.

Modern Monetary Policy

The Last 30 Years The history of monetary policy in the second half of the 20th century is one of increasing importance and self- confidence, and its effect on interest rates can be seen in Figure 10.5. In the late 1970s the Fed attempted to

existence of a believable monetary authority. Monetary authority, by the way, is the general name for institutions like the Federal Reserve. While a politically controlled monetary authority could generate that faith if it never wavered from potentially unpopular policies, experi- ence tells us this does not happen. We know this because those countries with a history of independent monetary authorities have experienced lower inflation rates, lower interest rates, and higher real growth rates than countries without that history of independence. The United States, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and the Nether- lands are examples of countries with such independence, whereas Spain and Italy are examples of countries with- out it. For the stability we enjoy, we are willing to accept the risk of having an independent monetary authority.

It is worth a small historical interlude to note that Congress could, by simply passing a law, regain complete control over the Federal Reserve. Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution gives the Congress control over the power to coin money. It never took the role of monetary policy very seriously, however; and before the Civil War paper money was usually a banknote, typically backed by gold, of an

FIGURE 10.5 Key interest rates from 1955 to 2015.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/statisticsdata.htm

18

16

14

12

10

In te

re st

r at

e

8

6

4

Year

2

0

Fed funds 1-year 10-year 20-year 30-year

19 55

19 59

19 63

19 67 19

71 19

75 19

79 19

83 19

87 19

91 19

95 19

99 20

03 20

07 20

11 20

15

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 138 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Modern Monetary Policy 139

combat the oil-price shocks and a stagnating economy with increases in the money supply. Unfortunately, these efforts served only to add to inflation. In 1981 the Fed changed course with a high-stakes war on inflation. It sent interest rates soaring. Its grip on M2 was such that the federal funds rate went to nearly 20 percent while the discount rate went to 13 percent. By most measures the resulting recession of 1981–1982 was the worst in post– World War II history. The unemployment rate peaked higher, real GDP fell more, and the reduction in inflation was greater than in any of the other post-1946 recessions. It also had the distinction of being the only recession caused intentionally by the Fed.

Since that time the Fed has had a little better luck and has learned from its mistakes. For one thing, since the recession of 1982 it has not had to fight a signifi- cant inflation battle. In part this has been because it has been vigilant about not contributing to inflation. After 1984 the highest inflation rate has been 5 per- cent. Not having to wring out double-digit inflation but only having to keep it under control has made the Fed’s job a little easier. In 1988, 1995, and again in 1999 and 2000, the Fed preemptively kept inflation in check by quickly increasing interest rates to slow an economy on the verge of creating inflation. It also worked to pre- vent a recession in 1994 by quickly pushing interest rates down.

Its response to the 1990 recession was slow, but it was probably forgivably slow. In the months leading up to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, real GDP growth was slow, inflation was picking up, and consumer indebtedness was starting to peak. On top of that, the Fed was deter- mined to wait for the outcome of a budget deal. At the time, the federal deficit was more than $250 billion, it was headed toward $400 billion, and the Fed wanted to hold President Bush’s (George Herbert Walker) and the Democratic leadership in Congress’s collective feet to the fire and force them to act.

Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not wait for the completion of the budget deal. After the invasion of Kuwait, gasoline prices increased sharply, and these circumstances precipitated an equally sharp decline in consumer confidence. Had the Fed acted immediately, it might have had better success keeping the United States out of the 1990–1991 recession, but its focus was on the deficit. It was also wary of duplicating the mistakes of the late 1970s by trying to battle cost-push inflation (inflation caused by movements in aggregate supply to the left) with increases in the money supply.

Whether explicitly or by chance, the Fed simply let the recession happen. It appeared to decide that there was little it could or should do to prevent it. Fortu- nately, however, the 1990–1991 recession was one of the shortest and the least disruptive recessions on re- cord. Inflation never became a significant problem in part because consumer credit card debt was so high. Thus, except for a short spike in gas prices, inflation was negligible during this period. Unemployment rose but it came nowhere near 1982’s modern record of 11 percent. During the first 18 months of the recovery, from June 1992 through the end of 1993, the econ- omy was so weak, however, that it was unclear at the time whether it was a recovery or just an extension of the recession. In 1992 and 1993 the Fed stepped in with a significant reduction in interest rates, and by the last quarter of 1994 the economy was humming along nicely.

From 1994 on, the Fed kept a vigilant eye on inflation. Where necessary, as in 1995, the Fed let its guard down enough to prevent a slowdown from becoming a reces- sion. By 1998 Fed governors were feeling rather proud of themselves. Unemployment was at a 30-year low, in- flation was nowhere in sight, and longtime Fed chairman Alan Greenspan had successfully kept the stock market in check by offering advice against “irrational exuber- ance.” In 1998 the economy was doing fine. It was in no need of increases or decreases in interest rates. Then the Asian financial crisis hit.

The Asian financial crisis resulted from a series of bad loans made in the Pacific Rim nations of Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia, and from failed attempts by these countries to hold their foreign ex- change rates constant.

The Fed’s response to the crisis was guarded at first. It wanted to prevent the crisis from spreading but did not want its action to have the effect of importing the crisis to the United States. Stock prices in the United States did fall 20 percent in three months, and many econo- mists began to predict that a recession would occur in the United States within a year. The Fed lowered inter- est rates a full percentage point, enough of an action to increase U.S. demand for imported goods. This helped to stabilize Asia. In turn, the dollar got so strong relative to Asian currencies that the relative price of imports pur- chased by Americans fell enough to offset any domestic price increases.

The recession of 2001 served as another example of monetary policy, its uses and its limitations. Beginning

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140 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

2002 and picked up considerable steam through 2003 and 2004. In response, the Fed raised interest rates to more normal historical levels in 10 steps through mid- 2005. As mentioned repeatedly through this chapter, the Federal Reserve’s response to the financial crisis of 2008 was swift, if not entirely effective. It lowered short-term interest rates to nearly zero in an attempt to forestall, or at least dampen, the impact of the recession.

Economists will debate whether these interest rate changes had the desired impact, but consider this: Be- tween June 2003 and June 2004, and again in 2008 and 2009, the Fed was pretty much out of bullets. The Fed can’t make businesses borrow money to invest in new plant and equipment and can’t make consumers borrow to buy expensive consumer durables. Once the interest rate has been driven to nearly zero, these deci- sions to borrow money are determined by the confi- dence that the borrower has in his or her ability to pay the money back.

Also worth noting was the Federal Reserve’s dif- ficulty in “talking down” skyrocketing home prices and questionable home lending practices in 2005. Fed increases in short-term interest rates during 2005 had little impact on mortgage rates, which remained low during that year.

with the ambiguous nature of the 2000 presidential elec- tion, the recession of 2001 was met with 12 separate cuts in interest rates by the Federal Reserve. By 2003 the federal funds rate was at its lowest level in more than 40 years. For a time, in the spring of 2003, 30-year fixed mortgage interest rates were below 5 percent for the first time ever.

As can be seen from Figure 10.6, the crowning pe- riod of this aggressive monetary policy was between 1999 and 2006. The Federal Reserve Board’s Open- Market Committee aggressively moved their federal funds rate target to combat economic circumstances. In mid-1999 the Fed aggressively raised interest rates six separate times to combat what Greenspan termed the “irrational exuberance” of the stock markets. These actions had little impact themselves in stemming the overheated stock market. The tech-stock bubble burst on its own in 2000, prompting the Fed to begin to lower interest rates.

The Fed was in the process of easing credit condi- tions in 2001 when the attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred. When stock markets opened the following Monday, it was with a Federal Reserve announcement that it was aggressively moving interest rates lower. With 13 rate cuts in a period of two-and-one-half years, the sluggish economy slowly rebounded through

In the late 1980s and through the decade of the 1990s, criticism started to be heard from the left and right that the Fed was overly concerned about the reappearance of inflation and not sufficiently concerned about the average person. Whether it has admitted it in public or not, since the late 1970s and early 1980s the Fed had considered inflation public enemy number one. This had been true whether inflation was really a problem, as it was in 1979 and 1980; had the possibility of being a problem, as in 1988, 1995, and 1999– 2000; or was just a theoretical threat on the distant horizon.

Only when the country or the world was in trouble and inflation was less than 3 percent, as in the United States in 1993 and 2001 and the world in 1994, has the Federal Reserve relaxed its vigilance against inflation. In being focused on inflation it has cut recoveries short or starved them of sufficient cash to really get going.

In late 2002–early 2003, and again in late 2008 and 2009, a new public enemy number one had begun to come into view: deflation. Recall from Chapter 6 that deflation is the opposite

of inflation but is no less of a concern. Deflation has the ef- fect of encouraging people not to buy now. This is because they know that if they wait, they will save money. This can be self- perpetuating in that by not buying, consumers force businesses to cut prices. This causes profits to fall and layoffs to occur, and buy- ing diminishes even further. Even moderate deflation is worse than inflation in this regard. The Japanese experience with deflation in the late 1980s and 1990s offered very slow growth and stagnant employment. The Fed understood this potential quite well in 2003 when it again began to consider further interest rate cuts. It also understood this well when it drove short-term interest rates to zero in the fall of 2008. We will not know for some time whether it real- ized the threat too late. The deflation of 2008 was confined mostly to housing (20 percent), energy (60 percent), and to some producer commodities such as corn (40 percent), soybeans (40 percent), and raw metal prices (20 percent to 50  percent). Core PCE did not de- crease during the period.

P U B L I C E N E M Y # 1 : I N F L A T I O N O R D E F L A T I O N ?

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 140 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Modern Monetary Policy 141

FIGURE 10.6 Aggressive monetary policy between 1999 and 2015.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm

7

6

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4

R at

e

3

2

1

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M ar

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14

Se p-

15

FIGURE 10.7 Selected yield curves on federal funds and U.S. debt.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/statisticsdata.htm

In te

re st

r at

e

18

16

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10

8

6

4

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Maturity

1-yearFed funds 10-year

19931981 2000 2002

20-year 30-year

Though Figure 10.5 makes it look like short- and long- term interest rates move in lockstep, they do not. Though they typically move together, it’s useful to remember Chapter 7’s definition of the yield curve. Figure 10.7

notes yield curves from different periods of recent his- tory. What appears is that at times the yield curve is up- ward sloping (the usual case), while at other times it is flat, and at still other times it is downward sloping.

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142 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

At no time in world history have central banks engaged in such sus- tained efforts to keep interest rates so low for so long. As can be seen in Figure 10.8, the U.S. Federal Reserve was hardly alone in its massive purchases of financial assets. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England quintupled the size of their respective port- folios. The European Central Bank started along the path the Fed was on and abandoned the effort at the same time the Fed doubled- down. The Bank of Japan, late to the show, tripled its holdings in the span of three years.

In the case of the U.S. Federal Reserve, it purchased nearly $2  trillion in mortgage-backed securities and nearly $2 trillion in long-term treasuries in three separate stages. The result is that $3.7 trillion is now in the economy with most of it in bank reserves (typically held at the Fed as excess reserves) and in the hands of investors. In late 2014 the Fed stopped pushing new money into the system and in late 2015 it began the long process of pulling it out.

The toe in the water was the December increase in the targeted Fed Funds rate. Recalling Figure 10.3, because nearly every bank has its own high level of excess reserves, few have any need to borrow in that market so the impact is likely muted.

Still, the real work of removing that money has to be done even- tually, and it appears that the way it will be done is simply through the process of lettering the instruments that were purchased ma- ture. When the mortgages that make up a mortgage-backed secu- rity mature, the Fed can simply not use the money to purchase a replacement security. When the long-term treasuries reach maturity, the same thing can occur. That could be a two-decade process. In the interim it can alter the interest rate that it pays on deposits that banks make at the Federal Reserve. By increasing the rate paid to banks on excess reserves, it can constrain commercial and con- sumer loans, and by decreasing the rate paid to banks on those ex- cess reserves, it can do the opposite.

W A S T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S A L O N E I N T H I S ? C A N I T B E U N D O N E ?

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FIGURE 10.8 Central Bank assets relative to 2007 (=100).

gue46399_ch10_131-144.indd 142 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Summary 143

Key Terms corporate paper federal funds rate inflation targeting liquidity trap M1

M2 monetary aggregate monetary transmission mortgage-backed security open-market operations

primary credit rate or discount rate

quantitative easing reserve ratio

1. The Constitution of the United States grants to Con- gress the power of monetary policy in Article 1, Section 8. Since 1913, Congress has a. jealously guarded this power. b. granted this power to the president. c. delegated this power to the Federal Reserve. d. ignored this power.

2. When engaging in monetary policy, the impact of ex pansionary policy on an aggregate demand– aggregate supply model is to a. increase aggregate demand. b. increase aggregate supply. c. decrease aggregate demand. d. decrease aggregate supply.

3. The most precise tool of monetary policy is a. the adjustment of the federal funds target. b. the adjustment of the discount rate. c. the adjustment of the reserve requirement. d. the use of open-market operations.

4. Federal Reserve independence is a. completely fictitious. b. totally complete. c. subject to Congress’s desire to keep it independent. d. subject to the Supreme Court’s desire to keep it

independent. 5. The “creation” of money is

a. entirely the purview of Congress. b. entirely the purview of the Federal Reserve. c. formally the purview of the Federal Reserve,

constitutionally the purview of Congress,

but banks have a practical means of creating money.

d. entirely subject to the whims of the banking system.

6. During 1999 through 2006, the Federal Reserve a. was passive and simply let things happen. b. reacted actively to quell potentially inflationary

expansions but did nothing to deal with the recession.

c. reacted actively to deal with the recession but did nothing to quell potentially inflationary expansions.

d. reacted actively to deal with the recession and to quell potentially inflationary expansions.

7. The ability of the Federal Reserve to control interest rates is a. limited almost entirely to short-term rates. b. limited almost entirely to long-term rates. c. limited almost entirely to intermediate-term

rates. d. unlimited.

8. Which of the following tools would have likely had the impact of raising short-term interest rates the most? a. Cutting the federal funds target by one-quarter

point b. Buying $1 million in bonds c. Raising the reserve requirement from 8 percent

to 15 percent d. Raising personal income tax rates by 1 percent-

age point each

Quiz Yourself

Summary With your newfound wealth of knowledge, you now under- stand the role of the Federal Reserve of the United States and its primary goal to maintain macroeconomic stability. You see that the Fed’s own apparent measure of success in meeting this goal has been the ability to control infla- tion. You know the tools of monetary policy, understand

how they work, and are able to apply that knowledge to an aggregate supply–aggregate demand model. You know the recent history of monetary policy and know how it has shaped the Federal Reserve’s current fixation with infla- tion. Finally, you understand the debate among economists over whether inflation or deflation is a greater concern.

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144 Chapter 10 Monetary Policy

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain how open-market operations work. 2. Explain the difference between the discount rate and

the federal funds rate. 3. Explain how lowering the reserve ratio affects the

economy. 4. Explain how the 2010–2013 quantitative easing

through the Federal Reserve purchase of mortgage- backed securities is different in style from what it usually does.

Think about This Because the chairs of the Federal Reserve Board can have an enormous impact on policy decisions of the Fed and thereby the economy, their selection has been the subject of great political interest. Politically motivated monetary policy could be ruinous economic policy. Previous Fed chairs have understood that their functional independence from congressional interference depends on the apolitical nature of their decisions. What would the economic consequences be if this balance was upset by a president who nominated a Fed chair dedicated to protecting the president’s political party?

Talk about This Presidents tend to nominate Fed chairs on the basis of advice from those working daily in the financial markets.

Who should have an impact on the choice of the Fed chair? Specifically, Fed policy can favor financial inter- ests or the interests of workers. Should unions or others with a claim to represent workers have an impact on the selection of the Fed chair?

For More Insight See Colander, David, “The Stories We Tell: A Reconsid-

eration of AS/AD Analysis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 169–188.

Ramo, Joshua Cooper, “The Three Marketeers,” Time, February 15, 1999, pp. 34–42.

Steiger, Douglas, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson, “The NAIRU, Unemployment and Monetary Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 33–50.

Behind the Numbers Consumer price index and historical U.S. inflation rates.

Bureau of Labor Statistics—www.bls.gov/cpi U.S. interest rates 1955–2015.

Federal Reserve Board; statistics: releases and his- torical data— www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/statisticsdata.htm

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C H A P T E R E L E V E N

145

Federal Spending Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the process that goes into creating the federal budget of the United States.

LO2 Show that mandatory spending—the portion of the budget that is devoted to spending on items for which no annual vote is taken—has steadily increased because of various entitlement programs and interest on the national debt.

LO3 Summarize how 30 percent of the federal budget is al- located almost equally to domestic spending and defense, with a relatively small amount going for foreign aid and for dues to international organizations such as the United Nations.

LO4 Explain how to use marginal analysis when looking at federal spending.

LO5 Distinguish between current-services and baseline budgeting.

LO6 Conclude that the idea of opportunity cost is at the heart of federal spending.

Chapter Outline

A Primer on the Constitution and Spending Money

Using Our Understanding of Opportunity Cost

Using Our Understanding of Marginal Analysis

Budgeting for the Future

Summary

The federal government of the United States of America spends more than $4 trillion each year on everything from welfare to national defense. This chapter focuses at- tention on how the government spends that money, a per- fect example of how, in public policy, we use the concept of opportunity cost that was introduced in Chapter 1.

We start with a brief primer on what the Consti- tution requires before money can be spent. We then discuss the difference between mandatory and discre- tionary spending and how the balance between the two has shifted over the years. Next we lay out where the money was budgeted in the 2014 fiscal year, how that budget reflects on our priorities, and how the shift in distribution over the years reflects a shift in priori- ties. We focus our attention, in particular, on health, Social Security, and defense spending, which make up

the bulk of the federal budget. We use the Chapter 1 notion of marginal analysis to discuss both the size of federal spending and the distribution of it among vari- ous programs. Finally, we describe baseline and cur- rent-services budgeting and use Medicare and defense to discuss the differences.

As can be seen in Figure 11.1, federal spending as a percentage of GDP stayed between 18 percent and 22 percent for 22 years. After peaking in 1952 as a re- sult of the Korean War, this measure trended up from 16 percent in 1955 to a peak at 23.5 percent in 1982 as spending on social programs increased. The Reagan years saw a slow decline only to rebound in the George Herbert Walker Bush years as billions were spent in a bailout of failed savings and loan associations. Since that time the size of the federal government,

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146 Chapter 11 Federal Spending

The Congress often uses that budget as a blueprint upon which it bases a budget plan of its own. It uses its version as it debates and negotiates with the executive branch of government. When both sides reach agreement on a final budget, Congress passes appropriations bills to actually spend the money that has been budgeted.

All of this work must be completed by October 1 be- cause the government’s fiscal year starts then and goes to September 30 of the following year. (So the 2017 fiscal year began October 1, 2016, and ended September 30, 2017.) When these bills are passed and signed by the president, they become law and money can be spent. Otherwise, money cannot be spent.

Shenanigans This process has a myriad of places for shenanigans. Chief among these are actions taken by the various subcommittee and committee chairs and in the House– Senate conferences. The chairs of the appropriations subcommittees and the chairs of the full committees can and do influence how much gets spent and where it gets spent. Whereas spending on social insurance programs like Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Secu- rity cannot be easily altered, highway spending and defense spending are prime targets for spending on items of local rather than national interest. The chair of a subcommittee like the one on highway spending

measured as a percentage of GDP, fell to its lowest point in 25 years only to rise again in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The $750 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) passed in October 2008 and the $787 billion Obama stimulus law passed in February 2009 greatly altered this figure. After the Great Recession peak of 25.2  percent, federal spend- ing as a percentage of GDP is projected to stabilize at around 22 percent.

A Primer on the Constitution and Spending Money

What the Constitution Says According to the Constitution of the United States of America, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.” This means that unless Congress passes an appropria- tions bill and the president either signs it or has a veto overturned, no money can be spent. The president and Congress thus must reach either an agreement or a com- promise on spending priorities so that Congress will pass an appropriation bill that the president will sign.

Under normal procedures, the president sends a pro- posed budget to Congress in late winter or early spring.

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FIGURE 11.1 Federal spending as a percentage of GDP. Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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A Primer on the Constitution and Spending Money 147

review. Promises to quell this type of spending are rarely kept.

Dealing with Disagreements The appropriations process seldom moves smoothly, and the process is particularly rough when the political party in control of the White House is not in control of Congress. Disagreements abound when this is the case, and rarely can one party “have its way” with the budget. While the Obama administration was elected to office with large majorities in both the House of Repre- sentatives and Senate, Senate budget rules required that Obama garner 60 votes for his stimulus package. He could do that only with Republican votes. Even then, he was in a considerably more advantageous position than Presidents Clinton and Bush. Neither could count on his own party to back his budget priorities, and both dealt with periods when Congress was in the hands of the other party. It has been a truly rare circumstance in recent American history where a president had suffi- cient political party and ideological majorities in Con- gress to get his way. Thus the usual case for much of the late 20th century featured long and protracted budget debates.

When Congress either does not pass appropriations bills that are acceptable to the president or passes bills the president does not want, there are only four choices:

1. Congress can give in. 2. The president can give in. 3. The government can shut down. 4. Congress can pass a continuing resolution and the

president can sign it.

If either side gives in, a bill gets passed. Shutting down the government becomes a battle of chicken until the sides reach compromises. A continuing resolution con- stitutes an agreement to disagree that lets the government continue functioning.

Specifically, a continuing resolution is a bill passed by Congress and signed by the president that allows the government to spend money temporarily in a fashion identical to the previous year. This usually happens when

Congress does not meet the Oc- tober 1 deadline. More often than not, it is for only a few of the 13 appropriations bills and for only a few weeks, but in 2013, almost the entire budget was passed as a continuing resolution.

can fund the building of bridges and highways in his or her district much more easily than anyone else can. As with roads and bridges, defense is also an area where the powerful chairs of the subcommittees and the full committees work to ensure that federal money is spent in their districts. Recent history is replete with examples of weapons systems that are not wanted by the military but that are being built anyway because the production facilities are in districts or states of powerful members of Congress.

Even worse, members of the conference committees, who are charged with putting together good compromise bills, have been known to spend significant time mak- ing sure money is included for their states or districts and less time making sure the bill is a good one for the country. Members of Congress who have seniority over other members are the ones who are assigned to such committees. Such appointments are considered rewards for years of service. The most egregious products of the conferences are usually found in parts of the final bill that were not in the original House or Senate version of the bill. These are items that conference members knew they could not get passed in their own houses. Knowing they  were going to end up on a conference committee, they just waited and made the inclusion of the item they wanted passed a condition of their support for the bill in conference.

Another element of budgetary shenanigans comes when members of Congress agree to support spending programs in each other’s districts. This vote trading, called logrolling among economists, increases spend- ing in ways that raise eyebrows. A senator from Ver- mont got his colleagues to declare Lake Champlain a Great Lake so that it would qualify for an environmen-

tal program. The emergency spending legislation approved after the attacks of September 11, 2001, included billions for wholly unrelated items. The infamous Alaskan “bridge to nowhere” was tucked into

emergency spending following Hurricane Katrina by then Alaska Senator Ted Stevens. The 2013 Hurricane Sandy relief bill included $33 billion in spending en- tirely unrelated to the storm. Bridges, roads, univer- sity studies, and memorials to obscure local celebrities tend to grow on spending bills in direct proportion to the need to move the legislation quickly as members of Congress take advantage of the situation and agree to spending that would otherwise require extensive

logrolling The trading of votes used to generate sufficient support for projects that are not in the general interest of the country.

continuing resolution A bill passed by Con- gress and signed by the president that allows the government to tempo- rarily spend money in a fashion identical to the previous year.

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148 Chapter 11 Federal Spending

spending. You can see that the broadest of its distinctions is the difference between mandatory and discretionary spending. Mandatory spending delineates those items for which a previously passed law requires that money be

spent, while discretionary spend- ing is subject to annual appropri- ations decisions. For instance, current law states that people are entitled to certain benefits that must be paid without regard to any other budget details. Future laws could overturn those now in existence, but the benefits that are currently provided through Social Security, Medicare, Med- icaid, and welfare are so firmly entrenched in our society that in reality the money spent on them is untouchable. These four areas of the budget are often referred to as entitlement spending be-

cause the people for whom they are intended are entitled to the money they receive based on their poverty or age. Entitlement spending is a subset of mandatory spending, which also includes interest on the national debt.

The appropriations for defense, student loans, the courts, and so on, occur annually. While these budgets rarely change drastically from the previous year, a failure to pass an appropriations bill can significantly affect the operations in these areas.

On the discretionary side of the budget there are three main components: defense, international policy and foreign aid, and everything else (broken out in Table 11.1). The most misunderstood and controversial of these is international policy. Of the $46 billion spent

Using Our Understanding of Opportunity Cost

The federal budget of the United States is an object lesson in opportunity cost. Whenever money is spent in one area, it cannot be spent in another. Although more money can be spent in all areas, this also has an opportunity cost. When money is taken from taxpayers, their ability to enjoy pri- vate consumption is reduced. Deficit spending is also not without opportunity cost. Interest payments add up into the future and money for private investment is reduced.

Some economists argue that the opportunity cost of government deficit spending is such that for every dol- lar the federal government borrows and spends, a dollar is removed from private investment. If these economists are correct, this phenomenon, called crowding out, is an example of opportunity cost at work: Government cannot just spend money and make everyone better off. In the

process, someone is being made worse off. Other economists suggest that crowding out is less than complete, which means that for every dollar of govern- ment spending something less

than a dollar of private spending is lost. In either case there is an opportunity cost to the money spent.

The remainder of this section describes the choices that must be made by Congress and the president when setting out a spending plan.

Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending Although the actual budget proposal of the president runs to more than 1,000 pages and is incredibly detailed and precise, Figure 11.2 offers its basic distribution of

crowding out The opportunity cost of government deficit spending such that private investment is reduced.

mandatory spending Budget items for which a previously passed law requires that money be spent.

discretionary spending Budget items for which an annual appropriations bill must be passed so that money can be spent.

entitlement A program where if people meet certain income or demo- graphic criteria they are automatically eligible to receive benefits.

TABLE 11.1 Nondefense domestic discretionary spending, Fiscal Year 2016.

Income Security, $528, 13%

Medicaid and SCHIP, $407, 10%

Medicare, $595, 15%

Social Security, $929, 24%

Discretionary domestic, $628,

16%

International A�airs and Aid,

$46, 1%

Defense and Homeland Security,

$604, 15% Interest, $240, 6%

FIGURE 11.2 Fiscal Year 2016 spending (in billions) and percentage of federal budget.

Category of Domestic Discretionary Spending

2016 Spending ($ billions)

Science and space 30.8 Natural resources/environment 42.6 Agriculture 25.6 Transportation 92.4 Education and training 113.9 Veterans 178.2 Justice 64.4

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Using Our Understanding of Opportunity Cost 149

future Congresses and presidents as less and less of the budget can be devoted to other priorities.

Where the Money Goes As you can see from Figure 11.2, defense, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and net interest take up $2.8 trillion of the $4 trillion spent each year. The rest is either in the form of other welfare programs such as Temporary Assis- tance for Needy Families (TANF) or food stamps, or it is spent in the relatively smaller amounts listed in Table 11.1. The biggest of these areas of spending are under the De- partment of Education and its education and training pro- grams. Of the $114 billion spent on education and training, $39 billion is spent on student loans, grants, and the federal work–study program. The remainder is spent as a supple- ment to state and local spending on primary and secondary education. With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, spend- ing on veterans’ benefits has increased to $178 billion. In 2016, transportation spending was budgeted at $92 billion with $64 billion for the federal justice system.

Figure 11.4 indicates that the mix of spending has dra- matically changed over the years. Half or more of the fed- eral budget once was devoted to national defense; today the amount is less than 16 percent. While Social Security once took up only 15 percent of the budget, today it is ap- proximately 23 percent. Net interest paid increased from less than 10 percent to more than 15 percent only to fall to 9 percent as a result of the surpluses of the late 1990s

in this area, $14 billion is spent to maintain the State Department and its embassies in other countries and to pay our dues to the UN and other international organiza- tions. The remaining $32 billion goes to other countries in foreign aid.

As you can see from Figure 11.3, the proportion of the budget devoted to discretionary spending has decreased from over 65 percent to just over 30 percent, while the proportion devoted to mandatory spending has skyrocketed. This led President Clinton in 1993 to decry the fact that under projections valid at the time, by 2010 Congress would convene each year to debate less than 10 percent of the annual budget. This troublesome trend was halted in the late 1990s, but was on track to resume before the financial crisis of 2008 and coincident reces- sion began. The massive increase in discretionary spend- ing that resulted from the 2009 stimulus plan briefly interrupted this trend. However, aging baby boomers will soon balloon Social Security and Medicare spend- ing, and the massive deficits of 2009 through 2014 and likely beyond will surely increase interest obligations such that President Clinton’s prediction may come true, a few years after he thought it would.

This brings us back to the inescapable notion of op- portunity cost. Every time a new entitlement program comes on board, such as the prescription drug coverage for Medicare recipients, it not only costs money now and in the future but also reduces the amount of flexibility of

FIGURE 11.3 Mandatory and discretionary spending as a percentage of total federal spending, 1962–2021. Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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150 Chapter 11 Federal Spending

Federal Reserve has used its power to buy this debt to temporarily reduce the interest rate.

An area of spending that has increased remarkably since 1970 is federal spending in support of health care. As seen in Figure 11.5, adjusted for inflation, federal

and early 2000s and the historically low interest rates of 2001 through 2004. As deficits grew during 2005–2007 and then exploded during and after the 2007–2009 re- cession, it is once again more than 10 percent. The only reason it has not already exceeded that amount is that the

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FIGURE 11.4 Composition of federal spending. Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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FIGURE 11.5 Real health spending by the federal government, 1962–2021 billions of 2000 dollars. Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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Budgeting for the Future 151

marginal analysis compares the marginal benefit of an action with its marginal cost. In particular, that marginal cost is its opportunity cost.

The Size of the Federal Government In judging the proper size of the federal government, an economist using marginal analysis would attempt to decide if the benefits resulting from additional tax money would outweigh the benefits that would other- wise accrue to private citizens if they were not taxed that amount. A government that purports to be “of, by and for the people” should seek to take only that money needed to fund programs whose marginal benefit is greater than or equal to their marginal cost. Thus it is not enough to say that we are getting $4 trillion in value for our $4 trillion; we need to be able to say that we are getting a dollar’s worth of value for the last dollar of those $4 trillion dollars.

The Distribution of Federal Spending Just as government should seek to maximize the net benefit to society by picking the optimal size of gov- ernment, it should ensure that the distribution of spend- ing between various priorities is optimal as well. Once the optimal size is established, the opportunity cost of money spent by one program is that it cannot be spent by another. For instance, the choice to build an aircraft car- rier could come at the cost of expanding student grants and loans to cover several thousand more college stu- dents. Thus money spent on a program with only modest evidence of success could be viewed as wasteful, even if it is spent with good intentions and does no harm, because the money could be spent elsewhere to greater effect.

Budgeting for the Future

Baseline versus Current-Services Budgeting The yearly budget debate in Washington is replete with claims about who is making what cuts. For instance, dur- ing the debate over the 1996 budget, Republicans sug- gested that spending on Medicare increases yearly at a rate of 9 percent rather than the 14 percent requested by President Clinton. Since another aspect of their program was a broad-based tax cut, they were accused of “cut- ting Medicare to pay for a tax cut for the rich.” This kind of debate is annoying because politicians often redefine simple words such as “cut” or simple phrases such as

spending on health care has risen 1,000 percent over that time. This is because Medicare and Medicaid spending has risen dramatically. When these programs were intro- duced in the late 1960s, spending on both was trivial. In the 2016 federal budget more than $407 billion was spent on Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and $595 billion on Medicare. Together this is more than is spent on any program other than Social Security.

Again we are faced with the fact that there are always trade-offs. The trade-offs that we have made until now have clearly been in favor of entitlements. Social Secu- rity, Medicare, Medicaid, and various welfare programs have driven the budget for many years. The combined budget for all non-defense domestic spending, which in- cludes everything from the federal judiciary to student loans, is exceeded by just one program, Social Security. The choice that we have made to ensure that elderly peo- ple and persons who are disabled have steady and reli- able incomes comes at a cost.

Another choice that we have made is to exercise our military power in other parts of the world. Though some would argue that we had no real choice being the world’s only superpower, it does, nonetheless, absorb resources and have an opportunity cost. As can be seen from Table 11.2, we spend a higher percentage of our GDP on military expenditures than our allies.

Using Our Understanding of Marginal Analysis

Federal spending is a prime arena to utilize marginal anal- ysis. We can use this form of thinking to discuss whether the federal government spends too little or too much and whether the distribution of spending on various spend- ing priorities is appropriate. Recall from Chapter 1 that

TABLE 11.2 International comparisons of defense spending as a percentage of GDP, 2014.

Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS

Country Defense Spending/GDP

United States 3.5 United Kingdom 2.0 France 2.2 Germany 1.2 Japan 1.0

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152 Chapter 11 Federal Spending

to ensure that government services are available to everyone who is eligible to receive them. There is no guarantee that baseline budgeting will provide enough money. A reasonable question to ask in budgeting is one that Democrats tend to ask: “How much will it cost to perform services this year in a manner identical to last year?” This is referred to as current-services budgeting. Current-services budg et ing takes into account such things as overall inflation, inflation in the specific sec-

tor, and an increase in the num- ber of people being served. If you want to guarantee enough money to provide identical ser- vices in the future, then merely starting with the previous year’s baselines may not work. This

has been particularly true in the health care field because new, more effective treatments become available. Thus the question is whether the new spending required to meet the old standard of care will be sufficient to meet the new standard.

Using current-services budgeting, President Clinton criticized Republicans in 1995 for their plan to “cut Medicare.” Republicans countered, using baseline budgeting, that there was no cut at all. By using jar- gon with technical definitions to further their own posi- tions, each party was telling the truth. In this case the truth depended on the standard that had been set. If the agreed-upon standard had been baseline budgeting, then the Republicans were right; if it had been current- services, then the Democrats were right. Because a standard had not been set, they were both right and they were both wrong.

“broad-based” to suit their argument. It is indisputable that Democrats wanted more money for Medicare and Republicans, less. Moreover, Republicans wanted a re- duction in taxes in rough proportion to taxes paid, and Democrats did not.

Had each side used straightforward and agreed- upon definitions, the debate would have been easier to understand. For instance, Democrats often define a broad-based tax cut as one that goes to everyone equally, whereas Republicans define it as one that goes proportionally to those who pay income taxes. Republicans argue that most of a tax cut should go to those making the most money since they pay the most taxes. (See Chap ter 41 on personal income tax.) Democrats, on the other hand, define broad-based tax cuts as those that are given to everyone in similar amounts.

The language problem on spending cuts is equally exasperating. The problem is that when you formulate a budget and you compare it to other years’ budgets, there is an open question as to how the comparison should be done. If you simply look at last year’s bud- geted figure and compare it to this year’s budgeted fig-

ure, you are engaging in what is referred to as baseline budget- ing. If you are budgeting more than you did last year, that is an increase; if you are budgeting less, that is a decrease. This is

a commonsense approach and it is one that Republicans typically take.

This approach, however, misses an important point that is vital to interests Democrats support. They wish

Summary You now understand the process that goes into creating the federal budget of the United States. You know that in percentage terms a large and increasing part of the bud- get is devoted to spending on items for which no annual vote is taken. You now see that this mandatory spend- ing goes mostly to Social Security, Medicare, Medic- aid, various welfare programs, and the costs of interest on the debt. You understand that the rest goes almost equally to spending on domestic concerns and spending

on defense. You see that a relatively small amount goes for foreign aid and other obligations to international or- ganizations such as the United Nations. You understand the difference between current-services and baseline budgeting and why this difference is at the heart of many political debates. Most important, you now understand that the idea of opportunity cost—choices have conse- quences, and money spent in one area cannot be spent in another—is at the heart of budgeting.

baseline budgeting Using last year’s budgeted figure to set this year’s budgeted figure.

current-services budgeting Using an estimate of the costs of providing the same level of services next year as last.

gue46399_ch11_145-154.indd 152 16/03/17 11:41 AM

Key Terms baseline budgeting continuing resolution crowding out

current-services budgeting discretionary spending entitlement

logrolling mandatory spending

1. Federal spending is typically percent of GDP. a. less than 10 b. between 18 and 22 c. between 25 and 30 d. more than 30

2. The FY 2016 federal budget was around a. $4 million. b. $4 billion. c. $4 trillion. d. $4 quadrillion.

3. Disagreements between the Congress and the presi- dent about the federal budget occur frequently. When they cannot agree on a budget but want to keep the government running, they a. use the president’s budget. b. use Congress’s budget. c. use a budget created by an independent budget

commission. d. pass a continuing resolution.

4. Mandatory spending implies spending that is a. required by a previously passed set of laws. b. required by the U.S. Constitution. c. needed more than discretionary spending. d. off-limits for any cuts at any time.

5. The largest single item in federal spending is a. international aid. b. welfare. c. interest on the debt. d. Social Security.

6. Total federal spending on health care, after adjusting for inflation, has been a. growing. b. relatively constant. c. declining slowly. d. declining rapidly.

7. In determining whether the federal government is the right size, an economist would determine whether a. the first dollar spent produced $1 worth of

social good.

Quiz Yourself b. the average dollar spent produced $1 worth of

social good. c. the last dollar spent produced $1 worth of

social good. d. an amount of social good was created equal to

the amount spent. 8. In determining whether the distribution of federal

spending among various agencies was correct, an economist would want to make sure a. that each agency manager got what (s)he

thought was needed in that area. b. that the last dollar spent in each area produced

the same amount of social good. c. that the average dollar spent in each area

produced the same amount of social good. d. that the total amount of money spent in each

agency produced the same level of social good. 9. If a program’s cost rises only with inflation and in-

creases in those that qualify for the program, this represents a. an increase in spending using baseline

budgeting. b. a decrease in spending using current-services

budgeting. c. no increase or decrease in spending using

current-services budgeting. d. a and c are both correct.

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain how mandatory spending comes about

relative to discretionary spending. Then assign the following programs to each: interest payments on the debt, national defense, Social Security, food stamps.

2. In order of magnitude, rank the following spending from greatest to smallest: Social Security, national defense, Medicare, federal support for education, space exploration, and foreign aid.

3. Explain what would transpire for new government expenditures to crowd out other economic activity.

Summary 153

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154 Chapter 11 Federal Spending

For More Insight See Lee, Ronald, and Jonathan Skinner, “Will Aging Baby

Boomers Bust the Federal Budget?” Journal of Eco- nomic Perspectives 13, no. 1 (Winter 1999).

Lynch, Thomas, Public Budgeting in the United States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979).

Behind the Numbers Historical data.

Federal spending. Mandatory and discretionary spending. Composition of federal spending. Federal government health spending. Budget of the United States Government; historical

tables—www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals World Bank; data and statistics—http://data.worldbank.org

4. One political party believes government spending is too high; another party thinks it is too low. Which party will argue for current-services budgeting as a practice for setting government budgets? Explain why.

Think about This The Medicare prescription drug benefit passed dur- ing 2003 comes at a significant long-term cost (at least $720  billion over 10 years). Consider the opportunity cost of this spending in terms of tax cuts, deficit reduc- tion, or spending on other priorities. Would you have committed the federal government to this spending?

Talk about This When Congress and the president do not agree on a spend- ing package and cannot agree on a continuing resolution, the government shuts down all but emergency services. What, in your mind, should be considered under the um- brella of “emergency”?

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C H A P T E R T W E L V E

155

Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Explain how economists look at the federal budget deficits and surpluses and the national debt.

LO2 Associate significant deficits as resulting from wars and se- vere recessions/depressions.

LO3 Conclude that economists are interested less in raw num- bers than in more sophisticated measures of the burdens that deficits and debt place on us.

LO4 Compare the U.S. national debt-to-GDP ratio relative to U.S. history and to other countries.

LO5 Explain that the federal government owns much of the debt and list what agencies own that debt.

LO6 Summarize the different positions taken by economists on the issue of a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

LO7 Conclude that the deficit and debt picture has changed substantially since 1990 and articulate why deficit projections are so often wrong.

Chapter Outline

Surpluses, Deficits, and the Debt: Definitions and History

How Economists See the Deficit and the Debt

Who Owns the Debt?

A Balanced-Budget Amendment

Projections

Summary

This chapter could have had a simpler title: “Deficits and the National Debt.” That is, except for a brief period in recent history, from 1998 to 2001, the federal govern- ment has spent more than it has taken in. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the history of the deficits, those few surpluses, and the national debt of the U.S. federal government. (Particular attention will be paid to the debts coming out of the 2007–2009 recession and the budgets of President Obama.) After a brief history of these, we discuss the main causes of deficits and debt through time. We examine how economists look at the federal

debt and how they compare the current state of affairs with other countries and U.S. history. When we discover who actually owns the federal debt, you will be surprised to see that a significant portion of it is owned by the fed- eral government itself. We discuss whether a balanced- budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes sense as economic policy, and we conclude by looking at the rosy projections of surpluses and the national debt made by the Office of Management and Budget and the Con- gressional Budget Office and comparing them with much less rosy projections made by others.

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156 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

Confederation, before the Constitution was ratified, the country had a considerable debt (more than $75 million) from the American Revolutionary War and no money to pay it off. In fact, because the Continental Congress had no power to tax during the war, almost all of the money necessary to fight and win it was borrowed. In the first 58 years of constitutional government in the United States, from 1791 to 1849, there were more years of surplus (36) than deficit (23), and over that time the country ran a net surplus of $60 million. As a matter of fact, in 1836 the debt had all been repaid and President Andrew Jackson got Congress to give states money. Congress missed the mark and gave away $37,000 too much. The only alterna- tive to giving the money to the states—investing in the private sector—was considered inappropriate.

The American Civil War ended notions that the coun- try would ever again go without a national debt. Two billion dollars was borrowed to fight that war, and even though in the 35 years after the war there were more years with a surplus (21) than a deficit (14), the debt remained at $2 billion by 1900. As a matter of fact, in the first 30 years of the 20th century, there were almost as many years of surplus (13) as deficit (17). The debt during that period grew because the deficits during the two-year U.S. involvement in World War I were twice the size of the combined surplus in the other years. The longest uninterrupted period of debt reduction began just after World War I and lasted until 1930, the first full year of the Great Depression. Surpluses ruled for 11 consecu- tive years. In general, U.S. economic history prior to the Great Depression can be summarized as one in which the expenses of wars created the debt and steady efforts were made to eliminate the debt when the wars ended.

Since 1930, however, deficits have been more the rule than the exception. During the 86 years from 1930 to 2015, there were only 12 years with surpluses (three years in the 1940s, three in the 1950s, two in the 1960s, two in the 1990s, and two in the 2000s), whereas there were 74 with deficits. Also during that time the national debt grew from $50 billion to $18.1 trillion. Adjusting the deficits and sur- pluses for inflation, we can compare the relative size of the various years, and this is shown in Figure 12.1.

Figure 12.1 also portrays an important division be- tween the total budget and the off-budget surpluses and deficits. Recall that the total budget is the combination of the on- and off-budget numbers. In recent times, espe- cially after changes in Social Security in 1982 that saw a hefty increase in taxes in anticipation of the large num- ber of retirements among baby boomers, the off-budget surplus has been substantial. In all but 12 of the 82 years

Surpluses, Deficits, and the Debt: Definitions and History

Definitions Defining budget deficit, budget surplus, or national debt ought to be simple, but because of the way the federal

government does its accounting, the definitions are not as simple as they could be. For instance, you would think that if you did the math, a surplus would result when the total amount of tax rev- enue that came in was greater than the total amount that you spent. If spending exceeded the revenue, the result would be a deficit, and the debt would be the sum of the deficits minus the sum of the surpluses.

The problem is the usual definitions are not quite right, and it is because the deficit or surplus for a year is the combi- nation of what are referred to as the off- and on-budget deficits and surpluses. Social Security, Medicare, and other parts of the budget that have trust funds at- tached to them complicate the matter because they are con- sidered off-budget. The part of the federal budget that operates from year to year without a trust

fund is on-budget. So, in 1998, when revenues exceeded expenditures and there was a $60 billion surplus for the total budget, we still added to our national debt because of a deficit in the on-budget part of the equation. When- ever we have an on-budget deficit, we have more debt. Since the off-budget part of the system had a greater surplus than the on-budget part had a deficit, the total budget was in net surplus, yet our debt grew.

History The annual budget of the United States is never actually balanced. The closest we ever came to a strictly balanced budget was a $3,800 deficit in 1835. Why is the budget not ever balanced? Congress passes the budget before it knows exactly how much money is going to come in. When the United States operated under the Articles of

budget deficit The amount by which expenditures exceed revenues.

budget surplus The amount by which revenues exceed expenditures.

national debt The total amount owed by the federal government.

off-budget Parts of the budget designated by Congress as separate from the normal budget. Programs that operate with their own revenue sources and have trust funds; Social Security, Medicare, and the Postal Service are examples.

on-budget Parts of the budget that rely entirely or mostly on general revenue.

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Surpluses, Deficits, and the Debt: Definitions and History 157

depicted in Figure 12.1, the off-budget part of the sys- tem was in surplus, and nine of these were from the late 1970s and early 1980s, before Social Security taxes were raised substantially. This continues to be the case with the surpluses in the Social Security system. These off- budget surpluses masked the severity of budget deficits in the late 1980s and created the illusion of surpluses in the late 1990s. It was only in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 that the on-budget side was showing a surplus. Deficits surged after the Bush-era tax cuts and spending increases resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deficits were slated to hover in the $400 billion per year range when, in 2008, the recession and financial collapse took place.

Figure 12.2 displays the trend in deficits as a per- centage of GDP. On the left side of the graph, the large annual deficits were for the expenses of war, just as 19th- century deficits were. In addition to all of the other upheaval caused by the Great Depression and World War II, budget deficits, measured in 1996 dollars in Figure 12.1 and measured as a percentage of GDP in Figure 12.2, peaked at more than $400 billion a year, or nearly a third of GDP.

The deficits of the 1980s and 1990s were caused by a confluence of events. In 1981 President Ronald Reagan took office on a platform dedicated to decreas- ing the size of the federal government and to lessening the threat of communism. Part of this meant that he worked to reduce federal income taxes. Tax rates were slashed and important deductions and exemptions were indexed1 for inflation to prevent bracket creep2 from rais- ing taxes later. The part of the equation that focused on quelling communism resulted in an increase in federal spending on national defense from $157 billion in 1980 to $303  billion in 1988. All of this might have meant a budget with historically typical deficits had President Reagan been successful in convincing Congress to cut or even substantially slow the rate of increase in domes- tic spending. Though the rate of increase in spending on those programs that were on-budget did slow, they did

400

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FIGURE 12.1 The total and off-budget deficits and surpluses since 1940, in billions of 1996 dollars.

Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

1Recall from Chapter 6 that indexing is adjusting a dollar amount for inflation. It is called indexing because an index, in this case the consumer price index, is used to perform the adjustment. 2When inflation occurs and incomes rise exactly in line with inflation, then, unless the tax brackets are adjusted for inflation, people pay a higher per- centage of that income in taxes even though the real spending power of their income has remained unchanged. This is called bracket creep.

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158 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

not slow enough. In addition, spending on Social Security and Medicare increased substantially faster than before. While revenues grew quickly despite the cut in income taxes, this growth was insufficient to keep pace with the spending increases. With spending growing in nearly all sectors of the budget and revenues not keeping pace, the deficits during this period were inflation-adjusted, larger than the deficits it took to win World War I but smaller than the deficits it took to win World War II.

Despite incurring the huge deficits, many argue in President Reagan’s defense that the victory over the

Soviet Union in the Cold War and the peace dividend (money that was freed up for other spending priorities when the Cold War was over) that en- sued was worth the investment.

To back up this position, they claim that the inflation- adjusted military budget in 2000 was smaller than at any other point since World War II and about half of its 1980s peak. If you accept the proposition that the Rea- gan defense buildup caused, or at least contributed to, a more rapid ending of the Cold War, then those respon- sible for allowing the deficits of the 1980s are no more to be criticized than those responsible for the deficits from either of the two world wars.

The dramatic turnaround in the deficit picture that occurred between 1996 and 2001 resulted from a nearly 50 percent increase in taxable income. About a third of that increase resulted from a skyrocketing stock market. From 1991 to 2000 taxable capital gains income increased from

just over $100 billion to more than $630 billion. As a re- sult, a deficit that had been approaching $300 billion in 1992 turned into a $236 billion surplus in 2000.

Beginning in 2000, things began to unravel. In March, the stock market reached its peak (12,000 on the Dow Jones and 5,000 on the NASDAQ) and began a two-and-a-half year decline (7,500 on the Dow and 1,200 on the NASDAQ). Taxable capital gains income was cut by more than half in that time. In November of 2000 we had an election where it took a month of court battles to decide who won the presidency. By the time George W. Bush took office, the economy was in recession and unemployment was on the rise. He delivered on a prom- ised tax cut in the spring of 2001 that further diminished revenues. The attacks of September 11 resulted in vast increases in government spending for reconstruction as well as military and domestic security. More tax cuts, undisciplined federal spending unrelated to defense, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq further swelled the def- icit such that by 2005 the total budget deficit was more than $239 billion.

In 2006 and 2007, the lack of progress in Iraq forced President Bush to choose between withdrawing or increas- ing forces. His surge strategy, combined with a weakening housing market, caused deficits to rise again. The 2008 tax cuts and weakening economy in early 2008 further exacerbated the deficit, resulting in predictions of $500 to $600 billion deficits that would greet a new president. Then, of course, the bottom dropped out of the financial sector in the fall of 2008. This created four strains on the deficit. First, the weakened state of the economy caused

Year

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FIGURE 12.2 Deficits as a percentage of GDP: 1940–2021.

Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

peace dividend Money that was freed up for other spending priorities when the Cold War was over.

gue46399_ch12_155-167.indd 158 16/03/17 11:42 AM

How Economists See the Deficit and the Debt 159

tax revenues to slow. Second, that weakening resulted in increases in unemployment compensation, Medicaid, and other welfare spending. Third, the financial collapse re- sulted in the appropriation of $750 billion to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in an attempt to prevent a global depression. Finally, a month after President Obama was sworn in, he signed a $787 billion stimulus package. Though not all of the money was spent in FY2009, defi- cits surged past $1 trillion for that year and stayed above that level until FY2012. The lack of agreement between President Obama and Republicans in Congress resulted in no significant deficit reduction. The tax increases on high-income taxpayers and the sequester (automatic budget cuts) of 2013 combined with a modestly growing economy had the effect of reducing trillion dollar per year deficits by 30 to 50 percent between 2013 and 2016.

How Economists See the Deficit and the Debt

As you know by now, economists see things differently from the way many other people see them. Nothing is more emblematic of that different viewpoint than the way economists look at deficits and the national debt. When noneconomists see that we have spent more than we have paid in taxes, they see it as a problem. Only a minority of economists believe that the current U.S. national debt rep- resents a significant threat to current or future economic health. This differs substantially from the position most economists took in the early 1990s when the deficit was large and growing and the debt and its interest obligations were becoming rapidly burdensome. We next examine why economists hold differing views on this matter.

Operating and Capital Budgets To see things from an economist’s perspective, consider first that the debt is made up of a series of budget defi- cits over time. The next thing to realize about the budget

is that, again from an econo- mist’s viewpoint, it is figured all wrong. It should be divided between operating and capital budgets. Things that are big, expensive, and will last several years ought not be accounted for in the same way as federal purchases of toilet paper. High- ways, dams, and buildings are certainly going to be around for

a while, and it makes little economic sense to account for them as though they are going to disappear at the end of the year.

Away from government, what businesses normally do with such large investments is to create a capital budget. An investment in an asset with a long life simply has to be able to generate profits over the years that are more than sufficient to make payments on the asset. The ex- penses of the business that go to pay for items that are used up soon after they are paid for, like labor, paper, and phone calls, go into an operating budget. As long as the revenue of the firm is sufficient to cover the operat- ing budget and make the appropriate payments on the capital previously purchased, the business is fine, even if it is carrying a large debt. If big corporations did their accounting the way the federal government does, they would rarely show a profit. When they did show a profit, it would be a great deal smaller than usual.

One problem with separating a capital budget from an operating budget is trying to figure out what spending is an investment that should go into the capital budget and what spending is not. Liberal politicians tend to argue that nearly all social spending should be included in the capital budget. Conservatives, on the other hand, usually say that nearly all military spending should be included in the capital budget. Each would label its spending rec- ommendations as investments in the future and the oth- er’s as spending on today. This distinction is important because getting the budget to balance is harder as more goes into the operating side. Moreover, balancing the operating budget is more a political shell game than an exercise grounded in fundamental economic principles.

Cyclical and Structural Deficits Another way in which economists look at the defi- cit differently from other people is that we divide it between its structural and cyclical components. In Chapter 6 we broke unemployment into three parts— frictional, cyclical, and structural. We can do a similar thing here. The part of the deficit that is attributable to

the economy’s not being at full employment is called the cyclical deficit, and the part of the defi- cit that would remain even if we were at full employment is called a structural deficit. If the deficit is large because the econ- omy is not doing well, then the whole economy is the issue, not the deficit. If the deficit is large

operating budget That part of the fed- eral budget devoted to spending on goods and services that will be used in the current year.

capital budget That part of the fed- eral budget devoted to spending on goods that will last several years.

cyclical deficit That part of the deficit attributable to the econ- omy’s not being at full employment.

structural deficit That part of the deficit that would remain even if the economy were at full employment.

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160 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

even when the economy is doing relatively well, then the deficit is a problem. Economists who think deficits can

be used to stimulate a lacklus- ter economy consider that part of the deficit attributable to the “stimulus package” useful and label it functional finance.

The Debt as a Percentage of GDP There are other reasons why most economists did not view the national debt (as it stood during the pre-2008 periods) as all that troubling. Among these was that, as a percentage of national income, the national debt was not anywhere near as high as it had been. If you look at Figure 12.3, you will see that the ratio of na- tional debt to the GDP was greater than 1 after World War II and, while it increased to near .70 in the 1990s, it fell sharply when in the late 1990s deficits turned into surpluses. Of course, that lasted only a short time as burgeoning deficits resumed bringing the debt-to- GDP ratio back near the 70  percent level. With the global economic downturn and the subsequent TARP and stimulus plans all occurring in relatively short order, the debt shot up to near 100 percent of GDP by 2011. Current projections suggest a debt level above 100 percent of GDP will exist through 2020.

Gross domestic product measures what we can afford as a nation, and Figure 12.3 shows that we were in a

position that was similar to the average of our recent history; yet with the debt above 100 percent of GDP, a level not seen in quite some time, and with Medicare and Social Security spending certain to rise much faster than their funding sources, more economists are con- cerned about the debt picture going forward.

International Comparisons There is an even more compelling argument that the state of the national debt has changed markedly in the last five years. Though the relevant measure of debt dif- fers among countries,3 what is clear is that government debts have increased throughout the developed world. As can be seen in Table 12.1, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio was well within the norms of the rest of the world for the period between 1970 and 2005. Though still nowhere near the levels of Italy and Japan, this debt-to-GDP ratio that had been significantly better than Canada’s and Germany’s, and only somewhat worse than that of the United Kingdom, is now noticeably worse than any of those countries. The country that has really begun to tread close to its ability to manage its debt is Japan. Once held up as an example of fiscal rectitude, Japan,

functional finance That part of the budget attributable to programs designed to get an econ- omy out of a recession.

3OECD and World Bank definitions of public sector debt differ. The OECD discontinued its published series. World Bank Gross PS includes all public sector debt (including state/provincial/local). World Bank-Central includes only the central government debt. These numbers differ greatly in more federal systems (e.g., U.S. and Canada) and less in centralized systems (e.g., the U.K.).

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FIGURE 12.3 Debt as a percentage of GDP: 1940–2021.

Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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Who Owns the Debt? 161

has seen its national debt balloon from 10.6 percent of GDP in 1970 to more than 244 percent in 2015.

Generational Accounting Some economists look at the deficit and surplus in a completely different fashion. These economists, led by Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff, argue that, in- stead of looking at the deficit as a meaningful number, we should look at the “net tax rate” that the current policies imply for future generations. To understand their argument, recall the discussion of present value from Chapter  7. These economists and others argue that if you look at the difference between the pres- ent value of what people of different generations pay in taxes and the transfers that they get in government benefits, you can compute a net tax rate. They claim that this number has been getting steadily worse for younger generations and that future generations will face a terrible tax burden because of the deficits of the 1980s and 1990s and the entitlement crises of Social Security and Medicare.

Who Owns the Debt?

The question of who owns the bonds that a nation sells to finance its debt is an important aspect of any na- tion’s debt. Although this may seem like an irrelevant issue, you may be surprised to know that the U.S. gov- ernment owes itself more than a quarter of the debt.

That is what separates the “Total” and “Public” debts in Figure 12.3 and is the point of Figure 12.4. There are two ways in which the federal government lends itself money:

1. The Federal Reserve uses federal debt for purposes of open-market operations.

2. The federal trust funds invest their money by lending it to other parts of the federal government.

As you may see in the issues chapter on monetary policy, the Federal Reserve of the United States (the Fed) has three options for moving the economy: open- market operations, changing key interest rates, and changing the reserve ratio. Open-market operations are activities that result in the Fed buying or selling bonds. To get money into the economy, it buys bonds, and to remove money from the system, it sells bonds. Since the role of the Federal Reserve is to keep inflation on an even keel, it must steadily increase the money supply to keep pace with the growth in the economy. Doing so requires that the Fed constantly buy bonds. In this way the federal government owes itself a growing amount of money. If you think that is silly, consider that when the federal government borrows money from itself it also pays itself interest, and, as a matter of fact, in the early 1990s it was borrowing money from itself to pay interest to itself.

The government also owes itself money through the various trust funds it maintains for Social Security, Medicare, highways, airports, and other smaller parts

TABLE 12.1 International comparisons of debt-to-GDP ratios. Sources: www.oecd.org; databank.worldbank.org

Year Canada U.S. U.K. Germany Italy Japan

OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central OECD

World Bank Gross PS

World Bank Gross Central

1970 54.1 44.5 78.0 17.5 38.1 10.6

1975 44.9 42.8 62.1 23.1 57.4 20.2

1980 45.6 39.8 54.5 30.2 58.0 47.9

1985 66.3 53.5 59.4 41.6 82.1 64.2

1990 74.5 66.6 33.0 41.5 103.7 68.6

1995 100.3 131.2 74.9 74.2 83.1 70.0 52.7 49.0 46.8 57.2 125.5 87.1

2000 82.1 108.1 56.1 55.2 61.5 53.0 45.6 42.3 41.3 60.4 58.9 37.7 121.6 105.1 101.9 136.7 136.5 101.0

2005 70.3 94.5 42.9 62.4 78.5 56.3 46.5 43.7 42.4 71.1 66.9 40.8 120.5 101.9 96.8 177.3 182.1 143.6

2010 84.4 105.3 49.5 92.8 116.0 85.6 81.3 79.7 77.9 79.9 81.0 51.6 131.3 115.3 108.5 198.4 212.5 174.6

2015 113.1 47.1 124.4 97.0 94.3 92.8 71.9 45.9 134.6 129.4 244.4 207.0

gue46399_ch12_155-167.indd 161 16/03/17 11:42 AM

162 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

19 40

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

19 44

19 48

19 52

19 56

19 60

19 64

19 68

19 72

Year

P e

rc e

n ta

g e

f e

d e

ra l d

e b

t

19 76

19 80

19 84

19 88

19 92

19 96

20 00

20 04

20 08

20 12

20 16

20 20

Trust funds Federal Reserve Public (non-Fed)

FIGURE 12.4 Who owns our debt? Percentage of the debt held by the public, trust funds, and the Federal Reserve.

Source: The Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

of the government entities. By law, these trust funds are allowed to invest their money in federal bonds only. Given that these bonds are the safest investment on the planet, this makes sense, but the bonds also return among the lowest interest rates available. In any event, when these programs bring in more money than they spend, the excess is lent to other parts of the government and is money that the government will not have to borrow on the open market.

From Figure 12.4 we see that the amount of federal debt that is held by the public tends to fall unless the deficit and debt are rising quickly. When these are rising quickly, the Federal Reserve is reluctant to buy a great amount of debt in a short period of time because injecting large quanti- ties of new money in the system can create inflation. Any time large deficits are rung up, they have to be sold to the public, and the overall proportion held by the public rises. When the deficit is not large or we have a surplus, the per- centage held by the public will fall. It is conceivable that if we ran many years of large surpluses, the bulk of the debt would be owed to the government itself.

On a more dreary note, we should remember that the portion of the debt that the Medicare system owns began to be sold to the public beginning in 2010. That was when the expenses of the hospital portion of Medicare first exceeded the tax payments that fund it. That debt was transferred to the Treasury and then sold to the public. Though the effect was slight at the time, as the process continues, we can expect that the portion of the debt held by the public will rise. Because of the way we do the accounting now, the national debt will not rise, but the amount that is important, the amount held by the public, will.

Externally Held Debt A concern that has arisen from time to time is the degree to which our national debt is owed to foreigners. At points in American history our national debt has been owed to citizens of other nations. While we could consider this flattering, in that these non-Americans view the United States as a safe place for their savings, it can also be a problem if too much of our debt is owed to foreigners.

Figure 12.5 demonstrates that, in large measure, the Japanese and Chinese have loaned us much of the money we have used to go on the federal spending and tax cut spree of the 2000s. Our debt to citizens of Japan has more than doubled since 2000 while our debt to Chinese citizens has increased 14-fold. Of the nearly $18 trillion in debt, 59 percent is owed to real people and of that 58 percent is owed to non-U.S. entities.

This presents a problem for the future in that even- tually these investors will want their money back in the form of goods and services. Foreigners are no different than the rest of us: They save in order to buy something later. When one U.S. citizen owes another U.S. citizen money, the future state of the economy is not necessarily threatened. On the other hand, when the U.S. taxpayer owes money to foreign investors, part of the taxes that we pay in the future will go to pay them interest rather than to pay for schools, defense, or our criminal justice system.

A Balanced-Budget Amendment

One of the important debates of the final quarter of the 20th century was whether we need an amendment to the U.S. Constitution requiring a balanced federal budget.

gue46399_ch12_155-167.indd 162 16/03/17 11:42 AM

A Balanced-Budget Amendment 163

Year

Japan Mainland China United Kingdom Caribbean banking centers

All others OPEC

2000

2,500

3,000

3,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

A m

o u

n t

o f

U .S

. T re

as u

ry (b

ill io

n s)

0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 20142008

FIGURE 12.5 U.S. debt owed to foreign entitites.

Source: www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfhhis01.txt

Economists are on both sides of this issue, but the major- ity believe it is not a good idea. Those who are opposed reason that an inflexible amendment could cause reces- sions to turn into depressions because the provisions of the amendment would mandate tax increases and spend- ing cuts at precisely the time when just the opposite would be needed. Those in favor of the amendment argue that the politicians’ performance in the latter half of the 20th century is evidence of Congress’s inability to show the discipline necessary to bring budgets into balance. Balancing the federal budget, it is argued, is necessary to generate low interest rates, which bring about long-term, investment-led growth.

Opponents of balanced budgets and of a constitu- tional amendment that makes them mandatory offer their best argument against a balanced-budget amend- ment by appealing to the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model that was explained in Chapter 8. The left panel of Figure 12.6 depicts this model and what would happen if we entered a recession. If aggregate demand were to shrink from AD1 to AD2 and a balanced-budget

amendment were not required, two things would happen: (1) People would make less money and therefore pay less in taxes, and (2) people would require more assistance from government and spending would have to rise. This would happen without any new laws having to be passed. This nondiscretionary fiscal policy is built into the sys- tem and is called a built-in stabilizer. This stabilizer would result in aggregate demand’s getting a boost back in the direction it came from, perhaps AD3. If a balanced- budget amendment were in place, we would be without the built-in stabilizer and the movement back to AD3 would not happen. A recession would thus be worse than it would be if it were to come along now.

Of course the opposite could happen, and the right side of Figure 12.6 depicts that eventuality. Because spending on welfare programs and unemployment ben- efits would fall and tax revenues would rise, an increase in aggregate demand would result in surpluses. With- out a balanced-budget requirement (that might force the money to be spent or taxes cut), aggregate demand would fall back to AD3. With such a requirement, aggregate

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164 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

demand would not bounce back and the economic boom would be more extensive than otherwise. What

this means is a balanced-budget amendment would be procyclical because good times would be even better and bad times even worse than they would be without such a

requirement. This “boom or bust” phenomenon was part of the economic landscape of the 19th century. Avoiding that outcome has been one of the successes of the eco- nomics profession in the post–World War II era.

The best argument for mandating a balanced budget in some way, however, is that an elimination of federal borrowing would go a long way to reducing interest rates. The results of the 1990s support the idea that reducing the deficit can create a virtuous cycle in which lower defi- cits create lower interest rates. With lower interest rates the economy grows, tax revenues increase, the deficit de- creases even more, and so on. While this occurred without a balanced-budget amendment in the late 1990s, the 1960s through the early 1990s was a period of extensive borrow- ing with little fiscal discipline by either political party.

In the 1990s both the Republican and Democratic par- ties claimed that reducing the federal deficit was impor- tant. Both parties, under President Bush (George Herbert Walker) with a Democratic Congress and President Clin- ton with a mostly Republican Congress, attempted to re- duce the deficit. Each did it with means consistent with their own party’s philosophy. They were successful be- cause a reduction in the demand for loanable funds by the federal government translated into lower interest rates. In particular, mortgage interest rates were lower during this

period than they had been in 30 years. Lower interest rates meant more business investment as well. What ensued was the most dramatic drop in the deficit and the longest peacetime expansion since the end of World War II.

Both proponents and opponents of such an amend- ment point to the behavior of the states during the 1990s and early 2000s. Opponents note that the fiscal crises the states experienced between 2002 and 2006, and again in 2009, were a direct result of the constitutional require- ments to have balanced budgets. Though the constitu- tions of the states are varied in this regard, they generally suggest that they can spend no more than the revenue for that year plus their built-up reserve. This essentially requires that they have a cyclically balanced budget, one that is in balance over the business cycle. An annual balanced-budget requirement would not let a state cre- ate or utilize a reserve. What occurred in many states, though, was that the shortfall in revenues lasted longer than the reserve. Many states raided their state employee pension funds and delayed payments to local school dis- tricts and state universities, forcing them to borrow to meet their needs, all in an effort to have a “balanced bud- get.” Opponents argue that governments will resort to these and other “smoke and mirror” tactics when forced to render any balanced-budget amendment meaningless.

The arguments relating to a balanced budget amend- ment were rendered moot when, in 2008, the federal government borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars for the spring 2008 stimulus and especially after the fall 2008 TARP plan required the federal government to bor- row nearly a trillion dollars to save the financial system from meltdown.

procyclical Situation that renders good times better and bad times worse.

AD2 AD3

AD1

AS

RGDP

P ri

ce le

ve l

AD2

AD3 AD1

AS

RGDP

P ri

ce le

ve l

FIGURE 12.6 Built-in stabilizers at work.

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Projections 165

The initial Obama budget, curiously if not ironically named “A New Era of Responsibility,” called for annual deficits of more than $1 trillion for 2009 and 2010 and deficits above $700 billion for many years after that. It has turned out that the deficit picture was somewhat worse than that with trillion dollar deficits extending into 2012. It is important to understand, though, that the ma- jority of economists would acknowledge that imposing a balanced budget in this period would have seriously di- minished the government’s ability to stabilize the econ- omy. Economists, even those among a group that might be called deficit “hawks,” were not upset by the record deficits of 2009 and 2010. The fear of these economists is that without a serious reduction in the deficit over the course of the next few years, when the large Medicare and Social Security bills due to retiring baby boom- ers come due, there will be little ability of the federal government to make good on those promises, even with borrowed money.

Economists are all over the map in terms of how and when these deficits should be closed. Some, like Paul Krugman, believe that the real concern is down the road and that tax increases (especially on the wealthy) will be enough to close the deficit to manageable levels. Others, like John Taylor, believe that it should not only be sooner rather than later but should be accomplished with entitle- ment reform. Still, almost no economist of any reputa- tion believes that a balanced budget requirement would have been helpful during the 2008–2011 period.

Projections

In the movie Major League, a 1989 baseball comedy, the character played by real-life Milwaukee Brewers announcer Bob Uecker suggests that a pitch that ends up in the stands was “juuuuuust a bit outside.” In terms of projecting the deficit/surplus picture, the Congres- sional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget have similarly missed the target. In 1990 both were projecting “deficits as far as the eye could see.” In 1995 they each projected a shrinking deficit. Five  years later they projected that “we would be debt free by 2010.” Two years after that, it was deficits now, surpluses later.

Figure 12.7 illustrates the rapidly changing projections, but the year 2005, in particular, illustrates the degree of misestimation. In 2000, the prediction for 2005 was that there would be a surplus approaching $402 billion. The year actually came to a close with a deficit of more than $400 billion. As a result, the estimates produced in 2000 missed the mark by $800 billion (or one-third the size of the federal government).

How could they get it so wrong, so often, and still be given any credibility? In an April 2003 report, the Congres- sional Budget Office makes a pretty good case that it wasn’t their fault. They argue that taking into account the things that occurred during this period, they did a pretty good job in short-term projections. They also argue that longer-term projections are given more weight than they are due.

–1,500

–1,000

–500

0

500

1,000

Year

1985 Outlook

2000 Outlook

1995 Outlook

2010 Outlook2005 Outlook

1990 Outlook

Actual2015 Outlook

19 85

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1 9 9 1

19 93

19 95

19 97

19 99

20 01

20 03

20 05

20 07

20 09

20 11

20 13

20 15

20 23

20 25

20 21

20 19

20 17

FIGURE 12.7 Deficit and surplus projections of the past.

Source: “The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update,” 1985–2015, Congressional Budget Office, www.cbo.gov

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166 Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt

Consider these factors: No one foresaw that the economy would grow at twice the projected rates in the late 1990s. No one projected that the stock markets would grow as quickly as they did during this period such that taxable capital gains income would increase 700 percent. No one projected that the 2000 presiden- tial election would insert so much uncertainty into the economy and push it into a recession in 2001. They had no way of knowing in 1995 that George W. Bush would take over as president and get a tax cut enacted

in 2001 and 2003. They certainly could not have taken into account in 2000 that Al-Qaeda would attack the United States or that we would respond by going to war in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003. Finally, few saw the economy of 2008 and 2009 “falling off a cliff,” as Berkshire Hathaway chairman Warren Buffett described it. Still, the “outlook” lines on the graph are all upward sloping, meaning that the OMB and CBO are always projecting a better future when the reality is that there are ups and downs.

Summary You now understand how economists look at federal budget deficits and surpluses and the national debt. You know that deficits have been more often than not caused by wars and that economists are less interested in the raw numbers of the debt and deficits than in more sophisticated measures of them. You now are aware of U.S. economic history and that comparisons with other countries indicate that the United States had a relatively moderate national debt-to-GDP ratio, but that the defi- cits of the period from 2008 to 2012 have raised debt

concerns dramatically. You know that the federal gov- ernment actually owns much of the debt, and you should understand why economists are mostly against an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would mandate that it maintain a balanced budget. Finally, you now see that the deficit–surplus picture changed substantially between 1996 and 2001 and changed again as a result of the 2001 recession, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the reces- sion of 2007–2009.

Key Terms budget deficit budget surplus capital budget cyclical deficit

functional finance national debt off-budget on-budget

operating budget peace dividend procyclical structural deficit

Quiz Yourself 1. In 2015 the national debt was approximately

a. $18 million. b. $18 billion. c. $18 trillion. d. $18 quadrillion.

2. The off-budget–on-budget distinction a. is important because two large programs, Social

Security and Medicare, largely run off-budget. b. is a historical fiction. c. deals with long-lasting products of government

(like roads and bridges). d. is important because defense is run off-budget.

3. The U.S. budget a. is required to be balanced.

b. is never truly balanced, but historically surpluses are more common than deficits.

c. is never truly balanced, but historically surpluses are less common than deficits.

d. is typically balanced except in time of war. 4. The $400 billion deficits of 2005 were

a. accurately forecast by the Office of Management and Budget in 2000.

b. accurately forecast by the Office of Management and Budget in 2002.

c. accurately forecast by the Office of Management and Budget in 2003.

d. much higher than any previous Office of Management and Budget forecast.

gue46399_ch12_155-167.indd 166 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Summary 167

5. The portion of the national debt owed to citizens of other countries a. is economically irrelevant however big it is. b. is economically important, but it has been

falling in recent years. c. is economically important and it has been rising

in recent years. d. is practically inconsequential because it is so

small. 6. When looking at a balanced-budget amendment to

the U.S. Constitution, economists a. are universally opposed to it. b. are universally in favor of it. c. are of two minds with opponents concerned

about its procyclical nature. d. are of two minds with proponents excited about

its procyclical nature. 7. By way of international comparison, recent U.S.

deficits have increased the ratio of debt to GDP a. such that the United States has the highest ratio

in the industrialized world. b. but every other industrialized nation’s ratio is

much worse. c. but the United States ratio is still lower than that

of Germany, Canada, and Japan. d. such that only Japan’s ratio is worse.

Short Answer Questions 1. If you ranked eras in terms of times in which the na-

tional debt was the biggest, what measures could you use and why? How would the measures differ when ranking the deficits of the 1940s, 1980s, and 2010s?

2. Why might you distinguish between borrowing to rebuild roads and bridges and borrowing to increase food stamp allocations?

3. Suppose the deficit were to be $300 billion during nor- mal times, but increases to $500 billion because we are in a recession, then increases again to $600 billion be- cause the government attempts to stimulate the econ- omy. Which of these amounts are the structural deficit and the cyclical deficit and which amount represents functional finance?

4. Explain why to whom a country owes its money matters in terms of the true burden a national debt will have on future generations.

5. Explain why what deficit spending buys matters in terms of the true burden a national debt will have on future generations.

Think about This The United States and China have had foreign policy dis- putes in the past. The most problematic situation could arise over the status of Taiwan. Does owing Chinese investors nearly $1 trillion make this problem more or less likely to come to a head? Does economic interdepen- dence promote peace?

Talk about This What is the opportunity cost of running a high deficit? How might this opportunity cost depend on the shape of the supply curve for loanable funds? What does it tell you about the supply curve for loanable funds when in- terest rates remained low even while the United States went from a $200 billion surplus to a $1.5 trillion deficit over 15 years?

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter

1996). See articles by Alan J. Auerbach, Ronald Lee, Jonathan Skinner, and Douglas Bernheim.

Ronald, Lee, and Jonathan Skinner, “Will Aging Baby Boomers Bust the Federal Budget?” Journal of Eco- nomic Perspectives 13, no. 1 (Winter 1999).

Behind the Numbers Total United States off-budget, on-budget and total deficit,

surplus, debt, debt sources 1940–2012. Budget of the United States Government, historical tables—

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals U.S. GDP 1940–2006.

Bureau of Economic Analysis—www.bea.gov International comparisons of gross debt-to-GDP ratios.

Statistical Abstract of the United States; comparative international statistics—www.oecd.org

CBO projections. Congressional Budget Office; The Budget and Economic

Outlook: an update, multiple years—www.cbo.gov

gue46399_ch12_155-167.indd 167 16/03/17 11:42 AM

C H A P T E R T H I R T E E N

168

The Housing Bubble

In this chapter you will learn about the U.S. housing mar- ket, mortgages, and lending practices. Specifically, you will learn how, fundamentally, housing prices are deter- mined, and how housing prices are determined in a hot, bubble market. Finally, you will learn how the bursting of such a bubble in 2006 and 2007 was only the first wave of housing foreclosures and how the combination set off the worst economic spiral in at least 27 years.

How Much Is a House Really Worth?

As you can see from Figure 13.1, between 1997 and mid- 2006 housing prices in many major urban areas rose much faster than overall inflation (as measured by core PCE) and much faster than housing prices in other areas. This housing price index, created by economists Karl Case and Robert Shiller, has a base year of 2000 and measures the increase in prices in major metropolitan areas. While the price of all goods consumers buy (excluding food and energy) increased about 13 percent between 2000 and 2006, and while home prices in Dallas and Cleveland increased a mere 25 percent, home prices in Miami and Los Angeles had almost tripled. Starting in mid-2006, the housing market in many metropolitan areas collapsed.

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 List the fundamental determinants of housing prices.

LO2 Compare and contrast the components of a traditional mortgage, an interest-only mortgage, and a negative amortization mortgage.

LO3 Discuss how a bubble can be created in a market based on unrealistic expectations.

LO4 Summarize the consequences of a burst housing bubble on the U.S. economy.

Chapter Outline

How Much Is a House Really Worth?

Mortgages

How to Make a Bubble

Pop Goes the Bubble!

The Effect on the Overall Economy

Summary

Home prices in Phoenix dropped 41 percent, while those in Las Vegas and Miami dropped 39 percent and 38 per- cent, respectively. To understand why this happened, we need to remember some fundamentals from the definition of opportunity cost, from supply and demand, and from interest rates and present value.

The key ingredients in what a house is fundamentally worth pertain to the opportunity cost of the land upon which the home sits, the cost of labor and materials in the community, the characteristics of the home itself, and the income of the likely potential buyers.

Referring back to Figure 13.1, the reason Dallas’s home prices never increased at the rate of those in other areas is that buildable land is abundant in north-central Texas. The area is flat, with relatively few alternative uses. Unlike Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Miami, Dallas has almost no physical barriers to expansion. This means that the supply of buildable land is quite elastic. That doesn’t mean land is created, but rather land use is changed from ranching to residential use and this can be done very easily. So even if there is a significant increase in the demand for homes, the price of an existing house can, therefore, not increase beyond that of the alternative of building a new one. While building farther away from the city center (and there are actually two city centers because Ft. Worth is practically

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 168 16/03/17 11:42 AM

How Much Is a House Really Worth? 169

the cities are not randomly distributed geographically. California has 17 of the top 20 least affordable cities and the Midwest is home to 15 of the top 20 most affordable.

Population growth also figures into the equation. The city of Detroit is the only city in the world to have gone from a population exceeding 2 million to a population of less than 1 million. This means that for every new home that is built, more than one home will go vacant. In grow- ing areas, new neighborhoods spring up constantly. The Atlanta metropolitan area has seen an increase in home prices based almost entirely on its increase in population.

Though the housing bubble of the early 2000s burst later in the decade, the result of the last few years has been a slow increase in home prices in those cities that experienced it. The cities of Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington, D.C., have each experienced significant re- coveries from their lows. After increasing to 275 percent, 280 percent, and 250 percent of their January 2000 level, respectively, when the bust ended houses were priced at only 160 percent, 139 percent, and 175 percent of their 2000 levels. The recovery from 2010 to 2015 allowed for each to regain about half their respective losses.

next door) can be inconvenient, resulting from the longer commute, most home buyers would gladly drive 10 to 20  minutes longer per day if they can save tens of thou- sands of dollars on the price of the home.

The supply of buildable land in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Miami is quite inelastic because there are oceans, beaches, environmental regulations, and either swamps or mountains that render some land unsuitable for residential building. An increase in demand for homes in these cities will inevitably result in higher prices.

The next biggest factors in explaining home prices are demand-side factors such as the characteristics of the home and the income of the buyers. That a home with all modern amenities will sell for more than an older one in need of repair is obvious. Similarly obvious is that the income of a community’s potential buyers matters as well. The Department of Housing and Urban Development estimated median family income in San Francisco and Washington D.C. is substantially higher (nearly $100,000) than median family income in Dallas and Cleveland (about $60,000). Table 13.1 ranks cities on housing affordability using the ratio of median housing prices to median income. Clearly,

FIGURE 13.1 Case-Shiller indices.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2

Phoenix Miami Dallas

Los Angeles Las Vegas Composite-10

Washington Cleveland Core PCE

0.00

50.00

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170 Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble

Mortgages

As we learned in Chapter 7’s review of present value and interest rates, the mathematics of amortization are relatively straightforward. In determining a car payment or a mortgage payment, you find the monthly payment that will pay off the debt, at a particular interest rate, over a particular period of time. A mortgage, besides being a formal piece of paper, is a payment scheme de- signed to bring the original debt to zero over a period of time. In the good old days, when your grandparents bought a home, mortgages were all structured the same. The home buyer would be required to pay 20 percent of the value of the home, and the bank would loan the remaining 80 percent. On top of that, your grandparents were compelled to provide verifiable documentation of their income, assets, and debts. Even if they had the 20 percent to put down on the home, if their mortgage payment, their estimated annual property taxes, and home owners insurance were more than 30 percent of the verifiable income, your grandparents’ banker would have been reluctant to lend them the money. They would have counseled your grandparents to buy a smaller home. A final aspect of “old-fashioned” mortgages was that your grandparents’ banker would have held the mortgage.

This meant that if your grandparents defaulted on their mortgage, their hometown bank would take the loss.

To understand how your grandparents’ mortgage would work, look at Table 13.2. In a traditional mortgage the pay- ment lasts for 30 years. Though home prices have risen substantially from the time they bought their first home and interest rates have fluctuated between 4.5 percent and 12 percent during that time, to be clear, let’s do an apples-to- apples comparison as we compare the old-fashioned mort- gage with the newer ones. Let’s assume a loan of $250,000, for 30 years, at 5 percent interest. A financial calculator or a spreadsheet program can help you compute the payment to be $1,342 per month. That is $1,342 the first month, the last month, and every month in between.

Now let’s turn to the evolutionary and revolutionary changes that have occurred in the mortgage market. The first significant change came in 1968 when Congress spun off the Federal National Mortgage Association (more com-

monly known as Fannie Mae) and authorized it as a government- sponsored enterprise to buy home mortgages from banks and other financial institutions that wrote them. It would securitize them; that is, it bundled those mortgages

TABLE 13.1 Most affordable and least affordable places to live.

Sources: National Association of Home Builders, www.nahb.com

Least Affordable Most Affordable

1 San Francisco–San Mateo–Redwood City, CA 1 Glens Falls, NY 2 Los Angeles–Long Beach–Glendale, CA 2 Sandusky, OH 3 Santa Ana–Anaheim–Irvine, CA 3 Syracuse, NY 4 Santa Cruz–Watsonville, CA 4 Kokomo, IN 5 Salinas, CA 5 Springfield, OH 6 San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara, CA 6 Rockford, IL 7 Napa, CA 7 Lima, OH 8 Santa Rosa–Petaluma, CA 8 Monroe, MI 9 New York–White Plains–Wayne, NY–NJ 9 Elizabethtown, KY

10 San Diego–Carlsbad–San Marcos, CA 10 Binghamton, NY 11 San Luis Obispo–Paso Robles, CA 11 Utica–Rome, NY 12 Oxnard–Thousand Oaks–Ventura, CA 12 Mansfield, OH 13 Oakland–Fremont–Hayward, CA 13 Battle Creek, IM 14 Santa Barbara–Santa Maria–Goleta, CA 14 Fairbanks, AK 15 Honolulu, HI 15 Lansing–East Lansing, MI 16 Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario, CA 16 Springfield, IL 17 Stockton, CA 17 Youngstown–Warren–Boardman, OH–PA 18 Fresno, CA 18 Cumberland, MD–WV 19 Modesto, CA 19 Salisbury, MD 20 Bend, OR 20 Harrisburg–Carlisle, PA

securitize The process of bundling nonfinancial assets (typically mortgages) together and then resell- ing them as either shares or as financial instru- ments to investors.

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 170 16/03/17 11:42 AM

171

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gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 171 16/03/17 11:42 AM

172 Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble

mortgage converts to a standard type and the balance is paid off over the remaining years.

Now let’s compare the tradi tional mortgages to the interest-only mortgages and negative-amortization mort- gages. Again, comparing apples to apples, suppose the home owner is borrowing $250,000, for 30 years, at 5 per- cent interest. Looking at Table 13.2 you see that an interest- only mortgage saves the buyer $300 per month for however long the interest-only period lasts, but the payment increases substantially once the mortgage converts to a traditional version. Because with most negative-amortization mort- gages, the borrower gets to choose how much to pay during the initial payment period, let’s assume they take an option of paying half the interest they owe each month. As a result the outstanding balance rises, so the payment rises, albeit very slowly until the point were it converts to a traditional mortgage, and then the payment nearly triples.

These interest-only and negative-amortization mort- gages were popular with home buyers because they al- lowed someone of modest means to get into a home they might otherwise not be able to afford. What is unclear is  the degree to which borrowers adequately understood the terms of these mortgages. They may have simply not read their documentation, or they may have been convinced that regardless of how high their mortgage payments rose, the ever-increasing value of their home would allow them to take out a second mortgage with a home equity line of credit. Of the interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages issued during 2006 and 2007, approximately half came with built-in home equity lines of credit.

How to Make a Bubble

As NASDAQ investors of the late 1990s discovered, bubbles are created by the expectation of higher prices causing people to buy assets based on that expectation rather than fundamentals. When you are told to “buy now before the price goes up” and you do, you only add to the volume of the bubble. People buy on the expectation that prices will rise faster than their ability to afford those same assets later so they become convinced to buy now. What really gets a bubble going is borrowed money. If you had to put 20 percent down on a home, the increased price would affect your ability to react to that expecta- tion. With the ability to put nothing down, and pay only half the interest, the buyer’s ability to continue fueling the bubble is sustained, not diminished.

As NASDAQ bubble-riders remember, bubbles are fun when they go up. Why? Suppose you bought that $250,000 home in Miami in January 2002. Suppose you

together and then sold shares of itself to investors. In so doing, it spread the geographic risk of mortgages that re- sulted from banks holding a significant portion of the portfolios in local markets. This reduced the risk to any one bank of going bankrupt as a result of a local economic downturn. In so doing, this reduced the risk to investors and thereby reduced home mortgage interest rates. Its sister or- ganization, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly known as Freddie Mac), was founded in 1970 and did much the same thing except that it focused on sell- ing these bundled mortgage-backed securities to other in- vestors. Neither the principal nor the profits of either entity was explicitly guaranteed by the federal government, but investors believed there to be an implicit understanding that should these entities have difficulty, the federal government would back them.

Beginning in the late 1980s, mortgages began to spring up where the buyer would have to put down only 5 percent or 10 percent. Though they would have to pay for an insurance policy (that would pay the bank in case of default), this opened up home buying as an option for millions of Americans. In the early part of this decade,

zero-down mortgages became common. Only paperwork costs would be charged when the house was sold.

Beginning in 2002, interest- only mortgages and even negative-amortization mortgages began to spring up. An interest- only mortgage, as the name sug- gests, has the buyer paying only interest for the first few (typically 5 or 10) years of a mortgage and then paying off the balance over the remainder of the mortgage. A negative-amortization mortgage does much the same thing, except that buyers get to choose how much they want their payment to be in the first few years of the mortgage. These pick-a-pay mortgages (also known as pay option adjustable rate mortgages) would typically have the buyer paying about half the interest accrued each month on the mort- gage so the outstanding balance on the mortgage would rise over time. After a few years, the

interest-only mortgage A mortgage that allows the buyer to pay only the interest portion of the typical payment for the first few years of a mortgage. The mortgage would reset to a tradi- tional mortgage after that period, typically at a higher payment.

negative-amortization mortgage A mortgage that allows the buyer to pay less than the interest portion of the typical payment for the first few years of a mortgage. The mortgage would reset to a traditional mort- gage after that period, typically at a higher payment.

pick-a-pay mortgage A variety of negative amortization mortgage that allows the buyer to choose a payment for the first few years of a mortgage.

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 172 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Pop Goes the Bubble! 173

borrower might better under- stand the features of a mortgage (such as the tripling of the re- quired payment after year 5).

Some in the financial system began to openly worry about the impact of a collapse of the mortgage market. This fear created an instrument that, perversely, only added to the bubble. By the middle of the decade, it became more difficult to sell the securitized mortgages because of the growing fear of foreclosures. The same entities that bought the mortgages, securitized them, and then sold them to investors, now offered to sell the investors credit default swaps. In this case, the credit default swap acted like an insurance policy that promised to pay the holder of the se- curitized mortgage should the borrowers fail to pay their debts. This satisfied the investors’ concern for security and kept the bubble going. The problem was that these insur- ance policies were not regulated like typical insurance policies. A typical home owners or auto insurance com- pany is compelled to have sufficient capital to pay claims and is often required to carry reinsurance. Though credit default swaps are, most certainly, insurance policies, those that sold them were not regulated as if they were. Though some in Congress and others in regulatory bodies began to question these practices, the underlying feel-good story of record rates of home ownership and increasing home owner wealth (at least paper wealth) overwhelmed these voices of concern. This was the now infamous AIG’s most profitable line of business for several years prior to its needed bailout by the Federal Reserve.

Pop Goes the Bubble!

What the feel-good story relies upon heavily is the fiction that home prices only go up. Home prices can fall. Imag- ine this story somewhat differently. Suppose the price of the home falls from $250,000 to $200,000 because the home was only 1,500 square feet to begin with, had few amenities, and was in a relatively unattractive neighborhood. That is, suppose the fundamentals start to take over and the specula- tive demand to buy a house at any price goes away, meaning that the only reason its price exceeded what was rational for its location was a bubble mentality (like NASDAQ in 1999 and 2000). Now the poor home owner, who paid $250,000 for a home that is worth only $200,000, must pay $1,656 per month because he or she owes $283,250.

What are the options? Not many. First, if the home owners sell the home they are in, they will owe $83,250 plus real estate fees of approximately $12,000 more, and

put nothing down and took out a negative-amortization mortgage. In Miami, from January 2002 to January 2007, the average home more than doubled in value. So you may owe $283,250 on the house you bought for $250,000, but who cares? It’s now worth $500,000. Having trouble making the payments that have now in- creased from $589 per month to $1,656? No problem. You now have $216,750 in equity in that home and since you signed up for a home equity line of credit when you signed up for the mortgage, you can use your home like an ATM. You can even buy an SUV and take a vacation!

While that explains the demand side of the housing bubble, bubbles require calamitous mistakes on both the demand side and the supply side. So you may be asking why banks would lend money to these borrowers. This takes us back to the first of the evolutionary changes in the mortgage market: securitization. While your grand- parents’ mortgage was owned by their local bank, these mortgages were immediately sold. It was no longer part of the local banker’s job to counsel home buyers against borrowing more than they could afford. Remember that old 30 percent rule? The banker no longer cared that you could not afford the payment because the banker was going to sell the mortgage within days of writing the mortgage. If you defaulted on the mortgage, it was someone else’s problem. In addition, about half of negative-amortization mortgages were “liar loans” in that the bankers who wrote the mortgages purposefully did not verify the income or assets of the borrower. They merely consulted the credit agencies. If your credit was good enough that they could sell your mortgage to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they wrote the mortgage and sold it within days.1

There is one other aspect of the modern mortgage mar- ket that may have contributed to the mess, and that is the noticeable absence of the intimidation involved in the clos- ing process. Your grandparents sat across the table from a banker who went through each piece of paper associated with the mortgage. Your grand parents paid very close at- tention, in part because they were afraid that if they didn’t, somehow the mortgage would not go through. Today, a click here or a phone call there, and you can be approved by a mortgage company with no local interests whatso- ever. That means that you get a package of papers that you simply have to take down to a notary public (a designation of a person that certifies that the person signing is indeed the named party) and sign where the “sign here” tabs are located. This eliminates one of the places where a

1They may still take your payment every month, but they are only servicing it. They send that payment to the true owner.

credit default swap Insurance on a mortgage-backed security.

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174 Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble

taxes would be well above 30 percent of their income in the “bubble” cities. One estimate in 2008 suggested that 1 in 6 households in the United States was above this 30  percent guideline and that 1 in 20 was paying more than half of its income in housing costs. Given that, it is no wonder that home prices stopped rising in 2006.

The shakeout after the collapse in housing has had a notable impact on the ability of the median-income fam- ily to afford the median home in these markets. At the peak of housing prices in 2006, with a 6 percent mortgage a median family would have to spend 43 percent of their income on housing in Las Vegas. In 2015, that was down to 32 percent. There are three basic reasons housing was more affordable in 2015 than 2006: prevailing mortgage interest rates were 4 percent rather than 6 percent, hous- ing prices were lower by about 20 percent, and median incomes were at least near their 2006 level.

The Effect on the Overall Economy

At the beginning, the bursting of the housing bubble had a modest impact slowing the rate of growth of the overall economy in 2006 and 2007 by about 1 percent. By late 2007 and into 2008, as foreclosures ballooned, the im- pact snowballed. It was not until the fall of 2008 that the true impact of the crisis came to light. In order to avoid a massive financial meltdown, the Treasury Department took ownership of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Federal Reserve took a significant ownership stake in the insurance giant AIG, and Congress passed the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to save the nation’s largest banks from the consequences of their ill-advised practices.

they will have no home. If they do not have that in savings, they will have to negotiate some other noncollateralized loan to pay off that amount before they can buy another home. Their only option to get out from under the massive debt is bankruptcy. This is a very bad option because they not only lose the home in which they live but they become unable to buy another home for years to come. Of course, they also eliminate their ability to buy cars, furniture, or anything else on time as well. Their ability to go on vacation is quashed by their inability to qualify for credit cards, and their ability to pay off their existing credit card debt is elimi- nated because they no longer have equity in their home.

People who used this form of negative-amortization loan to purchase a home did so either because they be- lieved their income in a few years would be sufficient to cover the increased mortgage payment, or they believed that housing prices would continue to rise, or they believed that a combination of the two would cause everything to turn out in the end. Unfortunately, it didn’t “turn out in the end” for many borrowers. Beginning in 2006 foreclo- sures and near foreclosures (homes more than 30 days in arrears) began to skyrocket. In 2007, foreclosures were up 51 percent, and in 2008 they were up 82 percent. In Nevada in early 2009, 1 in 14 homes was in some sort of foreclosure process. In one month alone, November 2008, 1 in 76 homes in Nevada received foreclosure paperwork. The hardest hit states were California, Nevada, and Flor- ida. It is not hard to see why. Consider Table 13.3 and the ability of the median family, with median income, to buy the median house in those locations we examined in Figure 13.1. Even if they chose a conventional mortgage, their 2006 mortgage payments, insurance, and property

Median Family Income1

Median Sale Price of an Existing Single- Family Home2

Approximate Annual Mortgage Payments (30 years)

Approximate Home Owners Insurance*

Approximate Property Tax*

Total Annual Housing Costs

Home Costs as a Percentage of Income

2006 2015 2006 2015 2006 (6)% 2015 (4)% 2006 2015 2006 2015 2006 2015 2006 2015 Phoenix $64.0 $64.2 $218.8 $257.4 $12.5 $18.5 $2.0 $2.0 $4.0 $4.0 $18.5 $24.5 38.2% 29.0% Los Angeles 63.0 59.8 506.8 589.2 29.0 42.4 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 35.0 48.4 80.9 55.6 Washington 109.2 97.2 388.6 430.8 22.3 31.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 28.3 37.0 38.1 25.9 Miami 49.9 49.2 290.0 365.5 16.6 26.3 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 22.6 32.3 65.6 45.3 Las Vegas 59.2 63.9 221.5 297.7 12.7 21.4 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 18.7 27.4 42.9 31.6 Cleveland 66.1 62.1 132.0 130.0 7.6 9.4 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 13.6 15.4 24.7 20.5 Dallas 70.4 65.0 210.0 150.9 12.0 10.9 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 18.0 16.9 25.9 25.6

TABLE 13.3 Measuring housing affordability in major cities.

*Author estimate. 1Source: HUD estimated from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act reports 2Source: National Association of Realtors

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 174 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Summary 175

that the recovery in housing, if it has occurred at all, has been very slow. One issue that slowed the process of the housing mar- ket finding its “bottom” was the difficulty in selling homes for which more was owed than the home was worth. Part of that

problem is that with securitization it is a difficult, time- consuming, and lawyer-filled process to engage in what is called a short sale. A short sale involves a buyer and a seller agreeing to a price and the mortgage company agreeing to write off the difference between the price of the home and what is owed on the mortgage. Until all such “underwater” homes are sold we will continue to live with one in seven homes in Nevada, for instance, being vacant.

It will be left to Chapter 14 to review the effectiveness of TARP and the 2009 stimulus package as well as the Federal Reserve’s attempt to stabilize markets by buying long-term treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.

From September 2008 through the end of that year, credit markets were almost entirely frozen. This meant that institutions that were otherwise healthy could not access credit markets in a normal and necessary fash- ion. As the news of that fall was almost entirely bad, consumers simply stopped buying anything that was not absolutely necessary. Depending on the automaker, car purchases fell between 40 percent and 67 percent, and by December, GM and Chrysler required TARP funds to survive. The year culminated with the worst Christmas shopping season in more than 40 years.

The final post-mortem has not been written on what the ultimate impact of the housing bubble was. It cer- tainly caused the steepest decline in economic activity since the Great Depression. It certainly led to relatively modest government deficits obliterating all post–World War II deficit records (whether in real or nominal terms) and states having to cut billions from their own bud- gets. Because of the timing of many of the ARMs, the ultimate bottom of the housing market did not occur until 2011 or 2012. A look back at Figure 13.1 shows

short sale A sale of a home where the amount owed is more than the sale price and in which the seller seeks to have the remaining balance forgiven.

Summary You now understand the fundamental elements that determine housing prices, how homes are typically fi- nanced, and that new types of mortgages are replacing traditional 20 percent-down, constant-payment mortgages.

You also understand that unrealistic expectations in hous- ing prices can create spiraling price increases and that such bubbles inevitably burst and can have a significant economic impact.

Key Terms credit default swap interest-only mortgage

negative-amortization mortgage pick-a-pay mortgage

securitize short sale

Quiz Yourself 1. The type of mortgage that allows you to make the

lowest possible payment is called a a. zero-down mortgage. b. a traditional constant-payment, 20 percent-down

mortgage. c. an interest-only mortgage. d. a negative-amortization mortgage.

2. In which type of mortgage do you build equity the fastest? a. zero-down mortgage. b. a traditional constant-payment, 20 percent-down

mortgage.

c. an interest-only mortgage. d. a negative-amortization mortgage.

3. In which type of mortgage do you neither build nor lose equity? a. zero-down mortgage. b. a traditional constant-payment, 20 percent-down

mortgage. c. an interest-only mortgage. d. a negative-amortization mortgage.

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 175 16/03/17 11:42 AM

176 Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble

get your hands on the fourth edition’s web chapter on this subject, you can see that I thought it was one, but because prices were stabilizing when I wrote it, I wasn’t sure.) The same thing was true with the stock market in 1929 and 2000. Fast-forward 30 years and imagine your- self in a position of trying to manage your retirement savings. How are you going to tell if your portfolio is really worth what your 401(k) statements say or whether it is a bubble all over again?

Talk about This We are in a post–housing bubble world in which millions of families owe substantially more money on their homes than they can sell them for. Recent changes to bankruptcy laws make it more difficult to declare bankruptcy, which leaves many fully employed, hard working people trapped in their homes with no means of financial escape. As we reconsider financial regulation, should we treat negative- amortization mortgages and interest-only mortgages like cocaine: banned to prevent you from making a lifetime mistake?

4. Fundamentally, housing prices are a function of the home’s a. location and amenities. b. amenities only. c. location only. d. interest rates only.

5. A housing bubble occurs when _______________ drive(s) prices more than fundamental factors. a. the price of gasoline b. a home’s expected future price

c. interest rate changes d. property tax increases

6. A bursting of a housing bubble could create more problems than the NASDAQ crash in 2000 because the housing bubble involves a. assets, and NASDAQ was about debts. b. risky forms of debt. c. more people. d. fewer people.

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain how mortgage securitization makes it easier

to borrow money to buy a house but harder to deal with when a house is sold for a loss.

2. Explain why securitization contributed to the prob- lem of people buying homes using mortgages for which they did not know all the details (such as the negative-amortization mortgages referred to in the text).

3. Explain why the Federal Reserve felt it necessary to bail out AIG and what result it was attempting to avoid.

4. Explain the role of the credit default swap and why the attempt to make things safer for investors made things worse for everyone.

Think about This Bubbles are a great deal easier to identify after they burst. Believe it or not there were many who did not be- lieve that the housing market was in a bubble until well into 2008 when it was obvious to everyone. (If you can

gue46399_ch13_168-176.indd 176 16/03/17 11:42 AM

C H A P T E R F O U R T E E N

177

The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the housing crisis and overall consumer indebted- ness as the cause of the 2007–2009 recession.

LO2 Enumerate the consequences of the recession including a record drop in housing prices, a significant increase in the unemployment rate, a substantial drop in real gross domestic product, and a long string of job losses.

LO3 Describe and model the discretionary and nondiscre tionary fiscal policy, monetary policy, and TARP program to combat the recession.

LO4 Enumerate and describe the components of the fiscal stimulus package passed in the early days of the Obama administration.

Chapter Outline

Before It Began

Late 2007: The Recession Begins as Do the Initial Policy Reactions

The Bottom Falls Out in Fall 2008

The Obama Stimulus Package

Extraordinary Monetary Stimulus

Summary

The recession of 2007–2009 was one of the most, if not the most, severe recessions in post–World War II history. In terms of peak unemployment, it was the second worst since the Great Depression. In terms of the drop in real GDP and in terms of how long it took for real GDP to recover to its prerecession peak, it was the worst. It began in the fall of 2007 looking very much like the short and shallow recessions of 1991 and 2001. Then in the fall of 2008 the bottom fell out as the bursting of the housing bubble and the decima- tion of the financial sector set off a series of events whose consequences are not yet fully understood.

This chapter will begin with a look at economic ac- tivity in 2005 and 2007, discuss the most significant cause of the recession—the bursting housing bubble— the attempts in early 2008 to make it another short and shallow one, the financial sector meltdown of the fall

of 2008, and the policy responses from the Federal Re- serve, the Congress, and Presidents Bush and Obama. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the debate surrounding whether these policies were effective in ei- ther shortening or mitigating the impact of the recession.

Before It Began

As can be seen in Figure 14.1, real economic growth was progressing at about the 20-year average (2.7 percent annually) until the final quarter of 2007. As you can see in Figure 14.2, this was despite gasoline prices that had nearly doubled from their early 2005 levels. What was providing the steam behind this growth? Housing.

While a full discussion of how the housing bubble was created (and subsequently how it burst) can be found

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 177 16/03/17 11:42 AM

178 Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses

rate of appreciation in homes averaged 14.2 percent. At that annual increase in prices, it was erroneously thought, even if the borrower defaulted on the loan, the bank would lose no money because they could unload the house for more than the loan value.

This housing price escalation fueled two distinct housing booms: home building and home equity lines of credit. As you can see in Figure 14.4, housing starts, though fluctuating with the weather, steadily

in Chapter 13, we’ll provide a much briefer version here. As can be seen from Figure 14.3, the price of homes (as measured by the Case-Shiller Home Price Index Composite-10) was also increasing at an astonishing rate. While this may have made buying a home difficult under normal circumstances, these were anything but nor- mal circumstances. Lenders were eager to make loans of almost any amount to people wanting to buy a home. This was because between early 2000 and late 2005, the annual

G D

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11,700.0

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GDP in billions of chained 2000 dollars RGDP at long-run expected growth

FIGURE 14.1 Real GDP (billions, 2000) 2005.1–2007.3.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls

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20 07

FIGURE 14.2 Average price of gasoline in cents.

Source: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/twip/twipmgvwall.xls

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 178 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Before It Began 179

increased between 2001 and 2007, and as you can see in Figure  14.5, nonrevolving credit, which includes home mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and car loans, increased at a 7.1 percent annual clip. Credit card debt increased at a 5.2 percent rate.

During this period the most significant policy con- cern of the Federal Reserve was the increase in infla- tion that was resulting from rapidly increasing energy prices and overall increases in demand. As you can see

from Figure 14.6, the Federal Reserve increased its tar- geted federal funds rate 14 times between June 2004 and June 2006 from 1 percent to 5.25 percent. At one point in January 2006 the concern over inflation was so great the Fed increased the federal funds rate 1.25 per- centage points in one step. Given that the vast majority of increases and decreases in the federal funds rate have been limited to one-quarter of a point changes, this was considered a very aggressive action to quell inflation.

240.00

220.00

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180.00

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100.00

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06

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6

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07

Ju l-0

7

FIGURE 14.3 Case-Shiller Price Index (Composite-10).

Source: www.macromarkets.com/csi_housing/sp_caseshiller.asp

500

450

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.3

Year.Quarter

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rt s

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FIGURE 14.4 Single family housing starts.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, www.census.gov/const/www/newresconstindex.html

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 179 16/03/17 11:42 AM

180 Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses

Late 2007: The Recession Begins as Do the Initial Policy Reactions

We know now that the National Bureau of Economic Research Business Cycle Dating Committee has pinned the beginning of the recession as late fall 2007. It was evident to policy makers that a slowdown was about to occur in late 2007. As can be seen in Figure 14.7, the

Federal Reserve began cutting its federal funds rate in September 2007 and didn’t stop cutting the rate until it was at zero in December 2008.

The Bush administration began lobbying in early 2008 for a stimulus package. Its preferred mechanism was to make its tax cuts of 2003 permanent as well as to provide tax rebates to taxpayers. It failed in securing the former but succeeded in garnering the latter. By early spring

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Revolving credit Nonrevolving credit

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FIGURE 14.5 Revolving and nonrevolving household debt.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist

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FIGURE 14.6 The federal funds rate.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 180 16/03/17 11:42 AM

The Bottom Falls Out in Fall 2008 181

2008 the rebate plan was enacted and by early summer, millions of Americans received $600 per individual, $1,200 per married couple. For most this money was deposited directly into their checking accounts by early summer. For the rest, rebate checks were mailed before summer was out. If you look at Figure 14.8, you can see that this $158 billion package had a significant short-run impact. Economic growth in the third quarter of 2008 was consistent with a healthy economy, but the economy was not at all healthy. Oil prices were rising to $145 per barrel and home foreclosures were increasing rapidly.

The Bottom Falls Out in Fall 2008

In the late summer and early fall 2008, a crisis of confi- dence in the financial sector threatened to freeze capital markets in a way not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. During the summer the rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, were downgrading mortgage‐backed securities and the companies that held them in significant amounts. The Federal Reserve created several loan programs to assist various bank and non‐ bank entities to cope with the difficult credit markets.

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FIGURE 14.7 Federal funds rate September 2007–December 2008.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm R

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FIGURE 14.8 Real GDP 2007.2 to 2008.3.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/national

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 181 16/03/17 11:42 AM

182 Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses

On September 7, 2008, the Treasury Department placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship, because it realized that these government-supported en- tities were essentially bankrupt. Within a week Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and two days later, the Fed lent the insurance giant AIG $85 billion (which ultimately became $182.5 billion). Two weeks later, then Treasury Secretary Paulson and Federal Reserve Chair- person Bernanke went to Congress seeking $700 billion for their planned Troubled Asset Relief Program. Two weeks after that, Wachovia teetered on the edge of bank- ruptcy and was purchased by Wells Fargo.

Within the span of two months, from Labor Day week- end to election day 2008, the financial system was on the verge of collapse. The terrible news, repeated on a daily basis, produced such a crisis of confidence that Christmas 2008 was the worst holiday shopping season in 40 years. As can be seen in Figure 14.9, a fair unemployment picture through mid-2008 turned sharply worse, and as can be seen in Figure 14.10, job losses mounted rapidly during the fall of 2008 with more than 2 million jobs lost in the third and fourth quarters of 2008. Particularly disturbing was that the number, including those working part time when they would like to be working full time, almost doubled.

The Obama Stimulus Package

Even before President Obama took the oath of of- fice, he was deeply involved in negotiations with the incoming Congress to produce a stimulus package. While President Bush had engaged fiscal policy in the form of tax rebates, as the Obama plan emerged, it was not confined to tax changes but included significant spending.

As you can see in Figure 14.11, the aggregate demand– aggregate supply model can be used to model both the recession as well as the built-in and discretionary policy reactions. As the initial crisis of consumer confidence took hold, aggregate demand contracted markedly. As unemployment rose, the welfare state kicked into high gear with substantial increases in unemployment insur- ance, food stamps, and Medicaid spending. This non- discretionary fiscal policy (NDFP) dampened the initial impact of the decrease in demand. A stimulus package passed by Congress and signed by the president is, by definition, discretionary and as you read in Chapter 9 is called discretionary fiscal policy (DFP). Whether or not the Obama plan has had or will have the desired impact will be known only with the passage of time.

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FIGURE 14.9 Unemployment rates 2006–2009.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (LNS12032194; LNU05026645; LNS12000000; LNS14000000)

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 182 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Extraordinary Monetary Stimulus 183

The stimulus package passed by Congress and signed by the president was entirely discretionary since they had to pass a law to make it happen. Still, as you read in Chapter 9, a portion of the spending was to shore up the nondiscretionary fiscal policy spending on welfare and unemployment insurance that is typically run through the states. The details of the Obama stimu- lus plan can be seen in Figure 14.12. As you can see, a roughly equal portion went to tax cuts (38 percent) and spending programs (39 percent) with the remainder going to shore up Medicaid, welfare, and unemploy- ment programs.

You can also see in Figure 14.12 that the bulk of the tax cuts went to individuals, with some additional tax cuts going to energy-conservation programs. For instance, in 2009, the purchase of energy-efficient appliances was given preferential treatment. About half of the aid to in- dividuals came in the form of money to states to help them provide Medicaid, given the anticipated increase in enrollment caused by the recession. About a quarter of the individual aid went to increase unemployment benefits by $25 per week and to extend benefits beyond the already approved 26 weeks. The final portion of the spending was broken into many pieces for many different priorities of the new administration.

Extraordinary Monetary Stimulus

At the same time the Obama administration was attempt- ing a fiscal stimulus, the Federal Reserve was engaging in the most expansive monetary stimulus in its history. When the fiscal stimulus ended, the monetary stimulus continued. For a detailed look at the monetary stimulus of this period, it would be worthwhile to read (or reread) Chapter 10’s discussion of the “The Additional Tools of Monetary Policy Created during 2008” and to exam- ine Figure 10.4. The short version is this: The Federal Reserve’s portfolio of assets nearly tripled between 2008 and 2013, and that tripling meant that there was available to the banking system three times more money in 2013

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FIGURE 14.10 Net change in employment (2009).

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (LNS12000000)

Pl

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AS

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AD3 DFP

FIGURE 14.11 Modeling the impact of nondiscre- tionary fiscal policy and the Obama stimulus package (discretionary fiscal policy).

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 183 16/03/17 11:42 AM

184 Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses

than there was in 2008. Moreover, the stimulus contin- ued through 2013 as the Federal Reserve was purchasing $40 billion in mortgage-backed securities and another $40 billion in long-term treasuries each and every month.

This dramatic increase in loanable money kept interest rates extraordinarily low for the whole period. In 2012 and 2013, home mortgage interest rates were below 3 per- cent for those with good credit. That allowed those who

refinanced their mortgages to lower payments or shorten the terms on those mortgages, or in many cases, both.

Whether this monetary stimulus was effective is also open for debate and will likely not be settled among econ- omists until the stimulus has been reversed. As the textbox at the end of Chapter 10 indicates, there were significant risks associated with this policy, that, at this writing in the spring of 2013, have neither been proven nor disproven.

Spending Total, $311,339, 39%

Total Stimulus Package (millions, %)

Aid Total, $178,140, 23%

Tax Cuts Total, $301,135, 38%

Individual Tax Cuts, $232,426, 77%

Bus and Manu Tax Cuts,

$8,000, 3%

Energy Tax Cuts, $19,963, 7%

Other, $40,582, 13%

Tax Cuts (millions, %)

Individual Aid (millions, %)

Unemployment/ Welfare,

$45,788, 26%

Health Insurance Subsidy,

$24,749, 14%

Medicaid to States,

$90,044, 50%

Computerizing Medical Records,

$17,559, 10%

Other, $19,219, 6% Outdoors, Indian

Reservations, Arts, $10,950, 4%

Commerce, Science and Justice, $15,920, 5%

Farming and Food,

$26,466, 9%

Environment and Energy,

$50,825, 16%

Aid to States, $53,600, 17%

Transportation and Housing, $61,795, 20%

Labor, Health, Education,

Volunteering, and Social Security, $72,564, 23%

Spending Total (millions, %)

FIGURE 14.12 The Obama stimulus plan in detail.

Source: www.cbo.gov

Summary The recession of 2007–2009 was set off by a confluence of events surrounding the bursting of the housing bubble. The housing bubble resulted in dramatic losses in the

financial sector and a tightening of credit. This tighten- ing was despite repeated attempts by the Federal Reserve, the Bush administration, and the Obama administration

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 184 16/03/17 11:42 AM

Summary 185

Quiz Yourself 1. Which of the following was not likely a contributing

factor to the recession of 2007–2009? a. The bursting of the housing bubble b. The 2008 tax rebates c. The failure of major financial service

companies d. The drop in oil prices from $150 to $40 per

barrel in late 2008 2. In the years prior to the recession the economy was

growing a. at about its typical rate. b. at a rate much slower than typical. c. at a rate much faster than typical.

3. Gasoline prices in late 2007 through mid-2008. a. spiked b. increased relatively slowly c. remained constant d. plunged

4. The Federal Reserve’s response to the recession of 2007–2008 was a. clearly effective in shortening the recession. b. quick but not obviously effective in shortening

the recession. c. slow and subject to criticism for being rather timid. d. procyclical in that it had precisely the opposite

impact as intended. 5. The Obama administration’s stimulus package was

a. almost entirely made up of tax cuts. b. almost entirely made up of spending on

“shovel-ready” projects. c. a balance between tax cuts, spending on

projects, and shoring up the unemployment and welfare systems.

d. almost entirely spent on welfare programs.

6. The job losses during this recession were a. typical of a short recession. b. nonexistent. c. significant and rapid.

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain each of the following in terms of whether

they were discretionary fiscal policy, nondiscretion- ary fiscal policy, or monetary policy: TARP, the AIG bailout, the 2009 stimulus package, the rapid increase in unemployment compensation spend- ing, the rapid reductions in state sales, and income tax revenues resulting from people having lower incomes.

2. How was “quantitative easing” different from what the Federal Reserve normally does?

3. Which lag described in Chapter 9 did the concept of “shovel-ready” intend to combat?

Think about This Nobel Prize–winning economist Paul Krugman repeat- edly warned through 2008 and 2009 that it was far worse for Congress to be too timid than too aggressive. In ret- rospect, was he correct? What would have been the result of a $1.5 trillion stimulus package?

Talk about This What lessons would you draw from the recession of 2007–2009? What could have realistically been at- tempted in the middle of the housing boom to forestall the bust that came after?

to revive the financial sector. The resulting loss of jobs and shrinking of GDP made this recession quite likely the worst since World War II. The attempts by the Federal

Reserve to shore up the financial sector and by the Obama administration to stimulate the economy were breathtak- ing in their magnitude, though uncertain in their impact.

gue46399_ch14_177-185.indd 185 16/03/17 11:42 AM

C H A P T E R F I F T E E N

186

Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal? Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the historical rates of per capita real GDP growth from 1950 to 2015.

LO2 Enumerate the sources of economic growth and explain why some of those sources cannot be repeated and why others may be repeated.

LO3 Describe the causes and consequences of slowing economic growth and describe the debate as to whether a shrinking middle class is best labeled a cause or a consequence.

LO4 Describe and model the alternative suggestions for jump- starting economic growth.

Chapter Outline

Periods of Robust Economic Growth

Sources of Growth

Causes and Consequences of Slowing Growth

What Can Be Done to Jump-Start Growth, or Is This the New Normal?

Summary

In the United States and around the globe there is a de- pressing concern expressed among economists that the era of sustained, standard-of-living-enhancing economic growth is coming to an end. For decades the U.S. econ- omy grew at a healthy and steady pace. While interrupted by recessions, that pace was considered sustainable. Whether measured in terms of real GDP growth, or per capita real GDP growth, Table 15.1 shows that during the

period from 1950 to 2000, economic growth was pretty constant. The annualized rate of growth in per capita real GDP was approximately 2 percent.

Since 2000, however, the “new normal” is a phrase that has crept into the economic lexicon to both describe and accustom people to the unpleasant realization that growth can no longer be expected to increase standards of living across the board. The outlook for economic growth pro- duced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) across the world’s richer countries shows just how slow growth is projected to be. The United States is the leader in terms of projected 2017 economic growth at a paltry 2.39 percent. The United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada are also clustered between 2 percent and 2.33 percent. France, Italy, and Japan are predicted to grow at rates of 1.62, 1.40, and 0.53 percent, respectively. This chapter puts these slow growth numbers in historical context, offers an explanation for why they are so low, and concludes with how this state of affairs could easily become the “new normal.”

TABLE 15.1 Real growth in the United States.

Decade Annualized Growth in Real GDP

Annualized Growth in Per Capita Real GDP

1950s 3.33 1.74 1960s 4.24 3.06 1970s 3.19 2.23 1980s 3.14 2.23 1990s 3.03 1.90 2000s 1.40 0.71 2010s 1.69 0.77

gue46399_ch15_186-192.indd 186 16/03/17 11:43 AM

Causes and Consequences of Slowing Growth 187

increased from 36 percent to 77 percent. All those extra workers clearly boosted overall economic output.

Technological growth also played an important role in increasing economic output. The use of carbon-based energy to power manufacturing and electric lighting to elongate the production day produced incredible gains. As a result of these technological innovations, labor productivity increased at a rapid pace for much of this period. Looking back at Chapter 6’s statistics on pro- ductivity, the five-year moving average of labor produc- tivity exceeded 2 percent (for all but a select few years) during the period from 1950 to 1975. Though it slowed dramatically, to below 2 percent for most of the period from 1975 to 2000, it once again rose rapidly in the pre–Great Recession 2000s as robotic- and computer- assisted manufacturing once again boosted production.1

Workers also became more productive, in part, be- cause of increases in worker educational attainment. Though explored more deeply in Chapters 36 and 37, it is worth noting here that the percentage of Americans ages 25 to 64 with at least a high school diploma in- creased from 45 percent just after World War II to around 85 percent by 1980. That figure stabilized until 2000 when it increased further to in excess of 90 percent by 2015. The college completion rate for that same popula- tion increased from under 5 percent prior to World War II to more than 30 percent in 2015.

Another source of growth during the period was glo- balization. International trade created new markets for U.S. goods while also creating new goods for American mar- kets. Of course, globalization also contributed to job losses, particularly for manufacturing workers, but economists are consistent that the impact on output was positive.

Causes and Consequences of Slowing Growth

Causes Slowing economic growth, on both a real GDP basis and a real per capita GDP basis, has several causes and con- sequences. In terms of causes, the two most significant of these have been the slowing of production-related technological improvements and the general reversal of the increases to the Labor Force Participation Rate. De- mographic changes have also occurred that are teeing up slower growth. The population is not only growing at a slower rate; it is aging. The lingering consequences of the

Periods of Robust Economic Growth

Estimates of real GDP growth for the pre–Civil War era vary, but they clearly show that the United States grew at rather modest rates (on a per capita basis). A startling statistic generated by economic historians suggests that between 1300 and 1750 per capita real economic growth was essentially zero. Another suggests that growth between the Revolutionary War and the Civil War was not much better at 1 percent. Pre–Industrial Revolution growth was limited by modest improvements in tools and animal-based energy (i.e., mules, horses, and oxen pulling plows). Though the cotton gin created a 50-fold increase in the amount of lint that could be separated from seed on a cotton plant, it was still operated by a hand crank with the energy of a slave. What ignited the years of growth after the Civil War was the use of carbon-based energy (i.e., oil, natural gas, and coal), which fueled the Industrial Revolution’s assembly-line manufacture of goods. Electric lighting added to this productivity by opening up the entire day for produc- tion. This torrential rate of growth created not only cars, airplanes, and useful home appliances; it created middle- class jobs for those who produced those goods. Those jobs created incomes that were then used to purchase those goods. The virtuous cycle of growth enabling more growth made it such that from the end of the U.S. Civil War to the beginning of the Great Depression, annual growth in real per capita GDP averaged 1.75 percent.

Toward the end of the pre–World War II portion of the Industrial Revolution, political change and economic growth also brought about unionization of employees, the substantial raising of wages, the dramatic improve- ment in working conditions, the ending of child-labor practices, a minimum wage, and the standardization of the 40-hour workweek. Laws protecting workers’ rights to organize, collectively bargain, and strike were passed. That growth and those laws created a broad U.S. middle class. Though conservative, pro-business economists would give more of the credit to growth and liberal, pro-labor economists would give more credit to labor- friendly laws, it is clear that the combination created a large, healthy, and stable middle class.

Sources of Growth

From 1950 to 2007 per capita real GDP growth averaged 2.16 percent. That latter growth had several “mothers.” During the 1950s through the 1990s the Labor Force Par- ticipation Rate for women of prime working age (25–54)

1Multifactor productivity, though notably slower overall, showed essentially the same pattern and timing.

gue46399_ch15_186-192.indd 187 16/03/17 11:43 AM

188 Chapter 15 Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?

Great Recession are also not to be discounted. Tighter credit standards and greater financial regulations have made it more challenging for small businesses to operate and grow. We will take each of these, in turn.

Though technological improvements have been dramatic since 2000, few of the inventions of the last 15 years have been particularly important to production. The cell phone and its offspring, the smartphone, have enabled us to do things as we walk from one place to another or as we wait in line somewhere, but we don’t do much of anything that is productive with those devices. While some of us may write or respond to work-related e-mail, most of us are reading for entertainment (e.g., a book in our Kindle app), participating in social media (e.g., Facebook, Pinterest), or playing a mind-numbing game (e.g., Candy Crush). The smartphone, the tablet, and all the applications to which we are addicted do not increase the productivity of the workforce in the way that the electric light did. The DVR, the smart TV, and the proliferation of streaming media outlets that feed them may increase the joy associated with our leisure time, but they do not add to production.

The bump in labor productivity of the 1990s and early 2000s was due to the application of computer technol- ogy to manufacturing, agriculture, retail, wholesale, and service providers. Auto companies now use robotic spot welders thereby increasing the consistency of those welds. Sawmills use laser imaging and computerized cutting programs to increase the amount of lumber that can be produced from each log. Hyper-accurate GPS- driven planters have increased yields in farm fields. Self- scanning checkouts have sprung up allowing one cashier to monitor several lanes at once. Interconnected supply- chain management software has allowed Walmart and others to order goods, load trucks, and restock shelves with greater efficiency. Banking and payment processing efficiency has increased dramatically because of com- puterized processes and electronic transfers.

On the other hand, Netflix, Facebook, Twitter, Pinter- est, Candy Crush, and the myriad simulation game apps do absolutely nothing positive for production.

Another significant cause related to slowing growth is the significant decline in the Labor Force Participa- tion Rate. Whereas men in their prime working ages used to participate at rates nearing 98 percent, that rate has fallen to 88 percent. Though still high, consider this: The percentage of men NOT working or look- ing for work while in their prime working years is six times higher than it was in the 1950s. Women in this age group, who constituted one of the “mothers” of earlier

growth, have also departed the labor force albeit at a much slower rate. At 36 percent in 1950, the rate for women ages 25 to 54 peaked at 77.3 percent in 2000. By 2015 the rate had fallen to 73.4 percent. Young people have also left the labor force. In the early 1950s, ap- proximately 60 percent of those between the ages of 16 and 24 were in the labor force. That number increased to a peak of 69 percent in the middle 1980s but dropped to 55 percent by 2015.

Another major cause of declining real GDP growth is the slowing increase in the population. This is one reason to focus on the per capita statistic. From 1950 to 1964, the U.S. population grew at between 1.4 per- cent and 2.2 percent per year, largely due to the post- war baby boom. The birth control pill slowed that rate such that it ranged between 0.8 percent and 1 percent from 1966 to 2009. The slowing since 2010 to less than 0.75 percent is attributable to out-migration of South and Central Americans and to a continued slowing of births.

A related cause is the changing demographic mix of the population. The percentage of the U.S. population under the age of 25 and over the age of 65 has changed dramatically over time. In 1970 46 percent of the popu- lation was under the age of 25 and 9.8 percent was over the age of 65. By 2010, 33 percent of the population was under 25 while 13 percent was over 65. That is, the popu- lation in 2010 in their peak earning years was 54 percent. That number is now falling. By 2014 it had fallen to 53.6 percent and is projected to continue falling to under 50 percent by 2040.

The Great Recession was not just an economic prob- lem for those who suffered through it; it created myriad problems that lingered far longer than the recession. Chapter 13 described the extraordinary measures un- dertaken by the Federal Reserve. Those artificially low interest rates should have caused an increase in business investment. The reality is that business investment did not revive, and that is likely because of the higher stan- dards that banks applied to commercial and industrial loans. Those higher standards are at least somewhat at- tributable to new financial regulations imposed on banks shortly after the Great Recession.

Consequences One of the elements that is a cause to some, a conse- quence to others, and to still others both a cause and a consequence, is the declining middle class (a subject explored in some depth in Chapter 31, “Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?”). The longer-term

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What Can Be Done to Jump-Start Growth, or Is This the New Normal? 189

consequences relate to the overall social and economic health and welfare of the American population. In par- ticular, with incomes growing more slowly than that projected by the Medicare and Social Security Trustees, the financial viability of those programs could be called into question.

The percentage of Americans in the middle class has seen a recent and troubling decline. The Pew Charitable Trust defines the middle class as those households with in- comes between 67 percent and 200 percent of the median household income by household size. For 2014, a three-per- son household with income between $42,000 and $126,000 would qualify as being in the middle class. As Table 15.2 shows, the middle class has been shrinking since the 1970s, but much of that shrinkage was because those near the top boundary of the definition had their incomes rise pushing them into the “upper-middle” category. Now it is shrinking because households nearest the bottom boundary of the def- inition are having their incomes fall into the “lower-middle” category and those at the bottom of the “lower-middle” cat- egory are falling into the “lowest” category.

Though a shrinking middle class can be viewed as merely a consequence of a slowly growing economy, it can also be viewed as a cause of that slowly growing economy. That perspective, that the distribution of in- come is contributing to the lack of income, is typically held by economists on the left. Their view is that because people in the lower and middle classes use most of their income for the purpose of bolstering their consumption and because those at the top of the income distribution use their income for the purpose of making more income for themselves, there is a macroeconomic impact to the change in distribution. Those in the bottom 80 percent use their income to buy things produced, typically, by those in the bottom 80 percent. When they buy, their spending is someone else’s income and their income is generated by someone else’s purchases of the goods and services they produce. At the very least the money in the hands of the highest-income individuals is spent or invested much more slowly than money in the hands of

those not in the highest strata. In this way, the conse- quence can also be a cause.

Where economists generally agree, because it is sim- ply math, is that when growth runs at 1 percent per capita rather than 2 percent per capita, the average newborn child today can count on having about half as much income when they retire. That is because growth is mathemati- cally exponential. It isn’t just 65 years of 1 percent lost for a 65 percent difference, it is 1.0165, or a 191 percent difference. The result is that everybody simply has a whole lot less. There are fewer opportunities, fewer jobs, lower pay, and lower tax revenue. This means that com- mitments that were made years ago, such as Social Secu- rity and Medicare, will become increasingly difficult to keep. It also means that new promises, perhaps to offer government-subsidized child care or to provide universal paid family leave, not only can’t be kept; they can’t even be responsibly considered. A society with twice as much income can do many more things for its citizenry. Growth not only helps those who earn the money; it also helps those who depend on government because government depends on revenue growth to support social programs.

One startling statistic that jolts and depresses at the same time is one that relates to suicide. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, between 2000 and 2014 the suicide rate for those between the ages of 45 and 64 increased from 13.5 to 19.2 per 100,000. This in- crease has been more pronounced among whites than other ethnicities. Already twice the rate for whites as for African Americans, the suicide rate for whites increased from 11.3 per 100,000 to 14.7. When growth is slow and good-paying jobs are hard to come by, depression can lead to suicide.

What Can Be Done to Jump-Start Growth, or Is This the New Normal?

Just as the cause of the slow-growth predicament is subject to debate, the conclusions economists draw are also subject to debate. There are essentially

Year Lowest Lower Middle Middle Upper Middle Highest

1971 16 9 61 10 4 1981 17 9 59 12 3 1991 18 9 56 12 5 2001 18 9 54 11 7 2011 20 9 51 12 8 2015 20 9 50 12 9

TABLE 15.2 Pew Charitable Trust income classes.

Source: http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing-ground/

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190 Chapter 15 Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?

two camps: “get used to it, this is the new normal” and “we can do better.” Within the “we can do better” camp there are also two camps with two vastly differ- ent solution sets. Liberals suggest a massive increase in stimulus to jump-start aggregate demand. Conser- vatives suggest an equally massive change to the regu- latory system and tax structure.

Chief among the “new normal” group of economists is Robert Gordon. In his book, The Rise and Fall of American Growth, Gordon makes the case that the sources of economic growth of the post–Civil War pe- riod through 2000 have all but evaporated. Specifically, there isn’t a large new workforce sitting by waiting to be tapped. Women entering the workforce in great numbers can only happen once. There is no significant portion of the day to be turned to productive use like there was when electric lighting allowed for round-the- clock manufacturing. The conversion to carbon-based energy from human or animal energy happened, and its benefits can’t be repeated. Even if we can convert completely to non-carbon-based energy sources, that will not increase output. Such a conversion may save the planet from climate change, but it will not increase production because electrically powered equipment does not run any better just because the source of that electricity has changed.

A group Gordon labels “techno-optimists” disagrees with his assertions that the days of robust growth are behind us. They point to driverless cars and trucks as an example of productivity enhancements that are only a few years away from having a dramatic impact. If all the labor devoted to over-the-road trucking were to be re- placed with driverless vehicles, that labor could be used to produce other goods and services. Further into the fu- ture, it is not hard to imagine that artificially intelligent robots could engage in home production in much the same way that current robots have increased productivity in factories. People might be able to engage in produc- tive activities rather than cooking, cleaning, shopping, or doing laundry. These techno-optimists imagine a world in which technology increases growth at once-again robust rates.

Back in the real world where we do our own cooking and cleaning, conservative and liberal economists debate what can be done to get the United States back on track. Liberals typically advocate for policies that increase ag- gregate demand while conservatives look to aggregate supply increasing actions. Figures 15.1 and 15.2 show these alternatives.

Liberals/Democrats would use the Chapter 8 levers of middle-class tax cuts and increases to government spending to shift aggregate demand rightward. It is argued that that would stimulate the virtuous cycle. Greater demand would foster more business invest- ment and more jobs (both to produce the greater number of goods and services and to increase the jobs associated with building new businesses). That would create more income and even greater middle-class de- mand. An abrupt rightward shift in aggregate demand would generate faster future rightward shifts in ag- gregate demand. This assertion is based on the notion

AD

ADʹ

ASPI

PIʹ

PI*

RGDPRGDP* RGDPʹ

FIGURE 15.1 Growth through increases in aggregate demand.

AD

ASʹ

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PIʹ

PI*

RGDPRGDP* RGDPʹ

FIGURE 15.2 Growth through increases in aggregate supply.

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Summary 191

shores, so companies simply leave those profits over- seas because stockholders are better off when they do. Lowering the corporate income tax would also keep U.S. companies from wanting to sell themselves to smaller foreign companies. This shell game, called inversion, reduces corporate income tax obligations dramatically thereby increasing share prices for stock- holders. Conservatives would also simplify the tax code to remove most of the tax breaks associated with favored types of behavior. These economists argue that deductions and credits for everything from college expenses to energy-efficient windows creates a level of needless complication in the personal income tax system and discourages productive activity in favor of tax-reducing activity.

that there is a level of growth that must be achieved to be self-sustaining. That is because consumer con- fidence is bolstered by increasing growth, and that increased consumer confidence is itself a cause of economic growth.

Conservatives/Republicans would argue that a re- duction in the U.S. corporate income tax rate and a reform and simplification of the U.S. personal income tax system would generate aggregate supply increases. The U.S. corporate income tax (considering both state and federal tax systems) places one of the highest busi- ness tax burdens on U.S. companies. It also motivates companies with large international divisions to locate and hide those profits in foreign countries. Profits are only taxed in the United States when they reach U.S.

Summary The rapid slowing of U.S. real economic growth from 2 percent per capita to less than 1 percent per capita is a significant problem not only for the near term but also the long term. Caused by both demographic shifts and a decline in productivity-enhancing technological im- provements, the decline in growth has led to a decline in the U.S. middle class and to reduced expectations for

the future. If the “new normal” ends up being the correct description of this slow growth, economic opportunities for today’s generation of young people will likely lead to many more of them living below their parent’s economic station for the first time in more than 150 years. Perhaps even more depressing is that there is no consensus solu- tion to this quandary.

Quiz Yourself 1. Per capita real economic growth during the pre–

Revolutionary War era was a. negative. b. zero. c. 1 percent. d. 2 percent.

2. Per capita real economic growth during the Indus- trial Revolution through the mid-1970s was a. negative. b. zero. c. 1 percent. d. 2 percent.

3. The impact of slowing economic growth over a long period of time is a. negligible. b. the lost growth times the number of years. c. substantial because of the exponential aspect

of growth.

4. The large increase in the Labor Force Participa- tion Rate that occurred between 1950 and 2000 was because a. women’s participation in the labor force

doubled. b. men’s participation in the labor force increased. c. the proportion of the population over 65 increased. d. young people’s participation in the labor force

doubled. 5. The large increase in the Labor Force Participation

Rate is ________ source of growth. a. a duplicatable b. an unduplicatable

6. What source of rapid (1950–1975) growth is not duplicable? a. Electrification of lighting b. Increases in education c. Increases in productivity

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192 Chapter 15 Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?

1. Why is it that some believe that slowing growth is a cause of a declining middle class and others believe the causality is reversed? Could it be both?

7. One issue that some call a consequence and others call a cause of slowing growth is a. a slowing rate of increase in the population. b. a change in the demographic mix of people to

nonworking populations. c. a declining middle class. d. an increase in the Labor Force Participation

Rate among women. 8. To counter the slowing rate of economic growth,

liberal economists would recommend a. taxation and spending policies that decrease

aggregate demand. b. taxation and spending policies that increase

aggregate demand. c. corporate and personal income tax policies that

decrease aggregate supply. d. corporate and personal income tax policies that

increase aggregate supply. 9. To counter the slowing rate of economic growth,

conservative economists would recommend a. taxation and spending policies that decrease

aggregate demand. b. taxation and spending policies that increase

aggregate demand. c. corporate and personal income tax policies that

decrease aggregate supply. d. corporate and personal income tax policies that

increase aggregate supply.

Short Answer Questions

2. Why would a cut in the rate of growth from 2 per- cent to 1 percent have more than a 10 percent impact if it lasted 10 years?

Think about This Part of the reason that the economy is slowing is that both men and women in their prime working years are decreasing their Labor Force Participation Rate. This could be because more couples are choosing to sacrifice income for the benefits associated with having one stay at home during the period when their children are young. If this is the case, is it a problem? Is it merely a conse- quence of a choice that individuals are making?

Talk about This Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump both tapped into a 2016 electorate troubled by the same thing: a slow- ing economy pinching the middle class (or a pinching middle class slowing the economy). Both targeted trade deals, but neither noted any of the causes cited by econo- mists (left and right). What is your explanation for why?

For More Insight See Gordon, Robert, The Rise and Fall of American Growth

(Princeton University Press).

Behind the Numbers Pew Charitable Trust—http://www.pewsocialtrends.org

/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing -ground/

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193

Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the source of the problem of the largest fiscal chal- lenges facing the federal and state and local governments as those associated with Social Security, Medicare, and pensions for state and local government employees.

LO2 Compare and contrast defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans and explain why defined ben- efit plans can be unfunded or underfunded but defined contribution plans cannot.

LO3 Describe the scope and degree of underfunding of each of the sources of fiscal problems.

LO4 List and evaluate the likelihood of each of the scenarios in which the underfunding of Social Security, Medicare, and pensions for state and local government employees presents smaller problems than expected.

Chapter Outline

What Is the Source of the Problem?

How Big Is the Social Security and Medicare Problem?

How Big Is the State and Local Pension Problem?

Is It Possible That the Fiscal Sky Isn’t About to Fall?

Summary

The story of “Chicken Little” is one in which the lead character claims that “the sky is falling” though the only thing that fell was an acorn. This chapter examines whether the fiscal sky is falling and uses the concept of present value to consider the question of whether the promises made by politicians of the past with re- gard to Social Security, Medicare, and defined benefit pensions to employees of state and local governments can be kept.

What Is the Source of the Problem?

As you may go on to read in Chapters 25 and 40, Medicare Part A and Social Security are funded through a system of payroll taxes. Working 40 quarters and paying taxes en- titles people to subsidized hospital care as well as a pen- sion based on the highest 35 years of earnings. For many employees of state and local governments, a system simi- lar to Social Security, albeit one in which instead of both

C H A P T E R S I X T E E N

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194 Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

spend their careers with one private employer and be- cause a large number of public employees do stay with their original employer, it is now the norm for employees in the private sector to have defined contribution plans and for public employees to have defined benefit plans.

Defined benefit plans, because they involve employers investing money on the behalf of employees, require either a degree of trust or a degree of regulation. Employee Retire- ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides regula- tion for defined benefit plans offered by private employers. The rules require that the funds in the accounts meet the

actuarial requirements to keep them fully funded. This simply means that, accounting for ex- pected returns on investments, life expectancy of pensioners, and so forth, the assets of the investments

must be able to meet the liabilities, which to the fund are the pension payments to retirees. They also must make pay- ments to the Pension Guaranty Trust Corporation, which operates as a public insurance company in cases where the pension fund cannot meets its obligations and the company that is supposed to pay in goes bankrupt. This guarantees pensioners that their defined benefit plans will pay pensions if the company that sponsored them does not survive.

Another thing that ERISA requires private companies to do is that when they offer health benefits to retirees, those funds also have to be fully funded. So if a private company, for whatever reason, wants to guarantee its employees that when they retire the company’s health insurance will follow them until they get to Medicare eligibility, they have to put enough aside to pay for that.

How Big Is the Social Security and Medicare Problem?

It is important to understand that ERISA applies most stringently to private pensions, and the public pensions, namely Social Security and state and local pensions, do not have to be fully funded. This is the crux of the prob- lem. Social Security is, in present value terms, under- funded by more than $12 trillion dollars, state pension funds are underfunded by $3 trillion, and local govern- ment pension funds are underfunded by more than one- half trillion. On top of that, though it is not a pension fund, Medicare is underfunded by another $4 trillion.

Let’s begin at the federal level. The Social Security and Medicare system had one gigantic, and perhaps even fatal, operational assumption: Current employees could pay for current retirees. This assumption was necessary so that

Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) A regulatory system for defined benefit plans.

employers and employees paying equal shares, states and local governments make most of the investments, provides pension benefits, typically based on the last three to five years of salary.

All three systems are either entitlements or defined benefit programs in that if you participate for the re- quired period of time, you get a benefit according to a

set of rules and a formula. For instance, defined benefits plans frequently have a rule defin- ing retirement eligibility that is structured around the variable years-of-service + age. When this number exceeds a particular

level (often  85), the person is eligible to retire. This is why a teacher who began teaching in a school district at age 25 can retire at full benefits at 55.

This plan differs from a defined contribution program. In a defined contribution pro- gram, those enrolled, as well as their employer, contribute to an account according to a formula (which can be 100  percent em- ployee, 100  percent employer, or some mix), and the investment of that account is under the con-

trol of the employee. Under defined contribution systems, retirees only get what their account accumulates.

Under a defined benefit program, because you pay ac- cording to a formula and you receive benefits according to a formula, there is the possibility that the formula will be wrong (on either side), resulting in a surplus (more than enough has been collected to pay the promised benefits) or a deficit (not enough has been collected and invested to pay the benefits). As is probably obvious, politicians would love the former because they can increase benefit payouts, but the latter is more likely. It is the latter that has occurred and now plagues the public pension system. Because you only get to reap what you sow in a defined contribution plan, there are no surpluses or deficits in those programs.

Defined benefit programs used to dominate the world of employee retirement systems, but they quickly fell by the wayside as fewer and fewer workers spent their entire careers with one firm. This is important because under most defined contribution plans there is a mini- mum years-of-service requirement and people who work 15 years with three different employers would usually get nothing or at least substantially less in aggregate pensions than they would if they worked 45  years with one employer. Because significantly fewer employees

defined contribution program A pension plan in which those enrolled, as well as their employer, con- tribute to an account according to a formula, and the investment of that account is under the control of the employee.

defined benefit program A pension plan that defines eligibility for retirement and benefits according to a set of rules and a formula.

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How Big Is the Social Security and Medicare Problem? 195

people could begin collecting benefits when the programs passed. Otherwise, the programs would have been col- lecting taxes and providing nearly no benefits for several years. Unfortunately for both systems, that mechanism requires that the number of babies born in a year remain roughly stable or grow at a steady rate so that eventually the ratio of workers per retiree can remain roughly con- stant. With the dearth of babies born between 1931 and 1945, due first to the scarcity of food during the Great De- pression, which made many women at least temporarily infertile, and, second, World War  II, which made young men temporarily scarce, and the subsequent baby boom of the postwar era, that assumption did not hold.

The result was that in 1982 analysts anticipated that beginning in 2008, as the first baby boomers became eligible for early-retirement Social Security benefits, and extending until around 2040, both Social Security and Medicare would have insufficient funds to pay for the anticipated benefits. In that year a compromise was worked out that significantly raised payroll taxes in order to create the Social Security and Medicare trust funds and raised the full-benefit retirement age from 65 to 67.

As of 2011, those accounts remain seriously under- funded. As can be seen in Figure 16.1, the annual deficits in these programs alone will, very soon, reach very high lev- els. Because these deficits will occur mostly in the future,

there are two reasonable ways of looking at them. The first, presented in Figure 16.1 displays them by discounting using the present value methodology of Chapter 7. Using an inter- est rate associated with long-term U.S. treasuries, 2.8 per- cent,1 the annual deficits are discounted and plotted below. The area between the 0-line and the Social Security line is the degree of the problem with regard to that program going out 75 years.2 It is $36 trillion. Similarly, between the 0-line and the Medicare line is the degree of the deficit in that pro- gram, which is $10 trillion. For perspective, at this writing the sum of those two numbers is nearly three times GDP. That means that the total liabilities of the United States are more than $64 trillion (the sum of the national debt and the unfunded liabilities of Social Security and Medicare).

To compound the problem, there will be a decreasing percentage of the population working to pay that enormous bill. As can be seen in Figure 16.2, the dependency ratio, the ratio of the population dependent on others to support them to the population supporting them, will rise from around 25 percent currently to more than 38  percent in the next 20 years and to nearly 44 percent within the next 75 years.

1 The zero-coupon bond yield at this chapter’s writing (March 2016). 2 This is the length of time the Social Security and Medicare trustees are required to consider and report upon.

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Social Security Medicare

FIGURE 16.1 The present value of the annual Social Security and Medicare deficits: 2015–2090.

Source: www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2012/tr2015.pdf

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196 Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

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Source: www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2012/tr2015.pdf

The other way of looking at the size of these problems is to consider that the earning capacity of the next generations will be greater than the earning capacity of today’s genera- tion, and through immigration and birth, the U.S. popula- tion continues to grow, making it somewhat likely that the problem could present less of a burden than these figures imply. In Figure 16.3 we see that we could pay for these deficits with an amount of money equal to around 1 percent of payroll over the next decade. Though, by this measure, these deficits as a percentage of payroll rise to 5 percent in

rapid order between 2020 and 2035, they only grow by an- other 1.5 percentage points in the ensuing 40 years.

How Big Is the State and Local Pension Problem?

State and local governments provide their own pensions in addition to Social Security. They do so, by and large, using defined benefit plans. The tumult in Wisconsin in 2011

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FIGURE 16.3 Social Security and Medicare deficits as a percentage of projected payroll.

Source: www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2012/tr2015.pdf

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How Big Is the State and Local Pension Problem? 197

each state by looking at 2010 pension liability data in Table 16.1. Produced by economists Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh, their methodology began by looking at the liabilities that these states acknowledge and the assets they claimed, but then made adjustments to the discount rate that these states use to establish those liabilities. Find- ing those discount rates unreasonably high, they instead chose to use what they determined to be a more reasonable rate—the rate that you would get on U.S. Treasury bonds.3 What they found was that in 2010 states had roughly $3 trillion in unfunded liabilities in their state-funded pension plans. When they updated the aggregate number using 2013 data, they found that the problem was growing and that the gap was as much as $3.3 trillion.

was in large part due to conflicts between its Republican governor and the public employees. The budget standoff in Illinois in 2015 and 2016 was a direct result of the unfunded pension liability problem there. The Republican governor and the Democratic state legislature could not agree on a budget because of, among other things, the pension issue. That standoff was made substantially worse when the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Illinois public pensions were “inviolate”—meaning they could not be lower than promised—and that this extended to everyone currently or previously working for state or local government in Illinois. The consequences of that standoff included little things, like cancelling spring break at Chicago State Uni- versity in 2016 and closing interstate rest areas for unpaid sewer bills; and really big things, like failing to honor state scholarships at public universities across the state and fur- loughs to several employees of those institutions.

How big is the problem of state pensions? You can see the degree to which these unfunded liabilities will affect

TABLE 16.1 State pension liabilities, 2010.

Source: Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh, “Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?” Journal of Finance, 2011.

State Name Liabilities, Stated

Liabilities, Treasury Rate

Pension Assets State Name

Liabilities, Stated

Liabilities, Treasury Rate

Pension Assets

Alabama 42.0 61.8 21.4 Montana 9.1 12.4 5.3 Alaska 15.3 21.7 12.4 Nebraska 8.4 11.6 5.5 Arizona 43.6 73.5 24.8 Nevada 25.4 36.3 18.8 Arkansas 21.5 30.4 14.6 New Hampshire 8.5 12.5 4.3 California 518.1 699.7 329.6 New Jersey 132.8 191.2 67.2 Colorado 57.3 86.2 28.8 New Mexico 28.8 39.8 15.9 Connecticut 45.3 69.1 20.1 New York 239.8 325.7 192.8 Delaware 7.6 10.9 5.8 North Carolina 74.9 101.8 64.0 Florida 136.4 186.3 96.5 North Dakota 4.4 6.3 2.7 Georgia 75.8 110.1 53.1 Ohio 197.5 281.4 114.7 Hawaii 17.5 24.2 8.1 Oklahoma 33.6 45.9 15.8 Idaho 11.7 16.6 8.7 Oregon 57.5 80.7 42.9 Illinois 151.0 233.0 65.7 Pennsylvania 110.6 164.5 64.3 Indiana 37.3 49.8 19.6 Rhode Island 13.9 20.5 6.6 Iowa 26.0 35.0 18.0 South Carolina 42.4 63.5 20.3 Kansas 21.3 30.3 10.2 South Dakota 7.4 10.3 5.6 Kentucky 45.2 63.4 21.1 Tennessee 36.7 49.6 26.4 Louisiana 36.8 54.8 18.4 Texas 191.2 268.4 126.1 Maine 14.4 20.1 8.3 Utah 22.6 31.2 14.7 Maryland 52.7 72.1 28.6 Vermont 4.0 5.7 2.4 Massachusetts 59.7 86.9 32.7 Virginia 69.1 89.6 41.3 Michigan 73.2 103.1 39.5 Washington 62.3 86.4 43.5 Minnesota 60.6 91.0 35.9 West Virginia 13.7 18.3 7.2 Mississippi 31.4 44.2 15.5 Wisconsin 79.7 114.6 58.4 Missouri 53.5 75.2 33.1 Wyoming 7.0 9.8 4.4

3 The technical reasons for this consideration are beyond the scope of this text; however, from Chapter 7 you understand that higher rates of discount mean that liabilities far off into the future will have a smaller present value. The authors argue that the discount rates on the liabilities are overstated for political purposes to mask the actual size of the problem.

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198 Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

To put a bow on this, imagine a household in Chicago wanted to pay off its share of all unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and pension liabilities (completely ignoring the other portions of the national debt); they would have to come up with more than $215,000, of which one-third would be their state and local liabilities. If this fiscal “sky is falling” prediction is accurate, the fiscal sky will fall in the next 20 to 25 years. That is the period in which the Medicare problem will hit its present-value peak, the state and local pension problem will peak, and the Social Security problem will still be increasing.

Is It Possible That the Fiscal Sky Isn’t About to Fall?

It is at least plausible that the preceding overstates the actual problem that Americans will face. Optimists point to a number of factors that could make these problems

These same scholars duplicated this analysis for county and municipal pensions. Using a comprehensive (but not universal) list of cities and counties and their pension plans, they performed similar calculations for those local gov- ernments. What they found, as shown in Table 16.2, was that for those counties and cities they could include in their database, there was $383 billion in unfunded liabilities on pensions, and if that was extrapolated to the remain- ing population of local governments, they have a total of $574 billion in unfunded pension liabilities. Some of those cities had laughably large unfunded liabilities. For instance, the city of Chicago had so many outstanding liabilities that if every household in the city contributed $40,000 to the city, it would still be insufficient to entirely eliminate the gap. Even worse, because the state of Illinois had not con- tributed anywhere near enough money to its pension funds for state employees (such as teachers, college professors, state highway patrol, prison guards), it would take almost an additional $30,000 to cover those liabilities.

TABLE 16.2 County and municipal pension liabilities, 2010.

Source: Robert Novy-Marx (University of Rochester and NBER) and Joshua Rauth (Kellogg School of Management and NBER), www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/rauh /research/nmrlocal20101011.pdf

Name (Number of Plans)

Liabilities, Stated Basis, June 2009 ($B)

Liabilities, Treasury Rate

Net Pension Assets ($B)

Unfunded Liability ($B)

Unfunded Liability/ Revenue

Unfunded Liability per Household ($)

Chicago 46.3 66.6 21.8 44.8 763% 41,966 New York City 155.8 214.8 92.6 122.2 276 38,886 San Francisco 16.3 22.6 11.9 8.7 306 34,940 Boston 7.4 11.0 3.6 7.5 430 30,901 Detroit 8.1 11.0 4.6 6.4 402 18,643 Los Angeles 34.6 49.3 23.2 26.1 378 18,193 Philadelphia 9.0 13.0 3.4 9.7 290 16,690 Cincinnati 2.2 3.2 1.2 2.0 321 15,681 Baltimore 4.4 6.4 2.7 3.7 260 15,420 Milwaukee 4.4 6.7 3.3 3.4 687 14,853 Fairfax County 8.3 11.1 5.5 5.6 169 14,415 Hartford 1.2 1.6 0.9 0.7 249 14,333 St. Paul 1.5 2.2 0.8 1.4 464 13,686 Jacksonville 4.1 6.0 2.0 4.0 278 12,994 Dallas 7.4 10.8 4.6 6.3 298 12,856 Contra Costa County 6.3 8.7 3.7 5.0 425 12,771 Santa Barbara County 2.3 3.3 1.4 1.8 329 11,995 Kern County 4.2 5.6 2.0 3.6 612 11,919 San Jose 5.4 7.5 3.4 4.1 321 11,391 Houston 11.1 16.4 7.2 9.1 356 10,804 Nashville Davidson 2.9 4.1 1.8 2.3 151 10,048 Arlington County 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.8 103 10,000

gue46399_ch16_193-200.indd 198 16/03/17 12:43 PM

Summary 199

substantially smaller in scope. First, the analysis is predi- cated on the ability of the authors of the Social Secu- rity and Medicare trustees’ reports to predict wages, life expectancy, GDP, interest rates, and other economic variables 20, 30, 50, 75 years in advance. Additionally, there are any number of changes that could make the next 20 years only slightly uncomfortable with regard to these underfunded programs. Incomes could grow at a more rapid, but still historically reasonable, rate, or the programs’ benefits could be curtailed.

Aside from the possibility that the forecasts are just wrong, consider the most likely and most important source for potential optimism. Taxable incomes could grow at the rate they did in the 1980s and 1990s and do so for a sustained period. Similarly, productivity and/ or technological increases could be sufficient to raise real GDP growth expectations from the 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent they have been to 3.5 percent to 4.5 percent. A one percentage point increase in growth would make the U.S. real GDP 28 percent higher in 25 years than it is now projected to be at that time, and that would be more than enough to make the funding of those particular pro- grams substantially less onerous.

Second, programmatic changes could be made, especially to Social Security, that could take the larg- est part of the long-term problem off the table. For instance, some combination of tax increases (either eliminating the maximum taxable earnings for So- cial Security, increasing tax rates 1 percent across the board on both employers and employees, or extending

Social Security taxes to unearned income) or benefits changes (eliminating the option for taking benefits at 62, raising the retirement age to 70, using price infla- tion rather than wage inflation to adjust benefits for the cost of living) could be enacted. If these were en- acted in the next five years, most of the problem in Social Security could be eliminated.

Whether state and local governments can break the promises they have already made to their teachers, firefighters, police, and other workers is another story. There would certainly be political and even legal chal- lenges to such changes. As governors around the coun- try were seeing between 2011 and 2016, it is politically difficult to require public workers to contribute (more) to their pensions; so, though there could be a political solution that would require higher contribution levels by the workers themselves, if that does not occur soon, such a solution will not be enough to solve the state and local pension problem. That would leave state and local governments needing to cut benefits to current retirees (which would ignite an even more furious political and legal challenge) or to seek a bailout from higher levels of government.

The biggest challenge to optimists has to be Medi- care. Its problems were almost completely ignored within the Obama administration’s health care plan. That plan’s focus was on expanding eligibility and not on realistic cost control. Second, Medicare’s fiscal challenges will be front and center earlier than the other programs.

Summary Whether or not you believe the “sky is falling” on fiscal issues relating to Social Security, Medicare, and the pen- sions systems for state and local government workers, you should now understand the source of the problem. Com- bined, various levels of government have underfunded their programs for retirees by trillions of dollars. You understand that the Medicare challenge will occur first,

followed shortly thereafter by the state and local pension challenge. The Social Security shortfall will not become acute until the late 2030s but remains the largest fiscal challenge. You understand that because these liabilities will occur so far in the future that the rate at which you dis- count them and the rate at which the economy will grow can significantly alter the estimated scope of the problem.

Key Terms defined benefit program defined contribution program ERISA

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200 Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities

Quiz Yourself 1. In terms of magnitude, which of the following has

the greatest fiscal shortfall? a. State pension funds b. Local pension funds c. Medicare d. Social Security

2. In terms of when these fiscal shortfalls are likely to require significant changes to budgets or program rules, which of the following is likely to occur first? a. State pension funds b. Local pension funds c. Medicare d. Social Security

3. Using a higher rate of discount a. makes no difference when calculating the pres-

ent value of future liabilities. b. raises the present value of future liabilities. c. lowers the present value of future liabilities.

4. The dependency ratio in the United States is a. growing. b. steady. c. falling rapidly. d. falling slowly.

5. State and local pensions for government employees are usually a. defined benefit plans. b. defined contribution plans. c. entitlements. d. determined year to year.

6. Deficits cannot occur in a. defined benefit plans. b. defined contribution plans. c. entitlement budgets. d. state and local budgets.

Short Answer Questions 1. Why does the discount rate matter when evaluat-

ing the future liabilities of defined benefit pension plans?

2. Why does it matter whether you have a defined con- tribution plan or a defined benefit plan in terms of

whether there is a degree of underfunding that your boss might not be telling you about?

3. Why would a schoolteacher be a better candidate for a defined benefit pension than a computer programmer?

4. Why would the Pension Guaranty Trust or some- thing like it be necessary in defined benefit plans?

5. Is Social Security closer to a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution plan?

Think about This When you go into the voting booth, which type of politi- cian appeals to you: the optimistic sort that seeks to as- sure you that brighter days are ahead or the pessimistic sort that seeks to warn you of impending disaster? Are voters the source of the problem?

Talk about This Suppose nothing is done about state and local pension issues and state and local governments face a choice of either paying their retired teachers what they were promised in terms of pensions or paying current teach- ers enough to ensure an adequate education for children. (Suppose for the purpose of this discussion, you are con- vinced at the state level if you impose a tax increase, too many citizens will leave to go to another state, rendering the tax rate increase ineffective.)

Behind the Numbers Social Security and Medicare— www.ssa.gov/oact/TR/2010/tr2010.pdf State and local pensions— http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/public-sector

-retirement-systems Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh, “Public Pension

Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?” Journal of Finance, 62, pp. 2123–2167.

Novy-Marx, Robert (University of Rochester and NBER), and Joshua Rauth (Kellogg School of Man- agement and NBER)—www.kellogg.northwestern .edu/faculty/rauh/research/nmrlocal20101011.pdf

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C H A P T E R S E V E N T E E N

201

International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs? Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Name the principal trading partners of the United States and the goods that are most often traded.

LO2 Illustrate how international trade benefits both trade partners.

LO3 Define the principles of absolute and comparative advantage and utilize these definitions to prove the benefits from trade.

LO4 Compare and evaluate the reasons given for limiting trade and illustrate the mechanisms for doing so.

LO5 Conclude that limiting trade protects some industries and jobs, but at a very high cost.

LO6 Enumerate attempts to use trade as a diplomatic weapon and evaluate the success of those attempts.

Chapter Outline

What We Trade and with Whom

The Benefits of International Trade

Trade Barriers

Trade as a Diplomatic Weapon

Kick It Up a Notch: Costs of Protectionism

Summary

One of the more important economic developments of the last 35 years is the increased globalization of our economy. Whereas the world used to be made up of more than 150 countries whose economies were mostly independent of one another, nearly all of the economies of the nations of the world now depend heavily on one another.

As you can see from Figure 17.1, exports make up approximately 14% of the U.S. economy while imports make up more than 17%. Though there was a significant decline in both as a consequence of the global recession in 2009, there has also been a general recovery in both. One thing that does appear to have happened is that both have stabilized after more than 30 years of consistent growth. The increasing importance of the international sector has led some to worry about whether this trend is a good one. Are American jobs being unfairly taken by

workers from other countries? If so, is this trend toward globalization avoidable?

We address these questions first by explaining why economists generally believe that international trade is good for both parties. Then we discuss the reasons for limiting international trade, distinguishing between rea- sons that economists embrace and those that they do not. Next we discuss the methods by which trade is limited. To wrap up, we consider whether trade can be used as a tool in political or diplomatic disagreements.

What We Trade and with Whom

Trade in the United States is not only growing; it is also encompassing a diverse area of goods and services, as seen in Table 17.1. We trade in the obvious goods and

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202 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

exporting others. Similarly, though we export and import computers, this also shows the degree to which many products are made all over the globe.

If you open up any computer, you will find compo- nents that were made in a variety of places. The memory comes from one country, the hard drive from another, and the CPU from still another. Your computer may have been assembled in the United States, but it was made

the not so obvious goods. We import TVs, computers, and other electronics, as well as cars and oil. We export industrial equipment and airplanes. You probably would have guessed this. We simultaneously export and import large quantities of automobiles, computers (electrical equipment), and services. While that may sound some- what odd, it is not as strange as it may sound. There are myriad types of cars, and we are importing some and

TABLE 17.1 U.S. exports and imports of goods and services.

Sources: International Trade Administration, www.trade.gov; TradeStats Express (TM), http://tse.export.gov

Exports Imports  

Transportation equipment 273.6 Computer and electronic products 365.8 Computer and electronic products 209.1 Oil & gas 263.2 Chemicals 200.2 Transportation equipment 355.7 Machinery, except electrical 152.6 Chemicals 205.7 Petroleum & coal products 116.9 Machinery, except electrical 160.8 Primary metal mfg. 64.0 Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 111.4 Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 81.9 Primary metal mfg. 101.2 Agricultural products 72.9 Petroleum & coal products 82.0 Food manufactures 70.7 Electrical equipment, appliances & components 99.8 Electrical equipment, appliances & components 60.6 Apparel manufacturing products 86.6 Special classification provisions, NESOI 43.8 Fabricated metal products, NESOI 66.2 Services 710.6 Services 447.4 Total 2343.2 Total 2851.5

FIGURE 17.1 Increasing importance of international trade.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/index.html

20

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Year

P e

rc e

n ta

g e

o f

G D

P

Exports/GDP Imports/GDP

19 60

19 64

19 68

19 72

19 76

19 80

19 84

19 88

19 92

19 96

20 00

20 04

20 08

20 12

gue46399_ch17_201-212.indd 202 16/03/17 12:44 PM

What We Trade and with Whom 203

from components that could have been produced in 10 other countries. You can see that it is difficult to decide where it was really made. In part this is one reason why the trade deficit we have with China is so high. China is the final assembly point for significant consumer elec- tronics, and it is the final assembly point that gets credit (in our trade data) for their export to us.

There is one good on the list of exports that also may intrigue you—“petroleum and coal products.” In this in- dustrial group is coal and the United States is a signifi- cant exporter of coal. It also includes refined products, so any oil imported to the United States as crude oil into the refineries around Houston, Texas, and is then sold in Mexico, would show up as an export of a petroleum product of the United States. Recent legislation has also allowed for the exportation of crude oil.

The final item in Table 17.1 that also might also seem out of place is the trade in services. It is hard to imagine that we would import babysitting and lawn-mowing ser- vices, but it is much more plausible in areas of financial services and, specifically, in insurance. An American insurance company can easily sell life insurance to Canadians, and vice versa. Services make up a large and

rapidly growing area of trade, and it is one area where the United States has a substantial trade surplus.

Table 17.2 may also surprise you in that few Americans realize how important Canada is as a U.S. trading partner. In trade it is roughly equal in importance to all of Europe. Figure 17.2 shows the degree to which these deficits continue to burgeon.

FIGURE 17.2 Trade balances with selected partners.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/foreign-trade

50

Tr ad

e b

al an

ce ($

b ill

io n

s)

19901985 1995 2000 Year

2004 2012 20152009

–100

–150

–200

–50

0

–350

–450

–300

–250

Canada

Mexico

Japan

China

Middle East

European Union

Africa

TABLE 17.2 U.S. exports, imports, and trade balances of goods with selected countries and regions of the world, 2015.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/foreign-trade

Country Exports ($ billions)

Imports ($ billions)

Balance ($ billions)

Canada 280.3 295.2 −14.9 Mexico 236.4 294.7 −58.4 Japan 62.5 131.1 −68.6 China 116.2 481.9 −365.7 OPEC 72.8 66.2 6.6 Europe 320.6 490.6 −170.0 Africa 26.9 25.4 1.5 World 1504.9 2241.1 −736.2

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204 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

their individual production of two goods. We will sup- pose that the two countries are the United States and Brazil and the two goods are apples and coffee.

In Table 17.3 we will suppose that the United States is better at producing apples than it is at producing coffee and Brazil is better at producing coffee than it is at producing apples. We will assume that a single unit of labor is capable of producing two units of coffee in Brazil but only one unit of apples. In the United States that situation is reversed. A unit of labor produces two units of apples but only one of coffee. Clearly, since a unit of labor in the United States can produce more apples than a unit of labor in Brazil, the United States has the absolute advantage in apples. Similarly, it is clear that Brazil has an absolute advantage in coffee.

To analyze comparative advantage we need to mea- sure what is given up when the two countries allocate a unit of labor. For instance, when Americans produce an additional unit of coffee, they are giving up two apples. When Brazilians produce an additional unit of coffee, they are giving up only one-half a unit of apples. Brazilians therefore have the lower opportunity cost of producing coffee. Similarly, when Americans produce an additional unit of apples they give up one-half a unit of coffee, and when Brazilians do so they give up two units of coffee. As a result Americans have a lower op- portunity cost for apples. What this means is that in addi- tion to having an absolute advantage in coffee, Brazilians also have a comparative advantage in coffee. Similarly, Americans have a comparative advantage as well as an absolute advantage in apples.

These advantages need not be in line. Consider Table  17.4, which shows where the Americans are as- sumed to have an absolute advantage in the production of both goods. A single unit of American labor can pro- duce more apples and more coffee than a single unit of Brazilian labor. As a result, Americans have an absolute advantage in the production of both goods. Comparative advantage is another story. The opportunity cost of an additional unit of coffee to Americans is two-thirds of a unit of apples. For Brazilians the opportunity cost of an additional unit of coffee is only half a unit of apples. Thus Brazilians have the lower opportunity cost of pro- ducing coffee and therefore have a comparative advan- tage in coffee. In apple production the Americans have an opportunity cost of one and a half units of coffee while the Brazilian opportunity cost is two units of coffee. Americans therefore have the lower opportunity cost of apples production and, as a result, the comparative ad- vantage in apples.

The Benefits of International Trade

Comparative and Absolute Advantage To illustrate the benefits of trade it is useful to distin- guish between two kinds of “advantages” that people can have. Consider a brain surgeon and her secretary. Suppose that the surgeon worked her way through school by typing papers and that she types faster than her cur- rent secretary. If she is better at both typing and surgery, would it be better for her to do both and fire her secre- tary? The answer is no; she will be better off having her slow-typing secretary do the typing. Making the decision relies on the notion of opportunity cost that we discussed in Chapter 1.

To review, opportunity cost is what you give up by mak- ing the choices that you do. In the case of the secretary and the surgeon, if the surgeon does her own typing, she must give up at least some of her lucrative surgeries. On the other

hand, if she delegates the typing, she will pay the secretary only a small fraction of the money she would earn doing extra surgeries. In this case she has an absolute advantage in both surgery and typing, because she is better at both things than the competition. Her secretary has a comparative advantage at typing because the secretary has a lower opportunity

cost of doing the typing than does the surgeon. As a simple example of how this applies to interna-

tional trade, consider Tables 17.3 and 17.4. We can il- lustrate comparative and absolute advantage and the benefits from trade for each of two countries by relating

absolute advantage The ability to produce a good better, faster, or more quickly than a competitor.

comparative advantage The ability to produce a good at a lower opportunity cost of the resources used.

TABLE 17.3 Production: Absolute and comparative advan- tage are the same.

Coffee Apples

United States 1 2 Brazil 2 1

TABLE 17.4 Production: Absolute and comparative advantage are not the same.

Coffee Apples

United States 3 2 Brazil 2 1

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The Benefits of International Trade 205

apples and produce 60 units. The Brazilians will ship 30 units of coffee to the United States in exchange for 30 units of apples, and in the end each will be able to consume 30 units of each and be better off with trade than without it.

Trade is also beneficial when one country has the absolute advantage in both goods. Turning back to Table  17.4 we can show that there are gains from trade here as well. Prior to trade the Brazilian situation is un- changed from the preceding example, but the American situation is such that 12 Americans are producing 36 units of coffee and 18 Americans are producing 36 units of apples. Again if both focus more on the good for which they have a comparative advantage, coffee for Brazilians and apples for Americans, and the terms of trade adjust appropriately, then the Americans will again ship apples to Brazil for coffee, and both will be better off.

Production Possibilities Frontier Analysis We can show the gains using our Chapter 1 production possibilities frontier as well. Recall that a production possibilities frontier shows the output combinations that a country can accomplish on its own. If we assume either of the scenarios presented above, then the production possibilities frontiers for the two countries, shown in Figure 17.3, would have different slopes. The Brazilian

Demonstrating the Gains from Trade In either case the gains from trade can be illustrated. Start- ing with the situation where the gains from trade are more obvious, look back at Table 17.3. If Americans focus their production on apples and Brazilians on coffee, then for every unit of labor that Americans move to apples and Brazilians move to coffee, there is a worldwide increase in total production of one unit of apples and one unit of coffee.

To see that each is better off with trade than without it, suppose there is a total of 30 units of labor in each country and each prefers apples and coffee in equal amounts. Before trade there will be 10 Americans pro- ducing 20  units of apples and 20 Americans producing 20 units of coffee. Similarly there will be 10 Brazilians

producing 20 units of coffee and 20 Brazilians producing 20 units of apples.

To see that trade makes both better off, we need to know how the terms of trade, the amount of one good required to get the other, between the two countries

will come out. If we suppose that it comes to one unit of apples for one unit of coffee, then we have our an- swer. The Brazilians will produce only coffee and make a total of 60 units, and the Americans will produce only

terms of trade The amount of a good one country must give up to obtain another good from the other country, usually ex- pressed as a ratio.

FIGURE 17.3 Increased consumption possibilities with trade.

Production possibilities frontier

United States

A p

p le

s

Co�ee

Production possibilities frontier

Brazil

A p

p le

s

Co�ee

A p

p le

s

Co�ee

Consumption possibilities frontier

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206 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

production possibilities frontier would be flatter and the United States’ steeper.

If we again assume the one-for-one terms of trade, per- fect specialization would improve the situation for both the Americans and the Brazilians, in that the Americans would now have to give up only one unit of coffee to get a unit of apples instead of the two they had to give up before. The Brazilians would benefit, too. They would have to give up only one unit of apples instead of two to get a unit of coffee.

This is specifically illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 17.3, which uses the production possibili- ties frontier of both to create a new line that shows the consumption possibilities with trade. We saw in Chapter 1 that a production possibilities frontier farther away from the origin implies that more production is possible. You can see that the consumption possibilities with trade are greater for both the Brazilians and the Americans than their individual production possibilities without trade. When the Brazilians concentrate on coffee and the Americans concentrate on apples, and they trade, each country is better off. Each produces what it produces best and trades for what it does not produce particularly well.

Supply and Demand Analysis We can demonstrate the same general conclusion, that Americans are better off because of trade than without

it, using supply and demand. Using Figure 17.4, suppose there is a market for domestically produced coffee (from Hawaii perhaps). In a world without trade, the market price of coffee is Pdomestic and the amount that the domes- tic industry produces is Q’d. If there is trade and there is a lower world price of coffee, domestic producers re- duce the amount they produce to Q’s. The domestic pro- ducer surplus falls by PdomesticPworldCF. This shows up as lower profits in the domestic coffee business and losses to domestic coffee workers from having to look for other work. The consumer surplus to domestic coffee consum- ers rises by PdomesticPworldCE. In the end, the gain to con- sumers is larger than the loss to producers.

Whom Does Trade Harm? Even though we have seen that both countries are clearly better off than before, there still are people who would not necessarily like the development of trade. Specifically, American coffee makers and Brazilian apple growers would not necessarily find the idea of trade good. Inter- national trade would cause workers in these industries to lose their jobs because the competition would drive their employers out of business. This simple model assumes that the unemployed could find new work in the expand- ing industries in their respective countries or in other in- dustries generally. This assumption, however, while not

FIGURE 17.4 Gains from trade.

P P

A

B

Qs Qd Qd Q/t Q/t

Pdomestic

Pworld Pworld

S

C

EF

S

DD

Domestic market World market

gue46399_ch17_201-212.indd 206 16/03/17 12:44 PM

Trade Barriers 207

bad in the long run, ignores the pain of people losing their jobs and needing to attain new skills. In addition, these displaced workers are likely to get jobs at wages below those they were previously earning.

A relatively recent phenomenon is the development of outsourcing. The term is generally understood by econo- mists to narrowly apply to a firm’s use of foreign contrac- tors to perform services that were previously performed within the firm. So, if a computer peripheral company that used to have a technical support line in the United States now contracts to have this service provided by a foreign company, this would be outsourcing. The popular press often refers to anything that used to be done domestically that is now done off-shore as outsourcing. Economists refer to this as off-shoring. An example here would be a manufacturer, like Ford, that used to assemble all of its F-150 pickup truck line in the United States, moving a portion of that operation to Mexico. In either case, the same issue arises. Domestic workers are required to find new jobs.

It is important to note, though, that in a typical non- recession year 30 million of approximately 140 million jobs are eliminated and about 31 million new jobs are created. While some of the 30 million jobs that are eliminated are eliminated because companies engage in outsourcing or off-shoring, more jobs are created than are lost.

Trade Barriers

Reasons for Limiting Trade Because it is possible that with free trade some businesses go under and some workers lose their jobs, it is useful to summarize some of the questionable and some of the good reasons to limit trade. The questionable reasons begin with protecting jobs within the industries that are being affected by better or cheaper imports. The good rea- sons are as numerous as they are narrow. We may choose not to trade with other countries in certain goods because those goods may be important to our national security or national identity. Producing such goods at home is there- fore important in and of itself. We may choose not to trade with countries that gain their comparative advantage through lax worker safety rules, lax environmental laws, or because they allow businesses to employ child labor.

Though there are clearly short-run costs to free trade, when people lose their jobs to foreign competition and need retraining to get new ones, the long-term benefits usually outweigh these. When labor unions argue against

free trade, it is often because the industry that they rep- resent has lost its comparative advantage to other coun- tries. Though this comparative advantage is sometimes lost because of labor or environmental protections, it is usually because the other country has come up with a better or more cost-effective method of producing the good. Protecting an industry in such circumstances is not beneficial for two reasons:

1. For capitalism to work, not only must success be rewarded, but failure must be punished. If companies see that the government will prevent international competition, they will become lax, and they will not produce the best goods for the lowest prices.

2. If other countries see that we protect our firms from competition, they will certainly feel free to do the same. Instead of everyone benefiting from trade, we will return to the days before trade and lose consump- tion possibilities. We will lose our ability to export our goods to countries where our products are better and cheaper than domestic goods.

The preceding points notwithstanding, there are still good and legitimate reasons for limiting trade even when other countries produce better or cheaper goods. If, for instance, a country other than the United States produced the best and cheapest combat aircraft and it also happened to be a potential wartime enemy of the United States, the United States would be seriously mis- guided to shut down its own combat aircraft industry and buy planes from the other country. For national se- curity reasons, guaranteed access to war material is im- portant for countries.

Countries also limit trade for reasons that are similar to national defense. If a nation’s identity is tied to a particular commodity the way the Japanese identity is tied to rice, for example, it makes sense for the government to limit imports of the commodity so that its domestic producers can survive. Though there is enough productive capacity in the south-central United States to supply the entire rice consumption needs of Japan, and though the Japanese con- tinue to pay more than five times the world market price for rice to maintain a domestic industry, this economi- cally inefficient trade restriction can be justified on two grounds. First, Japan without a rice industry is not Japan; and second, in case of a naval war in the Pacific, it is hard to imagine the United States or any other country devot- ing significant naval resources to protect rice shipments to Japan. It is not a coincidence that as the Cold War waned, the Japanese began to allow at least limited rice imports.

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208 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

A final reason for limiting trade is that other countries may get their comparative advantage by using production processes that indirectly harm other countries or that other countries find offensive. If a country lowers its production costs, for example, by polluting in a way that would not be allowed in the United States, the United States might rea- sonably decide not to let that country sell its products here. This is especially true if the pollution ultimately causes health problems here. The United States might not want to allow the importation of chemicals and other environmen- tally onerous products from Mexico if, as a by-product of their manufacture, they pollute the Rio Grande.

In addition to environmental objections, countries may find certain labor practices so immoral that they do not allow importation of goods from countries that engage in them. For instance, it is against U.S. law to import any good made with slave labor or with prison labor. Additionally, the United States will not knowingly allow the importation of goods made with forced or in- dentured child labor, and the U.S. government requires that its contractors certify that no child labor was used in the production of its goods.1 Several countries allow children as young as eight to work in factories several hours a day. For example, if you own a soccer ball, it was probably made outside the United States, and the production involved at least one child who would not be allowed to work in the United States. The garment industry joins sporting goods in utilizing child labor and engaging in other labor practices that are not legal in the United States. Child labor has existed in nearly every country at some point, and its use is attributable al- most entirely to high rates of poverty. In addition, some economists argue that laws outlawing child labor are not necessarily good for the children involved if their only alternative is abject poverty. Despite this, many see the issue less in economic terms and more in moral ones.

Other reasons for limiting trade have appeal to only a limited number of economists. The first of these, the infant-industry argument, says that trade protection is required to give an industry in a country time to get on its feet. In theory, there may be an argument for tempo- rary shelter from competition, but in practice, it often happens that trade is permanently limited.

The second of these limited- appeal arguments is the anti- dumping argument. Dumping occurs when international

competitors charge less than their cost in order to drive out competition. The argument is that competitors do this to gain a monopoly in the long run. The problem with this argument is ascertaining the true mar- ginal cost of the international competitor. Inefficient domestic producers’ assertions of dumping often hinge on the notion that since they cannot produce at such low costs, it must be impossible. The crux of the dumping argument is the attempt at generating a monopoly, and there are few if any industries in which such a strategy has prevailed.

Methods of Limiting Trade Once a nation has decided to limit trade, it must choose a method. There are three main methods for limiting trade: A country can put a tax on imported goods, limit the quantity of a good that can be imported, or put regula- tions on goods that are imported to make it more difficult for the goods to be imported.

The most widely used method for limiting trade is the use of a tax on imports, called a tariff. Figure 17.5 shows that if a country wants to limit the amount of a good imported to Qlimit, a tax can be put on the good that is sufficient to move the supply curve to where it intersects the demand curve at that output. With such a tariff the price increases to Plimit, where domestic producers have a better chance of competing. In ad- dition, the government gets CPlimit AB in tax revenue

that it can use to retrain work- ers or to provide other sorts of compensation.

The second method of limit- ing trade, a quota, places a legal restriction on the quantity of a

dumping The exporting of goods below cost to drive com- petitors out of business.

FIGURE 17.5 The effect of tariffs and quotas.

Qlimit Q*

Plimit

P

P*

C

D

Q/t

F

A

B

E

S Sʹ

Tari�

1See Executive Order 99-06-12, Executive Order on Child Labor, www.fedworld.gov.

tariff A tax on imports.

quota A legal restriction on the amount of a good coming into the country.

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Trade as a Diplomatic Weapon 209

good coming into the country. Also shown in Figure 17.5, this method is popular in that it has the effect of rais- ing the price that domestic producers can charge to Plimit. The main difference between a quota and a tar- iff is that with a quota the government of the import- ing country receives no tax revenue. Importers get to raise their prices and they get to keep the extra money as profit. Even though it appears this method would seem to be much worse than a tariff for the importing country, quotas sometimes provide politi- cal advantages. Often it is less of a diplomatic prob- lem for a country to impose a quota on the imports of another country. Also, as has happened before in the automobile business, it is sometimes possible to  get an exporting country to agree to limit its exports vol- untarily. While this operates exactly like a quota, the exporting country retains the power to end the action rather than ceding that power to the importing coun- try. In the early 1980s Japan willingly limited exports of cars to the United States when congressional action was threatened.

The final method by which a country can limit the imports of another country utilizes a recognized right of a country to inspect goods coming in. If you do not want a particular good coming into the country, you can set up rules for its import that effectively make the importation too costly. This method is ef- fective, it is nearly impossible to get around, and it becomes apparent only when the rules become silly. The method is seen mostly with the importation of agricultural products. Although it is perfectly legiti- mate for a country to want to inspect a shipment to look for certain diseases, bugs, or parasites, countries will sometimes use such inspection as an excuse to limit imports. Because the goods themselves are usu- ally perishable, this can raise the cost to prohibitive levels and effectively prevent any attempts to break into a new market.

Many examples of these nontariff barriers exist. Some are perfectly logical; others are dubious. An

outbreak of mad cow disease began to affect English herds in 1999, resulting in a ban on English beef sold in Europe. A concern over the potential

of allergic reactions in genetically altered corn re- sulted in a similar European ban on Starlink corn. The European ban on milk from cows that had been given bovine growth hormone (BGH) and the Japa- nese ban on American apples in the 1980s appear to

be examples of the use of nontariff barriers for strictly protectionist reasons.

Trade as a Diplomatic Weapon

There are countless examples in the last 50 years of international trade being used to make a diplomatic point or to solve a diplomatic problem. Since the late 1950s, the United States has imposed trade sanctions against Cuba to destabilize Fidel Castro. In 1979, in response to Iran’s refusal to free American diplomats being held hostage in its embassy, the United States made it illegal to trade with Iran. In 1980, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed a grain embargo, making it illegal to sell wheat to Russia. In the middle 1980s, in response to a series of terrorist acts by the Libyan government and its surrogates, the United States declared it illegal to buy Libyan oil. In the early 1990s, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United Nations imposed economic sanc- tions against Iraq in hopes that Iraq would retreat. Iraq did not retreat, the Gulf War was fought, and afterward, further economic sanctions were used in attempts to pressure Iraq into giving up its weapons of mass de- struction. This too failed.2 In 2012 and 2013, both Iran and North Korea were sanctioned by the United States and other allies for refusal to give up nuclear weapons. Neither budged.

Manipulating trade simply has not been particularly effective as a method of influencing diplomacy. Cas- tro has outlasted nine U.S. presidents; the Iranians did not buckle to such pressure; the Soviets, the Libyans, and the Iraqis followed their lead. The main reason that cutting off trade has not worked as a diplomatic tool is that it has been impossible to implement adequately. There have always been other avenues that the countries in question could use for trade. The Iranians had never sold much oil to the United States, and they found few problems selling their output to other countries. Argentinean and Australian farmers were only too happy to sell their grain to the Soviets, and the Libyans and the Iraqis had few problems breaking the sanctions imposed on them because many other countries felt free to break them. In theory, the limiting of trade appears to be a powerful diplomatic tool. In reality, it has not been very effective.

2Recently released interrogations of Saddam Hussein show that he failed to com- ply with these UN directives because Iraq had no such weapons after 1995, but that he wanted the Iranians to believe Iraq was stronger militarily than it was.

nontariff barriers Barriers to trade result- ing from regulatory actions.

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210 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

COSTS OF PROTECTIONISM

Reasons and mechanisms for limiting trade are available, but their use incurs substantial economic costs. We can examine those costs using Figure 17.5 and our consumer and producer surplus analysis from Chapter 3. Whatever the mechanism is for limiting trade, if the price of the imported good increases to Plimit and the quantity is re- duced to Qlimit, then there are winners and losers from the protectionist measures. The losers are consumers because their consumer surplus falls by P*Plimit AE. Do- mestic producers are winners because they get a higher price, and foreign producers are losers because their sales are limited. The net gain to producers from a quota, or alternatively the net gain to producers plus the tariff

revenue to the government, is CPlimit AB − BFE. In any event there is a net loss to society from the protectionist measures of ABE.

In practice this loss can be very substantial. Table 17.5 illustrates the net loss to the United States from trade protection in certain industries. It also demonstrates the net loss per job that the protectionist measures save. This table clearly shows the efficiency costs to American consumers from tariffs and quotas. We pay a few dollars more for many goods, but these figures add up to more than $32 billion to save 191,664 jobs. At $169,000 per job saved, trade protectionism is one of the worst jobs programs in place.

absolute advantage comparative advantage dumping

nontariff barriers quota

tariff terms of trade

Key Terms

Kick It Up a Notch

TABLE 17.5 Total cost of trade protectionism.

Source: Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994.

Industry Total Cost to Consumers ($ millions) Jobs Saved

Cost per Job Saved ($)

Food and beverage $ 2,947 6,035 $ 488,000 Textiles and light industry 26,443 179,102 148,000 Chemical products 484 514 942,000 Machinery 542 1,556 348,000 Miscellaneous 1,895 4,457 425,000 Total 32,311 191,664 169,000

Summary You now understand that the United States trades in many goods and with many partners and that we have a mas- sive trade deficit, but that both we and our trading part- ners benefit from our international trade. You are now able to use the principles of absolute and comparative advantage as well as a production possibilities frontier to

demonstrate why that is the case. You know the reasons for limiting trade and alternative mechanisms for doing so and that limiting trade comes at a very high cost. Last, you now see that the use of trade as a diplomatic weapon has been largely a failure.

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Summary 211

Quiz Yourself 1. America’s most significant trading partner is

a. Saudi Arabia. b. Canada. c. China. d. Japan.

2. In 2015, which country had the largest trade surplus with the United States? a. Saudi Arabia b. Canada c. China d. Japan

3. Theoretically speaking, all trade is based on a. comparative advantage. b. absolute advantage. c. numerical advantage. d. political advantage.

4. The trends in U.S. international trade are such that a. imports are increasing and exports are decreasing. b. imports are decreasing and exports are

increasing. c. both imports and exports are decreasing. d. both imports and exports are increasing.

5. Using simple linear production possibilities fron- tiers in a simple two-good, two-country model, comparative advantage is evident when a. one country can make more of both goods than

the other. b. the slopes of the two production possibilities

frontiers are identical. c. the slopes of the two production possibilities

frontiers are different. d. one country is incapable of producing one good.

6. Using simple linear production possibilities fron- tiers in a simple two-good, two-country model, ab- solute advantage is evident when a. one country can make more of a good than the

other country can. b. the slopes of the two production possibilities

frontiers are identical. c. the slopes of the two production possibilities

frontiers are different. d. one country is incapable of producing one good.

7. Of the following justifications for limiting trade, which one would economists be least likely to endorse? Some goods should not be imported because a. they are important for national defense

(e.g., tanks, fighter airplanes).

b. they are important for national identity (e.g., television programs).

c. their production employs many people (e.g., cars).

d. other countries use child labor to gain a com- parative advantage (e.g., clothing).

8. When choosing to limit trade, a country can impose a tax on imported goods. This is called a. an estate tax. b. a tariff. c. a quota. d. a capital gains tax.

9. Economists are concerned about nontariff (regula- tory) barriers when they are used to prevent imports when a good a. is produced via questionable means (e.g., ban-

ning milk produced from cows injected with bovine growth hormone).

b. is produced via more efficient use of labor. c. may spread disease (e.g., banning beef from

countries that have experienced mad cow disease).

d. violates local standards for decency.

Short Answer Questions 1. Use the concept of comparative and absolute advan-

tage to illustrate why a fast-typing business execu- tive might dictate letters on a digital audio recorder for her secretary to type rather than type them herself.

2. List some reasons why the United States might im- port and export cars, airplanes, chemicals, and pe- troleum products.

3. Construct an argument against “energy indepen- dence” as a policy goal for the United States using the notion of comparative advantage.

4. Explain why a tariff on imported oil would be better than an import quota as a means by which to achieve energy independence.

Think about This Today’s transportation infrastructure makes international trade more efficient than intra-U.S. trade was 100 years ago. What this means is that it is easier today for a shirt made in China to get to California than it was for a shirt made in Georgia to make it to Missouri in 1900. The U.S. Constitu- tion has always banned states from regulating trade between states. This amounted to a within United States free-trade

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212 Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?

Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 3 (Summer 1995). See articles by J. David Richardson and Adrian Wood, pp. 57–80.

Krugman, Paul R. “Is Free Trade Passe?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, no. 2 (Fall 1987), pp. 131–144. Any text with a title like International Economics.

Behind the Numbers Country comparisons—

www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html Industry comparisons—

www.trade.gov

agreement. Can we use the experience of the United States between 1900 and 2000 to predict what would happen in world trade if there was free trade across the globe?

Talk about This Simple trade theory suggests that a country should not import and export the same good. It should either import the good or export the good, but not both. Reality is that intraindustry trade is common. What might explain this?

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (Fall 1998). See

articles by Dani Rodrik; Maurice Obstfeld; and Robert C. Feenstra and Jeffrey G. Williamson, pp. 3–72.

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C H A P T E R E I G H T E E N

213

International Finance and Exchange Rates Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the importance of international financial transactions in the global economy.

LO2 Discuss how foreign exchange markets work to facilitate trade.

LO3 List the determinants of foreign exchange rates.

LO4 Analyze how alternative foreign exchange systems operate.

Chapter Outline

International Financial Transactions

Foreign Exchange Markets

Alternative Foreign Exchange Systems

Determinants of Exchange Rates

Summary

If you have studied the chapter “International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?,” you know that globalization is one of the central historical facts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the United States alone, as a percentage of GDP, exports have more than doubled and imports have more than tripled. Since 1970, U.S. investment abroad as a percentage of GDP has increased 10-fold and foreign investment in the United States as a percentage of GDP has increased 15-fold. What the previous two sentences imply is that a massive accumulation of trade deficits has resulted in the transition of the United States from the world’s largest creditor nation to the world’s largest debtor na- tion. In addition to discussing the financial implica- tions of increasing trade, increasing American trade deficits, and increasing globalization, this chapter dis- cusses the exchange of the world’s currencies.

International Financial Transactions

In order for international trade to occur, international cur- rencies have to be transacted to allow for that trade. There is almost no barter left in the world. Because of that, there

is no guarantee that the value of what is imported will equal the value of what is exported. There is also no guar- antee that the amount of money Americans invest abroad will equal the amount of money others invest in America. To understand international finance, you have to begin with three basic accounting concepts: balance of trade, current account balances, and capital account balances.

When Americans buy iPads, though the iPad is made by an American-owned company, Apple, it is assembled in China, with components manufactured in several coun- tries. We will wait to talk about currency exchanges until the next section, but we know that the Chinese company needs yuan, the currency of China, in order to pay its employees. Ignoring that detail for the moment, suppose that there is American currency, say $100,000,000, that has left the United States. Whoever ends up with that $100,000,000 can buy things that are made in the United States: They can buy financial assets, like U.S. govern- ment debt; they can buy physical assets that remain in the United States, like land, buildings, or manufacturing fa- cilities; or they can simply hold on to the cash. This latter option is rarely chosen unless the holder lives in a country where the dollar is a better form of money than the home currency, or the holder is engaged in an internationally

gue46399_ch18_213-221.indd 213 16/03/17 11:55 AM

214 Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates

illegal activity where holding cash makes them less trace- able. In short, that $100,000,000 has to return to the United States somehow. The “how” is the key question.

Table 18.1 lays out the balance of payments, the accounting system for how money moves between countries to facilitate the purchase of goods, ser- vices, financial instruments, and physical investments. What “balances” with the balance of payments is the current ac- count and the capital account. The current account represents the impacts of trade, short- term investment payments, and American payments of foreign taxes, foreign payments of American taxes, and the net transfer of private money. This latter item is most often seen when migrant workers send

money home to their families who live outside the United States. As you can see, mostly because of the enormous trade deficit, there is a massive current ac- count deficit of $470 billion.

Over time the current account and the balance of trade mirror one another quite closely. Figure 18.1 maps both as a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2010. For all but one of the last 33 years, the balance of each has

been negative. The exploding trade deficits of the 1990s and the 2000s can be seen as trade and current account deficits that had reached previous records in the middle 1980s and grew to in excess of 5 percent of GDP from

2003 to 2008. Both of these def- icits fell rapidly during the re- cession as Americans cut import demand signficantly.

The capital account repre- sents the changes in holding of longer-term financial and

balance of payments The accounting system for how money moves between countries to facilitate the purchase of goods, services, financial instruments, and physical investments.

current account The portion of the balance of payments ac- counting that represents the impacts of trade, short-term investment payments, and American payments of foreign taxes, foreign payments of American taxes, and the net transfer of private money.

Major Accounting Item Sub Accounting Item Sub Accounting Component Component Amount

Sub Accounting Balance Balance

Current Account Balance of trade Exports 3,306,574 −389,526 −277,636

Imports 3,696,100

Balance of short-term investment income

Income to the United States 816,445 231,076

Payments from the United States

585,369

Net Transfers (taxes, private payments) −119,186

Capital Account Change in the ownership of assets

U.S.-owned assets abroad 792,145 185,276 277,636

Foreign-owned assets in the United States

977,421

Financial derivatives net −54,372

Statistical discrepancy & net derivatives 146,732

TABLE 18.1 Balance of payments, United States, 2012 ($ millions).

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/international

2.00

0.00

–2.00 –1.00

1.00

–6.00 –5.00 –4.00 –3.00

–7.00

P e

rc e

n ta

g e

o f

G D

P (%

)

Current account (surplus/deficit)/GDP

Balance of trade/GDP

19 60

19 84

19 75 19

78 1 9

8 1 19

72 19

69 19

66 19

63 19

87 19

90 19

93 19

96 19

99 20

08 2 0

1 1 20

14 20

05 20

02

FIGURE 18.1 Current Account and Balance of Trade as a Percentage of GDP (1960–2014).

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/international

capital account Represents the changes in holding of longer- term financial and physical assets by citizens of one country in another country.

gue46399_ch18_213-221.indd 214 16/03/17 11:55 AM

Foreign Exchange Markets 215

so at a local store, the $500 goes several places. The first place it goes is to the store owner, who uses some of it to pay employees and other business expenses, and some to pay Apple. The rest is profit. Apple Inc. contracted with a company in China (Foxconn) to assemble the iPad from parts made all over the world and here is where the issue of foreign exchange comes up. Those in China want to be paid in their own currency called the yuan (to say “yuan,” say “u-wan,” which is also known by its other name, the “renminbi”).

Let’s look at this U.S. dollar-for-yuan exchange. Figure 18.3 looks like any ordinary supply and demand diagram except that the labels are more confusing. The confusion stems from the fact that in a typical market you are exchanging a form of currency for a good or a service. Here you are exchanging a form of currency for another form of currency. In this particular case the demand for yuan is also the supply of U.S. dollars, and the demand for U.S. dollars is really the supply of yuan. The price is confusing. Typically the price is quoted in terms of dollars per unit of the good. Here it is U.S. dollars per unit of yuan. It could just as easily be yuan per unit of U.S. dollars. For this reason we have renamed the curves using somewhat roundabout language.

The vertical axis of Figure 18.3 is labeled “Yuan to U.S. dollar” because it is the number of U.S. dollars that must be given up to get a quantity of yuan. The horizontal axis is the amount in yuan exchanged. What would normally be called a demand curve is the “curve that represents the willingness of those who have U.S. dollars to trade them for yuan.” It is downward sloping because people would be less willing to trade their U.S.

physical assets by citizens of one country in another country. The most significant elements of this are the amount of foreign investment in the United States and the amount of investment by Americans in other coun- tries. Recall that when iPads are sold, the holders of dol- lars have to do something with the money. For the most part, they buy U.S. financial and physical assets. The balance of the capital account, plus or minus a statistical discrepancy, is the opposite of the balance of the current account.

As can be seen in Figure 18.2, the globalization of asset holding has grown markedly. From less than a percentage point of GDP for much of the 1960s to 10 to 15 times those levels today, the international ownership of finan- cial and physical assets is quite clearly a sign of the times. Figures 18.1 and 18.2 are directly related in that the level of the current account deficit line in Figure 18.1 is the difference between the two lines in Figure 18.2.

The other feature of Figure 18.2 that is worth noting is that though the economy recovered from the Great Recession, the financial turmoil it caused continues to be reflected in these international transactions with ex- traordinary fluctuations in the annual changes in invest- ment positions.

Foreign Exchange Markets

To understand the importance and the complexity of dealing with foreign exchange, consider the simple act of buying a low-end iPad. When you plunk down $500 or

18.00

14.00

10.00 12.00

16.00

2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00

–4.00 –2.00

0.00

A n

n u

al in

ve st

m e

n t

as a

% o

f G

D P

U.S.-owned assets abroad Foreign-owned assets in the United States

19 60

19 84

19 75

19 78

19 81

19 72

19 69

19 66

19 63

19 87

19 90

19 93

19 96

19 99

20 08 20

11 20

14 20

05 20

02

FIGURE 18.2 Foreign purchases of U.S. assets and U.S. pur- chases of foreign assets as a percentage of GDP (1960–2014).

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov/international

A curve that represents the willingness of those who have U.S. dollars to trade them for yuan

A curve that represents the willingness of those who have yuan to trade them for U.S. dollars

Equilibrium exchange rate

Quantity of yuan

Price of yuan in U.S. dollars

FIGURE 18.3 Yuan to U.S. dollar.

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216 Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates

dollars for yuan if they had to give up more U.S. dollars to do it. What would normally be called a supply curve is the “curve that represents the willingness of those who have yuan to trade them for U.S. dollars.” It is upward sloping because people would be more willing to trade their yuan for U.S. dollars if they could get more dollars from them.

Going back to our iPad example, this simple pur- chase involves a number of different currencies that must be exchanged because the components are pro- duced throughout Asia. If currency exchange is as easy as going to the bank with a $20 bill and asking for 20 $1

bills, then foreign exchange is not an obstacle to trade. In most of the Western world, it is a relatively simple proposi- tion for a corporation to get the

currencies it needs. There are foreign exchange markets in all large cities that have stock markets. If you need a special permit to exchange currency, however, the transaction is far more cumbersome. Moreover, if that special permit is given only to those who support the ruling party, the ease of trading ranges from difficult to nearly impossible. Who gets hurt by such obstacles to trade? Lots of people. With too many barriers your iPad either will not be manufactured or will cost much more. You will be forced to choose to pay more or to do without it. The store owner will lose profit and the store salesperson will lose commissions. The distribu- tor, Apple, and the Chinese worker will be hurt too; one will not make a sale; the other will not have a job.

In most places in the world, exchange rates are like any freely traded asset. The price, or in this case the exchange rate, changes over time. A look at Figure 18.4

foreign exchange The conversion of the currency of one coun- try for the currency of another.

1.70

U.S. dollar per euro

U.S. dollar per British pound

Japanese yen per U.S. dollar

Chinese Yuan per U.S. dollar

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

Ye n

/D o

lla r

Y u

an /D

o lla

r

D o

lla rs

/E u

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o lla

rs /B

ri tis

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o u

n d

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8.00

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1.60 1.50 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.10

1.00 0.90 0.80

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00 7

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20 11

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01 3

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01 4

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01 5

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01 6

FIGURE 18.4 Exchange rates between the dollar and four major currencies.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist

gue46399_ch18_213-221.indd 216 16/03/17 11:55 AM

Alternative Foreign Exchange Systems 217

shows the exchange rate between the dollar and other key currencies around the world. As the previous sec- tion suggested, any exchange rate between any two currencies can be expressed either as the amount of country A’s currency you need to buy one unit of coun- try B’s currency, or vice versa. They are commonly expressed in both ways, as they are in Table 18.2, but there are times when a conventional method of expres- sion dominates. For instance, the yen–dollar exchange rate is almost always expressed in terms of the number of yen it takes to get a dollar, whereas the dollar–pound exchange rate is typically expressed the other way. There is no functional difference, as one is always the reciprocal of the other.

A strengthening of the dollar relative to the currency in each graph is shown as a decrease in the dollar per other currency line and an increase in the other currency per dollar line. So between July 2008 and November 2008 the dollar strengthened relative to the euro and pound and weakened relative to the yen.

It is important to note that the Chinese government does not let its currency move at the whim of market forces. It was not until 2005 that the Chinese let their currency move, and even then it was only slowly, and not nearly as fast as free market forces would have had it move.

In 2010 China began a slow process of letting the yuan float with other currencies in a managed way. In 2015 and early 2016, the yuan actually began decreasing in value as the slowdown in the Chinese manufacturing economy began to impact exchange rates.

Alternative Foreign Exchange Systems

Throughout modern history, currencies have been ex- changed in order to facilitate trade. During that time there have been three models for setting those exchange rates. As suggested by Figure 18.4, most exchange rates are determined by market forces. An increase in the de- mand for a currency will strengthen it relative to another currency. While this is the system that dominates today, it has not always been that way and as intimated above with reference to the Chinese yuan, market forces can be controlled by governments.

Though we have already dis- cussed the market, let’s quickly review the role of the market in determining exchange rates. In a floating exchange rate system, there is no government control

floating exchange rate system Foreign exchange rate system where there is no government control over exchange rates.

TABLE 18.2 Exchange rates between several currencies and the U.S. dollar, February 3, 2016.

Source: http://www.x-rates.com/table/?from=USD&amount=1

Foreign Currency

Amount of Currency Needed to Get $1

Amount of U.S. Dollars Needed to Get One Unit of the Currency

Argentine Peso 14.145009 0.070696 Australian Dollar 1.396831 0.715906 Bahraini Dinar 0.377095 2.651852 Botswana Pula 11.482067 0.087092 Brazilian Real 3.894941 0.256743 British Pound 0.685333 1.459145 Bruneian Dollar 1.414138 0.707144 Bulgarian Lev 1.76236 0.567421 Canadian Dollar 1.378635 0.725355 Chilean Peso 704.795996 0.001419 Chinese Yuan Renminbi 6.575946 0.152069 Colombian Peso 3373.5 0.000296 Croatian Kuna 6.91826 0.144545 Czech Koruna 24.383567 0.041011 Danish Krone 6.734442 0.14849 Emirati Dirham 3.673 0.272257 Euro 0.902379 1.108182 Hong Kong Dollar 7.794381 0.128298 Hungarian Forint 281.001131 0.003559 Icelandic Krona 129.49 0.007723 Indian Rupee 67.828047 0.014743 Indonesian Rupiah 13735.33119 0.000073 Iranian Rial 29950 0.000033 Israeli Shekel 3.938317 0.253916 Japanese Yen 118.041073 0.008472 Kazakhstani Tenge 370 0.002703 Kuwaiti Dinar 0.30165 3.3151 Latvian Lat 0.634192 1.57681 Libyan Dinar 1.36 0.735294 Lithuanian Litas 3.115733 0.320952 Malaysian Ringgit 4.174 0.239578 Mauritian Rupee 36.055 0.027735 Mexican Peso 18.169871 0.055036 Nepalese Rupee 108.991944 0.009175 New Zealand Dollar 1.502725 0.665458 Norwegian Krone 8.57476 0.116621 Omani Rial 0.3845 2.60078 Pakistani Rupee 104.85 0.009537 Philippine Peso 47.875 0.020888 Polish Zloty 3.989091 0.250684 Qatari Riyal 3.6409 0.274657 Romanian New Leu 4.07219 0.245568 Russian Ruble 76.709769 0.013036 Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.74962 0.266694

(Continued )

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218 Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates

Foreign Currency

Amount of Currency Needed to Get $1

Amount of U.S. Dollars Needed to Get One Unit of the Currency

Singapore Dollar 1.414138 0.707144 South African Rand 15.925171 0.062794 South Korean Won 1201.51151 0.000832 Sri Lankan Rupee 144.153287 0.006937 Swedish Krona 8.452912 0.118302 Swiss Franc 1.006031 0.994005 Taiwan New Dollar 33.29 0.030039 Thai Baht 35.695587 0.028015 Trinidadian Dollar 6.4202 0.155758 Turkish Lira 2.915752 0.342965 Venezuelan Bolivar 6.305 0.158604

remained constant for an extended period of time. In that system, depicted in graph A of Figure 18.5, an increase in demand for yuan must be met immediately with an increase in the supply of yuan by the Chinese govern- ment. That is not difficult for a country to maintain. It can always print more of its own currency. Graph B shows the opposite problem. Were the demand for yuan to decrease, the Chinese government would have to re- duce the supply of its own currency. This can be done by its supplying the necessary dollars to buy the yuan, or as graph B shows, pulling yuan out of the system, typically through exchanging other currencies or gold. If, once again, you focus on Figure 18.4 you note that from early 2006 to early 2009, the Chinese government let the yuan strengthen in value from 8 yuan to the dol- lar to a new set level of 6.8 yuan to the dollar. It has subsequently been allowed to strengthen to 6.5 yuan to the dollar. The Chinese government is clearly engaging in market transactions to ensure that the yuan does not become so strong that it eliminates the cost advantages that Chinese firms have in producing goods for the U.S. market. Many economists would consider this currency manipulation.

The third alternative is a managed float exchange rate system. In this system governments decide the range of exchange rates they will allow the market to create, and act only when either the top end or the bottom end of that range is breached. In this circum- stance the government need not

change the supply of its currency by the amount nec- essary to bring about the target exchange rate. It must only do enough to bring it back into the desired range. Graphs C and D work exactly like graphs A and B ex- cept that the government(s) managing the exchange rate must increase or decrease the supply of the cur- rency by a smaller amount so as to maintain the desired range.

In post–World War II history the world has seen its major currencies exchanged in all three fashions. As we indicated above, immediately after World War II the fixed exchange rate system dominated. The system became untenable in the early 1970s, and from that point to today, the system has been mostly a floating ex- change rate system with periods of managed float when exchange rates changed too markedly for politicians to stomach.

over exchange rates. The market for various currencies is determined solely by the forces of supply and demand. Shifts in the curves from Figure 18.3 are determined by the factors outlined in the next section. That is, trade im- balances, differences in real interest rates, and changes in the relative safety of investments in the two countries will cause changes to exchange rates.

We now turn our attention to the system that was common between World War II and the early 1970s. One of the perceived ills of the exchange rate system of the 1920s and 1930s was that, because it was deter- mined by markets, it created uncertainty for traders. In the days before options markets (where traders could lock in exchange rates for the future), the concern was that uncertain exchange rates dampened trade and that

dampened trade was bad for the world economy. As a result, after World War II a fixed ex- change rate system was enacted. Under a fixed exchange rate system, the country (or group of countries) that wishes ex- change rates to be fixed relative to other countries’ currencies must stand ready to purchase or sell its currency in exchange for foreign currencies or gold

so that any excess demand or excess supply is immedi- ately eliminated. (The gold standard is simply one way in which a country can achieve a fixed exchange rate.) For instance, if you look at the yuan–dollar exchange rate from Figure 18.4, you note that the exchange rate

fixed exchange rate system Foreign exchange rate system whereby the country (or group of countries) must stand ready to purchase or sell its currency in exchange for foreign currencies or gold so that any ex- cess demand or excess supply is immediately eliminated.

managed float ex- change rate system Foreign exchange rate system whereby govern- ments decide the range of exchange rates they will allow the market to create, and act only when either the top end or the bottom end of that range is breached.

TABLE 18.2 (Continued )

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Determinants of Exchange Rates 219

A decrease in the desire of either to have U.S. dol- lars will weaken the U.S. dollar, causing the price of yuan—the U.S. dollar-to-yuan exchange rate—to rise. So what specific factors determine the desirability of various currencies?

The first and typically most important factor for ex- change rates is the trade imbalance between the two coun- tries. The United States has a significant trade deficit relative to China. If the yuan and dollar are determined in markets (and we know from the above discussion of exchange rate systems they are not), the yuan will strengthen relative to the dollar. This is because there will be more dollars in the foreign exchange markets going after yuan.

The second factor influencing exchange rates is the relative real interest rate being offered on investments in the two countries. This combines two ideas, because the real interest rate is the difference between nominal in- terest and expected inflation. If inflation is expected to be the same in the two countries, because investors will seek the maximum return on their investment regardless

Determinants of Exchange Rates

Recall from our discussion of supply and demand in Chapter 2 and from our discussion of aggregate supply and aggregate demand in Chapter 8, we presented the models and then presented the reasons why each of the curves might shift. We need to replicate that here except that we need to remember that there really is no distinc- tion between supply and demand, so we will look at the factors that will strengthen or weaken an exchange rate. Since each exchange rate applies only to the two countries involved, the factors are expressed relative to one another.

So returning to our discussion of the U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan, the dollar can get stronger or weaker relative to the yuan if either the desire of yuan holders to acquire U.S. dollars changes or the desire of U.S. dollar holders to acquire yuan changes. An increase in the desire of either to have U.S. dollars rather than yuan would strengthen the U.S. dollar, causing the price of yuan—the U.S. dollar-to-yuan exchange rate—to fall.

Price of yuan

in dollars

D1

S1 S2

D2

Yuan* Yuan

ERfixed

A

C

B

D

Price of yuan

in dollars

D1

S1 S2

D2

Yuan* Yuan

ERtarget

ERceiling

ERdoor

Price of yuan

in dollars

D1

S1

S2

Yuan* Yuan

ERtarget

ERceiling

ERdoor

D2

Price of yuan

in dollars

D2

S2 S1

D1

Yuan* Yuan

ERfixed

FIGURE 18.5 Alternative exchange rate systems.

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220 Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates

of where that happens, they will seek the currency of the country with the highest interest rate. As a result, the currency of the country with the higher interest rate will strengthen relative to the one with the lower interest rate. If the interest rates of the two countries are the same, the country with the lower anticipated rate of inflation will see its currency strengthen relative to the country with the higher anticipated inflation rate.

The third factor is the relative safety of assets held in a particular country. This is why the dollar nearly always strengthens in times of international strife. The U.S. government, though in significant debt, holds the distinction of being the one government that has paid

every debt it has ever incurred. Being a haven for in- ternational investors seeking safety means that the dol- lar strengthens even when strife was triggered in the United States. The dollar strengthened slightly in  the wake of 9/11 and strengthened mightily relative to the euro and pound during the fall 2008 financial crisis (which started in, but was not confined to, the United States). There was also a relatively short-lived strength- ening of the dollar during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010. This occurred despite the United States having its own debt issues because investors were more concerned about the euro-denominated debt of Spain, Greece, and Ireland.

Summary For foreign trade to exist, currencies must be traded. Whenever trade between two countries is not balanced, the money that is not returned to the country maintain- ing a trade deficit will have to return eventually and will be used to buy assets in that country. As a result, trade balances, which are augmented by short-term invest- ment flows, will be balanced by longer-term asset own- ership exchanges. In this way the current account and capital account balance. The United States runs a large trade deficit and as result runs a large current account

deficit. This is balanced by a substantial capital account surplus. The markets in which these currencies are ex- changed can be allowed to function freely and without government intervention, or they can be managed by governments to maintain either fixed exchange rates or exchange rates within an acceptable range. Whether a currency is strong or weak typically depends on the trade balance between the two countries, the relative inflation rates, the relative interest rates, and the rela- tive safety of investments in the countries.

During the 2012 presidential election, there was political bom- bast on several issues, but one of the issues where both sides were in agreement was that “we” needed to get tough on Chi- nese currency manipulation. Is there evidence that the Chinese manipulate their currency? Of course, there is. That is what hap- pens when you have a fixed exchange rate system. You pick your desired exchange rate and you manipulate the market by buying and selling your currency in exchange for some other currency (or gold) in an attempt to achieve your desired exchange rate. In order to maintain the 6.22 yuan per dollar exchange rate, the Chinese have had to print more of their currency to sell into the market than they would otherwise have to print to maintain a functioning economy.

However, the United States is hardly innocent of the same charge. The United States has weakened its currency relative to every other currency by the unprecedented monetary policy of the Great Recession era (2008–2013). This can be seen most clearly in the upper right graph of Figure 18.4, which maps the value of the dollar relative to the value of the Japanese yen. From its peak in 2008, the dollar had been worth 110 yen. By early 2012, the dollar was only worth 76 yen. This made Japanese exports to the United States much less competitive, and by that time the Japanese had tired of it and began a manipulation to counter the U.S. monetary policy. In so doing, they raised the exchange rate (by weakening the yen) to 96 yen to the dollar by March 2013.

The lesson here is that the charge of currency manipulation can be hurled at many countries, the United States included.

A R E T H E C H I N E S E M A N I P U L A T I N G T H E I R C U R R E N C Y ? A R E W E ?

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Summary 221

Key Terms

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain why the current account and the trade bal-

ance are so closely aligned. 2. Explain or illustrate why it is that if $1 will buy you

.8€ that 1€ must equal $1.25. 3. If you had $1,000 and wanted to get the most for it

and you believed that the dollar would get weaker relative to the yen by 10 percent and that you could earn 5 percent in the United States and only 1 percent in Japan, show that you would still want to invest in a yen-denominated asset.

4. If you were a U.S. politician seeking to strengthen the dollar, how might you accomplish that, and what would the consequence be of the attempt?

Behind the Numbers Exchange rates.

Current: www.x-rates.com Historical: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist

Balance of trade, current account, and capital accounts www.bea.gov/international

balance of payments capital account current account

fixed exchange rate system floating exchange rate system foreign exchange

managed float exchange rate system

Quiz Yourself 1. What two numbers “balance”?

a. The current account and exports b. The capital account and the current account c. Exports and imports d. Short-term investment income and short-term

investment payments 2. From one country’s perspective a strong currency is

a. always good. b. always bad. c. good for some people and bad for others.

3. The dollar to yuan exchange rate will equal a. the yuan to dollar exchange rate. b. the reciprocal of the yuan to dollar exchange

rate. c. the yuan to euro exchange rate. d. the square of the yuan to dollar exchange rate.

4. If one country determines it wants a fixed exchange rate with another a. it can do nothing on its own but must have the

cooperation of the other country. b. it only needs to announce its desired exchange

rate, and that will result. c. it must stand ready to purchase or sell its own

currency in the market to maintain the exchange rate.

5. An increase in the expected inflation rate in one country will a. strengthen its currency. b. weaken its currency. c. have no impact on the exchange rate between its

currency and other currencies.

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222

European Debt Crisis Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Understand that the creation of the euro integrated monetary policy across member nations without effective integrating fiscal policies.

LO2 Understand that the integration of the monetary systems in the European Union allowed for the influx of relatively cheap capital into poorer European nations.

LO3 Understand that the causes of the Irish and Spanish crises differed markedly from the Italian and Greek crises.

LO4 Understand that the policies that the United States used to mitigate the Great Recession were largely unavailable to those European nations faced with crises.

LO5 Understand that the exit of individual countries from the euro could have set off a Europe-wide banking crisis had it occurred during the crisis.

Chapter Outline

In the Beginning There Were 17 Currencies in 17 Countries

The Effect of the Euro

Why Couldn’t They Pull Themselves Out? The United States Did

Is It Too Late to Leave the Euro?

Where Should Europe Go from Here?

Summary

From late 2008 through all of 2016 (and perhaps be- yond), the world economy was either in free fall or recovering at a painfully slow rate. The United States experienced the Great Recession (the subject of Chapters 13 and 14) and experienced an extraor- dinarily weak recovery (the subject of Chapter 15). Meanwhile China’s growth slowed and Europe stum- bled from one crisis to the next. In the process, there was a constant threat that Europe’s troubles would/ could drag the world into another, perhaps even deeper, global recession. This chapter explores the causes of Europe’s problems during this period by going back to the scene of the crime—the creation of the euro. The chapter continues with an analysis of the impact of the euro’s creation on housing markets in Ireland and Spain and on the borrowing habits of Italy and Greece. The chapter then describes why the existence of the euro made it very difficult for governments in the most

hard-hit countries to recover and why there is so much disagreement over the austerity policies many coun- tries were compelled to employ to secure the help of healthier European economies. The chapter concludes by recognizing that some countries may be better off in the future if they leave the euro, and those countries that remain with that currency may be better off if the weaker ones do leave.

In the Beginning There Were 17 Currencies in 17 Countries

After World War II when country borders were redrawn by the allied powers, each of the countries of Europe reestablished their individual currencies. Germany had the mark; France had the franc; Italy had the lira; Greece had the drachma; and so on. Very quickly it became clear to the various governments that the European

C H A P T E R N I N E T E E N

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The Effect of the Euro 223

The Effect of the Euro

The effect of the creation of the euro and these provisions was that the poorer members, some southern European countries, in particular, saw relatively rapid growth. As can be seen in Figure 19.1, growth in Ireland, Spain, and Greece exceeded that of the euro area and the United States from 2001 through 2007.

As can be seen in Figure 19.2, there was and is a considerable discrepancy between the per capita GDP of these countries. With the European Union-27 mem- ber nations indexed as 100, the interpretation of the data below is that in 2001 Greece had a per capita GDP 50  percent lower than the Netherlands and Germany. Spain was 15 percent poorer than Germany.

That these countries were growing faster than the richer countries promoted considerable lending to poorer member countries largely because interest rates to poorer member countries converged to the already low rates of the richer member countries. This was because investors believed that a loan to a euro-member country or a fi- nancial institution in a euro-member country was largely the same regardless of whether that nation was relatively rich or poor. As can be seen in Figure 19.3, the interest rates on 10-year government debt were, during the pe- riod from 2001 to 2007, largely identical across Europe’s largest governments.

These low interest rates and the relatively attractive weather of Ireland and Spain generated housing bub- bles in those two countries that were even more inflated than those in the United States. Figure 19.4 shows that, between 2000 and 2009 and relative to the first quarter in 2000, housing prices doubled in the United States, but increased by 125 percent in Spain and by 150 per- cent in Ireland. The sources of those mortgage loans, however, differed. In the United States, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought and securitized mortgages as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In Europe, the in- strument was the “covered bond.” In that method, the loans remained with the originating banks (unlike in the United States where the originating bank sold the mortgages within days) and then sold bonds that were backed by those mortgages. As a result, a bank in the United States that did not purchase MBS for its own portfolio could have largely escaped the housing cri- sis. In Europe, however, any bank that made the loans and any financial institution that purchased the covered bonds were vulnerable to this crisis. In both Ireland and Spain, the bursting of the housing bubble severely damaged banks in those countries but also threatened

economies would recover more quickly with a free- trade union allowing freight to travel between the coun- tries without having to stop at each border crossing. In 1958 the European Union’s predecessor, the European Economic Community, was created to establish travel and trade rules throughout the member nations.1 Through the years, the movement for European integra- tion intensified, culminating in a series of referendum votes in the 1990s approving the Maastricht Treaty that created a common currency for 16 countries.2 The cur- rency was in use in financial markets only from 1999 to 2001 and has circulated as the currency of the member states since.

By joining the euro, countries gave up a major sym- bol of their sovereignty, their currency. They also gave up the ability to use monetary policy (described in Chapter 10) as individual countries because they had to cede that authority to the European Central Bank (the counterpart to the United States’ Federal Reserve). It was for these reasons that some European Union nations, most notably the United Kingdom, refused to join. The transition process was remarkably smooth. Bank bal- ances were converted from home currencies to euro-de- nominated balances at specified rates, and actual paper and coin currency was recalled and exchanged. This typically occurred when businesses would deposit their local currency at local banks. At that time they would receive credit for those deposits in euros.

Several other provisions of the Treaty on the Func- tioning of the European Union were put in place to avoid the kind of economic catastrophe that we have seen in Greece and Spain. One such provision, Article 126, was that countries were required to maintain a deficit- to-GDP ratio of less than 3 percent and work to a debt- to-GDP ratio of less than 60 percent. Another, Article 123, stated that the European Central Bank could not purchase member nation debt. A third, Article 125, pro- hibited bailouts of one country by the union or by any member state unless it was viewed as necessary to avoid a systemic financial collapse of the entire union.

1 Current members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Bold = original members 2 There are now 17 countries that are part of the currency union. They are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Estonia joined in 2010 and was not part of the original 16. Further, mil- lions more live in countries with currencies whose value is pegged to the euro.

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224 Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis

FIGURE 19.1 GDP growth in euro countries and the United States.

Source: European Central Bank, www.ecb.int/stats/html/index.en.html

Euro area (changing composition) Ireland

Greece France Netherlands United States GermanySpain United KingdomItaly

8

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

2

0

–2

4

6

–10

–8

–6

–4

Euro area (17 countries) Ireland

Greece France Netherlands United States GermanySpain United KingdomItaly

160

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

130

120

110

140

150

70

90

80

100

FIGURE 19.2 Per capita GDP across Europe and the United States relative to EU-27.

Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 224 16/03/17 11:57 AM

The Effect of the Euro 225

FIGURE 19.3 Long-term interest rates.

Source: European Central Bank, http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu

25

20

15

30

35

5

0

10

GreeceGermany Ireland

FranceSpain

United KingdomNetherlands Italy

Ja n-

01

Ju n-

01

No v-

01

Ap r-0

2

Se p-

02

Fe b-

03

Ju l-0

3

De c-

03

M ay

-0 4

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M ar

-0 5

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8

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08

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-0 9

O ct

-0 9

M ar

-10

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10 Ja

n- 11

Ju n-

11

No v-

11

Ap r-1

2

Se p-

12

Fe b-

13 Ju

l-1 3

De c-

13

M ay

-14

O ct

-14

M ar

-15

Au g-

15

FIGURE 19.4 Housing prices in Spain, Ireland, and the United States.

Sources: www.statcentral.ie; www.standardandpoors.com

250

200

150

300

350

0

50

100

20 00

Q 1

20 00

Q4

20 01

Q 3

20 02

Q2

20 03

Q 1

20 03

Q4

20 04

Q3

20 05

Q2

20 06

Q 1

20 06

Q4

20 07

Q3

20 08

Q2

20 09

Q 1

20 09

Q4

20 10

Q 3

20 11

Q 2

20 12

Q 1

USIreland Spain

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 225 16/03/17 11:57 AM

226 Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis

also high. Politically, Italy’s prime minister was a self- aggrandizing, womanizing media mogul with no desire to tackle difficult structural issues such as reforming a pension system for a declining population.

In Greece, the origins were far worse. Its debt was always high and its deficits were worse. If it is possible, they were actually worse than the data show them to be because it is widely believed that the true deficit picture in Greece is worse than they reported to the European Union. This is because tax evasion by individuals and businesses in Greece is so pervasive as to be intractable. Everyone uses as their excuse for cheating on their taxes that others are too and that when others start paying their share, they will too.

Why Couldn’t They Pull Themselves Out? The United States Did

Though the start of the decline in economic activity among powers began in the United Kingdom, it got its first major push in the United States with the collapse of

larger German and French banks because this is where the money originated. Had there been no covering of the Irish and Spanish bonds by German and French banks, there would have been insufficient funds for Irish and Spanish banks to lend to people buying homes in Ireland and Spain and there would have been no housing bubble.

In Italy, the recession and fiscal crisis had a very dif- ferent origin. Italy’s economy is simply and steadily on the decline and has been for some time. In 2000, its per capita GDP was 18 percent higher than the EU-27 av- erage. By 2010, it was at the EU-27 average. That is, on a relative basis, the Italians spent the decade getting poorer. This has structural and political origins. The structural origin was twofold. First, Italy is aging more rapidly than any other major European economy be- cause the birthrate has plummeted for the better part of 40 years. Fewer births translate to fewer workers sup- porting its pension system. Second, it began with a rela- tively high debt. As can be seen in Figure 19.5, the Italian national debt was relatively high for the period prior to the crisis, and its deficits, as shown in Figure 19.6, were

FIGURE 19.5 Debt to GDP.

Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

180

100

80

60

120

140

160

200

0

20

40

GreeceGermany Ireland

Portugal

France

SpainNetherlandsItaly

1 9 9 0

1 9 9

1

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 3

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 5

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

20 00

20 01

20 02

20 03

20 04

20 05

20 06

20 07

20 08

20 09

20 10

2 0 1 1

20 12

20 13

20 14

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 226 16/03/17 11:57 AM

Why Couldn’t They Pull Themselves Out? The United States Did 227

FIGURE 19.6 Deficits to GDP.

Source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home

5

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

–10

–15

–20

–5

0

–35

–30

–25

EU (27 countries) GreeceGermany France Netherlands

Euro area (17 countries)

Ireland Spain United KingdomItaly

the American housing bubble in late 2008. The United States did three big things to counter the impact of the Great Recession: (1) TARP (the bank bailout), (2) acts of monetary policy on an unprecedented scale, and (3) fiscal policy–induced explosions in deficits in the form of Bush and Obama stimulus packages. The United Kingdom and France did the latter; Germany did not. The deficits in Germany in 2009 and 2010 were on the scale of their 2001–2005 deficits, whereas the deficits in the United States and France were two to three times those levels.

As for monetary policy, as Chapters 10, 13, and 14 noted, the Federal Reserve of the United States cre- ated and exercised authority in the area of monetary policy well beyond what any previous Federal Reserve chairperson would recognize. As a result of those actions, interest rates throughout the United States were at or near all-time lows. The Treasury was borrowing money on the short-term market for nearly zero interest. In the long- term market, interest rates were so low that 15-year mort- gages were being offered for less than half of previous 1960s era records. These were directly the result of the Federal Reserve’s purchasing U.S. debt at record rates.

Why did European nations not do the same thing? Sim- ply put, they couldn’t. They couldn’t do so individually

because interest rates were too high, and they couldn’t do so collectively because of the Article 123 provision that prohibited the purchase of member- nation debt by the European Central Bank. Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain did not have any tools of monetary policy, let alone the expanded ones, because just like the state of Maryland doesn’t have its own central bank, neither do individual EU countries.

Further, at its creation, the European Central Bank had one and only one mission—inflation control—and it is governed by the Germans, the Dutch, the French, and the Belgians, who have little interest in generating a threat of inflation for themselves by engaging in mone- tary policy that would help the Greeks, Spanish, Italians, and Irish. To make things worse, the individual coun- try’s governments had limited ability at best to engage in their own version of TARP, though the Irish tried. They would have had to borrow the money to do so and, as can be seen by Figure 19.3, the interest rates they faced on borrowing was prohibitive. Further, and for the same reason, they could not engage in fiscal policy to stimu- late their economies on their own because, again, they would have to borrow the money to do it. The bottom line is that everything the United States did to minimize

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 227 16/03/17 11:57 AM

228 Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis

the impact of the Great Recession was unavailable to the weaker economies of Europe, largely because they had no control over the value of their currency and had no ability to borrow at reasonable interest rates.

Because there was a growing recognition among the Germans and French that their economies were threat- ened by the instability of weaker ones, there was a will- ingness among the Germans and French to help the Greeks, Spaniards, Irish, and Italians. This formal recog- nition of the threat to the EU, generally, allowed for the cross-national bailouts because the systemic risk clauses of Articles 123 and 125 were invoked. For political and economic purposes, though, the Germans and French in- sisted that the weaker economies reform their budgets before they received the assistance. In each case the demand was for spending cuts and tax increases. These austerity policies had consequences. Figure 19.7 shows that unemployment rose everywhere but rose more dra- matically in these weaker economies. Governments laid off employees, cut pensions, and increased taxes.

From a Keynesian economist’s point of view, this is a predictable result of austerity. As can be seen from Figure 19.8, a decrease in government spending and an in- crease in taxes will result in a decrease in aggregate demand. That will result in a decrease in economic activity, and that will result in an increase in unemployment. Austerity could even be self-defeating. The loss of jobs would increase de- mands on the social safety net and decrease tax revenues. Austerity can ultimately lead to a larger deficit if the austere

FIGURE 19.7 Unemployment rates in Europe.

25

20

15

30

0

5

10

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20102009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

EU (27 countries) Greece

Germany France Ireland

Spain United KingdomItaly

actions of budget cuts and tax increases plunge the econ- omy into such a poor state that the impacts on the economy generate larger revenue losses than the deficit reductions resulting from the budget cuts and tax increases.

Is It Too Late to Leave the Euro?

For much of 2011 and 2012, speculation was rampant that Greece would leave the euro. The reasons why Greece would want to leave the euro should now be obvious. If you want to regain the ability to print your own currency

FIGURE 19.8 Result of austerity.

AD

AS

ADʹ

PI

PI*

PIʹ

RGDPʹ RGDPRGDP*

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 228 16/03/17 11:57 AM

Summary 229

either. Thus the threat of a Greek exit both increased the likelihood of a Greek exit and diminished the viability and desirability of a Greek exit. It also made it harder for the rest of Europe to keep them in. The problem was made worse because if the Greeks left, it would be diffi- cult to contain the concerns of Spaniards that their coun- try would be next. That would jeopardize Spanish banks. Spain would topple Italy and, if Italy was toppled, the euro would be a memory. As a result, as difficult as it was to achieve, the Germans and French felt compelled to keep Greece in the euro. It was a mess that only got better very slowly.

Where Should Europe Go from Here?

The irony of the situation is that Greece needed to leave the euro at a time that it could not, and Germany and France needed Greece to be out of the euro but could not allow it to happen out of fear of what the consequences might be.

Though a second collapse has not yet occurred, the European economies have been crawling for the better part of this decade. The EU was in recession through much of 2011 and 2012. Even out-of-recession growth has been anemic. It was not until 2015 that the European Central Bank began to engage in the massive monetary stimulus that the Federal Reserve of the United States had a few years prior. Even with 80 billion euros a month in monetary stimulus and negative interest rates, Europe’s economy only grew at 1.6 percent in early 2016.

All of this economic upheaval led to a political up- heaval in non-euro member Great Britain as it voted to leave the European Union in June 2016. The sentiment growing throughout Europe is that economic and politi- cal integration failed to pay the dividends promised. At this writing (the day after that referendum) it is unknow- able where this will lead.

and engage in monetary policy, you have to have your own currency to do it. Creating their own currency would not be difficult. Getting people to accept it would be dif- ficult. However, if the Greek government were to order all Greek banks to convert euro-denominated accounts into drachma-denominated accounts, the effect would be quick. Though the Greek government could easily issue this order, they would have little power to maintain the value of the drachma, and its value would almost cer- tainly plummet. The inflation in Greece would be dra- matic. From some perspectives, that would be a good thing. That’s because it would operate as an across-the- board tax on everyone. Your 1,000 euro account would have 1,000 drachmas in it, and then the drachma would lose half its value. You would be able to buy about half as much from the rest of Europe as you had been able to buy, and you would look to Greek providers of the goods or services because their drachma-denominated prices would look relatively more attractive. The attractive as- pect of the idea of the “Grexit” (Greek exit from the euro) is that it would fairly quickly stabilize the Greek situation by taxing each Greek by half their wealth as inflation of 100 percent cuts the buying power of wealth in half.

But, alas, it isn’t that easy. Smart Greeks had already anticipated the change. They became convinced that it would eventually happen just this way, so they closed their euro-denominated banks accounts in Greece and took those accounts to other countries. They converted their euros into assets out of the reach of the Greek government. As a result, the only people with any euro-denominated accounts in Greece were those who were either poor (and therefore couldn’t afford to do their banking with a foreign bank) or unaware (and therefore vulnerable).

This bankrupted Greek banks because they simply did not have the euros to pay off their depositors. Under- stand that no American bank could withstand a demand by a large number of its depositors for a cash withdrawal

Summary From late 2008 through all of 2012, the United States experienced and made its way through the Great Re- cession while Europe stumbled from one economic crisis to the next. The origin of European difficulties was in that they created a currency, the euro, thereby unifying their monetary systems without unifying

their fiscal systems. As a result, whether it was Ireland and Spain with housing-bubble-related crises or Italy and Greece with fiscal crises, the challenge for stron- ger EU countries was how to save the euro without the tools the United States used to weather the Great Recession.

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 229 16/03/17 11:57 AM

230 Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis

1. The cause of the European financial crisis had its origins in a. the creation of the euro. b. vast overspending in Germany. c. uncompetitive tax collections in Greece. d. speculative home buying in Belgium.

2. The proximate cause of the Spanish problem was a. vast overspending during the previous decade. b. lax tax collections during the previous decade. c. a burst housing bubble. d. both a and b.

3. The proximate cause of the Greek problem was a. vast overspending during the previous decade. b. lax tax collections during the previous decade. c. a burst housing bubble. d. both a and b.

4. The reason the Greeks didn’t use a plan similar to TARP to save their banks was that a. the Greek Central Bank had no funds. b. the interest rates Greece would have had to pay

on the loans would have been unaffordable. c. banks weren’t a problem in Greece. d. there was no political will in Greece to borrow

that kind of money. 5. The reason the European Central Bank (ECB) didn’t

engage in the kind of expansionary monetary policy that the Federal Reserve did for the United States was that a. the ECB didn’t view the problem as serious. b. the ECB could not raise the capital. c. the provisions of the treaty that created the ECB

did not allow for it to buy the debt of member nations unless there was systemic risk.

d. there was no debt for the ECB to buy. 6. The reason the ECB did not want the Greeks to exit

the euro was that a. Greece was viewed as a valuable member in

temporary distress. b. Greece was viewed as so unimportant that it

did not want the perception that countries were leaving for any reason.

Quiz Yourself c. Greece was a founding member, and political friendships were important to the ECB leaders.

d. Greece was viewed as the first domino in a series of dominos that, if Greece left, it would jeopardize the whole euro system.

Short Answer Questions 1. What should the Maastricht Treaty have included to

allow for an adequate response to the various Euro- pean economic crises?

2. When would be the right time and what would be the correct mechanism for getting a country out of the euro?

3. What would be the problems associated with the ECB being allowed to purchase the debt of member nations?

Think about This For full integration of the European Union, some argue that the nations should be like states of the United States with the central government having limited and enumer- ated powers. What would those powers be?

If Greece is analogous to Mississippi (relatively poor) and Germany is analogous to New York (relatively rich), what is present in the United States that makes it relatively easy for Mississippi to be in the same country as New York that is absent that makes it relatively hard for Greece and Germany to imagine themselves in the same country?

Talk about This The bursting of the housing bubble hit Phoenix and Miami much harder than Dallas/Ft. Worth. Why should the taxpayers of Texas have consented to programs that helped only citizens of Phoenix and Miami? Why, then, should Germans care if the Irish housing bubble caused problems in Ireland?

Behind the Numbers European economic data—http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat European interest rates—http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu

gue46399_ch19_222-230.indd 230 20/03/17 12:30 PM

231

Economic Growth and Development Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Identify why some already developed countries grow faster than others.

LO2 Explain why creating an environment for economic growth in a developing country is a very different and much harder challenge than fostering growth in an already developed country.

LO3 List what legal, political, and institutional factors have historically limited growth in many developing countries.

Chapter Outline

Growth in Already Developed Countries

Comparing Developed Countries and Developing Countries

Fostering (and Inhibiting) Development

Summary

Economists have been trying to figure out economic growth and development for as long as there have been economists. Why, for instance, does a country such as the United States command nearly one-quarter of the world’s yearly economic output while having less than 5 percent of the world’s population? Why did the United States grow faster than France during the last decade? Why can’t sub-Saharan Africa catch an economic break? Why has politically repressed China grown so rapidly for more than a decade, while India, a democracy for de- cades, grew much more slowly? Why has South Korea blossomed from a developing country to a developed one? This chapter is a little bit macroeconomics, a little bit international trade, a little bit government policy, and frankly, a little bit guesswork. Economic development is one of the least well-settled areas of economics in part because even the Nobel Prize–winning models perform poorly.

Let’s start by dividing the question of economic growth and development into two very different ques- tions: Why do already developed countries grow at different rates? Why do underdeveloped countries rarely

reach a point where they can emerge from their meager circumstances?

Growth in Already Developed Countries

If we go back to our Chapter 8 aggregate demand– aggregate supply model, we can begin to think about how already developed countries grow. An economy can grow because of sustained increases in aggregate demand but only when there is a simultaneous sustained increase in aggregate supply. To see why, remember the shape of the aggregate supply curve. It starts out flat, begins to slope upward, and finally becomes vertical. If aggregate sup- ply does not grow, then eventually increases in aggregate demand have no impact on real economic growth be- cause sooner or later we will hit the vertical portion of the aggregate supply curve and real GDP growth will stop. We also learned in Chapter 8 that deflation can be a very dangerous economic circumstance, so without increases in aggregate demand, increases in aggregate supply can conceivably bring a developed economy to

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y

gue46399_ch20_231-237.indd 231 16/03/17 11:59 AM

232 Chapter 20 Economic Growth and Development

and lower prices. Note that the word “harder” was not on the previous list of ways to increase productivity over the long run. People can work harder, but at some point you reach the end of human endurance. Getting more output from workers usually requires providing them with the education, tools, and technology to produce more.

What this means is that the economy can grow or contract in the short run for a variety of reasons mostly having to do with changes in aggregate demand, but the ultimate source of long-term growth in already developed countries is increases in worker productivity. As can be seen from Figure 20.3, from 1990 to 2004 developed countries that experienced higher levels of productivity increases also experienced higher GDP increases. The relationship is not one to one, but it does exist. For these countries, a one percentage point increase in productiv- ity growth is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in per capita GDP growth. Remember that this does not mean that workers have to work longer hours, or that they have to work at a faster pace, or that we need bosses intoler- ant of anything but the bottom line. Increases in worker productivity usually come about because of an increase in the education of workers and an improvement in the tools with which they work.

What feeds the worker productivity engine? Worker productivity is driven by policies that contribute to long-term capital formation and worker education and training. If saving is discouraged and consumption is encouraged beyond that which is sustainable, there is not a plentiful supply of loanable funds. If the benefits from saving money are exorbitantly taxed, then the mo- tivation to save money is diminished. Growth requires

a standstill as deflationary pressures diminish people’s willingness to buy big-ticket items. What this implies is that economic growth over the long term results from increases in aggregate demand caused by sound fiscal and monetary policy (covered in Chapters 9 and 10, re- spectively) and sustained increases in aggregate supply.

What fosters increases in aggregate demand? Again Chapter 8 gives us a clue, but a deceptive one. If we just look at the determinants of aggregate demand and what might be done to increase it, we note we can increase government spending, increase consumer confidence, decrease interest rates, decrease taxes, or weaken the dollar. As Figure 20.1 indicates, each will have the desired impact. The problem is you can- not do these in a sustained fashion. First, we cannot continually decrease interest rates or taxes. Zero is an absolute lower bound for each. We cannot continually increase government spending or eventually deficits will drive up interest rates. Consumer confidence is unlikely to grow without bound. This leads us to the conclusion that the ultimate determinant of economic growth in developed countries is likely to come from the aggregate supply side. Increases in aggregate de- mand simply keep it going.

What fosters increases in aggregate supply? Govern- ment regulation can’t continuously decrease and neither can wages or other input prices. What can continue to increase without bound is worker productivity. Workers, aligned with the right machines and technology, can  al- ways produce more than they produced the previous year if they work smarter, better, and more ef ficiently. When they do, we get the results shown in Figure 20.2: more output

FIGURE 20.1 Increases in aggregate demand.

PI AS

AD

ADʹ

PIʹ

PI*

RGDP* RGDPʹ RGDP

FIGURE 20.2 Increases in aggregate supply.

AS PI

ASʹ

AD

RGDP

PIʹ

PI*

RGDP* RGDPʹ

gue46399_ch20_231-237.indd 232 16/03/17 11:59 AM

Comparing Developed Countries and Developing Countries 233

a healthy capital market on the demand side as well. This means that rates of taxation on the gains from that capital must be at levels so that after-tax returns to businesses are sufficiently motivating for investment. A developed and motivated workforce is also a prereq- uisite to economic growth. Workers must be motivated to get the right amount of education and to then pro- ductively apply that education in the workforce. With moderate marginal tax rates, rates of interest and in- flation, reasonable regulatory policies, a sound educa- tion system, and a sound welfare system that does not overly compensate the unemployed, developed econo- mies will continue to grow.

Comparing Developed Countries and Developing Countries

Besides the obvious, income, what is different about rich and poor countries? Table 20.1 brings this all into stark relief. The countries listed on the top of the table have per capita gross national income (GNI)1 of more than $20,000, while the countries at the bottom of the table have per capita gross national income of less than $2,000. There are some other stark differences that ap- pear on this table. While those at the top of the table gen- erally have a large “middle class,” those at the bottom do

not. The Gini index, a measure of overall income disparity, is gen- erally higher in poorer countries

than richer ones. Those at the top have very little of their GNI coming from agriculture and a significant portion coming from services, while those at the bottom have the reverse. If you go all the way back to Chapter 2’s ref- erence to the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, you will also note that those at the top also tend to be the most economically free, while those at the bottom tend to be classified as the most unfree.

There is also an accounting issue that we need to discuss. In Chapter 6 we noted that real GDP and so- cial welfare are not synonymous. One of the reasons that is true is the existence of the underground econ- omy. Though the primary example in that discussion was the United States, consider the notion of the un- derground economy in a developing country like the Sudan. While many people in the United States engage in a little “cash-on-the-side” business (lawn mowing, babysitting, marijuana buying) where the efforts are not counted, most people in the Sudan make their own clothing, grow or raise their own food, or trade one good or service for another. As a result, whereas the underground economy is 10 percent of the U.S. pro- duction, as much as half a developing country’s econ- omy can be in nonmarket transactions. This is why the comparable figures for each country shown in Table

20.1 are adjusted using the no- tion of purchasing power par- ity. Economists have estimated what it costs to purchase a similar market basket of goods and services in each country and used that to estimate gross national income.

FIGURE 20.3 Annual productivity increases and annualized GDP growth rates (1990–2004).

Netherlands

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0 0.00 0.50 1.00

Annual productivity increase (%)

A n

n u

al G

D P

in cr

e as

e (%

)

1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00

Italy

Switzerland

Germany

Canada

Belgium

UK

Australia Sweden

Greece

U.S.

France Japan

Gini index A measure of overall income disparity.

purchasing power parity Using the cost of a similar market basket of goods across countries to compare an economic variable like gross national income.

1Gross national income modifies gross domestic product by adding in income earned abroad and makes other relatively small adjustments. For the most part GNI is a better number for comparing incomes across development categories.

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234 Chapter 20 Economic Growth and Development

The remainder of this chapter will focus on how a country might move from below the line in Table 20.1 to above it and what might prevent it from doing so. First, we need to appreciate that the challenges for policy makers in developing countries are substantially different and often substantially more difficult than the challenges of devel- oped countries. Those at the top of the table attempt to use sound fiscal, monetary, and regulatory policies within an overarching democratic political structure to foster long- term increases in labor productivity; low levels of infla- tion; moderate levels of taxation; and reasonable labor, safety, and environmental regulations. That is difficult enough, but all too often policy makers in countries at the bottom of the table don’t typically have a political, gov- ernmental, or banking structure to do any of these things. Further, they are faced with choices that go beyond simply

Fostering (and Inhibiting) Development

Modern models of economic development, like the Solow Growth Model, named after its Nobel Prize–winning author, provided the basis for much discussion on this subject of how economies would grow. The central pre- diction of that model, and of many others that it spawned, was that economies would converge in their levels of eco- nomic development. That is, poor countries would grow faster than rich ones to the point where levels of per capita GDP would not differ substantially. Even a brief look at Table 20.1 shows that this has not been the case.2

TABLE 20.1 International comparisons.

Source: The World Bank DataBank, http://databank.worldbank.org

Country Name

2014 Gross National Income per Capita (PPP)

1990–2014 Annualized Rate of per Capita GDP Growth

Distribution of Family Income— Gini Index

GDP—Composition by Sector Inflation Rate (consumer prices) 2014Agriculture Industry Services

Australia 64,540 1.74% 30.3 2.4 27.1 70.5 1.4 Belgium 47,260 1.23% 25.9 0.7 22.1 77.2 0.7 Canada 51,630 1.33% 32.1 1.8 France 42,960 0.98% 30.1 1.7 19.4 78.9 0.6 Germany 47,640 1.37% 27.0 0.7 30.3 69.0 1.7 Greece 0.59% 34.4 3.8 15.8 80.4 −2.2 Japan 42,000 0.78% 37.9 1.6 Korea, Rep. 27,090 4.36% 30.2 2.3 38.2 59.4 0.6 Netherlands 51,890 1.45% 25.1 1.8 21.2 77.0 0.8 Singapore 55,150 3.53% 46.4 0.0 24.9 75.0 0.2 Spain 29,440 1.16% 34.0 2.5 22.4 75.1 −0.4 Switzerland 0.71% 28.7 0.8 26.3 73.0 −0.7 United States 55,200 1.43% 45.0 1.5 United Kingdom 43,430 1.61% 32.4 0.7 21.0 78.4 1.7

Bangladesh 1,080 3.55% 32.1 16.1 27.6 56.3 5.7 Congo, Dem. Rep. 380 −2.38% 21.2 33.2 45.7 1.3 Cote d’Ivoire 1,450 −0.15% 41.5 22.4 21.1 56.5 0.9 Ethiopia 550 3.33% 33.0 41.9 14.7 43.4 11.0 Kenya 1290 0.71% 42.5 30.3 19.4 50.4 7.5 Madagascar 440 −0.79% 47.5 26.5 15.9 57.6 5.7 Malawi 250 1.55% 39.0 33.3 17.0 49.6 20.9 Mozambique 600 4.50% 45.6 25.2 21.1 53.7 3.6 Senegal 1,050 0.74% 40.3 15.8 23.5 60.7 0.1 Tanzania 920 2.09% 37.6 31.5 25.0 43.5 4.7 Uganda 670 3.31% 39.5 27.2 22.0 50.8 2.3

2That is not to say that these models are without value. They provided the basis for much of what we know about economic development, but in all honesty, this is an area of economics for which little consensus exists.

gue46399_ch20_231-237.indd 234 16/03/17 11:59 AM

Fostering (and Inhibiting) Development 235

are all too often corrupt, unstable, or both. Take Ni- geria, for example. Sitting on one of the largest de- posits of oil in the world, its long-standing civil war has prevented it from taking ultimate advantage of its resource. You may be able to get low-wage labor to get the oil out of the ground, but you have to pay bribes to the various warring factions to avoid having your equipment stolen, damaged, or destroyed, and you have to worry about your skilled engineers being kid- napped. Do you locate there or do you attempt to make your money elsewhere?

Corruption Even when a government is stable, the concern that the political leadership will simply take invested property is paramount. Take Uzbekistan, for example. It is also sit- ting on significant oil and natural gas reserves, but its po- litical leadership is so corrupt that you never know from one year to the next whether the leadership will national- ize those assets. Countries such as these have a culture that expects and accepts this type of corruption. Manag- ers coming from the cultures of developed economies are not, for the most part, comfortable investing in countries where bribery is common or expected.

Lack of Independent Central Banking If you look at the list of countries on the top of Table 20.1 and compare them with those at the bot- tom, you will note that the United States, Europe, and the economically successful countries of East Asia all have systems in place to control inflation. As de- scribed in Chapter 10, each has a central bank that sets interest rate policies, and in each case there is a degree of central bank independence from political control. In developing countries these banks are not only not independent, in some cases they do not exist. That means that when there is a central bank, it is often under the control of the ruling party, king, general, or junta. When no central bank exists, banking crises are common. In fact, the United States was without a func- tional central bank for much of the 1800s and saw sev- eral banking crises result.

Without an independent central bank in a developing country, when its ruler wants to print money to build a new palace or to pay soldiers for protection, he or she can and will. There are myriad examples of indepen- dent central bankers fighting inflation at the expense of an elected leader’s popularity. Leaders in countries with democratic traditions and independent central

future consumption versus present consumption, but of future consumption versus present survival.

The Challenges Facing Developing Countries To see why developing countries face such challenges, put yourself in the position of an open-minded company man- ager with a decision to make. Do you locate a manufactur- ing facility in a developed country or a developing country? Your goal, of course, would be to bring as much profit home to the stockholders as possible. You would probably be en- ticed by the low cost of labor and land in the developing country. Hourly wages in developed countries are almost always 5 to 10 times higher and at times 20 to 100 times higher than in a developing one. On the other hand, you would also have to recognize the potential pitfalls.

Low Rates of Basic Literacy It’s hard to find a quality labor force in a developing coun- try because, though wages are low, the typical resident has little formal education. They may not be able to read or do rudimentary mathematics. Without the basic ability to follow written instructions, the workers in the developing country will have to be managed much more closely than workers who can read and follow instructions.

Lack of Infrastructure Second, even if you can adapt your production processes to take advantage of the low-skill, low-wage work- ers, you still do not have the basic financial, physical, or legal infrastructure in place to keep it going. Local banks are necessary for access to credit, and to transmit profits out of the country. They may not exist or may be constrained in their ability to provide the financial services necessary for your business. Roads, bridges, rail lines, and ports are all necessary to transmit goods around the country and around the world. Without an ability to quickly move your finished products to the rest of the world, any cost advantage you had in wages might evaporate because of your inability to move your prod- ucts. Finally, legal protections are necessary for the own- ers of invested property. Whether those protections are based on social conventions, law enforcement, or trust- worthy governments, a social infrastructure protecting investments is necessary for those investments to occur.

Political Instability Trustworthy governments are hard to find in the devel- oping world. This can be because these governments

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236 Chapter 20 Economic Growth and Development

banks understand that the long-term effect of fight- ing inflation is far more important than the short-term benefit that is gained from being able to spend newly printed money.

Inability to Repatriate Profits Your ability to move money out of a country can also be limited by government policies. In many developing countries you can bring as much hard currency (dollars, euros, etc.) into the country as you wish, but you cannot reverse the transaction as easily. So, if you were mak- ing a profit in the currency of the host country, you may not be able to convert that into hard currency. This is less of a problem if you are manufacturing in a develop- ing country for sale in a developed country, but it is a problem if you are selling goods in the developing coun- try and wishing to turn those profits into hard currency. Knowing that, you will be less likely to invest in the de- veloping country.

A Need to Focus on the Basics Developing countries, especially the ones listed in the bottom half of Table 20.1, must focus on the very basic necessities of life. Even a well-meaning government would have a difficult time choosing between expend- ing resources on education or health care or food. The opportunity cost of extra spending on making education more widely available could well be a lack of adequate food or health care for others. With so many people en- gaged in subsistence agriculture, with so little capital with which to work, and with live births per adult woman above five, these countries are not in a position to invest in their future because their present is so bleak.

In addition, health concerns in these countries can be overwhelming. The countries on the bottom of

Table 20.1 are predominantly from sub-Saharan Africa. These countries have been ravaged by HIV/AIDs to such a degree that notions of long-term economic develop- ment have become secondary to survival.

What Works The best examples of countries rising above their 1960s economic status to become newly developed countries are the countries of East Asia. China and South Korea, in particular, have grown at a rather brisk pace for very long. Both got to their present position in different ways. South Korea’s success economically coincided with its liberalization politically, while China’s success occurred while it was relatively unfree politically. It is not just about natural resources either. Though Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have grown almost entirely as a result of enor- mous oil wealth, Japan’s growth through the 1970s and 1980s was despite the fact that it has no natural resources upon which to build.

The basic building blocks for what works tend to begin with education, a low or manageable level of government corruption, and a level of political and financial stability that creates confidence among foreign investors. Coun- tries that have grown have created political and financial stability, have created physical and social infrastructures that generate confidence, and have predictable, if not democratic, governments. Foreign direct investment in China, for example, continues to grow because inves- tors have some degree of confidence that the government will not confiscate their investments and will let them repatriate profits. South Korea’s economy continues to grow because their reaction to the late 1990s Asian fi- nancial crisis created confidence among investors that their banking system could adapt to challenges.

Summary You now understand that economic growth in already developed countries is mostly a function of their abil- ity to increase worker productivity and that economic growth in developing countries is often hampered by the lack of social, political, financial, legal, and economic

institutions that are prerequisite to economic growth. You understand the magnitude of the gap between de- veloped and developing countries and that the countries that have moved from developing to developed did not follow a single path.

Key Terms Gini index Purchasing power parity

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Summary 237

1. For developed economies, sustained increases in ag- gregate demand, absent increases in aggregate sup- ply, will result in a. growth for a while, but ultimately, they will re-

sult in only inflation. b. continuous economic growth. c. deflationary risks. d. a boom and bust cycle.

2. For developing economies, sustained increases in aggregate demand, absent increases in aggregate supply, will result in a. growth for a while, but ultimately, they will re-

sult in only inflation. b. continuous economic growth. c. deflationary risks. d. a boom and bust cycle.

3. In order to sustain economic growth in a developed economy, it is important for a. taxes to continuously decrease. b. government spending to continually increase. c. worker productivity to increase. d. worker productivity to decrease.

4. One of the biggest problems for developing coun- tries is that they all too often a. are ruled by representative democracies. b. are populated by people unwilling to work hard. c. lack the financial, physical, and social infra-

structure to grow. d. indulge in wasteful consumption.

5. For the ruler of a developing country, the opportu- nity cost of a choice to invest in universal education a. is the reduction in health care spending. b. does not exist because food is a necessity. c. is much lower than a similar choice for the ruler

of a developed country. d. cannot be measured.

6. Which advantage does a typical developing country have in attempting to draw foreign investment? a. Very low wages b. Poor education c. Easy profit repatriation d. Independent central banks

Quiz Yourself Short Answer Questions 1. What does Mexico have to do in order to grow eco-

nomically? What does Germany need to do to grow economically? Why are those likely to be different answers?

2. What is the long-term consequence to U.S. eco- nomic growth of having an education system that lags behind that of other countries?

3. What issues will China face if it wants to continue to grow?

Think about This Go to the CIA Factbook web pages cited below and ex- plore the economic statistics of the following countries: Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, and South Africa. Each has a per capita GDP between $3,000 and $15,000 per year. What country in that list do you believe is most likely to move into the class of “developed” countries? That is, which is likely to have its per capita GDP rise the fastest and why?

Talk about This Suppose you had to decide whether or not to invest in formal education for the masses, but the opportunity cost of doing so was reducing health expenditures for the sick and aged. What choice would you make?

Behind the Numbers CIA Factbook 2012—https://www.cia.gov/library

/publications/the-world-factbook/ World Bank—http://data.worldbank.org

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238

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - O N E

NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us? Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Conclude that economists generally believe free trade is better than restricted trade.

LO2 Show how trade agreements facilitate the opening of trade and why such agreements are sometimes necessary.

LO3 Describe the function of NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, and WTO as trade agreements and institutions.

LO4 Evaluate whether trade agreements are working as advertised.

LO5 Enumerate the economic and political concerns that free- trade agreements generate.

LO6 Conclude that, for most economists, trade agreements are good policy.

Chapter Outline

The Benefits of Free Trade

Why Do We Need Trade Agreements?

Trade Agreements and Institutions

Economic and Political Impacts of Trade

The Bottom Line

Summary

One of the central tenets of economic policy during the Clinton administration was that free trade is good for the United  States. The reasoning was that Americans can and routinely do outcompete their international trade partners. The jobs that were gained and the in- creases in living standards from such trade would thus outweigh any losses. The foundation for this argument relies heavily on the theory of international trade

that we addressed in Chapter 17, “International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?”

NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement; CAFTA, the Central America Free Trade Agreement; GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; and the WTO, the World Trade

Organization, are the spearheads of this free-trade policy. The TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, which came under attack by both major-party candidates in the 2016 presi- dential election is an agreement between 12 countries. Though the United States appears to be backing away, the

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

CAFTA The Central America Free Trade Agreement involving the United States and five Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guate- mala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a world trade agreement.

WTO The World Trade Orga- nization, an institution that arbitrates trade disputes.

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Why Do We Need Trade Agreements? 239

Table 21.1 shows that it takes one high-skill U.S. worker to make one HT good, that one high-skill Mexican worker can produce three LT goods, and so on. The suggestion here is that high-skill workers in the United States are more proficient than anyone else at all forms of production and that Mexican low-skill workers are less proficient across the board. The low- skill American worker is assumed to be better at HT production than the high-skill Mexican worker (perhaps because the American is working with better machines), but the two are equal in LT production.

If 100 American low-skill workers were to shift from the production of LT to the production of HT and 120 Mexican workers were to shift from HT to LT, then there would be 50 more HT goods and 300 fewer LT goods produced in the United States. In Mexico there would be 40 fewer HT goods and 360 more LT goods produced. The world (limited in this case to the United States and Mexico) would have a net addition of 10 HT goods and 60 LT goods. Given a fair distri- bution of these gains from trade, each side would be better off.

As a result of the increased competition from Mexican LT firms, the workers in LT firms in the United States would lose their jobs. They would quickly get new jobs in the HT firms, however, as increased demand for American HT goods increases demand for laborers capa- ble of such production. While there are more than a few places where the argument that trade is good for all can be criticized, it remains the basic position of economists. Most economists are convinced that trade provides in- creased standards of living and regardless of how many workers are displaced, they will always be absorbed into the growing industries.

Why Do We Need Trade Agreements?

You may instinctively distrust this economists’ view of trade. You may be asking, “If free trade is so good, why do we need agreements to keep it in place?” The answer is twofold: one economic, the other political.

other countries1 will likely continue their participation. This chapter explains the purposes of each and reviews the arguments for and against them. As a first step we summarize the theoretical argument for free trade. We then explicate some of the details of the several agree- ments just mentioned. Finally, we examine in some detail the effect of these agreements on trade, income inequal- ity, workers’ wages, and environmental health.

The Benefits of Free Trade

The economic benefits from trade are so often assumed to be obvious that economists do not feel the need to explain them. Most noneconomists, however, assume that trade is a zero-sum game that can be characterized by the phrase “your win is my loss.” Nothing could misrepresent trade more thoroughly. Nowhere in the field of economics is there such a discrepancy between what economists know and what noneconomists consider to be the conventional wisdom. If the explanation that follows does not lay out the economists’ argument on the benefits of international trade in sufficient detail, you will find additional infor- mation in Chapter 17, which cover international trade.

Suppose that the United States and Mexico are the only countries in the world and that they produce only two goods: low-tech (LT) and high-tech (HT). Further, suppose that U.S. workers can make both LT and HT more quickly and in greater numbers than Mexican workers. Why would the United States want to trade with Mexico when it can produce both goods itself? To see the possibilities, assume that workers in the United States and Mexico are divided between high skill and low skill and that everyone is fully employed in both countries. To see how effective they are, assume that Table 21.1 repre- sents the number of workers needed to produce specific amounts of each good in each country.

TABLE 21.1 Production of workers: number of workers needed to produce a number of goods.

High Tech Low Tech

High Skill Low Skill High Skill Low Skill

United States 1 produces 1 2 produce 1 1 produces 4 1 produces 3 Mexico 3 produce 1 4 produce 1 1 produces 3 1 produces 1

1 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.

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240 Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?

Strategic Trade Strategic trade policies are poli- cies designed to get more of the benefits from trade in a coun- try than would exist under free trade. On the economic front, there are circumstances under

which a country can increase its share of the free-trade benefits. That is, a country can increase its benefits from trade by putting on tariffs, quotas, and the like; if it does, however, the sum of the benefits from trade to the two trading partners deteriorates.

Although the circumstances under which strategic trade is better for a country than free trade are somewhat complicated, one example might shed some light. Sup- pose a large country is the dominant world player in the production of a particular good and another large country is a much smaller player. The monopoly power of the large company can overwhelm the other country’s small company. Economists have shown that, at least theoreti- cally, the country with the small company can subsidize its exports and increase its profits by more than the sub- sidy. The typical example of this has been the Boeing– Airbus competition in the manufacture of large aircraft. In practical terms, Airbus’s subsidy from France and Britain has been greater than its profits.

Special Interests Whenever there is trade, there are individuals who see themselves as the losers. Typically, these are the folks who are the most visible. When a plant closes in an American town to move production to a facility in an- other country, the job losses from trade are obvious for all to see. The jobs created by trade are more difficult for the average worker to see. As a result, workers left with pink slips become vocal opponents of trade, and those who benefit from it do not see that they benefit from it.

An even greater political problem occurs if the loser from trade has sufficient political strength to convince elected officials that restricting trade is in the officehold- ers’ electoral interest. Again, because many of the benefi- ciaries of free trade—consumers paying lower prices and workers having better jobs—do not see these gains as at- tributable to trade, they are far less vocal in favor of trade. There are two groups whose voices are typically raised in favor of trade, business interests and farmers. As a result, it appears to the political world as though free trade is a battle between workers on one side and big business and farmers on the other. In such a circumstance, though

free trade is rather obviously the better outcome to econo- mists, it is not so obvious to elected officials.

What Trade Agreements Prevent To see how misplaced self-interest can lead to a deteri- oration of trade benefits let’s return to our hypothetical example of trade between Mexico and the United States. If the low-skill, LT workers in the United States fear

that trade will cost their jobs, they can seek a tariff (a tax on imports) or a quota (a limit on imports) from the U.S. govern- ment. Each would raise the price

of imported goods and the former would bring tax rev- enue to the U.S. government. If Mexico does not retaliate by levying its own tariffs or quotas, our exports of HT goods will remain unchanged. This will be good for the United States, but less so than it will be bad for Mexico, and it will be worse for the world as a whole. If Mexico does retaliate, it can make itself better off than if it does not retaliate. It will do so with tariffs or quotas of its own. Again, the degree to which Mexico will make itself bet- ter off is outweighed by the damage done to the United States, which will retaliate further. Soon there will be no gains from trade because there will be no trade.

Trade agreements prevent countries from starting on the slippery slope of trade retaliation. Because a country is better off with free trade than with no trade, free trade wins. The problem is that countries will always be tempted to raise some barriers in hopes no one will retaliate. When countries get into a tariff war and retali- ation is met with more retaliation, not only are any small advantages lost, but all other advantages from trade are lost. Countries thus need trade agreements to keep them- selves from the temptation of creating trade barriers.

The history and politics of trade are somewhat strange. The first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, ran for his first U.S. House seat on a platform that called for high tariffs. Such protectionist trade policy was a staple of Republican political philosophy, and it was exemplified by the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariff law of the 1930s. Not until the 1950s did Republicans begin to change and to embrace free trade, and they did so because their constituents in business argued that they could be more profitable with trade than without it. During the same time, Democrats, the party most identified with labor unions, switched from being the free-trade party to the protectionist party, and they did so because the unions saw trade hurting their members. In 1993, Democratic president Bill Clinton started to move his party back

strategic trade policies Policies designed to get more of the benefits from trade in a country than would exist under free trade.

tariff A tax on imports.

quota A limit on imports.

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Trade Agreements and Institutions 241

to a free-trade position just as some Republicans were moving back to their traditional protectionist position. In 2005, most Democrats in Congress remained sym- pathetic to the protectionist concerns of labor and most Republicans remained free traders. It was in this context that President George W. Bush brought the CAFTA to Congress with an eye toward spreading the idea of free trade throughout the Americas. It passed by one vote.

During the 2008 presidential campaign, then candi- date Obama argued that NAFTA and similar trade pacts should be reopened and renegotiated to provide more protections for labor. In the late stages of that campaign, as the global financial crisis was turning into a global re- cession, President Bush attempted to tie a trade pact with Chile to an automaker rescue package being advanced by congressional Democrats. The rescue package failed Congress, prompting President Bush to use Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) money to assist the auto- makers. In the end the Chilean trade pact failed to gain congressional support. In 2010, President Obama ex- pressed a goal of doubling exports from the United States by 2015. Doing so would require a reduction of trade barriers around the world, and it was with that in mind that in that same year he worked to resolved the concerns he had with a trade agreement with South Korea. That agreement, signed by President Bush, had been held up over concerns President Obama had for the impact that the agreement might have on U.S. auto manufacturers.

Trade Agreements and Institutions

Alphabet Soup The North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, was first proposed by President Ronald Reagan, negotiated by President George Bush (George Herbert Walker), and, after being amended, pushed through Congress and signed by President Bill Clinton. It created a geographical area of free trade in which the United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed to (1) very low tariffs and (2)  procedures whereby some tariffs could remain in place. An impor- tant element in the agreement was a formalized grievance process whereby disputes could be aired.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, is another agreement negotiated across the terms of many presidents. GATT set out the conditions under which sig- natory nations could set tariffs and quotas. GATT came into existence just after World War II, but its most re- cent version, the Uruguay Round, has had the greatest free-trade bent. Even under stretched definitions, GATT

cannot be called a free-trade agreement, but it has moved nations in that direction. In reality it simply makes the rules for tariffs and retaliation more explicit.

The rules of GATT require that retaliation be pro- portional. When in 1999, for example, much of western Europe gave favorable treatment in banana sales to its former colonies, the United States, at the behest of major fruit companies like Dole, retaliated by threatening a tar- iff on European leather goods. Although the connection between bananas and purses is tenuous, it was deemed acceptable retaliation under GATT. It makes sense under GATT because the trade in question is roughly the same. In operational terms GATT is an agreement that says “there are ways you can impose tariffs and other ways you cannot impose them.”

The Uruguay Round also took up the issue of intellec- tual property rights and restrictions. The laws of China, South Korea, and other Asian nations at this time had not recognized the right of people to own ideas the way that copyright and patent laws allowed them to in Western countries. They engaged in copying and selling copy- righted materials like CDs, books, and computer software with impunity. In addition, much to the consternation of the U.S. government and the industries whose markets were affected, many nations whose television and movie industries were unable to compete with Hollywood lim- ited the importing of American shows and movies.

On the issue of copyright infringement, Asian govern- ments promised a crackdown on entrepreneurs’ openly making and selling copies of widely distributed music and software CDs. At one time there were more illegal than legal copies of Windows 95 (the predecessor of Windows XP and 7) in China. It was the position of the United States that this represented a theft from American artists, producers, record companies, and software pro- ducers and, as such, it should be banned. On this issue, GATT recognized copyright infringement as an area wor- thy of tariff retaliation.

Another priority for the United States was the distri- bution of American-made movies and television shows. The American entertainment industry sells its output throughout the world, and shows like Baywatch got very high ratings in Europe during the 1990s. Many countries, however, have “domestic content” rules that require that at least a certain percentage of all movies shown in a theater and programs shown on television be produced (1) in the home country and (2) with domestic actors. The United States objects to these rules because they have the effect of limiting U.S. exports. Even though movies and televi- sion programs represent an important area of American

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242 Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?

export, the final negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1997 did not ultimately resolve this issue in favor of the United States.

One aspect of GATT that did go our way was the power given to the WTO, the World Trade Organization. Until 1997 trade disputes involving countries reverted to no more than “yes, it is fair” versus “no, it is not fair” spats. There were no institutions charged with the task of find- ing the truth in such disputes. The WTO’s job is now to resolve those disputes. Although the WTO has no greater power than to suggest who is in the right and who is not, it is hoped that complaints with and without merit will be separated and that disputes will be resolved more easily.

Are They Working? From the outcomes of NAFTA, GATT, and the WTO, it is hard to tell which side was more wrong in its pre- dictions, those who suggested a “giant sucking sound” would be heard as jobs left the country or those who

suggested a great export employment boom would result. While trade has grown rapidly among the United States, Canada, and Mexico after NAFTA, it had grown rapidly before NAFTA. While some jobs were lost as firms left to go to Mexico, the overall economy created more jobs in a shorter period than at any time in U.S. history. So what was the impact of these agreements?

Take a look at Figure 21.1. In inflation-adjusted terms, exports to, and imports from, both Canada and Mexico have been rising steadily. Whether NAFTA had anything to do with these increases is the question. To investigate that, let’s compare annualized inflation-adjusted rates of growth in trade among the United States, Canada, and Mexico and compare those to similar rates for trade in general. From Table 21.2 we see that inflation-adjusted exports to Mexico were rising at 10.2 percent per year prior to NAFTA and rose at 12.9  percent immediately after NAFTA. Subsequently, exports to Mexico and im- ports from Mexico have been rising at a somewhat faster

FIGURE 21.1 NAFTA trade. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/data/index.html

400,000

300,000 350,000

250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000

0

Year

19 9

0

R e

al m

ill io

n s

($ 2

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9 )

19 9

1

19 9

2

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3

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4

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5

19 9

6

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7

19 9

8

19 9

9

20 00

2 0

0 1

20 02

20 0

3

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4

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15

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14

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13

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2 0

10

20 09

20 0

8

20 0

7

20 06

U.S. imports from MexicoU.S. exports to Mexico

U.S. imports from CanadaU.S. exports to Canada

TABLE 21.2 Percentage of annual real growth rates of U.S. exports and imports, Canada, Mexico, and world.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/index.html

1990 to 1994 1995 to 1998 1999 to 2007 2008 to 2015

U.S. exports to Mexico 10.2% 12.9% 2.7% 3.7% U.S. imports from Mexico 8.2 9.8 5.0 6.8 U.S. exports to Canada 4.3 4.1 2.1 3.0 U.S. imports from Canada 4.9 3.5 3.2 3.8 U.S. total exports 3.5 2.9 3.6 4.9 U.S. total imports 3.3 4.1 4.9 6.7

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Economic and Political Impacts of Trade 243

rate than they have been for the United States with the entire world. The experience with Canadian trade is dif- ferent. Both exports and imports grew at slower rates after NAFTA than prior to it. All trade, and in particular trade within NAFTA, was significantly altered by the 2007–2009 recession, and it remains to be seen whether prerecession patterns resume. However, between 1999 and 2007 worldwide trade was rising at the rate of 5.3 percent per year.

It is also worth noting that it was not until 2011 that NAFTA was indeed fully implemented. The last piece hinged on whether Mexican truckers, driving Mexican- licensed trucks would be allowed on U.S. highways. Though Canadian trucks were allowed to drive on American roads, it had not been the case that Mexican trucks were afforded the same right. The concern among the trucking industry and its main union, the Teamsters, was that they would be forced to compete with companies paying their drivers much less than union wages. While that concern was not dealt with, the president vowed to hold the Mexican trucks themselves to the same safety and inspection standards as U.S. trucks.

The impact that NAFTA has had on jobs is also in dispute. Before the program ended, the U.S. Department of Labor certified more than 100,000 workers as eligible for retraining benefits as a result of NAFTA-induced job losses, but these figures are hotly debated. Some argue that these figures are inflated and represent jobs that would have been lost to non-NAFTA–related competi- tion. Two economists, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffery Schott, estimated the impact in 2005 to be slightly positive, while a well-known think tank opposed to NAFTA, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), estimated that though 1  million jobs were created as a result of the rising exports, 2 million were lost due to more rapidly rising imports. The EPI estimated that this caused a $7.6 billion net drag on employee wages with the hardest hit states being in the industrial Midwest.

Economic and Political Impacts of Trade

Of much greater concern to those objecting to free-trade agreements than its effects on trade in general is its im- pact on workers’ wages, wage inequality, labor treat- ment in general, and the environment. Before we discuss whether worries about these variables have been borne out as a result of the trade pacts we have been discussing, it will be useful to look at them individually to explain the specific concerns.

Average manufacturing wages in the United States are substantially higher than those in Mexico, Canada, and nearly every other nation. If the productivity of workers were the same worldwide, you would expect that cor- porations would move their operations to places where there is cheaper labor. As long as the cost reduction to a company exceeds the increased costs of shipment and as long as there are not any trade barriers, you would expect jobs to leave the United States.

If workers in the United States are more productive but are not sufficiently more productive to make up for the difference in wages, then it is still the case that com- panies will make more money producing elsewhere and importing the goods into the United States. This can be prevented if trade protections are in place to prevent or to at least discourage imports. For the workers whose livelihoods are tied to the exiting industry, it is nearly im- possible to argue that they will not be hurt by free trade. What advocates of free trade suggest is that there are enough gains from trade to finance a retraining program for workers who are displaced.

We need only to look at the number of workers and the quantity of imports in certain industries to get an idea of the magnitude of worker displacement that is involved. Since 1960, industries involved with cars, car parts, steel, electronics, apparel, and textiles have lost significantly to imports. Unfortunately, these industries (with the exception of textiles) provided the best pay- ing low- to semi-skilled jobs around, and their loss con- tributed to one of the main problems of the second half of the 20th century, the lack of employment prospects for people without a college education.2 Using the CPI, real wages for production workers in the United States have fallen since 19703 while wages for high-skill work- ers increased. This increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots has increased the tension concerning trade tremendously.

Free trade benefits workers only if they keep their jobs. By and large the educated have kept their jobs and even gotten better ones. For such people the prices of goods they purchase are cheaper than they would be if they were produced in the United States, and, with jobs that pay well, they have enjoyed a sharp increase in their standard of living. Many people who have lost their jobs,

2 The extent to which trade exacerbates this is debated because this trend may have been inevitable. 3This is accurate unless you modify the CPI as suggested in Chapter 6, in which case the real wages for production workers have risen slightly.

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244 Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?

in comparison, have found new ones, but the new ones do not allow them to maintain their previous standard of living. The loss of steel production in Pennsylvania, auto production in the Midwest, and electronics production throughout the United States has seriously lessened the number of high-paying jobs. It is therefore not surprising that professionals and some highly educated people are in favor of free trade and that people who have been hurt by it, frequently those without a college education, are against it.

If our trade policy is to move forward on the premise that everyone can be a winner, we will have to ensure retraining benefits are available to those who lose out. To do this, some of the benefits accruing to those who benefit from trade will have to be transferred in the form of spending on temporary income assistance and retrain- ing for the unemployed.

Another area of significant concern with regard to trade agreements is the treatment both of child labor and of labor in general. If industries that were once in the United States have to compete with industries that hire eight-year-olds and pay them a dollar or less an hour, then either American workers have to be 10 times more efficient or the industry will move. Not only do many Americans consider child labor immoral, but they think anything that promotes its existence is immoral as well. If they perceive free trade as responsible for promoting child labor, they may very well consider free trade itself to be immoral.

It is not just the treatment of children that is of con- cern. Labor costs are kept down in impoverished coun- tries in large part because workers fear losing even a bad job. The concentration of wealth is so great among the few people who control the industries that employers can get away with threatening workers with an inability to work anywhere. The employers collude to keep wages down. Workers have few rights and, even if they have legal rights, they are unwilling to invoke them against an employer for fear that they will lose the job they have. Such fundamental rights as freedom from physical torture, breaks for regular meals or bathroom visits, a 40-hour workweek, and collective bargaining are but dreams to many of the world’s workforce.

Free trade gives countries with such a paucity of workers’ rights a competitive advantage against American and European firms that must pay higher wages and accord workers better rights. To compete, these Western firms must have efficiencies that their competitors cannot achieve with a poorly trained work- force. This is not difficult for high-skill areas such as

software development, but it is nearly impossible for tex- tile and apparel production. When a job takes very little skill or is not intellectually challenging, then a poorly treated, poorly trained, or poorly paid worker can keep up. It is only when the job requires complex thinking that workers who are well treated, highly trained, and handsomely paid are going to outproduce the poorly treated, poorly trained, and poorly paid by enough to justify those who hire them keeping production in the United States.

A last area where free-trade agreements are criticized is the environment. The maquiladoras, concentrations of industries on the Mexican side of the border with the United States, produce some of the most toxic substances in the world. Those toxic substances are produced wher- ever the manufacturing takes place, but their handling, an important factor, differs. For instance, in the United States the wastewater from these manufacturing plants would have to be cleaned to a near-drinkable standard. In Mexico, however, less than 10 percent of industrial wastewater is treated with that degree of stringency. This is an obvious example of how the comparative advantage gained and exploited through free trade is not wanted or good. Since much of the waste travels along the Rio Grande and affects Texans directly, it would be better for them if production were in the States, even though it would cost more.

Free-trade agreements can deal with these issues. Whereas it is impossible to impose U.S. labor and environmental standards on other countries, it is pos- sible to set forth principles in the accords that require that the less-developed countries continually increase standards in designated areas. Although neither NAFTA nor CAFTA does all of this, they do work toward that end. And GATT, while less strict than either NAFTA or CAFTA, also requires that signatories adhere to the international treaties on labor rights that they have already signed.

The election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 dramatically altered the politics of the free-trade movement. His opposition to the Trans-Pacific Part- nership and his pledge to put tariffs on imports from China and other countries as leverage to negotiate bet- ter trade deals for the United States were important hallmarks of his campaign. Whether the politics of trade return to their previous form (with Republicans in favor of free trade, with moderate Democrats in favor of modest restrictions, and with liberal Demo- crats opposed to free trade) is certainly up in the air after the 2016 election.

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Summary 245

The Bottom Line

The bottom line on international trade pacts is this: Most economists favor them for two basic reasons:

1. Economists generally favor allowing people to buy what they want from whom they want and to sell what they want to whomever they want, without restriction, as long as doing so does not harm an innocent third party.

2. More to the point of this chapter, they favor trade pacts because, if they are negotiated with care, such pacts enhance global economic well-being.

While free trade eliminates some jobs in some areas, it creates more jobs in other areas. Some countries with high poverty rates and low wages will gain jobs in areas where training and education are relatively unimportant. Other countries, including the United States, will benefit by being able to sell goods that require highly skilled workers to produce.

With regard to free trade, what economists insist is true is that with income support and retraining, the gains from trade are nearly always sufficient to offset the losses of the people made worse off by trade. What we need to understand is that if the people who gain from trade get all of the benefits and the people who get laid off are forgotten, then free trade is going to be seen and

will in fact become just another way the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.

One interesting spin on those who lose their jobs is the no- tion of creative destruction

introduced by Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter’s thesis is that workers’ desire for job security and their com- placency when they have it is such that they do not seek out better opportunities unless they are forced to. If this logic is to be believed, then free trade does such people a favor by sending them into unemployment. Because most economists firmly believe that people do what they think is in their best interests, it may be that they know that there are better opportunities out there but are sim- ply more comfortable where they are. This would sug- gest that unemployment is not really a favor. However, it is just not as bad as many fear because the massive and burgeoning service sector in the United States has ab- sorbed many of those whose jobs were lost due to trade.

Whether or not we have NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, or any other trade agreement, what labor unions, workers, and young people in general have to understand is that the days are over when a high school diploma ensured that the holder of a job could earn middle-class wages. The trends toward more mechanized manufacture are in- exorable. The jobs that are available now are in operating or designing the new machines. These jobs, moreover, require training and higher education.

In addition to the economic side, NAFTA’s diplo- matic benefits cannot be missed. Not since the Panama Canal treaty has Latin America been treated as well by the United States as it has as a result of negotiations with NAFTA. In the past the sovereignty of Latin American countries was threatened by the United States on more than a few occasions. Now NAFTA implicitly recognizes Mexico as a partner with both the United States and Canada in the development of the Western hemisphere.

Summary As a result of completing this chapter you now understand that economists generally see that free trade is better than restricted trade and that trade agreements that facilitate the opening of trade are seen by most economists as a good thing. You understand why economists insist that free trade is good and why it is that agreements to main- tain it are sometimes necessary. You are familiar with

NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, and the WTO as trade agreements and institutions, and you know some of the thinking about whether they are working as advertised. You understand the economic and political concerns that free-trade agreements generate, and you know that the bottom line for most economists is that such agreements are good policy.

Key Terms CAFTA creative destruction GATT

NAFTA quota strategic trade policies

tariff WTO

creative destruction The notion that people need to lose their jobs involuntarily in order to seize better opportunities.

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246 Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?

Quiz Yourself 1. Trade agreements are often necessary because

a. free trade is in no one’s best interest. b. limiting trade is in no one’s best interest. c. limiting trade helps those doing the limiting

but typically by less than it hurts those who are limited.

d. limiting trade helps those doing the limiting and typically by more than it hurts those who are limited.

2. Trade agreements are enforced a. militarily by the United States. b. militarily by the United Nations. c. by the consent of the parties to abide by the

judgment of the arbitrators. d. only by the willingness of the parties to respond

favorably to each other. 3. Which concept from Chapter 1 can be used to ex-

plain how it is possible for it to be in the individual interest of each nation to engage in protectionist policies but for everyone to be worse off if they all engage in protectionist policies? a. The fallacy of composition b. That correlation does not necessarily equate to

causation c. That all resources are scarce d. That the right policy option is one chosen at the

“margin” 4. Free-trade agreements

a. are just that, about tariff and quota-free trade. b. have very little to do with the trade of goods

and services and more to do with currency exchange.

c. are about making trade freer than it was before and rarely about making it completely free.

d. only impact the trade of goods and rarely impact the trade of services.

5. When one country objects to the trade restrictions of another, the provisions of trade treaties typically a. allow it to militarily exact retribution against

the offending party. b. require that it submit its objections to an adju-

dication body to determine whether the practice is allowed.

c. require that the offending country immediately stop the action pending a review of the case by an adjudication body.

d. provide no form of relief.

6. The World Trade Organization governs the provi - sions of a. NAFTA. b. GATT. c. CAFTA. d. SHAFTA.

7. From the perspective of the United States, a major accomplishment of the 1999 round of GATT was a. the complete banning of “domestic content”

provisions in movie and television production.

b. the creation of major restrictions on child labor.

c. the worldwide adoption of U.S. environmental practices.

d. the recognition of copyright protection for software, music, and movies.

8. The consensus among economists is that NAFTA’s impact on the U.S. economy is a. enormously positive. b. enormously negative. c. marginal in net though it has increased both

imports and exports. d. marginal in net because it has affected neither

imports nor exports. 9. Joseph Schumpeter coined the phrase “creative

destruction.” The idea of creative destruction is that a. people need to be forced from their comfort

zone in order to make crucial decisions that enhance their economic prospects.

b. unemployment affects society more nega- tively than thought because it breeds social discontent.

c. unemployment is good because it keeps prices down.

d. competition for resources is inherently destructive.

Short Answer Questions 1. Why might it be easier to see a job lost because of

NAFTA than to see a job created by it? 2. Why might an agreement like NAFTA increase

GDP but not be favored by union members? 3. Why would free-trade agreements be easier to nego-

tiate between similar countries than with ones that had very different methods of production, safety standards, and wages.

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Summary 247

Think about This Look at the ingredients list on the next nondiet soda you buy. The second ingredient behind water, is high- fructose corn syrup. If you do the same thing in Canada or Mexico, the second ingredient is sugar. The reason for the difference is that the United States imposes a quota on cane sugar imports (to protect sugar beet growers in Minnesota and California). Is this good policy?

Talk about This Protesters insist that the economic benefits of trade have social costs that go unrecognized. Whether or not you agree with them, make a list of those social costs. Open your closet and look at the labels on your clothing. Look for the labels on your consumer electronics to see where they were made. Are you, individually, better off with cheap clothing and electronics? In that context do we owe something to those who bear those social costs?

For More Insight See “China and the WTO,” Economist, April 3, 1999,

pp. 14–15.

Hufbauer, Gary, and Jeffery Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges. Institute for Interna- tional Economics, 2005.

Husted, Steven, and Michael Melvin, International Eco- nomics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), esp. Chapter 8.

Krugman, Paul R., and Maurice Obstfeld, Interna- tional Economics: Theory and Policy (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), esp. Chapter 11.

Scott, Robert, Carlos Salas, and Bruce Campbell, Revis- ing NAFTA: Still Not Working for North America’s Workers, Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper #173, September 2006.

The Seattle Times, December 4, 1999, and the Seattle Times WTO Web page, http://old.seattletimes.com/special/wto/

Whitelaw, Kevin, “Banana-Trade Split,” U.S. News & World Report, January 11, 1999, p. 49.

Behind the Numbers U.S. Trade—http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/index

.html

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248

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - T W O

The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply the supply and demand model and the concepts of consumer and producer surplus to the markets for tobacco, alcohol, and illegal goods and services.

LO2 Conclude that economists endorse interference in a market for reasons related to the information and costs to innocent third parties.

LO3 Utilize the concept of elasticity of demand to analyze who gets hurt by taxes on tobacco and alcohol.

LO4 Analyze the impact of drug legalization.

Chapter Outline

An Economic Model of Tobacco, Alcohol, and Illegal Goods and Services

Why Is Regulation Warranted?

Taxes on Tobacco and Alcohol

Why Are Certain Goods and Services Illegal?

Summary

Let’s face it. No mother wants her child to start smok- ing or drinking, or to engage in illegal activity. These are not healthy activities. Nevertheless, economists are generally reticent to suggest that a good or service should be banned outright just because it is not good for you. This chapter uses the tools of supply and demand, elasticity, and consumer and producer surplus to look at these particular goods and services and the reason some are regulated, some are taxed, and still others are illegal.

Seventeen percent of the American population smokes, and the average American consumes nearly 26.3 gallons of beer a year. With that much smoking and drinking going on, tobacco and alcohol are obviously important parts of the American economy. The tobacco industry employs 12,714 people a year, and it has an- nual shipments of $37.3  billion. The alcohol industry employs 75,247 people, and its annual sales amount to $63.4 billion. Because certain goods and services are il- legal, it is impossible to know exactly how much money is spent on them or how many people are employed in

their production. What is known is that nearly half of all adults under 35 have violated the law when it comes to their consumption of an illegal good or service.

Before looking closely at the economics of these goods and services, we will review the fundamentals of sup- ply and demand to remind ourselves of how equilibrium within a market serves the interests of both the consumer and the producer. Then we will turn to reasons why selling and using these goods are regulated, taxed, or banned and why economists might back such restrictions. Along the way, we’ll focus not only on secondhand smoke, drunk driving, the spread of disease, and increases in crime but also on the issues of age restrictions, warning labels, and prohibition. After a brief discussion of the importance of elasticity, we’ll use the concept within our supply and de- mand model to indicate who gets hurt by the considerable taxes that are levied on both tobacco and alcohol. Finally, we’ll discuss why tobacco and alcohol are legal, why other goods and services are not, and what decriminaliza- tion of these goods and services would likely bring.

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Why Is Regulation Warranted? 249

As a result of this analysis, we can state that the sale of this offending good makes both consumers and producers better off than they would have been without the sale. The sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus is CAB. If it were illegal to buy and sell these goods and services, and if everyone obeyed the law, all of the above- named parties would be worse off. Before you have a fit at this conclusion, though, remember that it was arrived at only after we made some fanciful assumptions.

Why Is Regulation Warranted?

It is now time to recognize reality and to deal with the very real problems of tobacco, alcohol, and illegal goods and services. The goods themselves are very addictive. There are harmful effects to innocent third parties from second- hand smoke, drunk driving, and the spread of disease. In addition, the use of any one of these goods or services negatively affects spouses and children. Their presence has caused experts in public health to persuade legislators to implement restrictions, regulations, taxes, or outright bans.

When people argue for government intervention in a market, they do so from many points of view. Economists, who tend to decry unwarranted intervention, generally categorize reasons into three broad areas. First, they deem it possible for people to suffer from a lack of knowledge or an inability to think clearly. When that is the case, it may be appropriate for the government to step in with information or with warnings of danger. It may even be appropriate for government to make decisions for people. Second, they accept that the good or service may have adverse impacts on people other than the consumer or producer. Those costs, which are ignored in a market, must be taken into account by the government. Last, and least appealing among economists, is that consumption or production of the good may be immoral. That is, even though buying or selling the good may not hurt anybody in a physical sense, its production or consumption hurts society in general.

The Information Problem For legal goods, advertising is intended to draw people to a product, and advertisers want their ads to be memora- ble. When the advertising is for products like tobacco and alcohol, we sometimes bemoan the effectiveness of the ads. For children of the 1950s and 1960s, the Marlboro Man™ was the image of health and rugged individualism. For children of the 1980s and 1990s, the R. J. Reynolds’ Joe Camel™ was as recognizable as Mickey Mouse.

An Economic Model of Tobacco, Alcohol, and Illegal Goods and Services

We’ll use the market that was presented in Chapter 2 as the basis for our analysis of these goods. To be general, we’ll just call the good or service in question, “the of- fending good.” You can substitute whatever example you wish because the analysis is exactly the same. As we did with the market in that chapter, we will assume that there are many buyers and sellers, that the demand curve for each is downward sloping, and that the supply curve for each is upward sloping. For the time being, we will pretend that there are no negative consequences to innocent third parties. We will also pretend that all the people who engage in these activities know exactly what they are getting themselves into. While these are fanciful assumptions, the approach gives us a jumping-off point that we can use to look at these markets. To prove that the markets benefit both the consumers and the producers, we have to refer to the consumer and producer surplus analysis that was presented in Chapter 3.

We start with a few facts that are presented in Figure  22.1. Consumers buy Q* goods and pay P* for each. This means that consumers pay producers an amount of money that is simultaneously less than the value the consumers place on the good and more than it cost the producers to provide it. That is, consumers are happier with the good or service than they were with the money they gave up, and producers make a profit. The gain to the consumers is P*AB and is called their con- sumer surplus. The profit to the producer is CP*B and is called their producer surplus.

The o�ending good/tO

S

P

D

B

A

C

Q*

P *

FIGURE 22.1 Market for an offending good.

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250 Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

In 1998, tobacco advertising was ended as part of a legal settlement. Still, Anheuser-Busch’s series of Budweiser and Bud Light ads have been quite effective with Super Bowl audiences for decades. Though economists recog- nize the role of advertising in markets for goods that are legal, they debate the usefulness of advertising bans when the goods are legal for only a specified group.

For illegal goods, advertising is not an issue; the real “information” problem is the degree to which people do not adequately weigh the likelihood or impact of addic- tion. Government’s reaction to this can be one of edu- cation, one of restriction, or one of prohibition. In the United States we use education to dissuade young people from using drugs and reinforce that with prohibition. In all but certain counties in Nevada, the government’s response to prostitution is simply one of prohibition.

The addiction argument clearly applies to cocaine, ecstasy, and methamphetamine. The reasoning is that potential users may not know or fully comprehend that these drugs can be addictive and what the impact of that addiction will be on users. The argument as it ap- plies to prostitution is somewhat different. When pros- titutes get started in the sex business, they may not fully realize the consequences of their actions. Some advo- cacy groups that seek to maintain and strengthen the ban on prostitution, for instance, claim that prostitutes generally begin their trade as children. Estimates place the number of U.S. prostitutes under the age of 18 at be- tween 300,000 and 600,000, with 100,000 new victims per year. People engaged in prostitution, especially at an early age, might not realize that sex workers are sexually assaulted on a regular basis or that the illegal drugs pro- vided to them when they get started are used as a means to keep them under control and dependent. Further, there is widespread concern of a growing market for sexual slaves. The girls caught up in this horrific practice are not convinced to participate but are either abducted or told that they have been chosen to live in the West be- cause of their academic potential or because there is a market for live-in child-care workers. Only after their ar- rival in the West do they learn their fate. Finally, these groups also make the point that more than 80 percent of prostitutes are the victims of childhood incest and that the sex industry capitalizes on this sense of degradation.

In general, then, economists suggest that the infor- mation problem can be dealt with using education, age restrictions, or prohibition. The appropriate tool de- pends on the degree of the problem. For example, the government requires that packages of cigarettes and bot- tles of  alcohol display warning labels that describe the

consequences of smoking and drinking. Thus, requiring warning labels and banning tobacco or alcohol advertis- ing on the grounds that these promotions serve only to cloud the judgment of consumers is acceptable to econo- mists. We take the “providing knowledge” a step further when we ensure that every new generation knows the addictive nature of smoking and drinking through pro- grams in the schools.

Of course, there are times when we simply do not trust young people to make good decisions, even when they have all the information. In these cases we either make it illegal to buy the goods or services or we re- quire that people reach a certain age before they can buy them. Economists are not at all uncomfortable forbidding children from consuming tobacco products for two rea- sons. First, the vast majority of smokers began their nico- tine addictions well before becoming adults. Second, there is evidence that the tobacco companies aided their becom- ing addicted through their marketing efforts. Because only a tiny fraction of smokers began smoking as adults, pre- venting children from having ready access to cigarettes is in society’s interest and in the child’s long-term interest.

Ultimately, the reason many economists embrace the prohibition of cocaine, ecstasy, and methamphetamine is that for these the addiction problem is often permanent.

External Costs Few economists object when government interferes in a market in which someone other than the consumer or producer is hurt by the consumption or production of a good. These externalities are important considerations for market regulation because the point of market ef- ficiency is that everyone either benefits from, or is left unaffected by, a transaction. If that does not happen, then standing by and allowing the market to take care of itself is not always acceptable.

The externalities that result from the use of tobacco are the illnesses and deaths associated with second- hand smoke and the increased health care expenditures incurred by people who do not smoke but must pay increased premiums for health insurance to cover the expenses of smokers. It is not the concern of most econ- omists that (knowledgeable) smokers hurt themselves by smoking. It is the concern of economists that those smokers tend to pass on costs to others.

The sale of drugs often affects someone other than the buyer or seller of the drug. As a result, at least some of the costs of that market are not being accounted for by the buyer or seller. If addicts are more likely to commit crime

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Why Is Regulation Warranted? 251

than nonaddicts, then neither the addict nor the dealer is accounting for the rising number of innocent victims when they sell their goods. Similarly, if a person gets a venereal disease from a visit to a prostitute and passes that disease on to an unsuspecting third party, then there is an external cost. Someone who is not part of the original transaction is being affected because of the transaction.

Establishing who should be counted as an innocent victim, though, is not as easy as it might sound. Chil- dren clearly are innocent victims, but are nonsmoking spouses? Some economists suggest that as part of the give and take of a marriage, smokers and their nonsmoking partners negotiate the rules for smoking in a household. If they decide it is all right for one to smoke and the other to be negatively affected, then smoking and its implica- tions do not constitute an externality; it is simply one of the costs of the marriage. Other economists disagree. They suggest that regulations are needed to protect any people who are not consumers themselves.1

However you decide the issue of who is an innocent victim, those who are subjected to secondhand smoke have higher rates of lung-related illness than exist in the general population. Children in the presence of smokers are much more likely to die from sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), asthma, and other lung illnesses.

Servers in restaurants, bartenders, and a variety of others who have been exposed to others’ smoke also report rates of lung illness that are not only higher but beyond those that might have occurred by chance. The costs of treating these innocent victims are ignored by both smokers and tobacco companies. Economists abhor ignored costs. Whether economists support corrective actions when there are such costs depends on the degree of those costs and whether eliminating them is worth the loss of private benefits. In addition, there are more smokers on Medic- aid than their proportion within the general population warrants. They, of course, produce some rather sub- stantial costs to the program. If they were not smoking, Medicaid would cost taxpayers less. Here the innocent victim is the taxpayer.

Externalities also exist in less likely places. Since smokers typically die 10 years earlier than comparable nonsmokers, if they have group life insurance policies whose rates are the same for both smokers and nonsmok- ers, the expected net payout for smokers’ beneficiaries is more than for nonsmokers’ beneficiaries. Life insurance rates are therefore higher for nonsmokers than they should be and the rates for smokers are lower than they should be.2

These facts combine to suggest that when smokers buy cigarettes, the full cost of their smoking not only is

There are a few facts on crime that we ought to consider when deal- ing with drugs in particular. First, 24 percent of all violent crimes (13 percent for rapes) are committed while the perpetrator is on drugs. Second, 55 percent of inmates in jail, detention, or prison used drugs during the month leading up to their arrest. Last, we spend $3.9 billion on drug interdiction at the federal level, another $21.8 billion in other drug control expenses, and $73.3 billion on incarceration in this country every year. One-quarter of those in- carcerated now are there for drug- related offenses. What effect would legalization have on these statistics? We would save a lot of money—one-fifth of the incarceration costs and all of the inter- diction costs. If overall use increased, as it probably would, vio- lent crime would increase as those who were not addicts before legalization became addicts after legalization and, once addicted, became violent.

BATTLING NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES WHILE CREATING OTHER PROBLEMS Solving the externalities associated with a good by enforcing a pro- hibition strategy creates a problem. Sometimes the solution can be worse than the problem it was intended to solve. Much drug violence exists only because of laws criminalizing drug use. If co- caine, methamphetamine, and marijuana were legal and inexpen- sive, there would be less of a need for addicts to rob in order to get money to buy them. There would be no drive-by shootings to protect turf. There would be no need for the hundreds of thousands of prison beds devoted to drug offenders. It is for this reason that you find a significant number of economists, even very conservative economists, favoring drug legalization. They appreciate that drugs carry with them externalities but see the solution as worse than the problem.

E X A M I N I N G T H E E X T E R N A L I T I E S

1This is the same argument that some economists use to suggest that government need not regulate workplace safety. Risk takers must be com- pensated adequately or they would not take the risk.

2This externality is avoided when life insurance companies differentiate their premiums for smokers and nonsmokers. The degree of the employer subsidy would have to depend on this as well.

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252 Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

not paid at the cash register but is not even fully incurred by the smoker. Most estimates of the external expenses that are paid by the general public come to around a dol- lar per pack of cigarettes.

This is not to say that economists hold unanimous opinions in these matters. Some suggest that there is a benefit to nonsmokers when other people smoke. These benefits come from two separate but related aspects of smoking. First, as mentioned previously, people who smoke for long periods of time die several years earlier than comparable people who never smoked. Smokers and nonsmokers pay into Social Security and other pen- sion plans, but nonsmokers have some of their retirement essentially subsidized by smokers, because the smokers die before they have collected the benefits to which they were entitled.

A second form of subsidy that smokers grant non- smokers is that not only do they die early, but they die more suddenly than nonsmokers. When smokers over the age of 60 become ill, their lifetime of smok- ing has so depressed their immune systems that they die of illnesses that nonsmokers are more likely to survive. They also succumb to those illnesses much faster and less is spent attempting to save them. Even though the money is spent sooner, it is much less. It is grimly ironic then that by dying more quickly than nonsmokers, smokers sometimes cost the health sys- tem less than do nonsmokers. By dying early and quickly, smokers avoid expenses that nonsmokers eventually need to pay. Because more than one-quarter of Medicare expenses are incurred during the last year of elderly people’s lives, hastening their deaths saves money. If this gruesome fact is taken into account, the net external costs of smoking become negligible in the eyes of some economists.

Though there is a morbid economic upside to smok- ing, there is no such benefit to drunk driving. There are more than 1 million arrests a year for driving under the influence of alcohol. While that number has come down substantially over the last decade, it is still more than high enough to represent a significant problem. Of the roughly 30,000 accidents that result in 32,675 traffic fa- talities each year, 31 percent involve at least one person whose blood alcohol level is over the legal limit. Another 5 percent involves someone who has a legal, but still measurable, blood alcohol content. Even when someone does not die, alcohol is a contributing factor in nearly a third of a million automobile accidents a year.

Despite these troubling statistics, it is time to try to look at the issue from a dispassionate viewpoint. To

model the problem of the externalities that are associ- ated with people who drive under the influence of al- cohol, we need to alter our supply and demand diagram to account for the extra costs for which their behavior is responsible. To understand Figure 22.2, you need to recall that under perfect competition the supply curve is the marginal cost curve to the firms in the business. Any costs that are borne by neither the seller nor the buyer must be added to these costs to create the social cost of the good. On the assumption that the only people who benefit from the consumption of the good are the con- sumers themselves, the demand curve is the social ben- efit curve. So instead of coming to the market solution of a price–quantity combination P*–Q*, the socially op- timal combination is P–Qʹ. That is, if there is a market for a good where some of the costs spill over to others, then the market will produce too much of the good and charge too little for it.

Morality Issues We have looked now at the first two circumstances under which economists consider it acceptable for gov- ernment to intervene in the market. Besides lack of in- formation and externalities in which innocent people may be harmed, a final reason why government might regulate a free market is that the market may be for a good or service that is considered to be immoral. For believers in certain major world religions, alcohol, to- bacco, drugs, and prostitution are accorded this status. While appeals to righteousness are not particularly meaningful to economists on an academic level, they are certainly important to many other people. Many re- ligions consider drinking a sin, and a few feel the same way about smoking.

External cost

Social cost S (marginal cost)

D (marginal benefit)

The o�ending good/tO Qʹ

P

Q*

P*

FIGURE 22.2 Modeling externalities.

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Taxes on Tobacco and Alcohol 253

Taxes on Tobacco and Alcohol

Modeling Taxes To correct an externality, we can tax the offending good, we can limit its use, and we can forbid its use. Of these options, taxes are the most appealing to econo- mists, as they allow people who are willing to pay all of the costs of their consumption to go ahead and con- sume. Using taxes in this way has the positive effect of discouraging those people who are not willing to pay the costs from becoming consumers of the undesirable or unhealthy good.

The taxes that the United States imposes on tobacco and alcohol are a $1.01 per pack tax on cigarettes and a 33-cent per six-pack tax on beer. The federal taxes on to- bacco raise approximately $15.4 billion a year, while the taxes on alcohol raise $10 billion. States also tax these goods, collecting $18 billion in tobacco taxes and nearly $6.5 billion in alcohol taxes.

Figure 22.3 shows that the effect of the federal taxa- tion on cigarettes and alcohol is to raise the price from

P* to Pʹ and to lower consumption from Q* to Qʹ. An important thing to notice about this effect is that smok- ing and drinking do not stop. This means that the del- eterious effects of secondhand smoke and drunk driving do not stop either. They are simply reduced. If the tax is set equal to the dollar value of such externalities, then in theory the tax revenue raised is sufficient to cover the costs of the externalities. One problem, though, is that the tax hits the considerate and rude alike. Smokers who light up alone do not cause secondhand smoke, whereas smokers who blow it in your face do. A per-pack tax hits both equally.

In any event, a policy short of prohibition implies that there are an economically acceptable number of expected drunk driving deaths and of childhood sec- ondhand-smoke-induced illnesses. The idea is that as long as we have an adequate sum of money available to compensate the people who are affected, it is accept- able for smokers to smoke, for drinkers to drink, and for people to be influenced in negative ways by their behavior.

People who are not economists have a very difficult time with the “acceptability” of deaths and illnesses. The basic idea is that people drink and smoke because they enjoy doing so. If we take taxing and regulating too far, the reduction in enjoyment by users would outweigh the effect of the reduction on innocent victims.

The notion of acceptable deaths is a difficult one for many to accept. Consider this though: The Brain Injury Association reports that approximately 5 children die each year on playgrounds as a result of falls and other injuries. We continue to send our children out on recess because we weigh what is to be gained with what is to be lost and judge the risk of injury or even death to be tolerable. We drive to work because we see that what is gained—income—is greater than what is lost—a small risk of injury or death.

One consequence of the national battle against methamphet- amine has been that over-the-counter cold medications are no longer simple to purchase. The manufacturers had to decide whether to alter their formulas or put those medications behind the pharmacy counter. Those manufacturers that chose to keep

the key ingredient that could be extracted to produce metham- phetamine lost sales because consumers were required to provide identification to pharmacists. Others changed their products to in- clude ingredients that are somewhat less effective. Externalities occur all over.

W H E R E D I D M Y S U D A F E D G O ?

Social cost S (marginal cost)

D (marginal benefit)

The o�ending good/tO Qʹ

P

Q*

P*

Tax = External cost

FIGURE 22.3 Modeling taxes.

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254 Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

The Tobacco Settlement and Why Elasticity Matters For quite some time legislators have given particular consideration to raising the taxes on tobacco. The settle- ment between several states and the big tobacco compa- nies that was reached in 1998 requires that the companies pay the states more than $250 billion over 20 years to compensate them for Medicaid expenses the states paid that were created by smoking. The companies will then pass on those taxes to the smokers who buy their prod- ucts. To see how a sequence like this works, we need to look at the supply and demand curve for tobacco.

First, it should be remembered that when someone is addicted to a product, as smokers are to cigarettes, the de- mand curve for the good is highly inelastic. If you look at Figure 22.4, you see that a tax will again raise the price from P* to Pʹ. If you compare the size of the tax (Pʹʹ to Pʹ) to the amount of the price increase, you see that smokers will be paying for most of this tax increase and that tobacco companies will pay comparatively less (P* to Pʹ versus P* to Pʹʹ). Since smokers are far poorer than the average of the general population, this tax is as regressive as any tax we can imagine. Since consumption falls only from Q* to Qʹ, it is also disturbing that the tax will not have a significant influence on how much people smoke either.

When you look at teen smoking, the picture is not quite so bleak. Because the habit of smoking takes up a much larger portion of teenagers’ than adults’ incomes, the elasticity of demand for cigarettes by young people is much greater. That is, demand is more elastic and the de- mand curve is flatter. If you were to draw such a demand curve, you would see that the burden of the tax would still fall mainly on consumers. You would also see that

tobacco companies would be paying a greater proportion of the amount of compensation. Further smoking, at least teen smoking, would be reduced by more. Until quite recently economists’ estimates were that elasticities for cigarettes were as low as .2 for adults and as high as .5 for children. Under these circumstances this means that an increase of a dollar in cigarette prices would dimin- ish adult smoking by 10 percent, but it would diminish smoking by children by 25 percent. More recent studies of cigarette elasticity put adult elasticity at .8 for adults. This is quite likely the result of electronic cigarettes and the degree to which they provide an alternative to users.

On beer, a study of the elasticity of demand put it at 0.53, which suggests a tax that adds 10 percent to the price of a six-pack would reduce consumption by 5.3 percent.

Why Are Certain Goods and Services Illegal?

The debate over whether drugs and prostitution should be legal usually comes down to a comparison of the neg- ative consequences of what is currently legal, tobacco and alcohol, with what is currently illegal. Clearly a case can be made that the aggregate impact of tobacco and alcohol is much greater than the aggregate impact of illegal drugs and prostitution. As you can tell by now, economists are less interested in “aggregate” impacts than “marginal” ones. Here, the case can be made that the negative externalities associated with one person pur- chasing one more unit of the illegal goods are greater than the negative externalities associated with one person purchasing one unit of a legal good. The other argument that could be made to justify the current state of the law is that the unknown or underestimated consequences to the consumer of using drugs or engaging in prostitution are substantially greater than those with regard to alco- hol. Of course, the opposite case could be made as well.

The Impact of Decriminalization on the Market for the Goods Given the previous discussion, suppose a good or service is currently illegal. What would result from making it legal? The first thing that would likely happen as a result of mak- ing a good legal is that the concerns of both consumers and producers about getting caught would evaporate. Because getting caught would not be a problem any longer, any shift to the left of supply that resulted from clandestine operation would cease to exist. Similarly, any shift to the left in the Q/t

S

Tax

P

D

Qʹ Q*

P*

P ʺ

S + tax

FIGURE 22.4 Tax on tobacco with inelastic demand.

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Summary 255

demand curve by those who might have wanted to partake of the illicit good but did not because it was illegal would cease to exist. The net result of legalizing a previously il- legal activity would be a movement in the demand curve to the right and a movement in the supply curve to the right.

Another impact of decriminalization would occur on the elasticity of demand and, to a lesser degree, supply. When a good is illegal, it is often the case that the con- sumers of the good are addicted to it in some sense. The demand curve for a good for which a consumer is addicted is likely to be very inelastic. Similarly, once people have made the decision to become a seller of an illicit good, the price they sell it for is not usually a stimulus to sell it in great quantities. This is because the risks of getting caught may prevent sellers from expanding their operation quickly as prices rise. Therefore, from either side, the supply and demand curves are less elastic when the good or service is illegal than when it is legal. The net result here is that both curves flatten out when the good is made legal. Figure 22.5 depicts the effect of legalizing a previ- ously illegal good. The demand curve flattens and moves right, and the supply curve flattens and moves right. If the supply curve movement is more than the demand curve

movement, as it is in Figure 22.5, the net result is a low- ering of price. Not shown, but equally plausible, is the case where the demand curve movement is greater than the supply curve movement and the price rises.

Thus, the direction of a price change as a result of decriminalization depends on whether the reduction in risk to dealers or prostitutes is greater than the increase in interest by consumers. Because the conventional wis- dom is that legalization would lower the price, conven- tional wisdom is just that: The supply curve shift will be greater than the demand curve shift.

The External Costs of Decriminalization Ultimately, whether legalization makes sense to you de- pends on whether you believe the external costs of these activities are significant enough to pay the significant costs of punishing users and dealers. One potential solu- tion that many pro-legalizers suggest is that we tax and regulate drug sales and prostitution in order to take into account and pay for the externalities.

Looking back to Figure 22.3, you see that we simply added a tax equal to the external cost that was examined in Figure 22.2 to get the Pʹ, Qʹ result. That is, a proper taxa- tion scheme can make up for the problems of an externality. There is money to educate against the use of the illicit good or to compensate victims of users of the questionable good.

The problem is that if the external costs are very great, the tax will have to be very high. If the tax is very high, there will be a motivation to have a black market in untaxed goods. As evidence of this, consider that in Canada a prohibitively high tax created a black market for ciga- rettes. In this case people drove to the United States, bought cigarettes, took them back to Canada, and sold them. In another similar case, while prostitution is legal in Nevada, it is highly regulated. That regulation leads to prostitutes’ avoiding regulation by working on their own outside the regulated brothels. Whenever a tax is too high or regulation too severe, a black market will exist beside a legal market.

P

Plegal

Qillegal

Sillegal

Dillegal

Pillegal

Qlegal

Slegal

Dlegal

Q/t

FIGURE 22.5 Making an illegal good legal or vice versa.

Summary

You now understand how we can apply a supply and de- mand model and the concepts of consumer and producer surplus to tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and prostitution. You understand that there are reasons that economists en- dorse interference in a market, reasons that have to do with information and costs to innocent third parties. You

have seen how the question of who gets hurt by taxes on tobacco and alcohol is dependent on the elasticity of demand for these goods. Finally, you have seen the ar- gument for the current state of the law with regard to the treatment of these goods and the economic conse- quences of decriminalization.

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256 Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods

Quiz Yourself 1. When examining the question of tobacco taxes,

economists focus almost entirely on a. the cost to cigarette companies of production. b. the cost to cigarette smokers for the cigarettes

themselves. c. the cost to cigarette smokers for their extra

health care expenses. d. the costs to nonsmokers (like secondhand smoke).

2. When discussing an addictive drug, an economist is likely to focus on a. both the external costs and the “information

problem” associated with addiction. b. the moral costs totally. c. the cost of the drug to the user. d. the costs of production.

3. If you became convinced that marijuana was neither addictive nor contributed to externalities, then ban- ning it creates a. a social benefit without social cost. b. what economists call deadweight loss. c. what economists call a vacuum. d. a social benefit with an exact countering social

cost. 4. Decriminalizing a drug is likely to lead to a price

decrease if a. the anticipated supply effect is greater than the

anticipated demand effect. b. the anticipated demand effect is greater than the

anticipated supply effect. c. the anticipated demand effect is exactly equal to

the anticipated supply effect. d. both demand and supply decrease.

5. Compared to a recreational user of a drug, an ad- dicted user’s elasticity of demand is a. much more elastic. b. much less elastic. c. much less. d. flatter.

6. If policy makers were to attempt to set a tax equal to the external costs of alcohol, one would have to evaluate a. the cost of production. b. the price paid by consumers. c. the value of innocent lives lost to drunk

driving. d. the value of the shortened lives of alcoholics.

7. When examining the “right tax” on a good that produces an externality, the tax should be such that a. it is greater than the externality. b. it is less than the externality. c. it is exactly equal to the externality. d. it makes consumption prohibitively expensive

for anyone. 8. One unsettling consequence of setting a tax on to-

bacco sufficiently high to reduce consumption would be that a. it would likely reduce Medicare costs. b. it would likely increase tobacco revenues to

farmers. c. it would likely increase tobacco company profits. d. it would make Social Security’s financial out-

look worse. 9. The introduction of e-cigarettes provides a substi-

tute for regular cigarettes. The result is likely that the a. elasticity of supply increases. b. elasticity of supply decreases. c. elasticity of demand increases. d. elasticity of demand decreases.

Short Answer Questions 1. If the United States is able to continue reducing the

incidence of children smoking, how might that end up costing more in the long run in terms of health- related expenses?

2. If the United States were to legalize marijuana pro- duction, what might the negative externalities be and what current negative externalities might be lessened?

3. If the United States were to eliminate the drinking age, what might you predict the outcome to be in terms of externalities?

4. What does the “legalize and tax” method of dealing with currently illegal drugs imply about how propo- nents of this approach view the ability to put a dollar value on human life?

Think about This There are considerate smokers and inconsiderate smok- ers. Secondhand smoke is not an issue when smokers are considerate (in that they smoke where no one is around to breathe it). Should these smokers be taxed when they are producing no harm to society?

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Summary 257

Talk about This As unsavory as it sounds, there are travel agents who book “sex tours” in parts of Asia. Travelers visit prostitutes in various locations. While some of the brothel operators man- date “safe” practices, others allow the patrons to pay extra if they wish to participate in “unsafe” practices. Should you be able to pay someone to risk their lives in this manner?

For More Insight See Grossman, Michael, Jody Sindelar, John Mullahy, and Rich-

ard Anderson, “Alcohol and Cigarette Taxes,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 4 (1993), pp. 211–222.

Thorton, Mark, The Economics of Prohibition (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991).

Behind the Numbers State and local taxes on tobacco and alcohol.

Tax Policy Center of the Urban Institute and Brook- ings Institution.

Tobacco—www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts /displayafact.cfm?Docid=403

Alcohol—http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics /alcohol-tax-revenue

Receipts—http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics /excise-tax-receipts

Employment and value of shipments. Survey of manufacturers—http://www.census.gov /programs-surveys/asm.html

Violent crimes and drug use. U.S. Dept. of Justice; Criminal Victimization in the U.S., 2008; statistical tables—http://bjs.gov/content /pub/pdf/cvus08.pdf

Federal spending on crime control. Federal drug control spending, 2011.

Office of National Drug Control Policy; drug con- trol funding tables—www.whitehousedrugpolicy .gov/publications/policy/11budget/fy11budget .pdf

Traffic fatality and blood alcohol statistics, 2009— www.nhtsa.dot.gov

Incarceration statistics—http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf /p11.pdf

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258

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - T H R E E

Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply the principles of present value to natural resource development.

LO2 Apply marginal analysis to answer the question of how clean is clean enough.

LO3 Apply the concept of externalities to explain why pollution warrants government intervention in the market.

LO4 Demonstrate why pollution is much more likely to occur on publicly owned property than on private property.

LO5 Summarize the variety of environmental problems that exist in the world as well as the economic solutions that exist to address these problems.

Chapter Outline

Using Natural Resources

How Clean Is Clean Enough?

The Externalities Approach

The Property Rights Approach to the Environment and Natural Resources

Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions

Summary

Maintaining a stewardship over the natural resources of the country and protecting the environment are increasingly popular positions for politicians to take. On the surface the solution to the first of these is to create a system of usage that leaves resources for the next generation, while the solution to the second problem seems rather simple: Stop polluting. For an economist, though, not only is the problem more complicated, but so also is its solution. The environmental problems of modern society are substan- tial and varied: unsustainable usage of natural resources, pollution of the water and air, the potential extinction of 1,799 species of plants and animals, acid rain that puts for- ests and fish in jeopardy, and greenhouse effects that are probably responsible for rapidly rising global temperatures.

To most environmentalists solving these problems in- volves strict questions of right and wrong. Economists, on the other hand, want to look also at costs and bene- fits. Economics may be central to solving environmental problems because in dealing with the environment we will need to reallocate our resources in directions that generally move from consuming and growing in positive economic ways to preserving and living with economic slowdowns. Where economics can be particularly help- ful is in the area of efficiency. Coming up with a plan that reduces pollution is not difficult, but it is hard to come up with a plan that reduces pollution in a way that will minimize the economic costs. That is what econo- mists bring to the discussion.

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How Clean Is Clean Enough? 259

its marginal benefit to its user. If an additional unit of oil is going to be utilized now, it has a decreasing marginal ben- efit to the refiner because there is a decreasing marginal utility for gasoline among consumers. The refiner must reduce the price to sell the extra gasoline. The question for the oil company is whether it is worth it to drill for oil now and refine more gasoline now when doing so requires that you reduce your price of gasoline now. In doing so, you give up the opportunity to wait and sell that gasoline later at a price that is likely higher. Though those later profits will have to be discounted, they can well outweigh the profits from producing and selling now.

An upward-sloping supply curve can also aid in moti- vating conservation. Continuing with the example of oil, the shale oil of the North Dakota area has been known to exist for half a century and yet went largely untapped even when oil prices peaked in 1980 and again in 2008. That is because it is very expensive to tap. The marginal cost of producing more oil, if that oil is from a location such as that, is very high and so few companies tried to extract it until recently. As a result there is conservation of difficult-to-extract resources, because the marginal costs are greater than the marginal revenues.

What this means is that market forces, both on the de- mand and the supply side, will lead to some degree of con- servation. The greater the discount rate, the lesser will be the degree of conservation, and the lower the discount rate, the greater will be the degree of conservation. This leads some environmentalists to conclude the morally correct discount rate is zero. Economists typically would not go so far as to say that. Economists would more frequently assert that the rate of utilization should be socially optimal for everyone involved, those present and those in the future. These economists would suggest, in the case of oil, that the rate of utilization should also factor in the likelihood that with greater scarcity of oil, alternatives to oil will be- come more profitable to develop and that history tells us that when society requires an alternative, prices adjust so that an alternative becomes profitable.

How Clean Is Clean Enough?

For many of you, when you were 10, your bedroom was a wreck. When asked whether a room is clean, a 10-year-old will respond with a reply that is pure economics: “Clean enough.” With that reply, 10-year-olds are saying that to them, further cleaning is simply not worth the effort. In the language of economics, children are saying that the marginal benefit of cleaning more (the value they place

Using Natural Resources The earth is a bounty of limited natural resources such as land, oil, natural gas, coal, mineral ores (iron, cop-

per, etc.), and renewable natural resources such as fresh water, wood, and wildlife. The ques- tion for a society is how to de- ploy those resources in such a way that maximizes their long- run usefulness. For a society to do that, it must weigh the value of those resources to those who are living now against the value of those natural resources to generations to come. The issue can be summarized as one of

stewardship, which is the management of resources in a fashion that weighs their value through time.

In the simplest sense, suppose you have a resource that you can use now or you can leave unused and pre- serve it for later. Suppose you also know what people will pay for it now and you have a good estimate of what they will pay for it in the future. In order to de- termine whether you should use it now or leave it until another time, you have to use the Chapter 7 concept of present value. To keep things simple, suppose the resource is costless to find, extract, and process and produces a constant value per unit in each time and that there are a fixed number of units. Any positive interest

rate will yield a conclusion that you should use it all now—the exact opposite of sustainability. Sustainability is the idea that you should only use renewable resources at the rate at which

they can be replaced, and it means that you use limited natural resources at the lowest possible rate in order to preserve them for future generations.

However, the simple introduction of a downward- sloping demand curve for that resource brings about the result that there is a trade-off between present use and future use that will result in a motivation among resource owners to conserve even with a positive dis- count rate. The downward-sloping demand curve ac- complishes this because increasing the present use decreases its marginal benefit.

Suppose, for the purpose of illustration, the resource is oil and that oil is used to produce gasoline. Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that the demand for gasoline represents

limited natural resources Resources that cannot be replaced.

renewable natural resources Resources that can be replaced.

stewardship The management of resources in a fashion that weighs their value through time.

sustainability The idea that you should only use renewable resources at the rate at which they can be replaced.

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260 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

on additional cleanliness) is less than the marginal cost of cleaning more (the value they place on Facebook time).

Economists apply the same standard to environmen- tal issues—merely on a larger scale than a child’s bed- room. The opportunity cost of a cleaner environment is lost economic satisfaction. We can use marginal cost– marginal benefit analysis to look at this problem, but only if we make some simplifying assumptions.

Let’s assume for the moment that we have a gener- ally accepted measure of environmental quality. Let’s further assume that the really dirty stuff is relatively easy to clean up but that achieving higher levels of cleanli- ness is harder and harder. Using the dirty room analogy, you know that the quickest way to make your room look cleaner is to pick up the dirty clothes, which can be done in seconds. Once you get down to straightening and dust- ing the knickknack shelves, the benefits are slight and the time required is great. What this implies is that the mar- ginal cost of achieving greater cleanliness is increasing while at the same time its marginal benefit is decreasing. As shown in Figure 23.1, this means that the maximum net benefit of environmental cleanup is EQ*, where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.

The Externalities Approach

We created many environmental problems in the first place when we produced and consumed goods and were concerned only with the costs and benefits that directly affected us. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, doing this is usually fine, but problems often arise when the ac- tions we take impose costs on or present benefits to

others. Economists call costs or benefits that are in- curred by someone other than the producer or consumer

externalities. We begin this chapter by reviewing why a mar- ket without externalities serves everyone. We then explore why there is a problem with markets

when externalities are present. After that, we examine the specific environmental problems discussed above. We conclude with a look at what economics can offer in the way of solutions.

When the Market Works for Everyone As we learned in Chapter 3, a market works very well in a world where all the costs and benefits of production are confined to producers and consumers. Figure 23.2 depicts in graphical form that the market price–quantity combination, P*–Q*, provides benefits to consumers, OABQ*, at a cost to them of OP*BQ*. The difference, P*AB, is called consumer surplus, that is, what consum- ers get in net benefits. Similarly, for the producer, the variable costs of production, OCBQ*, are lower than revenue generated from sales, OP*BQ*. The differ- ence, CP*B, is called the producer surplus. Thus when the market does not generate costs or benefits to anyone other than consumers and producers, both benefit and no one loses.

When the Market Does Not Work for Everyone The main problem with the model just described is that it does not take into account that there are nearly always indirect costs to others in either the production or con- sumption of a good. There are, for example, very few goods that do not require some form of energy for their

FIGURE 23.1 Clean enough.

EQ*

Marginal cost

Marginal benefit

Environmental quality/t

Marginal cost Marginal benefit externalities

Effects of a transaction that hurt or help people who are not a part of that transaction.

FIGURE 23.2 When the market works.

O

S

P

D

B

A

C

Q*

P*

Q/t

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The Externalities Approach 261

unaccounted for costs in the market. The existence of such costs is unacceptable to an economist. The funda- mental flaw with the market is that unless all costs are accounted for, it will produce too much and charge too little. To find the true cost of production and consump-

tion of a good that includes the effects on innocent bystanders, called the social cost, you need to add the external cost to the private costs (measured on the supply curve). When these costs

are accounted for, the price is to be P′ rather than P*, and the amount produced is Q′ rather than Q*.

Unless you believe that a pristine environment is a matter of right and wrong, allowing no compromises to your position, you will have to accept the existence of some environmental problems even when you account for all the costs. For example, Figure 23.2 does not dis- play a thoroughly clean environment, but it does show how the costs of pollution are weighed against the ben- efits of consumption. We may decide, for instance, that even though some pesticides threaten certain species, they so enhance food production that using them is worth the cost. The species are still threatened, but at least the cost is recognized. Similarly, we may decide that refor- mulating gasoline to reduce emissions by 80 percent is worth 20 cents per gallon but that reducing it another 10 percent is not worth the dollar a gallon it would take to accomplish that level of reduction. Here the costs of pollution are weighed, but so are the benefits of con- sumption. There are substances for which the optimal level is zero. This occurs when the marginal benefit of the production or use of even one drop of the good is less than its social cost.

production. Whether that energy is generated from the direct combustion of a steel mill’s smelting facility or electricity generated from burning coal, some fossil fuel is used in nearly all production. Even when the power is hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, or solar, there are environ- mental and possibly aesthetic costs that are not always considered.

Using fossil fuels like oil or coal creates a number of environmental problems from beginning to end. In each of the stages of getting energy to the user, people or ani- mals are affected. In extraction, land is either temporarily or permanently altered. The 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico clearly points out that extraction creates a nega- tive externality. Transporting oil, natural gas, and coal consumes energy. Transporting the first two carries with it the potential for an environmental catastrophe like the rupturing of the Exxon Valdez disaster and the resulting massive oil spill in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. By far the greatest problem, though, is created when fossil fuels are burned. Particulate matter creates breathing prob- lems that are unpleasant for some and life- threatening for others. Burning coal releases sulfur into the air and it produces acid rain. If current scientific predictions of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are found to be true, greenhouse gases will cause significant changes in the world’s climate.

You may believe that alternatives like hydroelec- tric, wind, or solar power offer externality-free energy, but, like fossil fuels, each has its own problems. As the Japanese experience of 2011 points out, though nuclear power is potentially clean, it is also potentially disastrous and even accounting for disasters ignores the problem of how to store nuclear waste. Hydroelectric power requires the destruction of river valleys, eliminating habitat as rivers flood the area behind the dams. While wind and solar power are clean in that they do not pollute the air or water, the sheer number of collectors needed to produce an amount of electricity that is equal to the amount pro- duced by coal at the present time is vast. Therefore, this option has the potential of destroying thousands upon thousands of acres of land that we now consider to have great scenic beauty.

Figure 23.3 depicts the problem as an economist would see it. Whereas firms pay attention to the costs of production of their goods, unless forced to, they tend to ignore the environmental costs of their production. Similarly, consumers pay attention to how much a good costs them, but it often serves their purposes to ignore the costs to those around them. Costs to people other than the producers and consumers are considered to be

FIGURE 23.3 When a market does not work.

External cost

Social cost S (marginal cost)

D (marginal benefit)

O Qʹ

P

Q*

P*

Q/t

social cost The true cost of produc- tion and consumption of a good that includes the effects on innocent bystanders.

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262 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

may consider the individual benefit to be worth one- hundredth of the cost of this regular maintenance, often no one will view maintenance for the entire neighbor- hood as worth the time or money. The ultimate problem is that no one owns the property. As a result, while the social benefit of the maintenance is greater than its cost, the benefit to an individual is much lower than its cost to that individual.

Natural Resources and the Importance of Property Rights Economists use many of the same tools to explore the use of natural resources as we use when dealing with pollu- tion. Whether the resource in question is mineral, tim- ber, energy, or the oceans’ bounty, economists note that the extraction, cutting, removal, or harvesting imposes costs on someone other than the producer or consumer. It doesn’t matter whether this results from the fact that the land is owned by the government or not owned by anyone at all, or because the process of garnering the resource is itself polluting. What matters is that all of the costs must be acknowledged.

Economists also bring another element to the table: the notion of present value. The value of an untapped resource to its owner is the present value of the profit associated with exploiting it over a period of time. In this way there is an optimal rate of exploitation, which is the rate that maximizes the present value. Suppose you owned a resource such as a forest of timber. You could clear-cut it and sell all of it at once. Then you would have to plant new trees, wait for the trees to grow tall enough to harvest, and repeat the cycle. On the other hand, you could cut only those trees that had achieved an optimal height and leave the rest for another year. In this way you would have a few trees to cut every year. An economist would look at this and say that whichever rate of exploi- tation maximizes the present value of the profit emanat- ing from that timber would be the optimal exploitation rate. Assuming that no timber company can influence prices, then there is no value to waiting to harvest trees unless some are relatively immature. The motivation to wait comes from the fact that trees grow, and thereby grow more valuable. If the interest rate is high (and ex- ceeds the rate of tree growth), then that favors the cut-it- now rate, while if the interest rate is low, that favors the let-them-grow rate.

The problem comes when no one owns the resources that are being harvested. For instance, the oceans are no- toriously overfished because there is no value to leaving

The Property Rights Approach to the Environment and Natural Resources

A Nobel Prize–winning economist by the name of Ronald Coase came up with a completely different method of dealing with pollution. His widely cited theorem states that markets with externalities can be made to be effi- cient. This can be done by simply assigning rights to the polluted property, but it requires that bargaining costs not be prohibitive. To see why this is so, we need to first look at why ownership matters.

Why You Do Not Mess Up Your Own Property Consider a relatively simple problem. Why is it that you are much more willing to litter in a park than you are to litter in your own residence hall, apartment, or house? The reason is that you have property rights in the place you live and you make your own place less valuable when you litter in it. You do not own the park. Though your littering diminishes the value of the park, it does not diminish your own wealth.

This explains why people treat many forms of com- mon property worse than they treat their own. If you have ever lived on a cul-de-sac, you will have noted that the circle of grass in the center of the turnaround was in demonstrably worse shape (or at least less well land- scaped) than the surrounding lawns. People tend to treat their own property better than they do public property.

Why You Do Mess Up Common Property Common property is property that is without a discernible individual owner. This property is usually owned by the government, a neighborhood association, or some other

collective group. The problem with common property is that even though it may be worth a great deal to the group, the benefits of treating the property well are not worth the costs to

any one individual. Economists refer to this as the “trag- edy of the commons.”

Consider again the problem of a neighborhood park. Suppose that a city agrees to pay the up-front costs of a park for a neighborhood of 100 homes. It buys the playground equipment, plants trees and grass, but then turns the park over to the neighborhood. What happens when the grass needs to be cut, a tree falls and needs to be taken out, or the surface under the playground equip- ment needs to be rejuvenated? While each neighbor

common property Property that is not owned by any individual but is owned by govern- ment or has some other collective ownership.

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Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions 263

the fish to grow bigger. Similarly, when logging compa- nies buy the right to harvest trees on federal land, those contracts need to be well specified and well enforced or the company will have no motivation to leave the smaller trees for a later date, especially if the contract expires before the trees grow to maturity. This is much less of a problem on private property because the owner must weigh the present value of the profit from taking an im- mature tree against the present value of the profit from taking it a few years later. It is often the case that the logging company that owns the property it is working on will leave the smaller trees because it is in its interest to do so.

Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions

Environmental Problems We face many environmental problems, some obvious and others not so obvious. Specific problems include water and air pollution, plant and animal species that face extinction, the effects of acid rain, landfills that are overflowing, limited natural resources that are being used up, and global warming. In this section we look briefly at each.

When humans are affected by the economic activ- ity of other humans, the problem is relatively easy to solve. People complain when they are being hurt. When producers pollute the air or water, there are concerned people who have to breathe the affected air or want to drink or swim in the affected water. They will lobby their representatives for pollution regulations. In fact, the En- vironmental Protection Agency was created in 1969 in response to pleas that environmental regulations be en- forced. The Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972 were additional responses to people’s per- ceptions that problems existed and their desire to have them addressed.

By most measures, these laws have been effective. The nation’s air and water are much cleaner than they were 40 years ago. Air pollution has been addressed with regulations that range from requirements that smoke- stack emissions be “scrubbed” before being released to requirements that cars have catalytic converters and burn unleaded gasoline. Since the Clean Air Act’s incep- tion the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in the air has been reduced by 84 percent, carbon monoxide by 67 percent, particulate matter by 20 percent, and lead by 99.6 percent. As can be seen in Figure 23.4, even since 1980, the Clean Air Act has resulted in significant reductions in all mea- sured forms of air pollution.

FIGURE 23.4 Pollutant concentrations.

Source: Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa.gov

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264 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

In the area of water pollution, municipal wastewater facilities now have to return untreated water to rivers and streams in nearly drinkable form. Companies can no lon- ger discharge waste materials into rivers or lakes, either. Though some of the damage to these bodies of water is permanent, most are improving. Classic examples of this include the Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, Ohio, which was so polluted that it once actually caught fire. Now it is clean enough that people can eat its fish. Other areas, though, have not yet fared as well. On the bottom of Onondaga Lake in Syracuse, New York, for example, there remains several feet of toxic sludge, and, on the of- ficial map of the city, there is a piece of shoreline labeled the “Allied Waste Beds,” where Allied Chemical simply dumped its toxic waste.

When air and water are unacceptably dirty, the prob- lem is fairly obvious. However, it is more difficult to see damage to wildlife and it is harder to address the problem. Plants and animals do not object as they become extinct. Fortunately for them there are scientists who monitor their health. To illustrate the difficulty of convincing people of problems with wildlife, though, it took threat- ening of our national symbol, the bald eagle, to bring about legislative action. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 has resulted in lists of plants and animals that are either threatened or, more serious, endangered. Currently there are in the United States alone 198 threatened and 489 endangered animal species, as well as 165 threatened and 733 endangered plant species. Since the inception of the act, 33 species have been removed from the lists and a number, including the bald eagle, which in 2007 was deemed fully recovered, have been delisted entirely.

Although 34 North American species of birds and mammals have become extinct since the 1500s, none that has been listed since 1973 has succumbed. Some species would have become extinct without the help of humans, but the rate of extinction is estimated to have increased at least 10-fold since the time of the first known human. It is discouraging, moreover, that for the listed species whose habitat is government land, there are 1.5 on the decline for every 1 on the rebound. On private land, where regulation is less stringent, the figure is 9 to 1.

The key to keeping plant and animal life from ex- tinction is to prevent the loss of habitat. This is why the Endangered Species Act is a problem for economic growth. The lost logging associated with preserving a single mating pair of spotted owls in the American Northwest amounts to $650 million. While strict en- vironmentalists push for the preservation of species, regardless of the economic costs of doing so, the costs

are foremost in the minds of the people whose liveli- hoods are threatened by this law’s requirements.

A piece of environmental legislation that combines protections for both wildlife and habitat is the Clean Air Act of 1990. In this legislation, the targeted prob- lem is acid rain. Acid rain is created when power plants burn high-sulfur coal and the SO2 emissions from that burning combine in the atmosphere with various nitro- gen oxides (NO2, NO3, etc.) to create a dilute form of sulfuric acid. In particular, the coal that is burned in the Midwest creates an acid that travels to the north- eastern states in clouds, and the rain that subsequently forms has caused trees to die and lakes to become deadly for fish.

The legislation limits the quantity of sulfur that in- dustry can put into the air. To comply with the law’s pro- visions, firms can buy more expensive low-sulfur coal, they can buy equipment to clean up the emissions, or they can buy another firm’s pollution permits. Offering options like the trading of pollution permits is consid- ered to be very innovative. It allows companies to clean up the environment in the cheapest way possible, and, as we will discuss later, this innovative way of dealing with pollution has earned economists a place at the table in discussing environmental problems.

An additional environmental problem is that landfill space is being used up faster than new space is created. The problem here is less an environmental problem than a location problem. Modern landfills are required to prove that no contamination leaks into groundwater. No homeowners want garbage in their neighborhoods, and Congress has steadfastly refused to allow states to keep others from exporting their garbage. A consequence of this stance is that more New York City garbage is put in out-of-state landfills than in those in New York. Because the interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Con- stitution prevents states from refusing to let out-of-state garbage in, and because of the way the U.S. population is distributed, the burden of siting new landfills has shifted from the East to the Midwest.

The economic implications of changes in Earth’s cli- mate are what we will discuss last in this chapter. It is fairly well-settled scientific fact that the globe is warming. The warmest years on record are concentrated after the 1980s. The problem is that unless they were told by a scientist that this is bad, most people would neither have noticed nor objected to the change in temperature. Though sum- mers have been somewhat warmer, winters— especially at night—have been still warmer. Who is likely to object if winter weather is milder than usual?

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Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions 265

Meteorologists tell us that the earth’s temperature has risen about 1.5° Fahrenheit in the entire 20th century. The average, though, is 2.5° higher in 1999 than it was in 1970. It is a change that is simply too small for the typi- cal person to detect. Over time, however, the problems with global warming will become more obvious. With temperatures that are anywhere from 5° to 10° higher by the end of the 21st century, several things may happen. The bad things include a thawing of the polar ice caps, which scientists say will be accompanied by a flooding of coastal cities and islands. Soils may become dry, mak- ing it more difficult to grow grains. People will use more refrigerants for air conditioning. Warm-weather diseases like malaria and yellow fever may proliferate, and certain areas of the world will become deserts, in a process la- beled with the frightening word desertification.

On the other hand, some good things will happen if global temperatures rise. Growing seasons will lengthen in northern climates, less energy will be needed to heat homes and businesses in those areas, and the impact of cold-weather diseases like colds and the flu will dimin- ish. A good way of imagining the positive impact is to realize that though there will be places where the climate will get “too hot,” some places that were once “too cold” will now be “just right.”

This is not to suggest that there will necessarily be an even-up trade by any means. While temperature zones will change relatively quickly, forests can move only ex- tremely slowly. Thus some forests whose trees require a specific temperature band to be healthy will die out long before new ones appear. There is also new research suggesting that only about half of the increased carbon dioxide, which may be good for some species of plant life, can be absorbed.

A statistic of vital importance to environmental economists is the responsiveness of climate to CO2 con- centrations. One estimate suggests a doubling of CO2 leads to an increase in global temperatures anywhere from 1º Celsius to 4.5º Celsius (relative to preindustrial levels).

Economic Solutions: Using Taxes to Solve Environmental Problems To solve the environmental problems that we face, we have to encourage or require clean behaviors, or we must discourage unclean behaviors or render them illegal. To varying degrees, all these methods work. America’s history of environmental regulations clearly indicates that we have been moving successfully from forms of

regulation that concentrate on punishing people to forms where we provide incentives that make clean behavior profitable.

Most environmental regulation still prohibits certain actions that damage the air, water, or wildlife. For instance, the Clean Water Act prohibits dumping of untreated in- dustrial waste into a river. Mandating that the environment be protected, however, is not necessarily the best way to deal with all environmental issues. For instance, it is hypo- thetically possible that production of a cure for a terrible disease may turn out to be very dirty. In such a case it might be in society’s best interest to sacrifice the environ- ment. Instead of an outright ban, a polluting activity could be heavily taxed. Activities that were sufficiently profit- able to cover whatever tax was levied could continue.

A tax could conceivably be used to discourage any pol- luting activity, including the creation of garbage or the use of fossil fuels. As Figure 23.5 indicates, a tax would be set that was equal to the external cost, that is, the dollar- denominated value of the pollution. Production of the good would fall to Q′, its socially optimal level, and the price would increase to P′. There would be enough tax revenue to compensate those affected by the pollution resulting from a garbage dump or, perhaps, to fund research on non- polluting technologies. Assuming a connection between energy use and global warming and between global warm- ing and hurricane flooding, such a fund might also be used to deal with flood relief from hurricanes.

Economic Solutions: Using Property Rights to Solve Environmental Problems Coase’s theorem holds that it does not matter if you grant the property right to the polluter or the victim of the pollution. If you say that people have a right to

FIGURE 23.5 Solving the problem with a pollution tax.

Social cost S (marginal cost)

O Qʹ

P

Q*

P*

Tax = External cost

Q/t

D (marginal benefit)

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266 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

clean air, then Coase suggests that the polluter would buy the right to pollute from the people; if you say that polluters have the right to do what they want, then Coase suggests that the people will pay polluters to be cleaner. Either way, the right amount of production and pollution will result.

An interesting adaptation of Coase’s ideas was the Clean Air Act of 1990 and its use of effluent1 permits. The law provides that each emitter of certain restricted pollutants can be granted a fixed number of permits ced- ing the right to pollute a specific amount. In 1990, the quota of polluted emissions was slightly less than the historical levels of pollution. Any firm that polluted less than that amount could sell its remaining rights to pollute to those that polluted more than their permits allowed. In 2000, in the second phase of the Clean Air Act of 1990, emission rights were reduced further, and when the act is reauthorized, it is likely that further reductions will be required. In this way pollution is reduced over time, while polluters have options that allow them flexibility in meeting the reductions.

In 2008, the Supreme Court compelled the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases (GHG) as pollutants and though the outgoing Bush administration chose not to

rush into this area, the Obama administration was quite will- ing to jump in. Its preferred method was to use this same cap-and-trade method. Cap- and-trade gets its name from the process by which the gov- ernment sets a “cap” on the level of pollution that is allow-

able and then allows polluters to “trade” the right to pollute. By giving the rights away each year, and in di- minishing amounts, the reductions are achieved in the most economically efficient manner possible. Specifi- cally, we get the most output (usually electrical power) subject to our societal goal of pollution reductions. This happens because power companies have different opportunity costs associated with reducing pollution. Those that have a high opportunity cost will buy per- mits from those that have a low opportunity cost. Con- sider the following uncomplicated example. Suppose there are only two electrical companies and both have older coal- powered generators that generate a great deal of pollution. Each one will have to reduce pollu- tion slightly unless it wishes to buy permits from the

other. Suppose one is close to a natural gas pipeline, but the costs of switching to cleaner-burning natural gas have been heretofore just beyond what would have made economic sense for the firm. Suppose the op- tions to the other are much more prohibitive. Suppose, finally, that electrical power demand is increasing, so each will be expected to produce more electricity and will therefore generate more pollution in the future. Because they cannot both increase pollution, the firm that has the lower cost option of reducing pollution will do so and be compensated for doing so by selling its permits to the firm with the higher cost option. In this way, society’s goal of both meeting the increase in electrical demand and reducing pollution is furthered.

For the purposes of acid rain reduction under the 1990 Clean Air Act, each permit grants its holder ap- proximately a ton of SO2 emissions. Total emissions of SO2 over the life of this provision of the 1990 act have been cut 78 percent to 5 million tons per year. Surpris- ing as it may seem, the price of those emission permits was falling through the 1990s and mid-2000s from $200 to $100. Though those prices spiked in 2006 at more than $1,500, today they are less than $8. At first this was because power companies have found it a profitable sideline to find ways to reduce pollution. And though the reduction in the number of available permits and the increase in electrical power demand put pressure on the permit prices to rise, electric utilities are using new, cleaner technologies either to reduce the number of permits they have to buy or to make money selling their rights. More recently, though, the biggest driver in clearing the air of SO2 and nitric oxides has been the re- duction in natural gas prices. A brief look at Figure 23.6 shows that after 2008 it became much less expensive to operate a natural-gas-fired electrical peaking plant, and as a result utilities began converting from coal to natural gas for those facilities. Natural gas, being a much cleaner burning fuel, allowed utilities to reduce their purchases of permits substantially. Thus the pressure on the price of these permits to decrease that has resulted from this innovation has greatly outweighed the pressure to rise.

Though the cap-and-trade idea was originally one cre- ated by economic conservatives in the 1980s as a way to use market forces to deal with environmental challenges, it became a useful political target in 2010. Dubbed “cap and tax,” the policy option designed by conservatives in the 1980s to avoid inflexible regulatory frameworks, in- stead became something conservatives could pin on po- litical opponents in 2010. It worked so well that even with a 60 to 40 majority in the U.S. Senate, Democrats were

cap-and-trade The method of reducing a pollutant whereby the government gives to polluters, or auctions, a capped amount of pol- lution permits and then allows those permits to be sold in a market.

1Effluent is the general term for the stuff that comes out of a smokestack.

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Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions 267

registered to the same owner in the previous two years, and as long as a new car was purchased that got 10 mpg more than the one traded in, this $4,500 meant that an old car that might have been worth only $1,000 in trade, became worth substantially more. Though economists debate how many of the used cars would have been junked anyway and how many of the newly purchased cars would have been purchased anyway, there was likely some modest, pollution-reducing effect. Economists in- fluence environmental regulations and legislation pre- cisely because we offer suggestions like cap-and-trade and cash-for-clunkers, thus aligning self-interest with environmentalism.

No Solution: When There Is No Government to Tax or Regulate Let’s assume that the problems of global warming exceed the benefits. What can be done? When an environmental problem is confined to one jurisdiction, the government, whether it be local, state, or national, can enact legislation to tackle the problem. When the problem is international, such as with global warming, there is no government to impose a regulatory or tax-based solution.

The Kyoto Protocol is a treaty to which the United States is a signatory. Such treaties require U.S. Senate approval, so President Clinton’s signature was point- less from the start because there were not 20 votes for ratification and he knew that when he signed it. Shortly after his election, President Bush formally pulled the

unable to muster the votes to pass cap-and-trade as part of their energy bill, which subsequently stalled as a result.

The reasons conservatives opposed cap-and-trade were not all purely political. The acid-rain producing pollutants were clearly identifiable as to their source—specifically, power plants and other large combustion units with obvi- ous smokestacks. The problem with using cap-and-trade for CO2 and other greenhouse gases is that there are many more polluters to monitor and regulate. It is relatively simple to monitor the two gases that overwhelmingly come from a few sources. It would be impossible to ac- curately monitor GHGs emanating from every car, home, business, and farm.

Another area where economists use the property right idea to help with air pollution is with the offset. Cars pol- lute, and old cars pollute much worse than newer ones. In California, polluters can either reduce their direct pol- lution or they can buy enough old cars and get those off the road. Similarly, across the United States, there are foundations that seek to reduce air pollution by buying emission permits so that they cannot be used by a busi- ness planning to pollute.

In 2009, as the Obama administration was pushing to reduce pollution, decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil, and breathe life into the auto industry, it introduced an adaptation of this idea. Called “cash-for-clunkers,” the program paid auto dealers up to $4,500 per car as long as they agreed to destroy them rather than resell them in the used car market. As long as the car was

FIGURE 23.6 Price of natural gas.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdM.htm

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268 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

carbon-based energy would have to quadruple in order to get that 25 percent reduction in the short run though a doubling would be sufficient to accomplish the same thing in the long run. That is likely the upper bound of what is necessary because a doubling of carbon-emitting energy prices would induce energy consumers to look to nonemitting sources. Accounting for the substitution to these other sources, some economists have estimated that the tax on emissions necessary to reduce GHG by 13 percent could be as little as $36 per ton of GHG to as much as $70 per ton. For perspective, a typical car pro- duces a little less than 1 pound of GHG per mile driven, and if you do a bunch of algebra, that translates to an appropriate tax of as little as 20 cents per gallon to as much as $1.75 per gallon. The experience of 2008 sug- gests that 20 cents wouldn’t be sufficient. Had the $2 gasoline price increase been sustained through 2008 and 2009 and had the economy not slipped into a deep re- cession, the shift from large SUVs to small cars would likely have been sufficient to have a significant long-run impact on U.S. GHG production.

Regardless of who is right, the issue illustrates the difficulty in dealing with international environmental problems. There is little economic motivation for a sin- gle country to impose high costs on itself, and there is no world government to impose those high costs on everyone. So while the politics in the United States have changed with regard to American participation in the Kyoto GHG reduction process, neither the Chinese nor the Indian gov- ernments have changed their views. As a result, if those warning of the consequences of global warming are cor- rect, this could be one of the more calamitous examples of the Chapter 3 notion of market failure.

United  States out of the agreement noting the signifi- cant economic impact compliance would have. He also noted that the agreement did not limit China or India, two rapidly growing energy consumers, in any mean- ingful way. China now produces two and one-half times the amount of greenhouse gases as it did when the pro- tocols were created, and India produces nearly twice as much. In terms of GHGs per dollar of GDP, these countries now rival the United States.

With the election of President Obama, the position of the U.S. government toward GHG regulation changed. There will, of course, be economic consequences. The extent of those consequences is debated among econo- mists. The United States is currently producing about 13 percent more GHG than it promised to produce. If you refer back to Figure 23.5, you can see how econo- mists might propose to deal with the issue. A tax would need to be placed on the production of GHG sufficient to reduce the amount produced by a quarter. Energy usage would have to either become more efficient, become less prevalent, or come from nonemitting sources such as wind, hydroelectric, solar, or nuclear.

The rapid increase in gasoline prices during 2008 can aid us in figuring out how much that tax would need to be; this is where elasticity comes into play. If the only thing we could do was reduce energy usage, we could estimate the tax on energy using the elasticity of de- mand for carbon-based energy. Clearly energy demand is inelastic. As the price of gasoline spiked in 2008, in- creasing 75 percent, gasoline consumption fell 6 percent. This suggests a short-run elasticity of .08. Studies of the long-run elasticity of demand for gasoline suggest it is 0.24. Extrapolation would imply that the price of

You now understand how to use the concept of externali- ties to explain why pollution warrants government inter- vention in the market. You understand why pollution is much more likely to occur on publicly owned property

than on private property, and you have a cursory under- standing of the variety of environmental problems that exist in the world. You now also have an understanding of some economic solutions to these problems.

Summary

cap-and-trade common property externalities

limited natural resource renewable natural resource social cost

stewardship sustainability

Key Terms

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Summary 269

6. The evidence on most environmental pollutants (lead in the air and water, sulfur in the air, etc.) is that a. they are not nearly as harmful as once thought. b. they are increasing at an alarming rate. c. they have decreased substantially in the last

20 years. d. they have stabilized in the air at their all-time

high. 7. An environmental economist would likely recom-

mend which of the following policies? a. Eliminate fossil fuel consumption b. A tax on gasoline equal to the environmental

damage caused by a gallon of gasoline c. A tax on gasoline greater than the environmen-

tal damage caused by a gallon of gasoline d. Voluntary limits on driving

Short Answer Questions 1. Why would an increasing marginal cost of produc-

ing oil lead to a more spread-out utilization plan? 2. Why would saving some species be worth the cost

of saving them while another species might not be? 3. Why would “cap-and-trade” be more aligned with

those who wish to use private market innovations to solve environmental problems than a regulatory- based environmental system?

Think about This Fossil fuels were the “clean” alternative to wood burn- ing and overcame wood as a source of fuel only when it became cheaper to use than wood. If left unchecked, this will happen to fossil fuels as well because this lim- ited resource will eventually become more scarce than its alternatives (solar-, wind-, hydroelectric-, or biomass- generated power). Should we just wait it out?

Talk about This Every power source entails some environmental conse- quence. Nuclear power leaves behind waste that is danger- ous for thousands of years. Hydroelectric power destroys the habitat of valley-dwelling animals. Wind and solar power require vast spaces for collection devices. Combus- tible fuels typically leave a heat-trapping gas. Currently, the dominant U.S. fuel sources are fossil based (coal, oil, natural gas). While other countries have turned toward nuclear power, we have not. Given that our power needs are continuously growing, what are your solutions?

Quiz Yourself 1. The notion of “clean enough” is

a. appealing to an economist thinking about average benefit and average cost.

b. appealing to an economist thinking about marginal benefit and marginal cost.

c. appealing to an economist thinking about total benefit and total cost.

d. completely rejected as a concept by an economist.

2. If a chemical does environmental damage but is used in the production of a good that provides satisfaction to the consumer and profit to the producer, an economist a. will insist that the market be left alone. b. will insist that the chemical be completely

banned. c. will seek to impose a tax on the good so that

the net benefit to society (including the environ- mental damage) is maximized.

d. will suggest that consumers voluntarily cut back their consumption.

3. An example of an externality that we see every day is a. people paying high prices for gasoline. b. people enjoying their ability to drive to work. c. oil companies making record profits. d. the emissions from a car’s tailpipe.

4. When tackling local environmental problems, taxes and regulations can be useful. The reason that global problems (like global warming) are more difficult to control is that a. it is in every countries’ aggregate interest to

ignore the problem. b. it is in no country’s interest to address the

problem. c. there is no ability to enforce those taxes or

regulations. d. the “marginal” country is unknown.

5. Overfishing certain parts of the ocean and certain species of fish has been a problem for centuries with countries actually going to war over fishing dis- putes. Ronald Coase would suggest that there would be no problem if a. someone owned (and could control) the ocean. b. people stopped eating fish. c. people reacted according to the golden rule. d. countries agreed to voluntary restrictions on

fishing.

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270 Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change

Behind the Numbers Air quality and emissions data.

Outdoor air pollution. Environmental Protection Agency; environmental

indicators—www.epa.gov/Envindicators/roe/pdf /tdAir.pdf

Emissions prices and trading. Environmental Protection Agency; clean air

markets—www.epa.gov/airmarkets Global temperatures.

History and projections. Environmental Protection Agency; global warming—

www.epa.gov Average surface temperature. World Meteorological Organization—www.wmo.int

Threatened, endangered, and delisted species. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; publications—

www.fws.gov/endangered

For More Insight See Joskow, Paul L., A. Denny Ellerman, Richard

Schmalensee, Juan Pablo Montero, and Elizabeth M. Bailey, Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program ( Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 3 (Sum- mer 1998). See articles by Gardner M. Brown Jr., and Jason F. Shogren; Andrew Metrick and Martin Weitzman; Robert Innes, Stephen Polasky, and John Tschirhart; and Richard Schmalensee, pp. 1–88.

Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 4 (Fall 1995). See articles by Michael E. Porter and Claas van der Linde; Karen Palmer, Wallace E. Oates, and Paul R. Portney, pp. 97–132.

Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 4 (Fall 1993). See articles by Richard Schmalensee; William D. Nordhaus; John P. Weyant; James M. Poteba and Gacielka Chichilinsky; and Geoffrey Heal, pp. 3–86.

Any environmental economics textbook, for instance, Economics and the Environment by Eban Goodstein.

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C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - F O U R

271

Health Care Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Summarize how the system of health care finance seriously alters the market for health care services.

LO2 Conclude that in the United States 45 percent of the health care tab is picked up by the taxpayer with the remainder being paid either directly by patients or by their insurance companies.

LO3 Analyze the health care industry using the supply and demand model and discuss the limitations of the model when applied to this industry.

LO4 Demonstrate that both private insurance and taxpayer- financed health care systems increase the overall price of health care.

LO5 Compare and contrast privately financed and single-payer, taxpayer-financed health care systems by noting their re- spective advantages and disadvantages.

Chapter Outline

Where the Money Goes and Where It Comes From

Insurance in the United States

Economic Models of Health Care

Comparing the United States with the Rest of the World

Summary

Health care in the United States has two characteristics that seem to be fundamentally inconsistent. No other country on earth can match the United States in terms of the quality of care that is available, but no developed country has our infant mortality rate. Additionally, in no other country are doctors as skilled, and in no other country are doctors as highly paid. In no other country is the quality of care as high, but in no other developed country is care denied so often because patients are un- able to pay for it. At its root, the problem of having high- quality care that is not available to everyone who needs it is attributed only to the way we finance health care.

In this chapter we explain health care in the United States by first detailing the money spent and by whom it is spent. We discuss how private and public insurance work in the United States and discuss the problems as- sociated with each. We then turn to why the economics

of health care differs so much from the economics of any other good. Along the way we compare our health care financing system with the model used in most other developed countries and hit the high points of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).

Where the Money Goes and Where It Comes From

In defeating the health care plan that the Clinton adminis- tration attempted to implement, Republicans claimed that Democrats were trying to take over one-sixth of the econ- omy. Indeed, while in 2014 one-sixth of the gross domes- tic product ($3.03 trillion of $17.35 trillion) was spent on health-related goods and services, the government’s portion was already nearly half (45 percent, or $1.4 trillion) of health

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272 Chapter 24 Health Care

will happen to you. You spend a little money on insurance that will cushion the effects of the bad prospect, should it occur. In other words, you pay a premium so that if the bad thing happens, the insurance provider (whether it be the government or an insurance company) will pay to make things better. In the case of health insurance, people pay premiums so that when they get sick their provider pays most of the expense of dealing with their illnesses.

It is perfectly rational to buy insurance even when the average expense you would face is less than the cost of the

insurance. The reason is that most people are risk averse: They pre- fer to be guaranteed a particular outcome, even when the odds are that for the average person, over an average lifetime, insurance is more expensive than the prob- lem they are insuring themselves against. As an example, suppose there is a 1 percent chance that you will have a major health-

related expense of $100,000 and a 99 per cent chance that you will have only $1,000 of typical health expenses. A risk-neutral person would look at the expected expense, $1,990,2 and not be willing to pay any more than that for full insurance coverage. People who are risk averse, on the other hand, would be willing to pay more than that to guar- antee themselves that they would not have to pay any more.

Nearly all private health insurance plans have a number of characteristics in common. You owe a premium that, for most Americans, is paid partly by you and partly by your em- ployer.3 Insurance companies use premiums for three things: (1) to pay doctor and hospital bills of their patients, (2) to cover administrative expenses, and (3) to provide profit for the owners (usually shareholders) of the insurance company.

If you get sick and have a health expense, it is usually the case that both you and your insurance company will pay part of the bill. There are four key pieces of vocabu- lary that determine who pays how much. The deductible

is the amount of health spend- ing a year that you have to pay before the insurance company pays anything. This very much depends on the type of plan you have but can be as low as

care expenditures. President Clinton and his Democratic supporters were merely attempting to federalize the pri- vate portion of health care expenditure.

Of the $1.4 trillion that government spent on health care in the United States in 2014, some $619 billion was

spent on Medicare (the govern- ment health insurance program for the elderly) and $496 bil- lion was spent on Medicaid (the government health insur- ance program for the poor). The remainder was spent by all levels of government on local, state, and veterans’ hospitals and in support of medical research.

Of the $1.67 trillion that was spent on health care in the private sector in 2014, some $991 billion came from premiums paid to insurance companies by businesses, households, or governments (or to employers’ self-insured systems). People paid an additional $330 billion in out-of-pocket expenditures, and the re- mainder was spent by private medical research companies.

In general, of the $3.03 trillion spent on health care in the United States in 2014, $972 billion went to hospitals and $603 billion went to doctors. Drugs accounted for $298 billion and medical research spending accounted for $45 billion.

Insurance in the United States

Most people in the United States are covered by some form of health insurance for at least part of the year. In 2014, for example, 83 percent of the 320 million people in the United States had coverage all year, another 7 per- cent had coverage for part of the year, and 10 percent had no coverage at all. The coverage during that year came from a variety of sources. The largest group, 175 mil- lion people, was covered by group insurance policies, 46 million had individual policies, 51 million were on Medicare, 62 million were on Medicaid,1 and of those, 8 million were on both.

How Insurance Works Whether we are discussing health insurance, life insurance, or auto insurance, private insurance of any kind works like this. There is a small chance that something bad will hap- pen to you, and there is a large chance that nothing bad

Medicare Public health insurance in the United States that covers those over age 65.

Medicaid Public health insurance in the United States that covers the poor.

1Because Medicaid’s enrollment is fluid, as many as 73 million have Medicaid at some point during the year.

risk averse A characteristic of a person who would pay extra to guarantee the expected outcome.

risk neutral A characteristic of a person who would not pay extra to guarantee the expected outcome.

deductible The amount of health spending a year that you have to pay before the insurance company pays anything.

2.99 × 1,000 + .01 × 100,000 = 1,990. 3This aspect is actually an artifact of World War II. Because of inflation fears during that time, it was against the law to raise wages to attract workers. Instead, companies increased benefits in the form of group insurance subsidies, and the practice survived the war.

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Insurance in the United States 273

nothing and as high as several thousand dollars. Typically, the deductible for a plan is between $1,000 and $1,800 per person and between $2,300 and $3,800 per fam- ily per year. For instance, if you have an insurance plan with a $1,000 deductible and you have a covered medical expense that totals $2,500, you will have to pay $1,000 before your insurance company pays anything.

The co-payment is either a set amount or the percent- age of the bill, after the deductible has been taken out, that

you have to pay. Typical office visit co-payments are around $25 for per visit. Co-insurance rates, the percentage version of co-payments, range between 10 percent and 40 percent. The national average is 20 percent. The maximum out of pocket is the most that a person or family will have to pay over a year for all covered health expenses. This means that a $500,000 health ex- pense will not bankrupt the typi- cal person because the maximum out of pocket is usually between $2,000 and $10,000 a year.

Some companies offer what are called mini-meds. Mini-med insurance policies are usually only offered to young people, have fairly low premiums and, as one of the features, have low (usually no more than $10,000) annual maximum amounts that the insurance company will pay. These limits are illegal, in general, but these policies serve a niche market that the Obama administra- tion did not want to harm when they banned the general practice of capping health insurance company liabil- ity. The fear was that by outlawing all mini-meds, they would reduce health insurance coverage for many young people in their first jobs.

Varieties of Private Insurance There are several types of private insurance plans out there, but they boil down to three large groups: (1) fee for service, (2) health maintenance, and (3) preferred provider. A fee- for-service provider allows sick people to go to any doctor they want, wherever they want, for whatever ails them. The doctor then bills the insurance company, the insurance company pays its share, and the doctor bills the patient for the remainder. Because there are few controls on spending in a system like this, it is very costly. Patients and doctors, however, have few complaints.

A health maintenance organization (HMO) requires that people see specific doctors at the beginning of any prob-

lem. These doctors are referred to as primary care physicians (PCP) or, familiarly, as gatekeep- ers. Patients can see specialists only after their primary care physician makes a referral, and the PCP, or gatekeeper, has the job of making sure that his or her

patients get the appropriate care as inexpensively as pos- sible. Usually HMO PCPs receive a fixed fee for every patient assigned, and specialists are either salaried or also have fixed fees for every referral. Patients and doctors complain about the controls on spending in HMOs, but these serve to keep costs down.

A preferred provider organization (PPO) is somewhat of a hybrid. People can choose the doctor they want from a list of doctors. The doctors agree to charge a specific amount per procedure or disease, and they take a lower fee than usual in order to be guaranteed a large number of potential patients.

Table 24.1 outlines the advantages and disadvan- tages of each of these private insurance options from the patient’s standpoint.

Public Insurance Public insurance, provided by the government, is di- vided into three main programs: Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. Medi- care is available to eligible citizens who are 65 years old and older. It works very much like a generous fee- for-service health insurance plan, except that the bur- den for high premiums is placed on the taxpayer rather than the patient or the patient’s employer. The tax that funds Medicare appears on your paycheck in the same place your Social Security tax does; they are both under FICA (Federal Insurance Contributions Act). The por- tion that is used for Medicare is 1.45 percent of your salary, wages, and tips; you and your employer each pay that rate. For part of Medicare, money is also taken from the general tax revenues of the government.

Medicare is generous in the following sense: By pri- vate health care standards its premiums are very low, and the co-payments and the deductibles are also low. In truth Medicare is really two programs, a compulsory program that covers hospital-related expenses and a voluntary pro- gram that covers doctors’ charges. In 2013, those who were eligible for the compulsory version, Medicare Part A, and

co-payment Either a set amount or the percentage of the bill, after the deductible has been taken out, that you have to pay.

maximum out of pocket The most that a person or family will have to pay over a year for all covered health expenses.

mini-med Low premium health insurance with a low annual maximum.

primary care physician (PCP) Physician in managed care operations charged with making the initial diagnosis and making referrals. Also called a gatekeeper.

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274 Chapter 24 Health Care

sense that they may be able to afford insurance but are healthy and therefore choose not to purchase it. A recently emerging group of people without health insurance is those who retire early and are waiting for Medicare to kick in when they turn 65.

Among the uninsured for at least some portion of the year are the nearly 8 million who are under 18. It was in reaction to more than 16 million children living with- out health insurance that the Children’s Health Insurance Program was created in the 1990s. Its function is like that of Medicaid, but it is focused, as the name suggests, on children who live in families where the breadwinners do not have insurance through their employer and do not make enough to purchase it themselves.

Economic Models of Health Care

We can use our supply and demand model to look at what happens when the good in question is not something tangible, like an apple, but intangible, like health care. Ad- ditionally, in the context of this model, we can explore how the health care finance system alters people’s behavior.

Why Health Care Is Not Just Another Good Health care is not like any other good. You can look at an apple grown in 1998 and say that it is comparable to an apple grown in 1995 or 1885. An apple is pretty much the same through time. On the other hand, health care tends to be changeable. The medical CPI has risen at or above the overall rate of inflation for several years. However, we cannot be sure how much of this increase is an increase in

worked between 30 and 39 quarters paid a $226 monthly premium. Those who worked less than 30  quarters paid $411 per month, and for those who worked more than 40 quarters, it was free. The voluntary version, Medicare Part B, cost beneficiaries between $121.80 and $389.80 per month depending on their 2016 income, and covered doctor-related expenses. Elderly people who are eligible for the primary welfare program for the old and poor, Supplemental Security Income, have Medicaid pick up the Part A premium and often the Part B premium as well.

In contrast with Medicare, Medicaid is a no-premium, no-deductible, very low or no co-payment health plan for the poor.4 Under Medicaid, doctors are reimbursed at rates that are low relative to what Medicare pays and extremely low relative to what private insurance pays. Hospitals and doctors can and do refuse to treat Medicaid patients when they judge the reimbursement rates to be too low.

In 2011 there were 49 million Americans who sur- vived, at least part of the year, without any health insur- ance at all. Many of these are people who move from one job to another and whose insurance runs out while they are unemployed.5 On the other hand, a 1994 study by Katherine Swartz indicated that 21 million Americans were without any health insurance for more than a year. Of the uninsured, 18 million are between the ages of 18 and 34. Their lack of insurance may be voluntary in the

TABLE 24.1 Advantages and disadvantages to patients of different forms of private insurance.

Source: Medicare, www.medicare.gov

Insurance Type Advantages Disadvantages

Fee for service Maximum physician choice Little insurance company meddling in doctors’ decisions

Highest premiums, deductibles, and co-payment rates because of little control over expensive and unnecessary

procedures HMO Maximum control over expensive and

unnecessary procedures so premiums, deductibles, and co-payment rates are low

Minimal physician choice Significant meddling in physician decisions, especially when differing procedures have significant cost

differences PPO Some physician choice

Moderate premiums, deductibles, and co-payment rates Some control over expensive procedures Minor meddling in physician decisions

4States may impose small co-payments to discourage abusive overuse. 5Workers have the right to continue their employer-sponsored health insurance even after they quit or are fired. The problem is that most employers do not continue subsidizing the premiums, which means people are not likely to be able to afford to exercise this right.

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Economic Models of Health Care 275

Another key problem with using a supply and demand model for health care services is that one of the assump- tions that we made for such a model to work was perfect knowledge. One of the reasons we go to the doctor in the first place is that we do not know what is wrong with us. We go not only to stop the pain but also to find out why the pain exists. This is distinctly different from buying an apple. We know what an apple is, we know why we want it, and we know what it costs to get one. In health care we have to trust the seller (the doctor) to tell us what we need and how much it will cost.

Implications of Public Insurance Though considerations such as these are important, we can still examine the effect of our financing system on the supply and demand model for health care services. As you can see in Figure 24.1, if there were no pro- gram to provide health care services to the poor, the nonpoor would get many services and the poor few. If Dpoor is the demand for health care by the poor and Dnonpoor is the demand for health care by the nonpoor, then Dpoor + nonpoor is the market demand for health care services. This is arrived at by adding the two demand curves together horizontally. Specifically, at each price, the quantity demanded of the poor is added to the quan- tity demanded of the nonpoor. If the supply curve is as shown, then the price is P* and the poor consume Qpoor, much less than the nonpoor, Qnonpoor.

On the other hand, if the poor were to get the services at no cost, then the situation might be quite different. Figure 24.2 shows that in this case, the market demand is the amount that the poor would consume if it were

prices, how much is an increase in quality, and how much is the availability of new procedures or treatments.

To illustrate, let’s discuss the treatment of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). In 1985 there was no standard treatment for AIDS. Morphine was sometimes given to ease pain—a terribly ineffective but “cheap” treatment compared to today. In 2001 the treat- ment became a “drug cocktail” of zidovudine (AZT) and a group of protease inhibitors. Newer drug cocktails cost more than $30,000 per patient per year, but they can sustain a good quality of life for several years. Which “treatment” costs more? You do not have to answer the question because you know that you are not pricing the same thing. The quality of the treatment has improved so greatly that to say that the price of the treatment has increased is simply wrong. The quality of the treat- ment has improved, and because there was no effective treatment to compare the current one to, the “price” has fallen from infinity.

Many of the complaints about the increase in the cost of health care over the past few years are misdi- rected. The cost of things that do not change in quality (syringes, bandages, etc.) has surely gone up. But, just as surely, we cannot measure the price of things whose quality is constantly changing. A night in a hospital, for instance, is not the same in 2011 as it was in 1985. Though some definitions are the same (semiprivate has meant and still means two beds in a room, for example), other aspects of the night’s stay are different. Today television sets and other creature comforts and sophis- ticated medical equipment, including beds that monitor vital signs, are standard. Not long ago these were either optional or simply unavailable.

There are three significant provisions of the PPACA that serve to ex- pand coverage to those who have been without it. First, beginning in 2014, employers of more than 50 full-time employees are now re- quired to provide their employees with at least a minimal insurance plan or else pay a tax. Second, Medicaid was expanded in states where the state agreed to pay a small portion of the extra cost. That expansion, where it occurred, allowed health insurance coverage for everyone (rather than just the children) in families earning under 133 percent (which because of an income exemption amounted to 138 percent) of the poverty line. Third, subsidies are now paid to those earning under 400 percent of the poverty line when they pur- chase health insurance through an approved exchange.

These provisions are not without controversy. The first provision forces employers that do not provide at least minimal health insur- ance to pay a fine if even one of their employees is given a sub- sidy to buy insurance. This provision has some economists worried that the PPACA lessens the incentive that firms have to employ new workers by raising the cost of that worker. The Medicaid expansion worried governors and legislatures regarding its impact on state budgets so much that only 31 states have agreed to the expansion with two others organizing an alternative using a waiver process. Finally, because the PPACA was such a charged political issue for so long, only 20 states have agreed to create the exchanges.

P P A C A P R O V I S I O N S T O E X P A N D C O V E R A G E

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276 Chapter 24 Health Care

FIGURE 24.2 Health care: who gets it with subsidies.

QA

PA

5PA

Qʹ Q/t

S

B

A

C

D

P

FIGURE 24.3 The effect of co-payments on the market for health care.

Dpoor

Qpoor

Dnonpoor

Qnonpoor

Dpoor+nonpoor

Qpoor+nonpoor Q/t

S

P

P*

FIGURE 24.1 Health care: who gets it without subsidies.

Dpoor

Qpoor

Dnonpoor

Qnonpoor

Dpoor+nonpoor

Qpoor+nonpoor Q/t

S

P

P*

free to them, Qpoor, plus the demand by the nonpoor. As you can see, the poor would consume much more, Qpoor, while the nonpoor would consume less. Prices would also be higher.

Efficiency Problems with Private Insurance What private insurance does to the market for health care is as disruptive as public insurance. Recall the idea of co-payments: After the deductible is met, for every dollar of covered medical expense, a low percentage (usually 20 percent) is paid by the patient and the remainder is paid by the insurance company. How does that affect the demand for health care? For simplicity’s sake, assume the deductible has either been met or is zero.

Figure 24.3 shows that the demand curve will rotate out to the right and that this will cause a greater consumption

of health care services and higher prices. Let’s look at why the curve rotates out to the right. Take the equilibrium point prior to any insurance; call that point A. A person is willing to pay PA and consumes QA medical services prior to insurance. Suppose that person now has insurance with a 20 percent co-payment rate. If that is the case, that person would be willing to consume QA medical services even if the price were five times that of PA. This is because the effective price to the insured person is 20 percent of 5PA, or just PA. The reason it rotates out of the horizontal intercept of the demand curve is that if health care ser- vices were free, the effect of co-payments would not mat- ter. Twenty percent of nothing would be nothing and five times of nothing would still be nothing.

Whenever there is a situation where someone other than the consumer is paying the bill, economists call this

other entity a third-party payer. When this happens, the usual role of keeping costs down is taken out of the hands of the consumer.

Since our demand curve rotates out, we buy more health care services and pay more for them. The good news here is that this effect is lessened if the underly- ing demand curve D is itself inelastic. It can certainly be argued that the demand for health care services is relatively inelastic, and the evidence from an extensive study started in the late 1970s and published in 1987 suggests just that. This is because we would not have an unnecessary operation even if it got less expensive, and most people will have a necessary operation even if the price is high. This study suggests that patient sensitivity

third-party payer An entity other than the consumer who pays part of the costs.

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Economic Models of Health Care 277

to price is greater for visits to doctors than for hospi- talizations. Overall health elasticity estimates from this study indicate that a 10 percent increase in the out-of- pocket expenses of the patient is associated with a 1 per- cent to 3 percent reduction in health care utilization.

The increase in health care utilization also has an ef- ficiency implication. Recall from the Chapter 3 discussion of consumer and producer surplus that the deadweight loss is the yardstick by which economists measure inefficiency. Here the triangle ABC is the amount of the inefficiency.

Another area of inefficiency with health care insur- ance in particular comes in the form of moral hazard.

People who have insurance con- sume more health care. This is a problem with all forms of in- surance, and the clearest exam- ple is in automobile insurance.

If you drive more recklessly when you have insurance than when you do not, having insurance makes you more likely to need insurance. In the field of health care, if having insurance makes you more likely to get tested for certain diseases, or even worse, fail to exercise or eat right, then moral hazard is a problem.

A final area of inefficiency in the health insurance market is the greatest threat to its existence, and that is

adverse selection. Adverse se- lection arises when, instead of a true cross-section of the popula- tion buying insurance, those in most need of insurance are the most willing to pay for insur- ance and drive up the price of insurance with their illnesses to such a degree that those people who are not as sick leave the market altogether.

To understand the problem, suppose there are three types of people who initially do not know their own health status and their own need for health insurance. Unbeknownst to them, they are the “healthy,” “somewhat healthy,” or “un- healthy.” Suppose the healthiest category of people have no serious illnesses in the offing and face few risks other than accidents that are equally likely to occur throughout the population. Suppose the unhealthiest category of peo- ple face many risks associated with expensive treatments as well as those same injury risks. Now suppose there are two periods: now and later. If no one knows his or her health status “now” and everyone is risk averse, everyone will likely buy insurance “now.” They will pay the costs of that insurance (through premiums), which will equal

the average cost of care plus the administrative costs plus the profit for the insurance company. In that sense, when no one knows anything, insurance works fine. Once they know their health status, they will be able to compare the premiums to their expected costs by going it alone. If the difference is dramatic, the healthiest group may drop out. Doing so will raise the average costs to everyone else left in the insurance pool. It may raise it so much that the some- what healthy people drop their insurance. This has been labeled by some as the “insurance death spiral.”

You can solve this particular problem of adverse se- lection in one of three ways: charging unhealthy people more than healthy people (which is what we do with car insurance in that bad drivers pay more), having a system in which everyone gets insurance through some means other than individual choice (which could be through their employer or through the government), or we can mandate that people buy health insurance. The first method is considered, by many, unethical because lack of coverage is frequently translated as lack of care and lack of care for the sick is considered immoral.

The second method, which is what most of those in group insurance live with, is the system that existed in the United States prior to health care reform in 2010. Prior to that time most Americans either got insurance through the government or through their employer, while some purchased it as individuals; and some of those in the individual market who were sick were denied cov- erage by insurers. The PPACA changed that. Insurance companies were required to cover them without con- sidering their health status. Closing that option off for insurance companies, though, left the companies vulner- able to adverse selection.

The resolution to this problem and the final method of dealing with adverse selection is mandation. Mandation is the requirement that everyone buy insurance. By requir-

ing the healthy to buy insurance (forcing them to pay a tax or fine if they do not), the problem of adverse selection disappears.

Major Changes to Insurance Resulting from PPACA Several provisions of the bill change how the health in- surance industry operates. Under laws existing prior to the enactment of PPACA, health insurers could cut off dependent children from coverage under their parents’ health insurance the first year after their children reached 23 and were free to consider, charge more for, and deny

moral hazard Having insurance increases the demand for the insured good.

adverse selection Those in most need of insurance are the most willing to pay for insurance and drive up the price of insurance with their illnesses to such a degree that those people who are not as sick leave the market altogether.

mandation The requirement to purchase insurance.

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someone else’s problem. While that is good for you, it is not necessarily good for society.

All of these other provisions have a similar problem associated with them. Again the benefits to those not cut off, or not charged more, or not denied coverage will be greater. However, those costs and burdens will go somewhere. They will not disappear. Take another ex- ample. Women, on average, are more costly than men throughout the health care life cycle because they face cancer risks—specifically, ovarian, breast, and uterine cancer—that men either do not face or, in the case of breast cancer, do with much less frequency. Just as in the auto insurance industry teenage boys pay more for car insurance than teenage girls because boys get in more serious accidents than do girls, women used to have to pay more for individual health insurance, and groups that were disproportionately women paid more than groups of the same size that were disproportionately men. What does that mean with regard to this provision? Men will pay more because women are paying less.

The aforementioned provisions affecting insurance that present the greatest challenge to the health insurance industry itself are the provisions that prevent insurance companies from denying coverage to the people based on pre-existing conditions. This, by itself, could (were it not accompanied with another provision requiring that everyone buy health insurance or have it provided to them) lead to the end of all private health insurance, through the aforementioned death spiral.

The resolution to the death spiral imagined by the PPACA is through a combination of provisions that ex- pand coverage. Through a large expansion of Medicaid through state-run insurance exchanges, and through an employer requirement (all explained later in this chap- ter), coverage will likely be extended to three-quarters of those who are currently uninsured. Still, those provisions alone would likely not be enough to forestall the death spiral. It is mandation that does this. Mandation is the re- quirement that everyone buy insurance if insurance is not provided to them. Requiring the healthy to buy insurance (forcing them to pay a tax or fine if they do not) makes the problem of adverse selection disappear.

In the individual health insurance market, insur- ance companies will have significantly less freedom to charge differential prices to buyers. They will be allowed to charge older customers no more than three times what they charge younger ones (though younger ones typically cost one-fifth or less than what older ones cost), and only be able to charge 50 percent more to tobacco users. They may set up broad geographic

coverage for any medical condition a prospective client had prior to purchasing insurance through the company.

They were free to set annual and lifetime limits on how much they would cover. They were free to set prior conditions by which they could rescind coverage, and they were free to raise the rates of those who became ill (and therefore expensive to the company). They were free to charge rates that were different for men and women. They were free from most government interven- tion when it came to premiums, profit, and the propor- tion of premiums taken up with administrative costs. Much of this ended or was scheduled to end with the passage of PPACA.

The law as it stands (or in some cases as it will soon stand) will require that health insurers allow depen- dent children to stay on their parents’ health insurance through age 26, that the insurers accept everyone without regard to health status, charge the same to healthy and the unhealthy alike, and charge the same for men and women. They can no longer set lifetime limits, and after 2014, they can no longer set annual limits. They can no longer rescind coverage or raise rates on the sick.

To the untrained eye and ear, each of these provisions might be considered unambiguously good, but consider the fact that each one of them will come with a cost that will, in all likelihood, be passed on to the people who pay the premiums for health insurance, the people who work for companies who provide them with health insur- ance, and the people who buy goods and services from those companies. Take the simplest of these provisions, the extension of dependent coverage to children through age 26. This provision means that you (because the ma- jority of those reading this book are college students under age 26) will be able to go to graduate school and/ or have some time to find that first good job. However, your parents’ employer will face extra costs associated with having you on their health insurance plan. How will they react? Depending on the elasticity of demand and supply for labor, the elasticity of demand for the good or service your parents’ employer produces, and some other factors, that means your parents’ paychecks will be smaller than they would otherwise be, your parents’ em- ployer may employ fewer workers than they might have and will have smaller profits than they might have had, the people who buy the goods or services your parents produce will have to pay more, or some combination of these. The cost of providing you with health insurance, or the cost of paying whatever health-related bills you face as a 24-, 25-, or 26-year-old will go from being your problem (perhaps with your parents’ help) to being

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Comparing the United States with the Rest of the World 279

other if the price were right. However, you might under- estimate the likelihood that you will ultimately need that other kidney. The sale of organs may be a poor idea, but selling blood may not. There is little economic reason to ban the sale of blood for medical purposes because, un- like organs, blood is self- replenishing.

Comparing the United States with the Rest of the World Every industrialized nation on earth has a distinct health care system. The one thing that is common throughout the rest of the developed world, though, is that govern- ment is the health care provider, insurer, or insurer of last resort. There are distinct advantages to the way the rest of the world does this, but there are disadvantages as well. Having a single-payer system, where the government col-

lects significantly high taxes to pay for everyone’s health care, benefits those who could not af- ford health care any other way. It creates serious shortages as well.

In Canada, England, and much of Europe, being a citizen of the country grants you unlimited rights to necessary health care that is either free or close to it. While the financial arrangements (shown in Table  24.2) in these countries differ, the citizenry need not worry about access to basic health care re- gardless of their ability to pay. This helps explain the very low occurrences of infant mortality and rela- tively long life spans in these countries, as seen in Table 24.3. The unemployed and the employed, the working and the retired, the young and the old, the rich and the poor are treated with a degree of equality that cannot be claimed in the United States. In ad- dition, because the doctors are paid salaries by the government instead of fees for seeing patients, they do not have an incentive to order expensive tests and perform costly surgeries. Further, as government employees, they are usually protected from lawsuits. Thus universal access is accomplished at lower over- all costs than in the United States.

This, however, comes at a cost. These countries have severe doctor shortages because, in an effort to keep costs down, physicians are paid much less than they are paid in the United States. One principal reason why you see many foreign-born physicians in the United States is that they can make a great deal more money here than in their own countries. Additionally, there is no monetary

price differences and may charge more for larger fami- lies than smaller ones. This all is opposed to few, if any, federal limits that had been in place with regard to market segmentation. Remember that, under normal circumstances, insurers maximize profits by charging premiums based on actual experience.

There is one other, in the grand scheme of things, relatively minor provision change that is potentially im- portant to young people; that is the provision that re- quires that administrative costs and profits make up not more than 20 percent of premiums. It is this provision that affects those in the relatively low-wage restaurant and retail industries. Full-time employees are fre- quently offered the ability to buy mini-med policies that provide, for a low premium, some minimalist benefits. These policies tend to be very expensive to administer.

The Blood and Organ Problem One problem associated with our current system is the scarcity of blood and organs. To an economist, the short- age of blood and organs is directly and unambiguously determined by the fact that it is illegal for people to sell these items for medical use. The ban on the sale of blood and organs for medical use is almost entirely justified on moral grounds. For instance, it is not illegal to sell your blood for use in cosmetics.

If a price can be forced to be zero, the quantity supplied will be reduced and the quantity demanded enhanced. This offers another moral dilemma. If a mar- ket were allowed, there would be people who would not be able to pay the price for a needed organ, and, as a result, they would die while someone else who could afford that organ would live. On the other side of that moral debate, though, is the fact that if there were a legal market, more organs would become available and more people would live.

Note that although both the supply and demand for organs are inelastic, neither is perfectly inelastic.6 There are people who would choose not to pay an exorbitant price to live, and there are people who would be more likely to sign their donor cards if there were a high re- ward that they could bestow on their heirs by doing so.

The downside of such a market is similar to the down- side of the market for tobacco. Poor information can cause people to make life-altering mistakes. For instance, you can live on one kidney, and therefore you could sell the

single-payer system The government collects (usually very high) taxes to pay for everyone’s health care.

6If both were perfectly inelastic at different quantities, there would be no market-clearing price.

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Though some waiting periods have shortened, this is in part due to the recognition by physicians that expensive procedures must be rationed. In the United States the elderly with kidney disease will be given dialysis as long as they are physically able to stand it (lengthening life by a year or more). A similar English patient cannot schedule routine dialysis treatments under the British government-run system.

Another important area that would be lost if the United States were to go to a single-payer system would be innovation. Prescription drug, medical device, and medical procedure innovation has been highly con- centrated in the United States, largely because the innovator makes money that cannot be made in the single-payer countries. Furthermore, the innovation

incentive to become a doctor when you cannot get rich by being one. The effect of having doctors on salary also is seen when these doctors are reluctant to put in long hours. Physicians are among the hardest-working people in the United States. You can also see the effect of this public health provision in the five-year survival rates of breast and prostate cancers. The United States enjoys the highest survival rates among these countries. Another factor weighing in favor of the U.S. system is immedi- ate access to procedures that require long waiting periods elsewhere.

In the United States a 50-year-old man with blocked arteries is hospitalized and operated on within hours of being admitted, whereas the waiting period for by- pass surgery in Canada has been as high as six months.

TABLE 24.2 International health care finance schemes.

Source: OECD Health Data, www.oecd.org

Country

Public Expenditures as a Percent of Total, 2009–2013 Hospitals Physicians

Function of Private Insurance

Australia 68.7 Mostly public A a Canada 70.3 Mostly private A, B a France 78.4 Mostly public A b Germany 75.8 Mix of public and private A a Japan 82.3 Mostly private A, B None United Kingdom 87.6 Mostly public trusts C a United States 48.2 Mostly private A c

A—mostly private fee for service. B—government-imposed fee schedule. C—public employees. a—option to purchase private insurance for all expenses. b—option to purchase private insurance for noncovered expenses. c—all non-Medicare, non-Medicaid.

TABLE 24.3 International comparisons of health expenditures, infant mortality, and life expectancy.

Sources: databank.wor.ldbank.org; stats.oecd.org; www.thelancet.com/action/showFullTableImage?tableId=tbl4&pii=S0140673614620389

Country

Health Expenditures/ GDP, 2013

Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 Births, 2013

Life Expectancy, 2013

Five-Year Survival Rates

Prostate Cancer

Breast Cancer

Ovarian Cancer

Cervical Cancer

Colon Cancer

Leukemia (Adult)

All Childhood Cancers

United States 16.4 5.9 78.8 97.2 88.6 40.9 62.8 64.7 51.8 87.7 United Kingdom 8.5 3.8 81.1 83.2 81.1 36.4 60.2 53.8 47.4 89.1 France 10.9 3.6 82.3 90.5 86.9 39.0 58.9 59.8 59.2 89.2 Germany 11.0 3.3 80.9 91.2 85.3 39.7 64.9 64.6 53.6 91.8 Japan 10.2 2.1 83.4 86.8 84.7 37.3 66.3 64.4 18.9 81.1

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Summary 281

Last, because doctors are typically immune from law- suits in countries with single-payer systems, accountabil- ity for mistakes is left to professional standards boards. While these mechanisms can work, very often they end up being a system for physicians to protect their own.

that takes place abroad is likely motivated by profits that can be made in the United States. As a result, very few health care economists believe that turning the United States into a single-payer environment would be good for health care innovation.

4. If you have a $2,000 covered health expense, a de- ductible of $500, and a 20 percent co-pay, then you pay __________ and the insurance company pays ____________. a. $1,500, $500 b. $1,000, $1,000 c. $800, $1200 d. $700, $800

5. Which of the following forms of private insurance is likely to have the lowest premiums and least doctor choice flexibility? a. Medicare b. An HMO c. A PPO d. A fee-for-service plan

6. Medical care inflation is likely to be easily over- stated (if you look simply at the increase in the cost of a hospital stay) because that calculation ignores a. the original costs. b. the new costs. c. quality increases. d. quality decreases.

Quiz Yourself 1. The primary motivation for the purchase of any

insurance lies in the fact that most people are a. risk lovers. b. risk averse. c. risk neutral. d. risk tolerant.

2. The risk-averse person will buy health insurance a. only if the expected health costs equal the

insurance premium. b. only if the expected health costs are greater than

the insurance premium. c. even if the expected health costs are less than

the insurance premium. d. under no circumstances.

3. The government, in the form of Medicare, Medic- aid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program, pays for _____________ of health care costs. a. less than 10 percent b. slightly less than half c. about 75 percent d. all

Summary You should now understand how the system of health care finance seriously alters the market for health care services. You also understand that in the United States 45 percent of the health care tab is picked up by the tax- payer, with the remainder being picked up either by pa- tients directly or through their insurance companies. You understand why health care is not like most other goods

that economists study but that we can look at it using the same supply and demand tools discussed earlier. You un- derstand that both taxpayer-financed health care and pri- vate insurance–financed health care increase the overall price of health care. Last, you understand why a single- payer, taxpayer-financed health care system would have both advantages and disadvantages.

Key Terms adverse selection co-payment deductible mandation maximum out of pocket

Medicaid Medicare mini-med moral hazard primary care physician (PCP)

risk averse risk neutral single-payer system third-party payer

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282 Chapter 24 Health Care

cases the patient, or the spouse, is the one who makes that decision (either with prior instructions or by mak- ing his or her wishes known to the health care provider). In the United Kingdom, the government can, and does, limit the availability of extraordinary medical treatment. Thus, though care is free (or nearly free) to the patient, it can be limited against their will. The U.K. government’s contention is that health care resources are scarce and they would be wasted extending the life of a terminally ill patient by a few days. Which is worse, the aspect of the U.S. system where people are denied care when they are unable to pay, or the U.K. system where they are denied care because their treatment would not lead to a significant increase in the quality of life?

For More Insight See Health Care Finance Association statistical tables—

www.hcfa.gov Phelps, Charles E., Health Economics (Reading, MA:

Addison-Wesley, 2009). www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/health.pdf International Comparisons of Types of Health Care Finance Systems—www.nao.org.uk/publications

Behind the Numbers International comparisons of vital statistics and health

care expenditures. Statistical Abstract of the United States; comparative

international statistics—www.census.gov/compendia /statab

Health care expenditures. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; historical

tables—www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData Health insurance coverage.

Coverage type— www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthins.html Lack of coverage. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention— www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhis.htm

Medicare premiums. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services—

www.cms.hhs.gov

7. The problem of the “third-party payer” arises in health care in the form of a. doctors having to pay part of their own expenses. b. government and/or private insurance paying a

significant part of the costs. c. patients having to pay a significant part of the

costs. d. hospitals not being able to collect from many

patients. 8. One significant feature of a “single-payer” system

lacking in the U.S. system is a. government involvement in health care. b. coverage for the elderly. c. coverage for the poor. d. universal coverage.

Short Answer Questions 1. Why would eliminating the ability to deny coverage

to those with pre-existing conditions require manda- tion to accompany it?

2. Why would risk-averse people be more likely to buy insurance?

3. For whom would a mini-med health insurance policy be a good policy to have relative to the alternative and why?

4. Why is it more likely that health expenses will rise faster in the United States than in Canada or the United Kingdom?

5. How might you apply the notion of “moral hazard” to decisions you make about exercise?

Think about This List the pros and cons associated with the U.S. system of financing health care relative to the U.K. system. Do the same relative to the Canadian system. Use your under- standing of opportunity cost to think about why we can’t have “the best of both worlds.”

Talk about This In the United States a terminally ill patient can decide to decline extraordinary medical treatment, but in all

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C H A P T E R T W O

283

Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe Medicaid as a program that covers medical expenses for many of this nation’s poor.

LO2 Describe Medicare as a public insurance program for the elderly.

LO3 Distinguish Medicaid from Medicare and understand their relationship.

LO4 Describe the Children’s Health Insurance Program as one that serves the children of the working poor.

Chapter Outline

Medicaid: What, Who, and How Much

Why Medicaid Costs So Much

Medicare: Public Insurance and the Elderly

Medicare’s Nuts and Bolts

The Medicare Trust Fund

Children’s Health Insurance Program

Summary

Since the early 1900s, the United States has been subsidiz- ing medical care for citizens whose incomes are extremely low. The number of people who were covered by some form of federal medical care increased until 1967, when the Medicaid program came into full fruition. From that point on, millions of Americans have benefited from free medical care. In 2014, 44 million children and another 27 million adults had nearly all of their medical expenses paid for by Medicaid and its companion program, the Children’s Health Insurance Program.

In this chapter we describe the Medicaid program in full, and we provide information about the people who are eligible for its benefits and what coverage they re- ceive. We also discuss the groups that draw most heav- ily on Medicaid benefits. We describe the relationship

between the federal government and the states in fund- ing and administering the Medicaid program. We out- line how doctors and hospitals are reimbursed when they work with patients whose costs are paid through Medicaid. We move on to use our supply and demand model to explain why Medicaid costs so much, and we focus attention on Medicaid’s treatment of two very different populations: the very old and the very young. Then we consider provisions in Medicaid that are in- tended to keep costs down.

Medicare and Social Security are the centerpieces of the United States’ policy toward its elderly. Social Security ensures an income for the retired, and Medi- care guarantees heavily subsidized health insurance for everyone over 65, retired or not. Social Security began in

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - F I V E

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284 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

that poverty line were also eligible, as were relatively few others who were affected by a variety of other rules. Under the rules prior to 2014, adults who did not have children under the age of 19 could have very little in- come and not be covered by Medicaid because their wealth made them ineligible for TANF or SSI.

The PPACA, as originally passed, required states to expand Medicaid eligibility to include anyone in the household if the household income was less than 133  percent1 of the poverty line unless the states were willing to forgo all federal money for Medicaid. The Su- preme Court decision that validated many parts of the act invalidated this provision. This meant that states could decide whether or not to participate. This also meant that although Medicaid enrolled more than 61 million, and CHIP enrolled another 7.9 million, only half of those whose incomes were below 150 percent of the poverty line received its benefits. Approximately half of states had formally declined the Medicaid expansion or were leaning that way in 2013, despite the provision that the federal government would pick up the vast majority of the extra costs. Whether this was rationally or politically motivated, the impact on Medicaid eligibility remained cloudy through 2013.

Medicaid pays for nearly everything that is consid- ered necessary from a medical standpoint, and it pays for some things that can be questioned. Doctor visits, emer- gency room visits, surgery, outpatient procedures, medi- cines, birth control pills, permanent and semipermanent birth control procedures and devices, eye care, long-term care—you name it, Medicaid probably pays for it. Liter- ally, the only things that are not covered are most abor- tions, cosmetic surgeries, and drugs for weight loss and hair growth. Abortions are paid for by Medicaid in only a few states, and in those states the state must pay the whole fee. Whenever a pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, or threatens the life of the mother, Medicaid pays as it would for any other procedure.

Far more women and young people are served by Medicaid than their proportion in the general popula- tion. Whereas 51 percent of the population is female, nearly 53 percent of the Medicaid population is. Only 23 percent of the population is under 18, yet 48 percent of the Medicaid population is under 18. If you look simply at the adults on Medicaid, 57 percent are female. Addi- tionally, though the population of Medicaid recipients is disproportionately young, we will show that the dollars

the New Deal 1930s; Medicare in the second great wave of social programs during the Johnson administration’s Great Society of the 1960s. In its first full year in opera- tion, 1967, the cost of its benefits totaled $2.7 billion; by 2015 it cost $630 billion.

Medicare comprises two programs: Medicare Part A, a mandatory program that covers expenses derived from hospital stays; and Medicare Part B, a voluntary pro- gram that covers doctor visits. This section begins by laying out why a government health insurance program for the elderly makes economic sense, and reviews the problems that such health insurance programs inevitably face. After discussing how each part of Medicare works, we focus on ways that each part has attempted to control costs. We then look at the Medicare Trust Fund and its projected problems in staying solvent, and we suggest ways Medicare can stave off bankruptcy. As part of that discussion, we talk about the relationship between Med- icaid and Medicare, the program for Americans 65 or older.

Finally we take up the relatively new Children’s Health Insurance Program and its function of providing health insurance to the children of working families where the parents have no employer-provided health insurance.

Medicaid: What, Who, and How Much

Medicaid was established in 1964 to consolidate and expand existing programs that had been charged with providing health care to those who could not otherwise afford it. In 2014 the program cost the federal and state governments $496 billion. We begin our discussion of the Medicaid system by describing who is eligible, what is covered, who is enrolled, which groups cost the most, what relationship the federal government has to the states, and how doctors and hospitals are reimbursed.

People who are eligible for Medicaid must meet one of many criteria. In general, anyone who is in a fam- ily that is eligible for cash assistance under Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or Supplemen- tal Security Income (SSI) is automatically eligible for Medicaid. Eligibility standards were altered by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) such that in 2014 many more adults were to have been covered by Medicaid. Prior to that act’s passage, any children under 19 whose parents’ income was less than 133 percent of the appropriate poverty line for their fam- ily size or pregnant women and children under a year old whose family income was less than 185 percent of

1Though technically the cutoff is 133 percent of the poverty line, there is an income exemption in the calculation, which makes the effective percentage 138 percent.

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Why Medicaid Costs So Much 285

spent are disproportionately allocated to care for the elderly.

In racial makeup, Medicaid recipients mirror the population of those who live in poverty nearly perfectly: 43 percent white, 21 percent black, and 19 percent Hispanic.

Medicaid is a cooperative effort of federal and state governments. The federal government mandates that the states enroll all people who are eligible, and it gives them guidelines to use if they wish to enroll others. States have the option of covering or denying coverage of certain specified expenses (like the previously mentioned abor- tions), as they wish.

The federal mandates are partially covered by federal matching money, and states are reimbursed according to their relative GDPs. Poorer states are given greater re- imbursement rates, and richer states are given smaller ones. Thirteen states get the minimum 50 percent matching percentage from the federal government, while seven other states and the District of Colum- bia get at least a 70 percent match. To motivate state participation in Medicaid’s eligibility standards, the PPACA temporarily raised these rates 7.6 to 15 per- centage points to assist states’ transition. The differ- ential rates make Medicaid less of a burden for poorer states to fund.

Whether or not they participate in the expanded Med- icaid provisions, some states make it easier to get on Medicaid than others. States have different income and wealth standards for TANF, and people who are eligible for Medicaid in New York and Wisconsin, for example, would not be eligible in states like Texas and Arkansas. This difference is effective only for adults, since children under one year of age are eligible, regardless of the state they live in, under a federal standard that makes them eli- gible if their family’s income is less than 185 percent of the poverty line. All other children are similarly eligible as long as their family income is less than 133 percent of the poverty line.

When they treat patients whose bills are paid by Med- icaid, doctors and hospitals are reimbursed at widely varying rates. States pay different amounts for the same procedures. These variations come about because Med- icaid payments start at the state level with the federal government matching the state’s payments. States must set reimbursement rates high enough that there are enough physicians and hospitals in all areas to treat Med- icaid patients adequately. When many physicians are in competition with one another, rates can be lower; when there are few, rates must be higher.

For doctors and hospitals, Medicaid is an all-or- nothing proposition. When doctors and hospitals agree to take Medicaid patients, they agree to accept the state reimbursement rate as payment in full. They also agree to take any and all Medicaid patients who show up for treatment. They cannot limit their practice to a certain percentage, and they cannot accept patients with one disease and not another. Finding these restrictions to be unreasonable and reimbursement rates too low, many private hospitals and prestigious doctors do not take Medicaid patients.

Why Medicaid Costs So Much

Medicaid is an expensive program. To examine why it costs as much as it does, it will be helpful to put it into our supply and demand context. In 2013, the federal and state governments spent $471 billion to provide health care for 67 million Americans of Medicaid and Medic- aid’s companion program, the Children’s Health Insur- ance Programs (CHIP). Netting out the CHIP enrollment and costs, that amount translates to just under $7,000 per recipient. People not on Medicaid spend about the same as that. As a matter of fact, until quite recently those on Medicaid accounted for substantially greater per capita expenditures than those not on Medicaid. Why is it that the expenses of people who pay for their own health care are almost identical to the expenses of people whose health care is paid through Medicaid?

Let’s turn to our supply and demand model for an ex- planation. As it is with any other good, the demand for health care is downward sloping. This is because when the price is high, people forgo care for ailments that are not all that troubling. Although price is always a con- cern, there are ailments that people will have treated pretty much regardless of cost. Keeping our upward- sloping supply curve makes sense because it takes more money to get doctors and hospitals to provide the greater quantities of care we desire and the higher quality of care that we also desire.

Figure 25.1 differs from every other supply and de- mand diagram you have seen, though, in that we have separated the demand by people in poverty from the de- mand by the people whose incomes are above the pov- erty line. The demand curve Dnonpoor for the nonpoor is farther to the right than the demand curve Dpoor for the poor. To get the market demand curve Dpoor + nonpoor, we must add the quantities of care that both the nonpoor and poor want at each price. At some prices the poor cannot

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286 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

afford any health care, and they therefore do not demand any health care. As prices fall, the poor begin to demand health care, and the nonpoor begin to demand more health care. To find where the market demand curve cuts the horizontal axis, you add the quantity of health care that each would want if it were provided free of charge. This horizontal adding of demand curves gives us the market demand curve.

Where the market demand curve Dpoor + nonpoor crosses the market supply curve S, we get the equilibrium price P* and quantity Qpoor + nonpoor. When we take that price over to the nonpoor person’s demand curve, we can read off the quan- tity of health care the nonpoor person will get as Qnonpoor. Taking it further, to the poor person’s demand curve, we can read off what the poor person wants as Qpoor. If the health care system is such that the poor cannot get access to care at affordable prices, there will be a disparity between the health care received by the nonpoor and that received by the poor that some people will consider to be unacceptable.

If the poor are provided health care free of charge, as they are with Medicaid, a different problem arises. The market demand curve does not stay as it was in Figure 25.1 but moves to its position in Figure 25.2. This new demand curve is made up by adding the quantity Qpoor of care poor people will want if it is free to the de- mand curve Dnonpoor for the nonpoor. At the intersection of market supply and market demand, the price rises to P′, which is substantially above its old price at P*. It also re- sults in greater access for the poor and less access for the nonpoor. Figure 25.2 exaggerates this effect, but in the real-world Medicaid recipients consume slightly more health care than those who have private insurance.

Why Spending Is Greater on the Elderly In terms of expenses, Medicaid dollars are spent dispro- portionately on the elderly. This stands to reason in that older people need care that tends to be more expensive, and they need it more often than do those who are younger. The average Medicaid recipient utilized about $7,000 in medical care in 2013. In 2013, the average child who was covered by Medicaid cost the government only $2,807, while the average covered person over 65 cost $15,483. Thus, though children make up slightly less than half of Medicaid’s population, they account for only 20 percent of the bills, and although those over 65 (and not disabled) make up less than 10 percent of its population, they ac- count for 20 percent of the bills. This is in addition to the $575 billion that they account for in Medicare bills.

As mentioned previously, the central reason for Med- icaid’s spending more on the elderly than it does on the young is that older people tend to get illnesses that cost more than those of younger people. However, there is a reason that comes in a close second: nursing home care. Nursing home care is not part of either Medicare Part A or Part B. People who are elderly must therefore pay for this care themselves, unless, of course, they cannot. When elderly people’s incomes are low enough that they qualify for assistance, Medicaid will pick up the tab for nursing home care. This can cost anywhere between $43,000 and $91,250 a year, constituting a substantial outlay for Medicaid. In the final analysis, Medicaid spends 25 percent of its total budget on long-term care, of which about three-quarters is on care for the aged.

The problem that this generates for elderly Americans is that they have to qualify for Medicaid before Medicaid

Dpoor

Qpoor

Dnonpoor

Qnonpoor

Dpoor+nonpoor

Qpoor+nonpoor Q/t

S

P

P*

FIGURE 25.1 The supply and demand for health care without Medicaid.

Dpoor

Qpoor

Dnonpoor

Qnonpoor

Dpoor+nonpoor

Qpoor+nonpoor Q/t

S

P

P*

FIGURE 25.2 The supply and demand for health care with Medicaid.

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Medicare: Public Insurance and the Elderly 287

will start paying. For widows and widowers this is not that difficult; they simply pay all their medical and nursing home expenses until their money is gone. Then Medic- aid starts paying. Oftentimes, adult children with power of attorney try to hasten the point at which Medicaid pays their parents’ medical expenses by draining the wealth of their parents by making gifts of it to themselves and their own children. It is legal to do this but only up to a point. Any money that is given to children and grandchildren in the name of the elderly relatives in the two-year period leading up to their enrollment in Medicaid is treated as a semifraudulent way of avoiding paying for nursing home care. The government monitors this and takes back any money that was given away within that period.

Giving away an elderly person’s assets does not solve the nursing home problem entirely, in any case, because many times an elderly married couple has one partner who needs care and another who does not. This is es- pecially true when an otherwise healthy person gets Alzheimer’s disease. Medicaid used to require that the entire household’s wealth be spent down before it would pay anything to a nursing home. This left many healthy spouses destitute because of the need to finance health care for their partner. At the time, the only alternative for the couple was to file for divorce the minute one of them was placed in a nursing home. That way, the assets were divided in half so that only half would be spent down, and the other half would be available for the healthy spouse. The needless emotional trauma of divorcing a longtime spouse is now avoided because the law now al- lows the assets of the couple’s household to be divided equally between what will be spent down and what will be left untouched when one member of the married cou- ple is admitted to a nursing home.

Cost-Saving Measures in Medicaid During the early 1990s Medicaid costs were rising by more than 10 percent a year. This trend, coupled with other welfare concerns, motivated many of the welfare reform measures of the middle part of that decade. Dur- ing that time states began to shift their Medicaid sys- tems from individual doctors reimbursed for expenses to health maintenance organizations (HMOs). From 1990 to 2004, doctors in HMOs went from treating fewer than 5 percent of Medicaid patients to treating 60 percent of them.

When HMOs are in place, people are denied coverage unless it is authorized by the doctors who have been des- ignated as their primary care physicians. Under HMOs,

primary care physicians are charged with providing basic care, and they are the only people who can refer patients to specialists. The use of HMOs has stemmed the unfor- tunate practice of Medicaid patients’ use of emergency room treatments for basic care. Nonemergency Medic- aid patients are now counseled that if they show up at an emergency room for treatment of nonserious matters, they may be turned away. They are also counseled about the benefits of having a physician who follows their par- ticular health needs. In this way HMOs are saving the state and federal governments money and, at the same time, are helping to improve the health of the people they are serving.

One other way in which states began cutting their Medicaid budgets in 2011 was to drop many optional coverages. Specifically, states that covered eyeglasses began to consider dropping such coverage for Medicaid recipients.

Medicare: Public Insurance and the Elderly

Why Private Insurance May Not Work There are two main arguments for government provision of health insurance for the elderly: equity and efficiency. While it was appropriate in earlier times to argue that it was only fair to provide for the elderly in that the el- derly were poorer than younger people, such arguments are less appropriate today. Today’s elderly are among the least likely of our citizens to be in poverty, due in some measure to these programs. What remains are arguments that the market cannot provide health insurance effi- ciently to people who are not in groups.

The problem with health insurance, in general, is that people who really need it, those who are sick, are more than willing to pay very high prices for it; and those who are healthy are only willing to pay low prices. Most people have in mind two kinds of health expenses when they are thinking about buying insurance, the ex- penses they are rather sure they will incur and expenses of which they are not as certain. They will buy insurance readily if the expenses they expect are greater than the premiums they have to pay. People will pay for insur- ance that covers them in areas they are not certain they will need, but if premiums are too high, only the sickest will want to buy insurance. If this group were to become the only one that buys insurance, the expenses to the in- surance company would be greater than the premiums received and premiums would have to rise. This would make the problem worse, as only the sickest of the sick

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288 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

would buy the insurance. This problem is referred to by economists as adverse selection.

This vicious cycle would go on and on until there was no insurance at all. Fortunately, this is not much of a problem in the United States because most private health insurance is group insurance that employers buy for their employees. In each group there are undoubtedly some people who are sick, some who are healthy, and many who are somewhere in between. The healthy subsidize the sick. Because being part of a group affords such im- portant benefits both to the insurance companies and to members of the group, people who buy health insurance as individuals always run into problems not encountered by people who buy into group health insurance.

This would not be a problem if the elderly were still with their employers. They are not; they are retired, and many employers do not offer membership in company health groups to retirees. With the efficacy of offering health plans to people in groups, and with millions of individual retirees needing health insurance, it has made sense for the government to offer such insurance, and it does so through Medicare.

What remains debatable about Medicare is who pays for it—its beneficiaries (as with normal health insur- ance), or all taxpayers, or a combination of these groups.

At the outset it was intended that the cost split would be about 50–50, proportions that offered the elderly a substantial subsidy. Today the subsidy is such that about three-quarters of the total expenses are paid out of tax dollars and only about a quarter by its beneficiaries.

Why Medicare’s Costs Are High All government health insurance programs suffer from problems of cost control, problems that are com- pounded in an era of rapid advances in medical technol- ogy that vastly improve health care but increase costs as well. Anytime the consumption of a good is subsidized via insurance, several basic problems ensue. The first problem is that you risk increasing its consumption to an inefficient level. The second problem, referred to by economists as the third-party payer problem, is that by insuring consumers and thereby insulating them from costs, neither consumers nor producers have incen- tives for holding down costs. These and other insur- ance problems were explained in detail in Chapter 24 on health care.

As with all other government health insurance pro- grams, then, the costs of Medicare have escalated dra- matically. Figure 25.3 shows the increase in the costs of Medicare since its inception in 1967.

500

600

700

400

300

200

100

0

Year

M e

d ic

ar e

s p

e n

d in

g ($

b ill

io n

s)

Medicare spending Medicare spending 2016–2021 est.

19 67

19 70

19 73

19 76

19 79

19 82

19 85

19 88

19 91

19 94

19 97

20 00

20 03

20 06

20 09

20 12

20 15

20 18

20 21

FIGURE 25.3 Medicare spending in billions of 2009 dollars.

Source: Refer to Table 8.6: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals

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Medicare’s Nuts and Bolts 289

For most programs, spending can rise only because prices rise or beneficiaries become more numerous. Medicare spending has risen for these reasons and one other: increases in numbers of available medical services. Medicare beneficiaries are not limited to the medical pro- cedures that existed in 1967. They can avail themselves of the best that medical science has to offer in the 2000s. This means that some patients who would have died 20 years ago, and who therefore would no longer be draw- ing on Medicare’s resources, are now given medicines and procedures that are allowing them to live much longer.

It would be unconscionable to deny medical treatment to Medicare patients, even if it would be expensive, to improve their life or their life span. Moreover, it would be unrealistic to assume that they would deny themselves expensive treatments in the name of cost savings. Thus, as treatments for health problems continue to become more effective and life expectancies increase, we will see a continued escalation of Medicare spending. As you will see in our section on the Medicare Trust Fund, it is this quickly increasing expense that has put Medicare on a course that is likely to lead it to bankruptcy.

One of the ways to deal with this kind of problem is to transfer the incentive to save money from the consumer to the producer. While it is usually consumers who want to limit the amount of money they pay, with insur- ance this incentive is either drastically reduced or even eliminated. As discussed above, if no one has an incen- tive to keep expenses down, no one will keep expenses down. It is possible, though, to make producers the cost- conscious parties by paying them prospectively rather than retrospectively.

Retrospective payment is what people are used to when they buy services. When a person has a car repaired, a ga- rage worker finds the problem, asks whether the customer wants it fixed, tells what it will cost, and fixes it. At that point the retrospective payment is made. Under normal circumstances, this is not a problem because the customer still has the incentive to keep costs down. Problems arise when retrospective payments are used with insurance. When you have an accident that is someone else’s fault, it is the other person’s insurance that is paying the bill. Here you want everything fixed perfectly, with original parts, and the repair shop is only too happy to oblige because the mechanic can rack up the charges. If you had to pay for the repair, you would be more likely to be satisfied with “good enough” and to accept substitute parts. That is why either you are required to get two or three estimates before the work starts, or the single estimate and the repairs must be preapproved by an insurance adjuster. Both multiple

estimates and insurance adjusters’ oversight serve to keep repair shops competing with one another and prevent or lessen overbilling.

In health care it is unusual for an insurance company to have you go to several doctors to get estimates, though some may require second opinions. This is why some insurance companies and Medicare have gone to a sys- tem of prospective payments. Prospective payments are made prior to the service being performed. The hospital gets paid up front to treat its patients, and it then has an incentive to keep costs below what it has been paid. In the private arena, HMOs are designed to take advantage of such payments. Gatekeeper doctors, who are usually family practice physicians, pediatricians, or obstetri- cian/gynecologists, are paid specified sums per patient under their care, and they are paid the sums whether the patients require a great deal of care or no care at all. Medicare HMOs work this way as well, and, as we will see, so does Medicare Part A.

Medicare’s Nuts and Bolts

As we discussed before, Medicare is divided into two categories. Medicare Part A is mandatory for people over age 65, and it covers hospital care. Medicare Part B is voluntary, and it covers doctor visits. No part of Medi- care covers common out-of-the-hospital prescription drugs or long-term nursing home care.

Provider Types The first choice a Medicare recipient has to make is whether to choose traditional Medicare or a Medi- care HMO. Medicare HMOs are approved by the government, and doctors who participate in them are paid per patient under their charge. The government pays less per HMO patient than per non-HMO patient on average, probably because healthy elderly people are more likely to enroll in an HMO. The cost controls that HMOs offer are usually enough that HMO pre- miums are significantly lower than normal Medicare premiums. People who opt for traditional Medicare are automatically enrolled in Part A; they may choose to enroll in Part B.

Part A For people who work 10 years before reaching 65, Medi- care Part A has no premium. For everyone else, the pre- mium charged for Medicare Part A differs, depending on how long they worked. In 2016 the deductible was a

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290 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

relatively high $1,288 for the first day in the hospital. The costs for the next 60 days were paid by Medicare. After 60 days in the hospital, patients paid $322 per day, Medi- care paid the rest, and after 90 days patients paid $644 per day. From day 91 on, patients have a 60-day reserve of days upon which to draw. When that reserve is gone, patients must pay the rest themselves.

From the hospital’s position, Medicare is paying amounts that it has settled on for specific diagnoses. These payments, and they are prospective payments, are determined by where the patients’ ailments put them on a list of more than 500 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). All Medicare patients who enter the hospital are placed in a DRG, and rather than paying for specific expenses that are incurred, Medicare pays the hospital a prede- termined amount that is considered appropriate for that DRG. This motivates the hospital to keep costs down. Medicare had paid for every bandage, meal, and service until the mid-1980s, when it found that hospitals were racking up costs of questionable medical value just to increase their profit margins. Under fixed payments for DRGs, Medicare has kept much better control of cost in- creases. This policy has also led to a significant shorten- ing of average hospital stays for specific problems. The current system also provides an incentive for hospitals to discharge patients as soon as possible.

This system for reimbursement is not without its crit- ics. Specifically, President Obama derogatorily labels this prospective payment system as paying hospitals based on what the patients have when they walk in the door not for what the hospitals do to make the patients better, or even by what services they perform. This criti- cism is not new, but the balance that was struck when the DRG-based prospective reimbursement was insti- tuted was that paying hospitals on performance (how much patients improve from when they were admitted) will cause hospitals to specialize in low-mortality, low- risk treatments, and that paying hospitals based on the services they provide will motivate hospitals to over- treat patients, thereby running up the costs. Though not without its critics, the current system is favored by most health economists as being one that keeps costs down, and with Medicare costs rising rapidly in the near future due to the aging of the baby boom generation, this is of primary concern.

Part B Medicare Part B, the voluntary insurance program that pays for visits to doctors, has a monthly premium and

an annual deductible. In 2016, the premium depended on your income. For those with incomes under $85,000 ($170,000 for married couples filing joint tax returns), the premium was $121.80 and the deductible was $166. Because neither the premium nor the deductible has increased at the rate of medical inflation, this part of the program is now being subsidized at a rate approaching 75 percent. What this means is that for every dollar a patient pays, Medicare Part B pays $3 out of tax rev- enues. Accordingly, there is virtually no reason for an elderly person not to enroll in Part B. For those who can- not afford the premium, Medicaid, the parallel program that provides health insurance for the poor, typically steps in. For everyone else, that $121.80 premium is a small enough amount that nearly 100 percent of the non- Medicaid eligible elderly are enrolled.

From a doctor’s perspective, Medicare Part B pays a regional standard for each treatment. Unlike Part A, Part  B is billed expense by expense with retrospective payment. Medicaid pays a fixed amount for each service, but each service is billed individually rather than being grouped in a DRG.

The reason that prospective payments do not work for non-HMO Medicare Part B is that, with a huge range of possible ailments, there are many potential doctors a pa- tient may want to see. In a Medicare HMO, a gatekeeper is in charge of referrals to specialists, but non-HMO pa- tients can go at any time to the doctors of their choice. It would be impossible to predict such choices in advance, and since no single doctor, HMO, or hospital is in total charge of their care under Part B, prospective payments cannot be made to work.

Prescription Drug Coverage (Part D) As part of the 2003 reauthorization of Medicare, the costs of prescription drugs are now covered. Prior to this change, health care economists were of two minds. First, they saw a distortion of the market when surgery was covered but medicines were not. Second, they noted Medicare’s precarious financial state and worried that the additional benefit would make it that much worse.

As expensive as most drugs are, drug-based treat- ments are less expensive than their surgical alternatives. Because Medicare did not cover prescription drugs and it did cover surgery, patients may have elected surgery even though it may have been more expensive.

On the other side of the debate were the concerns over the cost of any prescription drug program. Initial estimates in the 2003 Medicare reauthorization placed

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Medicare’s Nuts and Bolts 291

the cost of such a program at $400 billion over 10 years. Those estimates were quickly revised. Currently the program is anticipated to cost at least $1 trillion over 10 years. The Congressional Budget Office estimated (in its Outlook for 2015 to 2025) that “[n]et federal spending per beneficiary for Part D, which accounts for a small share of total Medicare spending, [was] projected to grow much more—by 77 percent— largely because of rising drug costs combined with provisions in the ACA that expand the extent of cov- erage for some prescription drugs.” What must be understood about any such estimates is that they are highly sensitive to assumptions about price elasticity for drugs. If the estimator uses data on the number of prescriptions filled and multiplies that number by the cost per prescription covered by the government (as- suming perfectly inelastic demand), this would seri- ously underestimate costs. There are people who will benefit from prescriptions who did not go to the doc- tor because they knew they would get a prescription slip they could not afford to fill. Additionally, there were elderly who used to get multiple prescriptions and fill only a fraction of them because they could not afford to fill them all. Taking this into account, cost estimates are likely to be exceeded and higher deficits will ensue.

The 2003 reauthorization also introduced means testing to Medicare. The Republican-authored bill made premiums and coverage dependent on income and required most seniors to pay as much as $3,600 out of pocket. Medicare Part D is not really a national plan but was intended to foster many private alternatives with substantial government subsidies. Premiums, deductibles, and co-pays are features of each plan and are highly localized, and as a result much more confusing to beneficiaries than Medicare Part A or B. Democrats, who had sought a government-run program akin to the other parts of Medicare, generally opposed the plan. Republican defenders sought to introduce private market incentives to keep costs under control. Neither seems to have the upper hand on this issue as the system was initially very confusing, but the most recent estimates suggest that it will cost the govern- ment 50 percent less than it was originally projected to cost. A particularly troubling part of the original law was the existence of a “donut hole,” where coverage began at one level of individual spending, then stopped until another higher level of spending was arrived at, and then began again. The donut hole is slated to be reduced under the PPACA.

Cost Control Provisions in Medicare Medicare has been attempting to keep costs under con- trol since its inception, but, unfortunately, it has enjoyed little success. Ultimately the reasons for this lack of suc- cess boil down to two:

1. Medical care is increasingly sophisticated, with con- tinually improving success rates, and it is therefore more costly.

2. There is no economic incentive for either patient or doctor to control costs.

While the aforementioned DRGs have helped con- trol costs in Part A, and Medicare HMOs have helped control costs in Part B, neither has been foolproof. The DRGs, however, have succeeded in doing a couple of important things with regard to costs. First, basing the payments on DRGs has given hospitals the incentive to take many procedures that used to require one night in the hospital and turn them into outpatient procedures. Second, hospitals have put pressure on doctors and pa- tients to shorten the average length of stay of many mul- tiday procedures.

Given that DRGs pay a fixed amount for a procedure, hospitals have the incentive to cut costs. Since one of a hospital’s greatest costs is keeping someone in a bed overnight, converting a procedure that formerly involved a hospital stay to one that is done on an outpatient basis helps to raise profits. Heart bypass surgery is not likely to be an outpatient procedure anytime soon, but many other procedures are candidates. While many people are concerned about the health consequences of turning out patients who would have stayed a night, there has been little medical evidence that sending people home right away has had adverse effects.

A second area where costs have come down is the shortening of the length of stay for many multiday proce- dures. Surgeries that used to require a three- or four-day stay in the hospital to recuperate now require only two or three. In part this is because surgeons are better at limit- ing the trauma to the body from surgery, and in part it is because postsurgical rehabilitation has improved.2

2While the data on length of stay have not shown a decline, this is misleading because of the aforementioned outpatient substitution. Since the length-of- stay data are based on the number of days a patient stays in a hospital, the procedures that are now outpatient do not count at all. If length of stay for the other procedures had remained the same as it was before the outpatient substitution, then the overall average would have risen substantially since whenever you remove short stays and leave only the longer stays, the aver- age rises. Since the overall average has remained constant, we know the length of stay for longer-stay procedures has fallen.

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292 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

The Medicare Trust Fund

One of the greatest concerns today is the fiscal health of the Medicare program that provides for our elderly’s phys- ical health. The Medicare Trust Fund enjoyed assets of $266 billion in 2014. This trust fund was set up to handle the anticipated medical expenses of the baby boom gen- eration. Like the Social Security Trust Fund, it deliber- ately collected more in taxes than was necessary in order to build savings for the period between 2015 and 2035, when it was anticipated that the high numbers of the baby boom generation were likely to strain the system. Like the Social Security Trust Fund, the Medicare Trust Fund is invested only in U.S. government debt. In 1997, however, the trustees of the Medicare Trust Fund issued an alarming report. They estimated that long before the serious crisis hit, the trust fund would be bankrupt. While later trustees’ reports have been somewhat more optimistic about the fis- cal health of the program, eventual bankruptcy remains its conclusion. In fact, in 2008 the balance of the trust fund began to shrink for the first time in its history.

The annual reports of the trustees have been based on three different projections of the future: one very op- timistic, the second very pessimistic, and the third on what the trustees judged to be the most realistic assump- tions. Assumptions have been made about two economic variables and two demographic variables. The eco- nomic considerations have been the growth in inflation- adjusted wages and the real interest rate. The demographic variables have been the fertility rate and life expectancy.

The higher the projected growth rate in wages, the more projected tax revenues would be; the higher the projected real interest rate, the better return on the trust fund would be; and because it is held that greater numbers of children will produce more tax revenue, the higher the projected fertility rate, the greater the projected tax revenues. Last, longer projected life expectancy would be anticipated to create greater Medicare expenses.

Figure 25.4 shows the actual balance of the Medicare Trust Fund from 1970 to 2011 and the projected balance of the trust fund until 2021 under the alternative assump- tions just outlined. The estimates of low costs are based on the following assumptions: Real wages will grow quickly, at a rate of 1.6 percent; real interest rates will be a high rate of 3.7 percent; and fertility will be high, at 2.2 children per woman. The figures that reflect the esti- mate of high costs are just the opposite: Real wages will grow at 0.6 percent; real interest rates will be 2.2 per- cent; and fertility will be 1.7 children per woman. The intermediate cost projections are that real wages will rise at 1.1 percent; real interest rates will be at 3.0 percent; and the average woman will have 1.95 children.

If the assumptions leading to high costs are correct, Medicare is genuinely on the verge of bankruptcy. If the costs turn out to be low, the year of bankruptcy is beyond the immediate projections of the report, but it still hap- pens in the middle of the 21st century. The 1997 report used the intermediate assumptions and projected bank- ruptcy in 2008. The 1999 update of the report projected that the system would be bankrupt in 2015. The 2000

High cost Intermediate cost

Actual balance Low cost

–400

–200

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200

400

600

800

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T ru

st F

u n

d b

al an

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19 70

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19 94

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20 03

20 06

20 09

20 12

20 15

20 18

20 21

20 24

FIGURE 25.4 The Medicare Trust Fund under alternative assumptions.

Source: Medicare Trustees Report

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Children’s Health Insurance Program 293

through 2008 versions have produced a relatively stable projection for around the 2020s.

The 2009 report was significantly less optimistic, while the 2010 report returned to projections of difficul- ties in the 2020s. These estimates have become somewhat political in that they were used to justify the need for the PPACA, and assumptions were made in them that most political observers understood would never actually take place. Specifically, the rate at which Medicare reim- burses hospitals and doctors was, by previous statute sup- posed to decline 20 percent as a result of cost estimates exceeding previously established benchmarks. Every year after the benchmarks were surpassed, Congress acted to waive those rate reductions. As unrealistic as it was, the trustees were required to assume that Congress would not change the law, which meant that they were supposed to assume that the last time Congress waived the rate reduc- tions would be the last time they ever did. This silliness was finally ended in 2015.

To forestall the projected bankruptcy, it seems rea- sonable to consider simply raising taxes along the way in a pay-as-you-go format. This would presuppose that nothing is done to alter the current program. If we go to a pay-as-you-go system where taxes have to increase each year to meet the health care needs of the elderly, tax rates may rise substantially.

Under current law, the payroll tax that funds Part A of Medicare is 2.9 percent. That is, you and your employer each contribute 1.45 percent of everything you make on the job. (The self-employed contribute the full 2.9 percent.) Under the most likely scenario, the rate would more than double to 3.3 percent each.

If raising taxes to the necessary levels is unacceptable, other solutions may be explored. The age at which people become eligible could be raised, premiums and deduct- ibles could be raised to their inflation-adjusted 1970 level or beyond, all beneficiaries could be required to have gate- keeper physicians (as in HMOs), and it could be mandated that at certain income or wealth levels the elderly would get reduced subsidies. Many people are dissatisfied with these alternatives, and none meet with the approval of the main lobbying organization for the elderly, the American Association of Retired Persons.

The Relationship between Medicaid and Medicare Besides beginning with the same act of Congress and besides sharing the first six letters of their eight-letter titles, Medicare and Medicaid share other features. The

most significant is a commingling of tasks when people are both old and poor. Medicare was set up to deal with only the aged and Medicaid was set up to deal with only the poor. When someone is both old and poor, both pro- grams come into play.

When a person is of an age to be eligible for Medicare and is also poor and qualifies on that ground for Medic- aid, the first to pay is Medicare. Medicaid is the payer of last resort. Since Medicare has two parts and since Medicaid’s costs are shared by both the federal and state governments, the story gets even more complicated.

All elderly are required to participate in Medicare Part A, which covers hospital expenses, and they can elect to participate in Medicare Part B, coverage for doctors’ vis- its. When people are poor as well and qualify for Medic- aid, the Medicare premiums and deductibles for Part A are paid by Medicaid and the remainder are paid by Medi- care. For Part B, the state can then elect to pay the Medi- care Part B premiums and deductibles and have Medicare Part B pick up the bulk of the expenses. In any event, when elderly people are eligible for Medicaid, there is significant overlap between Medicare and Medicaid.

Children’s Health Insurance Program

In 1997 the Children’s Health Insurance Program was cre- ated to help the children of the working poor. It allowed states either to expand Medicaid coverage to those mak- ing less than 200 percent of the poverty line or to create a separate program to serve that population. The states have chosen a variety of strategies to implement their programs. In general, though, when a child’s low-income parents have no insurance through their employer, they can purchase highly subsidized health insurance. Though the premiums vary from state to state, they are below $40 per family per month in all but two states (and are zero in 20 states), a tiny fraction of what they would be for private insurance. Similarly, the deductibles and co-payments are low as well. An interesting feature is that well-baby visits and immuni- zations are required to be free for children in the program.

The program is structured very much like Medicaid in that there is a matching rate for states depending on their per capita income and minimum coverage expecta- tions to ensure that all covered children are given ad- equate care regardless of where they live. The matching rates are closely tied to the regular Medicaid matching rates but are, on average, 23 percentage points higher. The program now serves more than 8.1 million children at a cost of more than $13 billion per year.

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294 Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program

Summary At this point you understand that Medicaid is a program that covers medical expenses for a subset of this nation’s poor. You understand that eligibility for Medicaid ben- efits is tied to family income and the age of dependent children, and, as a result, there are many people who are in poverty and not covered by the program. You understand that the beneficiaries are disproportionately women but that in other demographic dimensions they mirror those who are in poverty. You understand how

much the program costs, and you know why those costs are high relative to the costs of those who are covered by private insurance. You know that a disproportionate amount of money is spent on the elderly, and you are able to articulate why that is the case. You understand the relationship between Medicaid and the companion program for the elderly, Medicare. Last, you are aware of the cost-saving measures that have been put in place for Medicaid.

Quiz Yourself 1. In 2014, unless a state was willing to forgo all fed-

eral money for Medicaid, a member of a family earning less than 133 percent of the poverty line is a. ineligible for any health care assistance. b. eligible for Medicare’s prescription drug plan

only. c. eligible for all of Medicare. d. eligible for Medicaid.

2. When a 65-year-old goes to the hospital, the part of Medicare that pays for the hospital bill is a. Part A. b. Part B. c. Part C. d. Part D.

3. When a program like Medicaid is introduced, the market demand curve for health care will a. increase and flatten. b. increase and become more steep. c. decrease and flatten. d. decrease and become more steep.

4. Medicaid spending per recipient is a. twice that of the average citizen’s use of health

care. b. somewhat less than the average citizen’s use of

health care. c. somewhat greater than the average citizen’s use

of health care. d. half that of the average citizen’s use of health

care. 5. The DRG system controls Medicare expenses by

a. preventing doctors from using particular procedures.

b. paying hospitals after they submit bills. c. paying hospitals on the basis of a disease or

injury rather than expenses. d. paying the patient who then pays the hospital.

6. The Medicare Trust Fund is necessary because a. current expenses are greater than current

revenues. b. current expenses are less than current revenues. c. future expenses will be greater than future

revenues. d. future expenses will be less than future

revenues. 7. Medicare’s prescription drug coverage will likely

a. cost substantially more than it was estimated to cost in 2003.

b. cost substantially less than it was estimated to cost in 2003.

c. cost slightly less than it was estimated to cost in 2003.

d. cost about what it was estimated to cost in 2003.

Short Answer Questions 1. How might the elasticity of demand for a health care

service be used to estimate the demand created for a health care service when there is a new program for government coverage?

2. Why is the Medicare Trust Fund estimated date of fund exhaustion so dependent on the assumption made with regard to economic growth, interest rates, and political changes?

3. What are the benefits and costs associated with re- imbursing hospitals based on their actual services performed rather than based on the problems the pa- tients have when they come to the hospital?

Think about This One of the suggestions for providing the working poor with health insurance has been to require employers to provide health insurance benefits for all workers by

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Summary 295

having employers “buy them into Medicaid.” Requiring this would raise the cost to employers of hiring new work- ers. Under what circumstances would this be good for workers? Under what circumstances would it not be good?

Talk about This When public provision of health care is discussed in most political arenas, providing more coverage (e.g., prescriptions and long-term care) for the elderly typically garners more attention than expanding cover- age to the working poor. Why is that? Is this the right priority in your mind?

For More Insight See Garrett, Major, “Medicare: Healthier for Now,” U.S.

News & World Report, April 12, 1999, p. 29. Lee, Ronald, and Jonathan Skinner, “Will Aging Baby

Boomers Bust the Federal Budget?” Journal of Eco- nomic Perspectives 13 (Winter 1999), pp. 117–140.

Miller, Matthew, “Premium Idea,” The New Republic, April 12, 1999, pp. 24–27.

Newhouse, Joseph, “Policy Watch: Medicare,” Jour- nal of Economic Perspectives 10 (Summer 1996), pp. 159–168.

Phelps, Charles, Health Economics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), esp. Chapter 13.

“Survey: Health Care,” The Economist, July 6, 1991. 2000 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the

Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund.

Behind the Numbers Historical data. Federal Medicare spending. Budget of the United States Government; historical

tables— www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals Matching rates to the states— http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/fmap11.pdf Historical and projected Medicare Trust Fund assets,

1970–2019. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services;

Trustees Report— www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and

-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Reports TrustFunds/downloads/tr2012.pdf

Medicaid spending and population characteristics, Medicaid and Medicare recipients, eligibility, and

costs; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services— www.cms.hhs.gov

www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/downloads/Medicaid Report2010.pdf www.cms.gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo

Health, United States, 2010, with chartbook on trends in the health of Americans, National Center for Health

Statistics—www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus10.pdf

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C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - S I X

296

The Economics of Prescription Drugs Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply the concepts of monopoly as well as consumer and producer surplus to the economics of prescription drugs.

LO2 Summarize why most health economists view prescription drugs as relatively inexpensive, even while most nonecono- mists view them as very expensive.

LO3 Explain why it is that most health economists do not favor price controls on prescription drugs.

LO4 Identify the consequences of an approval process that is too stringent or too lax.

Chapter Outline

Profiteers or Benevolent Scientists?

Monopoly Power Applied to Drugs

Important Questions

Summary

When people go to the doctor because they are sick or injured, they want the doctor to make them better. For certain injuries they may expect active treatments, like surgery. It is just part of the human psychologi- cal makeup to want to know that “everything is being done” to restore the patient’s health. The same holds for the treatment of illnesses. Nothing is more frustrating to patients than to be told they have a “virus,” because they accurately translate that to mean “go home and go to bed because there is nothing we can do for you.” On the other hand, if patients go home having filled a prescription for a drug, they feel better simply because they think that taking medicine will make them well. In part they think this because the prescription drug industry has been so successful in treating everything from infections to impotence. When we have a virus and there is no prescription forthcoming, we lose hope for a quick end to our illness. In this sense we go to the doctor hoping for prescriptions because it is usually a drug the doctor prescribes, rather than something the doctor actually does, that makes us better.

It seems all the more strange to economists, then, that prescription drugs get as much criticism as they do when it comes to expense. The amount of money spent on prescription drugs is actually trivial relative to all health spending. In 2014, for example, all U.S. health spending amounted to more than $3.03 trillion dollars, and 10 percent of that was spent on prescrip- tion drugs.

This chapter has several purposes. We look at the degree to which prescription drug manufacturers are prof iteers or Good Samaritans. We use our monop- oly model to discern why drugs are so costly, and we examine some of the new drugs and discuss whether they are expensive necessities or relatively inexpen- sive godsends. In doing this we will see the funda- mental reasons why prescription drug companies are likely to remain unpopular even as they continue to provide important medicines. Last, we look at how other countries control prescription drug prices, and we offer a perspective on whether the United States should follow suit.

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Monopoly Power Applied to Drugs 297

in turn, that there are no other companies producing the particular drug. When the drug is one-of-a-kind, as AZT was in the early 1990s, and it is the only hope a patient has, its monopoly power is dramatic. It is all the more dramatic when the disease it treats is fatal. Since most drugs cost very little to produce but may, as in the case of AIDS drugs, cost billions to discover and test, we are conflicted about high prices. We know that companies need to be rewarded for their investments, but we also find it troublesome that money has the power to deter- mine whether a person gets a drug and lives or does not get a drug and dies.

On the other hand, when the drug is one of many, and it treats a non-life-threatening condition, as do the anti-heartburn medications Nexium and Zantac, we are not at all conflicted. The problem is not life and death, and the power the companies have to charge high prices is limited only by competition and consumers’ willing- ness to suffer through ailments that are merely annoying.

Whether we view drug companies as profiteers or benevolent scientists rests on whether they, in the end, do good and whether they charge what are perceived to be fair prices. Drug companies make a great deal of money, but they incur a great deal of risk. Much eco- nomic research has gone into studying whether their profits are out of line in comparison with those of simi- lar industries. Although that research has not settled on a definitive answer, it does suggest that the rate of return to stockholders in the pharmaceutical industry is either at or slightly above that of similar industries. What is clear is that prescription drugs have both improved the quality of life for millions and made companies billions in profit.

Monopoly Power Applied to Drugs

As stated previously, the key economic attribute of the pre- scription drug industry is monopoly. While patents do run out and competition takes place in the form of generic drugs, monopoly reigns for several years at least. Fig ure  26.1 is the same graph that we saw in Chapter 5 for a monopo- list’s decision on price and production. As you know, a mo- nopolist is the only seller of a good. This means that the demand curve that a monopolistic firm faces for its goods is the entire market demand curve. For such a firm, this has good and bad aspects. In contrast to perfect competition, the seller does not have to worry about other firms. On the downside, if the firm wants to sell more goods, it not only has to lower the price to the people who will buy the extra goods; it has to lower the price to everyone else as well.

Profiteers or Benevolent Scientists?

Among the more interesting advertisements of the 1990s were the pharmaceutical industry’s feel-good television spots that focused on a variety of hardwork- ing scientists endeavoring to conquer a disease. These ads differed somewhat from the ads that commonly try to get us to go to the doctor to ask about problems like hair loss, seasonal allergies, or other afflictions. Just as McDonald’s wants to sell burgers, so also the pharma- ceutical ads are trying to sell us a particular drug. The feel-good ads are there, not to have us buy any particu- lar product, but to persuade us to feel better about the industry in general.

Usually, the earlier ads discussed an emotional attach- ment the scientists had with curing the disease they were working on. A friend, spouse, relative, or parent had the disease and this, we were supposed to believe, motivated the scientist to spend long nights crouched over a micro- scope in search of a cure. With no attempt to criticize the scientists’ sincerity, however, we know deep down that whether or not something altruistic motivates the scien- tist, what motivates the drug company is profit.

As with any invention, the fundamental economic problem is how to reward the inventor. Unless the inven- tor is given exclusive rights to his or her idea once the item has been invented, copycats can steal it. Knowing this, inventors will have little economic incentive to in- novate. This is why we have laws that govern copyrights and patents. Within existing laws, a patent-holding in- ventor is the only person who can sell the invention for as long as the patent exists.

Monopoly power is particularly important in the so- called orphan drug industry, an industry that deals with

diseases that afflict few people. Therapies that benefit small num- bers of patients cannot hope to generate sufficient profits during normal patent lives for companies to justify research. For this rea- son drugs that are labeled orphan drugs are granted very long patent lives so that profits, though small, can be expected to last long into the future. Without this aspect of

the patent law, research on such diseases would never be in- stituted by scientists working in the private sector.

In economic terms what this monopoly power does is give the inventor total control. As you recall from Chap- ter 5, monopoly means that there is one seller. It means,

patent A right granted by gov- ernment to an inventor to be the exclusive seller of that invention for a limited period of time.

orphan drug A drug that treats some- one with a disease that afflicts few people.

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298 Chapter 26 The Economics of Prescription Drugs

supply curve would be if the market were under per- fect competition.

In Figure 26.2, monopoly is compared with perfect competition. The perfectly competitive market would produce QPC at a price of PPC, because this is where supply crosses demand. The monopolistic producer charges much more, Pmonop, and produces less, Qmonop, because this is where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Our consumer and producer surplus analysis, then, allows us to show that companies profit not only at the expense of sick people, but also at the expense of society as a whole.

Figure 26.2 indicates that the consumer surplus (the area under the demand curve but above the price line) at the perfectly competitive price–quantity combination is PPC AC, and the producer surplus (the area above the supply curve but under the price line) is FPPCC. Under monopoly, the consumer surplus shrinks to PmonopAB, and the producer surplus rises to FPmonopBE. This means that producers are better off but not by as much as con-

sumers are worse off. Stated differently, the deadweight loss, or loss to society of producing at the wrong price–quantity combination, can be shown as the difference between the sum

of consumer and producer surplus between the perfect competition and monopoly situations. That area is de- picted as EBC in Figure 26.2.

This includes the people who would have purchased their goods at high prices, so the money gained from increasing sales is partially offset by the money that is lost from having to lower prices. The good news for the firm is that raising the price does not cause all customers to leave, as it does under perfect competition.

Figure 26.1 depicts a drug company that is the sole provider of a certain drug. It indicates that the marginal revenue curve, the curve that represents the additional revenue to the firm associated with the sale of one more unit of the good, is downward sloping rather than flat, as it would be under perfect competition.

Using the tools of consumer and producer surplus, we can show that with the price equal to P* and the quantity equal to Q*, relative to the societal optimum, the price is too high and the quantity too low. This can be seen by looking at Figure 26.2 and the assumptions that go along with it. For a moment suppose that the proper comparison to make with regard to the mo- nopolistic production of prescription drugs is perfect competition.1 As you saw in Chapter 5, the marginal cost curve for a perfect competitor—out of the mini- mum of average variable cost—was the supply curve. If you adapt that notion here, the marginal cost curve for this monopolist in Figure 26.1 is also what the

FIGURE 26.1 The prescription drug monopolist.

Marginal cost

Demand

Sales ($)

Marginal revenue

Q*

P*

Q/t

FIGURE 26.2 Comparing monopoly and perfect competition in prescription drugs.

Marginal cost = Supply

Demand

Qmonop QPC

Pmonop

PPC

F

A

B

C

E

Sales ($)

Marginal revenue

Q/t

1Because of the large innovation costs, this is a poor assumption for the indus- try at all stages of production but a reasonable one after the drug has been invented and approved.

deadweight loss The loss in social welfare associated with production being too little or too great.

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Important Questions 299

on how long a drug company has monopoly power over a drug is somewhat complicated, but we will assume that the company has that power for 10 years; after that, perfect competition takes hold and all economic profits disappear.2 Add to this scenario the fact that few drugs make it from the scientist’s lab to the pharmacy. Drug companies claim that the number of unsuccessful attempts is very high and that this is an additional reason for high costs.

Let’s examine a hypothetical situation drug compa- nies might face. Assume for every five drugs that reach the testing phase another five do not make it that far. Fur- ther, suppose that only one of every five that is tested is shown to be safe and effective. Thus for every 11 that incur invention costs, there are five that also incur test- ing costs. Only one produces revenue. Suppose at the very beginning of this process the manufacturer does not know which of these 11 plausible ideas will pay off, but it does know that one of them will. Also suppose that the manufacturer has a good idea that marginal production costs will amount to $10 per patient per year. Given all that, at a 10 percent real rate of return, the anticipated profit to the manufacturer from this one drug would have to be $520 million per year for the drug company to make back its initial investment. Thus, even if you ignore all of the markups that wholesalers and retailers charge from the manufacturer to the patient, the price per patient per year for our hypothetical example will have to be $530 ($520 million in profit/1 million patients + $10 in production costs).

In addition to all the preceding considerations, drug prices are made higher by our society’s propen- sity for suing pharmaceutical companies. Americans sue each other more than any other group of people. Pharmaceutical firms have deep pockets. They pro- duce products that do not work all the time and that sometimes do more harm than good. In the last 15 years, Vioxx and other Cox-2 inhibitors were approved and later had their safety called into question because they were shown to cause heart problems. Subsequent multimillion-dollar lawsuits were filed against their makers and, if upheld, they will completely wipe out the profit from the sale of these drugs. With the fear of such judgments in mind, pharmaceutical firms will increase their prices so they have enough money on

Important Questions

Expensive Necessities or Relatively Inexpensive Godsends? In addition to the fact that we can show prices to be “high” in a theoretical sense, the data show they are also high in real life. In the United States in particular, drugs are often priced at 10 times their marginal production costs. In addition, drug prices are increasing far more rapidly than the overall inflation rate. As a matter of fact, from 1986 to 2015 drug prices went up more than 268 per cent at a time when overall inflation increased general prices 116 percent. While some difference could have been expected, this difference is remarkable given that nonprescription drugs declined from 2009 to 2016.

The reasons for increased prescription drug prices are many and varied, but they boil down to a few impor- tant issues: development costs, regulation, and litigation. There is also a problem with the mismeasurement of in- flation in drug prices.

Development of new drugs costs a great deal of money, and drug companies need to recoup costs before they can make a profit. Since the “easy” diseases already have cures or treatments, we are left with some very difficult diseases to research. The training required to even understand how to start researching drug therapies takes several years after a researcher has earned a doctorate or a medical degree. People who get that kind of education for that long a period of time are going to command very high salaries once they start working. In addition to high labor costs, the equipment needed for this kind of work is specialized and expensive.

The capital and labor costs of drug research are extended even further by the years required to take a drug from suc- cessful trials to government approval. Typically, new drugs are first tested on small animals. They are then tested on primates. These tests are followed by small-scale human trials, designed primarily to gauge safety. Finally, a large- scale human trial requires that the drug be shown to work effectively while not causing unacceptable side effects. This lengthy process is expensive and it significantly ex- tends the time before the company’s revenue stream starts.

The concept of present value can shed light on how this contributes to the high costs of drugs. Let’s use a numeri- cal example to illustrate these issues. Assume a drug com- pany sees that 1 million patients with a particular ailment are willing and able to pay for a treatment. Suppose it costs $10 million a year for 10 years to invent a drug. Suppose it then takes another $10 million a year for another five years to test it and get it through the approval process. The law

2Manufacturers typically will make some economic profits on drugs after the expiration of the patent because of brand loyalty among physicians and patients. Drug company representatives encourage that loyalty with gifts. Sometimes these gifts are as innocuous as drug company pens while at other times they are expensive company-sponsored vacations.

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still have much behavior-modification work to do and that to the uninsured it comes at a cost of $1,200 month.

These drugs are obviously very expensive and if they treated diseases for which the patient was blameless or treated people who have health insurance, we might not con- sider these costs a problem. The patients who need these are usually complicit in their fate and frequently do not have in- surance. That either leaves them untreated or puts enormous cost pressure on Medicaid. In 2016, 34 states did not cover Harvoni and 19 states would not pay for the Vivitrol shot.

To counter some of the preceding negative character- istics, it must be said that the prescription drug indus- try can also lay claim to lowering health costs in some areas and to improving lives in nearly all areas. Drugs treat some diseases that either used to require surgery or, worse, that simply went untreated. There are drugs, also, that improve the quality of life and do so in a number of important areas. Some nonemergency heart condi- tions can now be treated with drug therapies rather than $30,000–$50,000 bypass or $10,000–$20,000 catheter- ization surgeries. Although the drugs are expensive and cannot be used when a patient is suffering from near- complete arterial blockages, they can slowly open up the arteries, and they have been shown to have a success rate that is comparable to more invasive alternatives.

In other areas new drugs have simply improved life. From ailments as irritating as seasonal allergies to those as trivial as heartburn, to those as debilitating as asthma, new drugs have made the lives of people of all ages much better. While seasonal allergies and heartburn are never life-threatening, people’s lives are changed when they are successfully treated.

Before the invention of nonsedating antihistamines such as Seldane3 and Claritin, allergy sufferers like me were hard pressed to accomplish much outdoors in the spring and fall. These medications let allergy suffer- ers play golf, mow the lawn, and do many other enjoy- able and productive things that used to only induce fits of sneezing. Claritin was also shown to be safe enough that the FDA allowed the drug to go “over the coun- ter” (meaning no prescription is required) in 2003. Be- fore anti-heartburn medications such as Nexium,4 spicy, high-acid, or rich dishes were simply off-limits for many middle-aged people. While it may seem trivial to the young, being unable to eat favorite foods affects people’s quality of life. Being able to eat pizza, Cajun wings, or a piquant sauce does not rank high in the sphere of important

hand to account for such judgments and to have profit left over. In countries where lawsuits and judgments are limited, the prices of drugs tend to be commensu- rately lower.

Another phenomenon we must account for in analyzing the prices of drugs is that drug price indexes suffer from all of the problems that other price indexes suffer from. The consumer price index’s lapses, discussed briefly in Chapter 6, are especially problematic with drugs. For an illustration of this, you need look no further than birth control pills. The pills your grandmother took in the early 1960s are nothing like those that are available now. The side effects of the early pills were much more severe than they are today. Part of the increase in the current price of birth control pills can be attributed to the improvement of quality rather than to the effects of inflation.

Taking all of the preceding into account, we are left with the fact that either drug prices are high or they seem to be high. The problem of the high expenses of drug therapies is shown very clearly in the cost of AIDS treat- ment. The drugs necessary to keep AIDS under control cost more than $30,000 a year. The modern HIV/AIDS therapy is a once-a-day pill that renders the former com- plicated “drug cocktail,” a combination of AZT and prote- ase inhibitors, obsolete. The cocktail failed many patients because they failed to follow its requirements. Those that did, most notably basketball player and L.A. Dodgers’ owner Ervin “Magic” Johnson, lived with AIDS as a man- ageable disease. The more expensive once-a-day therapy eliminates patient error. The advance in AIDS treatment has proceeded from simply sedating patients as they died painfully, to the cocktail, to the once-a-day therapy. At each stage the cost of the therapy has increased, but that does not imply the price increased. The 1980s price of sur- vival had been infinite, because the price of something that doesn’t exist is infinite. The 1990s and 2000s price of an easy-to-follow therapy for AIDS was similarly infinite.

There are two new drugs that have come to market in re- cent years that deal with sad facts of modern illicit drug use. Harvoni (a combination of ledipasvir and sofosbuvir, brand name Sovaldi) treats hepatitis C. It costs $95,000 for a 12- week course of treatment. It is highly effective (95 percent or more) in treating the disease that left untreated can lead to liver cancer and now kills more Americans than AIDS. The renewed scourge of heroin addiction is plaguing an increasing number of Americans. A drug, brand-named Vivitrol gives addicts an injectable, long-lasting form of a drug proven to work in blocking the mechanism by which heroin creates its addiction. It literally gives addicts a chance to change their behaviors. The downsides are that patients

3This drug was pulled from the market because it was shown to interact in potentially fatal ways with heart medications. 4In extreme cases this drug has reduced the risk of esophageal cancer.

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Important Questions 301

R E S T L E S S L E G S S Y N D R O M E ?

You find the same thing in Detroit relative to Windsor, Can- ada. The drug is not safer in El Paso or Detroit; it is only more expensive. As a matter of fact, it is often in exactly the same package. Prices are lower in other parts of the world, and one of the reasons is certainly price controls.

Would we be better off if the government controlled the price of drugs? Probably not. The world’s drug inventors eye the profit that they get in the United States when they pour billions into their scientists and laboratories. If they could not make a profit in the United States, there would be no place to make one and they would not put the money into innovation. To mix metaphors, the United States is the drug industry’s cash cow; by controlling prices, we would be killing the golden goose just as she is producing some very important life-improving and life-saving eggs.

The law with respect to prescription drugs is in flux. It has been against the law for companies to buy pre- scription drugs in a foreign country and resell them in the United States. Otherwise, a drug company could sell its products to a Canadian company at a low price deter- mined by Canadian law. That Canadian company would then resell them to a U.S. retailer, thereby avoiding the high price in the United States. This would have the same effect as allowing Canada to control U.S. prices. Though considered throughout the Obama years, reimportation is still illegal.

FDA Approval: Too Stringent or Too Lax? The approval for, and the regulation of, prescription drugs is performed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

medical issues, but being able to indulge once in a while does make life a little more enjoyable.

These latter cases are also not life-threatening, but they do represent serious quality-of-life issues. The drugs that treat these ailments may not be critical to life, but they rep- resent significant advances for people. Some would classify them as luxuries, but compared to not having the treatments available, others consider them to be inexpensive.

Why then do prescription drugs get such a bad rap? It is the reality that drug prices have increased significantly faster than inflation along with perceptions that economists claim are not well founded. Our perceptions tell us that the costs of prescription drugs are much higher than the actual 10 percent of medical spending for which they are responsible. For every dollar of expense incurred in hospital or doctor visits, there is a corresponding patient out-of-pocket cost (9 percent and 21 percent, respectively). For prescription drugs, out-of- pocket costs are much higher, at 35 percent. This leaves the patient more aware of and sensitive to increases in drug costs than increases in the costs of hospitals and doctors.

Price Controls: Are They the Answer? Another of the facts that must be faced with regard to drug prices is that they are higher in the United States than any- where else in the world. That is because in most other coun- tries drug prices are regulated. Whether the drug prices themselves are controlled or the profits from their sales are controlled, people in other countries pay much less for drugs than we do. Go to El Paso, Texas, and price a drug, and you will find it at half price or less across the border in Mexico.

In 2006, a major pharmaceutical manufacturer, GlaxoSmithKline (yes, it is all one word) began producing and marketing Requip. The first thing it had to do was market the disease that Requip treated. So instead of describing the drug’s ability to solve an obvious medi- cal problem, like high blood pressure or heart disease, it had to tell people about “restless legs syndrome.” This is what they say about this particular malady on their website (www.requip.com).

Are your legs keeping you up at night?® Do you dread long busi- ness meetings, going to the movies, or traveling on an airplane because you know your restless legs won’t let you sit still? You just know you’ll have to get up to relieve the discomfort in your restless legs—disturbing your work colleagues, other moviegoers, and fellow passengers.

The drug has made millions for the company because they have effectively convinced people who can’t stand to sit in confined areas that they have a curable ailment. They have also succeeded in mar- keting their product to people who can’t get to sleep or stay asleep because they feel a compulsion to move. The cynical among us might suspect that this is an example of marketing a drug to a popu- lation who has money. Who has trouble on long flights? Who sits in long meetings? Who can’t get to sleep or stay asleep? Middle-aged businesspeople with money and prescription drug coverage, that’s who. Economically speaking, the purpose of advertising is to move the demand curve to the right. In this case, GlaxoSmithKline may have created it for themselves.

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302 Chapter 26 The Economics of Prescription Drugs

This is a prime example of how the marginal analy- sis of economics can be used to aid in decision making. The marginal benefit of increasing FDA stringency is the decrease in the health problems accruing to those who take approved drugs that later are found to be unsafe. The marginal cost of increasing FDA stringency is the forgone increase in the health of people who could have been treated but were not. The optimal degree of FDA stringency is where the marginal cost equals the mar- ginal benefit.

Whether a particular drug goes over the counter is also a matter for FDA approval. When a new drug shows that it is sufficiently safe that it can be used by consumers with little or no consultation with a doctor, the FDA will approve it for use over the counter. When that occurs, the price of the drugs falls precipitously because it can be more easily mass-marketed. Whether that translates into consumers saving money is another story. It is ironic that when Claritin went over the counter in 2003, consumers without prescription drug coverage on their health insur- ance saw the price fall from more than $100 per month to around $35 per month, while those with insurance saw the cost to them rise because no insurance companies cover over-the-counter drugs. Former Claritin users with insurance were then motivated to seek more expensive prescription solutions such as Allegra. Insurance com- panies have since responded to this trend by requiring over-the-counter options to be tried before prescription options are tried.

In the early 1990s the FDA was under scrutiny for not al- lowing drugs to come to market quickly enough. The issue then was magnified by the excruciatingly slow process of getting AIDS drugs approved. As described earlier, the FDA’s process is a multistage one where a drug is tested first for its safety and then for its effectiveness. A drug can be marketed only if both meet a high scientific standard.

While this sounds very good, the problem is that people will die of afflictions for which there are already existing drug therapies. For example, in the early 1990s the AIDS-combating protease inhibitors had been shown to be safe, but scientists had not yet had the time to show their effectiveness. Reasoning that unforeseen drug in- teractions were the least of their worries, dying AIDS patients wanted the drugs immediately. The problem of overly stringent FDA regulation is that people die when they could be saved with a less-stringent process.

During the middle 1990s the FDA began to experiment with a fast-track approval process. Here, drugs that are shown to be safe get an expedited review for effectiveness. The problem is that the initial safety review is conducted using a relatively small sample of people, while the effec- tiveness review is conducted using a much larger one. Ad- verse drug interactions and relatively rare and unforeseen safety issues come to light during this effectiveness testing. Expediting the effectiveness testing causes some safety is- sues to be missed, and as a result the FDA sometimes has to subsequently pull drugs off the shelves. This was Fen-Phen’s fate, and it may end up being the fate of all Cox-2 inhibitors.

Key Terms

deadweight loss orphan drug

patent

Summary You are now able to apply the concept of monopoly as well as consumer and producer surplus to the analysis of the costs of prescription drugs. You are able to apply those concepts to see the reasons most health economists view prescription drugs as relatively inexpensive even

while most noneconomists view them as very expensive. You also understand why it is that most health econo- mists do not favor price controls on prescription drugs. Last, you understand how economists see the issue of FDA approval and the appropriate degree of stringency.

deadweight loss orphan drug patent

Key Terms

Quiz Yourself 1. The prescription drug industry is characterized by

products that have a. low fixed costs and low marginal costs. b. low fixed costs and high marginal costs. c. high fixed costs and low marginal costs. d. high fixed costs and high marginal costs.

2. A patent is necessary to motivate innovation in areas where the innovation is a. costly to figure out and easily copied. b. cheap to figure out and difficult to copy. c. costly to figure out and difficult to copy. d. cheap to figure out and cheap to copy.

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Summary 303

Short Answer Questions 1. What reasons are there for not limiting the price,

or at least the increase in the price, of prescription drugs that have already been invented?

2. What are the reasons why, even if it is in the best interests of every other country to limit prescription drug prices, it might not be in the best interests of the United States to limit those prices?

3. Why might legalizing drug re-importation be equiv- alent to limiting drug prices?

4. What is lost in terms of societal welfare if, in the cause of safety, a drug or medical device has its ap- proval delayed by a year or two?

Think about This Vioxx and other Cox-2 inhibitors were invented because the existing pain medications (when taken for persistent pain) did damage to the lining of the stomach. After years of clin- ical trials, they were determined to be safe. It was only after use by millions of people that we became aware of the fact that they affected the heart. Under what conditions should their makers be legally liable for these side effects?

Talk about This When a disease has no cure, people with the disease have no options. Suppose a prescription drug is invented but is so expensive that some patients cannot afford it. Are we better off with a drug being available but only to those with insurance? What are the social consequences of this?

For More Insight See Scherer, F. M., “Pricing, Profits, and Technological Prog-

ress in the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal of Eco- nomic Perspectives 7, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 97–115.

Behind the Numbers Health, United States—www.cdc.gov/nchs Overall and prescription drug prices—www.bls.gov/cpi

/home.htm

3. The reason orphan drug laws were created was that the motivation to invent drugs for these diseases was a. much greater than normal because prices could

be high. b. much less than normal because prices would be

too low. c. much less than normal because firms antici-

pated few sales. d. much greater than normal because firms antici-

pated high sales. 4. The market form for a new drug in an area where

there are no competitors is a. perfect competition. b. monopolistic competition. c. oligopoly. d. monopoly.

5. The market form for a new drug in an area that has one other drug is a. perfect competition. b. monopolistic competition. c. oligopoly. d. monopoly.

6. The approval process for new drugs, if governed by economic thinking, should set stringency stan- dards so that the ____________________ equals the _________________. a. total cost; total benefit b. average cost; average benefit c. marginal cost; marginal benefit d. cost of production; revenue from sales

7. When an existing prescription drug goes over the counter a. everyone wins. b. drug companies win but consumers lose. c. drug companies lose but consumers win. d. drug companies likely win because of the in-

crease in sales, and consumers may win depend- ing on whether prescriptions are covered by insurance.

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C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - S E V E N

304

So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe private property, intellectual property, and contracts and relate their importance in enabling economic growth.

LO2 Explain why a system of bankruptcy laws is necessary to a thriving economy and show why those laws must be carefully crafted.

LO3 Describe the role of civil litigation in a society and discuss how economists participate in that arena.

Chapter Outline

Private Property

Bankruptcy

Civil Liability

Summary

This chapter outlines the importance of government and a legal environment in promoting economic ac- tivity. It starts by describing why a system of laws is a prerequisite to a healthy economy and then lays out the legal framework for private property, intellectual property, contracts, and bankruptcy. It ends by describ- ing a liability and tort system that can either aid or de- tract from economic efficiency depending on how it is applied.

As Chapter 3 laid out, there are times when markets fail and governments are needed to step in to correct those failures. That was not meant to leave the im- pression that without those “failure” conditions, the economy would function well with no government. Clearly, government is necessary to protect us from physical harm. We need armies and police forces to keep others from hurting us. Those services are pro- vided by government in response to a clear market fail- ure. This chapter focuses on the legal framework under which our economy operates.

Private Property

Suppose you have a quiz on this chapter in the next hour and you are reading this book so you can study. Now also suppose that you are smart and could get a decent grade on that quiz without reading carefully and the friend sitting next to you does not have a book and is not as smart as you are. He could claim to “need” it more than you and that the gain to him of reading it is greater than the loss to you of not reading it. All that may be true, but the book is your private property to do with what you wish. You sac- rificed money to buy it. It is yours. If your friend took it from you, you could have him brought up on charges of theft. Here government plays the role of pro-

tecting and respecting the impor- tance of private property.

Why does protecting pri- vate property foster economic growth? First, it motivates you

private property Land and other physical items that are owned by individuals or a group of individuals.

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Private Property 305

to work hard. If you work hard and produce goods and services for others, they will pay you. If you make a lot of money from working hard, you can buy stuff. You cannot count on getting to enjoy the benefits of that hard work if your earnings, or the stuff you buy with those earnings, can be taken by others without consequence. Second, gov- ernment’s protection of private property motivates you to save. If you save your earnings rather than immediately consuming them, you are providing the financial capital for others to buy productive machinery that they would otherwise not be able to buy. You get the reward of interest and they have the opportunity to increase their business’s profit. If fear of theft caused you to consume everything you earned right away, you would not save. You would be worse off because of the forgone interest and the borrower would be worse off because of the forgone profit.

Intellectual Property Usually, private property is the product of your hard work. Once in a while that hard work is a result of your

brain power, your imagination, your creativity, or your insight. This intellectual property is also protected from those tempted to steal it. This book is protected by a copyright. So is 50 Cent’s (pronounced fiddy cent) music . . . if that’s what you call it. Sim- ilarly the recipe to the vaccine protecting you from HPV and its cancerous consequences is pat- ented. For the life of the patent, only the inventing company can produce it. Finally, if you created a brand name for a blockbuster product, like BlockBuster did for renting videos and games, that name could not be used without your consent. The instrument that protects your intellectual property is called a trademark.

Contracts In more advanced economies con- tracts are necessary to lay out the

promises made by two or more parties. This typically oc- curs because the exchange between parties is not at the same

time. When I buy a Snickers bar at a gas station, I do not need to sign a contract because I have paid for the Snickers bar when I received it. I need a contract with my publisher be- cause I wrote this book several months before you bought it. I was paid my portion of the amount you paid for it about six

to nine months after you bought it. Without a contract, the publisher could simply keep the money, or perhaps hold on to it for years rather than months. My contract protects me from my publisher should it decide to be dishonest. That contract also protects my publisher from my laziness. When I wrote the first edition, they paid

me money in advance on the condition that I would deliver on my promise of a book they could sell.

Contracts protect both parties and make their prom- ises binding by something other than their good word. If I thought there was a chance that I would not be paid, I would not have taken the many months to have written it and the publisher would not have made money on it. If the publisher could not hold me to our agreement that I would deliver a book, they would not have paid me in advance. From our Chapter 3 concepts of producer and consumer surplus, society is better off when the book is produced. I make royalties, my publisher makes a profit, and a stu- dent learns about why contracts are necessary. Everyone is better off because of the existence of contracts.

Enforcing Various Property Rights and Contracts Just because we have a law that says you cannot do some- thing does not mean that it is not done. Someone has to enforce the law. If someone steals your money, you call the police. Assuming that person is caught and convicted, the punishment is jail time. If someone copies your song, book, drug, or marketing trademark, or violates his or her part in a contract, you have to appeal to a different part of government: the civil court system. That means you have to hire a lawyer and get a court date for a judge and jury to settle who is in the right and who has to pay whom. If they agree with your claim, the intellectual property thief or contract violator is punished by being ordered to stop the violation and to pay you the money you are owed.

So even when markets are perfectly competitive, con- tracts and property rights are imperative to an economy’s

intellectual property Written and recorded works, ideas, formulas, and other creative intan- gible property that are owned by individuals or a group of individuals.

copyright A right granted by government to a creator of a written or recorded work to be the exclusive seller of that work for a limited period of time.

patent A right granted by government to an inven- tor to be the exclusive seller of that invention for a limited period of time.

trademark A right granted by gov- ernment to a business to be the exclusive user of a phrase, logo, or name of such a business.

contract Written agreement by which each party is bound to provide other parties with goods, services, or financial consideration in ex- change for other goods, services, or financial considerations.

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306 Chapter 27 So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law

success, and government, whether it be the police or the courts, is needed to enforce those rights. Countries with- out stable and effective governments are typically not suc- cessful in fostering healthy economies. During the 1990s, Somalia’s economy collapsed because of lawlessness. No one could count on agreements being upheld, and no one had the incentive to create goods for the market because they were easily stolen. During more recent times, law- lessness in Iraq not only prevented the U.S. military from leaving as quickly as the American people had hoped but also prevented Iraq’s economy from recovering.

Negative Consequences of Private Property Rights Though a system of private property rights clearly moti- vates people to work hard and be creative, it also creates other ethical and economic issues. If you have discussed the issue chapters on prescription drugs or the cost of col- lege textbooks, you have become acquainted with some of these issues. Ethically, how do we accept a level of global wealth inequality that arises from our system of private property? Is it ethical to possess the means by which to manage the AIDs problem and not allow the poor countries in Africa to produce the medications to do so? Is it ethical to charge $125 for a textbook that costs $15 to produce? Is it economically efficient to have monopoly production, with the resulting deadweight loss, in these goods? Econ- omists generally agree that the system of private property motivates these goods to be produced in the first place and that removing the property rights protections would seri- ously reduce the incentive to produce them. The ethical conundrum and the monopoly-induced inefficiency are the price we pay for creating those incentives.

Bankruptcy

Sometimes people and firms are unable to meet their financial obligations. Either because they have come on hard economic times, have had health issues that turned into financial troubles, or simply spent more than they had, sometimes people cannot repay the money they owe. Bankruptcy allows people to start fresh with their debts. The bankruptcy laws have built-in options. Some

people want to keep homes and cars by agreeing to continue to pay mortgage and car payments. Some people want to get out of debt altogether.

A perfectly reasonable question to ask at this point is why, if we need government to enforce contracts, would it make sense to allow people to not repay their debts? For the answer we have to appeal to our Chapter 1 notion of incentives. Suppose you are in great debt and whatever you earn would go to paying on that debt. You would have no incentive to work if you knew there was no way out. Providing a system of bankruptcy that allows people a way out also reenergizes their incentives to work hard. Of course, when abused, a system of bankruptcy allows people to consume without ever intending to pay for it. In  2005, Congress recognized this concern when it re- formed the bankruptcy laws to put tighter controls on who could declare bankruptcy and for what purposes.

Since this is a college textbook and you likely are a col- lege student, it is also important for you to know that part of the way society pays for the subsidized interest rates on student loans is to make it so that you cannot escape them if you declare bankruptcy. They will follow you forever.

Civil Liability

Sometimes the harm one person does to another is not from taking something from them but from accidentally, negligently, or purposefully injuring them. Suppose you are driving along and crash into me in your car, and I die. My wife and children are clearly harmed. How much they have been harmed depends on what their lives are like without me compared to the way life was with me. Using this fairly straightforward principle and the no- tion of liability, we can determine how much my family should get from you and your insurance company.

Before we get into how much harm you have done, let’s think about how the accident came about. If you were driving the speed limit, had adequately maintained your car, were not impaired by alcohol, and were not talking on your cell phone, but instead were blinded by the sun when you came around a corner we can argue that this was an accident. In most states your liability here is limited be- cause, though you were at fault, it was an accident. Most states protect the perpetrator of true accidents with limits on their liability. If you were drinking, or had neglected your brakes, or were chatting on your cell phone, it can overcome this shield of liability and you have now be- come negligent and your liability is unlimited. Similarly, if you killed me on purpose because this book had bored you to tears one too many times, you would not only face civil liability, but criminal liability as well.

bankruptcy The legal state that allows debtors to be protected from the ac- tions of their creditors.

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Civil Liability 307

How much my wife has been harmed, though, is in- dependent of the degree of your liability. So now let’s assume that you were drunk and your employer knew it when he sent you out on a delivery. There is no limit on your liability or your employer’s. We can now look at your legal exposure by dividing it into monetary losses and nonmonetary losses. This division is similar to the accounting cost versus economic cost division from Chapter 4.

Let’s start with the monetary losses that are relatively easy to quantify. Suppose I make $75,000 per year as a professor at my university and I get pension, health, and other benefits totaling another $25,000 per year. You could find the present value of $100,000 per year for the rest of my working life and, depending on the interest rate chosen and the length of time I am likely to work, get a pretty good starting point for how much monetary damage you have done to my family. The present value of $100,000 per year for 25 years discounting at 5 per- cent is a little more than $1.4 million.

The problem is that you have not taken into account any pay increases I might get. You have not figured in how much this book will earn in royalties that will now be paid to a substitute author. You have not taken into account the fact that I might have died from something else. You have assumed that I will not be fired or will not just up and quit well before retirement age. You will have assumed I will retire at the “average” time. You have assumed an interest rate that is based on an assumed inflation rate. Economists make assumptions about these types of variables when testifying in trials, and all go into creating an expected present value of losses. Let’s pretend for a moment that your estimates on these vari- ables are accurate and you can modify your simple pres- ent value calculation appropriately. Having done so, you are still missing the nonmonetary losses.

If you go back and review the reasons real GDP is not synonymous with social welfare from Chapter 6, you will remember that real GDP only accounts for transac- tions that take place in markets. My choice to sell my labor to my university is a market decision, and both my salary and my benefits count. What does not count there, and has not counted so far, is my work around the house. Every day I get up with my children to make them break- fast and pack them each a lunch. I am a good husband and father in that I do my share of the cooking, cleaning, and shopping. I mow the lawn, split firewood, stoke the fire in the fireplace, help my children with homework, help them sort through boyfriend/girlfriend issues, and

appropriately discipline them for their errant Internet usage and excessive text messaging. What’s the loss as- sociated with all that? What about the loss to my family’s psychological well-being? These implicit losses are real but difficult to quantify.

Let’s suppose, for now, that the jury takes all of this into account and generates a solid, defensible verdict and jury award. Is it good for the economy? Many would argue that it is because this type of jury award forces people to understand and account for the actions they take that risk harming other people. If you recall from Chapter 3, markets fail when a person makes an eco- nomic decision without thinking about the harm done to an innocent third party. Having people think about all the economic consequences of their actions helps ensure that those actions are the correct ones. So if juries get their awards right, this serves to cause individuals and busi- nesses to consider all the costs they impose on a society.

The problem is that juries sometimes wildly inflate the less easy-to-quantify losses. Though I am a good fa- ther, I am not worth $100 million even if the jury wants to make a statement against drunk driving or driving while cell-phone talking. When firms are concerned that even when they make good-faith mistakes, they will jeopardize their very existence, they will be overly cau- tious. A good example of this concern is the arena of prescription drugs.

When drugs go through the FDA approval process, they are tested for both their effectiveness in treating the specific ailment for which they are prescribed as well as their safety. Assuming they are approved, they are mar- keted. The advertisements are often humorous without intending to be. The pitch person talks very calmly about the drug and its uses, and then someone else talks very fast about possible side effects. Part of the rationale be- hind the fast-talking discussion of side effects is to limit the liability of the drug maker.

Consider Vioxx. It was the first in a line of painkillers designed for arthritic patients who cannot take aspirin or Tylenol because these cheap over-the-counter medi- cations damage the lining of the stomach. After Vioxx and several other similar Cox-2 inhibitors passed the ap- proval process, a link between heart problems and these drugs was discovered. The companies that invented and marketed them did not immediately pull the drugs at the moment the first questions were raised, but rather waited until the links were confirmed. When those ill effects were confirmed, it was off to the races with civil liability lawsuits because they waited.

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308 Chapter 27 So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law

Why would individuals hire attorneys when they might lose? The answer is because they don’t have to worry about losing. Contingency attorneys are lawyers who agree

to take a case on the stipulation that if their client loses, the cli- ent owes nothing. If they win, the lawyer typically gets one-third of the judgment or settlement. Contingency attorneys take cases knowing that they may only win a few of them, but as long as the payoff to the wins is very high, as it often is, they can still make a handsome living.

In other cases, where the losses to individuals are very

low but where there are many similarly situated victims, attorneys create class actions. Class actions lawsuits are suits where the concerns of many wronged parties are grouped into one “class.” A good example here is my former 2002 Honda Odyssey. For whatever reason, it is alleged that the odometer on that model overesti- mated the true distance traveled by 5 percent. The losses to individuals are likely to be small, but the losses to the estimated 6 million Honda owners are not small in total. Because Honda settled the suit, they agreed to pay for any repairs that they would have paid for had the odometer reading been accurate. So if I had a 36,000 mile warranty and my engine blew at 37,000 miles, they would agree to fix it for free. Under the settlement, if I had already had the repair done, I could submit receipts to get my money back. Those who leased their minivans could recover a portion of their mileage overage charges. What also happened in this case, and what happens in

many class action lawsuits, is that the lawyers get paid, usually rather handsomely. In the Honda case, the law- yers netted close to $10 million.

Another example of a class action suit is the Takata airbag issue. Takata is a Japanese manufacturer of air- bag components for a variety of automakers (BMW, Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, and Toyota). At issue was the tendency (under certain conditions) of Takata airbags to go off with sufficient explosive force to turn the airbag housing into lethal shrapnel. By mid- 2016 there were 10 deaths and more than a hundred injuries attributed to this issue. While there is a national recall of those airbags, people who own those cars have to wait, in many cases years, before enough are available to replace the impacted ones. The loss to those families directly impacted by a death or injury would be settled individually. The losses to the owners who experienced lower-than-otherwise resale value would be dealt with by class action.

Whether this is good for the economy generally depends on whether the losses recovered by the wronged parties are significant, whether firms are more careful to account for these types of errors, and whether the firms overcompensate for the fear of losses by not producing useful goods that might generate such suits. The question of whether class action suits are, on the whole, useful devices to protect people and compel businesses to ensure their products are working properly or whether the lawsuits and the threat of lawsuits are a drain on the economy also separates the political parties. Contin- gency attorneys overwhelmingly favor Democrats while business interests seeking a limit on their liability over- whelmingly favor Republicans.

contingency attorney A lawyer who agrees to take a percentage of any judgment or settlement. The attorney is paid only if the client wins the case.

class action lawsuits Suits where similarly harmed people are joined together into one party so as to sue one or more defendants.

Summary In this chapter we have explored the role of govern- ment and the law with respect to property, intellectual property, contracts, bankruptcy, and civil liability. We have seen that their enforcement adds to economic

efficiency but comes at a cost. We have also seen that bankruptcy and civil litigation can be used as tools to enhance economic efficiency but can also be a drag on the economy.

Key Terms bankruptcy class action lawsuit contingency attorney

contract copyright intellectual property

patent private property trademark

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Summary 309

Quiz Yourself 1. For a market economy to function, economists insist

that government must protect a. private property. b. rights to free speech. c. freedom of assembly. d. free access to health care.

2. The type of private property that is protected by a copyright or patent is a. land. b. financial capital. c. intellectual property. d. personal property.

3. A monopolistic competitor’s brand identity is pro- tected by a a. trademark. b. patent. c. copyright. d. bond.

4. Economists insist that bankruptcy laws are always harmful to a well-functioning economy. a. True b. False

5. When one party harms another and the harmed party hires a lawyer who will collect only if the harmed party wins the suit, that party has hired a a. personal injury attorney. b. contingency attorney. c. corporate lawyer. d. disbarred attorney.

6. If an attorney wishes to combine the small claims of many people into one lawsuit against a defendant, he or she is engaging in a a. summary judgment. b. frivolous tort. c. pointed claim. d. class action lawsuit.

Short Answer Questions 1. Mortgages are a form of contract. Why might it not

be in the best interests of the borrower, the lender,

or the house buyer that such a contract be enforced if the value of the house is much less than the out- standing balance on the mortgage?

2. What are the potential costs and benefits associated with allowing for intellectual property rights? Do they always motivate innovation? Could they inhibit innovation? How?

3. What are the benefits of having a system that allows for bankruptcy? What are the costs?

4. In 2011 the Supreme Court heard a case in which lawyers were attempting to certify that all women who worked for Walmart were a single class. What would make you skeptical of such a large “class,” and why would having a large class such as this make it more likely that the plaintiffs would get some settlement in their favor?

Think about This When an economy creates intellectual property rights, it must enforce those rights. This is somewhat easy to do within a country but very difficult to do when the violator is outside the country. In China copyright in- fringement runs rampant, and DVDs and CDs are copied and sold by street vendors for much less than these mov- ies and albums sell for in the United States. The United States made this an important part of trade negotiations and emphasized it more than it emphasized adherence to international labor standards. Which issue is more im- portant to you and why?

Talk about This The Republican and Democratic parties differ greatly on their view of personal injury and class action law- suits. Republicans argue that these suits place a signifi- cant drain on the economy and reduce the motivation for innovation, especially in the medical arena. Demo- crats counter that consumers must have recourse when they are hurt or their interests are damaged by corpora- tions. Suppose, at some level, they are both right. Where would you balance the interests of everyone in a grow- ing but safe economy?

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310

The Economics of Crime Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe how economics can contribute to the debate over crime and crime control.

LO2 Describe who generally commits crime and why.

LO3 Conclude that economists who study crime often assume that criminals are rational.

LO4 Analyze the cost of crime to society and whether we are currently spending the right amount, focusing on the right criminals, emphasizing the right crimes, and enforcing the right sentences.

LO5 Apply the principles of incentives, marginal cost, and marginal benefit to crime control.

Chapter Outline

Who Commits Crimes and Why

The Rational Criminal Model

The Costs of Crime

Optimal Spending on Crime Control

Summary

Crime is a problem that does not naturally spring to mind as one for which economists would have much of value to contribute. Other than early work on crime by Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker, we have not used much of our research time and money on this subject. Still, there are areas where economic analysis is uniquely suited to deal with the problems of crime. For instance, a potential criminal makes a decision to commit a crime based on the income potential of legal work, the booty to be gained from the crime, and the chance and con- sequence of getting caught. Couched in different words, this is not all that different from an investment decision in which small gains in safe assets are compared to large gains in risky assets. When looked at this way, econom- ics and criminology have some important links.

The first thing we do in exploring the economics of crime is to look at who commits crime. We then see what a theoretical “investment-like” decision would tell us about who we should expect will commit crimes. Next, we use cost–benefit analysis to discuss how the noncrim- inal public should devote resources in the areas of crime

prevention, detection, apprehension, and punishment. Last, we use economics to study whether the goals of life imprisonment and the death penalty have the desired effects of deterring or preventing future crime.

Who Commits Crimes and Why

Most crime is committed by young men who are socially and economically disadvantaged. The victims of their crimes are disproportionately from the same group. Young black men, for example, overwhelmingly commit crimes against other young black men. Moreover, when we exam- ine the disadvantages attributed to racism and compound them with the economic disadvantage of poor job opportu- nities, the problem seems to magnify. For instance, in the latest data where we have the race of both the perpetrator and victims, white people are killed by other whites in about the number that would be predicted by the overall population (82 of 100), whereas 90 of every 100 murdered blacks are killed by other blacks. In this case the number

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - E I G H T

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The Rational Criminal Model 311

would be just plain stupid to pick the risky and lower- earning alternative of a life of crime. If you have the skills to be a doctor or lawyer and have a six-figure salary, the alternative of clearing $50,000 while selling cocaine is not all that attractive. Thus the rational criminal theory cor- rectly predicts that people with high legal incomes are not likely to be prevalent in the criminal and prison population.

This conclusion may seem trivially easy to come to, but what is not trivial is how a person with a set of intermediate skills, earning $10 an hour, or about $20,000 a year, would treat the issue. To be at that level of income in today’s soci- ety, most people have completed high school. It is therefore significant that less than half of those in the prison popula- tion graduated from high school, and 33 percent were not working at a legal job just prior to being arrested. Weighing a $20,000 a year job against a high-risk, high-income crimi- nal life is hard, and the decision could go either way.

A full-time minimum-wage worker, earning approxi- mately $14,500 (in 2016), would see the opportunity of earning a high criminal income as a significantly greater temptation than would a person making much more. We would expect that greater economic alternatives in the legal realm would translate into less crime, and fewer opportunities would lead to more crime. Why, then, did crime escalate during the sustained economic growth in the middle to late 1980s and fall during the sustained growth of the middle to late 1990s? The answer lies in the placing of economic opportunities.

If our rational criminal theory is accurate, raising a middle-, upper-middle-, or high-income person’s economic prospects should have little to no effect on crime. Even without a growth in income, such a person would have vir- tually no incentive to turn to crime. An increase in income would simply lessen a trivially small temptation and would have no appreciable impact on crime. On the other hand, if the economic prospects changed at the low end of the eco- nomic scale, the effect on crime would likely be substantial.

In the decade and a half from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, income inequality rose. Average income rose because the upper half of the income scale did very well, while people with little education and few job skills saw their real spending power remain stagnant or fall.1 What you would expect to see from our rational criminal model did, in fact, happen. Crime increased substantially through the period, and it did so more in the lower- income groups than in the higher-income groups.

predicted by the distribution of the population as a whole would be 13 out of 100, rather than 90 out of 100.

Crime statistics generally come to us from two sources: police reports and surveys of crime victims. Those who view the police to be racially biased may argue that statis- tics that come from police reports are racially biased, but it is hard to believe that crime victims would have an interest in biasing their reports. Falsely reporting an attacker to the police would diminish the likelihood that the perpetrator would be caught, and doing so in a survey would not serve any useful purpose. No matter whether you measure crime by looking at arrest reports sent to the FBI or by looking at victimization surveys, the data indicate conclusively that minorities commit far more crimes than their 38 percent proportion of the populace. The question is not whether poor blacks, Hispanics, and other needy members of mi- nority communities commit more crimes, but why.

The Rational Criminal Model

In the late 1960s, Gary Becker came up with a model of criminal behavior that explained crime in terms of a simple investment decision. According to Becker, the decision to commit a crime is one of risk versus return. The low-return investment, work at a legal job, has a low return, but the worker carries no risk of being ar- rested. On the other hand, the high-return investment, stealing or selling illegal goods, has a high return, but it puts the thief or drug dealer at risk of being caught and punished. In this context, a criminal is no different from an investment banker who is deciding whether to invest in tried-and-true U.S. Treasury bonds or a risky initial public offering of an Internet stock. Just as investors have a portfolio that contains a mix of risky and safe as- sets, you would expect to see that most criminals would have legitimate jobs as well. This is, in fact, the case.

We should take some time to explain what economists mean when they use the word rational. To an economist, if people know what it is they want, know the constraints they face, know the costs of getting what they want, and choose to proceed with getting it, then they are rational. This does not mean that these rational people will do what society thinks is best for them. It means only that their actions are consistent with their goals, constraints, and costs. By this standard all but the insane are rational.

Crime Falls When Legal Income Rises If a person has the potential for earning a higher income through legal means than illegal ones, then the person

1Of course, the material in Chapter 6 lays out the case that because the CPI over- states the effects of inflation, real incomes for the poor did not fall but rose slightly.

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312 Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime

After the recession of 1990–1991, however, when crime was at a near-term high, the economic prospects of low-skill workers began to increase. The minimum wage was raised from $3.35 to $5.15 during the period, and both the overall unemployment rate and the unemploy- ment rate for minorities and for low-skill workers fell. At the same time, either because of coincidence or because the model is right, crime fell, and it fell quickly.

The rational criminal model has a more difficult time explaining the general increase in crime during the 1960s, when incomes rose both in general and within the poor communities. This highlights an important thing to keep in mind when it comes to using economics to ex- plain complex social phenomena. Sometimes a change in social norms, an area better left to sociologists, or a change in moral values, an area better left to the clergy, is at the heart of these social phenomena. Economics is then less capable of explaining them.

Crime Falls When the Likelihood and Consequences of Getting Caught Rise The other variable that can change things in this ratio- nal criminal model is the probability and consequences of getting caught. We know that crime pays when you do not get caught. We also know that choosing to become a criminal becomes less attractive when the chances of getting away with crime diminish and when the potential punishment becomes more severe. It is usually true that if you knew you would get caught, you would choose a legal occupation. Sometimes, however, this is not true. For women who possess low levels of education and few mar- ketable skills, for example, the occupation of prostitute entails getting caught regularly and going to jail for a few days as a part of the cost of doing business. The important thing here is that even given the lost time in jail, for such women, prostitution pays better than legal work.

To deter potential criminals from committing crimes, there are two things that we can do. We can make the chances of meeting punishment greater, and we can make the punishment more severe. In its simplest terms, the first implies that by having more police, judges, and jails we can increase the likelihood that criminals will be caught, be convicted quickly, and go to jail. The second suggests that we make the sentences longer or the fines greater.

Though these may seem like two aspects of the same approach, in part because we are talking about increas- ing spending on the same kinds of people, they are re- ally distinct in their intent. The first is intended to make criminals less confident that they will get away with their

activities. Depending on where in the judicial system the money is spent, this can provide additional funding for cops on the street, making detection and apprehension more likely, or it can provide funds for greater num- bers of effective prosecutors, who may garner greater numbers of postarrest guilty verdicts. This differs from spending more money on prisons and allowing judges to sentence convicted criminals to longer terms.

Problems with the Rationality Assumption Criminologists and sociologists have a hard time grant- ing the assumption that the decision to become a criminal is a rational economic decision made by people capable of evaluating complex choices. In support of their view, you only have to look at the percentage of crime that is seemingly senseless. School shootings are not explain- able using economic methods. One of the main criticisms of economic models is that they assume too much in- tellectual capacity on the part of humans. For instance, it might be argued that if criminals could evaluate the options as rationally as economists claim they can, they probably would be smart enough not to have to turn to crime. In any event, economists use the idea of the “rational criminal” when looking at criminality; and, as was seen above, the rational criminal model is often con- sistent with what we know about crime.

The Costs of Crime

In the latest year for which there is comprehensive na- tional data, 2012, we spent a total of $265 billion on the police, the judiciary, and prisons. In 2014, 11.2 million persons were arrested and some 626,644 of that number got jail time. There were more than 2.2 million Americans in state or federal jails and prisons. This was all done in response to the 1.2 million violent and 8.3 million prop- erty crimes that were reported that year. When we see these numbers, we wonder whether the money we spend is worth it, and whether the distribution of spending on police, justice, and prisons is a good one.

If we put any faith in the model we have been dis- cussing, we are convinced that by spending money in this arena, we can change the probability of a crimi- nal’s being punished and the extent of the punishment. Of course, we could also talk about spending the money to raise the legal income potential of people. Some people argue, for example, that we should take money that is earmarked for building new prisons and put it into education and social programs like Head Start and

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The Costs of Crime 313

low-crime neighborhoods. This allows economists to cre- ate a “willingness-to-pay” measure. If people have to pay $100,000 extra to reduce their likelihood of victimization by half, then crime “costs” $200,000. This method can be used to estimate the value of a human life. If someone is willing to pay $100 to reduce their likelihood of death from one in 5,000 to one in 10,000, then they are im- plicitly saying their life is worth $100/.0002 = $500,000.

Another method uses jury awards in wrongful death and personal injury cases to establish loss estimates. In this method, the average jury award to the widow of a drunken driving victim is used as a proxy for the value of the life lost. The average jury award to a nonfatal accident might stand in for the intangible loss from a nonfatal assault.

If we simply ignore all of the estimated costs of pain and suffering and lives lost, then the cost of the average crime has been estimated at approximately $1,000. Add- ing the pain and suffering and other intangible costs, some economists have estimated these costs. For each crime, the estimates depend on methodology. For murder, the estimates cluster around $4 million. For rape, estimates cluster around $100,000. For other assaults, they cluster around $25,000. Other crimes have much lower estimated costs, such as $6,000 for car theft and $2,500 for house- hold burglary. On average, the cost estimates per crime including pain and suffering cluster around $15,000.

How Much Crime Does an Average Criminal Commit? We can use these figures to estimate the cost of letting criminals go free and compare that to the cost of keeping them in jail. If we know how many crimes the average criminal commits, we can multiply the average cost per crime by the average number of crimes committed in a year to come up with the costs imposed on society by the early release of a still violent criminal. Looking at it another way, we can compute the average cost of not catching and imprisoning a criminal.

Even when we interpret sophisticated criminologi- cal surveys, we find that the average number of crimes committed by the average criminal ranges all the way from 180 down to 10. Most economists are comfortable with estimates in the range of 10 to 20 crimes. If we as- sume for a moment that crime would stay the same if we eliminated all expenditures on law enforcement, the average savings from keeping average criminals off the street would range from 10 crimes per criminal times $500  per crime, or $5,000, to 20 crimes per criminal times $15,000 per crime, or $300,000.

employment training programs that might help people to get out of poverty legally. Others point to data that indi- cate that these programs do not work and suggest that building prisons is the best of a set of bad alternatives.

On the central questions of whether we are spending the right amount of money on crime control and whether we are spending on the right mix of control mechanisms, we need to examine how much crime there is and how much it costs us. Using a variety of criminological surveys, we know that, of the crimes reported annually, more than twice are actually committed. Though most murders get reported, robberies, rapes, and other crimes tend not to be universally reported. Some of this may be attributed to the rationality of crime victims. If the chances of catching the perpetrator of a crime are low and the psychological and monetary costs of testifying are high, then it is quite likely that some victims will not report crimes committed against them.

How Much Does an Average Crime Cost? When a crime is committed there are several different kinds of costs to consider. If we could put a dollar value on the average crime, we could, at least theoretically, come to an estimate of the cost of crime in general. The first and most obvious cost of crime is the value of items taken or stolen. This is fairly easily measured but it is not always very im- portant, especially if the crime is a form of assault rather than a form of theft. Even when the crime is a simple theft, if the stolen item is replaced with insurance, the cost of the crime to the victim doesn’t account for the loss to society of the theft. Insurance rates, for instance, will rise when thefts are prevalent as will extraneous theft-prevention activities that add little to actual economic well-being.

As difficult as it is to estimate tangible costs of crime, it is much harder to estimate the costs of crimes like mur- der, rape, and assault, because so much of those costs are intangible. There are some aspects of the loss that are eas- ier to estimate than others. For example, an assault victim who cannot work for a few days has a loss that is at least quantifiable. On the other hand, a sexual assault victim’s loss in terms of quality of life is not so easily quantified. Moreover, there is no way of knowing whether having been a victim of a crime causes people to be less ambi- tious or productive than they would have been otherwise. The monetary value of psychological trauma that comes with victimization is also difficult to estimate.

There are two general methods that are used to estimate these intangible losses. The first looks at how much money individuals pay to avoid crimes by looking at the relative price of homes in high- and

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314 Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime

A 2015 study by the Brennan Center for Justice conducted by economists and criminologists separated out the impact of various policies on the decline in crime that occurred during the 1990s and 2000s. Their study looked at the impact of increased incarcerations, increased numbers of police, the use of CompStat policies that used sophisticated statistics to deploy resources, the increased prevalence of the death penalty, and the increased prevalence of right-to-carry laws. They looked at economic factors such as consumer confidence, income growth, and unemployment. They looked at social and demographic trends, from the decreased use of crack cocaine and alcohol, to a decrease in the percentage of the population in their prime crime years (ages 16–24).

They began by noting the nearly 50 percent drop in the crime rate since 1991. With violent crime dropping by 51 percent and property crime dropping by 43 percent, something caused it to happen, and these scholars wanted to figure out what that was. They wanted to know whether it was any of the myriad policies that were tried or whether the drop was caused by something unrelated to crime policy.

One key conclusion was a wonderful example of diminishing re- turns. At first, during the 1990s, increased rates of incarceration had a significant impact, explaining as much as 10 percent of the drop in crime. Later, in the period from 2000 to 2013, rates of incarceration had no additional impact on crime. They found much the same thing with the impact of increasing the numbers of police. At first there was a large impact, but later there was no impact. Those with good economic intuition should not be surprised that diminishing returns would show itself in crime reduction.

The state of the local economy was a consistent factor in explain- ing crime rates as was the drop in the use of alcohol. CompStat also showed itself to have a positive effect in reducing crime but only as the methodology was honed in the 2000s.

Two interesting theories appeared during the 2000s (and in this textbox in previous editions of this book) to explain the drop in crime in the 1990s; both had their origins in changes that occurred during the 1970s. The first of these theories was that the legalization of abor- tion increased the average degree of “wantedness” of the children who were born in the 1970s and thereby resulted in fewer poorly par- ented children in the 1980s and 1990s. With fewer poorly parented children in the 1970s and 1980s, that, it was hypothesized, would have resulted in fewer crimes in the 1990s. The second of these theo- ries tied atmospheric lead concentrations to criminal conduct. This theory offered as proof that the increase in atmospheric lead that occurred because of increased driving in the 1950s and 1960s was, 20 years later, associated with an increase in crime in the 1970s and 1990s. It further argued that the subsequent decrease in atmospheric lead because of 1970s-era laws that eliminated it from gasoline led to decreased crime in the 1990s. The explanation, that lead in young children inhibits the judgment centers of the brain, seemed plausible. However, once all factors were taken into account, both of these theories were held to be without empirical support.

Policy favorites of the political right, increased use of the death penalty and increased prevalence of right-to-carry laws, were also shown to be without merit.

T H I N G S T H A T M A T T E R I N C R I M E

Optimal Spending on Crime Control

What Is the Optimal Amount to Spend? The average cost of holding a criminal in jail is $31,000  per year, and the total cost of incarcerations, $82 billion. Assuming that crime rates would rise if we eliminated all expenditures on law enforcement—either by the average criminal’s committing more crimes or be- cause otherwise law-abiding citizens turned to crime—it is quite clear that the money we spend on prisons is worth it. Even though more than 1.6 million people are in state or federal prisons at a cost of approximately $82 billion a year, this may be a good expenditure.

The question of whether we spend the optimal amount on keeping people in prisons, however, remains to be answered. At this time, there are far more than double the number of felons on the street than in prison. These are people who have served their sentences, been released on parole, or were never imprisoned in the first place. If they are committing crimes at a rate similar to

the 15 to 20 crimes a year that incarcerated criminals were committing, then we have too few people in prison.

Of key concern to economists is not necessarily whether the total amount spent on crime control exceeds the total amount saved from preventing crime, but whether we are spending the correct amount. At its heart, the problem is exactly the same as the profit-maximizing problem for a business firm. The mere fact that a firm’s revenues exceed its costs does not mean that profit is as high as it could be. That means we are less interested in the costs and benefits of capturing, trying, and incarcerating the “average” crimi- nal than we are in incarcerating the “marginal” criminal.

Think of it this way. Suppose we catch a prolific thief who costs society $100,000 a year, and it costs $31,000 a year to lock him up. Now suppose we catch a part- time thief who costs society only $10,000 a year, and it still costs $31,000 a year to lock him up. The interme- diate or average thief costs society $55,000 each year, and we spend $31,000 per year keeping him locked up. This does not mean we should not have locked up the

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Optimal Spending on Crime Control 315

In recent years, particularly as an outgrowth of the Black Lives Matter movement, critics have called into question the practice of incarcerating so many people, for so long. These critics have noted that the increase in incarceration frequency and duration has impacted the African American population disproportionately. Those that counter this argu- ment turn to the data on crime that shows (again, without regard to whether you use victimization surveys or police reports) that minorities commit a disproportionate amount of crime and that the drop in the crime rate that resulted from these incarcerations is worth the cost. If you accept their conclusion that the increase in incarcerations in the 1990s decreased crime (which evidence shows occurred) and in the 2000s (which new evidence suggests did not occur), that need not require you to accept that the increase in the cost (both monetary and social) is worth it.

What Laws Should We Rigorously Enforce? In a formal way, economists look at crime control mea- sures from a cost–benefit point of view. In Figure 28.1 the vertical axis represents the amount of marginal ben- efit and marginal cost associated with catching, adjudi- cating, and imprisoning an additional criminal. We will make three assumptions:

1. The marginal benefits are decreasing for each addi- tional criminal.

2. We will deal with serious crimes first and petty crimes last.

3. The dollar benefits of preventing these crimes will fall.

part-time thief. The marginal benefit to society of lock- ing him up was less than the marginal cost.

Applying this information to the problem of opti- mal crime control means that we would need to look at who the people are who get arrested and put away when we increase spending on criminal justice. The practi- cal problem is much harder to figure out than it is for a firm. In business we can see how much extra material and labor costs go into producing another unit of output and judge whether that is greater than the price, but we cannot easily determine which extra criminals are caught as a result of our spending more on police. Are these criminals more or less prolific than the average crimi- nal caught before the spending increase? For this reason, much of the research on crime assumes that the “mar- ginal” criminal is just like the “average” criminal.

Is the Money Spent in the Right Way? Whether we spend the right amount of money is inter- esting, but equally interesting is whether we spend the money in the right way. Again, marginal analysis is of use. If we spend $265 billion on the system, the allo- cation between police, justice, and incarceration should depend on how effective the marginal dollar is in com- bating crime in each category. If the optimal distribution is accomplished, the marginal benefit of a dollar should be equal in the three areas.

Are the Right People in Jail? Of course there is the related issue of whether the right people are in jail. Of the 1.6 million people who are in prisons and 744,600 in local jails, just under half are there for violent crimes. The remainder are there for nonviolent crimes such as burglary, drug possession, and drug distribution. If these prison spaces are being used for drug offenders rather than violent criminals or thieves, perhaps the wrong people are in jail. If we re- lease violent criminals in order to make room in prisons for drug users, we will have to either build more prisons or let the drug users go.

In recognition of this choice, state and local govern- ments decided to go on a prison-building spree. In Texas, for example, prison capacity during the 1980s and 1990s was nearly doubling every four years. This phenomenon was certainly not confined to any one state, as state after state went to “truth in sentencing” laws that required criminals to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. In Florida and Texas, felons had been serving less than a third of their sentences, a disparity these states and oth- ers found unacceptable.

FIGURE 28.1 Marginal cost and marginal benefit analysis and crime.

Marginal cost

Marginal cost Marginal benefit

Marginal benefit

Murderers, Rapists, Drug dealers, Drug users, Jaywalkers

Criminals

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316 Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime

committing the crimes they would have committed had they been left on the streets.

What Is the Optimal Sentence? One of the major debates of our time is whether criminals convicted of murder and other of the most heinous crimes should be put to death or be locked up with no opportunity for parole. While many religious leaders and laypersons alike approach this as a moral issue, economists again tend to look at it from the standpoint of the costs and benefits. If you sentence men and women to death, the sentences are carried out only after a long and drawn-out appeal process. Even then, many death row inmates die on their prison cots rather than face injection, asphyxiation, or electrocution. In economic terms we have to decide whether spending a lot of money over a 10-year period is worth the savings in im- prisonment expenses. Life sentences, which are routinely given in murder cases, also have cost issues to face. If a 75-year-old is released from prison, is he or she likely to again become a menace to society?

To examine whether the death penalty saves money or costs money we need to recall the Chapter 7 concept of present value. Suppose it would take $1 million invested now to make the payments to house, adjudicate appeals, and put to death a condemned inmate. Suppose it would cost less than $1 million invested now to simply house the inmate from the time he or she is sentenced to the time that inmate would have died if given a life sentence. In such a circumstance the death penalty costs money. Otherwise it saves money. This of course assumes that the death penalty is not a deterrent. It may also be that it costs $1 million in present value to execute a person and $900,000 to imprison the same person for life, but we get $100,000 or more worth of satisfaction knowing that the worst of the bad guys got his or her due.

The cost–benefit trade-off is important also in estab- lishing sentence length. Since nearly no crime is commit- ted by 80-year-olds, does it make sense to sentence people to life in prison? Why not let them out when the chances of their committing a crime have gone away? It is not hard to figure that, as time goes on, a person violent enough to kill at age 18 is not as likely to commit murder at 50 and is even less likely to at 70. This point may not be worth considering since the life expectancy in prison is such that few inmates sentenced to life live long enough to outlive their own violent tendencies. Prison life is hard, and the food and medical care are not geared to keeping people healthy in their “golden years.” Ironically, this makes the death penalty even less economically sensible since the “lifer’s” life is not going to be that long.

Furthermore, we will assume that the marginal cost of dealing with criminals increases because the petty criminals violating trivial laws are assumed to be more expensive to catch and convict than are criminals whose crimes are more serious. This assumption is predicated on the idea that we would have to have very many and, most important, less competent police2 to catch such violators.

Figure 28.1 indicates that it makes sense to spend the money to catch, prosecute, and imprison all murderers, rapists, and high-end drug dealers. It also indicates that it makes no sense to do the same for jaywalkers, drug users, and low-end drug dealers. Though this picture is simplistic in its assumptions, you can see, roughly, how an economist reasons on the issue of crime control. Spend the money on the really bad guys and do not spend it on the not-so-bad guys.

That leaves one last issue to deal with in determin- ing how we spend our law enforcement dollars: How do we divide the money among the various sectors? States, for example, have spent a growing part of their budgets to deal with crime and in doing so have changed the percentage that they allocate to the differ- ent sectors. The increase in resources has gone mainly to prisons and police, with a smaller percentage of money allocated to adjudication. Competent police are more effective in deterring criminals and apprehend- ing criminals who have not yet been deterred. It also means that people sentenced stay in jail longer. The downside of this is that more cases are plea-bargained than ever before.

Since the increases in spending have not funded all sectors of the system evenly, criminals are more likely to be caught, plea to a crime that is less severe than the one they actually committed, and go to jail. The length of term they face has probably increased because 85 per- cent of a short sentence is often longer than 33 percent of a long one. Part of the reduction in crime since the early 1990s is also attributable to this policy of sending greater numbers of criminals to prison. A small minority of criminals commit a majority of the crime, and they now must stay in prison longer. Though estimates vary, an increase of 10  percent in the prison population has been shown to result in a 4 percent to 6 percent decrease in crime. Whereas some of this may be deterrence, it is likely that simply holding criminals prevents them from

2We assume they are likely to be less competent because cities hire the more competent of their applicant pool first, and these are all gone when it comes time to hire more.

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Summary 317

Summary You should now understand how economics, and in particular the use of marginal benefit–marginal cost anal- ysis, can contribute to the debate over crime and crime control. Besides knowing who it is that generally commits crime and why, you have seen that economists often model criminals as rational human actors who are influenced by

the risks and rewards of their decisions. You have seen how much crime costs society and how much we spend to control it. You have seen how an economist looks at issues of crime control to answer questions about whether we are spending the right amount on the right criminals and the right crimes and enforcing the right sentences.

Quiz Yourself 1. If judges had to be trained as economists before tak-

ing their position, they might use ____________ analysis when deciding on the right sentence. a. marginal b. punitive c. religious d. average

2. The optimal level of police protection would com- pare the __________________________________ with the _______________________. a. marginal cost of hiring an additional officer;

marginal benefit of crime reduction b. average cost of all officers; average benefit per

officer of crime reduction c. total cost of all officers; average benefit of

crime reduction d. length of the average sentence; history of sen-

tences, per crime 3. If a crime prevention mechanism works initially, but

increasing it further has no additional impact that is an example of a. diminishing returns. b. downward sloping demand. c. the division of labor. d. economic loss.

4. The average cost per crime has been estimated at between a. $500 and $2,500. b. $1,000 and $10,000. c. $10,000 and $100,000. d. $100,000 and $1,000,000.

5. To an economist, the correct distribution of money among police, the justice system, and prisons is one that a. sets an equal amount to each. b. sets the amount each gets equal to its average

benefit. c. sets the amount each gets so that none is wasted.

d. sets the amount each gets so that no other ele- ment could get better use (in terms of crime reduction) of the marginal dollar.

6. The rational crime model explains crimes of a. passion. b. stupidity. c. profit. d. love.

7. The rational criminal model draws a parallel to the thought processes of a. investors. b. educators. c. law enforcement officers. d. politicians.

Short Answer Questions 1. How would you use marginal benefit and marginal

cost analysis to determine the correct sentence length for a particular crime?

2. How could you use marginal benefit and marginal cost analysis to determine whether money would be better spent keeping prisoners incarcerated or on employing more police?

3. Why is it important to use marginal analysis in ex- amining crime policies rather than “average” (cost and benefit) analysis?

4. What other policy changes could you make now that would have a similarly delayed impact on crime sev- eral years from now?

Think about This The rational criminal model is often invoked to ex- plain the behavior of drug dealers and their pushers. Economist Steven Levitt disputes this by suggesting that drug dealers engage in behaviors that are just as irrational as those who play the lottery. Is drug deal- ing rational?

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318 Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime

Talk about This Under what circumstances would you engage in a crimi- nal activity? Would your actions be rational?

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 1 (Winter

1996). See articles by John J. DiIulio; and Richard B. Freeman and Isaac Ehrlich, pp. 3–8.

Cohen, Mark, The Costs of Crime and Justice (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Levitt, Steven D., “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (Winter 2004).

Reyes, Jessica Wolpaw, “Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead Exposure on Crime,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7, no. 1 (2007), Contributions, Article 51.

“What Caused The Crime Decline?” Roeder, Eisen, and Bowling. Brennan Center for Justice. www.brennan center.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline, 2015.

Behind the Numbers Federal justice system statistics on crime, federal justice

system expenditures; number of arrests and inmates, Bureau of Justice Statistics; characteristics of vic- tims, criminals, and types of crime  committed, U.S. Department of Justice; Bureau of Justice Statistics; crime and victim statistics—www.bjs.gov

Crime in the United States, Federal Bureau of Investigation—www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr /crime-in-the-u.s

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319

Antitrust Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Understand why economists worry about monopolies and why some monopolies are inevitable and even good for society.

LO2 Be aware that laws regulate the existence and pricing be- havior of monopolies.

LO3 See how antitrust law has been applied to specific industries within the United States.

Chapter Outline

What’s Wrong with Monopoly?

Natural Monopolies and Necessary Monopolies

Monopolies and the Law

Examples of Antitrust Action

Summary

When a business treats us badly, most of us get a high degree of satisfaction by announcing that we will never be back. When the business is the phone, gas, electric, or water com- pany, though, it is frustrating because in most cases we can- not get our gas, electricity, or water somewhere else. We all buy goods or services from businesses that are monopolists. It is likely that you have only one source of cable television, electricity, water, or natural gas. When a representative of a monopolistic company makes you mad, you know and the representative knows that you have no alternatives; you are stuck. You can scream and complain, but in the end you have to go back to the same company for service. For capi- talism to function, these situations work best when there is both a carrot of high profits and a stick of bankruptcy to keep firms working in the consumer’s best interest. Without such incentives, a company’s profit motive tends to work against consumers rather than in their best interests.

It is for this reason that we have laws that inhibit firms from becoming monopolies through merger, and we have laws that prevent the monopolies that do exist from using their power to the detriment of consumers. That said, this chapter reviews what it is about monopoly that concerns economists and we also discuss situations where monopo- lies may be necessary evils. We then turn to laws that are in place to protect consumers from the problems that monopo- lists cause. We attempt to figure out how many competitors

are needed for competition to work, and we provide a few examples of firms that have been accused of using their mo- nopoly power to the detriment of their customers.

What’s Wrong with Monopoly?

High Prices, Low Output, and Deadweight Loss A survey of economists published in 1992 suggests that 72 percent agree, in whole or in part, with the idea that “laws should be rigorously enforced to reduce monopoly power”1 and that it is a proper role for government to prevent monopo- lies from charging excessive prices for shoddy products. Fig- ure 29.1 illustrates the core of the problem with monopolies.

Chapter 5 told us that a monopolist controls an entire market. That is, when we diagram the monopolistic situ- ation, the market demand curve will be the demand curve for the firm’s output. What follows from this is that to sell more of its good, the firm has to progressively lower the price it charges. When the firm lowers prices, the resulting graph shows that the marginal revenue curve is not flat, as it is under perfect competition, but is downward sloping. In

C H A P T E R T W E N T Y - N I N E

1Alston, Kearl, and Vaughn, American Economic Review 82, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 203–209.

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320 Chapter 29 Antitrust

above the supply or marginal cost curve, would be FPPCC for a combined social benefit of FAC. (See Chapter 3 if you need to review consumer and producer surplus.) In an industry that is ruled by just one firm rather than many, the consumer surplus is much smaller and the producer surplus somewhat larger. To be precise, the consumer sur- plus shrinks to PmonopolyAB and the producer surplus grows to FPmonopolyBE. The combined area is FABE. This is smaller than the combined area under perfect competition by the triangle EBC. Economists call this area deadweight loss because it represents the loss in economic benefits to society that results from carrying a deadweight—that is, a monopolist.

The desire to eliminate deadweight loss is at the heart of why economists, usually reluctant to let government control markets, generally accept the need for govern- ment to intervene in monopoly cases.

Reduced Innovation Another problem with monopolies—both those subject to price control by government and those that are government- owned, like the post office—is the reduction in the motiva- tion to innovate. When there are no competitors to keep a business on its toes, it can easily get lax. Monopolies like your local water company are much less likely to engage in cost-saving or service-enhancing innovation when they are not threatened with competition. Even worse, since they use their costs to justify their prices to regulators, they have an incentive to pad costs that make their own jobs easier.

This problem is not limited to privately held monopo- lies. The U.S. Postal Service is a government-held mo- nopoly for letters. It did not consider overnight delivery important until Federal Express and United Parcel Service developed the business. Cost-saving or service-enhancing technology is less likely to come from the U.S. mail than it is from the private package delivery companies.

Natural Monopolies and Necessary Monopolies

Natural Monopoly Many of the monopolies that we deal with every day are inevitable. The utilities—electricity, natural gas, local tele- phone service, sewers, and cable television—are monopo- lies where there are very high fixed costs and diminishing marginal costs. On an intuitive level you understand that you would not want several hundred wires or pipes coming in and out of your house. It would be ugly and expensive

particular, it has the same vertical intercept as the demand curve, and it cuts the horizontal axis at exactly half where the demand curve does. (Refer back to Chapter 4 and the discussion of marginal revenue to see why this is the case.)

Assuming that its goal is to maximize profits, a monopo- listic organization will sell its output at a price that is deter- mined by the point on the graph at which marginal cost and marginal revenue are equal. In Figure 29.1 that output level is Qmonopoly. The price a monopolistic firm would charge for that output can be found by going up from Qmonopoly to the demand curve and over to the price axis to get Pmonopoly.

To compare this monopoly outcome to what would exist in an industry made up of many firms in perfect competition, we need to recall that the supply curve for each individual perfect competitor is its marginal cost curve. To find the industry supply curve, we would hori- zontally add the individual supply curves together. When we do that we find that we have also created the mar- ginal cost curve for an industry ruled by one firm. That is why, in Figure 29.1, the supply curve for the industry of perfect competitors is also labeled as the marginal cost curve for the monopolist. It is simply a different in- terpretation of the same information. It is not, however, the monopolist’s supply curve. There is no such thing because monopolists do not take the price as given; they search for the price that makes them the most money.

Given that, we can say that if an industry is character- ized by many perfectly competitive firms rather than a monopolistic firm, then the price–quantity combination will be where supply equals demand: PPC, QPC.

Under perfect competition we know that the consumer surplus, depicted as the area under the demand curve but above the price line, would be PPCAC and the producer surplus, depicted as the area under the price curve but

MR

Q/tO

P

D

C

B

F

E

A

PPC

Pmonopoly

Qmonopoly QPC

SPC MC monopoly

FIGURE 29.1 Perfect competition versus monopoly.

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Natural Monopolies and Necessary Monopolies 321

curve ATC crosses the demand curve D. It should be clear that the difference between what an unregulated natural monopoly would charge, Pmonopoly, and what a reg- ulator would let it charge, Pregulated, is substantial. For this reason, it is argued that we are better off with one utility company that is prevented from exploiting its position, and we know that most local telephone, electrical power, and natural gas service are provided through regulated monopolies in the United States.

This need not be the end of the story. Technology and a revised legal structure are changing the competitive na- ture of many of these utilities. Satellite dishes are doing as much to keep cable TV rates down as regulation ever did. Cable companies are now selling phone and Internet access that was once provided only by a monopoly tele- phone company. An additional challenge to local phone companies is coming from the wireless phone industry. Many young people no longer have a home phone; they simply use cellular phones.

Though the poorly thought-out California electricity deregulation experiment was a disaster, some commu- nities are deregulating the electric power industry suc- cessfully. These forms of deregulation have the existing provider charge a wire access fee. This fee is similar to the fee that your local telephone company charges you to use its lines with a different long-distance provider. In this way there are competing electricity producers that sell to customers. It may be that in the near future these once inevitable natural monopolies will face competition.

Patents, Copyrights, and Other Necessary Monopolies Copyrights and patents are examples of other legalized monopolies that we have decided are needed for the economy to work well. The only way singers, authors, or moviemakers make money on their creative work is through their exclusive right to sell it. If you electroni- cally copy a CD, a book, or a movie, you know the cost is usually much lower than if you buy it in the store at full retail price. Monopoly power is given to record compa- nies, publishers, and movie producers so they can make enough money to inspire their efforts.

Consider the late 1990s and early 2000s history of file-sharing networks like the original Napster and Kazaa. For users it was their first introduction to the Internet and downloaded music. They learned that they could get all the latest music without paying for it. Many in the music industry believed that they were in violation of the copyright laws. They were correct and a federal

for there to be many different electric companies vying for your business. Changes in technology and reforms of the regulatory structure are rapidly changing the way these utilities do business. Still each locale typically has only one provider of these services.

If you look at Figure 29.2, you can see the problem in the context of Chapter 4’s cost curves. Instead of the marginal cost curve’s sloping up and the average total cost curve’s being U-shaped, both are downward slop- ing and steadily flattening out. In a typical monopoly, the fixed costs of stringing wires or burying pipes are so great that output levels never get to where marginal costs are rising.

It is the large fixed costs that represent a potentially insurmountable economic barrier to entry. Recall from

Chapter 5 one of the four re- quirements for perfect compe- tition is freedom of entry and exit. When fixed costs are high, it is nearly impossible for a firm to get a foothold in the market.

If the fixed costs are significant, then having more than one firm bearing them is not cost-efficient. A carefully regulated monopoly in this case may save money for the consumer. The quality of regulation is definitely the key, because the company will want to charge Pmonopoly and produce only Qmonopoly. The monopolist wants to exploit the power it has, and it is part of the government’s job to provide the regulation that prevents that from happening.

Government regulators will allow monopolies normal profit, the profit consistent with what a similar invest- ment would get them in another industry. This is depicted in Figure 29.2 as the point at which the average total cost

barrier to entry A legal or economic mechanism that prevents firms from competing in an industry.

D

Q/t

P

Pmonopoly

Qmonopoly Qregulated

Pregulated MR MC

ATC

FIGURE 29.2 Natural monopoly.

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322 Chapter 29 Antitrust

power in one market to enhance its position in another.3 According to the Sherman Act it is also illegal to attempt to control a market in all of its stages of production.

As we saw above, there are cases where monopoly power is a good thing. As a matter of fact, it is the ulti- mate carrot for a business. If a manufacturer is so good that it makes a product so much better than that of its competition, then it will, of course, benefit by having no competition. As long as the company is that good and as long as it continues to price its product low enough that other firms see no point in joining in, there is no demon- strable harm from having a monopoly. Concomitantly, there is no violation of antitrust law. Later in the chapter we will see that Microsoft claims to be a company that has performed so well that it became a monopoly in the operating system business.

As we said previously, it is against the law to use mo- nopoly power in a given area to generate business in an- other area. For instance, if a telephone company with a monopoly in a particular region sells cellular telephone service where it does not have a monopoly, it cannot re- quire that its local telephone customers subscribe to its cellular service.

Antitrust law also forbids a company from control- ling the entire production-to-sales process for a particular good. This is what got Standard Oil in trouble with the government in the early 1900s. At one time, Standard Oil dominated the oil and gasoline industry through its owner- ship and control of drilling equipment, oil wells, refiner- ies, pipelines, distribution networks, and gas stations. This was found at the time to be illegal, and it is still illegal.

Other parts of the law work toward preventing compa- nies from becoming monopolistic by merging. It is very much against the law for two separate companies, in an industry of only a few, to share information or to collude on setting prices. This is called “price fixing,” and local gasoline stations are accused of it all the time. Just as someone realized that companies could fix prices if they merged, Congress gave power to the Federal Trade Com- mission (FTC) to allow or to deny proposed mergers. When two airlines merge and it is a merger that would lead to a monopoly at an important airport, the FTC steps in. It can simply say no to the merger, or it can re- quire that the airline sell its gate access to another airline.

The interesting exception to this general rule is the case of Sirius/XM radio. Both companies were on the

court shut the original Napster down.2 The economic issue at the time was how this type of service affected the motivation to produce new music. What’s interest- ing now is that downloaded music has become another interesting antitrust example with Apple’s dominance in that market area as it has successfully used its iPhone and iTunes brands to reinforce each other.

Patents are given to inventors of new things for the same reason that copyrights are given to writers and per- formers. Patents expire after a number of years, depend- ing on the type of invention. While the patent is in force, however, the inventor is the only one who has the right to sell his or her invention. Whether the invention is a new drug, or the proverbial better mouse trap, it belongs to the inventor. In the modern era, scientists usually work for a big company that retains the right to buy their ideas for $1 each. Although this may seem unfair, scientists are often part of a team that jointly creates ideas. In addition, since inventing is a risky business with inventions only rarely striking it big in the marketplace, the companies guarantee the scientist an income. For that, they get to keep the high returns.

In any event, the exclusive right to sell something cre- ates the incentive to be creative or innovative, as the case may be. The author of the book you are reading right now would like to think he would have written this book for the good of his own students’ understanding, but the truth is he is working for money, too. Lest you think I am the only one, ask yourself whether you too are not moti- vated to work by money. Writers, singers, moviemakers, or inventors need the protection accorded monopolies to make money at their endeavors.

The rationale for other monopolies is that they provide a social good. The U.S. Postal Service performs the social service of providing equal mail service at an equal price to everyone anywhere in the United States. Though its de- tractors suggest that a privatized system would be more efficient and cost less, its defenders believe that the “social good” is sufficient to justify any monopoly inefficiencies.

Monopolies and the Law

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act Under the law it is not illegal to be a monopoly. It is not even against the law for a company to establish itself as a monopoly. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, how- ever, makes it illegal for a company to use its monopoly

2The new Napster sells downloaded music legitimately.

3While a number of important laws amending and clarifying the Sherman Act have been enacted since 1890, for simplicity and brevity we will consider this one body of antitrust law.

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Examples of Antitrust Action 323

basis of its ability to charge much less than the price that is currently being charged. What will you do? You keep your price low in hopes that Southwest will ignore you.

To its firm believers, this contestable markets hypothesis means that the answer to the question of how many firms it takes to have competitive prices is one, as long as it is one that is scared.

Examples of Antitrust Action

Standard Oil When John D. Rockefeller established Standard Oil, no one knew how petroleum would change the world. By the time the huge monopoly that was Standard Oil was broken up, Rockefeller had become the richest man the world had ever known. If you measure personal wealth as the percentage of all U.S. wealth, Bill Gates would have to more than double his to come close to Rockefeller’s. Rockefeller got as rich as he did by controlling the entire petroleum production pro- cess. He owned the oil fields, all the drilling equipment, all the pipelines and trucks that distributed it, and he licensed all the retail outlets that sold his gas, oil, and kerosene.

This kind of monopoly, called a trust, involves the sin- gle ownership of all stages of production, and it has been ac- complished to this degree only a few times. A comparable situa-

tion would occur if Bill Gates owned not only Microsoft but also Intel, Dell, Apple, Hewlett Packard, and all other computer hardware manufacturers, and he licensed fran- chises to all of the retail outlets that sold computers.

In Rockefeller’s case he used the total control he had over the oil production business to gain control over the pipelines and the retail outlets. He did this by sim- ply refusing to use pipelines that refused to sell to him, and he refused to sell his products to stations that he did not license. He then used this power to make even more money by buying the pipelines at low prices and by sell- ing his products to filling stations at high prices. Our debt to Rockefeller is that much of the law making trusts illegal simply makes illegal what he did so well.

The breakup of Standard Oil made several companies out of one. Each competed with the others for pipeline services and to sign up gas stations. Among others, we know these companies today as Exxon, Amoco, and Standard Oil. The

verge of bankruptcy before their 2008 merger and only narrowly avoided it in 2009 afterward. The question be- fore the anti-trust division of the Justice Department was not whether having two satellite radio providers was bet- ter than one; it was whether one was better than zero. It decided that one was better than zero.

What Constitutes a Monopoly? One of the new areas of economic research asks an interest- ing question: How many firms does it take to ensure com- petition? We have assumed that we needed many, but we have not produced a number. Some economists have begun to argue that one is actually enough. They argue that if the one entity that comprises the monopoly is afraid of potential competition, and prices its goods low enough that no one decides to enter the market, we have what ordinarily comes only with perfect competition. In this hypothetical example, however, it has come with but a single firm.

To see this at work, imagine an airport that is served by only one major airline. Speculate on how it will price its tickets, as a monopolist or as if it had many competitors. It turns out that under certain conditions, it will be suffi- ciently frightened at the prospect of another carrier coming in that it will price its tickets very close to a competitive level and significantly below the potential monopoly level.

As a concrete example, Southwest Airlines has a repu- tation of causing other airlines to lower their fares when they are in competition with Southwest and in some places where they are not. Southwest is an airline that is always depicted as being run by a group of happy people working hard. The man who started the airline pays himself a sal- ary that is much lower than his counterparts in other air- lines and he treats his employees well. In return, they have chosen not to insist on some of the typical union-induced work-rule inefficiencies that plague other airlines.

You may be able to see examples of Southwest’s ef- ficiency for yourself. The next time you have a long lay- over at an airport observe a Southwest gate. Time a plane from the moment it pulls into the gate to the moment it leaves again. Then repeat what you have done at Ameri- can, United, Delta, or USAir. More often than not you will see a turnaround time for Southwest that is considerably less than that of any of the others. This means that South- west can get at least one additional flight, if not two more flights, out of a plane and crew each day. This means it can outcompete everyone else on the price of tickets.

Suppose you are in charge of pricing tickets for another airline and you have a monopoly in a particular city. You know that Southwest chooses its next target city on the

contestable markets hypothesis One firm is all that is necessary for competitive prices to exist as long as that firm is threatened by hit-and-run entry.

trust A single company hav- ing ownership of all stages of production in a particular industry.

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324 Chapter 29 Antitrust

device, called a mouse, instead of using typed-in commands to tell the computer what to do. Microsoft followed shortly thereafter with its own changes that relied on a mouse. It called its new operating system Windows. While the first two versions of Windows were terrible and could have lost Microsoft its advan- tage in operating systems, Windows 3.1 took over the industry in short order.

Since that time,Windows (in its 3.1, 95, 98, 2000, XP, or NT form) has dominated the operating system market. The only serious threat that Windows faced during this time was IBM’s introduction of OS/2 and its follow-on Warp. Both offered multitasking, an at- tribute that Windows 3.1 did not possess. Multitasking allows a computer to divide its resources so that it can work on more than one task at a time. Because that is what mainframes do, IBM got it working first, Apple struggled to get it to work, and Microsoft’s Windows 95, which included multitasking, was more than a year from being released.

If the Justice Department and many of Microsoft’s critics are to be believed, this made Microsoft very nervous. Critics charged that it was at this point that Microsoft began using its preeminence in the industry to pressure software companies to write exclusively for the soon- to-be released Windows 95. The Justice Department also charged that Microsoft pressured the vendors of such hardware as modems, sound cards, disk drives, and network cards not to provide software for OS/2. If Microsoft did those things, it was in flagrant violation of the law.

In another questionable practice, Microsoft of- fered manufacturers a low price on its versions of Windows—but with a catch. The manufacturers would pay Microsoft a fixed fee per machine it sold, whether the customer wanted Windows or not. That way people who bought PCs had to pay for Windows even if they wanted a different operating system. Since most people did not have a good reason to pick another operating system, no other operating system succeeded in getting past this initial stage. Again if Microsoft did this to eliminate competition, it was in violation of the law. In any event, the threat that OS/2 posed to Windows evaporated.

Later Microsoft was to run into other problems. The Internet grew to a degree that Microsoft had seriously underestimated, and Netscape grabbed well over three- quarters of the market for Internet browsers. On top of that, Sun Microsystems created Java, a programming language that is compatible with Windows, Apple, or

lessons that Rockefeller taught the world were learned very well and most developed countries now have laws that make it illegal to use monopoly pressure to limit competition.

IBM International Business Machines, better known as IBM, came into the world as a producer of typewriters and add- ing machines. Your grandparents may remember working in an office where the secretary’s IBM Selectric was the most sophisticated machine in the place, because it could erase a typo. By the 1960s, however, IBM was well into the business of computers. Back then a state-of-the-art main- frame computer with the computational capacity of a cur- rent Palm Pilot would fill several rooms. Moreover, if you needed that kind of computing you had one choice, IBM.

As the monopolist in mainframe computers, IBM could use this power to get a leg up on the companies that produced mainframe software as well as other hardware. In 1969 the Justice Department sued, arguing that IBM was using its monopoly in one area, the central processing units for main- frames, to develop a monopoly in other mainframe areas.

This lawsuit dragged on in court for years. By 1977 an upstart company, Apple, developed the first personal computer, and somewhat later IBM decided to join in this market and began to make computers for the home and office. These computers were novel and they pos- sessed far more power than the computers that flew to the moon. By the early1980s it became apparent that the mainframe market was dying as the PC’s popularity grew. In 1982 the case was dropped because even if IBM had a monopoly in mainframe processors, which it no longer had, it was no longer an important area.

One of the reasons that IBM had lost any chance of generating a monopoly in PCs was that it had licensed the operating system of that original PC, called DOS (disk operating system), to a little-known company in Wash- ington State called Microsoft. Further, it was buying its microprocessors, so named because they were physically much smaller than the processors developed for the main- frames, from another little-known company called Intel. When others found that they too could put parts together to make a computer and use Microsoft’s DOS to run it, all chances of an IBM monopoly were gone.

Microsoft In the mid-1980s, Apple Computer introduced a new personal computer, called a Macintosh. It used pic- tures, called icons, on a monitor screen and a pointing

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Summary 325

the software that allows applications to talk to the operat- ing system, he was clearly implying that at some point in time Microsoft had done both. On appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals, the important finding of facts with regard to the illegal activities of Microsoft was upheld, but the breakup remedy was not. Prior to September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice was intently focused on settling the case and had taken the breakup off the table.

In November of that year, with other matters to attend to, the Department of Justice ended the fight with Micro- soft on terms quite friendly to the software giant. While some of the states that had sued alongside the federal government stuck to their guns, by 2003, when California settled for $1.1 billion in vouchers to the state’s citizens and AOL Time-Warner (the parent of Netscape) settled for $750 million, the battle was pretty much over.

Apple, Google, and the European Union Apple and Google have each found themselves in the European Union’s crosshairs. Both were essentially charged with the same crime: using its market domi- nance in one area to gain market dominance in another. While the U.S. government has yet to claim that either has run afoul of antitrust laws here, the European Union has made such claims. In Apple’s case their concern was that by making it such that iTunes songs only play on iPods and computers with the iTunes software, they are using these products to simultaneously reinforce mar- ket power in both players and the music itself. With the introduction of the iPhone in 2007, there was a reason- able fear that Apple could continue to leverage their dominance in music to dominate cell phones as well. In Google’s case, it was the allegation that Google was using its search engine functionality to privilege its own shopping service.

any other computer. This threatened not only the Win- dows stranglehold, but the domination of the Windows Office Suite as well. In reaction to these events, Mi- crosoft created Internet Explorer as its alternative to Netscape Navigator and, in Windows 98, integrated it into the operating system.

Even more troubling to the Justice Department was its contention that Microsoft was insisting that PC makers not put any product on their PCs that competed with a Microsoft product. Specifically, it was alleged that Microsoft would not sell Windows to PC makers if they also bundled their PC with Netscape or Corel’s WordPerfect Suite.

Last, it was believed by many in the industry that there were secret parts of Windows 98 that made com- puters using non-Microsoft products crash. If this was true, users of these non-Microsoft products would con- veniently blame the makers of those products and want the “more reliable” Microsoft software.

What the Justice Department charged in the trial of 1998 and 1999 was that Microsoft had used and was using the tactics of Rockefeller to drive out other com- petitors. On April 3, 2000, the judge for the case, Thomas Penfield Jackson, ruled first that the evidence showed that Microsoft wanted to monopolize a variety of areas of software, that it used its monopoly in Windows to further a monopoly in Office Suite, to build one for the Internet Explorer, and to prevent competition from, among others, Sun’s Java. He further ruled that Microsoft had harmed consumers in the process. In his June 7, 2000, ruling or- dering a breakup of the company into an operating system business and an applications business, he also showed that he believed that Microsoft had indeed used secret parts of Windows to cause other software to crash. By ordering that it “shall not take any action it knows will interfere with or degrade the performance of any non-Microsoft” software and by ordering that it disclose the “interfaces,”

Summary

You now understand why economists worry about monopolies, and why some monopolies have been seen as inevitable and even good for society. You know that

laws were enacted to regulate the existence and pricing behavior of monopolies. Last, you saw how that body of law was applied to Standard Oil, IBM, and Microsoft.

Key Terms barrier to entry contestable markets hypothesis trust

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326 Chapter 29 Antitrust

6. The suit against Microsoft accused it of a. using its own innovation to thwart competition. b. using its Windows monopoly to foster other

monopolies. c. incorporating more innovations into the Office

Suite. d. charging more than Windows was worth.

Think about This Those that opposed the Department of Justice suit against Microsoft argue that the company was responsible for great innovation. They argue that the “next Microsoft” would be reluctant to be as successful. Does this criti- cism make sense to you? Would a multibillion-dollar corporation be limited in innovation for any reason?

Talk abo ut This If Apple used the high market share in iPods to generate a monopoly in music downloads via iTunes, would that be a concern to you?

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 1, no. 2 (Fall 1987).

See articles by Steven C. Salop, Lawrence J. White, Franklin M. Fisher, and Richard Schmalensee, pp. 3–54.

Online Newshour, “The Microsoft Antitrust Case,” http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cyberspace /july-dec99/microsoft_index.html.

1. Antitrust law is designed to limit the impact of a. monopoly. b. oligopoly. c. monopolistic competition. d. perfect competition.

2. One of the concerns about monopolies is that they a. reduce the motivation to innovate. b. reduce the motivation to make a profit. c. hire people at an excessive level. d. waste resources in pursuit of the next invention.

3. Monopoly creates prices that are ________________ which would exist under perfect competition. a. lower than that b. equal to that c. greater than that d. more volatile than that

4. Using the monopoly power in one area to compel customers to buy goods in another area a. is a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. b. is legal but bad business practice. c. is illegal but would be bad business practice

anyway. d. is legal and a recommended strategy.

5. Standard Oil’s trust involved monopolizing a. gas stations only. b. oil exploration only. c. refining. d. all aspects of the petroleum industry.

Quiz Yourself

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327

C H A P T E R T H I R T Y

The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe how economists measure the income disparity between the races and sexes.

LO2 Define what discrimination is, how it is measured, and how it is detected.

LO3 Model discrimination in the labor market and summarize the evidence for its existence in the markets for real estate, automobiles, and lending.

LO4 Describe what affirmative action is; how, why, and when it came about; and what forms of it exist today in the United States.

Chapter Outline

The Economic Status of Women and Minorities

Definitions and Detection of Discrimination

Discrimination in Labor, Consumption, and Lending

Affirmative Action

Summary

African Americans and women have been subjected to discrimination throughout history. That discrimina- tion exists is not a surprise, but its precise detection and measurement are not as simple as they may seem. Some of the differences in income and wealth are di- minishing over time but nontrivial gaps remain. This chapter explores the economic status of women and minorities, discusses the varieties of discrimination economists recognize, and moves to explain them. In so doing, the chapter discusses the means of detect- ing discrimination and seeks to model its impact on wages. The chapter moves on to explain why, absent legally sanctioned discrimination, some economists thought wage gaps would close quickly and why other economists correctly predicted that those gaps would remain, even in the presence of laws forbidding dis- criminatory practices. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of affirmative action, its economic justifi- cation and machinations.

The Economic Status of Women and Minorities

Women Women are becoming an ever-growing part of the U.S. economy. Economists call the percentage of people in a particular category who are over 16 and working the labor force participation rate. The rate for women has been rising steadily for decades, from 38 percent in the early 1960s to 57 percent today. While the rate for men is higher than that for women, 69 percent, it has been steadily decreasing. Demographers, the people who

study population trends, adjust the labor force participation rate to reflect the fact that as the U.S. population ages, more people are in age groups likely to be retired from work. For this

labor force participation rate The percentage of the population of a group that is employed or seeking employment.

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328 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

reason, they suggest that the real importance of women in the workplace is even greater than the raw participa- tion rate suggests.

What is also important from an economic perspective is that though men and women are approaching equality in income and wealth, men still have 63 percent more income than women, make 23 percent more in wages for full-time employment, and are less likely to be in poverty. Though more couples file for bankruptcy than single men or single women, the incidence of single women filing for bankruptcy has increased substantially, while the incidence of couples or men filing alone has remained steady. Finally, single men, ages 35–54, have 270 percent more wealth than single women. The differ- ences are summarized in Table 30.1.

This is not to suggest that the economic status of women is not improving. Figure 30.1 shows that the ratio  of women’s to men’s weekly wages for full-time employment and the similar ratio for money income from all sources continue to increase. Still, as Table 30.2 suggests, even when you look at identical professions, women currently make less than men.

Minorities There are two clear trends in the data on economic and social conditions affecting the races. Inequality within the races is clearly documented, and the degree of inequality

TABLE 30.1 Economic differences between men and women.

Sources: www.census.gov/hhes/www/income www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth www.financiallit.org/PDF/2010_Demographics_Report.pdf

Men Women

Income from all sources $36,302 $22,240 Median weekly wages for full-time employment

$895

$726

Mean net worth (singles, 35–54) $238,494 $64,433 Poverty rate 13.4% 16.1% Percentage of single-filing bankruptcies

48%

52%

TABLE 30.2 Median full-time wage earnings: selected occupations.

Source: www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat39.pdf

Occupation Women’s Earnings as a Percentage of Men’s

Physicians 86% Lawyers 90% Managers/Executives 72% Teachers (elementary) 89%

FIGURE 30.1 Ratio of women’s income to men’s.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

19 80

19 82

19 84

19 86

19 88

19 90

19 92

19 94

19 96

19 98

20 00

20 02

20 04

20 06

20 08

20 10

20 12

20 14

Year

P e

rc e

n t

Full-time wages Total income

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The Economic Status of Women and Minorities 329

is lessening. The clearest sign of this phenomenon of shrinking-but-not-yet-zero inequality can be seen in the data on median family income for white and black fami- lies. Figure 30.2 shows us that since 1967 median fam- ily income has risen from $8,234 to $70,609 for white families and from $4,875 to $43,364 for black families.

Figure 30.3 indicates that while the gap in income between black people and white people is widening in absolute terms, the ratio of white median family income to black median family income is narrowing. This means that while white families still enjoy the benefits of more income, the income of black families is increasing at a faster rate than that of white families. The ratio of white family income to black family income remains signifi- cantly less than 1.0 (its value if perfect equality existed), but it has grown from .52 in 1950 to .614 in 2014. It is

worth noting that the 2007–2009 recession was harder in economic terms on African American families than it was on white families.

Other economic measures provide us with addi- tional data on the inequalities that exist between African Americans and whites. For instance, in 2015, for salaried and full-time hourly workers, median weekly earnings are $835 for white workers and $641 for black work- ers. In this arena, the ratio of .77 shows we are closer to equality, but this ratio has remained constant for nearly 36 years, and in fact declined following the recession of 2007–2009.

Although there remain many signs of astonishing economic inequality, there are also signs of signifi- cant progress. Nevertheless, only 23 percent of African Americans are in the top 40 percent of income earners,

FIGURE 30.2 Median family income.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income

10,000

0

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

80,000

70,000

19 47

1 9 5

1 19

55 19

59 19

63 19

67 1 9

7 1 19

75 1 9

7 9 1 9

8 3 19

87 1 9

9 1 19

95 1 9

9 9 20

03 2 0

1 1 20

07

Year

M e

d ia

n f

am ily

in co

m e

($ )

White Black

FIGURE 30.3 Ratio of black to white family income.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/www/income

0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.64

19 47

1 9 5 1

19 55

19 59

1 9 6 3

19 67

1 9 7 1

1 9 7 5

1 9 7 9

19 83

19 87

1 9 9 1

19 95

1 9 9 9

20 03

20 07

20 11

Year

B la

ck /W

h ite

m e

d ia

n fa

m ily

in co

m e

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330 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

discrimination rather than just one. If you treat two oth- erwise equal people differently and do so on the basis

of their sex or race, then this is called disparate treatment discrimination. If, on the other hand, you do something that is not necessarily discrimina- tory on its face but that impacts some groups more negatively than others, you are engaging in what is called adverse impact discrimination.

While both forms of dis- crimination are usually illegal, adverse impact discrimination

can be acceptable as long as the persons or compa- nies doing the discriminating can show that what they are doing makes sense for their needs. For instance, if whites sued the National Football League (NFL) on the basis that defensive backs were disproportionately black, there would be two legal hurdles. The first hurdle would be for whites, the group at whom the discrimination had supposedly been aimed, to show the “adverse impact.” They could do this easily, by showing that the United States is 70 percent white and that in 2014 there were no white cornerbacks. With adverse impact proved, the burden of proof would be transferred to the accused, in this case the NFL. The NFL would have to show a “busi- ness necessity” that led the teams to make the choices they made. The NFL would win in court if the teams could then point to their tests of speed, strength, and conditioning and show that (1) these tests did predict the ability to cover receivers, and (2) they chose defensive backs on the basis of these tests. Thus, while differen- tial treatment discrimination is always illegal, adverse impact discrimination is illegal only when it cannot be defended on the grounds that it stems from a business necessity.

The more common example of differential treatment discrimination arises when an employer uses a rule-of- thumb approach to hiring. Rules of thumb are useful in that they can be simple guidelines for people mak- ing complex decisions. Some economists who study this kind of discrimination assert that rules of thumb for hir- ing are generally perpetuated long past the time when they are relevant. Furthermore, they suggest that many of those rules of thumb never really were very good predictors of performance. One that was propagated in the world of broadcasting was that men, being gener- ally more interested in sports, would make better sports

whereas 57 percent are in the bottom 40 percent; more- over, unemployment rates across age categories are sev- eral percentage points higher for blacks than whites. A particularly troubling aspect of the 2007–2009 reces- sion was that while unemployment was rising across the board, it was affecting African Americans disproportion- ately. In particular, black teenage unemployment rose to 49.2 percent in September of 2010. That level was more than twice white teenage unemployment. Encouragingly, the growth in the number of businesses owned by mem- bers of minority groups has been astounding. Between 1987 and 1996 the number of such firms grew by 46 per- cent and their receipts by 63 percent.

We cannot escape the fact that black children are more than twice as likely as white children to be in a female-headed household. Because family structure is a  key determinant of economic well-being, this social problem of single-parent (overwhelmingly female) house- holds is a major cause of the economic disparity that African Americans face.

It must be noted, too, that African Americans are dis- proportionately the victims of crime. In any given year, 2.25 out of 100 African Americans are victims of violent crime, whereas only 2 out of 100 whites are so victim- ized. The racial distinction is greatly highlighted by the difference in rates of robbery victimization. Blacks are three times more likely to be victims of robbery than whites.

In the arena of educational achievement, African Americans are graduating from high school at a much faster rate than they were in 1960. Unfortunately, the rate at which African Americans are graduating from college is not growing with nearly the same rapidity. In part, this could be because a much higher percentage of African Americans get their high school diploma with a general equivalence degree (GED) than whites. Many colleges, moreover, are less enthusiastic about GEDs than actual high school diplomas. Further, white or black, the av- erage incomes of GED recipients are closer to those of high school dropouts than of high school graduates.

Definitions and Detection of Discrimination

Discrimination, Definitions, and the Law On the surface, it would seem that defining discrimina- tion would not be that difficult. If you treat people in a certain way because they are women, African American, or Hispanic, you are discriminating. To make matters more complicated, however, there are two types of

disparate treatment discrimination Treating two otherwise equal people differently on the basis of race.

adverse impact discrimination Doing something that is not necessarily discrimina- tory on its face but that impacts some groups more negatively than others.

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Definitions and Detection of Discrimination 331

A multitude of studies compare women’s pay to men’s. Many economists do the comparison by controlling for education, full- or part-time status, experience, job requirements, and a host of other factors to determine whether men and women earn the same money for the same work. Sociologists and nearly all feminists view this as fallacious because they see these as symptoms of continued mis- treatment of women, rather than economic phenomena that should be statistically controlled. The issues are:

• All income versus earned income: As shown in Table 30.1, if you focus on the broad issue of relative incomes, women earn only 61 percent of what men do, but if you focus more narrowly on the differences between what women and men earn when they both work full time, the ratio is narrower: Women earn 81 percent of what men do.

• Experience with the same employer: Men have been with their current employer for a median 4.7 years; the comparable figure for females is 4.5 years. It is notable that this gap has nearly been eliminated in recent years.

• Different professions: Only 37 percent of lawyers, 38 percent of doctors, and 14 percent of engineers are women. On the

other hand, women account for 94 percent of secre taries, 88 percent of nurses, 81 percent of elementary school teach- ers, 97 percent of day-care workers, and 81 percent of social workers.

• Pregnancy and child rearing: While it is illegal to discriminate based on pregnancy, any opportunity that a woman loses and a man gains can result in young professional fathers being promoted more quickly than young professional mothers. Since only women can give birth and 96  percent of stay-at- home parents are women, women lose opportunities.

• Flexible employment: For reasons that are primarily sociological, women rather than men pick flexible employment so that they can deal with their family’s needs. Flexible jobs also happen to be lower paying.

Are these legitimate economic consequences of choices that people make freely and knowingly or are they manifestations of  discrimination itself? That is a debate for you to have with your  fellow students and your professors of economics and sociology.

S O C I O L O G Y O R E C O N O M I C S : W H Y W O M E N E A R N L E S S T H A N M E N

broadcasters. Although it may be true that men watch more sports, that does not say anything about whether a particular man or a particular woman would be better for a particular job. Furthermore, many rules of thumb, like the notion that men are better drivers, never were good predictors of performance on the job.

Even when there is a concretely accurate rule of thumb, discrimination is illegal. This form of discrimi nation is the economic equivalent of racial profiling, which we

hear about with regard to po- lice tactics. In economics, such discrimination is labeled by some as rational or statistical discrimination because it is based on sound statistical evidence. It is referred to as “rational” only because it is consistent with the recognized goal of firms of

maximizing profit. For instance, it is a fact of life in the United States that when a bank consults with the best stat- isticians and economists, it finds that African Americans were, from 2007 to 2010, 6 percent more likely to default on a home loan. This is true even when the study holds in- come, occupation, and a host of other important variables

constant. If lenders use this information to charge blacks a higher interest rate for mortgages, or if they use this in- formation to set a higher standard for blacks to qualify for a loan, they are guilty of “statistical” discrimination.1 Re- gardless of whether it makes economic sense, it is illegal to use race in any part of the lending decision.

Detecting and Measuring Discrimination Detecting and measuring the extent of discrimination in an authoritative way are not always easy. If a Hispanic female high school dropout and an affluent white male college professor each went into a bank to ask for a loan, and the high school dropout was denied the loan and the professor got one, we would not automatically assume we were looking at a case of gender or race discrimina- tion. We would have to separate out the reasons why one person got the loan and the other did not.

There are two ways that economists try to do this. First, they use the statistical technique called “regression” to look

rational or statistical discrimination Unequal treatment of classes of people that is based on sound sta- tistical evidence and is consistent with profit maxi mization.

1Another interpretation of this finding is that it is actually whites who are being discriminated against since, all else being equal, they are defaulting less fre- quently than blacks. This implies that they are being turned down too often.

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332 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

for systematic patterns in the data. Once they figure the appropriate values using a statistical computer program, regression analysis tells them the impact of one variable on another, holding the effects of other variables constant. It allows them to say, with degrees of certainty, that a variable like race or sex has a specific impact on another variable, like whether or not a loan was approved, even when they hold other variables like income constant. When many dif- ferent people, from many different backgrounds, with dif- ferent incomes and debt histories seek loans from many different banks, the regression technique can, when cor- rectly applied, determine whether being African American or female makes an applicant less likely to get a loan.

The second technique involves creating fake identities for people who are exactly alike except for their race or sex. These “auditors” approach a situation one after the other to see if they are treated differently. Since every thing other than race is held constant, any differences in the way the au- ditors are treated must be related to race. A fascinating ex- ample of this work was conducted by economists Bertrand and Mullainathan. They showed that on purely fictitious and functionally identical résumés, applicants with names like “Emily” and “Greg” were statistically, substantially, and depressingly more likely to be called for an interview than applicants with names like “Lakisha” and “Jamal.”

These two techniques have their critics. This may, at least in part, be because of the somewhat different con- clusions the techniques have led economists to make. Generally, regression techniques expose a smaller race bias problem across the board than is exposed by audit techniques. Typically, those who advocate regression measurement rather than using auditors say that the ficti- tious auditors themselves may create part of the dispar- ity by the way they act. They also say that the exactness of the match is less than reliable. On the other hand, the advocates of auditing suggest that variables included in regressions, like intelligence scores, are themselves biased or indicative of other past discriminatory practices and therefore always understate the true problem.

Discrimination in Labor, Consumption, and Lending

Keeping these basics in mind, we turn now to three areas of the economy in which professional economists have studied discrimination in some depth. These areas are the labor market, where people sell their labor to firms; the goods market, where people buy things; and the lend- ing market, where people borrow money.

Labor Market Discrimination We can start exploring the effect of discrimination in the labor market by assuming a world, like the 1960s, where it is legal and openly practiced. In Figure 30.4, suppose there are two kinds of jobs: jobs that only whites are allowed to do and jobs that whites are allowed to do but blacks must do if they want jobs.2 In a world where there is no discrimination, the nondiscriminatory sup- ply curve SND crosses the demand curve at a wage WND that is equal for blacks and whites. In the world where such discrimination is legal and binding, the supply of workers available to perform tasks limited to whites only (left panel) is less, SD, and therefore the wage that must be paid to whites is greater. Because blacks must perform the other tasks, the supply of workers available in that market (right panel) is greater and therefore the wage is lower.

Thus with discrimination that is legal, whites make more than blacks. The question is: If discrimination is held to be illegal, is that sufficient to eliminate the wage differential? Beginning with the work of econo- mist Gary Becker, the profession showed theoretically that without a legal basis, discrimination and wage differentials would go away. In the 1960s the econom- ics profession was confident that profit-oriented but open-minded business owners would want to make as much money as possible and would therefore ignore skin color. If employers employed people to do what used to be considered “a white man’s job” and were right in assuming that the only reason blacks had been

2This analysis works the same for modeling sex discrimination.

FIGURE 30.4 The effect of racism on white and black wages.

SD

SD SNDSND

DD

Jobs that blacks are allowed to do

L LJobs only whites are allowed to do

Wblack

WND

Wwhite

W WWhites African Americans

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Discrimination in Labor, Consumption, and Lending 333

previously prevented from doing the job before was racism, then the African Americans would be able to do the job just as well as whites. That, in and of itself, however, would not motivate profit- oriented business owners to hire blacks. What would motivate them would be that they could offer blacks a little bit more than their other jobs paid but less than they were currently paying whites. In Figure 30.4 this would be between Wblack and Wwhite.

If profit-oriented managers were to hire African Americans at just above the Wblack wage that is depicted in the right panel of Figure 30.4, they could get all the labor they need at much lower cost than they would have had to pay white workers, Wwhite. Thus the business man- ager’s desire to make money can serve to narrow the wage gap, at least a little.

As other managers see the advantage of hiring lower-paid, equally skilled African American labor, the wages among African Americans would continue to rise as firms seeking cheaper labor attempt to outbid each other. Thus a traditional economist argues that in time nothing more than removing legal impediments is required to achieve equality. The idea that greed pre- vails over bigotry remains steadfast in the minds of many economists.

Considering that wages are not equal nearly 50 years after the civil rights movement’s heyday, however, there must be obstacles that simple economic incentives have not been able to overcome in equalizing wages. The first thing to consider with regard to whether economic profit incentives will overcome racism is that people will pay extra, when they want to, to satisfy their bigoted nature. Managers will pay a little extra not to have to work with “them,” regardless of whether “them” is women, blacks, gays, whites, or anyone else. Presumably bigots are will- ing to pay to support their bigotry.

Another problem is that some people will patronize only businesses where not any of “them” are around. Even if you are an open-minded, profit-oriented man- ager, if you see that your business decreases whenever you hire more African Americans, you may decide to hire only whites, and you will pay more to attract them. You may do this even though you know it is illegal and morally wrong. It is a fact of life that if you are a manager and your livelihood depends on satisfying your customers, you may do things you would not oth- erwise do.

It is for these reasons that, even though the wage gap be- tween whites and blacks has shrunk, it has not disappeared. Regression analysis shows that it remains at between

12 percent and 15 percent.3 Remember that the regression results hold constant things that are supposed to determine pay such as education and occupation. Because African Americans have attained a lower average level of education and because they are less prevalent in high-income occupa- tions, you would expect that they would be paid less. What this also means is that the actual difference in pay is much greater than the 12 percent to 15 percent that these regres- sion studies indicate. In an apparent contradiction, studies limited to well-educated professionals show that being a black woman actually pays a premium. This is interesting, but it lacks practical significance since most African Amer- ican women are not well-educated professionals.

Consumption Market and Lending Market Discrimination While it is easy to imagine discrimination in the labor market, where people either are denied positions or are hired for lower pay, it is harder to imagine in the market for goods. You never see a Walmart charge a white man $65 for a car battery and then charge a Hispanic woman $75. There are areas in the goods market, however, and especially in the services market, where the races can be and are treated differently.

At first it would seem rather silly for a business to dis- criminate and turn away profitable sales. What you have to consider, though, is that audits performed by various economists and government investigators have shown that discrimination is in fact quite prevalent in real estate sales, rentals, and car sales.

In real estate, audits show that real estate agents of both races tend to show white clients more houses. Moreover, they show white families houses in all-white neighborhoods while diverting black families to houses in black or integrated neighborhoods. The same results were evident when auditors looked for rentals. Why would real estate agents do this? Why, in particular, would black real estate agents do this? There appear to be a couple of explanations.

The first possibility is that agents are simply trying to make the clients happy, and they think they are doing this—and may in fact be doing this—by showing hous- ing in areas where they think the clients want to live.

3Some economists have found that when they include standardized tests of intelligence, this remaining difference disappears. These tests and their use in this context are hotly debated by economists. The economists who employ the results of the tests believe the tests are truly tests of intelligence, whereas oth- ers contend that the tests are racially biased and therefore of no value.

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334 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

Salespeople make judgments all the time about what will make their clients happy, and they do so with very little to go on. The economists who uncovered this form of discrimination attribute this behavior to racism and call it discrimination. If a significant segment of African Americans really do want to live in already-integrated neighborhoods rather than move into another neighbor- hood to become the only minority family in the area, the economists are incorrect when they label this behavior as discrimination.

The second possibility is that both the black and white agents have regular clients in the neighborhoods that contain the apartments or houses that are available, and they do not want to anger their regular clients by upsetting the racial “balance” in the neighborhood. The audits do not include interviews of the agents, so the data do not show whether either of these scenarios ac- counts for the discriminatory practices that exist when realtors are showing properties to their clients. If you live in a neighborhood originally developed before 1975, you might be shocked to find the covenants for your property probably include a line like the one I found in mine:

No person of any race other than Caucasian shall own, use or occupy any lot or building in this subdivision, except that this covenant shall not prevent domestic servants or employees of a different race domiciled with an owner tenant.

Another area where economists have found race and sex discrimination in the market for goods is in automo- bile sales. Auditors found that even when they used the same bargaining strategy, made it clear they would be paying cash, and were talking about the same car, dealers charged blacks and women more. The usual method of the audit had blacks and whites, men and women going into the same dealership within a short period of time and asking a salesperson to tell them the asking price for a specific car. In each case the auditors would then offer a price they had previously decided to offer and then they would use a “split the difference” bargaining technique until the salesperson and they arrived at a final price. What happened was that the initial offer made by both black and white car dealers was lower for whites than it was for blacks. The dealers also agreed to sell cars to whites for lower prices than those for blacks. The econo- mists who performed these audits concluded that, on the average, black women pay $1,000 more, black men pay $800 more, and white women pay $400 more for a car than do white men.

Why would dealers do this? Though the bias was less evident when the dealers themselves were women or mi- norities, they still discriminated against blacks and women. It seems as if either the dealers did not want the sales or dealers have preconceived notions of sales resistance and bargaining strategies. It may be they believe they can out- maneuver African American and female customers.

Another area where economists have investigated and found serious race discrimination is the area of mortgage lending. Because it is rare that banks offer anything but a single interest rate, the question is whether blacks are more likely to be turned down for loans than are whites. Again, audits found that given nearly identical economic characteristics, blacks were somewhat more likely than whites to be turned down for a loan. It seems likely here that, short of bigotry, banks, which use both objective standards and subjective standards in making their deci- sions, have discriminatory prejudice in their subjective standards. As we said before, it has been shown that blacks and whites of equal economic standing have dif- ferent default rates on mortgage loans. It may be that the loan officer who denies a mortgage to a black couple that would have been approved for a white couple is doing so in a “rational” sense. Nevertheless, this discrimination remains a violation of law, and banks are currently being monitored and penalized for such practices.

Some economists claim to have noted sex discrimina- tion in retirement annuities. Whether it is actually dis- crimination, men have better choices than women because women live longer than men by more than half a decade. Insurance companies that offer annuities have to charge women more than men, offer fewer benefits to women than men, or split the difference in some other way so that women end up paying somewhat more and being paid somewhat less. Making it illegal to charge women more than men for such annuities would not change these facts. It would merely force companies to indulge in what would amount to a redistribution of wealth from men to women.

Affirmative Action

The Economics of Affirmative Action As you saw in the preceding discussion, there are condi- tions under which discriminatory behavior can continue long after it is declared illegal. Either because employers may be bigoted or because employers may have custom- ers who are bigoted, discrimination in employment ex- ists even in a perfectly competitive market. This means that the perfectly competitive market may fail to arrive

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Affirmative Action 335

at the socially optimal level of employment for minori- ties. Minorities will be underemployed and underpaid, and whites and men will be overpaid for the work they are doing and get jobs for which they are not as qualified.

Anytime a market fails to achieve a situation where consumer and producer surplus combined are maximized, economists are interested in actions that can correct that market’s failure. Though corrective policies for failed markets have costs, they are seen by economists as nec- essary investments that will ultimately pay dividends. In

this context the corrective poli- cies are called affirmative action. Affirmative action is any policy that is taken to speed up the pro- cess of achieving equality.

The costs of affirmative action policies range from the costs of more thorough searches for employees to the cost of monitoring fair hiring practices with a fully staffed human resources office. These costs can be seen in the same context as any costs associated with correct- ing a failed market. For example, though it costs industry money to clean up pollution, expenditures to do so by industry, which are mandated by the government, make us better off in the aggregate than we would be without them. When affirmative action is utilized to correct an inequality that is seen as permanent, affirmative action supporters view it very much like scrubbers on coal-fired plants: It is money spent to fix a market failure. If af- firmative action exists to speed up a transition from in- equality to equality that would have happened eventually anyway, these are seen as costs that diminish the market failure by shortening the time it exists.

On the other hand, if the market differences between minorities and whites and between men and women only reflect the differences in the skills of the groups, then the market is not failing. If this is the case, then any at- tempt at affirmative action imposes a cost on, rather than a benefit to, the economy. In such a case, the costs of affirmative action should be viewed as buying “fairness” rather than fixing a market failure.

What Is Affirmative Action? Even if traditional economic models correctly predicted that pay gaps between men and women and between whites and minorities would eventually be eliminated without needing such influences as affirmative action, there is the problem of time. Affirmative action came about because proponents wanted to achieve equality more quickly. To the degree that equality is not arriving fast enough through

economic incentives, advocates have asserted that further affirmative action be taken to speed up the process.

Gradations of Affirmative Action Affirmative action’s many forms range from the inconse- quential to the highly consequential. For instance, many citizens hold as conventional wisdom that affirmative action consists of quotas that mandate the number of people who must be hired, promoted, or admitted. As a matter of fact, explicit quotas are rare and, unless they have been ordered through a court decision, they are illegal. On the other hand, many other policies can be engaged in that stop far short of quotas.

One form of affirmative action is simply to make sure that all potentially qualified employees know about a particular job. So, for instance, if you were hiring produc- tion workers in a southwestern city, affirmative action could consist of your advertising in both the English- and Spanish-language newspapers. If you were hiring in a city that had a radio station whose audience was pri- marily African American, under this form of affirmative action you would advertise there alongside radio stations where audiences were predominantly white. This form of affirmative action requires that employers cast the net wide when looking for new hires. It places very little burden on employers and it gives no one any sort of un- fair advantage. The only people who might be perceived as disadvantaged would be those who previously had an unfair advantage. These might be those who were less qualified but got jobs because minorities were not aware particular jobs were available.

Another form of affirmative action has held that if two applicants are judged to have equal qualifications for a position, then the one who is a member of a minority should automatically be hired. Just as in baseball where “tie goes to the runner,” this form of affirmative action suggests that “tie goes to the minority.” The advantage to the minority group members here is that once they have shown they are equally qualified, their chance of being hired goes from 50–50 to 100 percent, and the disadvan- tage to the member of the majority is that the chance of being hired goes from 50–50 to 0 percent.

A third, higher level of affirmative action is one in which an employer sets a level of qualification that is appropriate for a job, hires all minorities who meet the standard, and then fills out the remaining slots with nonminorities. When universities make decisions about whom to admit, and they use criteria to further affirmative action, they often conduct them in the following

affirmative action Any policy that is taken to speed up the process of achieving equality.

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336 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

board must file a report justifying the discrepancy. That means that though there is no specific number that must be promoted, any deviation from the guideline is suspect.

The final version of strictness associated with affirma- tive action is quotas. Surprisingly, the quotas that most people think of when they think of affirmative action are actually against the law as a general practice. Quotas are legal only when court-mandated, either through a ver- dict or a consent decree. Sufficient grounds must exist to show that a particular employer or university has been guilty of discrimination in the past to make quotas legal. What troubles some economists is the degree to which businesses engage in quota-like hiring practices designed to protect themselves from legal troubles.

way: A school will decide that an SAT of 1,000 is suf- ficient to make graduation likely and admit all minorities who meet that standard. The remainder of the student body is then generated from the best of the rest, a pool of students whose SATs may well be above 1,000.

A fourth version of affirmative action, just short of a quota, is establishing a guideline that employers should try to meet. The idea behind this is to ensure that employ- ers can be somewhat flexible while also ensuring that the proportion of minorities not be allowed to drop too low. In military promotions, for example, if the racial, ethnic, and gender proportions of those promoted are not roughly equal to the racial, ethnic, and gender pro- portions of those eligible for promotion, the promotions

Economists Roland Fryer and Glenn Loury studied affirmative action policies and concluded that the mythology of the practice sometimes overwhelms the reality.

Myth 1: Affirmative Action Can Involve Goals and Timetables While Avoiding Quotas They argue that because those looking for discrimination cannot see into the heart of the potential accused, the hiring, loaning, or admit- ting entity will likely create an “implicit quota” to achieve its goal.

Myth 2: Color-Blind Policies Offer an Efficient Substitute for Color-Sighted Affirmative Action They point to reactions in California, Florida, and Texas when af- firmative action policies were banned in college admissions. They argue that the attempt to use income or high school location as a proxy was ineffective and that getting the best, most diverse class of students is hampered by using proxies for race rather than race itself.

Myth 3: Affirmative Action Undercuts the Incentive to Invest in Yourself They argue that though whites may not see as much payoff to edu- cational investments, African Americans will see a greater payoff to

education. Which effect is greater, they argue, is an unsettled empiri- cal question.

Myth 4: Equal Opportunity Is Enough to Ensure Racial Equality They argue that because social networks (“who you know”) matter a great deal in hiring practices, previous advantages are likely to maintain themselves for a very long time.

Myth 5: The Earlier in, the Better They argue that this is an empirical question where the data have not yet shown that earlier investments in more equal education will assist later outcomes in graduation rates.

Myth 6: Many Nonminority Citizens Are Directly Affected by Affirmative Action They argue that far more whites and men believe they are passed over because of affirmative action policies than actually are.

Myth 7: Affirmative Action Always Helps Its Beneficiaries They argue that affirmative action has reduced the graduation and bar passage rates of African American law school students because they are admitted to schools where they are less likely to flourish.

M Y T H S O F A F F I R M A T I V E A C T I O N

Summary You now understand the economic implications of discrimination. You know how economists measure the impact of discrimination, detect its existence, and explain its importance. You know how labor market

discrimination can be modeled, which implies that dis- criminatory pay gaps should close over time, but the reality is that the rate of closure is slow. You know what affirmative action is in its various forms.

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Summary 337

1. How academics look at the evidence on how much women make relative to men is an issue that very much depends on a. which year you look at. b. which state you look at. c. whether you take some variables as “choices”

or as “further evidence of discrimination.” d. which court you are in.

2. The earnings of African Americans relative to whites has a. increased from 40 percent in the 1920s to

90 percent today. b. increased from 50 percent in the 1950s to

around 60 percent in the 1970s, remaining in that area since.

c. remained constant since the 1950s. d. decreased steadily since the 1960s.

3. The method of detecting sex discrimination most likely to minimize it would be to use a. simple differences in income between men and

women. b. simple differences in full-time wages for men

and women. c. regression techniques. d. auditing techniques.

4. The method of detecting sex discrimination most likely to maximize it would be to use a. simple differences in income between men and

women. b. simple differences in full-time wages for men

and women. c. regression techniques. d. auditing techniques.

5. If a woman does not get an interview for a job re- quiring heavy lifting because the manager has noted that the average woman can lift less than the average man, this is a. a legal example of statistical discrimination. b. an illegal example of statistical discrimination. c. a legal example of adverse impact discrimination. d. an illegal example of adverse impact

discrimination.

Quiz Yourself

Key Terms adverse impact

discrimination affirmative action

disparate treatment discrimination

labor force participation rate

rational or statistical discrimination

6. Those who believe that wages paid to minorities will rise without government intervention believe that bosses are primarily motivated by a. profit. b. religion. c. doing right. d. helping the downtrodden.

7. Affirmative action a. can take many forms. b. is almost always a racial quota. c. applies only to women. d. has typically been declared unconstitutional.

Short Answer Questions 1. Describe the process by which greed, absent sex-

ism or bigotry on the part of business owners, can lead to the reduction in wage gaps between men and women and between whites and nonwhites.

2. What are the reasons that income gaps between men and women and whites and nonwhites may persist even in the absence of sexism or racism by business owners?

3. Suppose an establishment has absolutely no overt his- tory of employment discrimination but has a goal of reducing race or gender gaps in its employment. What are the legal means by which it may reduce that gap?

Think about This Think about your chosen major, your favorite restaurant, the place you live. Are they predominantly male, female, black, or white? Would you feel comfortable going outside the so- cial norms in your choices? Are those social norms limiting?

Talk about This Who is going to raise your children? Who is going to sacrifice a career for their care, an illness, their after- school activities, etc.?

For More Insight See Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are Emily

and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,” America Economic Review 94, no. 4 (September 2004).

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338 Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination

Blau, Francine, Marianne Ferber, and Anne Winkler, The Economics of Women, Men and Work, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998).

Curry, George E., ed., The Affirmative Action Debate (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996).

Feiner, Susan F., Race and Gender in the American Econ- omy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994).

Fryer, Roland, and Glenn Loury, “Affirmative Action and Its Mythology,” Journal of Economic Perspec- tives 19, no. 3 (2005).

Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 2 (Spring 1998). See articles by John Yinger; William A. Darity, Jr., and Patrick L. Mason; Helen F. Ladd; and Kenneth J. Arrow, James J. Heckman, and Glenn C. Loury, pp. 23–126.

Sowell, Thomas, Race and Economics (New York: David McKay, 1975).

Waldfogel, Jane, “Understanding the ‘Family Gap’ in Pay for Women with Children,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 137–156.

Behind the Numbers Income and wealth.

Median family income; Income by Race and Gender. U.S. Census Bureau; historical income tables—

www.census.gov/hhes/www/income Wealth. U.S. Census Bureau; historical income tables—

www.census.gov/hhes/wealth Median earnings and ratio of men’s to women’s income. Bureau of Labor Statistics—www.bls.gov/cps

/ cpsaat39.pdf

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - O N E

339

Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair? Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Understand how income inequality is measured.

LO2 Understand how wealth inequality is measured.

LO3 Explain why income and wealth inequality exists in the United States.

LO4 Enumerate and explain the costs and benefits of income inequality.

LO5 Explain income mobility and note its extent in the United States.

LO6 Explain intergenerational income mobility and compare its degree across the developed world.

Chapter Outline

Measurement of Inequality

The Shrinking Middle Class

Causes of Household Income and Wealth Inequality

Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality

Summary

In 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement made head- lines regarding the concentration of income and wealth in the hands of the top 1 percent by claiming to represent the other 99 percent. As a result, there was quite a stir in the popular culture as well as in the economics literature about income and wealth inequality generally and the increase in the percentage of income held by the top 1 percent specifi- cally. Income inequality has many measures, causes, and consequences. This chapter will begin by showing narrow and broad measures of income and wealth inequality and how those measures have changed through the years. The focus will shift from measures of the tails (the top 1 per- cent) to the issues associated with the shrinking middle class. The chapter will move forward to discuss the causes and effects of that inequality and conclude by discussing why some inequality is necessary to reward productiv- ity and success while excessive inequality has potentially troublesome social and economic consequences.

Measurement of Inequality

Income Inequality The popular press measure of inequality looks at the percentage of total income going to the top 1 percent of earners. The data available for this type of analysis are garnered from an IRS publication (Statistics of In- come: Individual Income Tax). The data only become available three years after the fact. As can be seen in Figure 31.1, the same year the inequality issue gained widespread attention in the United States coincided with the worst of the financial-crisis-precipitated recession. This happened for two reasons: First, con- ventional wisdom placed the blame for the recession on wealthy financial interests; and second, the IRS re- port for 2007 became available in mid-2010 and showed that the “top 1 percent” share of income had risen

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340 Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

to 22.49 percent. Those decrying this level of income in- equality noted that in 1978 that same measure showed the “top 1 percent” share stood at only 7.55 percent. For that period and using that measure, the share of the top 1 percent of income earners had tripled.

Clearly, as can be seen in both Figure 31.1 and Figure  31.2, and using the share of income from more broadly defined groups, as more data became available, they showed that the increase from 2001 to 2007 was largely transitory. It peaked at the time of the tech boom

in the 1990s and peaked again just prior to the financial crisis. The biggest increase in systemic inequality had actually occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. The pe- riod of the 2000s was marked by highly variable income inequality measures.

As compelling as this may appear, there are problems using only this measure of income inequality. The first of these relates to the rapid increase in the proportion of Americans filing tax returns, while the second relates to the special tax treatment of capital gains.

Regarding tax filings, Figure 31.3 shows that from 1971 to 1998, there was such a rapid increase in the number of income tax returns filed that the proportion of the population completing income tax returns rose from 36  percent to 47 percent. There are three basic reasons this occurred: (1) More people were filing as “single head of household” because more people who were not married or were divorced had children; (2) more young people (under 24) were working at part-time jobs dur- ing this period than had been in previous generations; and (3)  the new Child Tax Credit combined with the refundable1 and greatly expanded EITC was creating a motivation for low-earning households to file tax returns when they were not legally required to (because they could garner a tax refund in an amount vastly exceeding

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FIGURE 31.1 Conventionally measured income inequality.

Source: The Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov

FIGURE 31.3 Ratio of returns to population.

Source: The Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov

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FIGURE 31.2 Conventionally measured income inequality.

Source: The Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov

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20 10

20 13

1A refundable tax credit is one whereby a household can receive more from the federal government in the form of a return than is owed in tax or withheld. The Earned Income Tax Credit (which was greatly expanded in both the Rea- gan and Clinton administrations) and the Child Tax Credit (which was created in the Clinton administration and doubled in size during the G. W. Bush admin- istration) are both refundable. Portions of the tax credits to support a college education are also refundable.

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Measurement of Inequality 341

their tax withholding). When filings increase faster than the population increases, and when nearly all of those extra filings are in the lower 99 percent, that expands the 1 percent group to cover more people than it oth- erwise would. For instance, in 2007, 32 million more filings were received than there would have been had only 36 percent of the population filed. With 32 million more filings, there were 322,000 more in the 1 percent. Essentially, the conventional measure scooped some of the 2 percent into the 1 percent. Correcting for that effect results in a 1.4 percent decrease in the top 1 percent’s systemic share. This is displayed in Figure 31.4.

Regarding the impact that changes to the tax treatment of capital gains have had on the measure of inequality, there is potentially a much larger effect. For the benefit of those not steeped in finance or tax issues, capital gains are those gains garnered from selling an asset for more than was paid for it. In the United States, capital gains are only taxed on “realization” rather than “accrual.” This means that taxes are only owed on the gain if the gain is “realized” in the form of a sale. Further, capital gains are forgiven at death, which means that if there is an accrued gain and a person sells, he or she realizes the gain and owes the tax. If the person dies prior to the realization, the gain is tax free (except for inheritance taxes) and the heirs can immediately sell that asset (with its gains) tax free. It is only if the heirs hold the asset that any gains are taxed, but even then the “stepped-up basis” means that its value on the day the person died becomes its effective purchase price. There are good economic reasons for this treatment that are beyond the

scope of this chapter, but the upshot is this: Capital gains realizations, and therefore payments of capital gains taxes, are almost entirely voluntary and easily avoided. Higher rates of tax encourage tax avoidance through nonrealization and lower rates of tax encourage realiza- tion. Figure  31.5 shows that the rate that high-income earners pay on those capital gains has changed over the years. That rate reached a peak in the late 1970s at nearly 40 percent and from 2003 to 2012 was at its all-time low level of 15 percent. This impacts the measure of income inequality markedly in that, were capital gains tax rates as high in 2007 as they were in the late 1970s, far fewer gains would have been realized, and therefore far fewer gains reported to the IRS. The accrued income would have existed, but the measured income would not have. If tax rates on capital gains had remained the same, pre- sumably the rate of realization would have remained the same. Because a higher percentage of capital gains prob- ably went unrealized during the 1970s, incomes of the top 1 percent were likely understated. Looked at differ- ently, if tax rates had remained at their mid-1970s peak, fewer realizations would have occurred and less income would have been reported by the top 1 percent. Either way, a decrease in the capital gains tax rate would be reflected in an increase in the observed measure of the share of income of the top 1 percent though inequality may not have changed at all. A simple analysis of the impact of a 20 percentage point drop in the maximum capital gains tax rate suggests that 8 percentage points of the increase in the share of the 1 percent can be attrib- uted to the drop in the capital gains tax rate. Accounting

1% Adjusted for returns (base = 1968)

27%

22%

17%

12%

7%

19 68

19 74

1 9 7 1

19 77

19 80

19 83

19 86

19 89

19 92

19 95

19 98

20 01

20 04

20 07

20 10

20 13

FIGURE 31.4 1 Percent adjusted for the increase in all returns.

Source: The Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov and author calculations 50

40

30

20

10

0

19 68

19 74

1 9 7 1

19 77

19 80

19 83

19 86

19 89

19 92

19 95

19 98

20 01

20 04

20 07

20 10

20 13

FIGURE 31.5 Maximum capital gain tax rate.

Source: The Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov

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342 Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

for the tax-returns effect and the capital gains effect, the top 1 percent’s share would have increased from 7.55 percent to 13.09 percent rather than to 22.49 percent.

One consequence of the reelection of President Obama in 2012 was that he negotiated an increase in the top capital gains tax rate for 2013 and beyond. For those holding assets beyond a year, the tax rate (for those in the highest income bracket) increased from 15 percent to 23.8 percent.

Wealth Inequality A parallel issue to income inequality is wealth inequality. Here there are fewer measurement concerns as there is no direct tax in the United States on wealth (except perhaps inheritance taxes that only occur at death). As a result, there is no issue associated with who is filing and who isn’t or capital gains accruals or realizations. The data on wealth concentrations come from a unique dataset: the Survey of Consumer Finances. These data are garnered from 4,500 individuals who are carefully selected to accurately represent the U.S. population’s demographics (age, gender, household type, etc.) but also to achieve an appropriate representation of households according to economic characteristics (homeowners vs. renters, high- income vs. low-income individuals, as well as those with defined benefit pensions vs. those with defined contri- bution pensions). Part of the survey’s usefulness is that there is what in the statistics world is called “oversam- pling” of high-income and high-wealth households to get a more accurate representation of households in those categories. Those “oversampled” households are then weighted downward to make sure they do not bias the results of the survey. Conducted on behalf of the Federal Reserve by the University of Chicago, it is widely con- sidered the gold standard of economic surveys.

Its results show that wealth inequality is similarly high and is higher than it once was. The share of the top 10 percent, which was 67 percent in 1989, grew to 75.3 percent by 2013. Figure 31.6 shows that the share of the top 1 percent grew markedly (from 30 percent to 36 percent) with the rise in the stock market during the 1990s and has been relatively stable. The relatively (but not extraordinarily) rich (i.e., the 9 percent in the top 10 percent but not in the top 1 percent) faired very well during the period after 1995. Figure 31.7 shows that the upper-middle class and the bottom half have seen their relative wealth shares fall. While the bottom half’s share drop from 2007 to 2013 (from 2.5 percent to 1 percent) is likely the result of the bursting of the

housing bubble in 2008 through 2010, both household types have seen systematic declines in their wealth shares since 1989.

Another measure of wealth inequality is the ratio of mean wealth to median wealth. Mean (the simple aver- age of) wealth differs from the median (the mid-point of) wealth because rich people are very rich, and modest percentage changes in their wealth are still very large and as such will change the mean significantly even if they have no effect on the median person’s wealth.

FIGURE 31.6 Share of wealth: top 10%.

Source: Survey of Consumer Finances

40

38

36

34

32

30 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

90–99% Top 1%

FIGURE 31.7 Share of wealth: bottom 90%.

Source: Survey of Consumer Finances

35

20

25

30

15

10

5

0 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 20132010

Bottom half 50–90%

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The Shrinking Middle Class 343

Figure 31.8 shows that during the 1989 to 2007 period, wealth (in inflation-adjusted dollars) rose 60 percent for the median household, but the mean rose 86 percent; that is, the rich got richer faster than did others. Again, most of that effect was a result of the increase in the stock market from 1989 to 2000. The gains from 2001 to 2007 were more the result of the housing bubble, and because the average household benefited more (in net wealth terms) from the increase in housing-related wealth than did the rich (who have far less of the wealth tied up in their homes), the relative increase in median and mean wealth for that period was approximately equal. When the housing bubble collapsed, however, the median household’s wealth fell 40 percent, all the way back to its 1989 inflation-adjusted level, while the mean value dropped only 15 percent. This caused the mean to median ratio, which had been rising steadily from 1995 to 2004, to spike to a level of 6.5. This means that the high end is so high that mean wealth is 6.5 times higher than the median household’s wealth.

The Shrinking Middle Class

Happening at the same time as the increase in inequality has been the shrinking of the American middle class. The two issues are similar but not necessarily identical. The inequality issue is about incomes of those at the very top increasing faster than everyone else’s (or increasing while everyone else’s has remained stagnant or fallen).

The issue of the shrinking middle class is associated, mostly, with the loss of income by those in the middle. As mentioned previously in Chapter 15, the Pew Chari- table Trust defines the middle class as those households with incomes between 67 percent and 200 percent of the median household income by household size. In 2014 a three-person household with income between $42,000 and $126,000 would qualify as being in the middle class. Table 31.1 shows the percentage of households by Pew’s income classes.

Without regard to definitions, the middle class can shrink or expand because people near the definitional thresholds have incomes increase or decrease. For instance, a surge in earnings of people just under the 200 percent definitional threshold would shrink the middle class by moving them into the “upper middle.” That would be an unambiguously good thing. To some degree that is what happened in the 1970s through the 1990s. Another unam- biguously good thing would be if people moved into the middle class because they were below the lower threshold and moved above it. That has not occurred at all during the last 45 years.

On the other hand, if people are falling below the 67 percent definitional threshold into the “lower middle” group, or worse, moving from the lower middle to the lowest group, that is unambiguously bad. Not just be- cause the middle class is shrinking but because of the way in which it is shrinking.

A graphical display of the income distribution is not a standard bell curve. It actually looks a great deal more like the two distributions shown in Figure 31.9. There are many people at the lower end of the distribution with an ever-decreasing percentage in each income category thereafter. The middle class is represented by the shaded portion. If the middle class shrinks, more of the distribu- tion is outside the shaded area. In particular, a movement

TABLE 31.1 Pew Charitable Trust income classes

Source: http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is -losing-ground/

Lower Upper Year Lowest Middle Middle Middle Highest

1971 16 9 61 10 4 1981 17 9 59 12 3 1991 18 9 56 12 5 2001 18 9 54 11 7 2011 20 9 51 12 8 2015 20 9 50 12 9

FIGURE 31.8 Median and mean wealth and their ratio (2010 dollars).

Source: Survey of Consumer Finances

700,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

300,000

200,000

100,000

W e

al th

R at

io

Median wealth Mean wealth Ratio

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.00 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

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344 Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

from the black distribution to the brown one would con- stitute a shrinking of the middle class.

The economic and political consequences of the shrinking middle class are enormous. When people’s incomes become less equal and when fewer people can describe themselves as being in the middle class, there is more antipathy to a market-based economic system. On the other hand, as long as people view the system as fundamentally fair, even those who find themselves at the bottom of the income distribu- tion will see their lot in life as a consequence of their own choices. Increases in income inequality, there- fore, cause more people to question the fairness of a market-based economy.

When people question the fairness of a market-based economy, they will seek policies that insulate them from the harshness of that system. The British vote to leave the European Union, for instance, could be viewed as such a reaction by that population. The popularity of 2016 presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders and their anti-trade prescriptions is another. Those insulating policies (reducing immigration or erecting trade barriers) inhibits the free flow of people, labor, investments, goods, and services. For those that argue for such policies, they do not necessarily care because they assert that the benefits from free trade and the free movement of those elements only favor the rich. For those that argue against such policies, they typically argue that the policies shrink the size of the economic pie and therefore reduce what is avail- able to everyone. When market-based systems produce

outcomes that are viewed by the majority as unfair or “rigged,” as a 2016 poll of Americans said it does, that system is threatened.

Causes of Household Income and Wealth Inequality

The reasons for the increase in household and wealth inequality are not particularly contentious. Some econo- mists and sociologists, however, might debate whether these increases were avoidable, how the increases might have been avoided, and even whether combatting the increases would be wise. Let’s begin with the causes, as they have been enumerated.

First, there is the decline of the American manufacturing sector generally and the decline of union-represented manufacturing employees specifically. Union- represented manufacturing employment, in autos, steel, and consumer durables (televisions, household appliances, etc.) has largely collapsed in the last 40 years. The jobs created by these sectors (and now lost) were well-paying positions re- quiring relatively little education. These jobs were, to the hardworking, a ticket to a middle-class lifestyle.

So why did this happen? Robotic production and in- ternational competition for the goods produced by these industries are largely to blame for the elimination of these manufacturing jobs. Specifically, fewer and fewer jobs are being performed by physically challenging labor, and more and more jobs are being performed by intellectually challenging labor. As a result, the premium paid to the brightest and most well educated continues to grow, and the relative wage of those performing manual labor has diminished. A worker today can be responsible for the output while supervising the actions of computer- and robotically driven manufacturing that once required several workers to perform physically demanding tasks.

International competition for goods-producing indus- tries has made it extraordinarily difficult for domestic manufacturers to compete if and when they have high wages and generous benefit packages. Domestic steel and auto production declined in the 1970s and 1980s, and while their decline continued through to today, the 1990s and 2000s saw a significant decline in the pro- duction of consumer electronics, appliances, and house- hold products. Many economists consider this aspect as having been inevitable. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, there was no major economy, other than the American one, with its economy and infrastructure

P e

rc e

n ta

g e

o f

in co

m e

t ax

fi le

rs

Income

FIGURE 31.9 Income distribution.

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Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality 345

more or less intact. For that reason, American manufac- turing had significant market power relative to the rest of the world. If someone wanted steel, for the better part of the 1950s and into the 1960s, he or she had to buy it from the United States. The same was largely true of automobiles through the 1970s and for consumer electronics and durables through the 1980s. With that market power, companies in the United States could pass on their higher wage costs to the world’s consumers. American unions could therefore bargain for higher wages, and because there was no international competition in these areas, the manufacturers were motivated to back down and pay those wages and offer better benefits. Again, because they could pass on the increased costs, they were not only not compelled to keep costs under control, but rather it was more in their interests to avoid sales-reducing strikes. As time progressed the economies of first, Germany and Japan, then Korea and China, and perhaps soon, India and Africa were able to undercut high American prices with the one advantage they had: lower wages. Short of walling off the U.S. economy, there was nothing the United States could have done to stop this pressure. As a result, downward pressure on American wages, under the story accepted by many, was an inevitable outcome of the late twentieth century.

All of this speaks to why incomes (and wealth) of those at the bottom would remain stagnant or decline, but what would explain why those at the top did so well? For this we have to turn to the aspects of global changes that benefited those at the top. The first of these changes involves the movement of global capital, while the second involves changes in the consumption-saving patterns of those not at the top.

In the aftermath of World War II and through the 1980s, the vast majority of financial capital used to grow businesses was locally generated. That is, Americans lent their money to other Americans to build businesses, finance homes, and so forth. Today, a bond used to fi- nance a company or a mortgage taken out to buy a home could very easily have its origins in Saudi Arabia or China. The foreign entity saves the money from profits earned in their global enterprises, converts that money to dollars, and invests it in U.S. markets. Capital markets have become much more profitable to those engaged in them and those engaged in them are, almost always, very wealthy people.

Furthermore, American saving rates have fallen pre- cipitously since the 1960s. A home that used to require a 20 percent down payment can now be had for 10 percent (or less) down. A car that used to be purchased for cash is

now far more likely to be financed with a loan or leased with terms often so generous as to allow the consumer to simply sign his or her name and drive away with a new car. What that means is that the savers, who used to come from all walks of life, are now far more likely to come from the higher end of the income scale.

To some degree, public policy since the 1980s has been more favorable to those at the high end of the in- come and wealth distribution than it was in years prior. Inheritance tax rates have fallen throughout the United States relative to where they were in the 1970s. Nation- ally, in inflation-adjusted terms, inheritance taxes are collected on fewer households than used to be subject to them and at lower rates. This is true at the federal and state levels. If there are two ways of being rich— inheriting your wealth or earning your wealth—policy changes are making the former easier.

The other significant tax policy change prior to the 1980s is the treatment of investment-based income. Capital gains tax rates as well as tax rates on carried in- terest (a form of income associated with an investment or hedge fund manager’s exceeding a specified return goal),which had been treated as ordinary income in the late 1980s and early 1990s, are now taxed at a lower rate than other earned income.

Finally, with all of this happening to increase income inequality, there had existed a counterweight to it in the 1960s through the 1980s: namely, the increasing labor force participation of women had turned millions of one- earner households into two-earner households so that the wage-and-salary earning class had seen rapidly increas- ing family incomes, especially during the early part of this period, from the increase in the number of income earners in those families. As the trend finished running its course during the end of this period, this particular counterweight was no longer holding back the move- ment toward inequality resulting from the other forces.

Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality

Market economies rely on the principle that individu- als earn an income that is positively related to the value of what they provide to that society where that value is measured by what others are willing to pay. If it is not positively related, some (perhaps many) individuals will stop doing what they are doing and do something else more lucrative or less demanding. If physicians and other professionals that require higher levels of educa- tion do not earn more than ordinary laborers, then only

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346 Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

those who wish to stay in school for long periods of time to engage in their desired profession will do so. If that happens, there will be too few people trained to be phy- sicians, engineers, scientists, and managers. Income in- equality provides a motivation for both those who wish to be at the high end of the income distribution to work to achieve it and those who wish to avoid being at the low end of the income distribution to work to avoid that result as well.

To see this in your own life, imagine that the profes- sion you wish to embark upon paid only the minimum wage. Would you continue pursuing a degree in order to engage in that profession? Some of you might, but most of you would change your degree program to do some- thing more lucrative—if for no other reason than to pay off your student loans or make the time in college worth the expense.

Significant income inequality has a social downside as well, especially when the level of inequality is viewed by those in the middle and at the bottom of the distribu- tion as unjustified by the aforementioned social benefits associated with meeting market needs. When the poor believe that their poverty is a result of choices they made or as a result of things they did or failed to do, income in- equality does not challenge the social order. On the other hand, when those in the middle or at the bottom of the distribution believe that the system is rigged in favor of the rich remaining rich, social disorder can be the result.

Social disorder can threaten the system that allows for income inequality in the first place, and as a result, it is frequently in the interests of those at the top of the distribution to ensure that those in the middle and at the bottom believe that the inequality is justified.

A positive view of income inequality by those in the middle and at the bottom can be achieved as long as there is the widespread belief that there exists upward income and wealth mobility in society. It is therefore im- portant for those at the top of the income distribution to create the reality of opportunity or at least maintain a widespread belief in a myth of opportunity. Table 31.2 shows the degree of income mobility from 1987 to 1998 and from 1996 to 2005. What it shows is that 38.9 per- cent of those in the lowest quintile in 1987 were also in the lowest quintile in 1996. What it also shows is that 17.9 percent of those in the lowest quintile in 1987 were in one of the two highest quintiles in 1996. From 1996 to 2005 these figures were largely the same, given that 37.8 percent of the poor in 1996 were also poor in 2005 and that 19 percent of the poor in 1996 were in one of the top two quintiles in 2005. At the other end, it shows that 55.3 percent (100% − 44.7%) of those in the 1 percent in 1996 weren’t in the top 1 percent in 2005.

Another way of looking at income mobility is the degree to which the income quintile of parents and the income quintile of their children are related; that is, whether or not you inherit your parents’ wealth, you

TABLE 31.2 Income mobility from 1987 to 1996 and from 1996 to 2005.

Source: United States Department of the Treasury, www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/incomemobilitystudy03-08revise.pdf

Lowest Second Middle Fourth Highest Total Top 1%

Lowest 1987–1996 38.9 28.3 14.9 10.6 7.3 100 0.3

1996–2005 37.8 27.1 16.1 11.8 7.2 100 0.3

Second 1987–1996 14.2 33.8 26.4 16.4 9.3 100 0.2

1996–2005 15.8 30.1 28 17.2 9 100 0.2

Middle 1987–1996 6.1 17.4 33.9 28.4 14.2 100 0.3

1996–2005 5.9 14 32.6 31.1 16.3 100 0.3

Fourth 1987–1996 3 7.5 19.4 40.1 30 100 0.5

1996–2005 3.1 5.7 15.5 41.9 33.8 100 0.3

Highest 1987–1996 1.8 2.5 7.3 20.6 67.8 100 5.4

1996–2005 2 2 5.7 17.2 73.2 100 4.8

Top 1% 1987–1996 2.1 0.9 2.5 4.7 89.9 100 46

1996–2005 2.7 1 1.5 4.5 90.3 100 44.7

All Income 1987–1996 11.3 16.5 20.1 24.1 28 100 1.5

1996–2005 11.7 14.7 19.1 24.4 30 100 1.3

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Summary 347

often inherit your parents’ values, work ethic, and social standing and that translates into higher income.2 This in- tergenerational income relationship has been estimated by economists for a variety of countries using a variety of methodologies. Canadian economist Miles Corak summarized the results that are displayed in Table 31.3. Higher numbers suggest a stronger relationship between parental and child income. This analysis shows that the U.S. claim to be “the land of opportunity” isn’t backed up by the data, at least not recently.

TABLE 31.3 Cross-country intergenerational income elasticities. Source: Miles Corak, “Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross- Country Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility,” http://ftp.iza.org/dp1993.pdf

Country Elasticity

Denmark 0.15 Norway 0.17 Finland 0.18 Canada 0.19 Sweden 0.27 Germany 0.32 France 0.41 United States 0.47 United Kingdom 0.50

2For instance, my fraternal grandfather earned a law degree; my father, brother, and sister (as well as I) earned PhDs; and my daughter is in a PhD program. That is highly unlikely to be random.

Summary The United States has significant income and wealth inequality. Part of the increase in income inequality is explained by measurement issues. The systemic increase in income inequality is explainable demographic factors and factors relating to tax policy. Inequality has benefits

in that a higher income is a market reward for higher productivity while it has costs related to social discord. Social discord is a more likely outcome when income mobility is low or decreasing, and in the present-day United States, both are the case.

Quiz Yourself 1. Income inequality, when measured as the percent-

age of total income going to the top 1 percent, in- creased most rapidly during the a. 1950s. b. 1960s. c. 1980s and 1990s. d. 2000s.

2. Income inequality as conventionally measured is ____ when you ignore the fact that a higher percent- age of the population is filing tax forms. a. overstated b. understated c. properly stated

3. Income inequality as conventionally measured is ____ when you ignore the decreases in the capital gains tax rate. a. overstated b. understated c. properly stated

4. Wealth inequality is _____ related to the ratio of mean to median wealth. a. positively b. negatively c. not

5. Which of the following had the effect of decreasing income inequality? a. The increase in the female labor force participa-

tion rate b. The increase in globalization of capital c. The increase in globalization of trade in steel,

autos, and consumer durables d. The increase in robotic production

6. Which of the following had the effect of increasing income inequality? a. The increase in the female labor force participa-

tion rate b. The decrease in globalization of capital c. The increase in globalization of trade in steel,

autos, and consumer durables d. The decrease in robotic production

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348 Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What’s Fair?

Fact 2: Our “liberal” political party, the Democrats, are frequently more conservative than the members of European conservative political parties.

Question: Which is the cause and which is the effect?

Think about This Are the poor adults with whom you are familiar poor because of things they did (got pregnant at an early age, committed a crime that prevented them from a getting a good job), things they failed to do (finish their education, work hard), things that happened to them (they were the victim of an accident, or were left with children to attend to), or is the system rigged against poor people? What policy would you suggest to a national leader to

increase income mobility?

Behind the Numbers Income—www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual

-Income-Tax-Returns Wealth—www.census.gov/people/wealth/data/dtables

html; www.census.gov/people/wealth Income mobility—www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds

/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf International statistics on intergenerational income

mobility. Corak, Miles, “Do Poor Children Become Poor

Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country Com- parison of Generational Earnings Mobility,” ftp.iza.org/dp1993.pdf.

7. The benefits of income inequality are a. always greater than the costs. b. always less than the costs. c. associated with rewarding hard work and work

that society values. d. associated with the social discord that it creates.

8. Social discord resulting from income inequality can be lessened if there is (are) a. high levels of intergenerational income

mobility. b. high levels of income mobility of individuals. c. belief that the economic system is rigged in

favor of the rich. d. a and b

9. The notion that the United States is the “land of opportunity” where who your parents are and how much they earn is unrelated to your income is (rela- tive to other industrial powers) a. clearly shown in the data to be accurate. b. clearly shown in the data to be inaccurate. c. not supported, but there aren’t data to support

the conclusion that it isn’t true either.

Talk about This Suppose you were rich. How would you structure your tax and welfare systems to make sure you could stay rich? Would you try to rig the system in your favor or could that be self-defeating? Fact 1: Americans tolerate a level of income inequality

that is higher than it is in much of the rest of the world.

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - T W O

349

Farm Policy Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Conclude that economists generally are not in favor of price supports in agriculture.

LO2 Conclude that price variation is the leading economic justifi- cation for farm price supports, while also concluding that this is insufficient justification for most economists.

LO3 Apply supply and demand and consumer and producer surplus analysis to demonstrate economists’ reasoning in opposing farm price supports.

LO4 Describe and illustrate the mechanisms that are typically used to enforce price supports and know some of their history.

Chapter Outline

Farm Prices Since 1950

Price Variation as a Justification for Government Intervention

Consumer and Producer Surplus Analysis of Price Floors

Price Support Mechanisms and Their History

Is There a Bubble on the Farm?

Kick It Up a Notch

Summary

Farm policy in the United States has been schizophrenic. Sometimes farmers are depicted as strong, independent men and women who simply need the government to stay out of their way. At other times they are depicted as desperate victims in need of help. In political speeches, family farms are spoken of with the same reverence as motherhood and apple pie, and to hear politicians talk, you would think farmers were demigods.

It is ironic, then, that without almost continuous government grants and low-interest loans, many farm- ers would have declared bankruptcy long ago. Help for farmers has come from government in many forms. The government has bought and stored excess production, bought and given away excess production, bought live- stock to prevent oversupply, and paid farmers not to farm.

We look here at the history of farm prices since 1950, and we draw on that history to discuss why government has intervened and will probably continue to feel moti- vated to intervene in agriculture. We use our basic sup- ply and demand model and our consumer and producer surplus knowledge to discuss the impact of farm price

supports. In that discussion, as we said, we review the history of farm price supports and the various ways that farmers have received assistance.

Farm Prices Since 1950

A look at Figure 32.1 quickly tells you that farm prices are anything but stable. While beef, hogs, milk, corn, and soybeans are sold in different units, by displaying prices relative to where they were in 1982, we can show all of them on one graph. A number higher than 100 in- dicates a price in a selected year for that commodity that exceeds its 1982 level. A number below 100 indicates the opposite.

Whereas the prices of all the products shown in Figure 32.1 were higher in 2013 than they were in 1950, it was not that long ago that several were lower than they were in 1982. Since, according to the CPI, overall inflation was 137 percent from 1982 to 2015, farmers who produced the same crops in the same amounts and

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350 Chapter 32 Farm Policy

rise. Corn and soybean meal are frequently used as ani- mal feed, thus the relationship between corn, soybeans, and beef and hog prices. Also in Chapter 2 and the no- tion of “alternative outputs,” recall that when two can be easily produced from the same inputs, the two prices will almost always mirror one another. If you have ever traveled from Ohio through Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, or Missouri, the farms along the highway are almost always planted in corn and soybeans. An increase in the demand for one will cause a decrease in the supply of the other. Farmers will plant whatever makes them the most profit, and as a result the prices will move in tandem. What oc- curred in 2007 and 2008 was a spike in the demand for corn owing to its potential use in corn-based ethanol.

Corn and Gasoline Let’s examine that corn–gasoline relationship in greater detail. What had once been a nonexistent relationship began to emerge in 2004 as subsidies and mandates for alternative fuels for cars and trucks became part of the U.S. energy landscape. Corn-based ethanol was a major part of President Bush’s energy strategy and played a role in President Obama’s energy strategy. Flex-fuel vehicles are an increasing portion of the rolling stock on Ameri- can roads, and as a result the overall demand for corn has risen. In addition, ethanol is now an increasing portion of the total fuel demand, so much so that 38 percent of the corn grown is now used for that purpose. As can be seen

with the same costs would have experienced a 58 percent (100/237) loss in real income if they were only able to get the same price they received in 1982. Hog prices in particular took a beating between 1998 and 2000, yield- ing at times less than 45 percent of their 1982 levels. Any farmers who had not gotten more productive by this time would have seen a standard of living only 33 percent of their 1982 level. Until quite recently, prices for most farm commodities have risen far more slowly than overall con- sumer prices. Since 2007, farm prices have seen a signif- icant increase, and two of them, corn and soybeans, saw such a spike between 2010 and 2013 that their overall increase since 1982 exceeded that of the CPI.

If you look carefully at Figure 32.1, you will see that there was a sharp jump in all of these commodity prices in the early 1970s and again in 2008, and then again between 2010 and 2013. Corn, soybean, and hog prices doubled in the four years from 1972 to 1975. Before 1975, corn, soybean, and milk prices had been the most stable, but since 1976, corn has joined beef as a commodity whose price is not stable.1 In 2007 and 2008 most farm commodities doubled or even tripled in price. By far the greatest increase was seen in corn and soybeans. Going back to Chapter 2, you will remember that when one good is an input into another, an increase in that input price will drive the price of the output to

FIGURE 32.1 Farm prices relative to their 1982 levels.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/ppi

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1 We are defining stability here as the ratio of the standard deviation of real prices to their mean.

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Price Variation as a Justification for Government Intervention 351

in Figure 32.2, prior to 2004 there was almost no relation- ship between the two prices, but between late 2004 and early 2009 the price per bushel of corn more than tripled in reaction to the tripling of gasoline prices. Going back to our Chapter 2 discussion of demand and supply deter- minants, ethanol is a substitute for gasoline and corn is an input to ethanol. A steadily high gasoline price would be expected to, and in fact did, lead to an increase in corn demand and corn prices.

Had gasoline prices remained at their summer 2008 highs, corn probably would have as well. When the de- mand for gasoline fell dramatically with the declining economy, the price of corn fell dramatically as well. By the end of 2008 the price of corn was about half of its mid-2008 high. The prices once again mirrored each other in the rise through late 2010 and into 2014.

Because ethanol is only a viable substitute for gaso- line when gasoline prices are high, with the dramatic drop in gasoline prices that occurred from 2015 and into 2016, the link between corn and gasoline prices was largely severed.

Price Variation as a Justification for Government Intervention

Economists agree on few things, but one area where there is wide agreement is on the inadvisability of gov- ernment intervention in agriculture. As a result, appeals for intervention tend to be based on sentiment rather than analysis. Although such sentimental appeals have not

persuaded many economists, they have swayed politi- cians. The family farm is so revered in America, even by people who have never lived on or even near one, that economists have had little success forestalling farm bail- outs. That said, there are reasons for government inter- vention in agriculture that a few academic economists, particularly agricultural economists, accept.

The Case for Price Supports The most compelling of the reasons for government in- tervention in this market is that price variability makes farming a necessarily economically risky occupation. Supporters think that farmers whose farms are small need some government action to survive the aforemen- tioned variability. The government’s assistance in this might take the form of buying and storing excess crops when prices are too low and selling them out of inventory when prices rebound. This would do nothing to change the long-term price of crops, but it would stabilize prices. When the government does this for farmers, it acts as it does when it controls the value of its own currency.

There are two sources of price instability for any good: supply uncertainty and demand uncertainty. Sources of supply uncertainty are obvious: the weather and other natural phenomena like diseases and insect damage. The source of demand variability is mostly the unpredictabil- ity of international markets and whether there is demand for American crops by other countries.

The weather and other aspects of nature determine whether crops will do well, and there is not a great deal

FIGURE 32.2 Relative prices of gas and corn.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/ppi

0 50

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352 Chapter 32 Farm Policy

without government help. If farmers do not buy options or crop insurance, it is because they cost money. Even when things go well, profit margins on farms are low enough that some farmers believe they cannot afford insurance.

Consumer and Producer Surplus Analysis of Price Floors

One Floor in One Market All of the many forms of support that government can give to farmers can be modeled with our supply and de- mand model, and we can discuss their implications using the consumer and producer surplus language that was in- troduced in Chapter 3. This section quickly reviews that language and uses Figure 32.3 to look at the impact of farm price supports on the economy.

Chapter 3 told us that consumer surplus is the differ- ence between how much consumers value a good and the price they have to pay for it. It also told us that producer surplus is the difference between the amount producers get from consumers and the variable cost of production. The demand curve represents what consumers are will- ing to pay for a good, and we interpret that as how much they value the good. In Chapter 5, we saw that the supply curve in a perfectly competitive market is made up of the marginal cost curves of the many entities that comprise the market. The area under the supply curve thus repre- sents the variable costs of production.

farmers can control once the planting is done. They can plant different varieties of corn and soybeans based on the lateness of the planting season, but once the seeds are sown, most of the economic decisions are made. Grain farmers, for example, are powerless to do anything if market conditions change after planting. At harvesttime they will reap what they sowed—no more, no less.

On the demand side, variability comes from the quan- tities of goods foreigners will buy. In part this is supply- side variability in other nations. For instance, if the weather is bad in the other major exporting countries of Argentina, Australia, Canada, and Russia, then demand will be high in the importing countries for American grain. The United States is the largest source in grain exports to the world, but prices in the United States are usually somewhat higher than in other countries. For this reason, food importers buy all they can from these other countries; then they buy the rest of what they need from the United States. If the weather in these other export- ing countries is bad, then importing countries will need great quantities of U.S. grain. If their weather is good, importing countries will not need much U.S. grain. With the weather and other forces of nature as variable as they are, there are few goods whose prices fluctuate as much as basic farm prices.

The Case against Price Supports Though price variability is the most compelling reason for government interference in agriculture, it is not a per- suasive reason for many economists. Option markets for agricultural goods exist and offer many opportunities to ensure that prices at harvesttime are known in advance. Such markets serve as insurance to farmers on prices.

To see how using an option market might work, sup- pose you planted your crop in May and expected it to yield 10,000 bushels. At planting time in May you can buy an option to sell 10,000 bushels at harvesttime for a specific price. If the price at harvesttime is lower than the price specified in the option, you can exercise the option and sell your harvest at the higher contract price. If the price is higher, you do not need the option. This is comparable to buying automobile insurance. You will use it if you have an accident; you will not if you avoid a wreck.

If you fear your crop might fail, you can protect yourself by buying crop insurance. Crop insurance will pay off if crops fail. With these two forms of insurance (options and crop insurance), farmers can deal with the aspects of farming over which they have no control

FIGURE 32.3 Price floors in a supply and demand model.

Pfloor

P*

O QD QSQ*

P

A

B

I

E

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S

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Price Support Mechanisms and Their History 353

Vermont rather than Eau Claire produces the dairy for New York. Thus not only do New Yorkers have to buy milk at high prices, but the fact that they do tends to re- ward less efficient means of production. This is, unfor- tunately, precisely what the Eau Claire Rule does in the United States.

What Would Happen without Price Supports? If there were no price supports, how low could prices go? The first thing to understand is that like everyone else, farmers have options other than farming. If prices go low enough, they will sell out and work somewhere else. In this sense farmers are like any other small businesspersons who must decide when they have had enough. While being your own boss has clear advan- tages, the advantages must also be weighed against risks and the frayed nerves associated with being in charge.

For most farmers, the lack of a boss outweighs the frayed nerves. Even with lower income, they would rather continue farming than work for someone else. On the other hand, there is a price for which the rate of return to farming is just too low. When that point is reached, farmers auction off their assets, pay their debts, and move on. As a result, prices cannot fall below the level where farmers are better off not farming. If they did, the farmers would leave the market, thereby reduc- ing the number of sellers, and that would put upward pressure on the price.

Price Support Mechanisms and Their History

Price Support Mechanisms As we noted in the previous section, there are many ways of enforcing a price support. The reason an enforcement mechanism is required in agriculture and not in other price floor situations is that production happens and most costs are incurred well before sales are made or even ar- ranged. For instance, the minimum wage is a form of price floor. The buyer of labor, the boss, cannot pay the seller of labor, the worker, any less than the minimum wage, just as the buyer of the agricultural product cannot pay the farmer any less than the price floor. The sup- ply and demand analysis in the minimum wage shows that more people want to work than there are jobs avail- able. This is not as much of a problem in normal work- ing situations as it is in farming because, unlike farming,

At equilibrium, P* – Q*, consumers have a consumer surplus of P*AC. Similarly, the producer makes out well, too. The firms net a producer surplus of HP*C. The combined surpluses make up the value to society of the exchange, a value represented as HAC.

If the government sets a price floor of Pfloor, it will have to enforce it somehow. While we will not talk until the

next section about how govern- ment might enforce the floor, assume for the moment that it is possible. Since consumers

will want only QD, this is all that will be sold to consum- ers. The consumer surplus will shrink (to Pfloor AB) while firms’ producer surplus will grow (to HPfloor BG), but the combined surpluses are less than without the floor by GBC. Economists label this deadweight loss. To see why this is the case, turn to “Kick It Up a Notch” at the end of the chapter.

Variable Floors in Multiple Markets Support for farmers and their price supports dates back to the Great Depression, when dairy farmers could not sell their products, and they convinced the government to set minimum prices. The so-called Eau Claire Rule came about at this time. Put in place so that farmers outside Wisconsin could survive and remain in business, the Eau Claire Rule sets the minimum price for milk as a func- tion of a farm’s proximity to this small Wisconsin city. To this day, a dairy farmer in central Wisconsin gets a substantially lower subsidy than a similar farmer in the other dairy capitals of central New York or northern California.

To see the effect of this, consider for illustration that there are three geographically distinct areas. Suppose two of these are rural areas where dairy products are both produced and consumed and the third area is a city where these products are consumed but not produced. Suppose one rural area—call it Eau Claire—has a pro- duction advantage over the other—call it Vermont—and this advantage overwhelms the fact that a consum- ing city, say New York, is closer to Vermont than Eau Claire. In such a circumstance Vermont dairy farmers would sell only to those living in Vermont, and Eau Claire farmers would sell to those in New York as well as Eau Claire. This is the economically efficient scenario.

If, on the other hand, there is a rule that says that the lowest price that can be charged in New York is higher than the market equilibrium, it might be high enough that

price floor Price below which a commodity may not sell.

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354 Chapter 32 Farm Policy

that did not prevent others from becoming farmers. It did not prevent remaining farmers from increasing their herds, and it did not prevent others from increasing the productivity of their cows, using artificial hormones. Grain farmers also experienced this form of price sup- port. Many were paid to have idle fields, fields that could be used for hay but not for cash grains like wheat, soybeans, or corn. In general, the government subsi- dies have had the effect of persuading significant num- bers of farmers either to do something else or to limit production.

An expensive option for the government has been to let farmers grow all they want and either pay them the difference between the market price and the price floor or simply buy up whatever was not purchased by consumers. Figure 32.3 shows that it is very expensive for the government to choose either of these options. If it chooses the former, it will have to pay farmers the difference between Pfloor and the price that QS will sell for on the open market, shown in Figure 32.3 as J, for all QS. This totals JPfloorEF. If the government chooses the latter option, it will have to buy the dif- ference between QS and QD for the Pfloor, price. That totals QDBEQS.

If it buys up what is left by consumers, the govern- ment still has to figure out what to do with the excess. There are three options here: let it spoil, give it away, or store it. The first does not cost anything more than trucking the surplus to a place where it can be dumped. Giving the excess away sounds more appealing, but if you give people something that they would have ordi- narily paid for, you still are not solving the agriculture price problem. You are reducing demand even further by the amount you are giving away. You can only give the good to people who are so poor they would have gone without, and you are most likely to find such peo- ple in the developing world. It may sound somewhat cynical, but the government of the United States is a leading contributor of foodstuffs to victims of starva- tion and natural disaster in the developing world in part because the United States has an excess that it needs to dispose of.

Even though the most expensive option for the government is to store the excess, it has, at various times, stored milk and grains. Milk has been stored either as a powder or in the form of block American cheese. While both can be stored at near room tem- perature, a cool, dry  environment is more conducive

the workers are not working and then looking to see if the boss will pay them. They are hired and then they do the work. Farmers, on the other hand, grow and harvest their crops before they have a known buyer. Raising the price that farmers get to Pfloor will not do farmers any good if many of them end up having truckloads of grain to sell and no one willing to buy them. They will have incurred all of the costs of working, but they will not derive any revenue from their work.

For this reason, the government has to enforce the price floor in a manner that makes sure either that only QD is produced or that QS is wanted. There are several ways that this can be done. The government can limit what farmers produce by allocating rights to sell among farmers. With rights to sell, farmers can sell only what their rights allow. The government can pay farmers to participate by allowing anyone to sell at P* while allowing only those who agreed to limit production to sell at Pfloor. The government can then buy all that farmers want to produce. At its discretion it can then give the good away to foreign or domestic recipients that could not afford to buy it at Pfloor, or the government can buy and store all that farmers want to produce at Pfloor.

The government’s least expensive option to keep prices high, however, is to limit the amount that a farmer can produce. It can do this by allowing only licensed farmers to produce specific quantities. Peanuts and chewing-grade tobacco are two crops that are produced under licensing. You cannot grow and sell these products unless you have a license. If you examine Figure  32.3 again, you will see that by limiting the number of farm- ers and the amount of acreage that can be devoted to this production, the Pfloor price can be maintained and farmers will produce only QD.

The government’s next least expensive option is to pay farmers not to produce as much as they might oth- erwise choose to. In the past the government paid farm- ers not to plant in certain fields, and it even paid them not to farm altogether. Moreover, to affect the price of milk, the government bought dairy herds and sent them off to slaughter. The government, of course, keeps pro- duction down when it pays farmers not to produce. The effectiveness of this method is lessened, however, by increases in productivity and by new people becom- ing farmers. In the case of milk, farmers who had their herds bought were not allowed to get back into dairy farming for several years, even if they wanted to, but

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Is There a Bubble on the Farm? 355

to long-term storage. Abandoned salt mines have served that purpose well.

Storing grain is somewhat easier. It does not require any processing, the way milk does, but it is still subject to rotting if it gets wet. However it is stored, storing food is very expensive.

History of Price Supports At various times the United States has employed every imaginable way of supporting agriculture prices. At one time it could have idled all grain farms in the United States for a year and still had enough in storage to pro- cess into food and to feed livestock. In the middle of the 1982 recession, there was enough excess dairy in storage that the government gave every poor person who showed up for it several pounds of cheese and several boxes of powdered milk. In the middle 1980s, thousands of dairy farmers around the country went into early re- tirement when the government paid top dollar to buy up their herds.

As we said before, the support for agricultural price supports grew out of the depression of the 1930s. Agri- cultural prices fell so far so fast that farm bankruptcies skyrocketed. Politicians reacted by putting price floors on a number of agricultural products, most notably dairy. In the middle 1980s, the Reagan administration tried to lessen the cost of agriculture subsidies by limit- ing supply, rather than serving as a buyer of last resort. First it sold off and gave away much of the govern- ment’s excess stocks of grain and dairy products. Then it offered farmers payments not to farm. The ultimate act in this regard was the middle 1980s policy to thin dairy herds. This led to nearly a 10 percent reduction in farmland under active cultivation since 1988. While we proceed down a path of restricting output rather than buying up excess, many thousands of farmers still are paid many billions of dollars not to farm many millions of acres.

The 1996 Freedom to Farm Act began yet another long phase of practices leading away from agricultural price supports. By 2002 the United States was supposed to exist without supports for milk or grain, but alas, sup- port continued with the federal government spending $19  billion in 2009. Supports totaled $13.4 billion in 2013 and are projected to climb to $17.7 billion in 2021. Farming is still considered as sacrosanct as motherhood and apple pie, so if Mom or the pie gets in trouble, politi- cians will always be strongly tempted to help them out.

Is There a Bubble on the Farm?

The housing bubble of the 2000s was the result of a more than doubling of home prices between 2000 and 2006. When it burst, many people looked around and wondered why few had recognized the danger. Beginning in 2011, ag- ricultural economists were expressing concern that a bubble was forming in agricultural land values. Figure 32.4 shows why. As corn and soybean prices rose, agricultural land val- ues rose along with them. The obvious reason for this is that the value of the land is directly related to the profit that can be made by growing crops on that land. Higher crop prices lead to higher farm profits, which leads to increased de- mand for farmland, which leads to higher farmland prices.

That chain of events is factual and reasonable. The real or imagined bubble problem comes when either of the fol- lowing is true: the prices for the crops are artificially high or the interest rates on the farm loans are artificially low. It is difficult to argue from Figure 32.1 that crop prices are artificially high as only corn and soybean prices are above their inflation-adjusted levels from the 1980s. It is easy to argue, using Figure 10.5, that interest rates from 2003 to 2006 and from 2009 to 2013 were artificially low. With Federal Reserve policy pushing interest rates low during these periods, one outcome has been inflated farmland prices. When the quantitative easing policy ends, it is likely that the run-up in farm prices will also end. Whether that results in a collapse in farmland prices (akin to the early 1980s collapse that resulted in hundreds of thousands of farm foreclosures), only time will tell.

FIGURE 32.4 Agricultural land values.

Source: USDA Agricultural Research Services

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356 Chapter 32 Farm Policy

Kick It Up a Notch

Referring back to Figure 32.3, at equilibrium, P* – Q*, consumers pay the producers OP*CQ*, but they value what they get at OACQ*. This means they have a consumer surplus of P*AC. Similarly, the producer makes out well, too. The producer receives the OP*CQ* in revenue and the variable costs are only OHCQ*. This nets the producer sur- plus of HP*C. The combined surpluses make up the value to society of the exchange, a value represented as HAC.

If the government sets a price floor of Pfloor, consum- ers will want only QD. They will pay the OPfloorBQD to producers. Consumers will value this at OABQD and will net a consumer surplus of PfloorAB. It will cost producers OHGQD, so their producer surplus will be HPfloorBG. The combined surpluses are HABG. The deadweight loss is the difference between the combined surpluses with and without the floor, GBC.

Summary Now that you have plowed your way through this chap- ter, you understand why economists generally are not in favor of price supports in agriculture. You understand that though price variation is real, there are mechanisms that farmers can use to compensate for that without

government intervention. You are now able to employ consumer and producer surplus analysis to demonstrate the inefficiency caused by price floors. Last, you under- stand how price floors work in practice, and you have an appreciation for their history.

1. The economic rationale for farm price supports is generally a. weak, but relies on price variability. b. weak, but relies on the unavailability of crop

insurance. c. strong, and relies on the fact that prices are too

high. d. strong, and relies on the importance of Iowa in

presidential elections. 2. Price supports in the United States have

a. always relied on the government paying farmers to set aside land.

b. always relied on the government buying excess crops.

c. always relied on forbidding production above certain levels.

d. utilized a wide variety of means to raise prices and reduce output.

Quiz Yourself

Key Term

price floor

3. Farm price supports are typically for a. basic commodities like raw milk and grain. b. fruits and vegetables. c. refined products like flour. d. manufactured products like breakfast cereals.

4. A price support mechanism a. can only regulate supply. b. can only regulate demand. c. must involve government purchases. d. can involve government manipulation of the

supply or demand of the good. 5. In Figure 32.3, maintaining Pfloor as the target mini-

mum price (rather than equilibrium) would a. raise consumer surplus more than it would

decrease producer surplus. b. raise producer surplus more than it would

decrease consumer surplus.

gue46399_ch32_349-357.indd 356 16/03/17 12:57 PM

Summary 357

c. involve creating deadweight loss. d. enhance the welfare of consumers and

producers. 6. Looking at Figure 32.3, maintaining Pfloor as the

target minimum price (rather than equilibrium) by having the government purchase how much of the product farmers wished to produce would cost the government _____________ dollars. a. OP*CQ* b. QDBEQS c. OPfloorBQD d. BCG dollars

Short Answer Questions 1. Given what you know about the relationship be-

tween corn and beef and corn and soybeans and corn and gasoline, an increase in the price of corn (due to a new insect that eats the roots out of corn) would have what impact on soybeans, beef, and gasoline?

2. If the price floor for corn is $3 per bushel and it is raised to $4 per bushel, what is the impact of that policy if the market price of corn is $6.50 per bushel?

3. During the 1980s many considered urban sprawl to be a serious problem for farmland. What would the mechanism be for “farm sprawl” reversing that?

Think about This How much does it matter from the perspective of market form (monopoly, oligopoly, perfect competition) if there are 100, 1,000 or 1,000,000 farms producing raw grain?

Talk about This Farm price supports are intended to help “the fam- ily farmer” but in reality often help multimillion-dollar farms. When Congress limited the size of the check that any particular farm could receive, farmers divided their farms into separate entities with different family members owning different farms so that they could continue to col- lect money. The “family farmer,” defined as a simple farm with one house and the occupants of that house working the land, no longer produces a significant portion of the raw grain, cattle, or milk in the United States. Is the fam- ily farm more of a social myth than an actual entity?

For More Insight See Gardner, Bruce L., “Changing Economic Perspectives

on the Farm Problem,” Journal of Economic Litera- ture 30, no. 1 (March 1992), pp. 62–101.

Behind the Numbers Farm product prices.

Bureau of Labor Statistics; Producer price index— www.bls.gov/ppi

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - T H R E E

358

Minimum Wage Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply supply and demand to a labor market.

LO2 Define and describe the purpose of a minimum wage.

LO3 Conclude that the minimum wage must be higher than the equilibrium wage in order to be relevant.

LO4 Apply consumer and producer surplus to identify real-world winners and losers of a minimum-wage increase.

LO5 Apply the concept of elasticity to the question of whether a minimum-wage increase would increase unemployment.

LO6 Describe the Earned Income Tax Credit as an alternative to a minimum wage.

Chapter Outline

Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum Wage

Rebuttals to the Traditional Analysis

Where Are Economists Now?

Kick It Up a Notch

Summary

The minimum wage is the lowest wage that may legally be paid for an hour’s work, subject to government restrictions. In 1938 the first minimum wage was set at 25  cents per hour, and the amount has been increased periodically over

the years. As of June 2016, the federal minimum wage was $7.25.

The minimum wage has tradi- tionally been justified as a mech- anism to ensure a living wage, that is, a wage sufficient to keep a family out of  poverty. As you can see in Fig ure 33.1, the mini-

mum wage was always sufficient to keep an individual above the poverty line. It has been less successful for fam- ilies. Since 1985 the minimum wage has been insufficient to maintain a one-earner, minimum-wage family (consti- tuting more than an individual) above the poverty line. For instance, to accomplish the feat of keeping a family of four above the poverty line, the minimum wage for a single full-time earner would have to be $11.65 an hour.

Figure 33.2 indicates that although the minimum wage itself has been increased several times over the last

78 years, its real value, that is, the value adjusted for infla- tion in 1999 dollars, rose for the first 30 years of its exis- tence and has steadily fallen since. Since 1950, the lowest it has been in inflation-adjusted dollars was its early 2007 level. It reached its highest inflation-adjusted level in 1968 at $11 per hour (2016 dollars).1 With solid majorities gained in the 2006 mid-term elections, Democrats pushed through a significant increase in the minimum wage. What had been $5.15 an hour in 2007 became $7.25 per hour in 2009. Even with that significant increase, in terms of its inflation-adjusted level, the minimum wage in 2009 was at its long-term historical average. With Republicans retaking the House of Representatives in 2010, there has been no increase since the last step increase in 2009.

Over time, economists have tended to argue against the minimum wage. In this chapter we explain those arguments along with the reasons why, until recently, most economists thought raising the minimum wage was

minimum wage The lowest wage that may legally be paid for an hour’s work.

living wage A wage sufficient to keep a family out of poverty.

1The poverty line used here is the official poverty line, with which there are many problems. Review the chapter “Poverty and Welfare,” to understand this issue.

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Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum Wage 359

to work more at higher pay, implying an upward-sloping supply curve; demand is made up of bosses seeking to hire that labor. The employers are assumed to want fewer laborers at higher wages, implying a downward-sloping demand curve. Without a law that sets its actual dollar amount, the wage would be set in this market at the point where the supply and demand curves meet. At this point there would be no shortage and no surplus. The wage would be W* and there would be L* work. Being a market clearing equilibrium, this is a wage at which no one who wants a job at that wage is without one, and no employers who want workers at that wage are unable to get them.

In this situation workers would be paid a total of OW*CL* dollars. When we addressed the notion of consumer and producer surplus in Chapter 3, we stated that the consumer surplus is the area under

wrongheaded. We also look at the arguments that suggest it may have been economists who were wrongheaded.

Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum Wage

Labor Markets and Consumer and Producer Surplus Most economists have had few good things to say about the idea of establishing a minimum wage, and they have based that opinion on a traditional supply and demand analysis of the issue. Figure 33.3 represents a market for low-skill minimum-wage labor. The good being sold in this market is labor, and the price at which it is sold is the wage. The supply is made up of workers who will want

FIGURE 33.1 The ratio of the earnings of a full-time minimum-wage worker to the poverty line for various family sizes.

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld; United States Department of Labor, www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm

0.4 0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

1 9 5 9

1 9 6 1

1 9 6 3

19 65

19 67

1 9 6 9

1 9 7 1

1 9 7 3

19 75

1 9 7 7

1 9 7 9

1 9 8 1

1 9 8 3

19 85

19 87

1 9 8 9

1 9 9 1

1 9 9 3

19 95

19 97

1 9 9 9

20 01

20 03

20 05

20 09

2 0 1 1

20 13

20 07

Year

M in

im u

m w

ag e

/ p

o ve

rt y

lin e

One Two Three Four

FIGURE 33.2 The nominal and real minimum wage, 1938–2016, in 1999 dollars.

Source: United States Department of Labor, www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages/minimumwage.htm

0

2

4

6

8

19 38

1 9 4 1

19 44

19 47

19 50

1 9 5 3

19 56

19 59

19 62

19 65

19 68

1 9 7 1

1 9 7 4

19 77

19 80

19 83

19 86

1 9 8 9

19 92

19 95

19 98

20 01

20 04

20 07

20 10

20 13

Year

W ag

e ($

)

RealNominal

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360 Chapter 33 Minimum Wage

the demand curve but above the price line, while the producer surplus is the area under the price line and above the supply curve. Of course, in this case the price is the wage.

The key difference here is that businesses are getting the consumer surplus W*AC, because it is they who are buying the good, that is, hiring the labor. We interpret consumer surplus here as the money that businesses make from the work of their employees that exceeds the amount they have to pay workers.

The producer surplus BW*C is also different in that it is what workers get, since it is they who are doing the selling. The interpretation here is that it represents the amount of money that workers get in excess of what they would have worked for. So, just as in any other market, the consumer gets something and the producer gets something.

A Relevant versus an Irrelevant Minimum Wage If a minimum wage is set below W*, would businesses pay the minimum wage rather than the higher W*? Surpris- ingly, the answer is no, they would not: To get workers in the numbers that are most profitable to the business, employers have to pay the higher W*. They would rather pay more than the minimum because, even though their labor costs then rise at a higher rate, the output of the extra

FIGURE 33.3 Labor market.

Labor

Wage

L*

W *

O

B

A

C

S

D

Because the federal minimum wage remained constant for nearly a decade, states and cities began to take the initiative to impose a higher minimum wage within their jurisdictions. As of June 2016, the 29 states (listed below) and several cities have minimum-wage laws that are higher than the federally mandated minimum wage. More- over, in an effort to prevent the inflationary erosion of their state minimum wage, 10 states (noted in bold) index their minimum wage to some measure of inflation.

AK–$9.75; AR–$8.00; AZ–$8.05; CA–$10.00; CO–$8.31; CT– $9.60; DC–$10.50; DE–$8.25; FL–$8.05; HI–$8.50; IL–$8.25; MA– $10.00; MD–$8.25; ME–$7.50; MI–$8.50; MN–$9.00; MO–$7.65; MT–$8.05; NE–$9.00; NJ–$8.38; NM–$7.50; NY–$9.00; NV– $8.25; OH–$8.10; OR–$9.25; RI–$9.60; SD–$8.55; VT–$9.60; WA–$9.47; WV–$8.75.

Throughout 2016 several cities (New York, Seattle, Pittsburgh, Greensboro, Seattle) and two states (California and Massachusetts) adopted $15 minimum-wage laws. Most of those laws will phase in that higher rate over a few years. Many economists, even those for whom increases in the minimum wage are considered wise, are con- cerned. That concern is centered on the observation that an increase to $15 per hour is not, what they call, “modest.” When increases in the

minimum wage are modest compared to the existing wage, there is far less motivation for business owners to make expensive adjustments to their production processes. However, when the increases are very large and when those increases come with built-in adjustments for future inflation, the motivation is not only high but sustained.

The owner of a prototypical fast-food outlet facing an immodest increase in the minimum wage must respond. That is because, as the National Restaurant Association reports, the profit margin at a typical restaurant is frequently smaller than the projected increased wage bill. It is not a matter of reduced profits to business owners going instead to their workers; it is a matter of those businesses closing. As a result, owners must increase prices or reduce labor. To reduce labor, they must come up with labor-reducing capital substitutions. An example of this type of substitution from the past is the moving of soft drink dispensing to the consumer side of the counter. Likely innovations in the future will replace order takers with automated ordering kiosks in much the same way as self-scan machines have replaced checkers at many large grocery stores. It is not entirely out of the realm of possibilities that Domino’s and Papa John’s will be among the first large-scale buyers of driverless cars. Very high mini- mum wages will surely produce job-saving innovations that will just as surely undercut the purpose of those increased wages.

C I T I E S , S T A T E S , A N D $ 1 5 P E R H O U R

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Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum Wage 361

workers will generate enough additional revenue to pay workers and to produce an increased profit as well. In ad- dition, it is in their best interests to pay W*, because other- wise their competitors will outbid them for labor. Thus any minimum wage set below W* is irrelevant, because firms make more profit offering W* rather than a lesser amount.

If you are not yet convinced that setting a minimum wage may be irrelevant, consider what would happen if your professors told you that you would fail if you showed up in class naked. Unless you had planned to do this any- way, an unlikely event since you would be kicked out of school, the rule would not affect your behavior in the least. Any rule that tells you that you cannot do something that you had no intention of doing anyway is not much of a rule. It does not alter your behavior, and it is therefore ir- relevant. For the minimum wage to be relevant, it has to be an amount that is set above the equilibrium wage.

What Is Wrong with a Minimum Wage? As seen in Figure 33.4, a minimum wage that has been set above the equilibrium wage has several effects. First, it raises the wage from W* to Wmin. Second, it reduces the amount of labor sold from L* to Lmin. Third, as long as the money gained from raising the wage to workers is greater than the money lost as a result of having fewer people working, workers in general have more money than they had before. From your earlier study of the concept of elasticity, you will recognize the condition for this is that the demand for labor has to be inelastic.

Finally, the imposition of a minimum wage will raise the unemployment rate for workers in this market. This will happen because either more workers will want to work or existing workers will want to work more hours. With a minimum wage set above the equilibrium wage, workers want to provide Ls labor, whereas they used to want to work only L*. Further complicating this is that employ- ers now want to hire labor only up to Lmin rather than the L* they had wanted previously.

In the end, the consumer surplus shrinks to WminAE and producer surplus grows. The sum of the consumer and producer surpluses is less than it was without the minimum wage, by the triangle FEC.

What this all leads to is that under this economic anal- ysis of the minimum wage, there are winners and losers. The winners are those workers who get a wage increase and who are still able to continue working as much as they want. The losers are men and women who used to be work- ing and who are now unemployed (L* – Lmin). The impor- tant part of this analysis is that what is gained by workers is less than what employers lose. We are thus confronted with what economists label deadweight loss, the net loss to society by the area FEC. To see this precisely, go to “Kick It Up a Notch” located at the end of the chapter.

Real-World Implications of the Minimum Wage Though rather elegant as a mechanism to analyze the im- pacts of a minimum wage, consumer and producer sur- plus analysis does not put it in terms easy for the average person to see. The winners are the more than 4 million people who work for the minimum wage and get a pay increase because they keep their jobs.

The losers are the people who lose their jobs. Re- search on the subject has led economists to use the rule of thumb that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage results in a 1 percent to 3 percent drop in the number of jobs held by teens. That translates to a loss of 360,000 to 1,050,000 jobs lost by teens as a result of the increase in the minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 an hour.2 Economists who study those unlucky teens find that they are disproportionately black, Hispanic, and uneducated. That is, they are among the very people that an increase is trying to help. This point must not be missed. An in- crease in the minimum wage may very well hurt the poor more than it helps them.

FIGURE 33.4 Minimum wage.

Wage

LaborL*

W*

O

B

A

C

E

G

F

S

D

Wmin

Lmin Ls

2This assumes that at $5.15, the minimum wage was above equilibrium. The evidence is that the equilibrium wage was higher than $5.15 for much of 2004 and beyond, making $5.15 an irrelevant minimum wage.

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362 Chapter 33 Minimum Wage

Other losers include small business owners who have to pay the higher wage with perhaps a very small profit margin to do so. Small independent restaurateurs are es- pecially hard hit because the industry is such that many such new entrepreneurs constantly teeter on the edge of bankruptcy and can afford to pay only minimum wage. That means that an increase in the minimum wage may destroy not only the jobs these entrepreneurs are creating but also the entrepreneurs themselves.

Finally, the losers include anyone who buys goods or services produced by minimum-wage workers, because part of the increase is passed on to them in the form of higher prices.

Alternatives to the Minimum Wage It is for all of these reasons and more that until recently most economists could not endorse increases in the mini- mum wage. Those who took the position that the mini- mum wage was an inappropriate cure for the problems of poorly paid workers highlighted the fact that most work- ers who made the minimum wage were under 24. Nearly a third of these were under 19 and therefore very unlikely to be supporting a family. Combine this with the fact that many of those who earn the minimum wage and are over age 24 are spouses who work only to supplement the in- come of the family’s primary income producer and are nowhere near poverty.

In the eyes of many economists a better alternative is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Low-income working families with three or more children are eligible for up to $6,269 that arrives in the form of a tax refund. The benefits of the EITC are concentrated on the people who actually need the money to feed their families. More than 70 percent of the money goes to households that are or would otherwise be in poverty. This contrasts dramati- cally with the minimum wage, where upward of 70 per- cent of the benefits accrue to households not in poverty.

The EITC, while born in the 1970s, saw great in- creases starting during the administration of President Ronald Reagan. It was during this administration that the minimum wage saw a long period of real decline in its value. It was President Reagan’s view that the minimum wage was a poor mechanism to help the poor and that the EITC could help working poor families without hurting businesses. While President Clinton’s first budget increased taxes for many, it also greatly increased the EITC. Moreover, though he pushed through an increase in the minimum wage as well, the increased level of the EITC has had a greater effect on the working poor.

Rebuttals to the Traditional Analysis

In contrast to the preceding section, important points of re- buttal to the traditional analysis have gained respectability in recent years among economists. They center on three main lines of argument. Macroeconomic analysis sug- gests, first, that the effect of a decrease in income by owners of businesses is somewhat offset by the effect of an increase in income by the lower-income people. Low- income people spend more and high-income people save more. A second line of argument is that the good in ques- tion, labor, is not as definable as most other goods and that with better pay, workers can be induced to work harder. If they do so, the increase in the wage becomes less of a burden on employers. The remaining argument is that the elasticity of demand for labor may be so low that the traditional analysis needs to reflect this fact. If it does, the negative aspects of the minimum wage will be small.

The Macroeconomics Argument The first argument in rebuttal to the traditional analysis relies on an aspect of macroeconomics that suggests that if you track all of the times a particular amount of money is spent, you can figure up the total impact of new spending. Or, as is appropriate in this case, you can examine the net effect of monies being spent by different people. If, for instance, business owners save most of their profit rather than spend or invest it, then something less than the entire profit of the business works its way through the economy in the form of additional spending. On the other hand, if the business owners have to relinquish more of that profit to workers because of the imposition of a higher minimum wage, then almost all of that money will be spent. Men and women who are paid the minimum wage save very little, and they spend nearly all of their additional income. Be- cause money is spent rather than saved, total consumption in the economy rises. From a macroeconomic standpoint, any negative effects of a minimum-wage increase range from being offset, to being nonexistent, to being positive.

Suppose, for example, that the result of an increase in the minimum wage is to increase the incomes for work- ers by $75 while creating a $100 loss in profit to busi- nesses. Remember that it is not simply a direct transfer; workers’ gains are offset by losses to business that are greater. The $25 difference, the deadweight loss, is the amount of damage to an overall measure of economic activity like the gross domestic product. This gap can be made up if the effect of low-skill workers’ spending is greater than the effect of bosses spending it. If low-skill

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Where Are Economists Now? 363

workers spend all of their increased income, and bosses spend or invest only 80 percent of theirs, the net effect of raising the minimum wage is that the GDP shrinks by $5 rather than $25. This  is because 80 percent of $100 is only $5 more than 100 percent of $75. This is, of course, predicated on the assumption that a higher mini- mum wage has the net effect of increasing the income of minimum-wage workers.

The Work Effort Argument The second argument is probably correct in assuming that people adjust the effort they put in at work depend- ing on how happy they are with their employer. This means that the graphs in Figures 33.3 and 33.4 are not as stable as we previously thought them to be. The good “labor” is not as fixed in its meaning as are most other goods for which we use this supply and demand model. People can work hard or slack off, and there is not a great deal that an employer can do to force slackers to work harder. If higher pay translates into workers who are hap- pier and who do more work per hour, it may be the case that some if not all of the impact of forcing wages to rise will be mitigated. In this way the minimum-wage in- crease may pay for itself. On the other hand, if it did pay for itself, we would have to assume that employers were either ignorant of this fact or not maximizers of profit. Neither of these assumptions sits well with most econo- mists. It is more plausible that such an increase merely lessens the negative impact.

The Elasticity Argument The last argument used to rebut traditional analysis simply tweaks the traditional analysis a little to suggest that the negative impact of an increase in the minimum wage is very small. Any increase can thus be interpreted as sim- ply a transfer of money from business owners to workers. Comparing Figure 33.5 to Figure 33.4, you will find that the only real difference is that the demand curve is steeper, that is, more inelastic, in Figure 33.5. The net amount that workers gain is very great, and the resulting unemploy- ment of those who had jobs before, L* – Lmin, is very low. As we said when we discussed elasticity in Chapter 3, there are two things that will influence elasticity: the num- ber of close substitutes and time to invent them.

Given that in the short run there are very few substi- tutes for having workers on the job, this rebuttal seems, of the three mentioned, the most persuasive to traditional economists. Most economists still believe that the exis- tence of a minimum wage will reduce employment in the

long run. They maintain that the only reason the gain to workers is great and the net loss to society is small is that this is an analysis that works only in the short run.

They argue that in the long run business owners will search until they find substitutes for labor such as easier- to-use machines and self-serve devices. If you look at the fast-food industry and the equipment that it uses, you will find that the companies involved are always look- ing for new ways to reduce the need for employees, and they have had great success in their endeavors. Putting the drink machines in the lobby and using chain ovens or broilers that cook the food for exactly the correct amount of time without needing employee monitoring are just a couple of examples of how employers of minimum-wage workers have substituted capital for labor.

Where Are Economists Now?

If the more recent nontraditional analysis is correct, it is probably because in the short run there is not much deadweight loss to be made up. The combined impact of the macroeconomic effect and the harder worker effect is therefore enough to completely eliminate the problem. The data on whether recent minimum-wage increases have had a net negative impact on unemployment for the 1990 and 1996 increases are mixed. Two influen- tial economists, David Card and Andrew Krueger, pub- lished a study of the minimum wage utilizing data on fast-food employment. They surveyed establishments in two neighboring states in a period where one increased

FIGURE 33.5 The minimum wage in the short run.

Wage

LaborL*

W *

O

B

C

E

G

F

S

D

Wmin

Lmin Ls

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364 Chapter 33 Minimum Wage

its minimum wage and another did not. They found that the increase did not negatively impact, and perhaps posi- tively impacted, employment in the state that raised its minimum wage.

Since this study ran against the conventional wisdom of labor economists, many were quick to try to dupli- cate their results. The attempts to replicate the work of Card and Krueger turned up serious data and methodol- ogy problems with their work. As a result of the newer work casting doubt on the Card and Krueger conclusion, most labor economists have not moved much from their earlier assessment. In particular, many still use the teen

employment rule of thumb mentioned earlier but concede that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage translates to a 1 percent or 3 percent decrease in teen employment. In particular, according to Jeffrey Clemens, it is young workers without a high school degree, those most likely to be working for a minimum wage, who seem to have been hit by the greatest reduction in employment oppor- tunities. The increases in the minimum wage through the midst of the Great Recession reduced their employment by 5.6 percentage points. In any event, economists have expended considerable time rethinking an issue that they thought they had put to bed a long time ago.

Kick It Up a Notch

Referring back to Figure 33.4, we can firmly establish the winners and losers and more rigorously defend the claim that the gain to workers from a minimum wage is less than the loss to firms and unemployed workers. Re- member that the benefit to workers from an increase in the minimum wage is the increase in their producer sur- plus. Without a minimum wage the producer surplus is BW*C, while with the minimum wage it is BWminEF. The

consumer surplus is the benefit to firms hiring the labor. They go from having a consumer surplus of W*AC with- out the minimum wage to a consumer surplus of WminAE with it. The gain to workers is W*WminEG – GFC, while the loss to firms is W*WminEG + GEC. The net effect is the gain to workers minus the loss to firms, which is –FEC. Because the net effect is negative, this is a loss, one that economists call the deadweight loss.

Summary After this exploration of the minimum wage, you understand why it exists in the first place and what its implications are for our supply and demand model for labor. You know how to use our consumer and pro- ducer surplus techniques to identify the winners and

losers of any minimum-wage increase and then apply real-world observations. You understand the diversity of opinion among economists on the subject, and you know the Earned Income Tax Credit is an alternative to it.

Key Terms living wage minimum wage

1. Between 1998 and 2007 the real minimum wage a. rose rapidly. b. rose slowly. c. remained constant. d. fell rapidly.

Quiz Yourself 2. In order for the minimum wage to reach its 1968

high in real terms (1999 dollars), it would have to rise to approximately _________ per hour. a. $8 b. $9

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Summary 365

c. $10 d. $11

3. The last time the minimum wage alone was sufficient to keep a family of three above the poverty line was a. 1979. b. 1985. c. 1990. d. 1998.

4. The argument that the minimum wage is worse than the Earned Income Tax Credit is based on the idea that a. the people who earn the minimum wage are

really poor. b. the minimum wage applies to all workers, not

just the working poor. c. the Earned Income Tax Credit goes to all workers. d. the minimum wage applies only to those

younger than 25. 5. The argument that the minimum wage does

not  significantly increase unemployment is based on a. producer surplus. b. consumer surplus. c. elasticity. d. aggregate demand.

6. The argument that the minimum wage hurts society more than it helps is based on __________________ analysis. a. consumer and producer surplus b. production possibilities c. aggregate supply–aggregate demand d. marginal

7. The argument that employers would actually not lose money if the minimum wage were raised is based on a. the idea that workers would spend the extra

money buying goods from their employer. b. the idea that workers would work overtime

without having to be paid. c. the idea that workers would be more productive

if they felt they were adequately compensated. d. the elasticity of demand for labor.

Short Answer Questions 1. Who is most likely to benefit from an increase in the

minimum wage? 2. Who is most likely to lose from an increase in the

minimum wage? Who of those might have thought an increase was in their best interests?

3. Suppose you knew that there was going to be 20 percent inflation between now and five years from now,

and suppose you knew that the minimum wage was only enough to get a family of three to 80 percent of the poverty line. How much would you have to raise the minimum wage over that period in order to make the minimum wage earn enough to be at that poverty line?

Think about This Several states have set the minimum wage in their states higher than the federal minimum wage. If doing so places them at a competitive disadvantage for new busi- ness this might be counterproductive. On the other hand, the minimum wage is typically relevant only in low-paid service jobs. Who makes the minimum wage in your community? Would your community be better off with a higher minimum wage?

Talk about This One of the principal opponents to minimum-wage in- creases is the umbrella organization for small business. Many states with higher minimum wages than the fed- eral level exempt businesses with few employees. Should small businesses be exempt from minimum-wage laws?

For More Insight See Brown, Charles, “Minimum Wages Laws: Are They

Overrated?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 133–146.

Brown, Charles, Curtis Gilroy, and Andrew Kohen, “The  Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employment and Unemployment,” Journal of Economic Literature 20, no. 2 (June 1982), pp. 487–528.

Card, David, and Alan Krueger, Myth and Measure- ment: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Behind the Numbers Historical data. Minimum wage.

U.S. Department of Labor; Employment Standards Administration—www.dol.gov/dol/topic/wages

/minimumwage.htm Poverty line.

U.S. Census Bureau; historical poverty tables— www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/

EITC eligibility and amount. Internal Revenue Service—www.irs.gov

Adams, Scott, and David Neumark, “A Decade of Living Wages: What Have We Learned?” Public Policy Insti- tute of California—www.ppic.org/main/publication .asp?i=620

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366

C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - F O U R

Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Define ticket scalping and describe why it exists.

LO2 Conclude that the market form appropriate to analyze ticket sales to an event is the monopoly model.

LO3 Contrast the marginal cost curve presented in Chapter 4 with the one appropriate for ticket sales.

LO4 Enumerate the reasons why promoters may rationally charge less for an event than they could, and conclude that the result of this is a shortage of tickets.

LO5 Describe why the conditions of a shortage typically create a scalping market, where people buy tickets below, at, or above their face value and sell them for a profit.

LO6 Conclude that economists generally value the scalping market, see very little reason to make laws regulating it, and see very little functional distinction between the legal and illegal forms of scalping that exist across the country.

Chapter Outline

Defining Brokering and Scalping

An Economic Model of Ticket Sales

Why Promoters Charge Less Than They Could

An Economic Model of Scalping

Legitimate Scalpers

Summary

If you want to see a concert, a game, a race, or any other event that is sold out, you probably know that you can always get a ticket—for a price. Some tickets command prices that are many times their face value. In the 1990s scalpers were getting more than $1,000 for a ticket to see Michael Jordan’s last game as a Chicago Bull and Mark McGwire’s attempt to break the single-season home run record. Some events are once in a lifetime, whereas other reoccurring events like the Super Bowl and the World Series are events that are important enough to some people that they are willing to pay more than face value for a ticket.

While in many cities it is illegal to sell a ticket for more than face value, in every major city there is a way of getting

such tickets when they are the only ones available. Econo- mists are almost always against laws that prevent people from selling things they possess. They reason that if one person would rather have $500 than a ticket to a game and another person would rather have a ticket to a game than $500, then both are better off with the trade than without it.

This chapter defines ticket scalping and offers an economic explanation for it. We begin that explanation by using our monopoly pricing model from Chapter 5 to understand the promoter’s ticket-pricing scheme. We show that for scalping to exist, promoters have to be underpricing their tickets, and we consider why they do this. We use our supply and demand model and our consumer and producer surplus language to see how

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An Economic Model of Ticket Sales 367

scalping helps consumers and scalpers alike. We talk about the mechanism by which scalpers become “legit” by calling themselves “brokers” or by offering packages that combine the tickets with other amenities.

Defining Brokering and Scalping

Brokering tickets is the act of buying tickets and selling them at a price higher than face value when such a trans-

action is legal. Scalping tickets is the act of buying tickets and sell- ing them at a price higher than face value when such a transac- tion is illegal. Thus, the practice is scalping only when it is done illegally. Regardless of semantic differences, for many fans and performers, scalpers and brokers are the worst form of predator;

they obtain large blocks of tickets before other people get them and then they sell the tickets at prices that net them a profit. They do not produce anything. Those who engage in this trade view themselves as simply providing a service from which they make a living. To others, they are simply leeching off the talents of others.

For economists, scalpers perform a function that “fixes” pricing that promoters get wrong. As we will see, scalping can exist profitably only when enough fans are willing to pay more for tickets than the face value of the ticket and there are more buyers willing to pay face value than there are seats.

This does not necessarily mean the performance is a sellout. If some seats are really good and others are really terrible, then the good ones, at courtside, say, might be scalped while those in “nosebleed territory” might re- main unsold. What is true is that there cannot be unsold seats right next to seats for which scalpers wish to charge more than face value. When traditional ticket outlets that sell for face value have open, decent seats, these will be sold out before scalpers can sell any.

An Economic Model of Ticket Sales

The question we can pose at this point is, “Why would a promoter charge less for a ticket than it is worth?” To answer the question we need to look at what determines the price a promoter should charge. To model that, we

need to go back to Chapter 5 to see which model of the market is more appropriate for ticket sales, perfect com- petition or monopoly. Because there is ultimately only one seller of the tickets, the promoter, our monopoly model is clearly more appropriate to this than the perfect competition model, in which there are many sellers.

Marginal Cost To complicate things somewhat more, remember the shape of the marginal cost curve that was introduced in Chapter 4. It is a check-shaped curve, as seen in the left panel of Figure 34.1. For ticket sales to a sporting event or a concert, the marginal cost looks a little different. The right-hand side of Figure 34.1 shows that up to the capacity of the stadium, the marginal cost is probably more likely to be a constant. The costs of printing and selling the tickets and the costs of cleaning up after each additional fan remain relatively constant. These extra costs are likely to be the same for the thousandth fan as the hundred-thousandth fan. At capacity, however, the extra cost of selling to another person grows astronomi- cally, as new construction would have to take place to add more seats.

The Promoter as Monopolist When promoters are attempting to maximize profits and are trying to figure out what price to charge for events, they have to gauge what the demand will be for the event. Once they have done that, they can look

brokering The act of buying a ticket and legally selling it at a price higher than its face value.

scalping The act of buying a ticket and illegally selling it at a price higher than its face value.

FIGURE 34.1 Marginal cost.

Typical good Tickets to an event

Q/t Q/tQcapacity

MC MC Marginal cost

Marginal cost

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368 Chapter 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping

at this problem as any other monopolist would. Recall that we have always assumed that firms are profit max- imizers. Though revenue would be maximized where marginal revenue cuts the horizontal axis, this is not where the profit- maximizing promoters operate. As is depicted in Figure 34.2, they project the number of sales and set the price so that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This means that they would sell Qmonop tickets for Pmonop each.

An interesting aspect of this is that it may make sense for promoters to see that the arena is only par- tially filled. Promoters hold back tickets when they would have to lower the price too far in order to sell out the facility. You should not be surprised by this conclusion, especially if you are at a school that does not have a popular athletic program. Consider a school whose men’s basketball team draws between 4,000 and 6,000 fans a game, while the women’s team draws fewer than 1,000  a game. If the athletic department were to price tickets to sell out the arena, tickets would be nearly free for the men’s games and the department would have to pay people to see the women. That is not a slam at the women; it is just a fact of life at a school without a na- tional sports reputation. Clearly, it makes sense for this university to charge more for the men’s games and to charge something for the women. The university makes the most money possible that way, even with only one sellout per decade.

The Perfect Arena To a promoter, the size of the facility is significant. In a promoter’s eyes, the perfect facility would be rep- resented as seen in Figure 34.3, where the capacity is exactly the number of seats that the promoter wants to sell anyway. That is, the facility with perfect capacity is the one where marginal cost intersects marginal rev- enue at the quantity that is exactly the capacity of the facility. Of course, promoters cannot always find the perfect facility. Most medium and small cities have only one or two places to hold an event like a concert, and even in other places, the perfect arena or concert hall may not be available.

In a big city with many venues of many different sizes, a promoter should seek the facility whose size en- sures that the marginal cost will cross marginal revenue at exactly the capacity. On the assumption that facilities that are unnecessarily large cost the promoter more to rent, booking this “perfect” facility maximizes profit.

In each case mentioned so far, there is no market for scalpers because the face value of the ticket is the price at which it is sold. Scalping makes sense only if the market price of the ticket is greater than the face value. The only way for that to happen is if the pro- moter charges less than the profit-maximizing amount. This is seen in Figure 34.4, where the ticket is priced at or below the price that would sell out the facility rather than the price that would maximize profits for the promoter.

FIGURE 34.2 The profit-maximizing promoter’s choice of price and ticket sales.

Q/tQmonop Capacity

P

Pmonop

MC

MR

D

FIGURE 34.3 The perfect arena.

Q/t

P MC

MR D

Qmonop = Qcapacity

Pmonop = Pcapacity

Rational capacity

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An Economic Model of Scalping 369

Why Promoters Charge Less Than They Could

Why might promoters sell out a facility rather than maxi- mize profits? First, they may not have good information on the price they ought to charge. This uncertainty might motivate them to err on the safe side and charge a lower price. Second, there may be some “excitement” factor to a full stadium that appeals to the performers and that is worth the loss of profit. Third, the performers may want a reputation of charging a “fair price” for their events and be willing to forgo maximum profit in order to further that reputation. Fourth, the performers may want some mechanism other than price to separate the “real fans” from those who go to events simply because they have money. Fifth, ancillary sales of shirts and other memora- bilia are important sources of revenue for performers and promoters alike. Since it may be that the revenue gained by these sales exceeds that lost by having low ticket prices, low ticket prices may lead to increasing audience size and may therefore maximize profit after all. Last, it may be in the long-run best interest of the performers to charge a low price for tickets so that the largest pos- sible audience can provide word-of-mouth advertising for them and generate interest for their talent.

Sometimes promoters do not have an exact idea of what price to charge for an event. More often than not, promoters of a new act must guess what the market will bear for the ticket. If they guess too low, scalping may ensue. In addition, promoters may want to play it safe

and not run the risk of pricing too high, thereby purpose- fully pricing less than even their best guess. This might also result in scalping.

There is an excitement to being at a sold-out event in a large arena. The sound and feel are different for a sold-out event than for one in a half-full auditorium. The performer enjoys it more and the fans enjoy it more. Al- though this may not seem like an important function for a promoter, consider that promoters are hired by athletes or performers to promote the event as effectively as pos- sible. It may be in the promoters’ best interests to cater to the performer, regardless of what maximizes profit.

Some performers try to establish a closeness with their fans. Some try to signal their empathy by making sure ticket prices are low enough that “ordinary” fans can afford to go. This means that performers and pro- moters are willing to accept less money for the good feel- ing that charging “fair” prices gives them.

Performers may appreciate fans who are willing to camp out for tickets more than those simply willing to pay a lot of money. You have to be much more excited about a band to camp out than to simply buy tickets. The people who are willing to camp out to get front-row seats are far more likely to convey enthusiasm for performers than those with deep pockets.

When you go to a concert, you often spend as much on shirts and other promotional items as you did on the ticket. If promoters keep you out by charging a price that is too high, they forgo that important other revenue as well. In the big picture, low ticket prices may be profit maximizing after all.

Promoters of new bands may decide that it is in their long-run interest to keep ticket prices low so that the band is seen by as many people as possible. By setting low ticket prices early in a performer’s career, they may be more likely to turn a one-hit wonder into a star.

For any one of the reasons just outlined, promoters may choose to sell their tickets at prices below their mo- nopoly market value and perhaps even below the price that would guarantee a sellout. In any event, a price below what they see as the free market value will cause scalpers to buy tickets at the lower price in order to sell them at a higher price.

An Economic Model of Scalping

A market characterized by ticket scalping is going to have a typical demand curve. It will reflect the demand by those who do not get tickets by normal means. For many

FIGURE 34.4 Capacity versus profit-maximizing prices.

Q/t

P

MC

D

MR Capacity

Pprofit max

Pcapacity

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370 Chapter 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping

events, such as any home game played by the Green Bay Packers, tickets only go to those who subscribe or have had tickets for many, many years. This “right of first refusal” on tickets is so valuable that married couples’ divorce agreements have been held up over this right. If you want to go to a single Packers game, you have to resort to the scalpers’ market.

The demand curve for these tickets is downward slop- ing just as it is for any other good. If the event is a “must see,” then you expect a demand curve farther to the right or perhaps more inelastic, or steeper, because tickets for a “once-in-a-lifetime event” have fewer substitutes than tickets for events that will be repeated. The elasticity of demand will be expected to be less.

The supply curve for this market is upward sloping (and not vertical), not because the number of tickets is not limited but because in order to get tickets away from those who have them, you have to give up more and more to persuade more and more rabid fans to give up their tickets. Figure 34.5 reflects the market for scalped tickets.

If the price is required to stay at the face value of the ticket, then there will be fewer tickets than potential buy- ers. To an economist this is the very definition of a short- age. Note that the supply curve may start below Pface value or above it. In Figure 34.5 it starts below. To understand why, consider that there are people who have tickets for an event who are willing to sell them for less than they paid because they do not want to go to the event. Why would you buy a ticket for an event you did not want to go to? Suppose you had season tickets to the Los Angeles

Lakers and a ticket to the California 500 NASCAR race. Suppose the L.A. Clippers were playing the Lakers on the day of the race. You paid face value for the ticket, and you are willing to take almost anything for that game’s ticket because you have decided to go to the race.

If scalping is illegal, only Qface value, the tickets that people are willing to unload for the face value will be sold. If those are the only tickets that are sold, then the people who are willing to pay more than face value will not find any to buy. Some people will go to the game when they would rather have received Pmarket and stayed home. Others will stay home, when they would rather have paid Pmarket and gone to the game.

Without scalping, there is a shortage and a loss of societal benefit. That loss, measured by the loss in consumer and producer surplus, can also be seen in Figure  34.5. The loss of welfare to people who want to see the game at the scalper’s price is EFB, while the loss to people who would like to have sold their tickets is GEB. The total loss to society when scalping is forbid- den is GFB.

In this circumstance, is the permission to scalp tick- ets creating a problem or solving one? Economists posit that scalpers are solving the shortage by taking tickets from those who have them and who value them least and transferring them to those who do not have them and who value them most. For this the scalper takes a cut. Performers take a dim view of this. They view it as a practice in which people profit from something they had no hand at all in creating.

Legitimate Scalpers

In some states, all forms of scalping are legal; in others, none are. In a growing number of states scalping remains illegal, but “brokers” are allowed to sell tickets for more than they pay for them. The only difference between a scalper and a broker is that the scalper walks around an event’s perimeter trying to sell tickets, while the broker does it from a desk and a phone. The scalper demands cash; the broker takes credit cards.

Another way that scalpers have become legitimate is by pairing their services with that of a travel agent. It is legal in nearly every state for travel agents to create packages with hotel rooms, cab rides, and the like, and then offer these along with the tickets. Suppose you want a  ticket to the latest “fight of the century.” If it is in a no-scalping state and you cannot get tickets the normal way, you can still get the ticket because travel agents now

FIGURE 34.5 A scalper’s market.

Q/t

P

Pmarket

Pface value

QmarketQface value

Sby scalpers

D

A

F

BE

G

C

Shortage

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Summary 371

After-market ticket exchanges used to be solely in the province of a perfectly competitive market of individuals who would buy tickets at ticket counters or on the street and then resell them outside of events. No longer. StubHub changed that with its web-enabled meth- ods of connecting buyers and sellers of tickets. Street scalpers still exist today, but businesses such as StubHub have allowed buyers to have some assurance of the authenticity of the tickets being sold and knowledge of the location of those tickets within the event space. When the sports leagues saw how much money could be made in the after-market ticket business, they wanted a piece of the profits.

Today, the after-market ticket exchange business has become in- tertwined with the primary ticket market. StubHub is the official ticket exchange for Major League Baseball. The official exchange outlet for the National Football League, NFL Ticket Exchange, is a cooperative arrangement between the league and Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster also has the National Hockey League and National Basketball Asso- ciation business through league-branded websites. These arrange- ments pay off handsomely for both the leagues and the business doing the exchange. The leagues can keep their ticket prices lower than market price levels, yet simultaneously benefit from higher mar- ket prices because they receive a sizable cut from the exchanges.

How do they enforce the “official” status of their preferred ticket exchange partner? When generated, there are competing claims to a seat; for instance, when more than one person claims to have purchased a particular ticket, the person who bought it from the “official” website gets the seat. I witnessed how this plays out in during a 2015 NFL game in Indianapolis. A couple sitting one row in front of my wife and I were confronted by another couple who had purchased the same seats on the NFL Ticket Exchange. The usher escorted the couple who purchased the seats on StubHub aside and told them (in a voice loud enough that everyone around could hear) that only official tickets would be honored when there was a dispute. The usher told the couple they could buy standing-room seats or be escorted out of the building.

What does this do? It converts the perfectly competitive market for tickets back to a near-monopoly. There are still street scalp- ers, but the official websites have gained significant market power based on these agreements. This clearly benefits the leagues to the detriment of fans. The leagues can effectively sell individual game tickets at market prices, while claiming to sell them at low prices. It may fool those who aren’t familiar with economics but not those who are.

S T U B H U B, T I C K E T M A S T E R, A N D T H E N F L T I C K E T E X C H A N G E

can combine a $100 ticket with a $100 hotel room and a  $10 cab ride and call it a $500 “excursion.” (Do the math!) This is legal nearly everywhere, even when “scalping” is not. It is also what an economist would call a distinction without a difference.

It must be reinforced, therefore, that economists gener- ally disapprove of anti-scalping regulations. Whether as legal brokers or illegal scalpers, the sellers are providing

services. They are not only fixing the market shortage left over by the promoter; they are also providing conve- nience. The hours of ticket offices at major arenas are not always amenable to customer desires. Lines at the ticket booth or at “will call” windows are often very long the day of the event. Because scalpers and brokers provide us with a convenience and harm no one in the process, there is little economic reason to ban their activities.

Summary You now understand what ticket scalping is and why it ex- ists. You understand that the market for tickets falls within the monopoly model and that the marginal cost curve pre- sented in Chapter 4 is not appropriate for ticket sales. You understand why promoters may rationally charge less for an event than they could and that the result of this is a short- age of tickets. You understand that under the conditions of

a shortage there is typically a place for a scalping market in which people buy tickets below, at, or above their face value and sell them for a profit. Last, you understand that economists generally value such services, see little reason to make laws regulating them, and see little functional dis- tinction between the legal and illegal forms of brokering or scalping that exist across the country.

Key Terms brokering scalping

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372 Chapter 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping

1. Ticket scalping is a symptom of a. stupid promoters. b. market prices being greater than the face value

of the ticket. c. market prices being less than the face value

of the ticket. d. stupid consumers.

2. Economists ___________________ the activities of ticket brokers and scalpers. a. draw no distinction between b. separately model c. draw a stark contrast between d. ignore

3. The optimal venue for an event is one where a. the number of seats exceeds the number where

marginal cost equals marginal revenue. b. the number of seats is less than the number

where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. c. the number of seats is exactly the number where

marginal cost equals marginal revenue. d. marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost for all

seats. 4. The distinct feature of the marginal cost curve in the

analysis of venues is that it is a. a vertical line. b. a horizontal line. c. a check-shaped curve. d. a backward L.

5. The model for a promoter is ___________________ whereas the model for scalpers is that of ________ __________. a. monopoly; monopolistic competition b. monopolistic competition; perfect competition c. monopoly; oligopoly d. monopoly; perfect competition

6. If anti-scalping laws are perfectly enforced, it will result in a. deadweight loss. b. a significant increase in consumer surplus. c. a significant increase in producer surplus. d. a significant loss to people who are going

to the event.

Quiz Yourself Short Answer Questions 1. What is the difference between StubHub and a ticket

scalper walking in front of a stadium? 2. Explain why it is not a contradiction for a ticket

scalper to carry a sign that says “Need Tickets” on one side when it says “Have Tickets” on the other side (indicating he is both buying and selling tickets)?

3. Suppose you have a ticket to an event that is on a very important day to your spouse and you know it will cost you if you go to the event. How is the scalper good for you?

4. Suppose you need a ticket to a sold-out event for which your spouse had asked you to buy tickets a long time ago (and you forgot). Would you be made better off with or without anti-scalping laws when those laws are closely enforced?

Think about This There are laws in many states and communities against scalping. Many promoters will let people buy only a limited number of tickets for fear that the buyer will simply resell them later. Why would a promoter care who buys the tickets? If you became a performer, would you care?

Talk about This Some scalpers will pay college students who have camped out for a concert to buy extra tickets for them so that they can later resell them. Because this is against the law in some places, there is some risk for the scalper in that the students could simply resell the tickets them- selves. If you were standing in line for tickets, what would you do?

For More Insight See Happel, Stephen, and Marianne Jennings, “The Folly

of Anti-Scalping Laws,” The Cato Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1995), pp. 65–76.

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - F I V E

373

Rent Control Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Use the principles of supply and demand to model the effect of rent control.

LO2 Understand that the reasons for controlling rents are typically short term in nature.

LO3 See why economists generally oppose rent controls.

LO4 Understand that the consequences of controlling rents vary with the time horizon: The short-term benefits to the renter are usually offset by longer-term losses to landlords and other renters.

LO5 Use the supply and demand model to explain why eliminat- ing rent control can be in a city’s general interests but not in the interests of the voters of that city.

Chapter Outline

Rents in a Free Market

Reasons for Controlling Rents

Consequences of Rent Control

Why Does Rent Control Survive?

Summary

Several cities in the United States have enacted laws that control the amount of rent that a landlord can charge. Some, like New York City, have laws that date from World War II and the price controls that were insti- tuted at that time because of the war. When the general price controls expired, New York City chose to extend them for rents in the city. Others, like the more than 100 New Jersey cities with such laws, began their excursion into rent control by simply extending the price controls imposed by President Nixon in 1971. San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Jose adopted controls when skyrocket- ing land prices drove rents up in California in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Rent control laws typically specify how often rents can be increased and by how much. Some rent control laws prevent rents from being increased as long as a ten- ant continues to rent the same apartment. As we analyze the issue of rent control, the first thing we examine is how rents are established in a free market. Then we look at what might motivate governments to control rents, and

we examine the long- and short-term consequences of preventing rent increases.

Rents in a Free Market

In a free market, rents are determined in the same manner as the price of any other good or service. The supply of apartments is determined by how much it costs landlords to build them and how their profitability compares with that of other investments. The demand for apartments is based on the number of people seeking apartments, how much it costs to rent in the city as opposed to buying or renting in a neighboring community, and the income of the potential tenants.

When landlords choose to invest their money in apart- ment buildings, they are motivated by exactly the same things that motivate all other investors. They look for the highest possible rate of return on their investments subject to a limited amount of risk. The costs associated

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374 Chapter 35 Rent Control

close to colleges and universities have higher rents than similar apartment buildings elsewhere, because college students value the lower transportation costs and are will- ing to pay higher rents so they can take advantage of them. People who are not college students do not value being close to the school. Because they have a homogeneous population, a landlord will require security deposits that are higher than typical for such apartments. This is im- portant because it would be illegal to have a differential security deposit for different types of people. For instance, landlords know that they will have to pay more in repair costs after a college-age male tenant leaves than they will after a college-age female leaves. They cannot set rents that are based on gender, race, religion, or age whether or not these factors are predictive of repair costs.

Reasons for Controlling Rents

When landlords face increased costs, they need to raise rents to make the rate of return on their investments of rental apartments equal to that of other, comparable invest- ments. Few people begrudge landlords such increases. On the other hand, like all other owners of businesses, land- lords want to increase prices to increase profits. What pre- vents landlords from raising rents is exactly what prevents any business from raising prices: Their competition will take their customers. In this area, though, landlords have an advantage over businesspeople who sell other goods.

with being a landlord are more varied and variable than they are with most other investments. The most promi- nent cost is the cost of the building itself. If the investor borrows money to build or buy the building, the build- ing’s cost is the interest portion of the monthly mortgage payment. If the investor buys the building without bor- rowing, the cost of the building is the interest rate that the investor could have received in his or her next best investment. In this sense the costs involved in investing in rental properties are not all that different from those in other investments.

Other costs in owning rental property, though, are considerably more variable than those of other invest- ments. Landlords have to fix all of the problems in a building. They have to deal with tenants who do not pay their rent on time. They have to deal with tenants who leave before their lease is up and tenants who cause more damage to their apartments than their security deposits will cover. It is for this reason that people who are handy find investing in apartment buildings highly profitable. They use their skills to save money on maintenance.

People looking for a place to live have a similar set of concerns. They must decide whether to buy or rent. If they buy, they need to come up with a down payment, and they have to pay for their own repairs. If they rent, they must decide where to rent. In a large city the cost of renting close to work is greater, but the time and ex- penses involved in commuting are avoided. If rents in the city are low, people are more likely to live in the city. If they are high, people are more likely to live farther away.

Figure 35.1 shows us that a market for rental apart- ments generates an equilibrium number of apartments rented Q* and an equilibrium rent R*. Such a market can be affected by a number of factors. If interest rates rise, for example, the cost to landlords rises and more people want to become renters. This is because the home mort- gage payments that represent the cost of alternatives to renters increase. Increased costs to landlords and greater numbers of potential tenants both lead to higher rents.

It is important to insert at this point that there are sev- eral rental markets for different types of rental housing. For instance, landlords who rent to young college-age people anticipate having repair costs at the end of the lease that landlords who rent to older people do not an- ticipate. Landlords who rent apartments of low quality must deal with the probability that some of their tenants will always be late paying their rent. Landlords who rent apartments that command higher rents will not.

With such a dichotomy of rents and quality it is often the case that renters are self-segregating. Apartments

FIGURE 35.1 The market for rental apartments without rent control.

Q*

S

D

Quantity

R*

Rent

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Consequences of Rent Control 375

When you switch brands of toothpaste, beer, or any- thing else, no cost is involved. When you change apart- ments the costs may be staggering. First you have to find a new place. This may or may not cost you money, but since it is a pain in the neck, its opportunity cost is high. Then you have to disconnect all utilities and have them reconnected at your new place, you have to inform ev- eryone of your new address, and you have to pack all your stuff and move it. Even if you know someone with a pickup and have buddies to help you move, it still costs you plenty of time and money to move. Since the threat of switching apartments is essentially the only leverage you have against the landlord, the costs of moving diminish that leverage.

Landlords know your leverage is diminished by mov- ing costs, and they know they can increase rents each year by just a little bit less than those costs. If they in- crease rents by more than the moving costs, you will move; but if they make sure to keep the year’s increase to less than moving costs, you will decide it is in your eco- nomic interest to stay put and pay the extra rent. This pro- cess cannot continue forever, since that would imply that rents always go up faster than other prices. If they did, investors would build new apartments in hopes of get- ting the higher-than-average return on investment. With new apartments, there would be a rent war, and renters would be its winners. On the other hand, it is possible for a rent war not to start for a few years. This in turn may be all that is required for politicians to mistake a temporary situation for one that’s permanent and that can be solved only through the imposing of rent controls. As we will see later, once rent control is imposed in a city, it is nearly impossible to discontinue it.

Consequences of Rent Control

Rent control is a form of price ceiling where the price is not allowed to rise above a specified level. Once rent control is in

place, the market for rental apartments is no longer gov- erned by supply and demand alone, but also by the often obscure rules that politicians have written into the legis- lation. The consequences of any price ceiling in general, and of rent control laws in particular, depend on the elas- ticity of the supply and demand curves. Those elasticities are dependent on the number of close substitutes and on time. Since close substitutes can be better developed over time, the two are closely related. We will subsume them both under the idea of time and discuss the consequences in the short run as being different from the consequences in the long run.

Note that for a price ceiling to be relevant it must be lower than the equilibrium price. Imagine what would happen if the ceiling were, in fact, above the equilibrium price. If landlords charged more than equilibrium, their renters would move to other landlords’ buildings. Since landlords do not find it in their best interest to do this, set- ting rents by law at a rate lower than equilibrium has the effect of telling landlords that they cannot do something that is not in their best interests anyway. It is exactly as if a professor were to tell you that you cannot attend her class naked. You were not going to partake of class in the buff anyway, so having her tell you not to do so is irrelevant.

We can analyze the consequences of rent control more systematically by examining Figure 35.2. First note that in Figure 35.2 there are two panels. The panel

FIGURE 35.2 The short- and long-run consequences of rent control.

Q

S S

D D

QQ QQ*

R*

Q*Quantity

Rent

Rentcontrol

R*

Rent

Rentcontrol

Quantity

Long runShort run

ʹ ʹ́ ʹ ʹ́

price ceiling The level above which a price may not rise.

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376 Chapter 35 Rent Control

Likewise, renters who live in the community are not likely to want to move to a better apartment immediately following the introduction of rent control. Renters who live outside a community, on the other hand, are not likely to want to move into the community until there is a substantial difference between their current rents and those in the rent-controlled city.

With all the preceding having been said, though, the short-run changes are actually likely to last quite a while, since most rent control laws do not lower rents but sim- ply prevent them from increasing. If overall inflation runs at 2 percent a year and rents are not allowed to rise, it takes several years for a significant difference between equilibrium rents and controlled rents to develop. It is only when that difference becomes large enough so that landlords do not fix up apartments and tenants start mov- ing that the full effect of rent control will even start to be felt.

Once this long-run scenario begins to develop, the se- rious flaws in rent control begin to overwhelm the ben- efits. The difference between Q′ and Q* in Figure 35.2 begins to widen significantly as landlords who would have built or refurbished apartment complexes in the community decide not to. The gap between Q″ and Q* also grows as commuters who live outside the commu- nity seek to rent in town, attracted by the lower rents.

Where the system goes from here depends on its rules. For instance, one set of problems is generated if rents can increase by only a fixed percentage each year regardless of who lives there. If, on the other hand, rents cannot increase at all for the duration of a tenant’s stay, another set of problems is created. Rules with regard to subletting and eviction tend to exacerbate the problems.

Some rent control laws allow modest yearly increases in rents. Usually, though, these increases do not keep up with either inflation or what equilibrium would have been. In New York City, the difference has had more than 60 years to build up, so that rent-controlled apart- ments are very inexpensive places to live. They can be had for a third or less of their free-market rent. This makes for a perverse scenario in which those looking for an apartment turn not to the newspaper’s real estate sec- tion but to the obituaries.

When markets are controlled, they will sometimes go underground. These shadow markets, as they are called by some economists, are generated because there are people who have legal rights to something of value—an apartment, say, whose rent is below equilibrium—and there are people who want them. It is illustrative that in New York City more transactions for rent-controlled

on the left indicates the consequences of rent control in the short run, while the panel on the right indicates the consequences in the long run. There are important long- run and short-run differences because, if you recall from Chapter 3, an important determinant of the elasticity of supply and demand is time.

The inelasticity of the supply and demand curves in the short run makes sense because renters and land- lords have little time or ability to change what they do. Apartment owners are going to rent most of their units regardless of what the rent is. It is only with apartments that need some attention that landlords will base the de- cision on getting them ready to rent on the amount of money they can get for them. Again, in the short run, this is likely to be a very small percentage of the units under their control.

Focusing on what they have in common for a mo- ment, we see that the equilibrium rent R* is being su- perseded by a legal limit Rcontrol. The first consequence of this is the one legislators intended: Rents are lowered, landlords make less than they would without rent con- trol, and renters either pay less in rent or get more for their money.

Reducing the rent also results in the quantity de- manded Q″ exceeding the quantity supplied Q′. The quantity of apartments rented decreased because a certain number of apartments (Q* − Q′) that would have been rented before rent control are not being put up for rent after rent control. To see why this is the case, imagine yourself a landlord with a building of apartments of vary- ing difficulty to maintain. The more difficult ones, say, basement apartments that require more frequent paint- ing because humid conditions cause early deterioration, will not be rented unless at least R* rent is paid. Thus the second consequence of rent control is that the number of apartments that would ordinarily be rented is decreased.

The final obvious consequence of rent control, which happens regardless of whether we are talking about the short run or long run, is that people will seek apartments in the rent-controlled community who had not sought to rent there before. Specifically, there will be Q″ − Q* apartments demanded at Rcontrol that had not been de- manded at R*.

The magnitude of these consequences and the reac- tions of people to the consequences determine whether they hold for the short or long run. In the short run, for instance, the rent reduction comes at a fairly small cost. Only a few people lose out on the ability to rent apart- ments, however, because in the short run, both the supply curve and demand curve are likely to be inelastic.

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Why Does Rent Control Survive? 377

leaving tenants worse off than if they had not reported the problem.

Thus one reaction of landlords is to reduce the qual- ity of the apartment they are renting. Charging the same rent for a lesser apartment is the same as raising the rent. As a result, economists suggest that, in the long run, rent controls are ineffective because landlords raise rent on the sly, not by explicitly raising rent, but by lowering quality. Finally, rent control makes racial, ethnic, age, and other forms of housing discrimination more likely. If there are more people interested in an apartment than there are apartments to rent, landlords can pick, albeit illegally, their next tenant based on their own bigotry. Under free-market pricing, the landlord’s bigotry battles the landlord’s wallet. Under rent control, bigotry has no such countervailing force with which to contend.

Why Does Rent Control Survive?

With all of these strange long-run consequences, it makes sense to ask why cities continue controlling rents. The answer is simple, and it can be traced to the ballot box. Let’s start with the obvious: You do not get to vote in a community unless you live there. People who live in a suburb cannot vote in a city’s election, even though the result of the election directly affects them. Add the fact that many of the people who live in the rent-controlled city benefit from rent control almost by definition.

Figure 35.2 helps to make this clear. The people hurt by rent control are (1) landlords and (2) people who can no longer find an apartment in the city (Q* − Q′). The first group is a minuscule number whose plight is not treated that seriously by candidates.1 The second group had to move out of town to find a place to live. Either way the majority of the people left in the community (Q′) are simply better off than they would be were rent control to be discontinued.

In Boston, though, repeal of rent controls led to none of the problems that rent control supporters had pre- dicted. Rents in previously controlled apartments did rise, but new construction ensued. This had the effect of holding down increases in rents.

apartments happen in the shadow market than out in the open. The evidence for this is the paucity of rent-controlled apartments advertised in the newspapers. Though more than 60 percent of the rental housing in New York is rent-regulated, only 3 percent of the ads in the major city newspapers list housing that is rent-controlled.

To illustrate how the shadow market works, suppose you know someone who has a loved one die and no local relatives are looking for a cheap apartment. You can go to the funeral, pretend to be sad, and see if you can get the dead person’s apartment. Of course everyone knows this, so, on the sly, the dead tenant’s executers attempt to sell the right to the apartment to the highest bidder. It is a common occurrence, in cities with laws such as this, for people to pay what amounts to a bribe to rent a rent- regulated apartment.

The law in other communities is even more strict: Rents cannot increase until the lease expires, and since the renter can perpetually renew the lease, this happens only when the owner dies unexpectedly. If the heirs of a deceased renter can swing it, they sublet with the original renter’s name still on a lease that is decades old. Again, the right to sublet an apartment is sold to the highest bid- der, sometimes through multiple generations.

Typically the only recourse that owners of buildings whose rents never increase have is to make the build- ings miserable places in which to live. This is a well-trod path. Because rents are so low, there is little money for repairs, and repairs simply are not made. Additionally, if owners can get every tenant in a building to leave, they can gut the building and start over again. Refurbished buildings are treated as new ones, and the owners can set charges that are subject only to the market. The other alternative that the owner has once the building is empty is to refurbish and sell the apartments as individual condominiums. Renters know this and will fight mov- ing out as long as they can. They do not do this to spite the owner. They do it because they know that finding a rent-controlled apartment is difficult. Without one, they would be one of many (Q″) wanting to rent one of the few (Q′) available apartments. This is why in rent control communities tenants often do their own repairs or pay for them out of their own pockets. They know they have a good thing going and they do not want to see it stop. The only recourse that tenants have against land- lords who do not pay for necessary repairs is to report them to the city health department. Sometimes the health department can get a court order for the landlord to fix the place up, sometimes they cannot. This sort of pres- sure rarely works. Owners simply abandon the buildings,

1This is not to say that these landlords have no influence. Through campaign contributions landlords, particularly the high-profile ones, are able to make their case and have received consideration on a number of development issues of concern to them. Nevertheless, this influence has not led to the undoing of rent control in New York.

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378 Chapter 35 Rent Control

Summary You are now able to use the model of supply and demand we introduced in Chapter 2 to show the effects of rent control. You understand that though there are reasons for controlling rents, these are typically short term in nature and economists generally are against rent controls. You understand that the consequences of controlling rents differ given the time horizon and

that the short-term benefits to the renter are usually offset by long-term losses to landlords and renters who cannot get housing in a community. Last, you are now able to use the supply and demand model to explain why eliminating rent control can be in a city’s general interest but not in the interests of the voters of that city.

1. The principal argument against rent control is that a. landlords and all tenants are made worse off. b. landlords and a few tenants are made worse

off by less than the majority of tenants that are made better off.

c. landlords and a few tenants are made worse off by more than the majority of tenants that are made better off.

d. all tenants are made better off, not just poor ones.

2. In the long run, rent control has _________________ impact because, over time, supply and demand be- come ____________ elastic. a. an increasing; more b. a decreasing; more c. an increasing; less d. a decreasing; less

3. Rent control is an example of a _________________ a. price ceiling. b. price floor. c. price irrelevancy. d. price equalization.

4. If the equilibrium rent is ___________ the controlled level, then rent control laws are ________________ a. above; necessary b. above; irrelevant c. below; necessary d. below; irrelevant

5. Which of the following is likely to occur after sev- eral years of relevant rent control? a. Rents exceeding equilibrium b. An increase in available housing

Quiz Yourself

Key Term price ceiling

c. A decrease in available housing d. Rents equaling equilibrium

6. History suggests that rent control laws a. tend to be declared unconstitutional. b. tend to be overturned soon after they are

adopted. c. tend to become a permanent fixture of a

community. d. are incredibly unpopular.

Think about This Rent control laws, like minimum-wage laws apply to everyone, not simply the poor. Should there be provi- sions to apply rent control only to those who need the lower rent?

Talk about This In smaller cities, being a landlord is a way for handy men and women to invest in property, fix it up, and rent it out. It allows them to save and invest some of their own sweat. Should rent control laws exempt these types of landlords?

For More Insight See Keating, W. Dennis, Michael Teitz, and Andrejs

Skaburskis, Rent Control: Regulation and the Rental Housing Market (New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research, 1998).

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379

C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - S I X

The Economics of K–12 Education Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Analyze education as an investment and as one that not only pays dividends to the person getting the education but also positively affects society at large.

LO2 Summarize the debate over whether spending more on edu- cation will yield more significant returns.

LO3 Summarize the economics behind the school reform issues.

LO4 Describe why many economists argue that the current structure of education prevents more money from doing any good.

Chapter Outline

Investments in Human Capital

Should We Spend More?

School Reform Issues

Summary

From a strictly economic perspective, the amount of time and money we spend on educating ourselves and our fel- low citizens is amazing. Required to stay in school until we are at least 16, and in some cases until we are 18, we are strongly encouraged to graduate from high school, and when we do, we are offered substantial subsidies to get some form of higher education. Some of us even press on to earn graduate degrees. In the end, it is easily possible that we have spent the first third of our lives acquiring an education. Our parents and our government have encouraged us to invest in ourselves even while contributing nothing of substance to society during that time. Since most people retire before they die, the typi- cal postgraduate educated person has fewer than 40 years to earn enough to pay back, figuratively, what he or she invested in formal education.

In general, parents and grandparents are staunch sup- porters of schools, at least financially. People without children in school have other reasons for supporting them. In this chapter we explore some of the reasons

people give for supporting education. We try to deter- mine whether society is getting its money’s worth for elementary and secondary education.

In considering the elementary and secondary level, we look at how much money is spent on education and attempt to determine whether taxpayers are getting what they pay for. To that end we plot measures of cost, and we look at the ratio of the numbers of students to teachers. Next we examine measures of success such as students’ performances on standardized tests and the numbers of degrees that are granted.

Investments in Human Capital

In Chapters 4 and 5 we spoke of capital as though the con- cept were confined to machines. In this chapter we turn to

another form of capital, human capital. This refers to the ability of a person to create goods and

human capital The ability of a person to create goods and services.

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380 Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education

be on welfare or commit crimes against us and are more likely to be productive citizens who pay more in taxes than they cost in government benefits. An additional benefit that we derive from public school education is that having children of all races, ethnic groups, religions, and income classes in the same schools may foster social stability. Thus, the external benefits of K–12 education

justify having a considerable subsidy to that education.

We can use our supply and demand diagram to illustrate the inefficiency of just having unsubsidized private education.

Consider Figure 36.1 and what it suggests the price of education should be to the parents of the children to be educated. The price is the annual tuition, and the quan- tity is the number of kids educated in a year. At low tuition rates, more will invest in education, and when it is free, everyone will take advantage of it. The resulting demand curve is downward sloping, but if tuition is low, schools will be willing to educate fewer students.

The equilibrium tuition T* and the equilibrium num- ber of enrolled students S* are what the unsubsidized market would yield. If there is an external benefit of the size shown, then the optimal number of students is much greater than the market amount. In this case the optimal number of students is everyone and the opti- mal price is zero. This means that taxpayers will have to pay the T′ per student. From a theoretical point of view, this does not necessarily mean that the school must be

services. Education and training play an important role in developing human capital.

Present Value Analysis In Chapter 7’s discussion of present value and invest- ments, we learned it is possible to invest too little or too much in anything, including human capital. Determining

the right amount depends on the value of the net present value, the difference between the pres- ent value of benefits and the present value of costs.

The investment we make in the education of our own children we do out of love for them, but it also makes sense from an economic point of view. If there were no “free”1 public schools, we would look first at the present value of costs of educating a child from kindergarten through high school. We would then sub- tract that from the present value of the child’s increased earning potential because of that education. If at that point we found that the net was positive, then we would conclude that, for the parent, the investment would be a wise one.

Again, from the view of the parent, an even more re- fined look at this analysis would subtract out those costs that would occur anyway. Consider the modern family with two working parents or a single parent. If there were no public school, they would have day-care expenses whether or not the child were educated. That means, at the margin, a cost of educating the child is the difference between the tuition to the school and the day-care costs. This reduces the relevant costs, and it makes education an even better investment.

External Benefits Of course, K–12 education is public and it has been for so long that we may not even think of asking why. There are societal as well as economic reasons for having free public education. Societally, benefits accrue to us all from having children become educated, whether or not they are our own children. Economically, benefits accrue to us because people who are educated are less likely to

net present value The difference between the present value of benefits and the present value of costs.

external benefits Benefits that accrue to someone other than the consumer or producer of the good or service.

1“Free” is in quotes for two reasons. First, some states require a textbook rental fee that, in Indiana at least, is between $100 and $200 per student per year. This fee is waived for students qualifying for the Federal School Lunch program. Second, the taxpayer pays for this public education. Thus “free” should be read as “free to the parents except for any fees that might be involved.”

FIGURE 36.1 External benefits of K–12 education.

S

D

T *

S*

Tuition

Enrolled students

External benefit

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Should We Spend More? 381

government-owned and -operated. In the United States, except for some experiments in Milwaukee and other cities, this is precisely what it means.

Specific estimates of the magnitude of this exter- nal impact have started to emerge. Economists Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti estimate that the impact of crime reduction is between 12 percent and 26 percent of the private benefit to education.

Should We Spend More?

The Basic Data We spend a great deal of money on elementary and sec- ondary education. In so doing we are hoping that the tax money we are spending nets us a return of smart, educated, and productive future taxpayers. In this sec- tion we look at how much is spent and how it is spent, measures of performance, and reasons why our dollars apparently are not buying us what they used to. We also explore the alternatives to public elementary and sec- ondary schools and ask whether the near monopoly that is our current public school system is serving our inter- ests adequately.

As of 2014 the United States was spending nearly $700 billion to educate 62.5 million elementary and sec- ondary students. In exploring whether this amount of money is justified, we can look at how inflation-adjusted spending per pupil has been tracked over time and

compare the amounts that have been spent with outcomes such as test scores and graduation rates. It is important that we look at things in this way because as the number of students rises, the number of classrooms needed rises too. This not only raises construction and maintenance costs; it also increases the number of teachers that are needed. Thus, whether or not spending increases, it is spending per pupil that matters. In addition, because in- flation makes a 1960 dollar more valuable than a 2006 dollar, we need to adjust the spending figures for infla- tion. Though a flawed measure, the CPI is what we typi- cally use to perform that adjustment.2

From Figure 36.2 you can see that even when it is adjusted for inflation, spending per student increased dramatically over the last 56 years. While there was a leveling off in the period of economic turmoil in the late 1970s and early 1980s and another during the early 1990s, there was, nonetheless, a marked increase from $3,544 (2015 dollars) per student in 1960 to its peak of $13,476 in 2009. The trauma to state budgets caused by the Great Recession led to a nearly 9 percent decline in inflation-adjusted per-pupil spending. This constitutes the first substantial period of decreased real resources for K–12 education since the Great Depression of the 1930s. While that spending went for many other things as well, it served to decrease average class size dramati- cally. As can be seen in Figure 36.3, in 1960 there were

FIGURE 36.2 Spending per pupil in 2012 dollars.

Source: Digest of Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

Year

R e

al (2

0 15

) t o

ta l s

p e

n d

in g

p e

r st

u d

e n

t

1 9 2 0

1 9 3 4

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1 9 4 6

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1 9 8 5

1 9 8 8

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1 1 9

9 4 1 9

9 7 20

00 20

06 20

09 20

12 20

03

2See Chapter 6 for a brief review of this.

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382 Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education

number of students in a class would be expected to have a similarly significant impact on the success of students. By some measures it has, and by others, it has not.

Figure 36.4 indicates that students’ scores on the SATs over the same period did not respond in propor- tion to the reductions in class sizes, and there is no clear

more than 26 students per class; there are currently 15.6. The resource constraints caused by the Great Recession also show up here with a 4 percent increase in average class sizes from their all-time low achieved in 2009. If the demands on what needs to be taught have remained constant, such a significant long-term reduction in the

FIGURE 36.3 Student-to-teacher ratios.

Source: Digest of Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Year

S tu

d e

n t-

te ac

h e

r ra

tio

1 9 5 5

1 9 6 5

1 9 7

1

1 9 7 3

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1 9 7 9

1 9 8

1

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1

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9 9 20

01 20

03 20

05 20

07 20

09 2

0 1 1

2 0 1 3

2 0 1 9

20 25

20 21

20 23

20 17

20 15

FIGURE 36.4 SATs for college-bound students.

Source: Digest of Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest

460

470

480

490

500

510

520

530

540

550

Year

M at

h a

n d

v e

rb al

S A

T s

SATV SATM

1 9 6 6

1 9 6 8

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 2

1 9 7 4

1 9 7 6

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1 9 8 0

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20 00

20 02

20 08

20 10

20 12

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20 06

20 04

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Should We Spend More? 383

because much of the increase has gone for noninstruc- tional purposes and special education. Though it is depressing on the surface, the low SAT scores can be accounted for in part by the increasing proportion of stu- dents from low socioeconomic groups taking the SAT. The high school graduation rate, which on the surface shows improvement, should be looked at in light of the fact that General Equivalency Degrees (GEDs) are in- cluded in the data. In addition, whether it is accurate or not, the perception is that it is easier to graduate today because the standards that teachers use to evaluate stu- dents are not as high as they used to be.

While real spending per pupil has more than tripled since 1960, an increasing proportion of the amount of increase has been going for noninstructional needs. The proportion of dollars spent on people who have only a tangential impact on student learning, for ex- ample, has gone from 32 percent of total spending in 1960 to 47 percent in 2013. Employees like janitors, bus drivers, secretaries, and administrators do not teach children, and therefore we should not count the money spent on them as though it has an impact on learning. The proportion of the total staff in the classroom has fallen from 70 percent in 1950 to a little more than half in 2013. If the proportion of total spending on nonin- structional employees had remained constant, then the

evidence that reducing class size led to an improvement in SAT scores for college-bound students. If anything, the opposite happened. Average math SATs plummeted while class sizes were falling and have rebounded during the time when class sizes have leveled off. The decline in verbal SATs bottomed out later and the rebound was less dramatic. These scores are 53 points below where they had been 50 years earlier.3

On the other hand, high school graduation rates have been rising dramatically. As you can see in Figure 36.5, this is especially true for African Americans and His- panics. High school graduation rates showed marked in- creases over the last 56 years, nearly doubling for whites and Hispanics and increasing 239 percent for African Americans.

Cautions about Quick Conclusions Before you draw any conclusions from these figures about whether schools are doing a good job, you need to consider some mitigating issues. The data, which on the surface indicate that there has been more than a doubling of real spending per pupil, are easily misinterpreted

FIGURE 36.5 High school graduation rates.

Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

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Year

E d

u ca

tio n

al a

tt ai

n m

e n

t: h

ig h

sc h

o o

l o r

g re

at e

r

White Black Hispanic

1 9 6 4

19 67

1 9 7 0

1 9 7 3

1 9 7 6

1 9 7 9

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 5

1 9 8 8

1 9 9

1

1 9 9 4

19 97

20 00

20 03

20 09

20 15

20 12

20 06

3The 3-test version of the SAT may have had an impact as the scores dropped markedly for the year in which it was adopted.

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384 Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education

and they averaged a combined score of 1,000, is that better than a class of 10 where the first 5 average a 1,000 and the 6th, a less-qualified student, gets an 800? Since more people are taking the SAT now than in 1960, and since the quality of the students who would not have taken it then but take it now is lower than the quality of students who would have taken it anyway, we should expect average SAT scores to decrease. Even a level SAT average would indicate that today’s schools are doing a better job.

Test scores have fallen as spending has increased, and we have speculated about why increased spending has not resulted in higher test scores. Let’s look now at graduation rates. Though graduation rates have risen substantially over the decades, there is an open question as to whether this can necessarily be viewed as an im- provement. For one thing, prior to 2014 when the exam changed (becoming substantially more difficult), more people had earned a GED diploma than at any other time in history. Some of them had dropped out of school for various reasons. Others were prisoners who had learned that completing a GED shaved time off their sentence. It was admirable that they would do this, regardless of who they were, but even though the “E” used to stand for equivalence, few employers considered it to be the equal of a high school diploma. The best evidence for this assertion is that the income of GED holders is still far closer to the income of high school dropouts than it is to high school graduates who have not gone to college. We need to consider this when we make positive statements about the marked increase in graduation rates for African Americans. Because they hold a vastly disproportionate number of the GEDs, we have to be careful to interpret the increases in graduation rates.

Additionally, there is the common perception that high schools engage in what is referred to as “social promotion,” that is, the granting of diplomas for sur- vival rather than for achievement, a trend that critics say has increased in recent years. In response to laws such as No Child Left Behind, states began implement- ing exit exams for students to combat this perception. The result was a concerning increase in the number of students who had passed all other requirements for graduation but could not pass the tests. The response in many states like California was to suspend the test. Un- less a significant flaw is found in those tests, it seems that the evidence shows that standards have indeed been lowered and that social promotion, rather than anything to be proud of, is responsible for at least some of the increased graduation rates.

overall rate of increase could be telling us something about whether we have been getting what we paid for. It has not remained constant, so we cannot. It is still the case, however, that real instructional spending per pupil has doubled.

Some of the real instructional spending per pupil that has doubled since 1960 has been devoted to legally man- dated special education instruction. In 2014, 12.9 percent of the student population was labeled with disabilities and thus eligible for help that was subsidized through various state and federal programs. Most students who have been labeled as having physical disabilities do not require many extra resources, but some require quite expensive services. Although the Americans with Dis- abilities Act requires that the school provide all neces- sary assistance to such children while they are in school, the money that it costs to do so should not be called a spending increase for purposes of deciding whether an- nual costs per pupil are too high. Such spending does not directly benefit students without disabilities, and it therefore should be netted out of the analysis.

If we include the spending that funds special educa- tion programs in our analysis, the figures on class sizes are understated. Because the figures are derived by simply dividing the number of students by the number of teachers, and because many of the additional teach- ers focus on only a few special education children, the correct number for analysis should be the number of non–special education students divided by the number of non–special educa tion teachers.

In the past 56 years real total spending per pupil has increased, real total instructional spending per pupil has in creased, and real total instructional spending has increased for students without eligible handicapping conditions. The SAT and other test scores are lower today than they were 50 years ago. While we would not ex- pect increased spending on bus drivers or students with severe academic problems to increase SAT scores, we have every reason to expect a real increase in spending on instruction of students without disabilities to increase test scores. Because spending has increased and the test scores have decreased, it seems logical to conclude that we are not getting what we pay for in education spending. That conclusion may not be warranted, though, because the number of students taking the tests has increased and the number going to college has increased. If we look at the entire range of students, moreover, we will see that greater numbers of those who earn lower scores are represented than used to be the case. For instance, if a high school senior class of 10 has 5 going to college

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School Reform Issues 385

Literature on Whether More Money Will Improve Educational Outcomes There is a vast literature written by economists on whether increases in spending can be counted on to in- crease educational outcomes. The premise that “you get what you pay for” and that more money will make things better can be traced to the production function that we outlined in Chapter 4. Recall that this function maps the relationship between inputs and the resulting outputs. We used workers as the example for that chapter. We showed that more inputs translated into more outputs until the point where the limited capital stock or the structure of the business prevented the new workers from having a positive impact on output.

Applying that idea to education, let’s assume that the input is teachers and the output is some agreed-on mea- sure of education outcomes. Each of these assumptions requires some clarification. First, whether it is best to hire more teachers (a higher quantity) to reduce class size or whether it is best to pay teachers more to get better ones (a higher quality) or both is certainly an open question. For the purposes of our graph, we will simply assume quality and quantity are interchangeable concepts. Second, while standardized test scores do not necessarily qualify as an agreed-on measure of outcome, for simplicity of explana- tion we will assume that they do. Given all that, Figure 36.6 shows the relationship between teachers and test scores.

Eric Hanushek, a leading economist on the issue of education, summarized 377 studies where one or more

measures of input like student-to-teacher ratio (the quan- tity of teachers), teacher education, and teacher experi- ence (the quality of teachers) were used to explain test scores. He reported that most of these studies found no relationship between test scores and these inputs and that nearly as many found a negative one as a positive one. This stunning conclusion, however—that money does not matter and that spending more is a waste of taxpayer resources—is in some dispute by other econo- mists. These economists contend that test scores are less important than the earnings of the graduates. They state that over the last century graduates of schools in states that spent more had more earning power than those who graduated in states that spent less. All economists who study the issue have found, moreover, that educational outcomes are determined mostly by factors that are largely beyond the control of schools, such as family in- come and family structure.

These results are not as contradictory as they might seem. Figure 36.6 indicates that it might very well be that the structure of public schools has been such that more money had a significant impact in the 1940s through the 1960s because we were spending so little and were on the steep, upward-sloping part of the curve. The argu- ment that Hanushek and others make is that it appears that we are now “on the flat of the curve,” meaning that we have done all we can do with more teachers. Now we need to look at something else.

School Reform Issues

If we are in fact on the flat part of the educational pro- duction function and more money will not help until the structure is changed, it is reasonable to ask what the structure is and why it is limiting. There are two sepa- rate issues with regard to the structure that we explore in this section. The first is that the public education system operates as a monopoly and as such tends not to be responsive to the desires of individual students and parents. The second is that teachers’ salaries are usually not dependent on their performance. The debate about whether private schools and vouchers to pay for them might help to improve formal education makes up the remainder of this section.

The Public School Monopoly In Chapter 5 we saw that in industries dominated by mo- nopolies, prices are higher and output is less than it would be under perfect competition. Public schools operate in

FIGURE 36.6 Educational production function.

Teacher quality/quantity

Educational production function

Te st

s co

re s

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386 Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education

classroom. This is a problem because energetic teachers can become discouraged by the lack of monetary recog- nition for their efforts. Any time pay is based strictly on who you are rather than what you do, there is an incen- tive to do as little as possible.

The other serious obstacle to rewarding good teach- ers and getting rid of bad ones is teacher tenure. Much like the institution of tenure in colleges and universi- ties, K–12 educators are often granted tenure after they have successfully met certain criteria and taught for a set number of years. This means that, short of some abusive behavior, they cannot be fired. This further adds to the lack of performance incentives in older teachers.

Many teachers and their union representatives argue several points in defense of this system. First, they argue that as professionals they are above economic consider- ations and teach to the best of their ability all the time. Second, they argue that granting a principal the power to fire senior teachers and hand out merit pay would fos- ter cronyism. Only those who did the principal’s bidding would keep their jobs or get large pay increases. Last, they argue that pay in general is low relative to other pro- fessionals and that any additional money should raise all teachers’ pay to a higher level.

An additional obstacle facing the current educational system is the degree to which talented women have fled teaching jobs. Economists Caroline Hoxby and Andrew Leigh have identified a frightening degree of movement of brighter women away from teaching and an even more frightening shift of less bright women toward teaching. This, combined with the fact that very few men, bright or otherwise, choose teaching as a profession, means that salaries will have to rise in order to reattract bright men and women to the profession of teaching. Teachers’ salaries, although they have risen with inflation, have fallen relative to the salaries of equally credentialed oc- cupations. These economists argue that economics has overcome the sociological tendency of women to be at- tracted to teaching as a profession and only more pay will reverse this trend.

Private versus Public Education In the presence of failed or failing public schools, many have come to ask whether private schools should be al- lowed to receive public funds. In general, students from private schools perform dramatically better and have far fewer discipline problems than students in public schools. This happens even though most private schools exist with funding that is far less than that of public schools.

most communities as a monopoly. Though there are pri- vate schools and homeschooling, these are not real op- tions to most parents. Even more interesting is that this monopoly charges you, in the form of state and local taxes, whether or not you use the schools. It would be as if your electric company could continue sending you a bill even after you decided to buy your own electric generator.

There are reasons for this. If you believe that the ex- ternal benefits of K–12 education are so great that they justify being subsidized, then parents who choose to send their children to private schools should have to con- tinue paying school-related taxes because they are get- ting those external benefits.

Ultimately, the problem that seems to come to the fore with a monopoly is that it becomes unresponsive to the needs and desires of its customers. In the case of public schools, there is no compelling monetary incentive for the school to help a child with a particular need or to foster excellence in another child. Consider the follow- ing problem that exists at the beginning of every school year in nearly every school in the country. Every school has teachers of varying quality and many parents know who the better ones are. Parents want the teachers they consider to be better, and the principal must disappoint some of these parents. Under competition, a disap- pointed parent could threaten to move to another school. Under competition, the principal would have at least a budgetary incentive to make bad teachers better. Under the current system in most school districts, the parents are simply told, “That’s the way it is.”

Merit Pay and Tenure One of the areas that distinguishes teachers from other professionals is the lack of economic performance in- centives and the presence of lifetime job security. One recent study has found that individual teacher quality does matter. Economist Jonah Rockoff, in particular, found that he could isolate the impact of individual teachers and found that he could identify the better ones statistically by carefully matching student achievement to their past teachers. The reason is that most teach- ers in the United States are represented by a union that is an independent union, an affiliate of the National Education Association, or the American Federation of Teachers. Unions in general, and teachers’ unions in particular, prefer that pay be based solely on education and seniority.

This means that a poor teacher with more experience earns more than a good teacher with fewer years in the

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School Reform Issues 387

When private schools outperform public schools, it can be attributed to a variety of factors. Because the par- ents pay tuition to private schools out of their own pock- ets, we can surmise that the students come from homes where education matters, they are wealthier on average than their counterparts in public schools, and it is un- likely they possess academic or physical disabilities.

The question is whether, after separating out these factors, private schools do outperform. The answer is an equivocal “yes.” If you look at public school students who fit a profile similar to private school students, private schools do a little more with a little less. The difference is not as dramatic as it is without this filter, but it still exists. The primary reason is that parent involvement is higher and administrative costs are lower in private schools.

There is a concern, however, as it relates to private schools and that is that the schools would be moti- vated to admit the easiest to educate. By and large, stu- dents with higher test scores, students from two-parent households, and students without significant physical

or psychological challenges are easier to teach than other stu- dents. Cherry picking, the act of choosing students easy to edu- cate, would leave the hardest and most expensive students in the public schools.

School Vouchers The question raised by the preceding analysis is whether parents should be allowed to take their children out of a public school and have them placed in another public school or a private school that is then given the taxpayer money that would have gone to educate the child in the first public school. With cost savings and a general dislike of teachers’ unions in mind, this option is popular among Republicans. Democrats, strict believers in the “public” part of public education, generally oppose attempts at privatization.

There are, however, ongoing experiments with school vouchers. The school system in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for example, has been operating a school choice program since 1990. In this system low-income parents can obtain vouchers to send their children to secular (i.e., nonreli- gious) private schools. The degree of parental disgust with public schools can be seen in the fact that there was space for only a third of those who applied for the vouchers.4

The results of this experiment and others like it are mixed. Until recently, only a research team at the Univer- sity of Wisconsin had access to the data and they concluded that, compared to all other Milwaukee public school stu- dents, children did no better. Research that ensued after the data were released to the general academic community suggests that those in the program for three or more years did better (3 to 5 percentile points on reading and 5 to 12 on math) than those who applied but could not get in.

The debate continues on the wisdom of school vouchers from a variety of perspectives, political, ethi- cal, and economic. Research conducted separately by Helen Ladd and Derek Neal suggests that vouchers and charter schools have not performed so well, or so badly as to settle the issue from the perspective of ef- fectiveness. Part of the problem in such analysis is that parents who show an interest in getting their children out of failing public schools are likely to nurture their children in either setting. If those who succeed in get- ting their children out of the failing schools and into charter schools are highly motivated parents, then any success in the charter schools is likely to be overstated with simple analysis. These researchers found that con- trolling for that bias, the impact of charter schools is modest at best.

Collective Bargaining An issue that developed in the aftermath of the 2010 midterm elections was the degree to which the collective bargaining rights of teachers had led to, or even contrib- uted to, a perceived decline in education outcomes in public elementary and secondary education. States with Republican governors that also elected solid Republican majorities, specifically Indiana and Wisconsin, saw moves to limit the collective bargaining rights of their teachers (as well as other public employees). The moves were, at least in part, motivated by the desire to rein in non-salary-related costs.

If you read Chapter 16 and its discussion of the public employee pension crisis that is about to hit many states, you understand that it is not current teachers’ salaries that are considered the problem, but instead it is their pensions. These pensions are frequently defined ben- efit pensions with a “rule of 85” clause that allows any teacher in a state to retire with full benefits (typically 75 percent of their salary) when their age plus their years of service equals 85.

The aforementioned legislatures went after the collec- tive bargaining rights of the public employees (specifically

cherry picking The act of admitting only students who are easy to educate, leaving the harder and more expensive ones for public schools.

4State law mandated that in such a circumstance the awarding of vouchers would be determined at random.

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388 Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education

the teachers in Wisconsin) because it was collective bar- gaining that led to these types of pension arrangements, which, because they allowed teachers to retire at full ben- efits at age 55, were considered (by the Republicans) to be more generous than the state could afford.

Associated with that same collective bargaining issue was the realization that state education budgets across the country were going to be cut, and it was through

collective bargaining that teachers’ unions had negoti- ated “last in, first out” clauses for layoffs. Those in favor of significant educational reform felt that these provi- sions would inappropriately require that excellent young teachers be let go while poor (yet experienced) teachers remained. Those opposed to the stripping of collective bargaining rights for teachers, objected to what they de- scribed as the vilification of experienced teachers.

Summary You now understand that education is an investment in human capital and that this investment not only in- creases the earnings of the person being educated but has positive externalities as well. You also understand that spending more money will not necessarily yield

even more returns. Moreover, you are well aware of the debate centering on whether, with the current edu- cation structure, we are on the “flat” of the education production function. You now understand the econom- ics behind the school reform issues.

1. The evidence on the impact of spending on K–12 education outcomes suggests that, ceteris paribus, a. the more a school district spends, the better it does. b. the more a school district spends, the worse it does. c. the more a school district spends on expensive

buildings, the better it does. d. the amount of money a school district spends

has no consistent positive or negative impact on outcome.

2. The fact that education benefits not just the person being educated but society as a whole suggests that there is a a. positive externality. b. negative externality. c. congestion. d. monopoly.

3. The argument that spending more money on teach- ers has little impact on educational outcomes in K–12 is a. inconsistent with any economic model. b. consistent with the upward-sloping nature of a

production function.

Quiz Yourself

Key Terms cherry picking external benefits

human capital net present value

c. consistent with the downward-sloping nature of a demand curve.

d. consistent with the flat part of the production possibilities frontier.

4. The institution of teacher tenure is meant to a. ensure job security for teachers with 10 years of

experience. b. ensure that teachers do not get fired for political

reasons. c. allow teachers to engage in any behavior they

wish. d. allow the easy firing of incompetent teachers.

5. The evidence on charter schools is that they a. have had no impact in any locations they have

been tried. b. have had an enormously positive impact on

education generally. c. have had a negative impact on students. d. have had some impact in some locations,

but there is no generally obvious positive impact.

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Summary 389

6. If all K–12 schools were privately owned with a constant subsidy paid by the government to the school for each student enrolled, what would be one potential and likely negative consequence? a. Cherry picking b. Collective bargaining c. Tenure d. Vouchers

7. In most school districts, all other characteristics held constant, an excellent teacher earns ____ a poor teacher. a. the same as b. more than c. less than

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain how the data in Figures 36.2 through 36.5

(increasing real spending per pupil, decreasing class sizes, decreasing SATs, and increasing graduation rates) can be occurring at the same time.

2. Use the production function “flat of the curve” ex- planation to describe why more money spent on education may not have a significant impact.

3. Provide an explanation for why it is possible that average SATs that are declining might be consistent with the assertion that more people are prepared for college than ever before.

4. Suppose you were to find yourself between an advo- cate for education who claimed that you have to pay teachers more in order to get more qualified teachers and an advocate for education reform who claimed that paying the same teachers more money won’t help. Explain why they both might be correct.

Think about This As bad as the gender discrimination of the 1950s and 1960s was to the career aspirations of smart women, there was a silver lining to the dark cloud: School sys- tems could hire very smart, very capable, and very motivated women to be elementary schoolteachers and

do so for relatively modest salaries. Suppose you were a school board member in the 1980s and noticed the decline in abilities of the new graduates. What would you have done to reattract great women to the teaching profession?

Talk about This Should teachers’ salaries be tied to their performance? How would you measure their performance? Should the performance-evaluation mechanisms be strictly based on quantitative factors (e.g., test scores) or should they re- flect the subjective judgments of administrators?

For More Insight See Greene, P., Paul E. Peterson, Jiangtao Du, Leesa Boeger,

and Curtis L. Frazier, The Effectiveness of School Choice in Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Program’s Evaluation. Education and Urban Society, 1999; http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs /10.1177/0013124599031002005

Hoxby, Caroline M., and Andrew Leigh, “Pulled Away or Pushed Out? Explaining the Decline in Teacher Aptitude in the United States,” American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (May 2004).

Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 4 (Fall 1996). See articles by Francine D. Blau; Eric Hanushek; David Card and Alan B. Krueger; and Caroline Minter Hoxby, pp. 3–72.

Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 4 (Fall 2002). See articles by Helen Ladd and Derek Neal, pp. 3–44.

Lochner, Lance, and E. Moretti, “The Effect of Edu- cation on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Ar- rests, and Self-Reports,” American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (May 2004).

Rockoff, Jonah E., “The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data,” American Economic Review 94, no. 2 (May 2004).

Behind the Numbers National Center for Education Statistics; Digest of Edu­

cation Statistics—http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - S E V E N

390

College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive? Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Understand why a college education is so expensive and why those costs have been rising faster than inflation.

LO2 Explain the role of textbooks in those rising costs.

LO3 Apply the principle of present value so as to see why bor- rowing money to pay for a college education is a wise, if potentially risky, investment in future income potential.

LO4 Understand that the United States has a greater percentage of citizens with a college degree than most other devel- oped countries, though that advantage is rapidly evaporating.

Chapter Outline

Why Are the Costs So High?

Why Are College Costs Rising So Fast?

Why Have Textbook Costs Risen So Rapidly?

What a College Degree Is Worth

How Do People Pay for College?

Summary

In the preceding chapter, we raised questions about the costs and effectiveness of education through grade 12. Here we explore whether students in colleges and uni- versities are receiving good value for their money. In 2014, a little more than $517 billion was spent educating 20 million college students, which works out to $25,850 per student, per year. Obviously it costs substantially more for higher education than it does for students in elementary or secondary schools. Moreover, tuition, room, and board have increased 702 percent over the last 34 years—a period when overall prices increased only 138 percent. Figure 37.1 shows that both college tuition and college textbook prices have increased much more rapidly than has inflation.

To find out why this is so, we examine some of the economic issues for higher education. We include a

discussion of why it costs more and whether those costs are worth it to the college student consumer. We proceed to discuss how higher education is financed in the United States and finish with a discussion of one of the most significant expenses in college textbooks.

Why Are the Costs So High?

The reasons why college costs more than high school per student are both obvious and hidden. First, the obvi- ous: On the average, college professors earn salaries that are twice those of elementary and secondary teachers. Colleges have libraries that dwarf what we might see in a high school, and librarians have no choice but to subscribe to wildly expensive journals, including many

gue46399_ch37_390-399.indd 390 16/03/17 2:01 PM

Why Are the Costs So High? 391

or to advance from a less prestigious school to a more prestigious school, research and other scholarly activity are more important than teaching.

That research is expensive. Research for an English professor requires a well-stocked library and a state- of-the-art computer. This is cheap compared to what it costs to set up a biologist to do advanced research. Not only do biologists require the well-stocked library; they require a fully stocked laboratory with equipment that can separate out DNA and that can magnify samples so that individual cells can be seen. The cost of some of this equipment is so high that if you used the money to equip high schools, you could equip all the high school labs of a medium-sized city for what it costs to fund the labora- tory of a single professor at Harvard, MIT, or Stanford. On the other hand, research brings in a considerable amount of money to universities. At nearly $46 billion in 2013, the revenue associated with grants and contracts is the next biggest source of higher education revenue next to tuition at $70.5 billion.

A final reason why college is so expensive relates to the subsidies. As shown in the previous chapter about K–12 education, a college education provides private benefits to its students as well as external benefits to the public at large. The private benefits include the higher

in the sciences that have five-figure subscription prices. If you have not already noticed, college professors teach far less than high school teachers do. A professor at a research-oriented university may teach only 3 to 6 hours a week, while a professor in a teaching-oriented com- munity college may average 12 to 15 hours a week. High school teachers are in the classroom from around 8 a.m. to around 3 p.m., with some time off for lunch and preparation. They may teach five- or six-hour-long classes, five days a week. In net, a high school teacher is in class more in a single day than some professors are in a week.

Exploring reasons for the disparities between K–12 and college teachers gets us into some less obvious reasons why per-pupil college costs are so high. Educators at all levels must maintain a high level of expertise in their field. At the college level, it is accepted that professors need time for reading and studying. Professors who teach at the higher end of a discipline need particularly great amounts of time for scholarly study. Many professors are also judged by the degree to which they advance knowledge in their academic discipline. This research commands most of a professor’s time at most universities, whether or not they are regarded as prestigious. A sad fact of life in modern college educa- tion is that for a professor to advance within an institution,

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College textbooks Tuition CPI

FIGURE 37.1 College costs relative to CPI.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm

gue46399_ch37_390-399.indd 391 16/03/17 2:01 PM

392 Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

incomes college graduates earn as well as the fun college students have in and especially out of the classroom. The external benefits include the fact that the college educated pay far more in taxes over a lifetime than do those with- out such an education as well as the increased knowledge they bring to their voting and leadership activities. Thus, though perhaps not as significant as the external benefits of K–12 education, they are still high enough to justify having a considerable subsidy to that education.

Just as we used our supply and demand diagram in the previous chapter to illustrate the inefficiency of just having unsubsidized private K–12 education, we can apply the same models and principles here. Consider Figure  37.2 and what it suggests about the price of a college education. The price is the annual tuition and the quantity is the number of college students educated in a year. At low tuition rates, more will invest in a col- lege education, so the resulting demand curve is down- ward sloping. However, if tuition is low, colleges and universities will be willing to educate fewer students.

The equilibrium tuition T* and the equilibrium num- ber of enrolled students S* are what the unsubsidized market would yield. If there is an external benefit of the size shown, then the optimal number of students is much greater than the market amount. Unlike the K–12 case, the optimal number of students is likely not everyone and the optimal price is likely not zero. It does mean that students should not have to pay all of the costs and that taxpayers will have to pay a subsidy. Students should pay Tfrom student, and taxpayers should pick up the rest so that the school gets the amount they need, Tto school, to teach S′ students. Notice, though, what happens to the cost per student (not

just to the student). It rises from the T* to Tto school. Subsi- dizing something contributes to its higher costs.

Why Are College Costs Rising So Fast?

As can be seen from Figure 37.3, though tuition has been rising fast, the rise in the revenues to universities has more to do with their other enterprises than it does with tuition. Total revenues to public universities increased by $230 billion over the period 1995 to 2013. Tuition increases only accounted for $47 billion of that increase. The staples of a public university’s budget—especially a public university that is not the flagship of the state—are its tuition, its state (and to a lesser degree federal and local) appropriation, and its housing-based auxiliaries (shown in the figure as “Aux-Non-Hospital”).

There is little doubt, however, that the mix in revenues has changed dramatically throughout the years, even ignor- ing the largest part of the increase: that is, the increase in gift, investment, grant and contract, and affiliated hospital- derived income.1 Zeroing out those elements, the relative sizes of the wedges of the pie have changed markedly. Specifically, from 2007 to 2013, total federal, state, and local appropriations to public universities fell from nearly $80 billion to less than $71 billion. At that same time tuition revenue increased by 26 percent. Figure 37.4 shows that the share of revenues attributable to appropriations fell from 57 percent in 1995 to 44 percent in 2013, with almost the en- tirety of that difference being absorbed within tuition. Essen- tially, public universities are justifying their rapid increases in tuition on the relative decline in state appropriations.

Another reason for the increase in the cost of higher ed- ucation is the degree to which student expectations of their environment have changed. The contrast between post– World War II student housing and modern student housing is remarkable. The floor of 40 two-to-a-room 10 × 15-foot prison cells with a common shower and bathroom facility has been replaced by suite–style housing with private or semiprivate showers and bathrooms. According to the Na- tional Center for Education Statistics IPEDS data, between 2002 and 2014 all of that construction led to a fourfold increase in long-term debt at four-year public institutions. Those costs have been passed on to students. Further, while not always directly demanding modern exercise facili- ties, students have chosen to enroll on campuses that have built them. The costs of constructing and equipping these

S

Tuition

Tto school

T *

S*

D

Social benefit

External benefits

Enrolled studentsSʹ

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FIGURE 37.2 External benefits of a college education.

1Some larger state universities operate hospitals as part of their medical schools, and the revenue from those hospitals significantly distorts the rela- tive size of the revenue sources.

gue46399_ch37_390-399.indd 392 16/03/17 2:01 PM

Why Have Textbook Costs Risen So Rapidly? 393

in-state students, they have largely let institutions charge out-of-state students whatever they wish.

Why Have Textbook Costs Risen So Rapidly?

The market for college textbooks is a good example of a great many economic concepts: fixed and variable costs, the impact of patents and copyrights on the market for a good, the fuzziness of the line between oligopoly and monopolistic competition, and the degree to which in- creased technology increases supply. Before we get too deep into the analysis, you should understand how a text- book comes to market.

Either solicited or unsolicited, a faculty member will write a chapter or two to show a publisher why this new book would be better than those that exist. Very few of these prospective books make it past this step. Those sample chap- ters that meet with the publisher’s expectations are sent out to faculty who, when the book is published, might consider using the book for their course. They are compensated for their feedback and, if the publisher senses from that feedback

recreation centers have been passed on to students either in the form of dedicated fees or in the form of higher tuition. Universities have built them largely for enrollment reasons. As public universities have come to increasingly depend on tuition revenue, they have become increasingly sensitive to student desires. In particular, out-of-state and international students are particularly prized by public institutions. While state legislatures have placed limits on tuition increases to

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FIGURE 37.3 Revenue to public degree-granting universities. Source: National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest *2001–2002 and 2002–2003 interpolated from available data

Tuition 29%

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1995

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Appropriations 44%

2013

FIGURE 37.4 Share of university revenue: Appropriations, tuition, and non-hospital auxiliaries.

Source: National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest

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394 Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

To see where the money goes on the sale of a new book, consider the one you are reading. As shown in Figure 37.5, the current edition of this book sold for $200 as a new book in my university’s bookstore. The book was sold to the bookstore for $160 so its expenses and profit come out of the store’s $40 markup. I get 15 percent of the amount that the publisher gets, or $24. The publisher keeps between $126 and $131. The pub- lisher’s costs include very high fixed costs for such things as supplements (recent textbooks have all needed to have expensively produced testbanks, instructor’s manuals, website materials, study guides, PowerPoints, etc.) as well as costs associated with editorial staff and market- ing. The variable costs also include the cost of the paper, ink, and printing of the book itself. In all, the marginal production cost of a textbook is less than $10, sometimes as little as $5. When all is said and done, the $126–$131 margin that the publisher makes must cover all the fixed costs of production.

Here it gets tricky because the publisher, and by ex- tension the author, makes money only when a new book is sold. You do not have to be in college very long to know that you can buy used textbooks for much less than new ones and that you can sell your books back

that the book will be successful, a contract is drawn up that specifies how the author is to be paid. Typically the author will get a percentage of the sales (in the neighborhood of

15 percent) to bookstores (based on the wholesale price, net of re- turns). An advance is usually of- fered to the author against future royalties. The book takes at least a year to write, revise, edit, and publish. Often, a first edition takes much longer than subsequent edi- tions because it is typically re- viewed by a different collection of faculty around the country.

Once available for sale, the book is mailed, free of charge, to faculty all around the country that teach a course in which the book might be used. This could be thousands of books, as is the case when there is a rollout of a principles of economics book (that which is appropriate for business and economics majors) or a few hundred (when the book has a more limited audience). Faculty place their orders with their respective bookstores and the bookstores order them in the month leading up to the beginning of the semester.

Author royalty, $24

Ink, paper, printing cost, $5–$10

Publisher fixed expenses and profit, $126–$131

$200

Bookstore markup, $40

FIGURE 37.5 Where the money goes.

advance The amount of money paid to authors prior to a book’s publication. This is typically counted against future royalties.

royalties The amount of money paid to authors. Typi- cally paid on a percent- age basis.

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What a College Degree Is Worth 395

books that really work in this niche. McGraw-Hill has a monopoly on this book, but it is a competitor in this niche. The market form best suited to this area is mo- nopolistic competition.

The market for principles of economics texts is much greater and there are many more choices. There are four really big sellers and several scattered players. This is also an example of monopolistic competition. The differences between books is quite slight (mostly in presentation and emphasis), but the publishers still retain their monopoly rights. For an example of an area in which there are fewer sellers, consider the market for graduate-level textbooks in mathematical economics. For all intents and purposes, there are two. One is older than dirt and the other one is a few years old. This is an example of oligopoly. Some areas of economics are so narrow, with such a small mar- ket, that there is only one book.

A third reason why textbooks have increased rapidly in price is that, like prescription drugs, in most cases the consumer doesn’t get to pick a cheaper alternative. Textbooks are chosen for you by faculty members who are often completely oblivious to the price that will be charged for the book because they get the book mailed to them free. When students go to the bookstore and get their books, they cannot choose which book to buy (beyond their choice of used versus new, buy versus rent, or print versus e-book). They have to decide to obtain the book or not. Thus the price of the book is irrelevant in the adoption decision. Under good circum- stances, the adoption decision is typically made after a professor has looked at the choices in the area and selected the one that goes best with the course and the way the professor teaches. In the end, faculty often pick books that have the supplements they are looking for, have illustrations that simplify the subject, and that are pleasing to the eye. All of these add to the price of the book, but the price often does not enter into the de- cision to adopt the book. The student is then made to choose between buying the book or not.

What a College Degree Is Worth

Now that we have seen a few reasons why college costs so much, we can ask whether it is worth the ex- pense. To explore this question, we need again to un- derstand and to use the concept of present value. If the interest-adjusted amount of money you spend on your education, the present value of the costs, is less than the interest-adjusted amount of the extra money you

to the bookstore at the end of the semester. Typically a book that sells new for $200 will sell used for $160. The bookstore will have purchased that used book from a previous student at the same university for around $100.2 The bookstore then stocks both new books and used books and makes a profit on either. There is some risk for the bookstore in overstocking a new book, since they have to pay a restocking fee to return new books to the publisher, but there is enormous risk in overstocking used books.

The bottom line for publishers is that they are in busi- ness to make money, and new sales increase profits and used book sales eat into profits. The break-even point on a book such as this one is around 5,000 units. The next 5,000 units can easily generate nearly a half mil- lion in profits for the publisher. This is why books are on relatively short production cycles. Calculus books, though the content hasn’t changed since Newton figured it out, are revised regularly because publishers and au- thors make money only when the new edition sells for the first time.

A second significant cause behind the expense of textbooks is the market form. The book you are reading is the intellectual property of its owner. I gave that intel- lectual property to the publisher in exchange for the roy- alties they pay me for sales on the book. The copyright gives McGraw-Hill Education the exclusive right to sell this material. It also prohibits you from walking down to FedEx Office and running off copies for your friends. Copyrights are necessary to bring intellectual property to market because without them producers of the books, songs, and inventions would have no financial motiva- tion to produce them.

In some disciplines there is one standard textbook that everyone uses, while in others there are multiple texts that look very much the same. Though there are hundreds of textbooks on the market, most are not good substitutes for another. It does little good to bring your economics text to your poetry class. In the end, your professor probably had a relatively small number of books from which to choose. If you are using this book while taking a general education economics course for nonmajors, your professor had to decide whether to cram a bunch of theory in or do an issues approach. Having chosen this book, your professor chose the issues approach. There are four

2There are several reasons why a student might get less than the full buy- back price. Some include the existence of key codes for online content or custom content, or the fact that the book came in loose-leaf form.

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396 Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

40 years of $18,000 extra a year is roughly $415,000. The net present value of a college degree is $333,000, making it so that dropping out of college is likely the most expensive noncriminal mistake you could ever make. Conversely, doing well in college may be the most lucrative thing you ever do.

How Do People Pay for College?

Many college students recognize the benefits of educa- tion but cannot see themselves paying for them. While we have just shown that it makes sense to complete col- lege even if you have to borrow all of the money to do it, you know that merely racking up student loans does not mean you get a degree. This means that there is some risk involved. You have to weigh the risk of having the only thing you take away from college be debt against the benefit that you get the $333,000 in net present value. In addition, according to CollegeBoard, though it seems as if a college degree costs you a lot of money, consider the fact that at a regional bache- lors-only public university you are getting a subsidy of

earn as a result of your education, the present value of the benefits, then your college education is worth the money you pay for it.

Assume for a moment that your four years of college cost you $10,000 a year in out-of-pocket expenses and you give up another $12,000 a year in what you would have earned had you worked full time. The total cost of your education is then $22,000 a year, or a total of about $88,000. Since the expenses incurred in the sec- ond, third, and fourth years are in the future, you must discount them by the appropriate interest rate. Now as- sume that instead of making $12,000 a year without a degree, you will earn the degree and then make $30,000 a year. The benefit from going to college is the extra $18,000 you earn a year. We use $18,000 because this is roughly the difference in median income of households headed by people who have college degrees over that same figure for households headed by people with only a high school education. We must again discount these benefits, as they will happen in the future. If we assume that all of these dollar figures are inflation-adjusted and the real interest rate is 3 percent, then the present value of the costs is roughly $82,000 and the present value of

In recent years, there have been three significant changes to the text- book market that have jolted textbook companies. The first of these is the advent of a relatively old niche market for textbook rentals. Chegg and other Internet companies have revived this relatively small market in a significant way. These companies typically charge approximately half the retail price of the book but compel you to return the book to avoid being charged for the other half. To accomplish this, they will typically take a customer’s credit card information for the sale and, if the book is not returned, charge it again. This amounts to the same issue as buying new books and selling them back, but the student doesn’t take the risk that the book will be out of edition (and therefore worth much less).

Additionally, companies are beginning to see their e-book alternatives grow in popularity, in part thanks to the iPad. While some text-only books work well with e-readers such as Amazon’s Kindle, graph- and mathematics-laden books with color are ill suited to the Kindle platform but are well suited to the iPad and PC platform. Again this is like renting a book but the book does not have to be returned; it simply becomes inaccessible after a semester (or year, depending on the seller’s policies).

Finally, an increasing number of faculty who have seen their students struggle with being able to afford their textbooks have

chosen a path that is both interesting as an economist and trouble- some as an author. It had been the case that when a new edi- tion of a textbook came out, nearly every faculty member would adopt that new edition and the old editions would be of almost no value in the market. For instance, when the fifth edition of this book became available in the spring of 2010, it sold in bookstores for $125 and rented on Chegg for half that. At the same time, the fourth edition, which had sold in bookstores for $120 the semester before, was selling for less than $10 on the Internet’s many used book outlets.

What seems to be occurring now is that some faculty order the old edition for everyone in their class so everyone in the class is in the same position. The faculty member has stayed with the author’s book, but there are no profits for the publisher or roy- alties for the author. The long-run impact of this strategy will, however, result in decreasing its viability as a strategy. As more faculty fail to “roll” to the new edition, the price of old editions will rise on the Internet as their easy availability shrinks. In addition, traditional bookstores will have an increasing difficulty finding and stocking the old editions in sufficient quantity to meet the demand. This new faculty strategy is both interesting and prob- ably unsustainable.

A V O I D I N G H I G H T E X T B O O K P R I C E S

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How Do People Pay for College? 397

educational income tax deductions and credits. As a rarely discussed part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Obama’s legislation reformed the student loan program to bypass banks. The loans, instead, will be administered out of the U.S. Department of Education. Taken together, these trans- formations have allowed more students to access some form of aid, but the aid is now more likely to come in the form of a subsidized loan.

Nationally, between 1992 and 2012, the percent- age of students on some form of aid increased from 58 percent to 84.4 percent, and the percentage bor- rowing to pay for college increased from 34 percent to 56.7 percent, while the percentage receiving feder- ally funded education grants has slowly increased to 47.4 percent.

Figure 37.6 shows that if we measure the success of higher education by looking at degrees granted, there is success. On the other hand, the United States is rapidly being caught (and surpassed) by other de- veloped countries in the percentage of adults with a college education. Until recently the United States led OCED countries with a third of the adult population ages 25 to 64 having at least a four-year college edu- cation. Counting those with some college, including

nearly $0.85 for every $1 you spend. At flagship doc- toral granting state institutions the subsidy is $0.65. The subsidy at a private university is less, but it is still substantial and usually comes in the form of in- stitutional financial aid and subsidized student loans. Subsidies to universities are computed from the value of interest-reduced loans and gifts to the universities. Whether you are a student at a public or private uni- versity, you are paying great sums of money, sums that would be even greater were it not for subsidies from national, state, and private sources.

One of the interesting changes over the last three decades has been the change in the way students pay for their portion of the costs of a higher education. In the 1940s, World War II veterans received the GI Bill, which allowed many former soldiers to go to college. Not only was their tuition paid, but they were also granted a stipend upon which to live. In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government instituted pro- grams such as the Pell Grant, which provided a simi- lar benefit to children of poor families. In the 1980s, President Reagan shifted the focus to making student loans available at subsidized rates. In the 1990s, Presi- dent Clinton reformulated the loan process by increas- ing federal government involvement and sponsored

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FIGURE 37.6 College graduates as a percentage of the 24 and older population. Source: United States Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html

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398 Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?

two-year degrees, Canada has surpassed the United States. Most disturbing is that the rate for young adults (24–35) places the United States behind seven other countries. The United States is not becoming less edu- cated. It is that others are catching up. The college

attainment rate for Americans has remained steady through the years, while the rate for other countries has increased rapidly. This could ultimately threaten the comparative advantage the United States had held in this particular area.

Summary You now understand why a college education is an ex- pensive thing to provide and why those costs have been rising faster than inflation over the years. You understand that a part of that rapidly rising set of costs is associated with the cost of textbooks. You understand that the prin- ciple of present value is useful in seeing why borrow- ing money to pay for a college education is a wise, if

potentially risky, investment in future income potential and that the source of funds for students has increasingly moved from grants to loans. Finally, you understand that though higher educational attainment is higher in the United States than it is elsewhere, that advantage is evap- orating as other countries’ citizens are rapidly increasing their levels of educational attainment.

Key Terms advance royalties

Quiz Yourself 1. Which of the following has increased slowest?

a. Overall prices b. College textbook prices c. College tuition

2. What are the key reasons why college costs are higher than high school costs? a. The expenses of research b. College faculty salaries are higher than K–12

faculty salaries c. Subsidies to education cause increased demand

for it d. All of these

3. The textbook production industry has a great deal in common with the pharmaceutical industry in that there are __________ fixed costs and ____________ marginal costs. a. high; high b. high; low c. low; high d. low; low

4. Authors are typically paid for their work a. based on a percentage of the sales at college

bookstores. b. based on a percentage of the sales from publish-

ers to bookstores.

c. a fixed amount regardless of sales. d. on a per-page basis.

5. The economic tool that proves the value of an ex- pensive college education is a. production possibilities. b. the yield curve. c. supply and demand. d. present value.

6. The cost of educating a college student a. is less than the cost of educating a high school

student because college classes are generally large.

b. is equal to the cost of educating a high school student because, although college teachers make more money, their classes are generally larger.

c. is less than it used to be. d. is much greater than the cost of educating a

high school student because college professors make more money and teach fewer hours per week.

Think about This Your education, from kindergarten through college, ben- efited you and it benefited society. The proportion of a

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Summary 399

Behind the Numbers Revenues, expenses, enrollments, sources of financing.

Digest of Education Statistics—http://nces.ed.gov /programs/digest

Costs relative to other goods— www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm

International comparisons— w w w. c g s n e t . o r g / d a t a - s o u r c e s - i n t e r n a t i o n a l

-comparisons-educational-attainment Educational achievement—www.census.gov/hhes

/socdemo/education/data/cps/index.html

typical college education paid by the student has risen in recent years. How much of your college education do you pay? (Consider the state appropriation to your school if it is public, the federal and state financial aid that you get, and the value of the guarantee on any of your student loans.) Is this the right division of the burden?

Talk about This How did cost figure into your choice of school? Did you have lots of options? If you could have gotten a “full ride,” where would you have gone?

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - E I G H T

400

Poverty and Welfare Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe how poverty is measured, summarize the demographics of poverty in the United States, and show how the percentage of the population that is poor has changed through the last 40 years.

LO2 Enumerate the significant problems associated with the federal government’s official poverty rate.

LO3 List and describe the myriad programs that exist for the poor.

LO4 Explain why the government prefers programs that grant the recipient goods and services rather than money.

LO5 List the incentives and disincentives of welfare.

LO6 Summarize the welfare reform issues that we currently face.

Chapter Outline

Measuring Poverty

Programs for the Poor

Incentives, Disincentives, Myths, and Truths

Welfare Reform

Summary

Welfare and the reforming of welfare have been politi- cal issues from the time when the first “relief” bills were passed by Congress in the 1930s. In more recent times, President Bill Clinton vowed to “end welfare as we know it,” and in 1996 a compromise was reached between his administration and the Republican majority in Congress. Shortly thereafter the welfare rolls were significantly cut and welfare programs in general were significantly changed. Even so, there are myriad programs that provide assistance to people in need, and we review them in this chapter. Some of these programs, such as TANF, and WIC, read like an alphabet soup; others have catchy names, like Head Start and Medicaid; still others have more straight- forward names, like Food Stamps and the School Lunch and Breakfast Program. Each program is designed to help poor people in specific ways. Some disburse cash; others provide goods or services at little or no cost.

After defining what constitutes a state of “poverty,” we describe the people who meet the criteria. We present and discuss some of the modern history of

poverty, and we discuss why the measure of poverty we outlined might not be adequate to the task of as- certaining who needs assistance and who does not. We then describe the programs that are available to the poor. We divide the programs into those that pro- vide cash and those that provide goods and services. We discuss why we make such a division. Last, we discuss, in general terms, the incentives and disincen- tives endemic to welfare programs, and we show why it is so difficult to solve the problems of those who live in poverty.

Measuring Poverty

What does being “poor” really mean? Are you poor only if you are on the verge of starvation? This absolutist po- sition would suggest that poverty in the United States is almost entirely gone. As we will see later in our dis- cussion, one of the most significant health problems of

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Measuring Poverty 401

were $12,701 for one person, $15,379 for two people, $18,850 for three people, and $24,230 for four people. The

poverty rate is the percentage of people in households whose incomes are under the poverty line. In 2014, the poverty rate in the United States stood at 14.8 percent.

Another important measure of poverty is the poverty gap, a representation of the total amount of money that would have to be transferred to house- holds below the poverty line in

order for them to get out of poverty. The poverty gap in the United States was $96 billion as of 2014.

Who’s Poor? Table 38.1 displays indicators of who is poor and com- pares that to their general portion of the population. Many people think that most poor people are African American. While many academics are quick to dispel that myth, they often perpetuate another with a counter-assertion that most poor people are white. Neither is true if you separate European Americans from Hispanic Americans. Table 38.1 shows disproportionate numbers of blacks and Hispanics are in poverty and that they comprise a

America’s poor is that they are obese rather than starv- ing. On the other hand, there is the position that pov- erty is a relative concept. We note that someone who has the living standard of a median-income Somalian is in poverty in the United States but not in Somalia, and an American today with an average income has a living standard that 100 years from now will likely be consid- ered unacceptably poor. To see this point, note that the poor of today live in larger homes than all but the very richest Americans did in 1900.

The Poverty Line Surveys have established reasonably well that low- income families of four spend roughly a third of their income on

food. Defining the poverty line as that level of annual income suf- ficient to provide a family with a minimally adequate standard of living, we created the first pov- erty line by multiplying the cost

of a minimally sufficient diet by 3, the reciprocal of one- third. In successive years, the amount has been raised by the amount of increase in the consumer price index. For other family sizes, a similar process takes place where the reciprocal of the fraction of income spent on food by low- income people of that family size is multiplied by the cost of the minimally sufficient diet. In 2014, these numbers

poverty rate The percentage of people in households whose incomes are under the poverty line.

poverty gap The total amount of money that would have to be transferred to households below the poverty line for them to get out of poverty.

poverty line That level of income sufficient to provide a family with a minimally adequate standard of living.

Demographic

General Population (in millions)

Percentage of the General Population

Percentage of Those in Poverty

Poverty Rate (%)

People in Poverty

White, non-Hispanic 195.2 61.8% 42.1% 10.1 19.7 Hispanic 55.5 17.6 28.1 23.6 13.1 Black, non-Hispanic 41.1 13.0 23.1 26.2 10.8 Male 154.6 49.0 44.4 13.4 20.7 Female 161.2 51.0 55.6 16.1 25.9 Under 18 73.6 23.3 33.3 21.1 15.5 18 to 64 years 196.3 62.1 56.9 13.5 26.5 65 and over 46.0 14.6 9.8 10.0 4.6 Female-headed household, no husband present

48.0 15.2 34.1 33.1 15.9

High school dropout* 24.6 7.8 15.2 28.9 7.1 High school graduate (no college)* 62.6 19.8 19.1 14.2 8.9 Some college (no degree)* 56.0 17.7 12.3 10.2 5.7 Bachelor’s degree or greater* 68.9 21.8 7.4 5.0 3.4

TABLE 38.1 Who’s poor.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau: Current Population Survey, www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/index.html

*There are different thresholds for different compositions of each group. These figures are for a single adult under 65, two adults, two adults and one child, and two adults and two children, respectively.

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402 Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare

majority of the Americans living below the poverty line. It is obvious that there is a significant degree of racial and ethnic distinction in U.S. rates of poverty.

The data indicate that women are more likely to be in poverty than men; and, if we define “families” as not in- cluding single adults, then of families in poverty, half are in female-headed households while 39 percent are fami- lies of married couples. Given that female-headed house- holds with children make up only 15.8 percent of the general population, poverty is clearly a women’s issue.

It is also true that children under 18 make up 33 per- cent of those who are poor, though they comprise only 23.3 percent of the general population. This is a poverty rate among children of 21.1 percent. Whether this in- dicates that the poor have more children or that raising children can itself lead families into poverty can be de- bated. Clearly, the picture of poverty is this: Minorities, women, and children are poor in numbers vastly out of proportion to their numbers in the general population.

Another key indicator of poverty is education or, more properly, the lack of it. Those with a bachelor’s degree experience poverty at one-sixth the rate of high school dropouts. Simply completing high school cuts the chance of being in poverty by half, and simply attend- ing college reduces the chance of being in poverty from 14.2 percent to 10.2 percent. Completing college reduces the rate even further. Only 1 in 20 households headed by a college graduate is in poverty.

Poverty through History Figure 38.1 indicates that although the number of peo- ple in poverty is roughly the same as it was in 1959, the poverty rate has fallen dramatically. As we will discuss later, the poverty rate shown fails to account for the many government benefits. This means that the reduction in the poverty rate since 1959 can be attributed to an eco- nomic strengthening for those whose incomes are at the bottom of the economic scale.

In considering the decline in the general trend in pov- erty, be aware of the following caveats. The poverty rate has remained largely unchanged since the middle 1960s when the “war on poverty” actually began. From that time to the present it has neither fallen below 11 percent nor, until the Great Recession, gone above 15.2 percent. The systemic reduction, as a matter of fact, occurred be- tween 1959 and 1969, before the enactment of many of the antipoverty programs. Noting that the shaded bars in Figure 38.1 indicate recessions, we can see that the poverty rate has increased during recessions and less- ened during periods of growth. Democratic presidents Kennedy and Johnson get much of the credit for the pre-1969 reduction in the poverty rate. However, this was a result more of a strong economy’s providing ex- cellent economic opportunities than anything these ad- ministrations did for the poor. The bulk of the pre-1969 decline took place prior to 1965 when these programs first began to become law. Since 1969 Democrats and

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FIGURE 38.1 Poverty since 1959. Source: U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html

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Measuring Poverty 403

rich but called poor. However, it is important to note that the poverty line measures only people’s income relative to a fixed standard that ignores measures of wealth.

Another shortcoming of the formula that is used to determine the poverty line is that it only includes in- come that is in cash. Thus programs that the poor take advantage of that are not cash-driven are incorrectly and absurdly omitted as if they have no value. For instance, the $200 in food stamps that a family might get a month is not counted, and if they found a subsidized rental apartment and free medical care, these also would not be counted. Depending on the study you believe, this failure to include income that is in forms other than cash overstates poverty by between two and four percentage points.

As we saw in Chapter 6, the consumer price index that is used to update the poverty line each year has many shortcomings. Best estimates are that prior to 2008 it has overestimated the cost of living by a full percentage point and in subsequent years by eight-tenths of a percentage point. Since the increase in the poverty line is generated using this flawed measure, it is likely that the poverty line has long been overstated relative to its real value in the 1960s. Figure 38.2 indicates that although the lower line, the adjusted version, tracks the upper line through- out the 1960s, the spread is significant enough that if you take the 1959 poverty line as the base on which to build the adjusted poverty line, you see that instead of being $24,230 in 2014 it should have been $15,752.

Besides the possible overstating of poverty that we have seen up to this point, there are additional problems with this measure that result in mislabeling some people as poor and others as not poor. As we mentioned specifically in the previous paragraph, the general CPI is used to adjust the poverty line. Because the CPI is a general indicator of the prices of many goods, it does not necessarily reflect the goods that are bought by people living in poverty. To the degree that poor people buy things that have increased in price more than the overall CPI, the “true” poverty line probably would fall between the two shown in Figure 38.2.

The way costs of living vary from area to area leads to  yet another source of mismeasurement of the num- bers of people who live in poverty, and it is a source about which there is uncertainty of the direction of the bias. Because it is much more expensive to live in San  Francisco, California, than in Appleton, Wisconsin, for example, families of four in San Francisco with incomes that are a single dollar over the poverty line figure of $24,230 are significantly worse off than families of four in Appleton with incomes one dollar under the poverty line. In this way the poverty rate

Republicans have nearly identical records with respect to poverty. Generally speaking, the poverty rate is a re- flection of the health of the overall economy.

Problems with Our Measure of Poverty There is a host of reasons why using three times the cost of a minimally sufficient diet as a measure of poverty is inadequate to the task of measuring who is poor. First, it does not distinguish among families that are intact with one income earner and families that either are not intact or for other reasons have day-care costs. Since nearly 34  percent of families living in poverty are headed by single women with children under 18, this is potentially a significant problem. Since the one-third fraction that was used in the original poverty measure came from a survey conducted when there were fewer such female-headed households, the poverty line could be understated by all or part of the cost of day care. According to a 2013 study by the Census Bureau day-care costs averaged $179 per week (about $9,300 per year) for a child under five. For older children the average cost is $93 per week (nearly $4,900). Ignoring these costs, even if there are many children in poverty who are watched by grandparents (30 percent), significantly understates poverty.

Although this indicates that poverty is understated, there are problems with the measure that indicate that poverty may be overstated. Robert Rector of the conser- vative Heritage Foundation repeatedly updates statistics that purport to show that poverty is not a problem in the United States.1 He uses government surveys and pub- lished statistical documents to show that 42 percent of households considered poor own their homes, 80 percent have air conditioning, 75 percent own a car, and 31 per- cent own two or more cars. He notes that the square footage of living space of America’s poor is greater than the square footage of the average western European, and the diet of the average poor American equals or exceeds the recommended daily allowances of important nutri- ents. As a matter of fact, one of the singular features of the poor in the United States is their rate of obesity, which implies that few are actually starving.

Specifically on the point of wealth, nearly a million poor families own homes worth more than $150,000. There are hundreds of thousands of people in the United States who have little income but who are worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some are even millionaires. Ad- mittedly, it is a small number of people like this who are

1 A recent version is available at www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/09 /poverty-and-the-social-welfare-state-in-the-united-states-and-other-nations.

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404 Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare

values, and looked at the percentage of people  in vari- ous European countries who would fall below this line. Using this measure, he noted that U.S. poverty rates were higher than eight of the nine countries examined. When he focused strictly on income inequality, measured by the percentage of people living on incomes below 40 percent of a country’s median disposable income, he found that the United States had the most unequal income of any of the countries compared.

Programs for the Poor

In Kind versus In Cash The programs available to the poor are many and com- plicated. They are better understood as varying from state to state rather than being one consistent program across the country. Further, these programs are best understood as being divided between cash payments and provisions of goods and services in forms other

than cash. Economists refer to the latter types as in-kind subsidies. Table 38.2 describes the different programs, the

functions, and the populations they serve, as well as the restrictions placed on eligibility to receive them.

underestimates both urban poverty and poverty on the coasts. It overestimates the incidence of poverty in rural areas, small cities, in the South, and in the Midwest.

There is a final reason to doubt official poverty numbers, and that is a missing $2 trillion. In Chapter 6, when we talked about national income accounting, we briefly explained the sources of the numbers that make up the gross domestic product. It turns out that data used by the Census Bureau add up to substantially less, $2 trillion less, than the source numbers for personal income used in GDP calculations. While much of the missing $2  trillion is the in-kind transfers mentioned above, this certainly does not account for all of it. It is clearly true that most of that probably goes to the nonpoor. Some of it must also be in the hands of the poor, so there are clearly some who are labeled poor who are not.

Poverty in the United States versus Europe As referred to in the opening, most countries have their own measures of poverty and they are not directly com- parable. Timothy Smeeding, one of the foremost econo- mists on the subject of poverty and income inequality, has attempted to create those comparable measures. He used the U.S. poverty line, adjusted it for different currency

2,000

7,000

12,000

17,000

22,000

27,000

Year

P o

ve rt

y lin

e (C

P I a

d ju

st e

d )

Poverty line Adjusted poverty line

1 9 5 9

1 9 6

1 1 9

6 3 19

65 19

67 1 9

6 9 1 9

7 1 1 9

7 3 1 9

7 5 1 9

7 7 1 9

7 9 1 9

8 1 1 9

8 3 19

85 1 9

8 7 1 9

8 9 1 9

9 1 1 9

9 3 19

95 1 9

9 7 1 9

9 9 20

01 20

03 20

05 20

13 2 0

1 1 20

09 20

07

FIGURE 38.2 Poverty line with and without CPI adjustment.

in-kind subsidies Provisions of goods and services in forms other than cash.

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Programs for the Poor 405

Cash or In-Kind and Annual Federal + State Cost Population Program Function ($ billions) Served Eligibility Requirements

Temporary Cash income Cash, $32 Poor parents Though this varies from state to Assistance to to the poor and their state, the following Needy Families (the children generalizations can be made: (TANF); welfare under 18 Recipients (1) have to have formerly check) children; (2) cannot have much called wealth (usually less than $5,000 AFDC net), including house and car;

(3) can remain on the program for 24 consecutive months only

Women, Food, formula, In-kind, $6.3 Pregnant Low wealth and income; cutoffs Infants and and diapers women and depend on the state Children (WIC) new mothers Food Stamps Vouchers that In-kind, $70 All poor Low wealth and income; cutoffs (now called SNAP) can be spent depend on the state; recipients only on food can remain on the program for

only 24 consecutive months Medicaid In-kind, $496 All poor Low wealth and income; cutoffs depend on the state Section 8 or Reduced rent In-kind, $45 All poor Low wealth and income; cutoffs Housing or low-cost depend on the state Authority housing Apartment Head Start Day care; In-kind, $7.7 Poor with First come, first served for preschool children anyone below 1.25 poverty line under 5 School Lunch Lunch and In-kind, $16 Poor with Anyone below 1.30 poverty line breakfast school-age children Supplemental Cash Cash, $58 Disabled Someone (a parent, guardian, or Security assistance and widow- spouse) must be disabled or Income (SSI) to “deserving (er)s and must have died poor” orphans Poor with school-age children Earned Income Negative tax; Cash, $58 Working Based on family size; phases in Tax Credit (EITC) boost low- poor at incomes up to $13,849, then pay workers phases out for incomes between

$18,150 and $47,747; family of four maximum now, $6,242

TABLE 38.2 Programs for the poor and their characteristics, FY2014.

Sources: Data compiled by the author

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406 Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare

more sense to give the adult access to such services rather than cash. This minimizes the likelihood that the money will be diverted by adults away from the targeted children.

Third, some welfare benefits seem designed more to provide those who tender them with a feeling of magna- nimity than to benefit the poor. If it is our own happiness we are maximizing and if our happiness is enhanced by the knowledge that we provided the poor with enough to survive, it may be even more important to us that we en- sure that the poor are consuming what we think is good for them rather than what they want.

Is $789 Billion Even a Lot Compared to Other Countries? Though the United States spends $789 billion on its antipoverty programs, the Smeeding analysis puts this in perspective by noting that European antipoverty programs are far more aggressive. He notes that after accounting for taxes and various welfare programs, the system in the United States reduces poverty (defined by him as the percentage of people living below 50 per- cent of median household disposable income) by only 26 percent, whereas the average European country’s pro- grams reduce their poverty by more than 60 percent.

Incentives, Disincentives, Myths, and Truths

While no one has ever intended this to be the case, many of the programs designed to help the poor are blamed for ensuring that people who live in poverty and who receive benefits have no incentive to become self-sufficient. The existence of welfare is accused of giving people a reason not to work. It is blamed for encouraging young women both to get pregnant and to carry the pregnancy to term. Welfare is indicted for encouraging recipients to have more children so that their WIC will be extended and their food stamps and TANF payments increased. The structure of TANF’s predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Chil- dren (AFDC), was blamed for breaking up poor families by giving them the incentive to have the father leave. Together, these problems created the concern that welfare was be- coming a way of life and that people were getting used to it.

From a theoretical perspective, each of the preceding arguments has merit, but the evidence from economic studies is not one-sided. First, there are several counter- claims. Birthrates among teenagers climbed steadily from the 1960s through the early 1990s and leveled off when the states and then the federal government instituted

Why Spend $789 Billion on a $96 Billion Problem? Given the preceding information on the extent of poverty and the dollar costs of poverty programs, the following should strike you: If the poverty gap is $96 billion, why do the various levels of government spend more than six times that on poverty programs? The answer is two- fold: (1) There are people above the poverty line in need whom we choose to help; and (2) poverty programs must be terribly inefficient if it genuinely takes $789 billion to cure a $96 billion problem.

Table 38.2 shows that billions more are spent on goods and services than are spent in cash benefits. Including some minor programs not mentioned in Table 38.2, cash benefits total around $148 billion, whereas in-kind ben- efits total $641 billion. Clearly the government spends far more money on programs that give it control over recipients’ behavior. For instance, we think the poor do not have enough to eat, adequate medical services, ade- quate housing, and so on. Instead of providing them with enough money to pay for these things, the government provides them with what it thinks they need.

If there is a family whose members enjoy good health, it is conceivable they would rather have more money spent on food and less on medical care. They cannot make that substitution. People who live in poverty are denied the ability to make basic decisions when they are given spe- cific goods and services rather than money. In many stud- ies of the poor, it is clear that they value cash more than the goods they are provided. Some food stamp (SNAP) recipients show exactly how little they value food stamps and WIC vouchers by selling them on Craigslist/eBay for 50 cents on the dollar.2 Why haven’t programs been de- signed so that people in need receive cash and are then en- couraged to make their own decisions on how to spend it?

There are several reasons, but three are obvious. First, through their elected officials, voters have made it clear they do not trust the judgment of the people who receive government benefits concerning what goods they buy. Many believe that if the poor could make good decisions, they would not be poor to begin with.

Second, people are more concerned with the welfare of needy children than with the welfare of adults. If you look at the programs with this in mind, you will see that nearly all of them require the presence of a child for an adult to be eli- gible. If we want to guarantee services for children, it makes

2Replacing the coupons of the food stamp program with the SNAP cards has significantly reduced fraud by an estimated 67 percent.

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Welfare Reform 407

known location of absent fathers to get benefits. Clearly, whether the need to apply for welfare leads to the breakup of families that would have stayed together is debatable. The reason that some welfare programs are contingent on a parent’s being absent stems from the conviction that if there are two able-bodied adults in a household, one of them should be working. Either the problem of absent fathers is a coincidence or it is the price society is pay- ing for building welfare requirements around a view that families with both parents present should not be eligible for assistance unless one is disabled.

Fourth, under AFDC, that is, prior to the welfare re- forms of 1996, welfare dependency had been growing at an alarming rate. Some 26 percent of recipients had been receiving benefits from the program for 10 years or more at the same time that the percentage of families that had been on welfare for very short periods of time was falling. In addition, daughters of recipients were tending to become recipients themselves. These circumstances and others like them led Congress and the president to agree to change welfare programs to incorporate limits on the length of time people could receive benefits and to require that recipients become gainfully employed.

Welfare Reform

Is There a Solution? To be successful, a social safety net must meet three goals:

1. The program that is designed cannot be so expensive that the taxpaying public will not sustain it.

2. The program must have an incentive built in that makes beneficiaries want to leave it.

welfare reforms designed to curb benefits. The truth is that the real dollar value of benefits per recipient is lower today than it was in the late 1960s. Thus, if poor teenag- ers were really considering the value of welfare in mak- ing decisions about having children, teen pregnancy rates would have fallen from the mid-1970s on as the real value of the benefits fell. It is more likely that the culture and teen sex drives had more to do with teen pregnancies than the prospect of receiving welfare checks.

Second, although it was and still is true that the more children you have, the more benefits you get, there is no systematic evidence that people on welfare had more chil- dren because they were on welfare. If welfare mothers were concerned only for themselves and the benefits they could get, it would make sense that they would have chil- dren so they would be eligible for more benefits. What had to have been evident to them, however, is that the increase in benefits does not cover any more than the increased cost of raising an additional child. Unless we want to claim that the poor do not care about their children, there is little like- lihood that rational women would get pregnant and do the work of raising an additional child in order to keep a few extra dollars a month. They could make more money with less effort if they cleaned houses on the side.

Third, it is true that families on welfare are far more likely to have absent fathers, but it is hard to say whether the father’s leaving was caused by the need to be wel- fare-eligible or the family became welfare-eligible be- cause the father left. In order to accept the argument that welfare caused a rash of absent fathers, you must hold the cynical belief that a well-meaning father would abandon his children so they could receive benefits. Al- though this might have been the case prior to 1996, today, after welfare reform, the abandonment would have to be complete. A mother now has to name and state the last

The world of welfare is replete with urban legends. My favorite goes something like this: “I was standing in line at the grocery store one day behind a nicely dressed woman who was buying beer, steak, shrimp, and a whole bunch of stuff I couldn’t afford. She had them put the steak and shrimp on her food stamp card and used her cash to buy the beer. She packed up her groceries and went to her brand new SUV.” In teaching this subject for years, I have heard this story in countless renditions from students who were either customers or grocery employees. The story is almost always the same. While the

story may be about fraud, it is also quite likely about their misinter- preting the actions of a foster parent.

Most states give foster families Medicaid cards and an allotment on a food stamp card to pay for the food and medical expenses of the children in their care. That some of these families are wealthy enough to afford nice meals and nice vehicles does not diminish our obligation to pay them for the service they are providing us by caring for orphaned, discarded, or abused children or those children whose parents are in prison.

W E L F A R E ’ S B E S T U R B A N L E G E N D

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408 Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare

incentives for relinquishing benefits were too expensive. Instead of being offered incentives to leave the program, people are now told how long their benefits will keep com- ing. States are given block grants of money (TANF) that they are supposed to use to aid their poor. Instead of having to give it away in cash benefits, as they did under AFDC, they can now spend it on job training, child care, or tax breaks for businesses that are willing to hire welfare recipi- ents. States must set time limits of 24 months or less and they must establish work requirements for some programs. Supplemental Security Income rules for disability have changed such that some people who were once eligible for full benefits are now eligible for only partial benefits.

By 1999, welfare caseloads had fallen to their lowest point in three decades. Though it is difficult to tell how much of this was due to the robust economy of the 1990s, it is clear that the reforms that were instituted have had some effect. Economist Rebecca Blank summarized the growing research that has been conducted on this issue by noting that through the reforms of providing assistance to work, monetary incentives to work, and requirements to work, the current array of programs is raising incomes and in- creasing employment in ways previous programs did not.

Is Poverty Necessarily Bad? There are many economists who object to the implied premise of this entire chapter: namely, that poverty is a bad thing. Without a carrot—wealth, and a stick—poverty, these economists believe that people would have little in- centive to “work hard and play by the rules.”3 If accepted as valid, this philosophy would suggest that there is a trade-off between rates of economic growth and rates of economic inequality. There is evidence from the 1980s through today that countries with low rates of economic inequality had low rates of economic growth, but there is much disagree- ment about whether the former caused the latter.

3. The program must provide enough of a level of basic necessities that recipients have a socially acceptable standard of living.

The problem facing policy analysts in the United States has always been that these goals cannot be satisfied simultaneously.

Any program must have a phaseout level of income. If the phaseout is too quick, meaning that for every dollar you earn you lose significant welfare benefits, the disincentive to work will be too profound. The AFDC program reduced benefits by nearly a dollar for every dollar the recipient earned. This nearly 100 percent take-back rate meant that without a salary at least twice the minimum wage in a job, a single parent with two small children requiring day care would be far better off on welfare than working.

If the phaseout is too slow, then too many people will be getting welfare benefits and not enough will be paying taxes. Though this is possible, it violates the first goal, that of having a program that does not cost too much money. On the other hand, the phaseout could be slow and of low cost to taxpayers. The problem would then be that there would not be enough money for recipients to survive on.

The implicit choice made by policy makers prior to the reforms of welfare that were instituted in 1996 was to give up on providing incentives to leave the program. The increase in long-term dependency on the program can, at least in part, be blamed on this decision. The near 100 per- cent take-back rate on AFDC left people with no earned income better off than people making $10,000 a year. The result was that only those recipients who could invest in an education could ultimately afford to leave the program.

Welfare as We Now Know It In the 1996 reforms, the problem of welfare dependency was tackled by simply ordering people to leave welfare. The institution of time limits was an acknowledgment of the concern that dependency was wrong and that monetary 3This phrase was often used by President Clinton as a political mantra.

Summary You now understand how poverty is measured, who is poor in the United States, and how the percentage of the population that is poor has changed through the last 57 years. You are able to describe some of the significant problems presented by the official poverty rate. You understand the myriad programs that exist

for the poor, note that most of the programs grant the recipients goods and services rather than money, and understand why it is that government does this. Last, you are aware of the incentives and disincentives in the welfare state, and you know the welfare reform issues that we currently face.

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Summary 409

Key Terms in-kind subsidies poverty gap

poverty line poverty rate

Quiz Yourself 1. Poverty is a _____ concept in that a person with that

income in the United States may be considered in pov- erty, while a person with that same income in Somalia may be in the upper quarter of income earners. a. relative b. absolute c. irrelevant d. fictitious

2. In a simple 300 million–person world of all four- person families, if the poverty line is $12,500 and half of the 10 million families (with 40 million poor people) earn $10,000 and the other half earn $7,500, then the poverty gap is a. $125 billion (= 10 million * $12,500). b. $250 billion (= 20 million * $12,500). c. $150 billion (= 20 million * $2,500 +

20 million * $5,000). d. $37.5 billion (= 5 million * $2,500 +

5 million * $5,000). 3. In a simple 300 million–person world of all four-

person families, if the poverty line is $12,500 and half of the 10 million families (with 40 million poor people) earn $10,000 and the other half earn $7,500, then the poverty rate is a. 3.33% (10 million/300 million). b. 13.33% (40 million/300 million). c. 16.66% (50 million/300 million). d. 96.33% ([300 million − 10 million]/300 million).

4. Using a poverty line of $12,500, under the current system of calculating the poverty rate, which of the following people is not considered in poverty and probably ought to be? a. A rural family whose sole income is from a

minimum wage ($10,300) position b. A rural family whose combined income is

$15,000 c. A New York City family whose combined

income is $13,000 d. A retired couple whose multimillion-dollar

estate yields them no income 5. Using a poverty line of $12,500, under the current

system of calculating the poverty rate, which of the

following people is considered in poverty and prob- ably ought not to be? a. A rural family whose sole income is from a

minimum wage ($10,300) position b. A rural family whose combined income is

$15,000 c. A New York City family whose combined

income is $13,000 d. A retired couple whose multimillion dollar

estate yields them no income 6. The distribution of aid to the poor between in-kind

and in-cash is a. roughly equal. b. weighted heavily toward in-cash benefits. c. weighted slightly toward in-kind benefits. d. weighted heavily toward in-kind benefits.

7. The most obvious pattern in poverty rates is the degree to which they are higher during a. Democratic administrations. b. wars. c. odd years. d. recessions.

8. The evidence is that welfare reform in 1996 resulted in _____ welfare rolls. a. a substantial increase in b. a slight increase in c. a substantial decrease in d. no impact on

Short Answer Questions 1. Compare the data on who is in poverty to whatever

stereotype you may have had prior to reading this chapter.

2. What do the data suggest with regard to poverty and the age profile of those in poverty relative to the age profile generally?

3. What measure of poverty would give you the low- est possible estimate of the amount of money you would need to solve the nation’s poverty problem? Why would only spending that amount not likely be a good solution to the problem?

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410 Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare

4. If you were to construct a poverty measure, what would you put into the calculations to deal with the issues listed in the chapter?

Think about This The wealth of one person, Bill Gates, is about equal to the annual poverty gap in the United States in one year, $96 bil- lion. The United States has a more significantly unequal division of income than any other industrialized country. What are the consequences of that unequal distribution?

Talk about This What other “urban legends” exist about the poor and welfare? What research could be conducted to dispel these legends or prove them to be factual?

For More Insight See Blank, Rebecca M., “Evaluating Welfare Reform in the

United States,” Journal of Economic Literature XL (December 2002).

Journal of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 2 (Spring 1997). See articles by Peter Gottschalk; George Johnson; Robert Topel; and Nicole Fortin and Thomas Lemieux, pp. 21–96.

Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 1 (Winter 1998). See articles by Dale Jorgenson; and Robert Triest, pp. 79–114.

Smeeding, Timothy, “Poor People in Rich Nations: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006).

Wolff, Edward, “Recent Trends in the Size Distribution of Household Wealth,” Journal of Economic Perspec- tives 12, no. 3 (Summer 1998).

Behind the Numbers Detailed Poverty Tabulations from the Current Popula-

tion Survey—www.census.gov Historical Poverty Tables, Current Population Survey—

www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty Federal Spending on Programs for the Poor, Detailed

Functional Tables—www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget

Statistics of those in poverty. The Heritage Foundation; paper by Robert Rector—

http://www.heritage.org/pover ty-and-inequality /report/how-poor-are-americas-poor-examining-the -plague-poverty-america

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C H A P T E R T H I R T Y - N I N E

411

Head Start Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Understand that Head Start is a program that provides early childhood education to nearly a million children.

LO2 See that the premise of the program is similar to any investment premise that money spent now will yield results in the future.

LO3 Analyze Head Start using present value concepts.

LO4 Understand that evidence that the program works is rather scant, concentrates on the time the child is in the program, and cannot be used to affirm that Head Start’s effects last into adulthood.

LO5 Understand that there is an opportunity cost to the $8 billion program.

Chapter Outline

Head Start as an Investment

The Head Start Program

The Current Evidence

The Opportunity Cost of Fully Funding Head Start

Summary

Established in 1965, the Head Start program serves 944,581 children under the age of five at an annual cost of more than $8.2 billion. It began on the seemingly sound premise that early intervention in the lives of chil- dren can pay dividends later in the form of improved educational outcomes, reduced crime rates, and other so- cially desirable outcomes. Thus Head Start has enjoyed broad political support, despite a vigorous debate over whether it has engendered a long-run positive influence.

We explore the premise that undergirds the notion that early intervention in the lives of children is worth the investment. We offer a cautionary note concerning the effectiveness of a short-term investment in early child- hood education. We fully describe the program and show the increase in enrollment and funding that Head Start has enjoyed. Additionally, we describe its mission, its faculty, and its client children. We examine the evidence of the success of Head Start as well as the evidence of its shortcomings, and we offer a final thought on the op- portunity cost of fully funding it.

Head Start as an Investment

The Early Intervention Premise When social scientists looked at the problem of pov- erty in the 1960s, many hoped that with enough money, poverty could be significantly reduced and perhaps per- manently eliminated. Early evidence gave them great hope. The poverty rate fell from more than 20 percent in 1960 to less than 11 percent a decade later, but it never fell below that. Though nearly $800 billion has been spent each year on poverty programs, the official pov- erty rate has continued to hover between 11 percent and 15 percent ever since.

More troubling has been the degree to which people whose annual incomes are lower than the poverty line have settled into habits that almost guarantee they will remain in poverty permanently. The poor are far more likely than the nonpoor, for example, to drop out of school, father children or become pregnant as teens, use illegal drugs, or get arrested. At the inception of Head

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412 Chapter 39 Head Start

External Benefits When people other than the consumer or producer of a good get a benefit from a good, economists refer to this as a positive externality. The argument here is that when

parents choose the child care for their child, people other than themselves, their child, or their day-care worker are affected. By choosing a high-quality op-

tion, other parts of society stand to benefit because the presumption is that the child is more likely to be a pro- ductive citizen in the future. Whenever there are such external benefits, economists will generally concede that some form of subsidy is warranted.

The Early Evidence The efficacy of the premise underlying the desirability of early intervention was fortified by studies from the 1960s through the 1980s that showed how effective early child- hood education could be. The most prominent of these studies followed several hundred young, poor children, half of whom were given an excellent preschool expe- rience free for two years, and half of whom were given nothing. The half that got the schooling not only per- formed better on IQ tests when they entered school, but also performed better in school, were less likely to commit crimes as teens, and graduated at far higher rates than the group that did not get that early education. By nearly every measure the children given the “head start” stayed ahead.

Advocates of Head Start maintained that for every dollar spent on early childhood education, five dollars would be returned in increased tax revenues and reduced welfare spending. While not reported in present value terms, recalculating it that way using reasonable interest rates suggests that such an investment would be a good one. Armed with that early evidence, Head Start began with great hope that in a generation or two, early child- hood education would make significant inroads into pov- erty in the United States.

The Remaining Doubts Even in the early years, some people questioned the premise that the investment in early childhood education could have the kind of return that was projected. These doubts were based mainly on the implausibility that a few years of preschool could enable children to overcome the effect of poverty and other social problems. Although most Head Start programs are offered for half days during the school year, even children in the all-day, all-year form

Start people thought that early intervention in the lives of children could lessen or even eliminate some of the sources or causes of poverty. Theoretically, children given academic skills, life skills, and health care to promote a “head start” on life would be more likely to succeed.

The early intervention premise suggests two things about money spent on a quality early education. By in- terrupting a cycle of poverty, we save future taxpayers money. This can be analyzed using the Chapter 7 concept of present value. What is also implied about this premise is that people other than the child and the parent benefit when a child gets high-quality care. We examine this as- pect as well.

Present Value Analysis Those who founded Head Start hoped that money in- vested early in the education of young children would pay for itself in the long run: Students who were not judged among the likely to succeed would graduate from school, live with good standards of hygiene, earn respectable incomes, and pay taxes. Ideally, using the economic concept of present value, we would be able to prove that, like any good investment, such early child- hood education would pay for itself. As you know, pres- ent value is arrived at by discounting future payments by projecting interest rates in a way that puts future and present dollar figures on an even basis. Because human nature is to want things now rather than later, dollars paid now are more valuable to people than dollars paid in the future. Therefore, if the present value of the dol- lars spent on early education is less than the present value of the stream of benefits, then any such early edu- cation program is a good investment.

Suppose it could be shown that having a child in Head Start reduced a child’s likelihood of dropping out of school, of getting pregnant, and of committing crimes for which jail time was required. Suppose it could also be shown that Head Start increased the likelihood that the child would grow up to be a fully functional taxpayer.1 If all that were true it still would not necessarily justify the investment. From a strictly economic perspective, the present value of the increased costs associated with Head Start would have to be exceeded by the present value of the benefits as measured by the increased taxes and re- duced welfare and imprisonment costs.

1Later in this chapter you will see that there is an open debate over whether Head Start has had any of these effects.

positive externality The benefits that go to someone other than the consumer or producer of a good.

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The Head Start Program 413

of Head Start spend only 4,600 hours in the enriching en- vironment. The rest of their childhood, 153,000 hours, is spent in poverty-stricken homes, crime-ridden neighbor- hoods, and educationally deficient schools. Regardless of how good the 4,600 hours is, it is hard to imagine that its influences would be strong enough to enable children to prevail over all the other influences in their lives.

Critics also point to flaws in the original study that showed the great potential for early intervention. Children in the original study were placed in a classroom that was nearly ideal, and their teachers were better equipped, phys- ically and educationally, than any national program could ever hope to be. Critics doubted whether the program could be duplicated and used for the rest of the country.

The Head Start Program

Ever since its beginning in 1965, Head Start has enjoyed significant growth in appropriations but has never had a budget sufficient to be called “fully funded.” A fully funded program would have enough money, staff, and facilities to handle all children who are eligible for the program. In reality there have been long waiting lists in some cities for Head Start services.

Head Start is much more than day care, and it is not merely a preschool. Under reforms enacted in the early 1990s, it has become a center of learning for the entire

family. Teachers are charged not only with creating a wholesome environment for children but also with mak- ing sure parents know of the available social resources for economically troubled families. The teachers make sure that immunization and health records are up to date, and they advise parents on a host of other matters related to child rearing as well.

The evidence is that Head Start centers are performing these tasks very well. Professional accreditation agencies have found that centers are well within the standards for early childhood education, certifying the vast majority of centers as “good” or better.

By 2015 there were 944,581 children enrolled in Head Start, at an average cost per child of nearly $8,681. As can be seen from Figure 39.1, inflation-adjusted spending and enrollment stayed relatively flat from 1965 to 1990. Though enrollment began at nearly 750,000 and fell through the 1970s to a low of 333,000, it rebounded through the early 1980s to a half million, where it stayed until 1990. Similarly, inflation-adjusted spending on the program stayed between 750 million and 1 billion 1982 dollars from its inception through 1990.

Beginning in 1990 President Bush (George Herbert Walker) and Congress attempted to change Head Start. They sought either to fund it fully or to open slots for many more students. By 1997 enrollment reached 800,000, with the stated goal for 2000 being 1 million

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FIGURE 39.1 Head Start spending and enrollment.

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414 Chapter 39 Head Start

children. While it fell short of that goal, enrollment has continued to rise. In that same year new standards came into place that required teachers to attain a higher de- gree of certification. This in turn was the impetus for in- creases in teachers’ salaries. These reforms increased the cost of the program substantially. Though enrollments increased a substantial 67 percent, spending increases were even more substantial. Inflation-adjusted spending increased by more than 204 percent from 1990 to 2001. It has since stabilized.

The children who are enrolled in Head Start do not mirror those who are in the general population, and they do not mirror the population living below the poverty level. While just about three-quarters of the general pop- ulation and just under half the people living in poverty are white, non-Hispanic, 40 percent of the children in Head Start are white. While only 13 percent of the over- all population and 23 percent of the poverty population are black, non-Hispanic, 29 percent of the Head Start population is black. Similarly, Hispanics are overrepre- sented, in that they comprise only 18 percent of the gen- eral population and 28 percent of the poverty population but constitute 38 percent of the Head Start population.

Groups that are significantly overrepresented in Head Start are the physically and mentally disadvantaged. Though fewer than 5 percent of children are disadvan- taged in this way, children with such disparities represent 13 percent of the children in Head Start.

The families of Head Start children are overwhelm- ingly poor and their levels of educational attainment are low. According to data available in 2003, on average they have more than one child, and they tend to receive some government assistance besides Head Start. Forty-four per- cent of Head Start families have yearly incomes that are lower than $9,000, and 60 percent have incomes below $12,000. Some 35 percent are headed by women who never married, and another fifth are headed by women who are separated, divorced, or widowed. Only 1 percent of Head Start families are headed by single men. Only 22 percent of the families whose children are in Head Start have only one child; a fifth have four or more. Only 16 percent of the families exist without any other form of government assistance than Head Start itself. Two-thirds are eligible to either receive Medicaid or participate in the Children’s Health Insurance Program, half receive Food Stamps (SNAP) or are eligible for the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program, and a quarter get a welfare check from the Temporary Aid to Needy Families pro- gram. Taken together, Head Start children are clearly in need of some sort of help.

In a third of the Head Start families no one in the household has a job. In these cases Head Start serves an augmented preschool function only. In one-fifth of households both parents are present and both have jobs. In these cases Head Start also provides a significant and free day-care service. In the remaining half, one parent, perhaps the child’s only custodial parent, works. Again, whether the parents view the day-care function as more important than the preschool function, the child never- theless gets good care and an education simultaneously. Moreover, parents are assisted in being better parents.

One of the more disturbing facts of life in the poor communities that are home to most Head Start children is that crime rates are much higher than they are in com- munities that are more affluent. Nearly a third of Head Start families are within eyesight or earshot of at least one violent crime every year. A quarter know a recent violent crime victim, and 6 percent have been victim- ized themselves by a violent crime that has usually taken place near home.

The 250,000 paid staff members of the program closely mirror the racial makeup of the children in the program. The median teacher is almost certainly a woman in her forties, she has more than 10 years of teaching experience, and she has been with Head Start for more than five years. Two-thirds have at least a bach- elor’s degree in early childhood education. Typically the staff are better paid and have a better benefits pack- age than a typical day-care worker, though the pay and benefits are somewhat lower than those of kindergarten teachers with a similar level of education.

The Current Evidence

Evidence that Head Start Works The evidence that Head Start works comes mostly from myriad studies that test Head Start children at or near their exit from the program. Head Start children do dramatically better on IQ tests than equally situated2 non–Head Start children on entrance into kindergarten.

2Not all studies of Head Start compare children’s abilities adequately. For in- stance, if you put a child of educated, financially well-off parents in a dilapidated building with a lousy teacher, you will probably get better results than you will if you put a poor child of a single, uneducated teenage mother in a new build- ing with a great teacher. The home environment is remarkably important. This means that unless you control statistically for home environment variables, you get study results that are not indicative of the effectiveness of the program. Good studies of Head Start must compare “equally situated” children.

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The Current Evidence 415

Virtually all of the studies that examine the program have found some significant advantage for these children in the year or so after they exit the program.

The improvements can be seen in lower numbers of children being retained in the first grade and in higher reading and verbal test scores. In addition, Head Start children are healthier than equally situated non–Head Start children, in large measure because part of Head Start is parental education and because children in Head Start are fed nutritious meals while they are in the pro- gram. In the teacher–parent contacts, immunization records are reviewed and, when necessary, doctor and dentist referrals are made. Parents of Head Start children are more aware of the many services available to them and their children, an awareness which explains, in part, why 59 percent of them are enrolled in Medicaid.

Individual studies continue to show success of pro- grams in particular states, in specific areas of short- and medium-term areas of achievement, or using particular Head Start curricula. Recently, a study produced by Oden, Schweinhart, and Weikart showed that children who participated in a Head Start program in the 1970s in Colorado and Florida were, 17 years later, less likely to drop out of high school and less likely to commit crime. Several others have shown that there is a demonstrable decrease in repetition of kindergarten and first grade and early placement in special education. Both of these are costly to school districts.

Evidence that Head Start Does Not Work Head Start’s detractors have evidence to support their position as well. While there are limited studies that show success for Head Start education that extends be- yond the second grade, there are companion studies that show that it does not. As the General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative wing of Congress, reported in 1997, there are no national studies that show, in a compelling way, that anything long lasting is achieved in Head Start. A study by Janet Currie and Duncan Thomas put it quite well: “In summary, despite literally hundreds of studies, the jury is still out on the question of whether participation in Head Start has any lasting beneficial effects.”

Although some studies do show that using some mea- sures of success, some types of students do better, the patterns in the literature on Head Start are not consistent. Some show lasting effects for black children and others do not. Some show lasting effects for white children and others do not.

The basic premise of Head Start is that it is liter- ally an educational “head start” and that the students who graduated from it ought to do better down the road than similarly situated students who did not participate. There is very little evidence, however, that suggests that test scores, dropout rates, graduation rates, or any other measure of educational achievement in later years is enhanced when students have Head Start in their back- ground. Most of the studies that show a waning influence find that most of the benefit of Head Start is gone by the third grade and that none is evident by the sixth grade.

Note, however, that the GAO report and the Currie and Thomas study found that none of the more than 200 academic studies on Head Start used a national represen- tative sample. Therefore, there are none upon which to make positive or negative claims.

More Evidence Is Coming and Some Is In In its 1994 and 1998 reauthorizations of the law that cre- ated Head Start, Congress commissioned a national study on the long-term benefits of the program. By 1999 a highly regarded committee of scholars settled on a methodol- ogy and a set of goals for collecting the relevant data. That process is ongoing and a final report went to Con- gress in 2009. The intermediate reports on Head Start’s impact do not clearly foretell an answer to the underlying question of whether the program is achieving its aim. The positive results are typically for narrowly defined groups on narrowly defined measures. In the meantime, Janet Currie, one of the authors of the study pointing to the dearth of long-term evidence supporting Head Start’s effectiveness, produced an additional study that shows that even if there are no long-term benefits to Head Start, the program may be worthy for its short- and medium- term benefits. Specifically, even many program detrac- tors concede the statistical evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that participants are less likely to have to repeat kindergarten or first grade and are less likely to be placed in special education during that time. If you further concede her point that half of the program’s costs would be spent anyway on subsidizing day care, then, Currie maintains, the cost reductions from diminish- ing grade repetition and the use of special education are nearly sufficient to cover the other half.

In a newer study she, and other economists, found that for whites, participation as a child increased their likeli- hood of graduating from high school and attending college, as well as increasing their income as young adults. For African Americans, participation as a child decreased their

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416 Chapter 39 Head Start

likelihood of being charged with a crime. Interestingly, the spillover benefits also extend to the child’s nonparticipat- ing siblings who also are less likely to be charged with a crime as young adults.

The Opportunity Cost of Fully Funding Head Start

If tax money had no opportunity cost, Head Start would not be controversial. In the tradition of the medical pro- fession’s Hippocratic oath, Head Start clearly does no harm. Whether it does any good and, if so, whether that good is enough to justify the costs are other questions. Head Start costs $8,681 per year per student, more than most day-care centers charge for a year of service, even though most day care is nine hours a day, all year, and Head Start is only four days a week during the school year. According to the Pew Research Center, day-care costs per four-year-old child range between $5,000 per year in the rural south to more than $12,000 per year in New York.

If the federal government wants to provide free day care for poor children, it can do it for less money than it spends on Head Start. If Head Start genuinely provides a measurable head start, it should show up in the congres- sionally commissioned study.

Make no mistake about it, the opportunity cost would exist whether or not Head Start was effective. The worst billion-dollar-a-year government program and the best billion-dollar-a-year program have the same opportunity cost: a billion dollars of other pro- grams or tax cuts.

What differentiates an effective program from an in- effective one is that when we fund a program that does not perform, we do not consider alternatives designed to meet the same goal that might perform better. The con- ventional wisdom among politicians is that Head Start is living up to its billing. They think that it is a good net present value investment. This 2006 study may prove that case, but until then this thinking prevents anyone from coming up with more effective long-term ways of utilizing the funds. The lost opportunity to experiment with a better alternative program cannot be ignored.

Summary You now understand that Head Start is a federally funded program that provides early childhood education to nearly a million children at a cost of $8 billion per year. You are able to use investment and net present value thinking to understand the premise of the program. You

know that despite the efforts of economists and others to verify the worth of the program, the evidence that the program works is rather scant and is the subject of ongo- ing research. You can see that, as with any other expendi- ture, there is an opportunity cost to the program.

Key Term positive externality

Quiz Yourself 1. From an economic perspective the tool one would

use to analyze the costs and benefits of Head Start would be a. present value. b. supply and demand. c. production possibilities. d. marginal net benefit.

2. If Head Start were a good long-run investment from a strictly economic perspective, for current children enrolled in the program it would a. make them happier. b. help their parents with subsidized day care/

preschool. c. increase the likelihood of future success as

adults. d. increase the likelihood that they knew the alpha-

bet going into kindergarten.

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Summary 417

3. Though the high-quality preschool experience is a private benefit for the children and their par- ents, the economic justification for Head Start is based on a. external costs. b. its low total cost. c. the increase in reading ability of participants

going into kindergarten. d. the external benefits to society.

4. The early evidence on programs like Head Start made it clear that a. the rate of return to these programs was very low. b. the net present value of the external benefits was

positive. c. the short-run benefits were not worth the costs. d. the long-run benefits were not worth the costs.

5. The typical Head Start teacher is a. an ill-trained minimum-wage worker. b. a professional credentialed worker making more

than the typical day-care worker. c. a college graduate making $30,000 a year or more. d. a professional with a master’s degree or higher.

6. Current evidence suggests that the long-term benefits of Head Start are a. sufficiently positive to make the net present value

positive. b. sufficiently positive such that when added to the

short- and intermediate-term benefits, the net present value is positive.

c. nonexistent. d. curiously negative.

7. The intermediate-term external benefits of Head Start a. focus on reducing the likelihood of the children

ending up in prison. b. focus on reducing the likelihood that the children

will become pregnant as teenagers. c. are significant if you know that the children would

qualify for subsidized free day care anyway. d. are significant in that they reduce the likelihood

of the children needing expensive special educa- tion in elementary school.

Think about This The notion of calculating the present value of external benefits and comparing that to the present value of extra

costs in evaluating Head Start is a purely economic way of looking at the program. Is this the only way? Is it the right way? Whether or not society benefits from their participation, does society owe these underprivileged children such a program?

Talk about This Suppose the evidence was that Head Start was com- pletely ineffective from a present value perspective. What would you do with the money that is spent on the program? What programs are we forgoing?

For More Insight See Congressional Budget Office, Research Provides Little

Information on Impact of Current Program, April 1997.

Currie, Janet, Early Childhood Intervention Programs: What Do We Know? April 2000, http://www.brook.edu /dybdocroot/es/research/projects/cr/doc/curie20000 401.pdf.

Currie, Janet, and Duncan Thomas, “Does Head Start Make a Difference?” American Economic Review 85, no. 3 (June 1995), pp. 341–364.

Garces, Eliana, Duncan Thomas, and Janet Currie, “Longer- Term Effects of Head Start,” American Economic Re- view 92, no. 4 (Sept. 2002).

National Head Start Impact Research, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Head Start Impact Study, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact _study/ index.html.

Oden, Sherri, Lawrence Schweinhart, and David Weikart, Into Adulthood (Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press, 2000).

Behind the Numbers Head Start enrollment and families, 2015.

Administration for Children and Families; Head Start Bureau—https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc /data/factsheets/docs/head-start-fact-sheet-fy -2015.pdf

Head Start Program Information, 2005. Administration for Children and Families; Head Start Bureau FACES 2000 Survey—http://eclkc .ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc/data/rc/ohs-2013-biennial -report-to-congress.pdf

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y

418

Social Security Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe what Social Security is and its basic tax and benefit structure.

LO2 Detail the history of changes to the program since its inception.

LO3 Explain the economic rationale for having such a system.

LO4 Enumerate the effects of the program on work and savings.

LO5 Show how economists use present value analysis to aid in determining for whom the program works and for whom it does not.

LO6 Explain the origin and purpose behind the Social Security Trust Fund.

LO7 Summarize present estimates of the future financial health of the Social Security system and evaluate the options for ensuring its long-run solvency.

Chapter Outline

The Basics

Why Do We Need Social Security?

Social Security’s Effect on the Economy

Whom Is the Program Good For?

Will the System Be There for Me?

Summary

When most people think about Social Security, they en- vision retirement checks for the elderly. Social Security has a much broader scope, including benefits for eligible widows and orphans in addition to medical and disability insurance. In this chapter we concentrate on retirement benefits.

We begin by reviewing the history of Social Security as a government pension program, and we include its tax, benefit, and structure. We then turn to why it is needed. We discuss the effects of Social Security on the economy in general and show that as a retirement program, it is better for retirees who are poor than for those who are rich and much better for those who re- tired before 1960 than after 1980. Last, we discuss why bankruptcy is likely without reform and what reform might look like.

The Basics

The Beginning In 1935 the Social Security Act was passed and signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt. The stock mar- ket crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s had caused great upheavals in people’s financial circum- stances. Unemployment had reached a high of 25 per- cent. People who had been wealthy investors before the crash were lucky if they had a job that would allow them to at least live from paycheck to paycheck after the crash. Many banks closed when, as a result of the stock mar- ket crash, their investments were insufficient to pay their depositors. In this circumstance, even people who had saved diligently and invested prudently for their retire- ment found themselves without savings. Social Security

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The Basics 419

Benefits On the benefit side, eligible retirees get benefit checks that are based on what they made during their working years. The average index of monthly earnings (AIME) is

the monthly average of the 35 highest earnings years (capped by the maximum taxable earn- ings for each respective year) adjusted for wage inflation. The AIME is put into a formula that generates the primary insurance amount (PIA).1 Single people are paid the PIA and married couples get 1.5 times the highest of their PIAs, or the sum of their individual PIAs, whichever is higher. For full benefits workers cannot begin to collect until they reach the retirement age, though they can collect partial benefits at age 62.

Although the payroll tax structure is such that everyone with income under the maximum taxable earnings pays the same rate of tax, the benefit structure is such that, in net, Social Security redistributes income to the lower end of the income scale. To see this, consider the following example. Assume, inflation-adjusted, a person makes $5,000 per month for 35 years, so that person’s AIME is $5,000. In- flation-adjusted, the employee and the employer each pay $382.50 (7.65% × $5,000) per month in taxes. That person would get a monthly Social Security check of $2,147. If someone else were in a similar situation with one-fifth the income, that person and his or her employer would com- bine to pay one-fifth the tax, but the benefit would be $816 per month. Thus, this employee pays one-fifth the tax but receives one-third the benefit. This means that the person at the lower end of the income scale has a benefit dollar– to–tax dollar ratio that is twice that of the upper-income person. This is by design, and, as such, the program serves to redistribute money down the income line.

Changes over Time Since its inception Social Security has added bene- fits. Payments to widows and orphans, called survivor

guaranteed a safety net, come good times or bad, to gen- erations who retired from the late 1930s on. At the time, it was not intended that Social Security be the only in- come on which a person lived. In 2014, 35 percent of recipients received more than 90 percent of their income from Social Security.

Today, Social Security provides guaranteed retire- ment benefits averaging about $1,341.77 a month to 40 million American people over the age of 62. Social Se-

curity is a pay-as-you-go pension system where current workers’ taxes are used to pay pensions to current retirees. This is unlike a traditional fully funded pension system where, for every ben- efit dollar it is required to pay in the future, there is an offsetting amount currently invested that is sufficient to pay off that dollar. It is the pay-as-you-go aspect that allowed money to go to the el- derly right away (the first checks

went out in 1936), but, as we will see, it is also this aspect that currently puts Social Security in the most jeopardy.

Taxes Social Security taxes (technically called FICA, or Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes) are payroll taxes. That is, the amount workers pay is based on what workers earn

from their work. This is different from an income tax in that inter- est, dividends, and other forms of unearned income are not sub- ject to this tax. In addition, not all payroll is taxed; taxes are paid only up to a limited amount of income called the maximum taxable earnings. In 2016, this amount was $118,500, which

means that workers did not have to pay the old-age por- tion of the Social Security tax for income they earned beyond that point. Both the employer and employee pay an equal amount of this tax so that if you have to pay $1,000 in tax, so does your employer. The self-employed pay both parts of the tax.

As part of a temporary stimulus agreement after the 2010 elections, the employee portion was reduced to 4.2  percent from 6.2 percent for the 2011 and 2012 tax years.

pay-as-you-go pension A system where cur- rent workers’ taxes are used to pay pensions to current retirees.

fully funded pension A system that has an amount currently invested that is sufficient to pay every benefit dollar it is required to pay in the future.

payroll taxes Taxes owed on what workers earn from their work.

maximum taxable earnings The maximum of tax- able earnings subject to the payroll tax.

average index of monthly earnings (AIME) The monthly average of the 35 highest earnings years adjusted for wage inflation.

primary insurance amount (PIA) The amount single retirees receive in a monthly check if they retire at their retirement age.

retirement age The age at which retirees get full benefits.

1 The formula for 2016 was 90 percent of the first $856 plus 32 percent of the next $4,301 plus 15 percent of the remainder up to a maximum benefit that is computed using the maximum taxable earnings for each of the work years. This formula is adjusted yearly for inflation. For more information, see www.socialsecurity.gov.

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420 Chapter 40 Social Security

benefits, have been part of Social Security from its in- ception. Disability insurance, for workers who are un- able to work for long periods of time, was added in 1956, and basic, highly subsidized health coverage (called Medicare) was added in 1966.

Table 40.1 shows how the tax rate, the maximum taxable earnings, and the retirement age have changed since the program began. This table shows how Social Security’s components have been changed to ensure its survivability. As you can see, tax rates have risen, in part to pay for the other benefits described previously but also to guarantee that retirement benefits would be there for each generation. The tax rate has risen from 1 percent to 7.65 percent while the maximum amount subject to tax has risen from $3,000 to $118,500. The retirement age has also risen. People born before 1938 can retire with full benefits at 65; those born after 1960 must wait until they are 67. A somewhat complicated transition formula determines the retirement age of those born between 1939 and 1959. In short, in con- trast to the view that Social Security has been a mono- lithic and unalterable program, there have been many changes that have both broadened its scope and ensured its survivability.

Why Do We Need Social Security?

If you have worked through other issues chapters in this book by now, you know that it has been mentioned before that economists believe that government intervention in private enterprise must be justified on at least one of the following three grounds:

1. The need to control externalities that is, effects cre- ated by an unregulated market on people other than the buyer or seller, such as pollution, secondhand smoke, and drunk driving.

2. Concern about significant moral or ethical problems as- sociated with the good being sold, for example, drugs, prostitution, and pornography.

3. Sellers or buyers are incapable of making rational deci- sions, because people either cannot be counted on to do the smart thing or have inadequate information upon which to base a decision.

It is a combination of the first and third reasons that makes some form of compulsory-saving/ retirement- benefit program nec- essary in the eyes of economists.

TABLE 40.1 History of Social Security’s components at selected points in time.

Year

Maximum Taxable Earnings ($)

Old-Age and Disability Tax Rate (% of payroll)

Medicare Tax Rate (%)

Total Tax Rate That Both Employers and Employees Pay (%)

Retirement Age*

Year of Birth Age Benefits†

1937 $ 3,000 1.000% 0% 1.000% 1937 65 OA, S 1950 3,600 1.500 0 1.500 1950 66 OA, S 1955 4,200 2.000 0 2.000 1955 66 + 2

months OA, S

1960 4,800 2.250 0 2.250 1960 67 OA, S, DI 1965 4,800 3.625 0 3.625 1965 67 OA, S, DI 1970 7,800 4.200 0.600 4.800 1970 67 OA, S, DI, HI 1975 14,100 4.950 0.900 5.850 1975 67 OA, S, DI, HI 1980 25,900 5.080 1.050 6.130 1980 67 OA, S, DI, HI 1985 39,600 5.700 1.300 7.000 1985 67 OA, S, DI, HI 1990 51,300 6.200 1.450 7.650 1990 67 OA, S, DI, HI 1995 61,200 6.200 1.450 7.650 1995 67 OA, S, DI, HI 2000 76,200 6.200 1.450 7.650 2000 67 OA, S, DI, HI 2016 118,500 6.200 1.450 7.650 2016 67 OA, S, D, HI

*Until 1983 the retirement age was 65. In 1983 the law was changed to increase it depending on year of birth. 1938, => 65 + 2 months; 1939, => 65 + 4 months; 1940, => 65 + 6 months; 1941, => 65 + 8 months; 1942, => 65 + 10 months; 1943−1954, => 66; 1955, => 66 + 2 months; 1956, => 66 + 4 months; 1957, => 66 + 6 months; 1958, => 66 + 8 months; 1959, => 66 + 10 months; 1960 on, 67. †OA = old age; S = survivor; DI = disability; HI = health insurance (Medicare)

externalities Effects created by an unregulated market on people other than the buyer or seller.

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Social Security’s Effect on the Economy 421

Social Security’s Effect on the Economy

Effect on Work Before Social Security was implemented, 51 percent of men over age 65 worked. Today, that number is 24 per- cent. While there is much dispute on the degree to which Social Security itself caused this to happen (in fact, this number has risen in recent years), Social Security has clearly made it easier for people to retire. This has good as well as bad aspects. Though the retired may be happier being retired, the economy is deprived of their labor and the fruit of their labor. On the other hand, as more people retire, positions are opened up throughout the labor scale as everyone moves up to fill vacated positions. Paradoxi- cally, this is a circumstance in which the economy is hurt even though everyone in it is happier. (If this seems odd, revisit Chapter 6 and the section “Real Gross Domes- tic Product and Why It Is Not Synonymous with Social Welfare.”)

Effect on Saving Most economists believe that if people had to save for their own retirement, they would save more than they do now. Though these economists disagree on the magnitude of this effect, they have concluded that the existence of Social Security reduces the amount

of money that is saved in the economy. This is primarily due to the asset substitution effect. If the government is taxing you on your earnings now and promising a pension payment later, the government is, in ef- fect, saving for you. If the gov- ernment is saving for you, you will save less for yourself.

Two counteracting effects to this are the induced retirement effect and the bequest effect.

As mentioned, people are clearly retiring earlier than they did in the past. If Social Security did not exist, and people had no hope of ever retiring, they might not save anything. On the other hand, since Social Security makes retirement a possibility, people may save so as to retire. The induced retirement effect thus increases na- tional savings because people need to save more if they are going to retire earlier than they would have without Social Security.

Another impact of Social Security is that it may in- crease national savings if the elderly are putting aside

Ideally, rational and wise people will be able to save money for their own retirements based on their own preferences for consuming now versus consum- ing later. They will realize that money spent now has an opportunity cost, namely, money that cannot be spent later. Investment markets allow people to save or borrow as they please. If all the assumptions about well-functioning markets are valid in the investment market, then there is no reason for government to force people to save. They will save the right amount for themselves.

In opposition to the rationale put forth by economists is the contention that people may not be able to save the right amount for themselves. This is an argument that has little appeal among economists. Many economists maintain that if the government were not taxing workers for this purpose, workers could be saving the money on their own, and saving or not saving would therefore be their choice.

On the other hand, two arguments against a com- pletely free market approach have some appeal among economists. First, our humanity prevents us from let- ting others starve. If people do not save for themselves, someone else will be forced to bail them out. Their decision not to save affects others. These “others” could be children, relatives, friends, or government. Social Security prevents people from not saving the right amount, and it protects others from having to bail them out.

Second, our rationality stems from our ability to learn from our mistakes. In most situations, and espe- cially in most markets, we learn from our mistakes. For instance, if the first time you go grocery shopping for yourself you buy nothing but marshmallows and Red Bull, you will quickly learn that you need vegetables and fruits in your diet. If you do not save enough for retirement, you cannot just decide to live the first 65 years of your life over again. Government often pre- vents us from this sort of mistake. There are few guar- antees that we will always do the right thing ourselves. There are other examples of this: (1) You cannot bor- row money before age 18 with out a cosignature; (2) you cannot drop out of school be fore you are 16; and (3) you cannot drink until you are 21. Society fears that you might suffer irreparable bankruptcy, poverty, or alco- holism, respectively; and it wants government to ensure that you will not make mistakes that cannot be undone. For these reasons, the question among economists is not whether some form of government-run retirement is needed but what form that system takes and how to fund it so that it is financially stable.

asset substitution effect Government is saving for you; thus you will save less for yourself.

induced retirement effect People need to save more if they are going to retire earlier than they would have without So- cial Security.

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422 Chapter 40 Social Security

people born in different generations. Though exact esti- mates vary by marital status, by earners, and by age, the results show unequivocally that the program was a net win- ner across the income scale for those retiring before 1980. However, because of the rapid increases in FICA taxes, this situation has steadily eroded, leaving only married couples, with only a single low-income earner, to benefit.

To get a flavor of what this kind of analysis entails, consider the following example. First, we need to make some basic assumptions. To estimate the present value of your Social Security taxes and benefits, we need to know your age, your marital status, the starting salary you can expect upon graduation, the rate at which your income will grow, an assumption of yearly inflation, your age at retire- ment, and, finally, your age at death. For Table  40.2 we will assume the following: You are 19; you will graduate at age 23; you will not get married; you will work until you are 67; you will die at 88; inflation will be 3 percent every year; your income will grow at 4 percent per year; and 8 percent is the appropriate interest rate. Though the old age and disability tax rate is 6.2 percent, the old age part is only 5.3 percent. This tax is on both the employer and em- ployee, so we will assume that your old age Social Security contributions amount to 10.6 percent of your earnings (up to, of course, the maximum taxable earnings).2

Table 40.2 indicates that today’s 19-year-olds would do better if their Social Security taxes were invested at 8 percent per year (inflation plus a 5 percent real rate of return) than they would do under Social Security. The first column shows the income assumed for the calcula- tions, and the second indicates the present value, at 8 per- cent, of all taxes to be paid. The third column shows the present value, again at 8 percent, of all the benefits that people will be entitled to from their retirements at age

more money for bequests, that is, money that will go to younger family members when their elders die. It may be that Social Security provides a stable enough income for the elderly that they choose to save enough to pass on a larger inheritance than they would have if there had been no such program. The bequest effect thus increases

national savings because people save more so as to give larger gifts to their descendants than they would have without Social Security.

Economists dispute the net effect of Social Security on savings. Martin Feldstein, in particular, was the first to estimate the effect of Social Security on savings. In 1974 he concluded that there was a dramatic reduction in savings. This was disputed by other economists, led by Alicia Munnell in 1977 and Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy in 1982, all of whom estimated that the net effect was zero. Not to be silenced, in 1996 Feldstein published revised estimates for 1992, when personal savings were actually $248 billion, indicating that it would have been $646 billion without Social Security. The upshot is that there is little agreement except for a middle ground that appears to indicate a small net negative impact of Social Security on savings.

Whom Is the Program Good For?

With a spreadsheet, a few assumptions, and some spe- cialized terminology, you can compute whether Social Security is a good deal for you. To do this you will need to draw on the present value discussion of Chapter 7. We can then compare the taxes we pay today with the benefits we anticipate getting 40 or 50 years from now.

There is much literature on the present value of Social Security. C. Eugene Steuerle and Jon Bakija provide de- tailed present value estimates for different categories of

TABLE 40.2 Present value analysis of Social Security.

Income ($)

Present Value of Social Security Taxes at 8% ($)

Present Value of Social Security Benefits at 8% ($)

Net Present Value of Social Security at 8% ($)

Real Rate of Return (%)

$ 15,000 $ 25,780 $ 11,434 −$ 14,346 2.6 20,000 34,374 13,836 −20,538 2.3 25,000 42,968 16,239 −26,729 2.1 30,000 51,561 18,446 −33,115 1.9 35,000 60,154 19,572 −40,582 1.7 40,000 68,748 20,698 −48,050 1.5

bequest effect People save more to give larger gifts to their de- scendants, thus increas- ing national savings.

2 We assume that employees bear the entire burden of the Social Security tax because empirical estimates of labor supply elasticity are nearly zero.

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Whom Is the Program Good For? 423

of $100,000 a year, at age 90 the present value of this is around $2,000 a year.

If your parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents had run these numbers when they were your age, the out- comes would have been markedly different. For those re- tiring in 1960, the real rate of return averaged 15 percent while those retiring in 1980 saw an average 7 percent real rate of return. The basic reason for the difference in real rates of return between you and previous genera- tions is that the Social Security tax rates they paid were much lower than the rates you can expect to pay. Those retiring in the 1960s faced tax rates of less than 3 percent for much of their working lives. Those who retired in the 1980s saw tax rates rise from 1 percent to 5 percent while they worked. You will face Social Security tax rates (old age) of at least 5.3 percent for your working life.

In part, Social Security has been viewed as a suc- cessful program because, until recently, it has been a good deal for everyone. For people alive when So- cial Security was introduced, it was an example of the great things that government can do. For people born between 1935 and the mid-1950s, Social Security provides a guaranteed retirement income that is about equal to, for married average-wage earners, what they would have gotten in the stock market.4 For those born after the mid-1950s, the real rate of return on Social Security is likely to be dwarfed by private investment opportunities. For those who are single people, for mar- ried dual-income earners, or for higher income earners, the year of birth for a break-even status was as long ago as 35 years earlier. For such people, Social Security has returned to them much less than private investments would have.

The whole question of who benefits from Social Se- curity is often seen as a loaded one. Simply asking it sometimes causes people to think that you favor its elim- ination. So given that this section may have struck you as a sales pitch for its elimination, remember that Social Se- curity is part of what economists call “social insurance.” It is not intended to be a good investment. It is intended to provide a secure source of income during retirement. As you will see when we discuss the reform question, that is where the debate centers. Those who favor some form of privatization judge the program using a yard- stick, like rate of return, that others reject.

67 until their deaths at 88. The last column indicates the appropriate real interest rate that equalizes the present value of taxes and benefits.

As can be seen from the first two columns, as people make more money, they also pay more taxes. Starting with people making minimum wage ($7.25/ hour × 2,080 hours in a year) and ending with people starting their working life with a $40,000 salary, the present value of their taxes increases from $25,780 to $68,748.3 Also apparent from the table is that the pres- ent value of benefits for high-income people is greater than that for low- income people. This is because the more you make and contribute to the system, the big- ger your benefit checks are at retirement. Note here that although the high earner makes much more than three times what the lower earner makes, the benefit check the high earner gets is a little more than twice that of the lower earner.

The fact that the net present value is negative means that Social Security will not pay as well as a private investment making 8 percent. As can be seen from the fourth column, everyone in your generation will do bet- ter if your money is privately invested. For those of you who are going to be high earners, this loss is significant. The last column shows that, as an investment, Social Se- curity is a better deal, in terms of the real rate of return, for a low earner than for a high earner.

Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 40.2: (1) For no members of the current generation of college students is Social Security likely to beat their private al- ternatives; (2) the more money people are likely to make over their lifetimes, the worse the discrepancy between private investments and Social Security is likely to be.

There are a couple of logical questions that could be asking at this point so I’ll ask them for you: (1) You assumed a 5 percent real interest rate. What would happen if you assumed something like 3 percent? In this case, the net present values would be near zero for the low earner and –$41,693 for the high earner. (2) What if I live until I’m 100? Can I beat the system? The power of compounding interest dwarfs your ability to live long enough to make the system work for you. Even though a high earner would get benefits in excess

3 The reason that the increase in taxes paid is less than proportional to the in- crease in income is that people with starting salaries of $40,000 and 4 percent growth per year will hit the maximum taxable earnings before they retire. So, whereas the taxes that a poor worker will pay will go up 4 percent every year, the taxes a richer person will pay will go up only 3 percent a year once they have hit that limit.

4 Because the system has a built-in transfer from high-income earners to low-income earners, though the average earner would break even, the low-income earner would get more than the present value of taxes. A high- income earner would get less.

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424 Chapter 40 Social Security

The Social Security Trust Fund To combat the demographic problem the Social Security Trust Fund was established in 1982 to collect more taxes

than were needed to pay cur- rent benefits. In later years there would thus be money enough to pay benefits to baby-boom retirees. In 2014, there was ap- proximately $2.8 trillion in U.S. government debt in this fund. As you may recall from Chapter 10, “Monetary Policy,” or Chap-

ter 12, “Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt,” the federal government owes itself $7.5 trillion.

Whether this actually constitutes a true trust fund is de- batable. It is a collection of debt that will either be issued for the first time or reissued to the public when there is less in Social Security tax revenues than benefits to pay. One way of looking at this issue is that the trust fund is money that was collected using the Social Security tax, rather than the income tax. This was begun in the 1980s and early 1990s to reduce what would otherwise have been a much larger deficit. If you look at it this way, the national debt that grew to $18 trillion by 2015 actually only grew to just $13 trillion (and just $11 trillion if you count Federal Reserve holdings of the national debt). As a result, should surpluses come in, we would be reducing the true national

Will the System Be There for Me?

Why Social Security Is in Trouble There has always been a concern about whether Social Security could survive. Tax rates have always risen faster than benefits have been added because the retired popu- lation has grown faster than the working population. In 1982 a significant concern was raised that the pay-as- you-go system could not handle the demographic bulge of the post–World War II baby boom. In the years follow- ing World War II, until around 1960, some 2.5 percent of all women gave birth each year. The advent of the birth control pill, the increased availability of abortion, and the social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s significantly altered America’s birthrate. By 1976 only 1.5 percent of women gave birth each year.

As a result, the baby-boom generation, 50 to 68 years old in 2014, represents 24 percent of the current popula- tion. A comparable group before them, those between 70 and 85, are now only 8 percent of the population. Because of this, the number of taxpaying workers per benefit-receiving retiree will continue to fall precipi- tously. In 1950, there were more than 16 workers pay- ing taxes for every retiree who was collecting benefits. Today, the number is 2.8, and current projections say it will drop to 2.2 by 2030 and to 2.0 by 2090. Figure 40.1 presents an overview of this situation.

Social Security Trust Fund A fund established in 1982 to hold govern- ment debt, which will be sold as necessary when tax revenues are less than benefits.

FIGURE 40.1 Workers per retiree history and projections.

0

10

20

30

40

50

W o

rk e

rs /R

e tir

e e

19 45

19 50

19 55

19 60

19 65

19 70

19 75

19 80

19 85

19 90

19 95

20 00

20 05

20 10

20 15

20 20

20 25

20 30

20 35

20 40

20 45

20 50

20 55

20 60

20 65

20 70

20 75

20 80

20 85

20 90

Year

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Will the System Be There for Me? 425

of economist and Social Security expert Peter Diamond. He notes that even if the trust fund is exhausted in 30, 40, or 50 years, the taxes paid will be sufficient to cover 75 percent of benefits. On the other hand, the possible solutions that we next describe also require several years to be effective if the goal is to make the program 100  percent solvent into the future.

Options for Fixing Social Security The options for saving Social Security are plentiful, and they range from radical to timid. They all include a mixture of the following elements: raising payroll taxes, raising the retirement age further, cutting benefits to upper-income re- cipients, changing the target from indexing benefits using wage inflation to indexing using price inflation, investing the trust fund in corporate stocks and bonds, or carving out some of the payroll tax for privatized individual accounts.

Raising taxes is the option most preferred by those who like Social Security the way it is. This could be accomplished by raising the tax rate as well as raising or eliminating the maximum taxable earnings lid on what an individual has to pay. Estimates vary, but eliminating this provision so that the upper-income people would have to pay taxes on more than just the first of their earnings would solve about a third of the problem. Raising the overall payroll tax rate for the old age part from 5.3 percent to 6.3 percent would probably be sufficient to deal with the remainder.

Another alternative would be to raise the retirement age. Typically those who like this option argue that Social Secu- rity’s original retirement age was pegged at life expectancy, which in 1935 was 65. If the retirement age is exactly life expectancy, then people who die at or before expectancy pay a lifetime of taxes and get no benefits. This ensures that there is enough money to pay for those who die after expec- tancy. Currently life expectancy is 79. For those who make it to 65, men can expect to live another 18 years, women 21 years. Though people are living much longer, the prob- lem is that there is less Social Security retirement money to go around. Depending on how quickly we did it, raising the retirement age to 70 would also solve about a third of the problem. If the retirement age were not raised to age 70 until 2075, as some suggest, it would be of no help in resolving the problem scheduled to occur in 2033.

One of the great successes of Social Security is that it has brought the poverty rate among the elderly down greatly. On the other hand, many retirees have enjoyed financial success in their own right. Some have succeeded so well in this area that they are getting Social Security checks but have no need for them. The median net worth

debt to allow ourselves the ability to borrow much more later. Either way it is essentially the same. Reissuing debt and borrowing money are functionally identical.

The Social Security trustees periodically issue re- ports that attempt to project how long this trust fund will suffice. They issue three different predictions based on three different sets of assumptions. The “optimistic” re- port is based on assumptions that economic growth will be higher than we have seen in the recent past, life spans will be shorter than current health trends are likely to yield, and interest rates will be lower than they are likely to be. The “pessimistic” report is based on assumptions of slow growth, long lives, and high interest rates.

The “intermediate” report is the most widely quoted, and it indicates that the Social Security system generally (except for 2010 through 2011 when revenues were down as a result of the recession) collects more in taxes than it pays in benefits and will likely do so through about 2020. Between 2020 and 2034 there will be less collected in taxes than paid in benefits, and the difference will come out of this fund. By 2034 the fund will run dry and the annual deficit could be as much as 21 percent of the ben- efits owed in 2034 and 27 percent of benefits owed in 2086. It is in 2034 that the system will have insufficient assets to pay off its obligations. This is what some would describe as bankruptcy, although since the government could continue to pay the benefits with other revenues or borrowing, that term is not technically valid.

This intermediate view of whether Social Security will survive has to be balanced by the fact that much of it is based on assumptions that may or may not material- ize. For instance, if the optimistic view holds, and the economy grows a single percentage point a year more than predicted, the problem is mostly solved. Changes, for example, in immigration policies that allow more workers to enter over the next 20 years, could help solve the remainder of the problem. Additionally, if inflation and interest rates are slightly less than predicted, Social Security bankruptcy is far from certain.

As a matter of fact, an increase in something as unre- lated as the divorce rate would make the problem worse. Husbands and wives typically get less in benefits mar- ried than they do if they are divorced.

The long and the short of it is that economists can- not be sure that Social Security will be bankrupt. Sig- nificantly altering what many consider to be the nation’s greatest social program on the basis of economic as- sumptions that may or may not come true strikes many as foolhardy. This is especially true, from the point of view

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426 Chapter 40 Social Security

might not do very well. Second, the process of picking government investments might be unduly politicized. Given politicians’ penchant for succumbing to special interests, it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that such investment would not be in the general interest. Third, though corporate securities do better in the long run than government bonds, they are also riskier.

The last option suggests that individuals be al- lowed to invest part of their taxes themselves. In the 2000 presidential election, candidate George W. Bush made this a cornerstone of his solution to the Social Security crisis. The precipitous declines in global stock markets that began in 2000 and did not abate until 2003 seriously undercut the political support such an option was beginning to build, but with his reelection in 2004, President Bush again pushed this option front and center. What he suggested was a sys- tem by which younger workers would have a portion of their taxes placed in an account under their control. Opponents of the president’s plan focused on the fact that the guaranteed Social Security benefit would be significantly reduced while supporters countered that the proceeds of the accounts, if investments returned their normal historical rates, would more than make up the difference.

In late summer 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita took over the headlines and the subsequent political damage to President Bush ended his ability to sell a major change to Social Security.

During his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama rejected all forms of privatization and instead suggested that the 6.2 percent old-age portion of the Social Security tax be reimposed on incomes over $250,000. President Obama never offered a solution during his eight years in office and President Trump’s campaign doubled down on this inaction by pledg- ing not to make any of the adjustments that econo- mists insist are necessary to maintain full retirement obligations.

for a Social Security recipient is currently about four times that of a nonrecipient. One proposed solution to Social

Security’s problems is to subject its beneficiaries to a means test. Those with high incomes or great wealth would get less of their PIA than those who depend on the monthly check. Depend-

ing on how much a wealthy person’s check is reduced, this could go a long way to staving off bankruptcy. Denying Social Security to anyone whose other income is greater than $50,000, for example, would eliminate the solvency issue altogether. Less radically, means testing could be in- troduced into the system by using a hybrid form of index- ing espoused by economists Pozen, Schieber, and Shoven. They suggest indexing benefits for upper-income retirees using price inflation rather than wage inflation. Since the former is usually one percentage point lower than the latter, this would have the effect of slowly reducing the benefits paid to upper-income retirees. On the other hand, this could create problems. If benefits to the wealthy are reduced too much, this could seriously discourage sav- ings among the upper- and upper-middle-income earners. Also, political support for the program might be seriously jeopardized, as it would resemble a welfare program more than a universal retirement program.

Another way to save the system would be to invest the Social Security Trust Fund in corporate invest- ments that yield higher rates of return. As mentioned above, the trust fund buys government debt and this debt “yields” between 2 percent and 3 percent. In this sense the government (the Treasury) owes the govern- ment (the trust fund) money and has to pay itself in- terest. Proponents of this solution contend that if the government invested the money in corporate stocks and bonds, the higher rates of return would generate enough to pay retirees’ benefits.

There are problems with the approach. First, gov- ernment would be in the business of picking stocks and

means test Determination of the amount of one’s govern- ment benefit on the basis of income or wealth.

Summary You now understand what Social Security is. You know its basic tax and benefit structure as well as the changes that have been made to the program since its inception. You understand the economic rationale for having the system to begin with, and you know the effects of the program on work and savings. You understand how economists use

present value analysis to aid in determining for whom the program works and for whom it does not. You understand that, under present estimates, the system will be bankrupt by 2034, what the Social Security Trust Fund is, and what the options are for fixing the system so that it will not only be there for you but be good for you as well.

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Summary 427

Key Terms asset substitution effect average index of monthly earnings

(AIME) bequest effect externalities

fully funded pension induced retirement effect maximum taxable earnings means test pay-as-you-go pension

payroll taxes primary insurance amount

(PIA) retirement age Social Security Trust Fund

Quiz Yourself 1. Social Security’s revenue emanates from taxes on

a. all income. b. payrolls. c. capital. d. estates.

2. One of the reasons a government-run annuity sys- tem such as Social Security may be better for society than simply relying on private savings is that a. no one would save for themselves. b. people, being overly risk averse, will save too much. c. people, being risk neutral, will save too much. d. people, having imperfect foresight, will save too

little. 3. The average index of monthly earnings is indexed

a. for wage inflation. b. for consumer price inflation. c. for producer price inflation. d. via a combination of wage and price inflation.

4. Since its inception, the portion of earnings that has been subject to the Social Security tax has a. remained roughly intact. b. increased substantially. c. decreased slightly. d. decreased substantially.

5. In 2013, a worker who earned $125,000 would have in Social Security taxes taken out of

his or her pay and would also be paid by the employer. a. $17,396; $17,396 (both equal to $113,700*.153) b. $8,860.45; $8,860.45 (both equal to

$113,700*.0765+.0145*$11,300) c. $8,470.65; $8,470.65 (both equal to

$113,700*.0765) d. $9,562.50; $9,562.50 (both equal to

$125,000*.0765) 6. The asset substitution effect implies that Social

Security will from where it would have been without it. a. increase savings b. increase work

c. decrease work d. decrease savings

7. The question of whether Social Security increases or decreases savings depends mostly on whether the

effect outweighs the effect or vice versa. a. bequest; asset substitution b. bequest; induced retirement c. asset substitution; induced retirement d. interest; asset substitution

8. When compared to people of your grandparents’ generation, you can expect the net present value of Social Security to be a. much better. b. about the same. c. slightly worse. d. much worse.

Short Answer Questions 1. Why would comparing the benefit and tax structure

of Social Security to what might be achieved in a private investment alternative be valid, and why might it not be valid?

2. How would a change in immigration policy affect the projected solvency of the Social Security system?

3. How much would an individual receive in benefits if she had a constant (wage-inflation adjusted) monthly income of $6,000, and how would that compare to someone who had an income one-third that size?

4. What economic concept do you use to compare ben- efits received in the distant future with taxes paid in the past, currently, and in the near future?

Think about This How much risk is appropriate for a government-run an- nuity system? Is there an appropriate risk-return calcula- tion to be made? Is Social Security risk free? What about political risk?

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428 Chapter 40 Social Security

Hyman, David, Public Finance: A Contemporary Appli- cation of Theory to Policy, 7th ed. (11th Ed. Cengage, 2013).

Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, no. 3 (Summer 1996). See articles by Edward M. Gramlich; and Peter A. Diamond, pp. 85–88.

Leimer, Dean, and Selig Lesnoy, “Social Security and Private Saving: New Time Series Evidence,” Jour- nal of Political Economy 90, no. 3 (June 1982), pp. 606–642.

Pozen, Robert, Sylvester J. Schieber, and John Shoven, “Improving Social Security’s Progressivity and Solvency with Hybrid Indexing,” American Eco- nomic Review 94, no. 2 (May 2004).

Rosen, Harvey S. and Ted Gayer, Public Finance (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2010).

Steuerle, C. Eugene, and Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st Century: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform (Washington, DC: Urban Insti- tute, 1994).

Behind the Numbers Social Security information. Components, taxes, and bankruptcy. Social Security Administration—

www.socialsecurity.gov History and projections. Social Security Administration; 2012 Trustees Report—

www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2012/tr2012.pdf

Talk about This Defenders of the status quo in Social Security note the extremely low administrative costs of the system rela- tive to those associated with private investment houses. Critics of the status quo note that the real rate of return to future recipients is so much less than the long-term historical average of stocks that paying the extra ad- ministrative costs would be worth it. Who’s right? Given the methods of saving Social Security described in this chapter, which combination would you employ to save it?

For More Insight See Aaron, Henry, “The Myths of Social Security Crisis:

Behind the Privatization Push,” NTA Forum 26 (Summer 1996).

Clark, Robert, “Social Security Financing: Facts, Fanta- sies, Foibles, and Follies,” American Economic Re- view 94, no. 2 (May 2004).

Cogan, John F., and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Perspectives from the President’s Commission on Social Secu- rity Reform,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 2 (Spring 2003).

Diamond, Peter, “Social Security,” American Economic Review 94, no. 1 (March 2001).

Feldstein, Martin, “Social Security and Saving: New Time Series Evidence,” National Tax Journal 49, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 151–163.

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y - O N E

429

Personal Income Taxes Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Explain the rudiments of federal income taxes.

LO2 Describe the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity and how they apply to the issue of taxation.

LO3 Summarize the trade-off that exists between simplicity and horizontal equity when people are making tax policy.

LO4 Describe how taxes can alter the incentives of people to work and save.

LO5 List examples of where taxes are used to motivate socially desirable outcomes.

LO6 Summarize the debates over taxes that took place during the 1990s and continue today.

Chapter Outline

How Income Taxes Work

Issues in Income Taxation

Incentives and the Tax Code

Who Pays Income Taxes?

The Tax Debates of the Last Two Decades

Summary

In 2015 income taxes accounted for $1,541 billion of the $3,250 billion that made up federal revenue. As Fig- ure 41.1 suggests, the rest came from payroll (FICA), corporate, customs, excise, estate, and miscellaneous taxes. Personal income taxes make up almost a majority of the revenue government takes in. These taxes also pro- voke many of the disagreements between Republicans and Democrats. Each party fights for policies it believes are best for the nation and that help its constituencies.

Usually the political fights surrounding the personal income tax code boil down to whether the rich pay their “fair share.” To look at these controversies with any in- sight, we will need to understand the way taxes work and who pays them before we get into which party has the better claim on taxes.

This chapter leads off with a discussion of how in- come taxes work in the United States. Following that, we discuss whether and how income taxes alter the willing- ness of people to work and save and how capital gains fit into this picture. We then introduce surprising news about who actually pays taxes. At the end we lay out some of the interesting tax debates of the last decades.

How Income Taxes Work

Federal income taxes in the United States are collected through a series of guesses that are corrected on April 15 of the year after the tax year. When you get a new job, you have to fill out a W-4 form on which you specify how many exemptions you are taking. Usu- ally, your exemptions are you and the others in your household, but you can adjust the number by as many as necessary to improve the guess on the taxes you will owe. The number you provide is used by your

employer to figure out how much tax should be withheld from each of your paychecks. Withholding is the deduction from your paycheck in which you and the government es- timate how much tax you are

going to owe during a year so you can pay it a little at a time rather than all at once. On April 15 you use the amount you actually earned, as reported to you on a W-2 or a 1099 form, to compute what you actually

withholding Deduction from your paycheck to cover the estimated amount of taxes you are going to owe during a year.

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430 Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes

As you can see from Figure 41.2, the amount of tax you owe looks complicated. In reality tax computations are simple for most people because, thanks to a 1986 law, most people can skip the most complicated step, the deductions, and fill out as few as 10 lines on their tax forms. Still, for many others, tax forms, rules, and proce- dures are complicated and jargon-filled. To understand how taxes affect people, we must first take a crack at un- derstanding those forms, rules, procedures, and jargon.

The tax you owe is, of course, influenced by how much you earn. The adjusted gross income (AGI) is the total net income from all sources. To get that number, add together all of your income from the traditional sources (wages, salaries, tips, interest, and dividends). Then add in any net profit from businesses and rental

apartments, any profit you have from asset sales (called capital gains), and, finally, adjust that for net alimony received. (If you paid alimony, this is a negative.)

To figure out how much of that adjusted gross income is taxable, you first have to

owe. People who have had too much withheld get a tax refund. If they have too little withheld, they have to make it up by April 15.

Individual income, $1,540.8

FICA, $1,065.3

Estate, $19.2

Corporate income, $343.8

Customs, $35.0

Misc., $147.6Excise, $98.3

FIGURE 41.1 Federal taxes and their sources in billions. Source: Office of Management and Budget, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget /Historicals

AGI Adjusted gross income = Wages + Salaries + Tips + Interest + Dividends + Business profit + Rents (received) + Capital gains + Other income.

= ⇒ ⇒⇒

=

Exemptions Exemptions = $4,000* (the number of people in the household + the number of people over 65 + the number of people who are blind).

Deductions The Bigger of

Itemized deductions = Medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of AGI + Interest paid on a home mortgage + Unreimbursed business expenses in excess of 2% of AGI + Charitable donations + State and local income and property taxes.

Standard deduction = ($6,300 for a single person and $12,600 for a married couple).

Taxes Owed

What You Owe

Taxable Income

Credits Credits = Earned income tax credit + College tuition credit + Child-care credit + Dependent child credit.C

o m

p ar

e t

o A

lt. M

in . T

ax

Tax Table 2000 Tax Table—Continued

If line 39 If line 39 If line 39 (taxable And you are— (taxable And you are— (taxable And you are— income) is— income) is— income) is—

At But Single Married Married Head At But Single Married Married Head At But Single Married Married Head least less filing filing of a least less filing filing of a least less filing filing of a

than jointly sepa- house- than jointly sepa- house- than jointly sepa- house- rately hold rately hold rately hold

Your tax is— Your tax is— Your tax is—

32,000 35,000 38,000

32,000 32,050 5,555 4.804 6.117 4.804 35,000 35,050 6,395 5.254 6.957 5.254 38,000 38,050 7,235 5.704 7.797 6.078 32,050 32,100 5,569 4.811 6.131 4.811 35,050 35,100 6,409 5.261 6.971 5.271 38,050 38,100 7,249 5.711 7.811 6.092 32,100 32,150 5,583 4.819 6.145 4.819 35,100 35,150 6,423 5.269 6.985 5.269 38,100 38,150 7,263 5.719 7.825 6.106 32,150 32,200 5,597 4.826 6.159 4.826 35,150 35,200 6,437 5.276 6.999 5.280 38,150 38,200 7,277 5.726 7.836 6.120 32,200 32,250 5,611 4.834 6.173 4.834 35,200 35,250 6,451 5.284 7.013 5.294 38,200 38,250 7,291 5.734 7.853 6.134 32,250 32,300 5,625 4.841 6.187 4.841 35,250 35,300 6,465 5.291 7.077 5.308 38,250 38,300 7,305 5.741 7.867 6.148 32,300 32,350 5,639 4.849 6.201 4.849 35,300 35,350 6,479 5.299 7.041 5.322 38,300 38,350 7,319 5.749 7.881 6.162 32,350 32,400 5,653 4.856 6.215 4.856 35,350 35,400 6,493 5.306 7.055 5.336 38,350 38,400 7,333 5.756 7.895 6.176 32,400 32,450 5,667 4.864 6.229 4.864 35,400 35,450 6,507 5.314 7.069 5.350 38,400 38,450 7,347 5.764 7.909 6.190 32,450 32,500 5,681 4.871 6.243 4.871 35,450 35,500 6,521 5.321 7.083 5.364 38,450 38,500 7,361 5.771 7.923 6.204 32,500 32,550 5,695 4.879 6.257 4.879 35,500 35,550 6,535 5.329 7.097 5.378 38,500 38,550 7,375 5.779 7.937 6.218 32,550 32,600 5,700 4.836 6.271 4.886 35,550 35,600 6,549 5.336 7.111 5.392 38,550 38,600 7,389 5.786 7.951 6.232 32,600 32,650 5,723 4.894 6.285 4.894 35,600 35,650 6,563 5.344 7.125 5.406 38,600 38,650 7,403 5.794 7.965 6.246 32,650 32,700 5,737 4.901 6.299 4.901 35,650 35,700 6,577 5.351 7.139 5.420 38,650 38,700 7,417 5.801 7.979 6.260 32,700 32,750 5,751 4.909 6.313 4.909 35,700 35,750 6,591 5.359 7.153 5.434 38,700 38,750 7,431 5.809 7.993 6.274 32,750 32,800 5,765 4.916 6.327 4.916 35,750 35,800 6,605 5.366 7.167 5.448 38,750 38,800 7,445 5.816 8.007 6.288 32,800 32,850 5,779 4.924 6.341 4.924 35,800 35,850 6,619 5.374 7.181 5.462 38,800 38,850 7,459 5.824 8.021 6.302 32,850 32,900 5,793 4.931 6.355 4.931 35,850 35,900 6,633 5.381 7.195 5.476 38,850 38,900 7,473 5.831 8.035 6.316 32,900 32,950 5,807 4.939 6.369 4.939 35,900 35,950 6,647 5.389 7.209 5.490 38,900 38,950 7,483 5.839 8.049 6.330 32,950 33,800 5,821 4.946 6.383 4.946 35,950 36,000 6,661 5.396 7.223 5.504 38,950 39,000 7,501 5.846 8.063 6.344

33,000 36,000 39,000

33,000 33,050 5,835 4.954 6.397 4.954 36,000 36,050 6,675 5.404 7.237 5.518 39,000 39,050 7,515 5.854 8.077 6.358 33,050 33,100 5,849 4.961 6.411 4.961 36,050 36,100 6,689 5.411 7.251 5.532 39,050 39,100 7,529 5.861 8.091 6.372 33,100 33,150 5,863 4.969 6.425 4.969 36,100 36,150 6,703 5.419 7.265 5.546 39,100 39,150 7,543 5.869 8.105 6.386 33,150 33,200 5,877 4.976 6.439 4.976 36,150 36,200 6,717 5.426 7.279 5.560 39,150 39,200 7,557 5.876 8.119 6.400 33,200 33,250 5,891 4.984 6.453 4.984 36,200 36,250 6,731 5.434 7.293 5.574 39,200 39,250 7,571 5.884 8.133 6.414 33,250 33,300 5,905 4.991 6.467 4.991 36,250 36,300 6,745 5.441 7.307 5.588 39,250 39,300 7,585 5.891 8.147 6.428 33,300 33,350 5,919 4.999 6.481 4.999 36,300 36,350 6,759 5.449 7.321 5.602 39,300 39,350 7,599 5.899 8.161 6.442 33,350 33,400 5,933 5.006 6.495 5.006 36,350 36,400 6,773 5.456 7.335 5.616 39,350 39,400 7,613 5.906 8.175 6.456 33,400 33,450 5,947 5.014 6.509 5.014 36,400 36,450 6,787 5.464 7.349 5.630 39,400 39,450 7,627 5.914 8.189 6.470 33,450 33,500 5,961 5.021 6.523 5.021 36,450 36,500 6,801 5.471 7.363 5.644 39,450 39,500 7,641 5.921 8.203 6.484 33,500 33,550 5,975 5.029 6.537 5.029 36,500 36,550 6,815 5.479 7.377 5.658 39,500 39,550 7,655 5.929 8.217 6.498 33,550 33,600 5,989 5.036 6.551 5.036 36,550 36,600 6,829 5.486 7.391 5.672 39,550 39,600 7,669 5.936 8.231 6.512 33,600 33,650 6,003 5.044 6.565 5.044 36,600 36,650 6,843 5.494 7.405 5.686 39,600 39,650 7,683 5.944 8.245 6.526 33,650 33,700 6,017 5.051 6.579 5.051 36,650 36,700 6,857 5.501 7.419 5.700 39,650 39,700 7,697 5.951 8.259 6.540 33,700 33,750 6,031 5.059 6.593 5.059 36,700 36,750 6,871 5.509 7.433 5.714 39,700 39,750 7,711 5.959 8.273 6.554 33,750 33,800 6,045 5.066 6.607 5.066 36,750 36,800 6,885 5.516 7.447 5.728 39,750 39,800 7,725 5.966 8.287 6.568 33,800 33,850 6,059 5.074 6.621 5.074 36,800 36,850 6,899 5.524 7.461 5.742 39,800 39,850 7,739 5.974 8.301 6.582 33,850 33,900 6,073 5.081 6.635 5.081 36,850 36,900 6,913 5.531 7.475 5.756 39,850 39,900 7,753 5.981 8.315 6.596 33,900 33,950 6,087 5.089 6.649 5.089 36,900 36,950 6,927 5.539 7.489 5.770 39,900 39,950 7,767 5.989 8.329 6.610 33,950 34,000 6,101 5.096 6.663 5.096 36,950 37,000 6,941 5.546 7.503 5.784 39,950 40,000 7,781 5.996 8.343 6.624

34,000 37,000 40,000

34,000 34,050 6,115 5.104 6.677 5.104 37,000 37,050 6,955 5.554 7.517 5.798 40,000 40,050 7,795 6.004 8.357 6.638 34,050 34,100 6,129 5.111 6.691 5.111 37,050 37,100 6,969 5.561 7.531 5.812 40,050 40,100 7,809 6.011 8.371 6.652 34,100 34,150 6,143 5.119 6.705 5.119 37,100 37,150 6,983 5.569 7.545 5.826 40,100 40,150 7,823 6.019 8.385 6.666 34,150 34,200 6,157 5.126 6.719 5.126 37,150 37,200 6,997 5.576 7.559 5.840 40,150 40,200 7,837 6.026 8.399 6.680 34,200 34,250 6,171 5.134 6.733 5.134 37,200 37,250 7,011 5.584 7.573 5.854 40,200 40,250 7,851 6.034 8.413 6.694 34,250 34,300 6,185 5.141 6.747 5.141 37,250 37,300 7,025 5.591 7.587 5.868 40,250 40,300 7,865 6.041 8.427 6.708 34,300 34,350 6,199 5.149 6.761 5.149 37,300 37,350 7,039 5.599 7.601 5.882 40,300 40,350 7,879 6.049 8.441 6.722 34,350 34,400 6,213 5.156 6.775 5.156 37,350 37,400 7,053 5.606 7.615 5.896 40,350 40,400 7,893 6.056 8.455 6.736 34,400 34,450 6,227 5.164 6.789 5.164 37,400 37,450 7,067 5.614 7.629 5.910 40,400 40,450 7,907 6.064 8.469 6.750 34,450 34,500 6,241 5.171 6.803 5.171 37,450 37,500 7,081 5.621 7.643 5.924 40,450 40,500 7,921 6.071 8.483 6.764 34,500 34,550 6,255 5.179 6.817 5.179 37,500 37,550 7,095 5.629 7.657 5.938 40,500 40,550 7,935 6.079 8.497 6.778 34,550 34,600 6,269 5.186 6.831 5.186 37,550 37,600 7,109 5.636 7.671 5.952 40,550 40,600 7,949 6.086 8.511 6.792 34,600 34,650 6,283 5.194 6.845 5.194 37,600 37,650 7,123 5.644 7.685 5.966 40,600 40,650 7,963 6.094 8.525 6.806 34,650 34,700 6,297 5.201 6.859 5.201 37,650 37,700 7,137 5.651 7.699 5.980 40,650 40,700 7,977 6.101 8.539 6.820 34,700 34,750 6,311 5.209 6.873 5.209 37,700 37,750 7,151 5.659 7.713 5.994 40,700 40,750 7,991 6.109 8.553 6.834 34,750 34,800 6,325 5.216 6.887 5.216 37,750 37,800 7,165 5.666 7.727 6.008 40,750 40,800 8,005 6.116 8.567 6.848 34,800 34,850 6,339 5.224 6.901 5.224 37,800 37,850 7,179 5.674 7.741 6.022 40,800 40,850 8,019 6.124 8.581 6.862 34,850 34,900 6,353 5.231 6.915 5.231 37,850 37,900 7,193 5.681 7.755 6.036 40,850 40,900 8,033 6.131 8.595 6.876 34,900 34,950 6,367 5.239 6.929 5.239 37,900 37,950 7,207 5.689 7.769 6.050 40,900 40,950 8,047 6.139 8.609 6.890 34,950 35,000 6,381 5.246 6.943 5.246 37,950 38,000 7,221 5.696 7.783 6.064 40,950 41,000 8,061 6.146 8.623 6.904

*This column must also be used by a qualifying widow(er) (Continued on page 64)

FIGURE 41.2 Federal income taxes, 2015.

adjusted gross income (AGI) Total net income from all sources.

capital gains Any profit generated by selling an asset for more than was paid for it.

gue46399_ch41_429-439.indd 430 16/03/17 2:16 PM

How Income Taxes Work 431

adjust that number by two other numbers. The first, exemptions, is an amount by which AGI is reduced that is determined by the size of your family. These exemp- tions are similar to, but not the same as, the exemptions you compute for form W-4. For that form you can es- sentially create fictitious people in order to make your withholding correct. Here, the exemptions have to be real. Each person in the household counts as one. Each person over 65 counts as one more, as does each blind person. For the 2015 tax year, each exemption reduced AGI by $4,000. For example, a married couple, both of whose members are old and blind, would have had six exemptions, whereas a husband and wife with two small children would have had four. In the first case the total exemption is 6 × $4,000, or $24,000. In the sec-

ond example it is 4 × $4,000, or $16,000.

Deductions are also amounts by which AGI is reduced. These are complicated by the fact that they are the greater of either a minimum level or the sum of particular expenditures, the value of which is money that will not be taxed. The minimum level of deduction is called the standard deduction, and this is the amount that most people take. Itemized deductions are for particular expenses on which government does not want taxes paid. The reason most people can compute their taxes rela- tively easily is that they skip this complicated step. Rather than itemizing deductions, they accept the value of the standard deduction.

When people itemize (that is, “list”), they add up those things that are deductible (approved types of expenses) and instead of reducing their taxable income by a fixed amount, they reduce it by the sum of those expenses. For instance, when people buy homes, they typically have mortgage pay- ments. In the early years of paying a mortgage, the payment is almost entirely interest. That interest is de- ductible. Other deductible items that are listed include state and local income and property taxes, charitable donations, certain employment expenses, and certain (usually very high) medical expenses.

Most people do not itemize their deductions because if they did, the total would not equal the standard deduc- tion. This is especially true for those who rent their resi- dences, because renters cannot deduct mortgage interest and property taxes. Only those who own the properties are entitled to take these deductions.

The standard deduction simplifies taxes for most people, and it reduces the amount of tax that they owe. Those people who itemize have at least one, if not many, more forms than the people who take the standard deduc- tion. In addition, since the standard deduction gives the people who take it a larger reduction off income than they would otherwise get, it reduces their tax burden.

Taxable income is therefore ad- justed gross income minus per- sonal exemptions minus (the greater of either the standard or itemized) deductions.

Another thing people must know in order to compute the tax they owe is their filing status. A person’s filing status can be one of four things: single, mar- ried filing jointly, married filing separately, and single head of household. Single people without children file as singles, whereas

those singles with kids in the household file as a single head of household. Almost all married people file jointly, though those going through a separation or a divorce typically file separately. Most married couples pay less tax if they file jointly, though some couples file separately because they balk at sharing financial information with one another.

In the 2015 tax year, for married couples the standard deduction was $12,600; for single people it was $6,300. As a result, for those married couples with two chil- dren who took the standard deduction, the first $28,600 ($4,000 × 4 + $12,600) they earned was tax-free. For single people the first $10,300 was tax-free.

The tax tables show the amount most people owe in tax. To read tax tables, find the column that contains the filing status. Then read the row to find the amount of tax- able income. As an example, take a single person who does not own a home and whose only income is salary. The taxes she or he owes are very simple to compute. Say such a person earns $52,000 a year and takes the standard deduction. The taxable income is $52,000 − $6,300 (standard deduction) − $4,000 (personal exemption), or $41,700. A 2015 tax table is duplicated here in Figure 41.3, and circled on that form is the tax amount of $6,225.

exemptions An amount by which AGI is reduced which is determined by the size of the family.

deductions Amounts by which AGI is reduced; the greater of either the standard deduction or itemized deductions.

standard deduction The minimum level of deduction.

itemized deductions Deductions for particu- lar expenses on which the government does not want taxes paid.

deductible Approved types of expenses for income tax purposes.

taxable income Adjusted gross income minus personal exemp- tions minus (the greater of either the standard or itemized) deductions.

filing status Classification of taxpay- ers based on household; can be single, married filing jointly, mar- ried filing separately, and single head of household.

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432 Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes

2015 Tax Table

* This column must also be used by a qualifying widow(er).

If line 43 (taxable income) is—

And you are—

At least

But less than

Single Married filing jointly *

Married filing sepa- rately

Head of a house- hold

Your tax is—

39,000

39,000 39,050 5,550 4,931 5,550 5,196 39,050 39,100 5,563 4,939 5,563 5,204 39,100 39,150 5,575 4,946 5,575 5,211 39,150 39,200 5,588 4,954 5,588 5,219 39,200 39,250 5,600 4,961 5,600 5,226

39,250 39,300 5,613 4,969 5,613 5,234 39,300 39,350 5,625 4,976 5,625 5,241 39,350 39,400 5,638 4,984 5,638 5,249 39,400 39,450 5,650 4,991 5,650 5,256 39,450 39,500 5,663 4,999 5,663 5,264

39,500 39,550 5,675 5,006 5,675 5,271 39,550 39,600 5,688 5,014 5,688 5,279 39,600 39,650 5,700 5,021 5,700 5,286 39,650 39,700 5,713 5,029 5,713 5,294 39,700 39,750 5,725 5,036 5,725 5,301

39,750 39,800 5,738 5,044 5,738 5,309 39,800 39,850 5,750 5,051 5,750 5,316 39,850 39,900 5,763 5,059 5,763 5,324 39,900 39,950 5,775 5,066 5,775 5,331 39,950 40,000 5,788 5,074 5,788 5,339

40,000

40,000 40,050 5,800 5,081 5,800 5,346 40,050 40,100 5,813 5,089 5,813 5,354 40,100 40,150 5,825 5,096 5,825 5,361 40,150 40,200 5,838 5,104 5,838 5,369 40,200 40,250 5,850 5,111 5,850 5,376

40,250 40,300 5,863 5,119 5,863 5,384 40,300 40,350 5,875 5,126 5,875 5,391 40,350 40,400 5,888 5,134 5,888 5,399 40,400 40,450 5,900 5,141 5,900 5,406 40,450 40,500 5,913 5,149 5,913 5,414

40,500 40,550 5,925 5,156 5,925 5,421 40,550 40,600 5,938 5,164 5,938 5,429 40,600 40,650 5,950 5,171 5,950 5,436 40,650 40,700 5,963 5,179 5,963 5,444 40,700 40,750 5,975 5,186 5,975 5,451

40,750 40,800 5,988 5,194 5,988 5,459 40,800 40,850 6,000 5,201 6,000 5,466 40,850 40,900 6,013 5,209 6,013 5,474 40,900 40,950 6,025 5,216 6,025 5,481 40,950 41,000 6,038 5,224 6,038 5,489

41,000

41,000 41,050 6,050 5,231 6,050 5,496 41,050 41,100 6,063 5,239 6,063 5,504 41,100 41,150 6,075 5,246 6,075 5,511 41,150 41,200 6,088 5,254 6,088 5,519 41,200 41,250 6,100 5,261 6,100 5,526

41,250 41,300 6,113 5,269 6,113 5,534 41,300 41,350 6,125 5,276 6,125 5,541 41,350 41,400 6,138 5,284 6,138 5,549 41,400 41,450 6,150 5,291 6,150 5,556 41,450 41,500 6,163 5,299 6,163 5,564

41,500 41,550 6,175 5,306 6,175 5,571 41,550 41,600 6,188 5,314 6,188 5,579 41,600 41,650 6,200 5,321 6,200 5,586 41,650 41,700 6,213 5,329 6,213 5,594 41,700 41,750 6,225 5,336 6,225 5,601

41,750 41,800 6,238 5,344 6,238 5,609 41,800 41,850 6,250 5,351 6,250 5,616 41,850 41,900 6,263 5,359 6,263 5,624 41,900 41,950 6,275 5,366 6,275 5,631 41,950 42,000 6,288 5,374 6,288 5,639

If line 43 (taxable income) is—

And you are—

At least

But less than

Single Married filing jointly *

Married filing sepa- rately

Head of a house- hold

Your tax is—

42,000

42,000 42,050 6,300 5,381 6,300 5,646 42,050 42,100 6,313 5,389 6,313 5,654 42,100 42,150 6,325 5,396 6,325 5,661 42,150 42,200 6,338 5,404 6,338 5,669 42,200 42,250 6,350 5,411 6,350 5,676

42,250 42,300 6,363 5,419 6,363 5,684 42,300 42,350 6,375 5,426 6,375 5,691 42,350 42,400 6,388 5,434 6,388 5,699 42,400 42,450 6,400 5,441 6,400 5,706 42,450 42,500 6,413 5,449 6,413 5,714

42,500 42,550 6,425 5,456 6,425 5,721 42,550 42,600 6,438 5,464 6,438 5,729 42,600 42,650 6,450 5,471 6,450 5,736 42,650 42,700 6,463 5,479 6,463 5,744 42,700 42,750 6,475 5,486 6,475 5,751

42,750 42,800 6,488 5,494 6,488 5,759 42,800 42,850 6,500 5,501 6,500 5,766 42,850 42,900 6,513 5,509 6,513 5,774 42,900 42,950 6,525 5,516 6,525 5,781 42,950 43,000 6,538 5,524 6,538 5,789

43,000

43,000 43,050 6,550 5,531 6,550 5,796 43,050 43,100 6,563 5,539 6,563 5,804 43,100 43,150 6,575 5,546 6,575 5,811 43,150 43,200 6,588 5,554 6,588 5,819 43,200 43,250 6,600 5,561 6,600 5,826

43,250 43,300 6,613 5,569 6,613 5,834 43,300 43,350 6,625 5,576 6,625 5,841 43,350 43,400 6,638 5,584 6,638 5,849 43,400 43,450 6,650 5,591 6,650 5,856 43,450 43,500 6,663 5,599 6,663 5,864

43,500 43,550 6,675 5,606 6,675 5,871 43,550 43,600 6,688 5,614 6,688 5,879 43,600 43,650 6,700 5,621 6,700 5,886 43,650 43,700 6,713 5,629 6,713 5,894 43,700 43,750 6,725 5,636 6,725 5,901

43,750 43,800 6,738 5,644 6,738 5,909 43,800 43,850 6,750 5,651 6,750 5,916 43,850 43,900 6,763 5,659 6,763 5,924 43,900 43,950 6,775 5,666 6,775 5,931 43,950 44,000 6,788 5,674 6,788 5,939

44,000

44,000 44,050 6,800 5,681 6,800 5,946 44,050 44,100 6,813 5,689 6,813 5,954 44,100 44,150 6,825 5,696 6,825 5,961 44,150 44,200 6,838 5,704 6,838 5,969 44,200 44,250 6,850 5,711 6,850 5,976

44,250 44,300 6,863 5,719 6,863 5,984 44,300 44,350 6,875 5,726 6,875 5,991 44,350 44,400 6,888 5,734 6,888 5,999 44,400 44,450 6,900 5,741 6,900 6,006 44,450 44,500 6,913 5,749 6,913 6,014

44,500 44,550 6,925 5,756 6,925 6,021 44,550 44,600 6,938 5,764 6,938 6,029 44,600 44,650 6,950 5,771 6,950 6,036 44,650 44,700 6,963 5,779 6,963 6,044 44,700 44,750 6,975 5,786 6,975 6,051

44,750 44,800 6,988 5,794 6,988 6,059 44,800 44,850 7,000 5,801 7,000 6,066 44,850 44,900 7,013 5,809 7,013 6,074 44,900 44,950 7,025 5,816 7,025 6,081 44,950 45,000 7,038 5,824 7,038 6,089

If line 43 (taxable income) is—

And you are—

At least

But less than

Single Married filing jointly *

Married filing sepa- rately

Head of a house- hold

Your tax is—

45,000

45,000 45,050 7,050 5,831 7,050 6,096 45,050 45,100 7,063 5,839 7,063 6,104 45,100 45,150 7,075 5,846 7,075 6,111 45,150 45,200 7,088 5,854 7,088 6,119 45,200 45,250 7,100 5,861 7,100 6,126

45,250 45,300 7,113 5,869 7,113 6,134 45,300 45,350 7,125 5,876 7,125 6,141 45,350 45,400 7,138 5,884 7,138 6,149 45,400 45,450 7,150 5,891 7,150 6,156 45,450 45,500 7,163 5,899 7,163 6,164

45,500 45,550 7,175 5,906 7,175 6,171 45,550 45,600 7,188 5,914 7,188 6,179 45,600 45,650 7,200 5,921 7,200 6,186 45,650 45,700 7,213 5,929 7,213 6,194 45,700 45,750 7,225 5,936 7,225 6,201

45,750 45,800 7,238 5,944 7,238 6,209 45,800 45,850 7,250 5,951 7,250 6,216 45,850 45,900 7,263 5,959 7,263 6,224 45,900 45,950 7,275 5,966 7,275 6,231 45,950 46,000 7,288 5,974 7,288 6,239

46,000

46,000 46,050 7,300 5,981 7,300 6,246 46,050 46,100 7,313 5,989 7,313 6,254 46,100 46,150 7,325 5,996 7,325 6,261 46,150 46,200 7,338 6,004 7,338 6,269 46,200 46,250 7,350 6,011 7,350 6,276

46,250 46,300 7,363 6,019 7,363 6,284 46,300 46,350 7,375 6,026 7,375 6,291 46,350 46,400 7,388 6,034 7,388 6,299 46,400 46,450 7,400 6,041 7,400 6,306 46,450 46,500 7,413 6,049 7,413 6,314

46,500 46,550 7,425 6,056 7,425 6,321 46,550 46,600 7,438 6,064 7,438 6,329 46,600 46,650 7,450 6,071 7,450 6,336 46,650 46,700 7,463 6,079 7,463 6,344 46,700 46,750 7,475 6,086 7,475 6,351

46,750 46,800 7,488 6,094 7,488 6,359 46,800 46,850 7,500 6,101 7,500 6,366 46,850 46,900 7,513 6,109 7,513 6,374 46,900 46,950 7,525 6,116 7,525 6,381 46,950 47,000 7,538 6,124 7,538 6,389

47,000

47,000 47,050 7,550 6,131 7,550 6,396 47,050 47,100 7,563 6,139 7,563 6,404 47,100 47,150 7,575 6,146 7,575 6,411 47,150 47,200 7,588 6,154 7,588 6,419 47,200 47,250 7,600 6,161 7,600 6,426

47,250 47,300 7,613 6,169 7,613 6,434 47,300 47,350 7,625 6,176 7,625 6,441 47,350 47,400 7,638 6,184 7,638 6,449 47,400 47,450 7,650 6,191 7,650 6,456 47,450 47,500 7,663 6,199 7,663 6,464

47,500 47,550 7,675 6,206 7,675 6,471 47,550 47,600 7,688 6,214 7,688 6,479 47,600 47,650 7,700 6,221 7,700 6,486 47,650 47,700 7,713 6,229 7,713 6,494 47,700 47,750 7,725 6,236 7,725 6,501

47,750 47,800 7,738 6,244 7,738 6,509 47,800 47,850 7,750 6,251 7,750 6,516 47,850 47,900 7,763 6,259 7,763 6,524 47,900 47,950 7,775 6,266 7,775 6,531 47,950 48,000 7,788 6,274 7,788 6,539

FIGURE 41.3 Tax table for 2015. Source: www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf

Take the amount of taxable income, $41,700, and find the column labeled “single.” The person with that taxable income owes $6,225.

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How Income Taxes Work 433

The third major credit is the child (and elder) care tax credit. For the majority of families with child-care ex- penses, this credit allows for between 20 percent and 35 percent (again, depending on AGI) of those expenses to come off the tax bill. The last of the major credits is a tuition tax credit (renamed the American Opportunity Credit). This allows for up to $2,500 of college-related expenses to come off the tax bill.

There is an important distinction between tax credits and deductions. A tax deduction comes off taxable in- come, so the savings to taxpayers are whatever their mar- ginal tax rate is times the amount of the deduction. For example, if a person is in the 15 percent tax bracket, a $1,000 deduction is worth $150. A $1,000 credit, on the other hand, is $1,000 off the tax bill. Tax credits are there- fore better than deductions if the two are in equal amounts.

There is another aspect of the distinction between credits and deductions that is important. During tax de- bates there is often a discussion of whether there should be a tax deduction for something or a tax credit for it. Since credits are more costly to the government than de- ductions, we can imagine that the choice facing policy makers for the tax cut would be a $2,500 deduction or a $500 credit. For people in the 15 percent tax bracket, a $2,500 tax deduction is worth between nothing (be- cause they still end up with insufficient deductions to get over the standard deduction) and 15 percent of $2,500, or $375. For people in the 28 percent bracket, a $2,500 deduction is worth up to $700. The net result of this is that credits are better than deductions when they are in equal amounts and that for tax reductions of equal cost to the government, credits are better than deductions for the poor. For the rich the opposite is true: Tax deductions are preferred over tax credits.

For people with a variety of income sources and many deductions, the rules are very complicated. The vast ma- jority of people are not in this predicament. You have to own a farm or business, have a significant and actively changing investment portfolio, have significant medical expenses that you have to pay yourself, work in an en- vironment where you get high pay but have to pay for

A part of the tax calculation process that still exists, in an albeit more limited form, is the alternative minimum tax (AMT). This tax, invented in the 1960s to prevent the superrich from accumulating so many deductions that they could avoid taxes altogether, had begun to hit ordi- nary middle-class taxpayers. The alternative minimum tax was doubly frustrating for taxpayers who did their own taxes because after they had completed their federal return, if they came under its provisions, they would have to refigure their taxes using its provisions. There was no obvious way to know this until you were almost entirely finished completing your 1040. The creeping nature of this burden was resolved following the 2012 election. The AMT was reformed to raise the income threshold substantially and to index them for inflation.

The tax rates in the United States are progressive in that with higher income you pay a higher rate of tax. Table 41.1 shows the so-called tax brackets in the United

States for 2015. One result of President Obama’s reelection was the creation of a new 39.6 percent bracket in 2013 at the top end. The marginal tax rate is the percentage of each dol- lar in that bracket that must be paid in tax. This means that our single person making $52,000,

with taxable income of $41,700, has a tax rate of zero on the first $10,300 of income, pays 10 percent on the next $9,225, pays 15 percent on the next $28,225, and 25 percent of the remainder.

Even after you have figured your tax, this is not what you actually owe. There are four important tax credits that now go into the computation. The first, the earned income tax credit, is designed for the working poor. This can be a substantial increase in your take-home pay if you have children and do not make a lot of money. In 2015, for those with at least two children, the credit amounted to as much as $6,242. The second important credit is the child credit. For those married couples who make less than $110,000, this credit amounts to $1,000 per child.

TABLE 41.1 Marginal tax rate.

Status 10% 15% 25% 28% 33% 35% 39.6%

Single $0–9,225 $9,225–37,450 $37,450–90,750 $90,750–189,300 $189,300–411,500 $411,500–413,200 $413,200–

Single head of household $0–13,150 $13,150–50,200 $50,200–129,600 $129,600–209,850 $209,850–411,500 $411,500–439,000 $439,000–

Married filing jointly $0–18,450 $18,450–74,900 $74,900–151,200 $151,200–230,450 $230,450–411,500 $411,500–464,850 $464,850–

Married filing separately $0–9,225 $9,225–37,450 $37,450–75,600 $75,600–115,225 $115,225–205,750 $205,750–232,425 $232,425–

progressive taxation Those with higher in- come pay a higher rate of tax.

marginal tax rate The percentage of each dollar in a bracket that must be paid in tax.

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434 Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes

actually have the profit in hand) rather than accrual (when the asset price increase happened). This undertaxes capi- tal gains by letting the holder of them defer the tax.

Taxing on realization rather than accrual is simple, but it creates a different problem whose solution only creates another problem. Because there is no tax until an asset is sold, when a person dies while in possession of an asset, there are capital gains. Perhaps there is no paperwork to find out when it was bought, so there is no way of finding out exactly how big the capital gain is. To solve this, all capital gains, and therefore all taxes owed on those gains, are forgiven at death. This creates yet an- other problem. There is an incentive for the elderly to hold assets with large capital gains rather than sell them, because doing so avoids the capital gains tax.

Thus the problem is that there is a trade-off between simplicity and equity. In order to be simple, we will violate equity, and in order to be fair, this will cost us simplicity.

Incentives and the Tax Code

There is an active debate among politicians and among economists about the effects of income taxes on the behavior of people. Two of the most interesting of these is- sues are how such taxes affect people’s willingness to work and save. Republican politicians and conservative econo- mists are convinced that income taxes cause people to

work and save less. Democratic politicians and liberal economists are convinced that people do not work and save any less and may, in fact, work and save more.

This is because there is a fun- damental disagreement between economists concerning the rela- tive importance of what econo- mists call the substitution effect and the income effect. Any time you change the price of some- thing, in this case either the take- home wage rate or the after-tax interest rate, you create these two effects. The substitution effect moves people toward the good that is now cheaper or away from

the good that is now more expensive. As an example, if there are only two goods, apples and oranges, and the price of apples increases, you would move toward oranges. This is not the end of the story, though. There is also an income

lots of work expenses (like a truck driver), or have some other strange source of income in order to have overly complicated income taxes.

Issues in Income Taxation

Horizontal and Vertical Equity One question that always arises with regard to income taxes is whether they are fair. The very definition of “fair” requires some thought. To be fair, it seems clear that equal people should be treated equally. This concept, called horizontal equity, is not much disputed. People who make the same income, from the same sources, with the same family structure, and who are the same in every

other dimension should pay the same taxes.

Where the controversy lies with most people is the issue of vertical equity. That is, are people across the income scale treated fairly with regard to their ability to pay? As you saw with Table 41.1, people at the upper

end of the income scale pay much more in tax and much higher percentages of tax than people at the lower end.

Equity versus Simplicity There is a distinct trade-off between horizontal equity and simplicity. This is because it is difficult to nail down the question of “sameness” that is at the heart of the definition of horizontal equity. Most economists who study the issue of taxation want the tax code to be neutral. For instance, to ensure neutrality, income earned from work must be treated the same as income made from investments. The problem

is that in order to accomplish neu- trality, the tax code would have to be very complicated. Consider capital gains income.

When assets are bought and later sold at a profit, there is cap- ital gain. Under the principles of

neutrality that capital gain should be taxed—the question is how much? This question arises because there are prob- lems with capital gains that do not affect earnings from work. First, much of the increase in the value of an asset is simply the compensation for inflation. We tax all gains rather than just the inflation-adjusted gains because this is easier. Second, some assets are difficult to evaluate, so capital gains are taxed only on realization (when you

horizontal equity Equal people should be treated equally.

vertical equity People across the in- come scale are treated fairly with regard to ability to pay.

neutral When applied to a tax code, the implication that it does not favor particular forms of in- come or expenditure.

substitution effect Purchase of less of a product than originally wanted when its price is high because a lower-priced product is available.

income effect An increase in price lowers spending power; if the good is normal, this further lowers consumption; if it is inferior, it can increase consumption back toward where it was (or even further). This effect works in either direction.

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Who Pays Income Taxes? 435

effect. This can go either direction and depends on the Chapter 2 concepts of normal and inferior. If a good is inferior, the increase in price lowers your real spending power and you would move back toward that good.

Do Taxes Alter Work Decisions? One of the most well-researched questions in economics is the effect of take-home pay on the number of hours worked. To the untrained observer this may not seem like a very difficult question, but it actually is. The sub- stitution effect is the more obviously seen effect. Since taxes reduce the take-home pay for every hour worked, the incentive to work, rather than stay home and relax, is lessened. Thus you reduce your work effort. The other side of the story, though, is the reduction in income. If you do the work that is necessary to generate a certain standard of living, then you will have to work more hours to have the income to sustain that standard of living. The empirical research suggests that if taxes do alter the work decision, it is only very slightly. Most estimates suggest that the substitution effect is exactly countered by the in- come effect. That is, an increase in taxes has no effect on work effort, though some have found the effect to be that it takes an 8 percent reduction in after-tax wage rates to generate a 1 percent reduction in work hours. Either way, taxes do not substantially alter the incentive to work.

Do Taxes Alter Savings Decisions? A similar result has been found on after-tax interest rates. Though there is disagreement in methodology that gen- erates a disagreement in the conclusion, many econo- mists also believe that an increase in tax rates has little or no effect on saving behavior. This also suggests that the substitution effect and income effect completely counter each other. There are, though, estimates that suggest that the net is not zero. In particular, Michael Boskin esti- mated that a 2.5 percent decrease in the after-tax interest rates results in a 1 percent decrease in savings.

Taxes for Social Engineering If taxes do not substantially alter the incentive of people to work or save, then you might think that policy mak- ers would have given up on using taxes to get people to do other desirable things. If you thought that, you would be wrong. President Clinton proposed and Congress en- acted a plan to use tax credits to provide an incentive to go to college. Tax deductions and credits for a variety of desirable outcomes have been tried at a variety of dif- ferent times. Typically the breaks do not end up causing

more of the desired outcome but simply subsidize the people who were already engaging in it.1

President Bush was less fond of tax changes of this type, but President Obama jumped right in with billions of targeted tax deductions and credits in his 2009 Economic Recovery Act (i.e., his stimulus package). In that package there were tax credits for first-time home buyers, for buy- ers of hybrid cars, and even for buyers of energy-efficient water heaters. The belief that the federal income tax code can be used to motivate socially desirable activities is deeply held in the halls of the capitol, yet there is little evidence that these tax credits have a significant impact.

Who Pays Income Taxes?

A vastly misunderstood concept of income taxation is who it is that pays. For years Republicans and Democrats alike have perpetuated the myth that middle Americans pay this tax and the rich do not pay their fair share. A look at Table 41.2 should begin to dispel that myth. The first col- umn indicates the percentile of tax returns; the second and third columns indicate the percentage of income earned and taxes paid by everyone at or below that percentile.

TABLE 41.2 Distribution of taxes, 2013.

Source: Statistics of Income: Individual Income Tax Returns 2013, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, DC

Percentile of Taxpayers, Bottom x% of Returns*

Cumulative Percentage of Adjusted Gross Income

Cumulative Percentage of Taxes Paid

10 0.00% 0.00% 20 0.49% 0.02% 30 2.06% 0.11% 40 4.59% 0.39% 50 8.15% 1.06% 60 12.85% 2.33% 70 19.26% 4.84% 80 27.50% 8.92% 90 39.59% 16.99% 100 55.32% 28.56%

100.00% 100.00%

*Example: The bottom 40 percent of taxpayers earn 4.59 percent of adjusted gross income and pay 1.06 percent of all federal income taxes.

1 If the research on college tax credits that is published in the next few years duplicates the results of the research on work and savings, the tax deduc- tions and credits will probably not increase the number of people going to college but will merely be a special tax break to those who would have gone to college anyway. Another effect of this subsidy is that it gives colleges and universities an increased ability to raise tuition.

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436 Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes

For instance, the bottom 40 percent of earners account for 2.33 percent of income and 1.06 percent of taxes paid.

From this table you can draw several myth-breaking conclusions. First, the bottom half of taxpayers pays only 2 percent of the income tax while the top half pays the remaining 98 percent. Second, the top 10 percent of tax- payers accounts for 71 percent of federal income taxes paid while the rest of us account for only 29 percent. Third, if it were true that the rich were not paying as much as the middle class, the second column would not always exceed the third. It does, and the rich pay far more tax than do the rest of us.

Figure 41.4 portrays the same information graphically. If all income and taxes were earned and paid equally, it would represent a straight line. The degree to which the income earned, shown as AGI, is bowed is the degree to which in- come earned is unequal. If taxes were paid mostly by the middle class, then the tax curve would be above the income curve. Since the opposite is true, it should be clear that there is significant effective progressivity in the tax code.

The Tax Debates of the Last Two Decades

One of the central themes of the political debates of the 1990s and 2000s was whether tax cuts should be across- the-board or targeted. Republican presidential candidates offered across-the-board tax cuts, whereas Democratic

presidential candidates offered tax cuts that were tar- geted to specific populations. The difference in philoso- phy boils down to essentially two differences of opinion: whether most of the tax cuts should go to the people who pay most of the tax or whether the tax code should be used to encourage particular behaviors and help people with the least income.

On the first difference of opinion, it is clear that any across-the-board tax cut must go mostly to the rich since it is they who pay the vast majority of income taxes. Thus an across-the-board tax cut by definition favors the rich. Whether this is fair criticism is relative. If you look at where most of the dollars go in such a cut, it is indis- putable that the rich get most of the money. On the other hand, this is because they pay the most. Giving a tax cut to the poor gives a tax cut to people who do not pay any federal income taxes to begin with.2

Because of the progressivity of the tax code, simply reducing the tax rate by a fixed percentage not only gives more of a tax break to upper-income taxpayers, but it also changes the income distribution in a way that favors upper-income Americans. To see how, consider Table 41.3. The second column indicates before-tax in- come, showing a circumstance where the upper-income person makes 10  times what the lower-income person makes. The third column indicates the tax that would be paid under the simple hypothetical tax code where 10 percent of the first $50,000 and 20 percent of the rest is paid in tax. The progressivity of the income tax is displayed here in that the upper-income household makes 10 times as much as the lower-income house- hold but pays 15 times as much tax. The fourth col- umn shows the after-tax income. Again, note the effect of the progressive income tax is to reduce the ratio of spending power of the high-income to lower-income person from 10 to 1 to 9.44 to 1. The fifth and sixth columns show the effect of a 10 percent reduction in tax rates. The 10 percent tax rate becomes 9 percent and the 20 percent tax rate becomes 18 percent.

Republicans and Democrats will interpret Table 41.3 in two entirely different ways. The Republicans will say that under both tax codes the upper-income people are paying 15 times the taxes that the lower-income people are paying. Moreover, they will claim that any tax cut that helps the poor will change the distribution of taxes to be even further

0

20

40

60

80

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Percentage of tax returns

P e

rc e

n ta

g e

o f

p e

rs o

n al

in co

m e

Returns Adjusted gross income

Taxable income Income tax

FIGURE 41.4 Income and tax distributions. Source: Statistics of Income: Individual Income Tax Returns, Internal Revenue Ser- vice, Washington, DC, www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Individual-Income-Tax-Returns.

2 Tax cuts to the poor typically result from increasing the earned income tax credit. This credit often exceeds the amount of tax owed by a substantial amount. Many low-income families pay “negative taxes,” so a tax cut to them simply makes this more negative.

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Summary 437

slanted to upper-income people. Democrats will focus on the distribution of the after-tax income figure and note that an across-the-board tax cut increases the ratio of an upper- income person’s after-tax income to a lower-income person’s after-tax income from 9.44 to 9.51. As a result, though an across-the-board tax cut keeps the percentage of government funded by each group the same, it changes the after-tax income distribution in favor of the rich.

Another great debate of the last decade centered on unraveling the 1986 tax reform law that eliminated most social engineering from the tax code. Prior to that year thousands of provisions were included to induce people to do a variety of things. The law passed in 1986 elimi- nated almost all of them. Slowly, but steadily, the Clinton administration sought provisions to again urge people in particular directions. For instance, they sought and got partial tax deductions and credits for higher education.

After his election in 2000, George W. Bush sought and got two substantial personal income tax cuts. The first, in 2001, cut marginal tax rates, phased in an in- crease in the dependent child credit, and phased out the estate (inheritance) tax. The second, in 2003, sped up the timetable on the 2001 tax cuts and reduced the tax rate on corporate dividends.

Taken together, the beneficiaries of these tax cuts were middle-income and higher-income families with children and the wealthy. Middle-income families with children saw dramatic declines in their effective rates as the per-child tax credit jumped from $200 per child to $1,000 per child. The wealthy saw a sizable reduction

in their taxes as well with the reduction in marginal in- come tax rates by 3 to 5 percentage points (depending on bracket), the reduction in the rate at which dividends are taxed, and the phasing out of the estate tax.

One of the central questions of the 2008 presiden- tial campaign was whether the 2003 tax cuts should be allowed to expire in 2011. President Bush repeatedly at- tempted to convince a skeptical Democratic Congress to make the cuts permanent. Senator McCain vowed to make them permanent were he elected. Then candidate and President Obama argued that only those tax cuts that assisted those making less than $250,000 should be maintained. As if the point needed more emphasis, he had a ready response to congressional Republican com- plaints that only those that paid federal income taxes should benefit from tax cuts: “I won.” President Obama and congressional Democrats argued for and ultimately passed the 2009 stimulus. In it were provisions cutting taxes for anyone who paid Social Security taxes. This in- cluded billions of dollars for millions of taxpayers whose federal income tax liability was zeroed out as part of the plan. The midterm elections of 2010 constituted a sig- nificant shift in the other direction as Republicans made historic gains in both the House and Senate. One conse- quence of those changes was that the Bush tax cuts were extended through 2012, setting up an obvious election issue for both parties. In a democracy such as that which exists in the United States, elections have consequences, and regardless of the politics of the time, taxes are al- ways going to be a focal point for debate.

TABLE 41.3 Hypothetical example of the effect of a 10 percent cut in tax rates on income distribution.

Tax Code where Tax = 10% of the First $50,000 and 20% of the Rest

Tax Code after a 10% Cut in Tax Rates where Tax = 9% of the First $50,000 and 18% of the Rest

Before Tax Tax After Tax Tax After Tax

Lower-income person $10,000 $1,000 $9,000 $900 $9,100 Upper-income person $100,000 $15,000 $85,000 $13,500 $86,500 Ratio 10 15 9.44 15 9.51

Summary You now understand how taxes work and are able to apply that knowledge and the concepts of hori- zontal and vertical equity to the U.S. tax code. You

understand the trade-off that exists between sim- plicity and horizontal equity and understand that in theory taxes can alter the incentives of people

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438 Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes

to work and save but that little effect has actually been shown. You know that this has not stopped policy makers from using taxes to motivate socially

desirable outcomes. Last, you should be able to un- derstand in a greater context the debates over taxes that began during the 1990s and continue today.

Key Terms adjusted gross income (AGI) capital gains deductible deductions exemptions filing status

horizontal equity income effect itemized deductions marginal tax rate neutral progressive taxation

standard deduction substitution effect taxable income vertical equity withholding

Quiz Yourself 1. The tax brackets have higher tax rates for more tax-

able income. This makes the federal income tax a. proportional. b. regressive. c. progressive. d. integrative.

2. Because there are __________________, adjusted gross income is always __________ taxable income. a. deductions and exemptions; less than b. deductions and exemptions; greater than c. credits; greater than d. credits; less than

3. The alternative minimum tax has the effect of limiting a. income. b. taxable income. c. deductions. d. exemptions.

4. If Congress wants to use $100 billion on tax cuts, the version that would help a family of four making $40,000 a year would a. lower marginal tax rates by one percentage

point. b. increase the standard deduction by $2,000. c. increase the child credit by $1,000. d. index the alternative minimum tax to inflation.

5. If someone is in the 25 percent tax bracket, this means that _______________ is owed in taxes. a. 25 percent of his or her salary b. 25 percent of his or her adjusted gross income c. 25 percent of his or her taxable income d. less than 25 percent of his or her taxable

income

6. Which of the following would immediately be more valuable for most people? a. A $1,000 increase in the child credit b. A decrease in the degree to which brackets are

inflation-indexed c. An indexing of the alternative minimum tax d. A $2,500 increase in the standard deduction

Short Answer Questions 1. Suppose someone were to say that they earned

$100,000 per year, that they paid less than $10,000 in federal income taxes, but that their marginal tax rate was 25 percent. Could that be true?

2. Use the tax tables in the chapter to compute the taxes of someone taking the standard deduction, having a spouse, three children, and $80,000 in income.

3. Explain why someone who cared about the poor and energy savings would advocate for a tax credit rather than a tax deduction if $100 billion was going to be devoted to tax cuts to promote energy-saving changes to behavior.

4. Explain why an across-the-board tax cut would ben- efit those at the higher end of the income scale more than it would affect those at the bottom end.

Think about This If current law is not changed, the alternative minimum tax will affect 30 percent of taxpayers. The problem with fixing it is that doing so only helps the top end of

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Summary 439

Hyman, David, Public Finance: A Contemporary Appli- cation of Theory to Policy, 6th ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press, 1999), esp. Chapters 13 and 14.

Slemrod, Joel, “Do We Know How Progressive the Income Tax Should Be?” National Tax Journal 36, no. 3 (September 1983), pp. 361–369.

Slemrod, Joel, Do Taxes Matter? The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).

Behind the Numbers Fiscal year

Federal revenue and income taxes. Budget of the United States Government; histori- cal tables—www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget /Historicals

Federal tax data. Income and tax distribution.

Statistics of income—www.irs.gov Tax tables, rates, exemptions, and deductions.

Internal Revenue Service; publications—www.irs.gov

taxpayers. One solution would be to simply index the current point at which the AMT kicks in. The longer we wait, the greater the pressure will be to do something because the impact will start to affect people who are not that wealthy. This is what happens when you do not index brackets for inflation. When should they fix this?

Talk about This The Democrats tend to work toward tax code adjust- ments that help those at the lowest end of the income scale; Republicans do the opposite. As a college gradu- ate you are likely to start at the low end and become part of the high end. Are your attitudes about a political party going to stay the same or change as your income circum- stances change?

For More Insight See Boskin, Michael J., “Taxation, Saving and the Rate of

Interest,” Journal of Political Economy 86, no. 2, pt. 2 (April 1978).

Citizens for Tax Justice, The Hidden Entitlements (Washington, DC: Robert S. McIntyre, 1996).

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y - T W O

440

Energy Prices Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Define a cartel.

LO2 Model how a cartel can make its members large sums of money.

LO3 Show why cartels are not typically stable and describe the conditions necessary for creating cartel stability.

LO4 Evaluate whether OPEC qualifies as a cartel.

LO5 Summarize the history of inflation-adjusted oil and gasoline prices.

LO6 Model the role of expectations in determining gasoline prices and explain why events in the Middle East can cause prices at the pump to change in a matter of days.

Chapter Outline

The Historical View

OPEC

Why Do Prices Change So Fast?

Electric Utilities

What Will the Future Hold?

Kick It Up a Notch

Summary

The world runs on petroleum products. Whether it is gasoline for automobiles, diesel fuel for trains and trucks, or home heating oil, modern society could not survive without oil. With proven oil reserves at 1,656 billion barrels, roughly 565 billion barrels more believed to be yet undiscovered, and oil consumption running at a little over 96 million barrels a day, it is likely that oil reserves will run out in the second half of the 21st century.

This chapter reviews the history of oil and gasoline prices and discusses the causes and effects of significant changes. We consider the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and how it developed and collapsed, recovered and re-collapsed as an effective oil cartel. We also talk about why gasoline prices seem to rise and fall much more quickly than supplies would jus- tify and use the 1999–2016 period as our primary focus. We look at electricity prices and why the industry lends itself to monopoly, why this has led to government price regulation, and why the California experience with de- regulation was so problematic. Last, we look at the future

and try to get an idea of where the oil industry might be 50 to 100 years from now.

The Historical View

Oil and Gasoline Price History Gasoline prices, which were never stable, skyrocketed in the 1970s. Although several events coincided during that decade to increase prices, many politicians declared that this period was the beginning of a general long-term “energy crisis.” A brief look at Figure 42.1 suggests that the crisis was actually short run in nature. As a matter of fact, by 1998, the prices of crude oil and gasoline had fallen to a point at or near their 30-year lows. Crude oil prices doubled in the 1999–2000 time frame, doubled again in the 2003–2005 time frame, and doubled once again from 2007 to July 2008. Non-inflation-adjusted gasoline prices reached all-time highs of above $4 per gallon during the July 4th weekend of 2008 and began a six-month plummet that ended with them dropping in

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The Historical View 441

world. You can surmise from this that the politics of the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf in particular, have been important in determining oil supplies.

The Arab–Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 generated a great deal of animosity between Arab nations and the Western world. The United States in particular was cas- tigated because it supported Israel. The United States provided both substantial intelligence and support in material that helped the Israelis to prevail in taking (in 1967) and then holding (in 1973) the West Bank of the Jordan River from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Gaza Strip and Sinai peninsula from Egypt.

After this, Arab nations, angered by U.S. aid to Israel, refused to sell oil to the United States and much of the rest of the Western world. Though this did not lead to the rationing of gasoline in the United States, it did in Great Britain. This embargo also resulted in marked increases in prices. Figure 42.1 indicates that these first jumps in oil prices occurred in 1973 and 1974.

The significant price increases that came about in the late 1970s resulted from the economic power that OPEC wielded as an oil cartel. How cartels come about and how they can raise prices substantially will be thoroughly explained later in this chapter; but suf- fice it to say, in inflation-adjusted terms, crude oil and gasoline prices reached record highs during this time. Gasoline hit $1.40 a gallon, the 2015 equivalent of $3.65, and crude oil hit $40 a barrel, the 2015 equiva- lent of $104.

some areas of the United States to below $1.30 per gallon by Christmas 2008. Crude oil prices fell nearly 75 percent during that same span. Prices climbed steadily back once the Great Recession ended and spiked in early 2011 as turmoil in the Middle East created significant uncer- tainty about oil availability.

The top curve in Figure 42.1 shows the path of gaso- line prices (adjusted for CPI-measured inflation) since the general conversion to unleaded fuel in 1978. The middle curve tracks the price of domestically produced crude oil, and the bottom curve shows the price of im- ported crude. Though oil prices are usually quoted in barrels, the prices have been converted to gallons for use here, and the prices have been adjusted for inflation.

Geopolitical History Some geopolitical history here will provide insight into why oil prices changed as they did. As you can see from Table 42.1, oil is not evenly distributed throughout the

FIGURE 42.1 Inflation-adjusted gasoline and domestic and imported crude oil prices, 2015 (2005 dollars).

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

0

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TABLE 42.1 Global reserves by region.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

Group

Barrels in Reserve (in billions)

Percentage of World Reserves

Persian Gulf OPEC 793 48 Non-Persian Gulf OPEC 413 25 Rest of the world 450 27

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442 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

During this time in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini took over from the deposed Shah, making neighbors such as Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia very nervous. There is some dispute as to who the aggressor was, but these fears proved to be well founded, when in 1980 Iran and Iraq went to war. Although this war had many impacts more morally significant than its effect on the price of oil,1 the impact on the price of oil changed the business of oil forever.

Because modern weapons are expensive, because both Iran and Iraq were strapped for cash, and be- cause each country had only one realistic way of rais- ing money, each began to sell as much oil as it could. While their official production figures do not show it, likely because they had to lie to fellow OPEC members, greater production allowed them to purchase more and better weapons.

As oil prices rose through the 1970s, Iran and Iraq began to pump more oil. Additionally, other nations engaged in efforts to find new sources of oil. New re- serves were found in the North Sea, in Mexico, and in many other countries, and these reserves began to be exploited. In 1982 and 1983 a major recession rocked the United States and Europe, depressing demand for oil. As a result of these factors, the price of oil collapsed. Ultimately, by 1986 the price per barrel of oil fell to less than $10, and the average price of oil at the end of the year was $12.51.

When the Iran–Iraq war ended in 1988, oil prices began to recover but reached only the $15 level—a little more than 30 cents a gallon. At the end of the war, Iraq owed Saudi Arabia and Kuwait $40 billion each, as it had borrowed feverishly to buy weaponry. At $15 a barrel Iraq could not afford to both pay these debts and rebuild its war-torn country. Adding to the insult that Iraq felt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were not budging on OPEC production quotas, and Iraq felt that it had done Kuwait and Saudi Arabia a favor by fighting Iran in the first place. As we will see later when we discuss cartels, pro- duction quotas must be held down to keep prices high.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the United States was convinced it was poised to continue the attack into Saudi Arabia. The fear of another war in the Persian Gulf sent oil prices to nearly $30 a barrel very quickly, which caused the average price for the year to be $20 per barrel. With the American- and British-led

victory in the Gulf, prices calmed down and until 1998 fluctuated between $10 and $15 a barrel.

Since that time OPEC has reasserted itself with a series of production cuts that led the price of crude oil to top $30 a barrel in the spring of 2000. Another po litically inspired set of price swings occurred in the run-up to and aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003. Gas prices spiked at over $2 per gallon in many U.S. cities in the month before the war. Once the conventional aspect of the war ended without major petroleum shortages, the price of gasoline came back to a more normal level. Between 2003 and 2005 the Iraqi insurgency prevented a continuous flow of oil from that country and, coupled with increased world- wide demand for oil, prices spiked once again. Historical highs were set in 2004 and 2005 in nominal terms, and for the first time in 25 years, the inflation-adjusted record price for oil began to be challenged. Inflation-adjusted gasoline prices briefly exceeded record levels in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina. Events in 2006, 2007, and 2008 propelled prices even higher. In 2006 the Bush administration was warning Iran against pursu- ing nuclear weapons. Oil markets reacted with signifi- cant concern that the administration was contemplating military action. At the same time, continued conflict in Nigeria and growing world demand from China and India were driving up prices. In 2007 and into 2008 investors looking for a place to make money started driving up world crude oil prices. Their bet was that the growth of China and India coupled with the flattening of world oil production would create a severe oil shortage. (Note in Figure 42.2 that at 85–88 million barrels per day, world oil production was stagnant from 2005 through 2011.)

The Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf in particular have proven that they can rival the Balkans in the old adage that “they produce more history than they can consume locally.” The price of oil is inextricably tied to the political, military, and religious tensions of the re- gion, tensions that are historically significant but would likely be dismissed in the West were it not for the oil.

A Return to Irrelevancy Though the Great Recession caused prices to temporar- ily plummet from $150 per barrel down to below $40 per barrel, the economic recovery of 2009–2014 helped OPEC restore its long-run price targets of $100/barrel. What happened next was a repeat of the experience of the 1980s.

There is a cliché in economics that goes: “The cure for high prices is high prices.” That economic truism re- sults from the motivation to innovate. That motivation is

1Iraq first used poison gas on Iranian soldiers and its own citizens, Iranians recruited children to serve as soldiers, the Reagan administration sold the Iranians weapons while using the profits to fund the Nicaraguan contras, and the CIA gave intelligence support to Iraq.

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The Historical View 443

the cartel is large, any price-increasing reduction in pro- duction of the cartel can be quickly matched by price- decreasing extra production by the outsiders.

The opposite economic truism, “the cure for low prices is low prices,” can also be seen in Figure 42.3 that maps 2014–2016 oil prices against data on oil rig counts. When the price of oil plummeted from $100 per barrel in 2014 to under $30 per barrel in 2015, many produc- ers waited to see if the new lower prices would remain. When they did and after losses mounted, they stopped drilling. The number of active rigs in the United States dropped from 1600 to below 400.

The reason for the lag can be explained by the shut- down condition. Remember that just because a firm is losing money does not mean it will immediately stop producing. As long as the price is greater than average variable cost—which in this case is the cost of running the rig once you have located the oil—the firm will pro- duce. It was only when the price dropped below the aver- age variable cost or when the operators had to move the rig to another place that drilling slowed down. The long- run drop in prices eventually reduced production. Lower levels of supply caused prices to rise to around $50 per barrel in mid-2016.

One other thing that happened between 2014 and 2016 was that oil production became much more elastic. For many years, oil production had been stable. Prior to 2014, every well was producing oil as fast as it could and

stoked by high prices. In the early 1980s the high prices of the day directly motivated the search for and the pro- vision of oil in places that it was previously known to exist but thought to be to too difficult to extract: Alaska, the North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. Those new sup- plies eliminated the prerequisite monopoly power cartels need to create artificially high prices via the conspirato- rial restriction of output. Fairly quickly $40 per barrel oil dropped below $10 per barrel.

In 2014, three technologies came to full fruition: hyper-accurate seismologic imaging, hydraulic fractur- ing, and directional (usually horizontal) drilling. The first allowed oil companies to find mini-pockets of oil and precisely map their size and location. The second allowed those companies to, if necessary, break up the rock in which the oil was located so as to allow it to be profitably pumped. The third allowed those companies to go get the oil by drilling one vertical bore and then to turn their drill bits horizontally to get each mini-pocket one at a time. From new oil fields in North Dakota to re- opened ones in Texas and Oklahoma, U.S. oil production increased markedly.

OPEC could no longer restrict output sufficiently to increase its profits. An unmercifully complicated eco- nomic diagram will be mercifully skipped in favor of this relatively straightforward assertion: In order for cartels to keep prices high, the production by entities outside the cartel has to be limited. When production outside

FIGURE 42.2 Worldwide oil production, 1970–2014.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

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ay )

OPEC Non-OPEC World

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444 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

By way of illustration on a small and personal scale, look at the Google-Earth image of my place of employment: Indiana State University. A dormant and capped oil well on a campus parking lot inspired the (obviously not-by-coincidence former professor- of-petroleum-engineering-turned-) university president to have a company look for oil on campus. Using the new seismological tech- nology they were able to find several mini-pools of oil on or near campus. One was below my church, Central Presbyterian (the build- ing directly below the “H” in “Hulman Center”), and the other was below a recreation field near our principal first-year residence halls. As was our fate, the university struck oil just as the price of oil was on its 2014–2015 run from $100 per barrel down to $30 per barrel. Still it generates more than $100,000 per year in royalties for the university.

Though a small-scale example, this occurred all over the United States during this time frame. Thought to be dormant oil fields were reopened and U.S. production of oil tripled from its 2004 low. On an

aggregated level, these technologies caused the United States to re- sume its place as the number one producer of petroleum in the world.

O I L B E N E A T H M Y C H U R C H P E W

Oil Well

Pools of Oil

FIGURE 42.3 Oil prices and rig counts.

Sources: www.aogr.com/web-exclusives/us-rig-count/2011 and www.eia.gov

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gue46399_ch42_440-454.indd 444 16/03/17 2:29 PM

OPEC 445

agreement, prices will rise. Recall from Chapter 5 that in the long run and under perfect competition the price of a good will equal both the marginal cost and the average cost. If prices rise, profits rise and all of the members of the cartel are happy.

Why Cartels Are Not Stable This is not the end of the story, though, because cartels such as these are not stable. Let’s look at an intuitive rea- son why. Suppose your teacher in this class announced, at the beginning of the semester, that exams would be graded on a curve. This would mean that regardless of how well people did on exams, a predetermined percent- age of students would be assigned As, Bs, Cs, Ds, and Fs. A clever class of students would band together to make a joint promise not to study. They would reason that if they all studied, they would end up ranking exactly the same (based on their aptitude for economics) as they would if they did not study at all.

Let’s add here the outlandish assumption that stu- dents have no desire to study economics for fun and that they just want the grade for as little effort as pos- sible. What would happen then? Would no students study? The scheme might work for the first quiz, but it would start falling apart as one or more students even- tually sneaked off to study. They would see that it was in their interest to study because they could get bet- ter grades. Eventually, other students would notice that some were cheating. They would see their own grades drop in relation to those of their peers as the cheat- ers passed them by. Non-cheaters would then start to cheat—that is to say, they would study. If, as we specu- late, everyone ends up studying as they would without the prior agreement, then the agreement has become meaningless.

This is rather close to what happened with OPEC. Countries saw that they could make money by cheating even a little. A country committed to cheating would see that cheating paid because at their agreed-upon produc- tion their marginal revenue (the new high cartel price) was greater than the marginal cost so the country could make a profit. That profit would greatly exceed the profit previously received at the cartel’s imposed quota. As in our previous example, using grading on a curve where everyone schemed together, individual greed induced cheating on the collective, and this caused all gains to evaporate. Cheating by OPEC members led not only to the disappearance of the large profits but also to the evaporation of all economic profits.

as fast as the laws of physics would allow. Now there are oil wells that get turned on at $40 per barrel, still more at $45, and still more at $50.

OPEC

What OPEC Tries to Do In the preceding historical survey of the price of oil, we alluded to the important part OPEC has played. OPEC

is a cartel (an organization of individual competitors that join to form as a single monopolist) that is composed of Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela: countries that export oil. Taken together, they have, as Table 42.1 shows, 73 percent of the proven oil reserves in the world. There was a time when this gave them enormous political power to wield. Through the 1990s, however, oil prices were such that the cartel seemed to be power- less, only to be revived in 1999 and 2000. How did all this happen?

When groups of people, firms, or countries have lit- tle power as individuals but perceive their joint power as great, they hypothesize themselves as a joint force. If something exists or arises that binds them together and there are not too many of them to organize, there is a chance they can pull it off. These ingredients were present when, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries saw that together they could punish Israel’s main supporters and make a profit at the same time.

This turned a loose organization, OPEC, into a pow- erful oil cartel. Cartels can exist in many different in- dustries where a small number of competitors make up the vast majority of the suppliers of a commodity. The trouble is all cartels have a self-destructive tendency and OPEC was no different.

How Cartels Work Cartels work because the individual perfect competi- tors join forces to act like a monopolist. In order to do this they must agree on a mechanism to withhold their goods from the market. In OPEC’s case, that means they must, together, agree on a plan to reduce oil production. That plan usually means that each country must limit its production to a fraction of what it was producing before they formed the cartel. If they succeed in getting that

cartel An organization of individual competitors that join to form a single monopolist.

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446 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

Putting another nail in the coffin of OPEC was the introduction of other, non-OPEC countries into the mix. A large importer, Great Britain, motivated by high prices to find its own sources, found oil in the North Sea. Moreover, it found enough to both solve its own problems and become an exporter. Mexico and other countries also found oil and began selling it in large quantities. Although OPEC tried to persuade these countries to join in a larger, more powerful cartel, none agreed. They reasoned that they could still sell at or slightly below the cartel price, and they could do so without any production quotas. Figure 42.2 highlights this fact by showing that, as a percentage of total world production, OPEC is no longer the biggest producer. Other nations are producing oil and taking market share from OPEC.

Back from the Dead The 1990s saw oil prices fall dramatically and remain below historical averages until 1999, when prices took a sudden jump higher. How did OPEC, which seemed dead, come back to life? In fact, the potential profitabil- ity of OPEC never disappeared. It was only the behavior of the individual countries that dissipated potential prof- its. Throughout 1998 and 1999, OPEC began a series of production cuts that eventually totaled 4.3 million barrels a day. They thus drove up world prices. Unlike previous oil price spikes, they chose to let up before a major inflation episode struck the United States. Thus OPEC was back in the saddle again, controlling world oil prices.

Why Do Prices Change So Fast?

It takes months for an empty tanker to leave the United States, arrive in the Persian Gulf, be loaded with crude oil, arrive back in the United States, be offloaded, and the crude oil to be refined into gasoline. If that is true, how is it possible that the price of gasoline at a neighborhood gas station can change by 20 percent in a week? The an- swer takes us back to Chapter 2 and the determinants of supply and demand. Remember that the expectations of the future price of a good affect both the current supply curve and the current demand curve.

Remember, too, that if the price is expected to rise, then on our supply and demand diagram there will be little to no delay in the demand curve’s moving to the right and the supply curve’s moving to the left. This

is because consumers will want to stock up before any price increase fully takes effect and producers will want to hang on to what they have in hopes of being able to sell it for more later. The impact of this is that prices will rise now in anticipation of price increases later.

To see how this works in the oil industry, recall the re- action in the United States to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Within days gasoline prices went up by as much as 25 cents per gallon. How did this happen? Starting with the oil-importing companies and ending with the gas stations, each wanted to buy and store all the product it could before the prices went up. Normally, no one in gasoline production keeps significant quantities in storage. It costs money to store oil and other petroleum products.

The oil companies thus hurried to fill their tankers before the price went up too far. Refineries got in the act by rushing to get tankers lined up to sell them their crude before the price went up too far; distributors did the same thing, and so did gas stations. At every stage, the demand for product rose because firms wanted to put as much cheap input in storage as possible. They would then have more when the prices rose.

Also true in such circumstances is that at every stage, firms do not want to sell out of their storage to provide someone down the line with product to store—that is, unless the buyer is willing to pay more. Prices rise and storage tanks fill up. If there were an actual gasoline shortage, this would not be bad: It would be beneficial to have the extra oil in storage.

When prices are anticipated to fall, the opposite hap- pens: Firms attempt to get rid of product. Because firms will want to get as much as possible for the gasoline that is in storage and will empty storage tanks only when it is clear that prices will in fact fall, prices decrease more slowly than they increase. Prices did fall after the Gulf War, and they fell by more than the 25 cents they had increased, but the decrease took much longer than the increase had taken.

The ultimate example of rapid price swings based on price expectations occurred the afternoon and evening of September 11, 2001. In response to concerns, both real and imagined, over the availability of gasoline, prices at some stations tripled. Some stations, particu- larly in the Midwest, were charging $1.40 per gallon in the morning hours prior to the terrorist attacks and were charging more than $4.00 per gallon later that day. While some price increase could be explained by changes in wholesale prices (they increased between

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Why Do Prices Change So Fast? 447

it take only hours for price increases to be reflected across town? The answer to these questions revolves around the fact that the industry is governed by oligop- oly. The neighboring stations must keep their prices at or below one another so when wholesale prices change there is a natural tendency for the resulting retail prices to come out close. In most communities, though there are many gas stations, there are but a few wholesale suppliers. The wholesale suppliers face rapidly chang- ing national spot markets for gasoline and keep their prices in line with their competitors (few as they may be) in order to maintain their gas station customer base. Since only a few wholesalers are selling to the same set of retailers at the same wholesale price, and since those retailers are pricing according to the replacement cost of the gasoline, it should not be surprising that gas prices seem to change at the same time across a community.

From $1 to $4 per Gallon in 10 Years? We need to take a step back to understand something about the “price” of oil. As Table 42.2 shows, there is not one price. Every grade and type of crude oil has a price based on the ease with which you can refine it into saleable products like gasoline. As a result there can be a 25 percent difference in the crude oil price between the output of countries and even within countries. When oil prices are referred to on the news, they typically choose a representative type. The most often-quoted oil prices are Brent Sea, Saudi Light, and West Texas Intermediate.

Still, by whatever measure, the price of oil skyrocketed between December 1998 and 2008. For data consistency purposes the U.S. Department of Energy produces a weighted average of imported oil prices that it calls the Refiner Acquisition Cost of Imported Oil. Figure  42.4 shows how that measure increased over the 10-year period from late 1998 to 2008.

5 and 10 cents per gallon that day), the bulk of the price jump occurred because of a rumor-fed fear that prices would dramatically rise if refineries were shut down or oil imports stopped. While consumer advocates and attorney generals were upset, consumers in par- ticular were not blameless. Two-hour gas lines were not uncommon that afternoon and evening fueled by the same rumor-fed fear that if they did not fill up then, the price would be higher the next day. But by morning it became apparent that refineries were not in jeopardy, and prices fell to previous levels.

Is It All a Conspiracy? There is a common view in the general public that gaso- line prices are all a conspiracy and that deals are cut in back rooms to set the price of gasoline. Were that true it would be against the law both federally and in every state in which it occurred. Absent an explicit conspiracy, what would explain the fact that prices increase not just rapidly (which is explained by the “expected price” phenomenon from Chapter 2) but at almost exactly the same time from gas station to gas station?

When a station gets its supply, the price it pays changes to reflect changing wholesale prices. Were that the end of the story, then prices would change only when stations got a new supply. The twist is that the cost of the  gasoline in the ground is quite literally “sunk” and therefore ignored. Remember from Chap- ter 5 that fixed/sunk costs are ignored when setting the profit-maximizing price. It is only the cost of replac- ing that gasoline, its opportunity cost, that concerns the profit-maximizing gas station. Since that price changes daily, even if the gasoline in the underground tank is a week old, gas stations will adjust their price daily to reflect the cost of replacing it.

Why would the prices at neighboring gas stations change within minutes of one another, and why would

TABLE 42.2 Crude oil prices, various types*.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

Price of Oil

Variety of Oil Apr-07 Jul-08 Jan-09 Apr-11 May-13 Mar-16

West Texas Intermediate $63.98 $133.37 $41.71 $109.53 $94.51 $37.55 Brent Sea (U.K.) $67.49 $132.72 $43.44 $123.26 $102.56 $38.21 Saudi Light $62.65 $116.08 $38.70 $117.81 $101.92 $35.29

*The quoted prices for West Texas Intermediate and Brent Sea are spot prices, whereas the quoted prices for Saudi Light are landed costs.

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448 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

What caused this rapid increase in prices? The short answer is increased world demand coupled with problems in the world oil supply chain brought about by increased OPEC discipline, political unrest in oil- producing countries, and the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Gasoline prices, which tend to closely follow crude oil prices, were also impacted by limited U.S. refining capacity.

The main factors in increasing demand between 2002 and 2008 were the global economic expansion coming out of the 2001 recession; the significant increase in miles driven by the typical American; the substitution by Americans from more fuel-efficient cars to less fuel- efficient vans, pickups, and SUVs; and the long-term expansion of demand in India and China.

Americans have steadily migrated to less fuel-efficient vehicles. Whereas cars made up 70 percent of the U.S. fleet in the late 1990s, they now make up 60 percent. Though the fuel efficiency of cars has increased and the fuel efficiency of vans, pickups, and SUVs has in- creased, the impact of moving to the larger vehicle has totally eliminated the benefit of greater gas mileage. As you can see from Figure 42.5, this increase in demand,

combined with a variety of supply issues, caused gaso- line prices to spike.

Chinese demand for petroleum has increased mark- edly as well. Once a net exporter of fuels, China is now a leading importer. Over the last 16 years while global petroleum demand has increased 24 percent, China’s petroleum demand increased 159 percent. Over the next 10 years China is expected to account for 34 percent of the increase in world oil demand.

Just as there is more than one variety of oil, there is also more than one variety of gasoline. Gasoline is not simply “regular,” “plus,” or “premium.” For envi- ronmental reasons gasoline is formulated for the par- ticular climate and environmental conditions of local areas as well as state and local laws. Gasoline prices are also impacted by state and local taxes. These taxes average 26.5 cents per gallon, with Pennsylvania, Washington, and California topping the charts at 51.4, 44.62, and 37.16 cents, respectively, and Alaska, New Jersey, and South Carolina having the lowest taxes, at 9, 14.5, and 16.8 cents, respectively.

Though gasoline can be imported directly, more than 90 percent of gasoline is produced by a limited number

FIGURE 42.4 Refiner acquisition cost, December 1998–January 2009.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

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1—OPEC production cuts; low stocks of oil; bad weather. 2—Release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; recession. 3—Political unrest in oil-producing Venezuela and Nigeria; war in Iraq. 4—Hurricanes damage platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. 5—Threatened conflict between the U.S. and Iran; Nigerian civil war heats up. 6—Global commodity speculation given increases in Chinese and Indian demand and stagnant production. 7—Global financial crisis and recession.

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Electric Utilities 449

system where, if anything goes wrong, prices escalate rapidly, and for 10 years many things have gone wrong.

Electric Utilities

Electricity Production While it took more than a century for Edison to capitalize effectively on Benjamin Franklin’s dreams for electricity with his lightbulb, it did not take that long for the United States to become dependent on it. Similarly, while the motivation for building the Hoover Dam may have been economic stimulation, flood control, and irrigation, the by-product of cheap electricity was credited with allow- ing millions to live and find work in southern California.

For the most part, electricity is produced by regulated utility companies. These companies incur substantial fixed costs that present nearly insurmountable barriers to entry. These fixed costs include the power plant it- self as well as the transmission lines and transformers that get the electricity into homes so that consumers can use it.

Their variable inputs are sometimes nearly free, as is the case with hydroelectric, wind, and solar power; but more typically, oil, natural gas, coal, or nuclear fuel must be purchased. Where you live often determines how your electricity is produced. Nationally, burning coal to produce electricity through steam turbines accounts for 40  percent of electricity produced. Nuclear power accounts for 20 percent of electricity production, while

of refineries in the United States from crude oil that is in- creasingly imported. Figure 42.6 shows the location and capacity of refineries in the United States. Of significant note is that the refineries along the Gulf Coast of the United States are susceptible to hurricanes. The four hur- ricanes that hit the area in the summer and fall of 2004, and five more in 2005, highlighted this particular bottle- neck. In 2004, with the hurricanes coming in one after the other, ships carrying crude oil from Venezuela and Africa could not make it to port, thereby constraining U.S. supplies of gasoline. Hurricane Katrina decimated the Port of New Orleans and in the process dramatically affected gasoline prices in the late summer and early fall of 2005.

Who is to blame for all this? Mostly ourselves. The U.S. government has chosen to limit new exploration and the creation of more refining capacity, largely for envi- ronmental reasons. The BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico only underscored the doubt many Americans had regard- ing the potentially enormous consequences of drilling in environmentally sensitive locations. It also doesn’t help the situation that Americans generally are to blame for driving more miles and driving less fuel- efficient cars. The war in Iraq cut supplies coming from that country, with Iraqi oil production still not back to pre-invasion levels. Blaming the Chinese for increasing their appe- tite for driving is the “pot calling the kettle black,” but they are, so we can blame them too. Finally, OPEC has become far more disciplined in its management of cartel prices. In the end, we are running on a global energy

FIGURE 42.5 Gasoline prices, December 1998–January 2009.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, www.eia.gov

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450 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

natural gas accounts for as much as a third of electricity production during the summer months and as little as 20  percent during winter months. Hydroelectric power and other renewables account for the remainder.

The distribution of that reliance varies substantially across the country. The Pacific and Mountain West regions produce 15 to 20 times the amount of electricity through the turbines of their dams than does New England. Nuclear power provides almost 70 percent of the elec- tricity usage in Connecticut, but nothing in Washington State and less than 10 percent in Maine. Not surprisingly, burning coal is a main source of electricity where coal is abundant.

Why Are Electric Utilities a Regulated Monopoly? Because of the high fixed costs of production, the residential electricity market is characterized by monopoly because these costs tend to deter entry. Whether or not the proper model for this market is that of a natural monopoly

or a simple monopoly depends on the type of electricity produced and the distance of transmission.

A natural monopoly exists when there are high fixed costs and diminishing marginal costs. In nu-

clear and hydroelectric power the variable costs are low.  In nuclear power the rods them- selves are cheap, relative to the amount of coal that would

have to be purchased to produce the same electricity. On the other hand, the personnel that are required at a nuclear facility are highly trained and compensated, on top of which when things go wrong at a nuclear facility, they can go terribly wrong. In hydroelectric power, the variable input is free since the water that drives the tur- bines does so because of gravity. In both cases the cost of the facility is enormous relative to the costs of the variable inputs. Even when coal, oil, or natural gas are burned to generate electricity, the market tends toward monopoly because of the high fixed costs of the trans- mission network.

natural monopoly Exists when there are high fixed costs and diminishing marginal costs.

FIGURE 42.6 Refinery locations and capacity in the United States.

Less than 10,000 barrels/day 10,000 to 99,999 barrels/day 100,000 to 250,000 barrels/day 250,000 or more barrels/day

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What Will the Future Hold? 451

monopoly. In either case the price is substantially above the marginal cost. This, combined with the fact that peo- ple need electricity to live a modern life, led to the wide- spread regulation of prices for electric utilities.

Figures 42.9 and 42.10 show the likely regulated prices that would exist if the regulators sought to allow the electric companies normal profits.

What Will the Future Hold?

Oil reserves are likely to be almost entirely depleted before the end of the 21st century. What will hap- pen? Will we revert to the Stone Age once all the oil is gone? No. There are no perfect substitutes for oil and gas today, but there are some serviceable ones. We already use vegetation-based fuels; and we produce electricity with geothermal and solar power and with wind. As supplies decrease, more efficient uses of petroleum will be invented. Why are economists less worried about the end of fossil fuels than are people in other fields? Economists, who are not usually ac- cused of making Pollyanna-ish predictions, are con- vinced that normal human self-interest will be more than adequate to spur on the important innovations that will be needed.

A lot of money will be made as we find substitutes for fossil fuels. As these fuels become more scarce and we exhaust all sources of them, they will become more and more expensive. Moreover, prices will not fall in the latter half of the 21st century. This will spur investment, and investment will spur innovation. It always has and it always will.

Consider this: If you were an oil company and you anticipated the end of your current form of business,

Figure 42.7 shows what the price-output combina- tion would be in an unregulated market for electricity in the case of a simple monopoly while Figure 42.8 shows the price-output combination for an unregulated natural

FIGURE 42.7 A simple monopoly.

Q/tQmonopoly

Pmonopoly

P

O

MR D

MCmonopoly

FIGURE 42.8 A natural monopoly.

Q/tQmonopoly

Pmonopoly MCnatural monopoly

ATCnatural monopoly

P

O

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D

FIGURE 42.9 A regulated simple monopoly.

Q/tQmonopoly Qregulated

Pmonopoly

Pregulated

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FIGURE 42.10 A regulated natural monopoly.

Q/tQmonopoly Qregulated

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ATCnatural monopoly

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452 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

you drilled down and hit the oil, only a small portion would be recoverable with that method. The oil was too thick to flow toward the well. In the last 10 years, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (dubbed “fracking”) has unleashed three or more decades’ worth of natural gas in Pennsylvania, and the same process is just now beginning to be exploited in North Dakota. The potential is now that this oil could com- pletely supply U.S. needs that have heretofore come only from imported oil. It is only because oil prices rose during the last decade that anyone bothered to consider this possibility. At $100 per barrel, interest- ing drilling tactics are profitable that are not so profit- able at $40 per barrel.

Nearly any problem can be solved with the proper in- centive, and profit is one of the oldest and most effective incentives of all.

you would spend as much money as it took to figure out a way to continue to sell fuels to your current cus- tomers. You would spend money on a variety of prom- ising leads. You would try, for example, to figure out how to use renewable corn or soybeans to fuel existing cars, and, if that did not work, you would experiment with high-power, quick-charge batteries that you could sell so cars could run on electricity without the cur- rent problems of slow acceleration and long recharge times.

Evidence of the power of the profit motive is all around us. It has been known for nearly a half century that there was thick oil in relatively thin layers of rock in the Bakken formation, a deposit of oil shale that runs from North Dakota through eastern Montana and into southern Canada. It was simply too expensive to exploit using conventional vertical drilling, because if

Kick It Up a Notch

Going back to the question of how cartels work, con- sider Figure 42.11. On the left panel is the market for oil. If the market were governed by perfect competition, then the price–quantity combination would be Pcomp, Qcomp. This price would be carried over to the right panel, which would show the cost functions of a repre- sentative oil- producing country. Recall from Chapter 5 that the long-run equilibrium in such a market would mean that the price line would come tangent at the

bottom of the average total cost (ATC) curve, where it would also intersect marginal cost (MC). Thus the representative oil-producing country would sell qcomp, because this is where marginal revenue (MR) intersects marginal cost (MC). At this level of production, they would make only normal profit, that is, the profit con- sistent with the return expected in other industries.

If they joined a cartel with other, similar countries, then the model for the market would be monopoly rather than

FIGURE 42.11 A model of a cartel.

b

MR

Market Representative country

MC

ATC

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qcheatqquota

Scomp = MCcartel

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Summary 453

Summary Now that you have completed this chapter, you know what a cartel is, that OPEC is a major oil-producing cartel, why it is that cartels work to make their members large sums of money, why it is that they are not stable, and that they seem to be able to rise again from the dead. You know that,

inflation adjusted, the price of oil and the price of gasoline have been historically unstable and that this instability has been a consequence of geopolitics and the inherent instabil- ity of cartels. You understand why it is that events in the Middle East can alter prices at the pump within a few days.

1. In order to compare the price of gasoline in the 1970s with the price in any other year, you have to adjust for a. the availability of oil. b. the price of oil. c. overall inflation. d. unemployment.

2. The heaviest concentration of proven oil reserves is found in a. Alaska. b. the North Sea. c. the Persian Gulf. d. Texas.

3. When a group of competitors joins together to form a monopoly, they are forming a a. cartel. b. coalition.

Quiz Yourself

Key Terms cartel natural monopoly

c. union. d. trust.

4. Cartels are considered ________________ because each participant is motivated to ________________. a. stable; work with each other cooperatively b. stable; work in their own interest to produce more c. unstable; work with each other cooperatively d. unstable; work in their own interest to produce

more 5. Gasoline prices in early 2007 were above $2.25.

They were a. the highest nominal prices and highest

inflation-adjusted prices in American history. b. the highest nominal prices but were not the

highest inflation-adjusted prices in American history.

perfect competition. If that were the case, then the cartel would jointly produce only Qcartel and would charge Pcartel because that’s where marginal revenue (MR) intersects marginal cost (MC) on the left panel of Figure  42.11. Since total production of all countries combined would be less than before, the representative country’s produc- tion would also have to be less than it was before. Some negotiations between the member countries would result in each one being allocated a quota, labeled qquota. If the representative country produced qquota and received P cartel per barrel, it would make an economic profit, that is, profit above normal, in the amount of abcd.

Cartels are not stable because cheating pays. The right-hand panel of Figure 42.11 shows this; see that

qquota marginal revenue MR′ was greater than the mar- ginal cost MC. Countries that cheated did so hoping that no one would notice. A country committed to cheating would see that cheating paid. Looking again at Figure 42.11, you see that at the new high cartel price Pcartel the country would maximize profit at qcheat. This is where MR′ equals MC. That profit, gaef, would greatly exceed the profit previously received at the cartel’s im- posed quota. As in our previous example, using grading on a curve where everyone schemed together, individual greed induced cheating on the collective and this caused all gains to evaporate. Cheating by OPEC members led not only to the disappearance of the large profits (gaef), but also to the evaporation of all economic profits.

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454 Chapter 42 Energy Prices

c. neither the highest nominal prices nor the highest inflation-adjusted prices in American history.

d. the highest inflation-adjusted prices but were not the highest nominal prices in American history.

Short Answer Questions 1. There have been other cartels through history: most

notably drug cartels in the 1980s in Colombia and during more recent times in Mexico. They never suffered from cheating. Why?

2. At the height of the 2008 financial crisis, in the time it took a completely full oil tanker to travel from Saudi Arabia to the United States, the price of oil fell nearly $50 per barrel. Use the expected price formulation to explain how that could happen.

3. What would be the principal obstacle preventing a cartel from emerging in the production of beef?

4. Why might the cartel model still make sense even when OPEC produces less than half of the world’s oil?

Think about This All energy consumption involves externalities that are recognized. Given that we have spent billions of dollars

militarily defending access to oil, should we consider that an externality too? Aren’t the consumers of energy indi- rectly compelling increased spending on the military?

Talk about This Oil prices are highly sensitive to output changes. Hurricanes, terrorist acts, and other unexpected oc- currences regularly cause the price of oil to increase by 10 percent within the course of a month, only to fall again when the trouble subsides. Should the fed- eral government use its strategic petroleum reserve to counter these effects or should it use the reserve only in a true emergency?

For Moe Insight See Adelman, Morris, Genie Out of the Bottle: World Oil

Since 1970 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

Behind the Numbers Global energy resource data. Oil consumption per day. Global oil reserves by region. World crude oil production. Energy prices.

Oil and gasoline prices—www.eia.gov

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y - T H R E E

455

If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Apply economic principles to issues of sports.

LO2 Conclude that despite the obvious attempts of cities to acquire sports franchises through league expansion and by other means, no economic evidence suggests that having a franchise enhances a city’s economic stature.

LO3 Analyze how owners decide, when negotiating with players, whether they wish to make more money or win championships, since it is clear that teams in small markets cannot do both.

LO4 Summarize the basics of sports labor economics history and the vocabulary that is central to it.

LO5 Apply the concept of monopoly to motorsports.

Chapter Outline

The Problem for Cities

The Problem for Owners

The Sports Labor Market

The Vocabulary of Sports Economics

Summary

Sports offers an interesting venue in which to ask economic questions. For instance, if you are the mayor of a city whose citizens want a sports franchise, are you better off if you get one from another city, or do you mount a campaign to gar- ner an expansion franchise? If it will enhance the chances of getting a franchise, do you build a multimillion-dollar stadium and hope you get a team to put in it? Now suppose you are a mayor of a city that already has a franchise whose owner is threatening to leave. Do you build the franchise owner a stadium, even though the one the team is in is only 25 years old? The question that underlies all these decisions is whether a sports franchise is an important economic at- traction for a city. Mayors make deals all the time to attract other kinds of major employers. Why not a sports franchise?

To change perspective, suppose now that you are an owner of a franchise. What would make you want to move your team to a different city or to hold your own city hos- tage to build you a stadium? How do you decide whether

to bid for high-priced talent? Can you compete in the financial arena if you do? Can you compete on the field, the pitch, the ice, or the court if you do not?

These are all questions that arise in all sports, and they are all economic in their nature. We answer each by looking at them from two perspectives: the city’s and the team owner’s. Since no discussion of the economics of sports today would be complete without a discussion of labor, we include that, too. We try to figure out how we went from sports as games to sports as business.

The Problem for Cities

Expansion versus Luring a Team One of the emerging trends of the 1990s, like the 1950s, was the sudden increase in the desire among owners of sports franchises to move their teams from

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456 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

money because corporations paid hundreds of thousands of dollars for luxury boxes.2 Nashville has the same story to tell as the Oilers moved from Houston. In each case, a city stood in line, was denied a place at the table, and man- aged to buy its way in anyway.

In its pursuit of a team, a city has to decide whether it should build a stadium in hopes that a team and a fran- chise will come. This “if you build it, they will come” strategy is fraught with uncertain payoffs. St. Louis built it, and the Rams did come. St. Louis then failed to reno- vate it, and the Rams left. St. Petersburg built it, and no one came. In hopes that the Chicago White Sox would move, the Tampa–St. Petersburg area built a new stadium, but, at the last minute, the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois agreed to build the White Sox a new stadium. The White Sox are still in Chicago. Though the Tampa Bay area ultimately got an expansion franchise, the wait lasted 10 years, and the city may have to build another new sta- dium because the facility in which the team plays is con- sidered one of the worst places to see a baseball game in the major leagues. Building in hopes of getting a franchise sometimes works and sometimes does not. Since it rarely happens that a city gets a franchise without either a good stadium or one that is already under construction, build- ing a new facility may be the only chance a city has, even though it may not be a very good bet.

While these lessons regarding expansion apply to the American sports world of the NFL, NBA, MLB, and NHL, they don’t apply to soccer. Quite literally, a city in England could get its local club team into the Premier League, Eng- land’s top league, in just a few seasons. Unlike American sports, where the franchises are in the league as long as they wish to be and expansion is quite limited, in European soccer, the teams have to stay out of the cellar in order to stay in their respective leagues. At the conclusion of each season, three soccer clubs are “relegated.” That means they are dropped from the Premier League down to a lower league, and the three top lower league teams are promoted to the Premier League for the next season. A city desiring a place in the Premier League could, theoretically, purchase enough talent on the open market for soccer players to win enough games over enough seasons to go from being a local soccer club to playing Manchester United (the Yankees of the Premier League). This also leads to the odd result that

one city to another. Compared to other sports, base- ball has been relatively stable. It has increased in num- bers of teams, but existing teams have tended not to move. Other sports, however, have seen teams move all over the place. Some of that movement, such as baseball’s movement west, occurred with the Dodgers and Giants relocating from New York to California during the 1950s. That made good economic sense for the sport at the time. The movement of the Rams and Raiders out of Los Angeles during the 1990s, on the other hand, made little economic sense for the National Football League.1 In nearly all of the recent franchise shifts, movement has resulted from a city’s offering enticements to owners. In each case, the fran- chise owner has made millions.

A city has to decide on its strategy when it seeks to attract a team. While each sport has added new teams in the last several years, such expansion is not always the surest way for a particular city to get a team. In part, this is because there’s no guarantee that a given sport will expand or will choose that city. Football and base- ball added only two teams each between 1970 and 1990. Though the 1990s have seen increased expansion in both sports, many cities have waited in line for an expansion franchise, only to be spurned. When cities lose patience, they may turn their attention to finding teams that are in financial trouble and offering their owners the lure of millions of dollars as well as profit guarantees.

Cities that have been spurned in the expansion pro- cess and have subsequently sought out financially trou- bled teams. Some have succeeded in getting them, albeit at a high cost. After St. Louis lost the football Cardinals to Arizona, it sought, but was denied, an expansion team while franchises were granted to Jacksonville and Charlotte instead. It turned, then, to luring an existing team. The Los  Angeles Rams wanted a stadium built in Los Angeles containing revenue-producing luxury boxes, and the owner threatened to move if demands were not met. As part of its expansion bid, St. Louis was already in the process of building such a stadium. When Los Angeles refused to build one, the Rams moved to St. Louis. Before their Super Bowl year, the team drew fewer fans than it had drawn in Los Angeles. Nevertheless, the owner made more

1The only economic aspect of the decision not to have a team in the second largest city in the United States that makes sense is that the Rams and Raiders rarely sold out the Los Angeles Coliseum. This meant that not only were their games blacked out during that time, but also the network slated to cover the game could not cover any other game during that time. With no team in Los Angeles, there are no game blackouts and that means more ad revenue to the networks, which could potentially mean a higher bid for broadcast rights.

2In 2016 the story was completely reversed. The new owner used the stadium contract with St. Louis to try to force improvements. That contract required that the stadium be in the top 25 percent of NFL stadiums and that if it wasn’t, the city and state would make sufficient renovations so that it was. When the city and state refused, the Rams relocated back to Los Angeles.

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The Problem for Cities 457

in England in 2012–2013, there were six London-area teams in the Premier League and sizable cities with no teams.

The magical story of Leicester City being promoted after the 2013–2014 season, being forced to go on an incredible winning streak to avoid relegation in 2014–2015, and then winning the Premier League in 2015–2016 only serves to make the point that soccer really is different. It should be noted, however, that in Spain’s LaLiga Barcelona and Real Madrid have finished one–two in every year but one from 2008–2009 to 2015–2016. In the Premier League it is only a little more equitable in outcomes. Since 2000–2001 the top five teams (Manchester City, Manchester United, Arsenal, Chelsea, and Liverpool) have accounted for all but three of the 48 top three finishes, and two of those three occurrences were in 2015–2016.

Does a Team Enhance the Local Economy? From a rational perspective, a city needs more reasons for having a franchise than just wanting to have one. To this end, the justification that most proponents give for getting a team is that doing so is an investment in the city’s future. If that were true, the jobs gained, the tax income generated, and the prestige gained from having a team would genuinely be enough to pay for the costs of building the stadium. Because most mayors consider economic development a vital responsibility of their terms in office, you might think that enticing a team to move in would be the same as enticing any other major employer to move in. Does it not make sense for a mayor

who seeks to draw a major employer to an area to also seek out a sports franchise that will employ many people?

While the reasoning sounds good, sports franchises simply do not generate very good jobs for people other than the athletes. Whether the jobs are created in the facility or are in surrounding restaurants, their pay scale is relatively low, and they provide few benefits. Moreover, though each baseball team has 81 home dates, in basketball the number is 41, and in football it is a mere 8. You cannot build a local economy with only a few workdays a year.

It turns out that whether a sports franchise can be an eco- nomic cornerstone is a well-researched question. You may be surprised to know, though, that in nearly every study on the subject, economists have concluded that sports teams do next to nothing to improve economic activity in a city. The research has focused on whether cities that have lost franchises did any worse economically than they would have had they not lost the team. Research also questioned whether cities that were granted a franchise did any better than they would have without one. The conclusion that was consistently drawn was that a city’s economic activity was almost totally unrelated to whether it had a franchise.

The reason that sports teams do not add much to a local economy is that money spent on tickets, park-

ing, and memorabilia is mostly local. This is referred to as local substitution, and it means that local people are going to games instead of eating out or going to movies or other things they

The competition for teams is neither confined to the big-time profes- sional leagues, nor even professional team sports. Beginning in the 1990s, first in Florida and then years later in Arizona, cities began at- tempting to lure Major League Baseball teams and their spring training sites. The threats made by teams became far more real in the 2000s as many threatened to move to Arizona for their annual training during the months of February and March. In fact, while at one time there were fewer than 10 teams in Arizona during spring training, half the league now trains there. It can be argued that the cities in the compe- tition to be spring training sites are more rational because (according to their own market research) more than half of attendees at spring training games come from outside the area. Some people choose their spring break vacation site based on where their favorite team locates. If this is the case, the local substitution effect can be said to be minor.

It is also worth noting that, although college teams do not threaten to move, the NCAA has. It was once located in Overland Park, Kansas (a Kansas City suburb), and that city benefited from garnering a disproportionate number of NCAA men’s basketball tournaments. In 1999, the NCAA garnered many concessions from the city of Indianapolis and moved to that city. With it they brought the ability to locate major tournaments in the city and state. The men’s Final Four is in that city in every fifth year. In the other years they get an opening weekend set of games, or a second weekend round, or get the women’s Final Four. Again, because the vast majority of the people in attendance are from out of town, the local substitution argument is negated, and be- cause it is on a repeating basis, the city’s reasoning is somewhat more defensible.

S P R I N G T R A I N I N G A N D T H E N C A A

local substitution The effect of the substi- tution of one economic activity for another within a community, so the net effect is zero.

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458 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

would have done locally with their money. In the larger picture, sports is just a branch of the entertainment in- dustry. Having a team changes how entertainment dollars are spent, but it does not change the amount that is spent. To make a somewhat exaggerated point, the Queens Park Rangers from the Premier League were a relegated team in 2013. As such, their fans had five other London-area Pre- mier League teams to see when they were relegated. There was no loss of economic activity, even soccer-related eco- nomic activity, in London as a result of their relegation. In this sense, arguing whether a city should attract a sports team is like arguing whether a city should fight to attract a Super Walmart. Both produce about the same gross rev- enue and employ large numbers of people at low wages. The difference is that for a Walmart, much of the money leaves the local area in payment for the store’s goods, and for a team, huge amounts of money go to a few rich stars.

Although some cities may not feel they have “ar- rived” or are “major league” until they have at least one baseball, basketball, hockey, or football team, they pay a very high price for that honor. Some cities grow in population to the point where a team is justified, but they have none. Austin, Texas is now the largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area without any major league football, basketball, hockey, or baseball franchise. When people in Austin, Texas look at the attention that a small city of less than 100,000 gets each year with the Packers in Green Bay, they may conclude that they will not be living in an important area until they have one. If image is everything, then it may be worth it to assess citizens millions in taxes to get a franchise. Otherwise such out- lays of money are highly questionable.

Why Are Stadiums Publicly Funded? That outlays for stadiums are questionable as a means of creating economic growth does not prevent the issue from coming up. Public funding of stadiums can be explained in terms of positive externalities and bargaining power.

The positive externalities here are the benefits to the fans of having a team in the city that are in excess of what

they get from going to the games. There are millions of sports fans who enjoy having a team in their city whether or not they ever go to a game or watch it on television.

They enjoy following the team in the newspaper and talking about the team with their friends. Because they value that experience, voters, having decided that they want to keep a team, are willing to pay taxes to keep the team. This is simi- lar to their willingness to pay taxes to support the arts when they do not attend concerts or museums.

Having seen why voters may be willing to pay taxes to keep a team, we need to look at why they end up having to pay to keep a team. Because teams have demonstrated a willingness to move, and cities have demonstrated a willingness to lure the teams of other cities, all of the bargaining power belongs to the team owner. One of the things that we assumed in Chapter 5 when we discussed perfect competition was that there were many buyers and many sellers and that none had any market power. Here the market power is concentrated with the owner, who can move the team if voters do not pay for the stadium.

The Problem for Owners

To Move or to Stay Owners are the big winners in sports when teams play musical chairs with their locations. Owners understand that an individual team’s worth is based on how much it can rake in from memorabilia sales, luxury boxes, and, in the case of baseball, local TV revenue. They also know that it is to their advantage to have many suitors for their teams and to do little to discourage talk of moving.

Unfortunately, owners are often at cross-purposes with their leagues since it may be in the best interests of the leagues to have stable teams. Each owner knows that the sport is harmed by movement. Each owner knows that the owner of the team that is moving makes a great deal of money. As a result, it is in the communal best in- terests of sports that teams do not move around too much. However, it is in every individual owner’s best interests to consider moving, to threaten to move, and sometimes to actually move. This is why baseball and football have ownership rules that require agreement of two-thirds to three-quarters of the other owners for a team to move or be sold. Though the owners of the Minnesota Twins, the Pittsburgh Pirates, and the Chicago White Sox threat- ened to move their baseball teams, none have. In football, the owners have seen the money that others have made in moving. To keep the option open for themselves they have routinely approved other owners’ moves.3

When teams relocate, it is because the owners want to make more money. Some relocations lead to the need for new team mascots; new mascots mean vast increases in sales of shirts, hats, and other memorabilia. The Browns reaped such benefits when they moved to Baltimore and became the Ravens. The Oilers also benefited when they

positive externalities The benefit that a per- son other than the buyer or seller receives as a result of a transaction.

3An exception to this was the refusal of the NFL to let the Seahawks move from Seattle to Los Angeles. This location was too lucrative to just let some- one have. It will likely be the location of an expansion franchise, and all own- ers will get a cut of the franchise fee.

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The Problem for Owners 459

moved to Nashville and became the Titans. Even teams that should have changed their mascots but did not reaped revenue from the sales of memorabilia. For instance, the Jazz moved from New Orleans to Utah, and the Lakers moved from Minneapolis to Los Angeles. Each move meant sales to a whole new set of fans in the new city.

Football teams usually move to gain stadiums with luxury boxes. Such boxes provide a significant source of extra revenue for a team. Though television contracts for football are admittedly large, the NFL spreads the revenue equally among the teams. The teams therefore get the same amount, whether they are in New York or Green Bay. Since the league’s contract with the players dictates salary costs for all the teams, owners are left with small margins of profitability and a motivation to look for alternative sources of revenue. Luxury boxes make the difference. Because luxury box revenue is not shared between the teams the way ticket revenue is, potential revenue from such boxes has been enough of an incentive for the Rams to move from Los Angeles to St. Louis, enough for the Oilers to move from Houston to Nashville, enough for the Browns to move from Cleveland to Baltimore, and enough for the New England Patriots to nearly move from the Boston area to Hartford, Connecticut. Oddly enough, in each case, luxury boxes improved team finances enough to warrant movement from a larger metropolitan area to a smaller one.

To Win or to Profit Some teams are worth very little where they are and would be worth much more if they moved. The Kansas City Roy- als and Minnesota Twins are two baseball teams that can- not simultaneously field consistently competitive clubs and make a profit. In baseball, team revenues are largely affected by local television deals. The Yankees’ TV deal, for example, dwarfs that of the combined size of the Royals, the Twins, the Mariners, and a number of other “small- market” teams. The Royals were sold for $96 million in 1996 on the condition that the team not leave Kansas City for at least 10 years. Had the owners been able to at least threaten to move to another city, chances are good that they would have sold for many times $96  million. A move to someplace like Charlotte, Orlando, or another large, grow- ing city would generate a lucrative local TV deal. It may be, however, that the only owner with sensitivity toward his city and the team’s fans was the late Ewing Kaufman, whose will required that anyone who bought the team be required to keep it in Kansas City for a decade. For a pro- spective owner, nothing can be better than to be able to buy a struggling team for under $100 million and to sell it 10 years later for a half billion. This is probably a temptation that a living owner will not pass up. But for a resurgence in

2014 and 2015 the Kansas City Royals could easily have gone down in history with the Washington Senators, who moved and became the Texas Rangers, and the Seattle Pilots, who moved and became the Milwaukee Brewers.

This is not to say a small-market team cannot win. Some such teams will win if they construct a superior farm sys- tem and are lucky enough to see their players all mature at exactly the right time. This happened with the Royals in the late 1970s, and again in the mid 2010s with the Twins in the middle 1980s, with the Mariners in the middle 1990s, and with the Rays in 2008 through 2010. Unfortunately, if a team is that lucky, free agency will limit the time that the team can win and remain profitable. The Cubs, Red Sox, Yankees, and Dodgers will always be ready to buy up the talent as soon as the players are eligible for free agency. As further evidence of this problem, a special committee ap- pointed by the commissioner of baseball noted that, from 1994 to 1999, no team whose payroll was in the bottom half of major league baseball won a playoff game. Though the Rays bucked the trend for three years, their roster was raided prior to the 2011 season.

This is also not to say that a team with money will always buy the right talent. Table 43.1 shows that a willingness to bid for free agents helps teams to get into the playoffs, but also that it is far from a slam dunk. Between 2010 and 2015 there were 56 teams making the playoffs. Twelve came from the bottom third of team salaries, 22 came from the middle third, and 22 came from the top third. In terms of World Series participants during that same period, of the 12 teams, five came from the top third, six from the middle third, and one from the bottom third. Not buying free agents clearly diminishes your prospects of playing in October and November, but dumping a great deal of money on free agents is no guarantee of winning a ring.

In early 2009, the NBA, as quietly as possible, bor- rowed $132 million to help its struggling franchises make payroll. Though their short-term troubles could be tied to

TABLE 43.1 Salary Ranks and Playoff Appearances.

Year

Number of Teams Qualifying for the Playoffs

Number of Playoff Teams with Team Salaries in the Top 10

Number of Playoff Teams with Team Salaries in the Bottom 10

2010 8 4 1 2011 8 2 2 2012 10 5 2 2013 10 3 3 2014 10 5 2 2015 10 3 2

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460 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

the state of the economy in late 2008 and early 2009, it is a long-term challenge for all sports leagues when there is a marked imbalance in team revenues. Owners face the “win or make money, but you can’t do both” challenge when they are at the bottom of the league in team revenues.

Similarly, in NASCAR, the top teams with the top names and millions in sponsorship money can field teams that win 90 percent of races. Since 2007, Joe Gibbs Rac- ing, Hendrick Motorsports, Roush Racing, Stewart-Hass Racing, and Richard Childress Racing have accounted for all but seven of the 121 Chase participants and every single champion.

The ultimate example of this phenomenon occurred with the Premier League’s Manchester City. Purchased in

2008 by a group from Abu Dhabi who invested millions in garnering worldwide talent, they were sold in 2009 to Sheikh Mansour, an individual estimated to be worth $30 billion from a family estimated to be worth a trillion dol- lars. With massive investments, the team won Britain’s FA Cup in 2011 and won the 2012 Premier League for the first time in 44 years, all while losing nearly $200 million a year.

Don’t Feel Sorry for Them Just Yet While it may be tempting to feel sorry for the “poor” owners who lose money each and every year on their franchises, you can probably leave the Kleenex in your pocket. As Tables 43.2 and 43.3 indicate, even

TABLE 43.2 Purchase prices, current values, and rates of return on selected Major League Baseball franchises.

Source: Forbes, www.forbes.com

Team Purchase Price on Most Recent Sale (Year)

Forbes Magazine 2016 Estimate of Value (millions)

Real Annual Rate of Return

New York Yankees

$  10 million (1973)

$ 3,400 15%

St. Louis Cardinals $  150 million (1996)

$ 1,600 13%

Los Angeles Dodgers $  2 billion (2012)

$ 2,500 6%

Kansas City Royals $  96 million (2000)

$   865 15%

Washington Nationals $  450 million (2006)

$ 1,300 11%

TABLE 43.3 Purchase prices, current values, and rates of return on selected National Football League franchises.

Source: Forbes, www.forbes.com

Team Purchase Price on Most Recent Sale (Year)

Forbes Magazine 2015 Estimate of Value (millions)

Real Annual Rate of Return

Pittsburgh Steelers $  2,500 (1933)

$ 1,900 18%

Dallas Cowboys $  150 million (1989)

$ 4,000 13%

Oakland Raiders $  180,000 (1966)

$ 1,430 20%

Phoenix Cardinals $  50,000 (1932)

$ 1,540 13%

New Orleans Saints $  70 million (1985)

$ 1,515 11%

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The Vocabulary of Sports Economics 461

though baseball and football franchises may claim to lose money each year, the return on their investment is still substantial. How? Because history suggests that the team will sell for substantially more than the owner paid for it. Economist Rodney D. Fort specializes in sports economics, even writing a textbook devoted to it. Having collected financial data on NFL and MLB franchises over the years, he has come to the conclusion that it is the capital gain that makes these investments truly valuable.

You might expect there to be high real rates of return on owning powerhouse franchises like the Yankees, Cardinals, and Dodgers in baseball and the Cowboys and Steelers in football. On the other hand, even teams without much of a history of success earned substan- tial profits for their owners. For comparison, it should be noted that these real rates of return are better than typical alternatives. Specifically, real stock market re- turns average between 5 and 8 percent.

The Sports Labor Market

What Owners Will Pay When we think about the market for talent in any sport, we have to recognize that it is fundamentally no different from any other labor market. Firms will hire the marginal laborer as long as the contribution of the employee to rev- enue equals or exceeds the money that must be paid to that

employee. This concept, called the marginal revenue product of labor, is important in any firm. In sports, the marginal revenue product of labor is the money that

the team generates in revenue because a particular player is on the team. It would include any increase in revenue that results directly from their performance as well as all that revenue that results indirectly, say in the form of mem- orabilia sales, from the player being on the team. So a star may make a team win, which causes it to draw more fans. But the star’s presence may also cause sales of team logo jerseys to increase. In deciding whether to sign a player to a large contract, therefore, an owner must decide whether the player is worth the money. If the player brings in at least as much in revenue to the team as the salary that the player commands, then the player is worth it.

What Players Will Accept The issue for players is whether the pay they are offered to play for a team exceeds their next best offer. This next best

offer is a player’s r eservation wage. It is the least that the player will sign for, because anything less makes an offer from some other team or some other job more de-

sirable. Before the days of lucrative sports contracts, players quit their sports before they otherwise would have because their outside offers were better. Depending on the institu- tional structure of the sport, a player’s reservation wage can be very high because he4 will have offers from other teams, or it can be very low because the player is able to offer his services to only one team. In the latter case, the reservation wage is the next best job, but outside of the sport.

The pay that a player will end up getting will thus be between the most it can be, the marginal revenue prod- uct, and the least it can be, the reservation wage. This gap can be enormous.

The Vocabulary of Sports Economics

Franchise owners, of course, spend their time attempt- ing to increase revenues and fighting increases in ex- penditures. We have dealt with the revenue side and the luxury-box solution, but the expenditure side is stickier.

The problem owners face is players who are free agents. It is increasingly difficult to com- pete in the major sports with-

out an ability to buy talent. Total gate receipts for the average “small-market” major league baseball team is between $60 million and $75 million. The 1997 Florida Marlins lost millions winning the World Series, and the owner proceeded to sell all of the team’s high-salaried players the following year. Though this practice occurs most often in baseball, it is done in other sports as well. In basketball, for example, once Michael left the Bulls, the owner of the now Jordanless team traded, sold, or decided not to renew contracts on Pippen, Rodman, and a host of others. As a result, the Bulls became the first

team to win a championship in basketball and follow that with a season in which they were eli- gible for the draft lottery.

The draft is a mechanism designed to provide competi- tive balance. By allowing teams that finished poorly to draft first, the leagues infuse the poorer teams with the best of the young talent. One problem with such a draft is that it

marginal revenue product of labor The additional revenue generated from hiring an additional worker.

reservation wage The least amount that a player will accept because it is the next best offer.

free agent A player who is able to offer services to the highest bidder.

draft The process by which new talent is assigned to teams.

4“He” is appropriate here as long as big money is associated only with men’s professional team sports.

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462 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

motivates teams to play badly to vie for the first pick. This was the accusation in the NBA when, in hopes of getting Ralph Sampson with the first pick in the 1983 draft, the Houston Rockets played very badly. While never proven conclusively, the concern was they were playing badly in- tentionally. In 1985 the NBA created a system whereby the teams that did not make the playoffs were entered into a lottery. In 1990 the system was changed so that the chance of winning was higher for the poorer performing teams.5

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a team to win without great talent; and unless it manages to find that talent through the draft, it must bid for the talent of players who are free agents. With the single exception of the 1998 NBA lockout, the ultimate winners in labor negotiations during the last several years have been the players. Athletes have successfully negotiated for greater access to free markets for their talent. Free agency has driven average salaries up faster than revenues from TV or ticket sales so that today, a single player can make more in a year (though only in nominal terms) than it cost to build Yankee Stadium in 1923.

Quite often today’s owners must decide whether to make money or to win games. It is unfortunate that for more than a few teams, in more than a few sports, these are conflicting goals. Owners within each of the major sports have complained about their inability to turn a profit or to at least break even. Because only a few players are on the free agent market each year and because many teams con- sider themselves just a few wins short of either contending for the playoffs, or better, winning a championship, the price that players are able to command is quite high.

Sports franchise owners have attempted to institute salary caps, in order to protect themselves from them-

selves. That is, they want to protect themselves from being tempted to bid against one an- other. Other than baseball, each

major professional team sport has some form of salary cap in place. The owners hope to lessen their costs at the expense of players by limiting the amount of money they can bid against each other for talent. Sometimes it is not in the best interests of the owners to have strict salary caps. During the 1980s the NBA allowed teams to have one player’s salary not count against the cap as long as any further signings were done at the minimum. This

rule, called the Larry Bird exemption, was instituted so that teams could keep a marquee player.

Another avenue for allowing small-market teams to succeed is to put into place a general sharing of revenues, or at least a sharing of the television revenues. Since

football does revenue sharing well and baseball does not, you would expect a more fluid mix of winners and losers in football than in baseball. That is, in fact, what we saw in the 1990s. Two

baseball teams dominated the decade, the Atlanta Braves and the New York Yankees, both of which had a “local” television market via cable that was, in fact, thoroughly national. Neither, of course, shared the revenue it got with the other baseball teams, and this gave them an ab- surd advantage in bidding for high-priced talent.

In a simpler time sports were games played by men who were happy to be paid at all. Owners were happy to oblige them by hardly paying them at all. There were no women’s professional leagues and no laws requiring high schools and colleges to fund women’s athletics. Without a doubt there was grumbling among players about their pay, but not until 1977 did business considerations come into play. In that year baseball had an epiphany. An arbi- trator declared two players free agents and the sport was forever changed. Within a few years other sports also gained forms of free agency and players who had had virtually no right to the economic benefits of the free competitive market began to get rich.

Prior to 1977 all players in all team sports were bound to the team they played for the previous year. Having this

so-called reserve clause in con- tracts meant that the only choice players had was to either play for what the owner offered or retire. Whereas star players in their later years had the sort of le- verage that was afforded by the

support of public opinion, lesser players did not. Even when Joe DiMaggio, considered by many the best right- handed hitter of all time, held out for a better contract by going home to San Francisco to open a restaurant, he ultimately came back to the Yankees for much less than he was worth. Going back to our discussion on the reservation wage, with the reserve clause in place, the reservation wage for players bound by it was very low.

From 1977 on, each sport has engaged in collective bargaining agreements that have given players more and more freedom of movement and contracts that are much

reserve clause A contract clause that requires that players re-sign with the team to which they belonged the previous year.

salary cap The maximum in total payroll that a team can pay its players.

revenue sharing The process by which some revenues are distributed to all teams rather than simply the teams that generate them.

5Specifically, of the 29 teams in the NBA, 13 do not make the playoffs and are in the lottery as a result. Like the lotto, each team’s logo is printed on Ping-Pong balls. A team has one ball plus one for each team they were behind in the race to the playoffs. Thus the worst team in the league has 13 of the 91 balls in the hopper. As a result, their probability of getting the first pick is 14.3 out of 100.

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The Vocabulary of Sports Economics 463

more lucrative in terms of salaries and incentives. These agreements usually require teams to pay a minimum salary. Baseball’s minimum salary was set at $300,000 in 2004 and adjusted for inflation thereafter. Hockey’s minimum salary had been the lowest of the majors sports and is now the highest, at $575,000. The NBA has a minimum salary chart that is based on years of service. For a rookie, the minimum salary for the 2015–2016 season was $525,093 while for a 10-year veteran it was $1,499,187. The interesting thing about the NBA system is that it works against veterans who wish to finish their careers as role players. If you refer to Chapter 33’s dis- cussion of the minimum wage, this is an example of how this type of minimum wage can actually hurt someone it was intended to help.

In each sport players are bound to the team they played for the previous year for a period of time that ranges from four to six years, depending on the sport. These collective bargaining agreements have decidedly raised the reserva- tion wage of players with the requisite experience to have earned free agency. For free agents, the reservation wage

is the next best offer from another team. That is usually very close to their marginal revenue product.

Thus free agency and other aspects of collective bar- gaining agreements have raised average salaries in all sports far faster than inflation. Though there is dispute among economists as to how much credit for this change goes to free agency, average salaries have ballooned. They increased sevenfold in 25 years in baseball, sixfold in bas- ketball in 20 years, and sixfold in football in 20 years. This increase may be attributed to an increase in the marginal revenue product of players, which has come about in part because the sports are more popular, they draw larger gates and television audiences, and sales of memorabilia have grown. For whatever reason, consider this: In the  1920s Babe Ruth became the first player to earn more than the president. In 2015 the minimum major league salary was more than $100,000 more than the president’s.

Of course when you change a system, good and bad outcomes ensue. Along with higher pay and ben- efits for players arrived at through collective bargain- ing agreements, professional sports has had to endure

In 2004–2005 the National Hockey League became the first sports league to lose an entire season to a work stoppage. The NHL own- ers chose to lock out the players after negotiations failed to produce an agreement to lower salaries. The players refused an owner de- mand that the league adopt a salary cap that would have cut players’ salaries by 30 percent. In the end, after a completely lost season,

the owners got almost exactly what they wanted. This stands with a football strike in the 1980s and a basketball strike in the 1990s as the only cases in sports history in which owners unambigu- ously won a labor dispute. Because the owners won, they tried it again in 2012–2013. In that dispute, however, the season wasn’t lost, but both sides did. The sport’s following dropped significantly.

T H E N A T I O N A L H O C K E Y L E A G U E ’ S 2 0 0 4 – 2 0 0 5 L O C K O U T

At the completion of the February 2011 Super Bowl, the NFL own- ers locked out its players. The dispute, like nearly every labor- management dispute before or after it, was about compensation. The previous contract gave the owners the right to the first $1 bil- lion in revenues and 40 percent of the remaining (approximately) $8 billion. The players got 60 percent of the revenues after the first $1 billion. Because revenues to the sport grew so rapidly during the previous contract, the owners felt the old agreement unfairly enriched the players and wanted the first $2 billion in revenues and a larger share of the remainder. Although there were other issues, such as long-term health benefits for players

and the potential for an 18-game schedule, the real issue was money.

What warrants a side explanation is that the players tried an interesting tactic: decertification. When a union and an employer come to loggerheads in a dispute, the players can strike or the own- ers can lock out the workers (players). When there is no union, a lockout constitutes a violation of antitrust law. Shortly after talks broke down, the union decertified. Because it was a transparent at- tempt by the players to short-circuit the lockout, the owners sued. A lower court ruling in favor of the players was overturned on appeal, and the two sides worked out a deal.

T H E N F L L O C K O U T

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464 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

strikes and lockouts. Each sport has lost at least part of a season to this sort of work stoppage. A strike, a refusal by the play- ers to work, is usually voted for when the players want some- thing in a new contract that is quite different from the status quo. A lockout, a refusal by

the owners to let the players work, is usually instituted when the owners want to make extensive changes in existing contracts.

Baseball owners have tried other avenues to get around the competitive nature of bidding on free agents. After 1986, baseball free agents found that owners were no longer willing to bid on their services. The change was so abrupt that it caught many off-guard. Subsequently, players began to suspect that it could only have resulted from the collusion of the owners not to bid on each other’s players. In 1987 the first case went to an arbitrator. The owners offered the “How could we possibly collude?” de- fense, arguing that such an arrangement would have been impossible to enforce among themselves. It was not lost on millions of baseball fans or the arbitrator that, in a different era, a different set of owners had managed to collude to keep blacks and Hispanics from the game until 1946. Vari- ous arbitrators found that baseball owners had in fact col- luded and were ordered to pay $280 million in damages.

To illustrate how much, or how little, power each side has, consider the alternatives a player has. If a league has a structure that prevents owners in the league from bid- ding against one another, then players have little choice but to accept what the team offers—that is, unless the player has value in another league. For most athletes, this power only exists for two-sport stars. For soccer players, however, there are myriad other leagues in other coun- tries willing to pay players. A player on a Premier League team doesn’t just have options to move to another team; he has options to move to another league. The Spanish and German leagues, for instance, regularly sign players who have played in the Premier League.

What differentiates team sports like baseball, foot- ball, hockey, and basketball from individual sports like golf and tennis is that individual sports have no “owners” with whom to negotiate. Players can make as much as they want. They just have to win.

One problem with team sports is that it is under the con- trol of a small number of self-serving owners. They pay the talented players. Unfortunately, anytime only a few bosses bid on talent, the bosses are usually satisfied, and the talent

usually grumbles. In golf and tennis there are no owners, so golfers and tennis players never grumble. They accept the direct relationship that exists between winning and in- come. While I am a fan of many sports, auto racing, and, in particular, National Association of Stock Car Auto Rac- ing (NASCAR),6 is interesting to me as an economist. It is something like golf and tennis in that individual achieve- ment is vital. It is also something like team sports in that an individual driver must rely on a host of others doing their jobs. In auto racing there are so many different owners and so many different drivers that something like perfect competition exists. Moreover, there is easy entrance and exit from the market because anybody with sufficient capi- tal can start a new team and attempt to qualify for major events like the Daytona 500 or Indianapolis 500. Addition- ally, there are enough buyers and sellers of talent that the prices arrived at for talent seem fair to all concerned. The only issue that could upset this balance would be if NAS- CAR, Indy Racing League (IRL), or Formula 1 got so lax with safety that drivers were forced to band together to fix a problem. Thus they would become adversaries instead of partners with the owners and sponsors. Unless something like this happens, racing will probably remain an example of how, under perfect competition, all parties get what they are worth and are worth what they get.

What a Monopoly Will Do for You Motor sports offers an interesting lesson in the power of monopoly. Three of the major series (NASCAR, the IRL, and Formula 1) are owned by a single person or fam- ily. The France family, the Hulman-George family, and Bernie Ecclestone control their respective series with iron fists. Moreover, many of the venues in which the series operate are owned by these people as well. To the never-ending frustration of the track owners who attempt to host races at other sites, these series owners control the destiny of their sport to a degree that no baseball or football owner can imagine.

The IRL, which drove its principal competitor (CART) out of business, is owned by the family that controls the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. In 2002, excepting a race in Denver, CART’s total attendance was less than that of the Indy 500. From the time when the two series split in 1996, the IRL was able to use the family-owned Indy 500 to bully CART and television networks.

strike An action by labor to deny employers the services of the employees.

lockout An action by employ- ers to deny employees access to their jobs.

6NASCAR is the governing body of the most notable of several stock car racing circuits. Stock cars are called “stock” because they look vaguely like regular passenger cars that you can buy at your local dealer.

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Summary 465

The France family, which owns a controlling interest in International Speedway Corporation (ISC, a holding company for many tracks where NASCAR runs) and the track in Daytona, was hounded in court by the owner of the Texas Motor Speedway until it acquiesced to give that track a second race. In 2007, Kentucky Motor Speedway’s own- ers sued NASCAR, attempting to get a race at their track near Cincinnati. Their legal argument was based on the as- sertion that because the France family owned NASCAR and ISC, they were in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. They bolstered this argument with the fact that an ISC track, the California Motor Speedway, received a second

race starting in 2004 though it has yet to sell out a race. In 2008, a federal judge dismissed the suit and upheld the authority of NASCAR to set its dates and tracks, thereby solidifying this family business’s stranglehold on the sport.

Formula 1 racing has rarely been able to maintain the same race schedule two years in a row. The problem here is that the owner, Bernie Ecclestone, requires such a high advance fee to hold a race in a particular location that promoters cannot afford to build a fan base for this worldwide form of racing.

As in all economics, market power, and especially mo- nopoly power, determines who the winners and losers are.

Summary You now understand how economic principles can be applied to the issues of sports. In particular you un- derstand that, despite the obvious attempts of cities to acquire franchises through expansion and by luring others, there is no economic evidence to suggest that having a franchise enhances a city’s economic stat- ure. You understand that owners are not only on the

opposite side of this particular bargain, but they also face a problem of their own. They must negotiate with players; if they are doing so in a small market, they must often decide whether they wish to make money or win. Last, you now understand the basics of sports labor economics history and the vocabulary that is central to it.

Key Terms draft free agent local substitution lockout

marginal revenue product of labor

positive externalities reservation wage

reserve clause revenue sharing salary cap strike

1. The value of a sports franchise to a city’s economy depends greatly on a. the sale of memorabilia to citizens. b. the degree to which non-ticket-based sales

increase. c. the degree to which restaurant revenues rise. d. the degree to which noncitizens spend money in

the city. 2. Most baseball franchises have ____________ over

the years while the sale price of the typical team has ____________. a. made a profit; fallen b. lost money; fallen c. made a profit; risen d. lost money; risen

Quiz Yourself 3. The typical problem for generating parity in sports

leagues is that a. there is no mechanism for bringing in new

talent in a way that helps the bad teams. b. there is no means by which players on one team

can move to another. c. with no salary cap and with unlimited free agency,

big city, high-revenue teams have an advantage. d. no one wants it.

4. The motorsports industry is dominated by indepen- dent teams running in series operated as a. monopolies. b. oligopolies. c. monopolistic competitors. d. perfect competitors.

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466 Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions

Motor Speedway. Michelin’s tire was simply too dangerous for the teams to safely run the 2005 U.S. Grand Prix. Because there are two competing tire companies supplying tires to competitor teams, neither would agree to the other’s posed solutions. This would never happen in NASCAR or the IRL because they use only one tire manufacturer. Once a problem was identified, it would have been in everyone’s interest to find a solution. What does this tell you about the benefits and costs of oligopoly over monopoly?

Talk about This The Indianapolis Colts used an implied threat to move as a means by which to induce the state of Indiana and the city of Indianapolis to build them a new stadium. This is somewhat ironic since the same family used the fact that Indianapolis built them a stadium in the 1980s to leave Baltimore. To what degree are the com- bined threats by owners to leave their respective cities a conspiracy?

For More Insight See Kahn, Lawrence M., “The Sports Business as a Labor

Market Laboratory,” Journal of Economic Perspec- tives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000).

Sheehan, Richard, Keeping Score: The Economics of Big-Time Sports (South Bend, IN: Diamond Commu- nications, 1996).

Siegfried, John, and Andrew Zimbalist, “The Eco- nomics of Sports Facilities and Their Communi- ties,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000).

5. Economists note that a reason exists for policy mak- ers to subsidize sports stadiums, and it is that a. they bring in billions of dollars to their

communities. b. they result in large increases in city payrolls. c. they result in enormous increases in taxes. d. the teams make people happy—even those who

don’t go to the games. 6. When the National Hockey League had its 2004–

2005 work stoppage, it was a. a player strike over salaries that were too low. b. a player strike over a limited ability to move to

another team. c. an owner lockout over reducing salaries. d. an owner lockout over union work rules.

Short Answer Questions 1. How did the reserve clause serve to allow owners to

pay something close to the players’ reservation wage rather than their marginal revenue product of labor?

2. Use the local substitution argument to consider what the economic value of your college’s basketball team truly is.

3. If someone from the arts community were to argue for a subsidy to garner an arts festival, how would the local substitution argument apply and how might the external benefits argument apply?

Think about This Formula 1 may never compete again in the United States as a result of a problem with tires at the Indianapolis

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467

C H A P T E R F O R T Y - F O U R

The Stock Market and Crashes Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe how stock prices are determined and what stock markets do.

LO2 Apply the concept of present value to the fundamental ele- ments of stock prices and describe how prices can get out of line with their fundamental value.

LO3 Explain that bankruptcy is an important feature in corporate business but that many of the bankruptcies of 2001 and 2002 involved a level of deception on the part of their accountants that was potentially quite damaging.

Chapter Outline

Stock Prices

Efficient Markets

Stock Market Crashes

The Accounting Scandals of 2001 and 2002

Rebound of 2006–2007 and the Drop of 2008–2009

Summary

Even to many of the people who invest in it, the stock market is a mystery. Investors buy stocks, that is, shares of the value of a company. As stockholders they have the right to vote in shareholders’ meetings and a right to a pro- rated share of dividends. The questions of what makes the prices of stocks go up and down in general and why prices actually soar or plummet on any particular day have per- plexed both stockholders and economists for many years.

Figures 44.1, 44.2, and 44.3 show the values of three important measures of the stock market. In each, the level of each of these indices is in black and the common log- arithm (the log base 10) is in blue. You can see that the level of each has grown over time, and though each saw a major dip in 2000 and 2001, that dip was small, given the substantial runs of the previous 20  years. You can also see that the plunge in late 2008 brought each index back to a level that was similar to its 2001 low. Graphs such as these are deceiving though, if you just look at the level, which is why the logarithmic scale is useful. For instance, when looking at historic swings from 25 or even 70 years ago, what is imperceptible on the level scale is quite noticeable on the logarithmic scale. So you probably know that the Dow Jones and S&P 500 each grew rapidly in the 1920s and then plunged in the 1930s.

It is impossible to see that on the level scale but much easier to see it on the logarithmic scale.

What could cause stocks to go up by more than 50  percent in four months, as they did in 1982? What could cause a stock market to lose 20 percent of its value on a single day, as it did in October 1987? Assuming that the price of a share of stock does, in fact, represent the value of that share of the company in question, how can the value of anything change so fast?

The ultimate question of what actually determines stock market prices is the focus of this chapter. We ex- plore what traditional economic theory has to say on the subject of how stock prices are determined. We discuss how a stock market can advance economic growth by helping to transfer financial capital into the hands of the people who can use it best. We show that if a stock mar- ket is “efficient,” small investors—investors who invest relatively small amounts of money—do not need to take a lot of time thinking about their investments because it will not do them much good. We move to a discussion of the causes and effects of some of history’s stock market crashes and what might be done to prevent them. We fin- ish with a discussion of bankruptcy and the accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002.

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468 Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes

Stock Prices

How Stock Prices Are Determined Traditional economic analysis has always suggested that the value of any asset is based on three things: the flow of returns that come from the asset, the amount that the asset is expected to sell for when it is sold, and the rate at which the future flow of those returns is “discounted.” To compute the value of a stock, we add up payments

that come in at different times. To put those payments on an even playing field, we use the concept of present value that we introduced in Chapter 7.

Although the math for computing present value is somewhat complicated, the concept is not hard to under- stand. If there are 1 million shares of a company and the company profits are exactly $1 million, then the earn- ings per share is exactly $1. How much would you pay for a share of stock that would yield earnings of $1/year

FIGURE 44.1 The Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1896–2015.

Source: www.quandl.com

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FIGURE 44.2 Standard and Poor’s 500, 1870–2015.

Source: www.quandl.com

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Stock Prices 469

FIGURE 44.3 NASDAQ Composite Index, 1980–2015.

Source: www.quandl.com

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forever? What it is worth is the present value of that $1 each year. Recall that you learned in Chapter 7 that one of the components of present value is the interest rate. Sometimes we change the jargon a bit and refer to it as the discount rate, but it is the same concept: the amount by which future payments are discounted. In the previous example, if you are confident of being paid $1/year/share forever, the present value is the reciprocal of the inter- est rate. If the interest rate is 5 percent, then the present value is $20. If it is 10 percent, the present value is $10.

Since we rarely act as if companies will last forever, we usually judge the value of a stock to be the present value of its expected dividend payments plus the present value of its expected final sales price. Both of these present values are greatly determined by the discount rate, the interest rate that is used to translate future payments into present value. As the discount rate rises, the present value of the payments falls.

You can see from everything we have said so far that the price of a share of stock can move as a result of a change in any of the three variables. A change in the profit expecta- tions will change both dividend expectations and final sale price expectations. These in turn will change the price of the stock. A  change in interest rates will also change the stock price. In the end, though, the ultimate long-term

value of a stock is determined by its profit expectations and the interest rate. These are known as fundamentals, elements that go into a stock’s price that make long-term economic sense.

What Stock Markets Do Stock markets exist as an efficient way of getting avail- able financial capital to whichever investors can make the best use of that financial capital. Stock markets set share prices, thereby providing investors information about which companies are doing well and which are not. Stock markets allow firms that need new influxes of money to get what they need, and they allow investors to invest their money in places that provide good returns.

Though most of the shares traded on any particular day are stock issued many years before, an important function of a stock market is to support new companies with investors’ funds. When a company sells stock for the first time in an attempt to raise money for expansion,

this initial public offering (IPO) turns what is typically a small, privately held firm into one that now has stockholders, issues dividends, and has a board of directors.1 It allows companies

to grow far beyond what owners can borrow or otherwise raise themselves. Though such firms can incorporate and sell stock among a limited number of people,2 an IPO opens up the possibility that an unlimited number of peo- ple, or even other corporations, can become its investors.fundamentals

Elements that determine stock prices that make long-term economic sense—profit expecta- tions and interest rates.

initial public offering (IPO) A company’s first sale of stock to the public in an attempt to raise money for expansion.

1 Sometimes IPOs are not so small. When AT&T spun off its hardware division, Lucent, that IPO was very large. 2 Such an entity is called an S-corporation.

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470 Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes

For stocks that are not IPOs, the market has two ef- fects. First, it has the effect of spreading risk equally across all stocks to all stockholders. In economic terms, it equalizes the risk-adjusted rates of return across in- vestments. If one company is going to yield a return on equity that is greater than another, the market price of the share of stock of the better company will rise until the return is equal to any new investors. In this way the stock market provides a way of signaling value to all fu- ture investors.

An additional important effect of the non-IPO market is that it provides liquidity to those shares of stock that were previously issued. IPOs only have value when their owners know that they can sell them if they wish to turn their investments into cash. Without a market for previ- ously issued securities, it would be overly costly to issue new ones.

Efficient Markets

A market is labeled efficient by economists if all avail- able information is accounted for in the market. For in-

stance, if markets are efficient, the price of a share of stock will encapsulate everything that in- vestors know about that stock. If investors are concerned that a

product that a company sells is likely to generate cum- bersome lawsuits, for example, the market price will fall by the value that the market places on the uncer- tainty it is feeling about the company and on the ex- pected legal exposure.

What this “efficient market hypothesis” means for everyday investors is that they do not have to worry about outsmarting the market. The Wall Street gurus who spend every waking minute looking for new in- formation on the market will bid prices up and down in appropriate ways as new information on profits, risks, and interest rates comes in. Since all of that information will be absorbed into the market long before most other investors find out about it, most other investors cannot take advantage of it. As unlikely as it may seem, new investors can simply invest in whatever they like, know- ing that the chances are good that anything they pick will have the same chances of doing as well as anything else a professional outside Wall Street might pick.

While maintaining a diverse portfolio of invest- ments is less risky than picking a specific stock, inves- tors do not always have enough money to buy a variety

of different stocks. Such investors can avail themselves of index funds, which buy stocks in exact proportion

to their value in a commonly known stock index, like the Dow Jones Industrial, Standard and Poor’s, and NASDAQ (see

Figures 44.1 to 44.3). Since a stock index is simply a weighted average of stock prices in a particular group, buying shares of an index fund provides diversity and an expected return that is on a par with any other investment involving similar risk.

The best evidence that markets are efficient is the stories you hear about how well monkeys do when picking stocks. Newspapers often compare the hypo- thetical monetary returns earned from a monkey’s ran- dom choices with the returns generated by professional investors. Unhappily for the professionals, monkeys have been known to hold their own.

Stock Market Crashes

The American stock market “crashed” twice in the 20th century, once in October 1929 and again in October 1987. In both cases a loss of at least 25 percent of the stock market’s total value was experienced in a matter of days. The real question that economists who believe that stock markets are rational have to answer is this: Is it possible that expectations of things that are fundamental can change for everyone simultaneously and by amounts necessary to change stock prices that much?

If the answer to that question is “no,” that things that are fundamental cannot change that much or that fast, then the stock market is not much more socially use- ful than a casino. On the other hand, if you can explain everything that goes on in a stock market in terms of changes in fundamental economic variables, then, as we explained before, the stock market is socially useful.

Bubbles It is crucial for us to know how a stock market, or how any market for anything else, crashes. If people invest their savings for retirement, college, or anything else, and their investments are going to be subject to wild

swings, then it is important to know whether increases in stock prices happen because of in- creases in value or because of what economists call bubbles. A bubble of any kind grows slowly

efficient market All information is taken into account by partici- pants in a market.

stock index A weighted average of stock prices in a particular group.

bubble The state of a market where the current price is far above its value determined by fundamentals.

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Stock Market Crashes 471

and looks very nice while it exists, but, when bubbles break, they break fast and ugly. The metaphor of a bub- ble is often used to describe an asset market that grows beyond all economic reason.

The two fundamentals that go into the formula for the value of an asset are the flow of payments it produces and the interest rate. The price of a stock can change a great deal if either of these changes a great deal. Econo- mists are not overly concerned about this, and their lack of concern becomes justified when the stock prices of companies that are believed to generate losses in the short run and great profits in later years vary quite a bit with a change in interest rates. This variability does not bother economists much even if the stock price can change by a large percentage in a short time. The ex- pected flow of payments, or profits, also is not likely to change quickly enough to change the price of the stock greatly or quickly.

The main source of crashes and the bursting bubbles is more likely to be abrupt changes in the sale price that is projected for the future. This is especially true if our expectations of future prices are based, at least in part, on current prices. For instance, because today’s price is $90, you may think the price next year will be $100. If the price today were $80, you might expect that the fu- ture price might be $90, and so on.

The bubble bursts when a stock price falls and you think this indicates that it will be worth less next year. That makes you think that its value today is lessened. Now you start thinking that its value will be even less next year, and its current value becomes even less in your mind. This vicious cycle spirals the value of the stock down, and it can all happen very fast. As we discussed earlier, nearly every stock in the world lost in the neigh- borhood of 25 percent of its value within hours of the start of the October 1987 crash.

If stock market crashes had no impacts other than hurting some of the investors who hung on too long, there would be no issue of concern. The problem is that stock market crashes have real impacts on average fami- lies. When stocks are doing very well, people feel richer, and they are richer. They do not have to save as much because their previous savings are doing so well. As a result, they feel comfortable buying new homes, cars, major appliances, and furniture that they would not have purchased if things were not as good.

Homes, cars, appliances, and furniture are all goods that have to be made by industry, and industry runs on its workers. When the demand for their labor is high, workers get more hours, better pay, and a host of other

benefits. With better pay, workers are richer, and they buy more and more. This is an economically virtuous cycle in which good times create more good times. A good stock market causes a good economy, and a good economy fosters an even better stock market. Unfortu- nately, we cannot avoid the reality that what goes up can also come down. When the stock market falls, peo- ple lose wealth, and they then buy fewer goods. Stock values fall even lower; consumption drops even further.

The doldrums within Japan’s stock market lasted for all of the decade of the 1990s. Japan’s equivalent to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Nikkei Index, re- mained depressed during a time in which the American stock market values tripled. The virtuous cycle that ex- isted in the United States during the 1990s and the vi- cious cycle that existed in Japan during the same period give testimony two important conclusions: (1) A stock market’s health influences the rest of the economy and (2) stock prices can rise and fall very quickly.

Example of a Crash: NASDAQ 2000 In 1999 the NASDAQ (National Association of Se- curities Dealers Automated Quotations) increased 84 percent from 2,208 to 4,069 on the back of a tech- nology sector that seemed to grow without bound. By March 10, 2000, the NASDAQ was above 5,000. The NASDAQ did not finally bottom out until October of 2002 when it reached a low of 1,114. What could have happened that an entire market index would lose 78 percent of its value in 31 months (see Figure 44.4)?

There are a number of explanations. Some of them revolve around our notion of the bubble, while oth- ers are more fundamental. The technology sector in general, and some of the hottest companies in particu- lar, were operating with staggering losses while being touted as leaders of the “new economy.” As a matter of fact, for the dot-coms, making a profit was a sign of “stagnant thinking.” New-economy thinking led firms to plow everything they made into improving name recognition and market share. To this end, the 1999 and 2000 Super Bowl broadcasts were filled with elaborate multimillion-dollar-per-minute dot-com ads.

Expectations for these companies were that losses now would be more than made up for with massive prof- its later. If you do the math, and we will avoid that here, you will see that anytime you have losses early on and profits much later, the net present value of this invest- ment can change quite rapidly with reasonably small changes in interest rates or profit expectations.

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472 Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes

To see this, take a hypothetical dot-com that is ex- pected to lose $1 per share for 10 years and then make $5 per share thereafter. If the appropriate interest rate on a comparably risky investment is 10 percent, then, using the fundamentals, the stock would be worth $14.44. If you increase the interest rate to 11 percent, the stock’s value would drop to $11.23. A 10 percent increase (1  percentage point) in the interest rate would translate to a 22 percent drop in the value of the stock. If the ex- pected profit to the company had been spread out evenly throughout the lifetime of a company of equal value, an increase in the interest rate of 1 percentage point would only decrease the value of the stock to $13.13. Thus, one explanation of the drop in the NASDAQ is that interest rates rose during the period.

A second explanation of the drop in the NASDAQ is diminished profit expectations. Again, because the profits were expected to come much later in the process, small changes had large effects. Continuing with our hypothetical dot-com, a drop in profit expectations to $4 per share, even keeping interest rates constant at 10  percent, would drop the value of the share of stock to $10.22. Thus, a 20 percent drop in profit expectations drops the share price 29 percent.

The final explanation for the 1999 run-up and the 2000–2001 tumble is the bubble explanation. Recall that a bubble is the metaphor for an asset whose value has stretched far beyond its fundamental value, based on the notion that expected increases in the asset price are self-fulfilling. Whether the NASDAQ in March 2000 was in a bubble state is in some dispute because of the aforementioned changes in fundamentals that

occurred during the period. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the buying frenzy among investors in 1999 and early 2000 was fed by the desire by many not to be left out of “the next Microsoft” or “the next Intel.” Thus, if people buy without regard to the fundamentals, a bubble is created, and when fundamentals are reexam- ined, bubbles burst.

The Accounting Scandals of 2001 and 2002

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center buildings and the recession of 2001, the Enron Corporation de- clared bankruptcy. Enron, which at the time was the United States’ seventh-largest corporation in terms of revenue, declared bankruptcy, owing more than

$5  billion and lacking the abil- ity to pay the interest on that debt. Companies or individuals declare bankruptcy when they lack the necessary funds to pay their creditors. While Kmart and Global Crossing also de- clared bankruptcy during the same period of time, the Enron bankruptcy made far more

news. Why? Kmart served many more customers, and Global Crossing was more in debt ($12 billion), but Enron’s demise was potentially far more damaging.

FIGURE 44.4 NASDAQ Composite Index, 1999–2003.

Source: MSN Money, http://money.msn.com 1/

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creditors The people or institutions to which a company or individual owes money.

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The Accounting Scandals of 2001 and 2002 473

The Kmart and Global Crossing Cases When Kmart and Global Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2002, economists found the reasons to be familiar and not all that troubling. Kmart, in the middle of a discount store sandwich with Walmart and Target, went bankrupt because it was not able to discount as deeply as Walmart, nor was it able to market to upscale consumers as effectively as Target. Global Crossing took a gigan- tic gamble borrowing billions to string fiber-optic cable under the oceans, connecting Europe, Asia, and North America with Internet-friendly broadband connections.

Bankruptcies like these do not trouble economists in the way they appear to disturb people in the press, bankers, and shareholders. Economists hold that when companies get outcompeted, it’s right that they lose money. Further, when they do it long enough, they should go out of business. They maintain that capitalism works only when the promise of profit is countered by the threat of bankruptcy. Incompe- tence and risky business decisions that turn out badly must have consequences, and in the cases of Kmart and Global Crossing this is exactly what happened. Kmart suffered from management and marketing strategies that were not up to those of the competition. Global Crossing operated on the premise that intercontinental bandwidth would be a hot commodity, and it used debt to finance its decision. AT&T, which is in the same market and raised its money with sales of stock and reinvested profits, also made little money in this market. It survived because its losses resulted only in disappointing earnings to stockholders. Global Crossing, on the other hand, could not generate enough profit to pay the interest on its $12 billion debt.

Both Kmart and Global Crossing declared bankruptcy even though they possessed more in assets than they owed their creditors. Kmart had $16 billion in assets and $2 billion in debts while Global Crossing had $22  billion in assets and $12 billion in debts. There were two problems, though: The assets were listed at book value rather than market value, and the assets were not such that they were producing revenue.

Two examples may illustrate the problem. When Kmart builds a store and outfits it with the Kmart logo and colors, it may cost $10 million, but there is no one who will pay $10 million for it after it is built. Similarly, it may have cost Global Crossing $20 billion to lay fiber- optic cable from one end of the ocean to another, but that by no means suggests that anyone will buy it from Global Crossing for that amount of money.

To illustrate further the circumstance in which there are many assets and no revenue from those assets with which to pay creditors, suppose someone is worth $5 billion

Bankruptcy When a corporation cannot pay its creditors, it must either renegotiate the repayment schedule that it has with its creditors or it must declare bankruptcy. When a company declares bankruptcy, it has two choices: It can try to reorganize and go forward or it can simply give up. The former, called Chapter 11 bankruptcy, protects a company from its creditors so as to give the company time to get its financial affairs back on track. The latter, called Chapter 13 bankruptcy, lets the company sell off its assets in an orderly fashion so as to preserve as much value as possible for the last-in-line stockholders. Nearly every case of corporate bankruptcy you hear on the news is of the Chapter 11 variety.

When a company declares bankruptcy, a judge is appointed to oversee its financial affairs. Major financial decisions, such as the sale of assets, must first be ap- proved by the judge.

Why Capitalism Needs Bankruptcy Laws While on the surface it may seem strange that the abil- ity to avoid debts would be viewed as a “good” thing, under capitalism bankruptcy laws actually aid eco- nomic efficiency. Without the ability to seek protec- tion from your creditors, even a temporary inability to pay your debts would make it so that any one of them could foreclose on the business. This could reduce or even eliminate the business’s ability to turn things around. It would happen because, while it would be in the collective interest of the creditors for the company to get back on its feet, it would be in their individual interest to be the first in line to get their money back.

Suppose, for example, that a company owes money to three different banks. Suppose, too, that the company has insufficient funds to pay these creditors this year but that, given the chance, it can probably make enough money over the next few years to pay them what it owes. Further suppose that if the company sells its assets, it can pay what  it owes to only two of the three banks. Without the protection of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it would be in the interests of each of the banks individu- ally to foreclose because each would not want to be the one bank that wasn’t paid. In an apparent contradic- tion, it might easily also be in the banks’ interests for the company to be allowed to continue without anyone foreclosing. Bankruptcy laws enable firms to continue under judicial supervision and afford all concerned the hope that they will pay off their debts.

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474 Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes

and borrows $10 billion to buy gold coins. The person has an asset worth $10 billion but has no revenue coming in to pay the interest on the debt. Now suppose the per- son takes those coins and drops them one by one in the ocean between New York and London. Our hypothetical person now has $15 billion in assets on his or her books, but the coins that are apparently worth $10 billion may actually be worth next to nothing. There is genuinely $10 billion worth of debt with no revenue in sight to pay for the interest that is accruing on it.

What Happened in the Enron Case Usually it is not that difficult to say what a business does. Walmart, for example, is a discount retailer; GM makes cars; and State Farm sells insurance. To get a handle on what happened in the Enron case, you have to understand Enron’s actual business activities. What did Enron do to make money? It was an energy trading company. It bought electricity, oil, natural gas, gasoline, and other energy sources from producers, with the intent of reselling them to industrial companies and utilities. It made money by “buying low and selling high.” It did this rather well for several years during the 1990s. Later it started getting into sideline businesses such as the buy- ing and selling of bandwidth for the Internet.

“Buying low and selling high” is always good business practice, but it is hard to sustain because economic profit always induces entry (i.e., new competition), especially when there are few barriers. Enron had few competitors in this industry in the early 1990s, but when other companies saw that profits were achievable in this arena, they jumped in. With no barriers against getting into the arena, Dynegy Inc., Reliant Energy, El Paso Energy, Duke Energy North American, and Calpine Corp. joined the competition, and they raided Enron for valued employees who knew the game. Had this been the end of the story, there would not have been much of a story at all. It would have been the typical “company has idea, milks it for as long as it can, and then settles in for a run of normal profits.”

What happened with Enron was that its management wanted to keep things going and its executives were paid almost exclusively in stock and stock options. One

of the classic problems in cor- porate capitalism is called the principal–agent problem, a prob- lem that occurs when the owners of the company (the sharehold- ers) are motivated by long-term profitability for the company and the managers are motivated

by monetary gain for themselves. When chief executive officers (CEOs) are paid high salaries, they may avoid potentially lucrative business avenues that might be ac- companied by some level of risk. The problem is that the agent, in this case the CEO, is not making decisions consistent with the principals’ (in this case the stockhold- ers’) wishes. The primary concern in this example of the principal–agent problem is that salaried CEOs will avoid risking their jobs and will err on the side of caution.

For years it has been taken on faith that the best way for stockholders to get the CEO to do their bidding was to tie the CEO’s compensation to stock performance. One version of this has the CEO paid only in stock. Thus, when stock prices are low the CEO is paid less than when the stock price is high.

An extreme version of this scheme is in place when management is paid in stock options. Stock options are authorizations that allow those who hold them to buy a specific number of shares of stock at the price stated on the option. They are enormously valuable when the stock price is above the option price but have no value when the underlying stock price is below the option price. En- ron’s compensation package for its managers was a com- bination of stocks and options.

Enron’s management compensation was thus tied to stock performance, and in the eyes of Enron sharehold- ers, this was good. Their perception was that management decisions that affected the company in good ways were re- warded while those that affected the company in bad ways were punished. It unfortunately also put management in a position such that if it could deceive the markets into thinking that it was doing better than it actually was, then management could enrich itself. This is not new. This is the primary reason why accounting firms exist. They are supposed to guard against such deception by going over the corporate financial statements of the companies they audit so as to certify to the public that when a company says it earned $1 billion, it actually did.

Enron’s deception took the form of high-debt, off-the- books gambles. Enron created several subsidiaries, named, for whatever reason, for “Star Wars” characters, and it saddled each with millions in debt. Each subsidiary had a high-risk, high-return niche market. None of this would be interesting except for the fact that the debt of these firms was secured by assets of the larger corporation. That in turn would not be interesting except that this debt was de- ceptively noted in Enron financial statements.

Enron would state that it was owed money by other companies; it would report this as an asset but would not mention that it was also a debt. Even more troubling,

principal–agent problem The problem that occurs when the owner of an asset and the manager of that asset are differ- ent and have different preferences.

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Rebound of 2006–2007 and the Drop of 2008–2009 475

the smaller subsidiaries would borrow from banks to pay Enron the interest, thus raising Enron’s reported profits. In the final analysis, Enron was overstating its profits by $1.2 billion and its assets by even more.

When the whole thing collapsed in the fall of 2001, there were two fatally wounded companies: Enron and its accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. Andersen had cer- tified Enron’s books to be accurate when they demon- strably were not. It had participated in the creation of the subsidiaries and had gone along with the attempt to cover things up by issuing a reminder to employees working on the Enron account to shred “unneeded” documents. Though this “reminder” was technically a simple restate- ment of company policy, everyone at Andersen who worked on the Enron case knew that it meant to shred the evidence. Why would an accounting firm participate in such fraud? It again boils down to the principal–agent problem. The lead accountant in any firm wants to please his or her clients. The clients pay the firms millions in fees per year for which the lead accountants are handsomely rewarded. The principal, the accounting firm, must trust the action of its agent, the lead accountant. Their inter- ests are sometimes at odds because the accounting firm is worthless without a reputation for honesty. That reputa- tion was effectively sold by the lead accountant, without Andersen’s knowledge or consent. The upshot of all this was that Andersen was destroyed by the actions of its lead accountant in the Enron case.

Why the Enron Case Matters More Than the Others The Kmart and Global Crossing cases really do not have much influence on the economy as a whole, but the Enron debacle is an ominous sign of a systemic problem. Economically speaking, Kmart’s loss is Walmart’s and Target’s gain. Global Crossing rolled the dice and it came up “snake-eyes.” The risk associated with buying Global Crossing stock was pretty well understood, and if interna- tional bandwidth markets had taken off, Global Crossing stockholders would have made a fortune. Because they did not, and because the firm was very much in debt, the stockholders were left with nearly worthless stock. Enron stockholders were simply lied to. Investors must be able to rely on the veracity of financial statements.

Investors take calculated risks. They assemble the in- formation and make decisions based on that information. The area of uncertainty that investors expect is that of the return to be received from their investments. Some companies make a profit and others do not. They seek

to avoid the uncertainty over the veracity of financial reports by insisting on independent audits. If account- ing firms aid the company’s deceptive tactics rather than uncover them, then investors are left with two areas of uncertainty: (1) Will the company make money? and (2)  Will the financial statements tell me the truth? The additional uncertainty about the accuracy of audits raises the required rate of return on stocks and results in inhib- iting some profitable business avenues.

As a direct result of problems evidenced by Enron and Andersen, other companies began to reveal their own “overstatements” of profits. One by one, Xerox, World- Com, and other corporate giants came out with earn- ings “corrections.” As a result, investors continued to lose confidence through 2002, and stock values dropped an additional 20 percent from levels that were already 20 percent to 60 percent below the levels of March 2000. It was not until the early spring of 2003 that the markets began to shake off the effects of these scandals.

Rebound of 2006–2007 and the Drop of 2008–2009

As the economy grew out of the 2001 recession, stocks were slow to recover. By mid-2008, however, the DJIA and S&P 500 had reached or exceeded their March 2000 levels (though the NASDAQ stood at barely half its all- time high). What was behind this resurgence? Profits and persistently low long-term interest rates, fundamental de- terminants of stock market value, reasserted themselves during 2006 through early 2008.

It was another bubble, the housing bubble, described in Chapter 13, that then came crashing down on the heads of investors in 2008. Companies, especially financial services companies, with significant exposure to housing finance were the first to drop. By Labor Day 2008, it was clear that the problems of the housing and financial services indus- try would not be confined to just those industries.

Not all drops in the stock market result from bursting bubbles. When the automakers and their parts suppliers experienced a dramatic drop in sales and losses topped $10 billion per quarter at General Motors, few econo- mists were calling it a bubble in this area. These changes were part of the fundamental aspect of what stock mar- kets do. When profit expectations fall because of poor sales, stock prices fall.

Bank and insurance stocks were hit by a very high level of uncertainty. The across-the-board drop in these stocks was due to investor concern about their ability to distinguish

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476 Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes

between healthy and vulnerable financial institutions. The concern was magnified by the fact that the rating agencies, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, had failed to forecast the problems with housing generally and AIG in particular.

As 2009 was moving into 2010 and beyond and the economy began to recover (albeit at a painfully slow pace), the stock market made handsome gains. These gains, it must be said, were driven by the two funda- mentals: profit expectations and interest rates. Corporate profits increased much faster during this period than did

any other economic measure. The reason was that em- ployers of all varieties found that once they got past the recession’s bottom and had made adjustments to their labor force, the remaining workers were quite produc- tive. Sales increased while, for the most part, costs did not. The result was higher profits, and those higher prof- its created expectations of higher future profits. Com- bined with low interest rates, the result was a 174 percent rise in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from its March 2009 lows to its level in June 2016.

Summary You now understand how stock prices are determined and what stock markets do. You should understand the fundamental elements of stock prices and under- stand how prices can get out of line with their funda- mental value. You were able to see these concepts at work as you read stock market declines in 2000.

You understand the economic need for bankruptcy law and the consequences of the accounting scan- dals and bankruptcies of 2001 and 2002. Finally, you understand that the drop in stock market prices dur- ing 2008 and 2009 resulted from fundamental changes to profitability.

Key Terms bankruptcy bubble creditors

efficient market fundamentals initial public offering (IPO)

principal–agent problem stock index

Quiz Yourself 1. The fundamental value of a share of stock is based

on the present value of expected future a. dividends. b. revenues. c. profits. d. costs.

2. A stock index is a. essentially the weighted sum of stock prices. b. the simple sum of stock prices. c. the geometric average of stock prices. d. the consensus view of professional economists.

3. If you invested in 20 different companies and chose those companies at random, you would be counting on the ________________________ market hypoth- esis and its implication that you would do as well as you would with any other investment strategy. a. random b. complete c. stock d. efficient

4. Stock market crashes tend to result when stocks get _______________ their fundamental values. a. too far below b. too close to c. too far above d. confused with

5. A stock market exists a. only to service the sale of new issues, called

IPOs. b. to provide liquidity to all stocks, including re-

cent IPOs. c. to help policy makers predict the future. d. to make the rich richer.

6. The principal–agent problem centers on the separa- tion of a. supply and demand. b. investors and savers. c. owners and managers. d. interest and dividends.

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Summary 477

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain why the announcement of higher interest

rate targets by the Federal Reserve (if they were at least somewhat of a surprise) would likely result in lower stock prices.

2. Explain why, if a company’s profits are growing at rates greater than the current interest rates and have been expected to continue doing so for several more years, a stock price can greatly exceed what might otherwise seem reasonable for the sum of the assets of that company.

3. Explain why a stock market must exist for the resale of stock first issued many years ago for newly is- sued stock (an IPO) to garner significant interest among investors.

4. Explain how the “bubble” process, in which expec- tations get way out in front of reality on the upside, can be duplicated on the downside, causing a stock to fall below a reasonable level.

Think about This Not all asset bubbles are related to stocks. In 2005 there was a concern about housing prices on the coasts

exceeding all rational prices. One of history’s bubbles involved tulip bulbs. The problem is that bubbles are easier to recognize in retrospect. Are there any assets you can think of that currently look like a bubble?

Talk about This Stock markets are designed to allow corporations to raise initial capital. In providing liquidity to previously issued securities, they enhance that function. For these benefits we devote some of our best and brightest financial minds. Is that a good use of resources?

For More Insight See Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 2 (Spring 1990).

See articles by Joseph E. Stiglitz; Andrei Schliefer and Lawrence H. Summers; Peter M. Garber; Robert J. Schiller; Eugene N. White; and Robert P. Flood and Robert J. Hodrick.

Behind the Numbers Historical data.

Dow Jones Industrial Average; S&P 500; Nasdaq; www.quandl.com

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478

C H A P T E R F O R T Y - F I V E

Unions Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe why labor unions exist and model how they alter the bargaining relationship between employers and employees.

LO2 Distinguish between a competitive labor market and one where there is market power only with the employer, only with the employee, and when both have power.

LO3 Differentiate between labor unions that seek to raise wages by reducing supply and those that seek to raise wages by using collective bargaining as a monopolist.

LO4 Use knowledge of the history of unions in the United States to predict the future of unionization in the United States.

Chapter Outline

Why Unions Exist

A Union as a Monopolist

The History of Labor Unions

Where Unions Go from Here

Kick It Up a Notch

Summary

The role of labor unions in the United States has been the subject of some controversy for more than 100 years. As the economy developed from agriculture to indus- trial manu facturing, labor issues came to the forefront. Although the struggle to organize labor to demand better treatment began much earlier, it was not until the 1930s that legislation was enacted giving workers the right to bargain collectively and to join unions. Unions grew in influence and membership, with their representation in the workforce peaking at nearly 30 percent in 1975. That year saw the beginning of a long and rapid decline, and unions now represent 11 percent of the total workforce and less than 7 percent of the private workforce.

On a theoretical level, we discuss here why unions are usually desirable in a manufacturing economy, and we show how they can serve the best interests of both laborers and the economy as a whole. We then survey the early struggles, the pertinent laws, and the successes and failures of unions. We use two measures of union power to illustrate the health of labor in the United States, and we conclude with some insights into the ways unions are making the transition to the 21st century.

Why Unions Exist

The Perfectly Competitive Labor Market When the United States was almost entirely agrarian in nature, aside from those who were enslaved, indentured, or otherwise beholden to masters of one sort or another, people worked mainly for themselves. Obviously, if you work for yourself, and outside influences are not at work, your pay and working conditions cannot be unfair since your own productivity determines your own wealth. As the United States grew throughout the 19th century, how- ever, it evolved into an economy where fewer and fewer people worked for themselves. The industrial revolution came to the fore, and more and more people began to work for companies that manufactured goods. The sup- ply and demand model of the economy supports us in concluding that any time one person buys something from another person, there are gains to both sides. This applies to labor as well.

Figure 45.1 indicates that if the good being sold is labor, and the price at which it is sold is the wage, then,

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Why Unions Exist 479

like any market in perfect competition, there is an equi- librium wage and an equilibrium amount sold that make both parties better off than they were before the transac- tion took place. In Figure 45.1, at equilibrium the wage paid is W* for L* labor. The firm that hires the labor pays it OW*CL*, values it at (i.e., generates revenue from the sales of output from it of) OACL*, and therefore gets the difference that is  its consumer surplus (or profit) of W*AC. The workers get paid OW*CL* when it costs them only OBCL* in opportunity cost to provide their efforts. As a result, they get producer surplus of BW*C. There is no other wage– labor combination that provides as much surplus to the combination of both workers and firms as this one.

In a fairly subtle way, we conditioned all this on the assumption that there was perfect competition in the labor market. This means that there are many indepen- dent firms and many independent—that is, nonunion— workers, so that neither buyers nor sellers of labor have any control over the wage. Perfect competition also re- quires that all parties involved have good information about their alternatives.

A Reaction to Monopsony We can safely assume that there is perfect competition if we are talking about a very large city and a field that is not particularly specialized. For instance, there are many carpenters in large cities, and there are many contractors who hire them. On the other hand, competition can be a lot less than perfect for two reasons, which both boil down to whether the number of firms buying labor is limited. The most extreme example of this would be a so- called company town, where only one firm buys labor in a particular area. Though company towns tend to be rare today, towns like Redmond,Washington, with Microsoft, and State College, Pennsylvania, with Penn State Uni- versity, are close. On the other hand, history is replete

with companies that literally owned entire towns. Mining towns were especially likely to be company towns, with all the problems of paternalistic control and subjugation of workers with which they have been associated.

The case where the specialization is so narrow that there are at most only a few potential buyers of that skill is one that is somewhat different in cause but similar in effect. This is fairly common in high-skill special- ties where there is only one employer in a large area. You may be actually sitting at a chair in such a location. While assistant, associate, and full professors in colleges earn pretty good salaries, adjunct professors at colleges and universities are paid very little. Faculty at mid-level universities often earn in the neighborhood of $80,000 and teach four to six courses per year. Though there are research and service obligations to their jobs, their salaries translate to between $13,000 and $20,000  per course. Adjuncts are often paid less than $3,000 for a semester-long course. Many colleges are in towns where they are the only employer of people with masters and doctoral degrees (especially in the arts and humanities). For that reason, for people who are in the college town as a result of their spouse’s work, a college can offer to pay them very little and still get relatively high-quality instruction.

Regardless of the reason, if it is the case that there is only one employer in an area, that employer has power that is very similar to the monopoly power enjoyed by utilities. Recall that under monopoly there is only one seller of a good and that seller can charge very high prices.

When the market has only one buyer, a monopsony exists. In a monopsony the seller rather than the buyer is exploited.

Figure 45.2 shows how mono psony alters the per- fectly competitive markets depicted in Figure 45.2. Be- fore going into the detail of the graph, though, we need to step back and deal with a little labor vocabulary. As we mentioned briefly in the explanation of Figure 45.2, the demand curve for labor represents how much money an additional worker can generate for the firm as that

worker increases production and therefore sales revenue. This is called the marginal revenue product of labor, and it is equal to the demand curve, because the firm will be willing to pay

up to the amount of money it can make from its workers’ efforts in order to squeeze all possible profit out of its labor force.

FIGURE 45.1 A labor market under perfect competition.

L*

W*

O

C

D

SA

B

Wage

Labor

monopsony A market with only one buyer.

marginal revenue product of labor The additional revenue generated from hiring an additional worker.

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480 Chapter 45 Unions

In addition, since there is only one buyer of labor, the firm is not looking at an equilibrium wage that it must pay its employees. The firm decides how much labor it wants, and it pays the minimum required to get that labor. To get more workers, it not only has to pay the new work- ers more; it also has to pay all workers more. Thus if the

firm wants to hire more workers, its costs do not rise along the supply curve; they rise faster. The cost of increasing hiring is therefore not the supply curve but the curve that is labeled the marginal resource cost (MRC) in

Figure 45.2. This shows the increase in total labor costs to the firm of buying increasing amounts of labor.

To solidify this in your mind, consider Table 45.1. The first column represents the wage that is paid. The second is the quantity supplied. The third, the total cost to the employer, is the product of the first and second. The final column is the difference in the total cost from one worker to the next. Notice that it rises substantially faster than the first column.

The monopsonist firm maximizes profit when it hires at the point where the marginal revenue product of labor

equals the MRC. In Figure 45.2 this is LCT (i.e., in a com- pany town) rather than L* workers. To find what these workers are paid, we take LCT up to the supply curve to get WCT. If we want to know what these workers are worth, we go up to the demand curve to find that the amount of money they are making for the company is Wvalue. It should be clear that under monopsony workers do not earn what they are worth. As a check, note that under perfect compe- tition, at L*, workers earn their marginal revenue product; that is, they earn exactly what they are worth.

A Way to Restrict Competition and Improve Quality Some unions and professional organizations enhance the pay of their members by restricting the supply of work- ers and by increasing the value of their members. Thus Figure 45.3 alters Figure 45.1 by reflecting the reduction in potential workers as a changing of the shape of the sup- ply curve. First, the supply curve moves to the left because there is a cost to the employee of learning how to be- come skilled in this area. The costs to the newly licensed employees are reflected in the general movement of the supply curve to the left. Since the number of openings for training in the field, here noted as L′, is limited, the supply curve is perfectly inelastic at that point. Because there is an improvement in skills of the workers and the quality of their work, there is a movement of the demand curve to the right. This raises the wage to those who ul- timately work in the field. Among others, the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and the Plumbers and Steamfitters1 all follow this pattern.

FIGURE 45.2 A company town and a monopsony market for labor.

L*

W *

O

C

SA

E

F

B

Wage MRC

Wvalue

WCT

MRPL

LCT Labor

FIGURE 45.3 The impact of licensing.

Wage

Labor

A

Dʹ D

C

S

W *

L*

B

O

TABLE 45.1 Relationship between supply and marginal resource cost.

Wage Quantity Supplied

Total Cost to the Employer

Marginal Resource Cost

5 1 5 6 2 12 7 7 3 21 9 8 4 32 11 9 5 45 13

marginal resource cost (MRC) The increase in total labor costs to the firm of buying increasing amounts of labor.

1The United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada.

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A Union as a Monopolist 481

By restricting the ability of people to become workers in a particular field, these types of unions keep the supply of workers down. You cannot practice medicine or law without a license, and that license serves as a mechanism to restrict competition. While you can wire your own house or do your own plumbing, in many communities you cannot sell these services to others without a license.

The other side of Figure 45.3 is the increase in demand. Because of the training that union plumbers and electri- cians get, we can model their increased productivity and quality as an increase in the demand for their services. Thus, having a certification process also increases the pay of these workers, because an increase in the demand occurs for their services. As you can see, the net result is an increase in the price of these services and an uncertain effect on the numbers of these services that are provided.

If, on the other hand, the net effect of unionization of this form is that the labor sold is reduced, then union- ization of this type detracts from economic efficiency. Otherwise, unionization is neutral or good for it. Though there is considerable debate among labor economists on this point, they tend to suggest that the net impact of licensing is generally negative.

A Reaction to Information Issues Another reason that the actual market for labor may not be the perfectly competitive version is that workers may not have good information about other positions they might fill. Workers who explore other prospects tend to be viewed as disloyal by their bosses and co-workers. To avoid this perception as well as the effort of looking for a new job, people may not know what they are worth elsewhere. Though it was not stated above, one of the things that makes the perfectly competitive labor mar- ket perfect—workers earn what they are worth—is that workers who are paid less than market wages know it and will move on to other, better-paying jobs. If they do not know about the other jobs, they are not likely to move even when they are poorly paid or poorly treated.

There are a couple of ways that this works to hurt workers. The first, as stated above, is that there is a ten- dency for employers and co-workers to distrust people seeking better jobs, especially when those better jobs are with the competition. Therefore, there is sociologi- cal “peer pressure” that stands in the way of workers finding out what they are worth. Second, employers are not above conspiring with one another to strike fear into workers. This works when there is a limited number of firms and they collude in agreeing not to bid against one another for workers. When this works, each of the firms

can threaten “disloyal” workers with statements like “you will never work in this town again.”

A Union as a Monopolist

Unions exist to ensure that workers get at least what they are worth in a perfectly competitive market and possibly more. In economic speak, laborers band to- gether in unions so they can force employers to pro- vide them with wages that are equal to their marginal revenue product. They do this by countering the mar- ket power that firms have with market power of their own. Unions are most effective when they are the single seller to a firm’s single buyer. Sometimes unions such as the United Auto Workers, the United Mine Workers, and the Teamsters2 provide labor to many different buy- ers of labor. In such cases, it is the union that possesses the sole market power.

The formal model of unions is the same as the model of monopolies. In Figure 45.4 you see the impact of hav- ing a union control all labor. The marginal revenue to the union is set equal to the supply curve to find the amount of labor the union wishes to provide. This occurs at Lunion. That means that wages are higher than before, as Wunion exceeds W*. If we look at unions as if they existed in a vacuum, it would appear they are bad for the economy, since the consumer surplus falls by less than producer surplus grows, so unions appear to hurt the economy.

Unions did not arise and they do not exist in a vacuum. In some cases, poor treatment, poor pay, or both poor pay

Lunion L*

W *

Wunion

B

Wage

MR

D = MRPL

LaborO

A

E

C

S

F

FIGURE 45.4 A union’s effect on wages in a perfectly competitive labor market.

2The United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; the United Mine Workers of America; and the International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, respectively.

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482 Chapter 45 Unions

and poor treatment encouraged workers to organize. For others, Figure 45.4 depicts the end of the story. When unions simply use their monopoly power to sell labor to different competitive firms, then the existence of the union detracts from economic efficiency. We can see, though, that some workers lose opportunities to work, because Lunion is less than L*. We also see that the gain to those who keep their jobs is greater than the loss to those who lose theirs, because the producer surplus in- creases. Clearly the firms that do the hiring are worse off as their consumer surplus is reduced. The net effect is that unions reduce the total amount of the surplus.

To compare those unions that exist as a reaction to monopsony power to the case without the union, we need to combine Figures 45.2 and 45.4. In Figure 45.5 we can find out where the battle lines are drawn. In its monopo- listic form the union will want to set the wages at Whighest. This is what the union would demand if it were bargain- ing with many different employers. The “company” that rules the company town will want to pay what it would have paid if it were bargaining with many independent workers, Wlowest. There are some sophisticated economic models that are designed to predict the outcome of bar- gaining between unions and firms, but at this point we have difficulty making good predictions about where within the range the wages will ultimately settle.

Once a wage has been agreed on in this range, the number of workers the employer will hire depends on the supply and demand curves. To find out exactly how many will be hired, remember that since we are not going to be at equilibrium, it will be the lower of quan- tity demanded and quantity supplied at that wage. To find quantity demanded at that wage, take that wage to the demand curve. Similarly, to find quantity supplied, go over to the supply curve. As long as the bargaining

process works out between what unions want and what firms are willing to pay, the economy is better with a union in a company town than it is without a union in a company town. The result of the bargain is that the loss of consumer plus producer surplus is limited.

The History of Labor Unions

Labor organizations have existed in the United States since shoemakers banded together near the end of the American Revolutionary War. Labor’s battle was largely unsuccessful until the beginning of the 20th century, though, because courts saw their actions as restraint of trade or conspiracy. Thus any union that organized and struck an employer for better conditions or better wages had these actions stopped by the courts.3

Before laws began to support laborers’ attempts to form unions, and before unions had any rights under the law, there were court rulings that were decidedly anti-union. At one point, in a dispute between workers and a company that made railroad cars, sympathetic railroad workers refused to handle cars made by that particular company. The company retaliated by having U.S. mail cars attached to the “offend- ing” company’s cars. When railroad workers then uncou- pled the mail cars from the company’s cars in sympathy for the company’s workers, they were jailed for conspiracy to tamper with the U.S. mail. From the end of the Civil War to 1914, the courts, Congress, and most presidents were beholden to large corporate interests, interests that saw that union members were fired, jailed, beaten, and killed. Sel- dom were they successful in getting pay increases.

All that began to change in 1914 when President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, was able to work with a Congress controlled by the Democrats. In that year, laws were enacted to grant labor rights. Although one of these laws, the Clayton Act, was overturned by the Supreme Court, its passage marked a clear dividing line between the political parties. Republicans sided with manage- ment and Democrats with organized labor.

Through the 1920s Republicans held both the presi- dency and Congress and nearly no headway was allowed for labor unions. The Great Depression, which started in 1929, changed the economic and political landscape. As millions of workers lost their jobs, Democrats were voted into office; and, under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, Congress enacted the Norris–La Guardia Act, the National Industrial

Wage

D = MRPL

O L*

W *

Whighest

B MR

MRC

Labor

A

E

C

S

FWlowest

FIGURE 45.5 The union fights the one-company town, or monopoly versus monopsony.

3See Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, and David A. MacPherson, Contemporary Labor Economics, 8th ed. (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2008), Chapter 10.

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The History of Labor Unions 483

Recovery Act, and the Wagner Act, among others. These laws reestablished labor rights that had been granted under the Clayton Act, and they created new ones. Under these acts, workers were given the right to organize and to bar- gain collectively. Additionally, they stipulated that exercis- ing these rights could no longer be construed as conspiracy to restrain trade. The law now stated that whenever a major- ity of workers voted for union representation, the union was held to represent all workers, whether nonunion workers wanted to be represented or not. In actuality, it was often the case that when a firm’s workers were represented by a union, membership in that union was required as a condi- tion of employment for all the employees.

These rights did not apply to everyone. Most notably, government employees were still forbidden from strik ing, but the new laws did give labor a great deal of muscle. As the economy surged out of the depression and into World War II, strikes were becoming commonplace. Strikes were consid- ered serious enough that, during World  War  II, Congress temporarily gave the president power to seize control of in- dustries in which strikes were considered to be jeopardizing the production of war material.

In the year following Japan’s surrender in World War II, nearly 120 million workdays, 1.9 percent of all potential work time, were lost to strikes. In part, this was because a wide disparity existed between where wages were going before the war and where they were as a result of a war- time freeze. Since wages were frozen for much of the war,

workers wanted to at least be paid what they would have been paid had the freeze not been in place. Management liked the low current wages and argued that the health insurance benefits that were put in place to balance the wage freeze were sufficient to make up for the freeze.

As a result of depression-era laws, labor was still hold- ing nearly all of the cards and was quite successful in achieving its aims. Organized labor was so successful that to keep its power in check, a Republican Congress passed the Taft–Hartley Act over President Harry Truman’s veto.

The Taft–Hartley Act amended the Wagner Act in ways that gave management back some of the cards it had held in previous years. It allowed states to determine whether they would allow workers who did not want union rep- resentation to work for a company for whom a majority wanted union representation. It also allowed the president to order a cooling-off period, temporarily ending any strike that threatened the economic health of the nation.

In 1962 President John Kennedy issued an executive order that gave federal employees the right to unionize and to bargain collectively in ways they had not been able to do under the Wagner Act. Though still unable to strike, they were granted grievance procedures. Other protections were instituted that led greater numbers of public employees to form and to join unions.

A look at Figures 45.6 and 45.7 shows that since the time of President Kennedy, there has been a general de- cline in the number of workers who belong to unions.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

19 64

19 75

19 80

19 83

19 90

19 92

19 94

19 96

19 98

20 00

20 02

20 04

20 08

20 14

20 12

20 10

20 06

Year

U ni

o ni

ze d

w o

rk e

rs (%

)

Private Public Total

FIGURE 45.6 Union membership as a percentage of the workforce.

Source: Bureau of Labor and Statistics, www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm

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484 Chapter 45 Unions

Though union power peaked in the middle 1970s, the decline has been long and consistent. The exception has been the relative health of public employee unions. Figure 45.6 shows that the percentage of all workers who  are unionized and the percentage of private-sector employees who are unionized have fallen dramatically since the 1980s. It further shows that the percentage of public employees who are unionized has stayed at a rela- tively constant 35 percent to 40 percent.

This difference between the health of public and pri- vate employees’ unions is most clearly seen in just a few unions. The United Auto Workers lost nearly half of its 1.5 million members between 1978 and 1995. In 2015 their membership was only 408,000. The United Steelworkers of America once numbered 1.3 million; today membership is half that. On the other hand, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Union has had membership increase sixfold.

Similarly, if you look at work stoppages as a measure of labor unions’ confidence (that they can win in a situ- ation in which workers either strike or are locked out by management), you find that unions have been running scared since the early 1980s. The drop in the number of strikes is generally attributed to President Reagan’s fir- ing of the striking air traffic controllers in 1981.

In one of the more ironic events in labor history, the only president of the United States who had ever be longed to a union or had been a president of a union became the president most identified with labor’s downfall.

President Reagan had been a member of, and eventually president of, the Screen Actors’ Guild. When the Pro- fessional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), the union representing the air traffic controllers, struck in the summer of 1981, President Reagan followed the law, which unambiguously stated that public employees who engaged in strikes were to be terminated. At the time, hardly anyone thought he would actually follow through and fire the controllers, and virtually everyone thought he would hire them back after the strike was settled. When they struck, he fired them. He then ordered his secretary of transportation not to negotiate with them, since they were fired and no longer held legal status as employees. Instead, he ordered every available air traffic controller in the military to fill in until new controllers could be recruited and trained.

The events of this single week in 1981 are given in- ordinate weight by many, but it does serve as a timepost. Though PATCO was a small union and though unions were beginning to lose many of their battles in the late 1970s, the outcome of this strike is viewed by many in the labor movement as singularly important. For the first time since the 1930s, the government was perceived to be as much a foe of unionized labor as was manage- ment. It is even more ironic, then, that President Reagan garnered more union votes than any other 20th-century Republican president.

It was not until 17 years later, when the Teamsters Union struck the United Parcel Service (UPS) in 1998,

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FIGURE 45.7 Lost time from strikes and lockouts.

Source: Bureau of Labor and Statistics, www.bls.gov/wsp

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Where Unions Go from Here 485

that a major union won major concessions from an em- ployer. Whether this strike serves as another turning point or simply magnifies labor’s difficulties by serving as the exception that proves the rule will not be known for several years. For more than 15 years nearly every major strike left workers worse off than they had been when the strike started. The only exception to this generalization is strikes by already highly paid professional athletes, which succeeded in making them even more highly paid. Less than one-tenth of 1 percent of all work time was lost to strikes over the late 1990s, a consequence that can be attributed to the realization on the part of labor that they would lose any confrontation.

The ultimate reasons that organized labor won the UPS strike are the same as the reasons that any union wins a strike. The workers were not easily replaceable and the company that employed them had competitors that were taking its market share. The labor market of the late 1990s was such that finding dependable work- ers was difficult. This contrasts with strikes such as the strike by Caterpillar’s Peoria, Illinois, workers in the early 1990s. In that period of time dependable work- ers willing to take jobs at $15 to $25 an hour were not difficult to find. In 1998 such workers were much more difficult to find. Thus, the Teamsters would demand higher wages. Another difference was that UPS saw its market share in the overnight delivery business disap- pear. The fear that customers would not return after the strike induced the company to settle. Conversely, Cat- erpillar had less of a concern that competitors would or could take market share for long because of Caterpil- lar’s dominance in the heavy construction equipment industry.

In July 2005, the AFL-CIO had its most significant defections in decades as the Teamsters and other unions abandoned the umbrella organization. The dispute cen- tered on whether the financial resources of the unions should be devoted to electing politicians sympathetic to union concerns or whether they should be devoted to increasing union membership by unionizing previously unorganized industries.

Where Unions Go from Here

Unions composed of men and women who work in the public sector will likely survive long into the future, as there are far fewer pressures on them than there are on  unions in the private sector. For instance, if a car company decides it can no longer afford its union’s pay

demands, it can move its production facilities to a loca- tion where the workers are only too happy to take the jobs at whatever the company is offering. On the other hand, if a city cannot afford its firefighters’ wage demands, it must negotiate. It cannot move to a location where it can hire other firefighters and pay lower wages.

Unions in the private sector are likely to have con- tinuing difficulty for three basic reasons. First, because employment growth has been most evident in service and retail industries where many employers hire only a few employees each, unions have found it much more difficult to organize these workers. Second, since old- line manufacturing in areas like automobiles and steel is susceptible to international trade pressures to keep costs down, unions will have a hard time winning concessions even in industries in which they are still strong. Third, the impact of Walmart and other major retailers on con- sumer good manufacturers has been enormous. When firms are faced with a specific retailer that is responsible for nearly half their sales, and that retailer demands sig- nificant cost concessions, unions representing the em- ployees of those manufacturing firms are faced with a tough choice. Either they give in to wage reductions or they risk having their jobs leave for foreign lower-cost venues. For these reasons the picture for private-sector unions is rather bleak.

In general, the health of private-sector unions will depend greatly on whether we return to the days when only a few major employers hired most workers. The information age has seen many start-up companies lure workers away from larger companies. The wages of computer engineers, programmers, and the employ- ees who actually make computers are pretty close to what these workers are worth. If, on the other hand, the computer industry begins to centralize around only a few major employers and start-ups become rare, unions may finally make inroads into information-age industries. Unless that happens, public-sector unions may dominate the labor movement by the end of the 21st century.

Public-sector unions play an increasing role in our economy and in our politics. The tension between the Wisconsin governor and the public employees of that state in 2011 show why this is the case. Public employ- ees are attached to their employer for a much longer period of time than private-sector employees. This is largely the case because public-sector employees re- main on defined-benefit pension plans that reward longevity with one employer. Those pensions pay off very well for those people who join the police force,

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486 Chapter 45 Unions

or the firefighters, or the school system when they are young and stay with them until retirement. None of these professions pay well in terms of salaries, but they all have benefit packages that well exceed what is typi- cal for private-sector workers in that salary range. This is especially true when you count the near certainty of continued employment and the very low employee

contribution rates for those benefits. The future for public-sector employees likely will continue or fall on the basis of these public-sector unions’ ability to retain that benefits advantage. They understand this very well, which is why public-sector employee unions are some of the most prolific contributors to politicians who pro- tect their interests.

Kick It Up a Notch

Referring back to Figure 45.2 and using the notions of consumer and producer surplus introduced in Chapter  3, we can see that monopsony is worse than perfect competition. Firms do better because they pay less, and workers do worse because they make less. The net to society is reduced by EFC because the con- sumer surplus to firms is WCT AEF while the producer surplus to workers shrinks to BWCT F. That combined area is less than the optimal level by EFC. We can conclude from the preceding that if  the problem that

unions combat is monopsony, then unions can make things better by moving the market toward its original equilibrium.

In Figure 45.4 we see that the fall in consumer sur- plus is WunionAE and the increase in producer surplus is BW unionEF. As a result, in combination there is a net reduction, and unions appear to hurt the economy. Re- member from the body of the chapter, unions do not exist in a vacuum and are typically a reaction to something operating against workers.

Summary You now understand why labor unions exist and how they alter the bargaining relationship between employers and employees. You understand how a competitive labor mar- ket differs from one where there is market power with only the employer, with only the employee, and when both have power. You understand that labor unions differ

in that some seek to raise wages by reducing supply, whereas others seek to raise wages by using collective bargaining as a monopolist. Last, you now understand how unions came about in the United States, and you have enough knowledge of recent history to be able to project where unionization is going in the United States.

Key Terms marginal resource cost (MRC) marginal revenue product of labor monopsony

Quiz Yourself 1. When there is only one employer in a city, the model

that economists use is one for a. monopoly. b. monopsony. c. perfect competition. d. monopolistic competition.

2. When there are many employers in a city and one union, the model that economists use is one for

a. monopoly. b. monopsony. c. perfect competition. d. monopolistic competition.

3. Under perfect competition marginal resource cost ___________ supply; under monopsony marginal resource cost ___________ supply.

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Summary 487

a. equals; equals b. equals; is greater than c. equals; is less than d. is greater than; is less than

4. A union that trains and restricts supply has an effect on the supply curve that moves it to the ___________ and, at a point, makes it ___________. a. left; vertical b. left; horizontal c. right; vertical d. right; horizontal

5. Labor unions have greater representation in ___________ employees. a. public b. service c. manufacturing d. retail

6. In the past 40 years work stoppages have a. plummeted. b. remained constant. c. increased slowly. d. increased rapidly.

Short Answer Questions 1. Explain why the marginal resource cost rises faster

than the supply curve for labor. 2. Explain why, in a negotiation between a monopolis-

tic union and a monopsonistic company in a town,

there would not be a single outcome of wage and quantity like there is if only one of those two condi- tions hold.

3. Explain why there has been such a reduction in the number of work stoppages.

4. Use the context of the monopoly-monopsony ten- sion to explain why public employees are so heavily unionized.

Think about This The ability of unions to have their demands met has de- creased markedly since the 1981 PATCO strike. Work stoppages have also decreased since that time. Are unions just not trying to make their influence known or do they not strike knowing they have little chance of winning?

For More Insight See McConnell, Campbell R., Stanley L. Brue, and David A.

MacPherson, Contemporary Labor Economics, 10th ed. (New York: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2013), esp. Chapters 10, 11, and 13.

Behind the Numbers Union and private workforce information. Statistical Abstract of the United States; labor—

https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011 /compendia/statab/131ed/labor-force-employment -earnings.html

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488

C H A P T E R F O R T Y - S I X

Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the importance of Walmart in the U.S. economy.

LO2 Demonstrate that the grocery sector continues to have a variety of competitors with monopolist competition being an adequate model to explain it.

LO3 Show that consumers tend to benefit when Walmart enters a community but that labor may win or lose, that other businesses may win or lose, and that the net impact is not always easy to compute.

Chapter Outline

The Market Form

Who Is Affected?

Summary

Depending on whom you talk to, Walmart is either one of the great American success stories and the driving force behind the upsurge in American productivity, or it is the emblem for low-wage, no-benefit, dead-end jobs, and the destroyer of small business. The reality is that it is all of that. Begun by Sam Walton as a small dis- count store in Bentonville, Arkansas, it has grown over the last 35 years to become the largest nongovernmen- tal employer in the United States, responsible for nearly 3 percent of U.S. GDP. With nearly every new store there is a debate about whether a new Walmart is good or bad for the community. Several communities have banned large discount stores on the argument that what Walmart brings, low-priced merchandise and low-wage jobs, is not worth the cost in terms of other lost jobs and lost local character. This chapter explores the pros and cons of “big-box stores” in general and Walmart in particular.

The Market Form

Most communities that have Walmart Supercenters have other large grocery chain–affiliated stores as well. Also in the mix are individually owned stores, some

of which are affiliated with what was once called the International Grocers Association but is now known as the familiar IGA. Your prototypical community will have stores of all varieties. From warehouse stores like Sam’s and Costco to the “supers” (Kmart, Walmart, and Target), to the national chains (Kroger), to the national holding companies (e.g., Ahold is a holding company with regional stores like Stop & Shop and Giant and Cerberus Management is a holding company that in- cludes Safeway, Albertsons, and several others), to the regional chains (Wegmans, Winn-Dixie, and Publix, etc.), to the IGA-affiliated stores, the grocery business is large and diverse. The market form that best describes this set of conditions is monopolistic competition. Though very small towns may have only one grocery store (monopoly) and small cities may have just two or three (oligopoly), the vast majority of Americans live in a community in which three of the four types of stores are present.

Every grocery store has a monopoly of sorts based on its location but is faced with competition from other stores as consumers are willing to travel short distances past one store to go to another. Many people

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The Market Form 489

have a preference for stores that include or do not in- clude some goods. While some are intimidated by a “super” store, others are attracted to them because they can do grocery shopping, have their pharmacy needs met, and pick up a power tool and a new-release DVD all in one location. Some consumers want the “home- town proud” feeling of an IGA affiliate because they want to be on a first-name basis with their meat cutter and appreci ate the fact that the owner sponsors a local Little League team. Monopolistic competition fits this market quite well.

A look at Figure 46.1 and Table 46.1 clearly shows that the regional and top national grocery store com- panies and holding companies are widely dispersed throughout the United States with little likelihood that any one firm could gain a monopoly in any but the

Ahold USA* Delhaize Group*

Demoulas Market Basket

Giant Eagle Inc* Lowes Foods

Price Chopper Tops Friendly Markets

Wegmans Weis Markets

Wakefern

Brookshire Grocery Company*

Delhaize Group* Ingles Markets Lowe’s Market* Piggly Wiggly

Publix Southeastern Grocers*

Sprouts Farmers Market

Fareway Giant Eagle Inc*

HyVee Meijer

Piggly Wiggly Schnucks

Sprouts Farmers Market H-E-B Grocery Co.*

Lowe’s Market* Raley’s Supermarkets*

Sprouts Farmers Market WinCo

WinCo

* Includes stores operated under a banner of the parent company.

FIGURE 46.1 Store locations of the regional grocery store outlets in the United States.

TABLE 46.1 National Grocery Chains, Locations and Establishments

Firm Number of States Number of Establishments

Albertsons* 33 2,200 Aldi 34 1,540 Kroger* 35 2,778 SUPERVALU* 38 1,534 Super Target** 22 200 Trader Joes 40 453 Walmart Supercenters 49 3,465 Whole Foods Market* 42 430

* Includes stores operated under a banner of the parent company. **There are 278 Target stores that are 170,000 square feet or larger, offering a full gro- cery selection. Target has 1500+ stores in 45 states that have a limited grocery selection.

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490 Chapter 46 Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always

smallest of communities. Table 46.2 shows the percent- age of total grocery sales by the top 10 firms. However you slice the data, the concern that Walmart is establish- ing a monopoly is not supported.

A similar concern is the degree to which Walmart affects its suppliers. To many firms, large and small, Walmart is their largest buyer. Were Walmart to become its only potential buyer, the problem of monopsony would occur. In that circumstance, companies are forced to reduce the prices to Walmart for fear that Walmart will shut them out. Just as Walmart can “make” a company by vastly expanding the market for a company’s prod- ucts, it can just as easily break it by compelling the firm to produce goods more cheaply. This can, and often does, result in the company outsourcing production to another country, reducing wages and benefits at its U.S. produc- tion facilities, or making products from less expensive and less durable materials. The left-leaning Economic Policy Institute estimated in 2015 that between 2001 and 2013 there were 400,000 jobs lost in the United States solely because of Walmart’s practices such as this. They further attribute 15 percent of the growth in the U.S. trade deficit with China to Walmart.

Who Is Affected?

There are many stakeholders when any “super” comes to town and, especially in the Northeast and West, local city and county authorities have developed zoning laws that are clearly aimed at keeping “supers” at bay. In examin- ing why some object to the introduction of a Walmart

Supercenter into a community, it helps to look at who wins and who loses. First, as a group, consumers unambigu- ously win because Walmarts tend to charge substantially less for identical items when comparisons are made be- tween its prices and those of other big national or regional grocery stores like Kroger, Safeway, Food Lion, or Albert- sons. Often Walmart can sell its staple items (like milk and bread) for less than IGA affiliates pay their suppliers. Sec- ond, workers may win or lose depending on two things: (1) whether there is a net increase in jobs or whether the jobs gained at the Walmart are countered by lost jobs at competitors, and (2) what Walmart pays its employees. Third, taxpayers may win or lose depending on whether or not there is a net addition to sales in the community that results in a net increase in sales taxes. Finally, some of the owners of small businesses and other existing corpo- rate retailers may be affected negatively, while others may benefit from such an endeavour. Let’s examine some data.

Most Consumers Stand to Gain—Some Lose Options We’ll take each set of stakeholders in turn, starting with the buying public. The gain to consumers from paying less for their groceries is substantial. The average Walmart Supercenter sells between $100 and $150  million worth of goods in a year. Estimates vary considerably, but a trade association of mass marketers once estimated that Walmart’s prices were 15 percent to 22 percent lower than national averages. Some recent estimates have reduced that margin. That suggests that the logistical advantages that Walmart has enjoyed are slowly eroding as others learn from Walmart’s tactics. Suppose the average con- sumer saves 15 percent. The gain to the consumers who voluntarily switch from an average store to a Walmart Supercenter is (per store) between $15 and $33 million annually. Aggregate that over the entire country. Fifteen percent of Walmart’s grocery sales amounts to more than $50 billion. Given that total Federal spending on food as- sistance (SNAP and WIC) is $76 billion, that is a rather large supplement to family food budgets.

Whatever these consumers do with the saved money, it is clear that they benefit from this perspective. Whether or not the local economy benefits depends on what consumers do with the saved money. If they consume more locally produced goods and services, then the local community benefits. If they put the money in their Wall Street–managed investment accounts, the local com- munity does not benefit as much.

There may be some locations where a “super” drives an IGA-type store out of business and doing so makes

TABLE 46.2 Top 10 grocery store chain sales in the United States.

Source: nrf.com/news/power-players-2015 nrf.com/2015/top100-table

*Safeway, Albertsons, plus others

Rank Company Annual Sales (billions)

% of Top 10 Sales ($699 b)

1 Walmart $344 49.15% 2 Kroger $103 14.74% 3 Target $73 10.39% 4 Cerberus

Management* $56 7.98%

5 Publix $31 4.37% 6 Ahold USA/Royal

Ahold $26 3.72%

7 H-E-B Grocery $20 2.83% 8 Delhaize America $17 2.44% 9 Meijer $16 2.24%

10 WakeFern/ShopRite $15 2.14%

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Who Is Affected? 491

some consumers worse off because they now have their optimal grocery option removed from their set of choices. To ballpark that loss, suppose a family used to pay $1,000 more a year on groceries at an IGA than they would have at a Walmart and did so because they liked the personal- ized service available at the IGA store. They have shown through their “revealed preferences” that this option is worth at least $1,000. For every 1,000 consumers so affected, the loss would be $1,000,000. What seems likely is that consumers as an aggregate are better off though some may be worse off.

Workers Probably Lose It’s hard to tell what the impact will be on workers be- cause it is unclear whether there will be any net addition (or net loss) to the workforce. If there is a net addition, it may not be great enough to offset the loss associated with the fact that, despite recent increases in their own wages, Walmart’s pay, including benefits, is usually lower than a unionized grocery store. A representative sample of re- cent Walmart openings shows that they employ approxi- mately 300 people per store. However, there are problems with that number: First, about half of the jobs are part time, and second, the literature on displacements suggests that between 75 percent and 133 percent of such jobs will be displaced elsewhere in the community.1 If we assume that a work year contains 2,080 hours, and, further, if we assume Walmart pays its employees $5 less per hour than its competitors, there will be a loss to the community of workers that is $3 million per store.

Sales Tax Revenues Won’t Be Affected Much The question of whether taxpayers will gain or lose depends on whether the net sales in the state increase. The literature on the degree to which new supercent- ers increase total sales in a community suggests that between 70 percent and 80 percent of their sales dis- place sales that would have taken place in that com- munity anyway. The problem with saying that sales taxes would therefore increase is that (1) a sizable por- tion of the sales are for tax-exempt items like food and (2) very little of the taxable sales would go to people who would have spent their money outside the state.

The latter point is important because sales taxes in many states go directly to the state. Therefore, whether the sales

are in the particular community or in one of the neighboring counties, the sales taxes collected are the same. So, though more sales taxes would be collected in the community, there would be little effect on total sales tax collections.

Some Businesses Will Get Hurt; Others Will Be Helped The impact of Walmart and other “supers” on other stores in the area is not clear. IGA affiliates follow a strategy of not trying to “out-Walmart” Walmart. They “believe that a good grocery store isn’t a sprawling, impersonal ex- ample of cookie-cutter commerce, but a community hub owned and operated by the very people who know the area best—the citizens.” As a result they support local charities, sponsor many local children’s athletic teams, stock food products not often stocked at a “super,” hap- pily take special orders for meats not typically carried by the “supers,” cut meat on-site rather than having it deliv- ered already packaged, and their owners are on-site and part of their communities. At least some of Walmart’s growth has been at the expense of these stores.

What is also important in the mix is that Walmarts tend to lead to the creation of complementary businesses. This “pull-factor” has been estimated to increase the creation of other retail business and other economic activity. A new Walmart is likely to “pull” retail sales from neighboring counties. That also leads to new fast-food and chain sit- down restaurants and other “big-box” retailers like Home Depot, Best Buy, and Staples that often follow “supers.” Walmart can be the instant critical mass for an undevel- oped or depressed area to become economically vibrant.

Of course they “pull” from somewhere. A study of Walmart’s impact on community tax bases shows that there is a statistically significant increase in the tax base in a community when a Walmart comes to town but also that adjacent communities see their tax bases fall. Looked at from a regional perspective, the net, while positive, is much smaller because the decline in adjacent communi- ties’ tax bases wipes out two-thirds of the benefits to the community with the new Walmart.

Community Effects Sociologists have entered the Walmart discussion by pointing out that the introduction of “supers” has the im- pact of displacing stores that are owned by people who are also community leaders. This suggests that there is a further external cost to Walmarts in that they damage a community’s noneconomic fabric. They also argue that after controlling for a host of other variables, shortly after a Walmart enters a market, local rates of poverty rise.

1 One nonacademic source suggests that Walmart gets so much more work out of an employee that the total number of workers falls when a Walmart comes to town.

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492 Chapter 46 Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always

Summary The net result of any new Walmart is what you would expect. Consumers mostly win and workers mostly lose; some businesses win and others lose, with the net being somewhat positive depending on the particulars of the community. If the new store simply replaces sales that would have occurred in the town anyway and the gain in employment is offset completely by the closing of other businesses, then what consumers gain is approximately

equal to what workers lose. If, as is more likely, there is some net addition to employment and complementary businesses grow alongside the Walmart, then it is a net addition to the community. The local business leaders will gain or lose depending on whether they try to go head-to-head with Walmart (a suicidal venture) or they attempt to complement the Walmart by selling what Walmart does not, service.

Quiz Yourself 1. The impact of a new Walmart on a community’s

consumers is a. significantly positive for those that get lower

prices. b. somewhat negative for those that prefer a

personal touch (if stores offering it close). c. substantially negative in all aspects. d. a combination of a and b.

2. The impact of a new Walmart on a community’s workers is a. only positive in that new jobs are created. b. only negative because better-paying jobs at

competitors are lost. c. positive and negative because new jobs are cre-

ated, but they often displace better-paying ones. d. only positive because Walmart pays better than

their competitors. 3. We can measure how much someone values the per-

sonal touch of a small grocery store by using the amount extra they pay at that store even when there is a Walmart in town. Economists call that a. revealed demand. b. revealed preference. c. parsing the preference. d. noting the demand.

4. The impact of Walmart on its suppliers is a. unambiguously positive. b. unambiguously negative. c. positive and negative in that Walmart enlarges

the market for their products but demands a much lower price than they typically receive.

d. negligible. 5. The predominant market form for the grocery busi-

ness in the majority of U.S. cities is one of a. monopoly. b. oligopoly.

c. monopolistic competition. d. perfect competition.

6. Walmart’s entry into the grocery business in the 1990s a. turned it into a monopoly. b. had no impact on the market form; it remained

perfectly competitive. c. had no impact on the market form; it remained

monopolistically competitive. d. had no impact on the market form; it remained

an oligopoly.

Short Answer Questions 1. Theory suggests that Walmart might be able to come

in, drive out competitors, and then raise prices. Data suggest that it doesn’t happen. What would explain why Walmart doesn’t do this?

2. Give an example of a “pull effect” that you have seen with a new large retail operation in your city or town, and explain whether this is simply an example of local substitution.

3. What are the strategies that grocery stores use to survive when a new Walmart locates in their area?

4. What is the gain to consumer surplus associated with a new large retailer, and why might that not be enough to overcome the losses associated with it?

Think about This Walmart’s entry into the grocery business in the 1990s had an important effect in lowering the price of groceries to poor people. Should this be taken into account when establishing the poverty line?

Talk about This Major American companies that used to manufacture their goods in the United States are now manufacturing their

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Summary 493

goods in China because Walmart puts enormous pressure on the company to lower prices. This is because its practice is to tell a manufacturer what it will pay for a good. If the company wishes to sell its goods in a Walmart, it will lower prices. This is good for you in that you get goods at a lower cost. It is bad for the U.S. employees of the business because they lose their jobs. What is the net good/bad in your mind?

For More Insight See Boyina, Manjula, “An Examination of Pull Factor

Change in Non-Metro Counties in Kansas: A Study of the Economic Impact of Walmart Construction,” Kansas Policy Review 26, no. 2 (Fall 2004).

Franklin, Andrew W., “The Impact of Walmart Supercenter Food Store Sales on Supermarket Concentration in U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” Paper presented at the USDA conference, “The American Consumer and the Changing Structure of the Food System,” Arlington, Virgina, May 3–5, 2000.

Hicks, Michael J., The Local Economic Impact of Walmart (New York: Cambria Press) (2007).

Stone, Kenneth E., Georgeanne Artz, and Albert Myles, The Economic Impact of Walmart Supercenters on Existing Businesses in Mississippi: www2.econ .iastate.edu/faculty/stone/mssupercenterstudy.pdf

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y - S E V E N

494

The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the potential economic impact of casino gambling in the context of the local substitution problem.

LO2 Apply the concept of externalities to casino gambling.

LO3 Summarize the local economic impact of casino gambling while noting that it depends greatly on where the casino is located.

LO4 Understand daily fantasy and distinguish it from other sports betting.

Chapter Outline

The Perceived Impact of Casino Gambling

Local Substitution

The “Modest” Upside of Casino Gambling

The Economic Reasons for Opposing Casino Gambling

Sports Gambling and Daily Fantasy

Summary

When state and local governments run into financial difficulties, one of the first solutions brought to the table is casino gambling. Whether it be the introduction of gambling to the state or its expansion to a new part of the state, the argument goes something like this: “If we open a new casino, gaming companies will hire people to build it, more people to run it, and in the end they will all be paying more in taxes.” This “everyone wins” scenario is plagued with the same logical flaw as the “if we build it, they will come” argument for publicly fund- ing the construction of a new sports stadium. This is in addition to the negative externality that is created for casino communities.

The Perceived Impact of Casino Gambling

The perception that gambling has an enormous eco- nomic impact on a community is understandable. More than 76  million Americans set foot in a casino each year, leaving nearly $38 billion. The casinos

themselves employ 336,272 people while paying more than $10  billion in taxes. That, in a nutshell, is why gambling became one of the “answers” to state budget crises that stemmed from the 2001 recession and were once again turned to by states looking to close budget gaps in 2009 through 2011.

Local Substitution

The problem with the argument that a casino is an eco- nomic boon to its host community is that the money that goes into the casino came out of the pockets of some other businesses and therefore does not increase total economic activity in the community. To explain why, I will use my hometown as an example.

Terre Haute, Indiana, is known for two things: It was the college town for Larry Bird, and it is the home of the U.S. penitentiary that housed and then executed Timothy McVeigh. It is also home to economic and population decline. Once considered a major city in the state, it currently struggles to be noticed by the state’s leaders.

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The Economic Reasons for Opposing Casino Gambling 495

Some local leaders proposed that the solution to Terre Haute’s economic woes included a riverboat on the Wabash River that defines the city’s western edge.

It is unambiguously true that such a facility would have cost in the neighborhood of $100 million to construct and that many of those construction jobs would have gone to citizens of the city. It is also true that once operational, a casino in Terre Haute would employ hundreds of workers at all levels of pay and responsibility. The problem is that money would have, in large part, come from people who already spend their entertainment dollars in the city.

The confusion over whether casinos are an economic answer to a community’s problems results from the fact that the thing right in front of you often masks the equally sized but more dispersed negative impacts. This is true even if there are not the negative social consequences associated with gambling.

When properly examined, the bulk of the money that is spent on gaming in a community is money that usually comes from inside the community. The only substantial impact comes when a casino is located in a relatively rural area with a major market unserved by an existing casino. Thus residents of Cincinnati used to drive to Indiana’s neighboring Aurora to gamble when they otherwise would not have gone across the Ohio River to spend their enter- tainment dollars. Chicago, Illinois, is on the Illinois and Indiana border. Four cities on the Indiana side of the bor- der, East Chicago, Gary, Michigan City, and Hammond, all have casinos, but these mostly serve the Chicago met- ropolitan area.

A Terre Haute casino might draw Indianapolis resi- dents, but it is not close enough to make it a slam-dunk success. The other problem with relying on the India- napolis market is that if the issue of casinos is opened up again in the Indiana legislature, other towns much closer to Indianapolis will certainly want in on the game. In the end, the people most likely to patronize a Terre Haute casino are people who already spend their entertain- ment dollars in Terre Haute. We know that this is exactly what will happen because it is exactly what happened to the people of eastern Indiana in 2011 when ground was broken on a new casino in Cincinnati. The two casinos in eastern Indiana faced significant competition in late 2012 and suffered from the fact that their main customer base now has a newer casino much closer to home. In 2017, one of those weakened casinos sought to move some of their licenses to Terre Haute.

This Indiana example is playing out in many states. Whether it be gambling in Wisconsin, Missouri, or any- where else, the names change but the idea stays the same.

The “Modest” Upside of Casino Gambling

Senior Economist Thomas A. Garrett of the St. Louis Federal Reserve notes that, “Although economic develop- ment is used by the casino industry and local governments to sell the idea of casino gambling to the citizenry, the de- gree to which the introduction and growth of commercial casinos in an area lead to increased economic develop- ment remains unclear.” The evidence, as Dr. Garrett puts it, favors a “modest impact.” In particular, the im- pact depends on where the casino is (rural or urban) and whether there is a large unserved market nearby.

Were there no externalities associated with casino gambling, the Garrett data would suggest that it is no different from any other recreational activity. That it is no ticket to an economic panacea would not preclude it from being part of the larger solution of economic growth. Again, looking at my state’s experience shows that the impact of casino gambling is quite modest. From 1991 to 2001, the period of significant casino growth in the state of Indiana, the annual growth rate in per- sonal income in counties with a casino was 5.3 percent, whereas in counties without a casino that annual growth rate was 5.2 percent.

Further, the notion that casinos are a boon to com- munity tax coffers is partly wrong and partly deceiving. Much of the revenue that gets attributed to the casino would have been paid by other entertainment operators were there no casino. Concentrating the dollars paid into one source doesn’t make them any greater. The real in- crease in tax revenue attributable to casinos exists be- cause the effective tax rate on a gambled (and lost) dollar is substantially higher than the effective tax rate on a dollar spent at a restaurant or a dollar spent at a bowl- ing alley. It is a tax increase that brings in the revenue to local governments, not an increase in economic activity. No wonder politicians fall for casino industry promises of money; they offer the possibility of raising taxes without the negative political consequence.

The Economic Reasons for Opposing Casino Gambling

The economic reasons to oppose this modest economic growth opportunity are the same as the reasons to op- pose or limit the sale of tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and prostitution. Gambling is quite clearly addictive. Addicts of all varieties will do anything to satisfy their desires.

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496 Chapter 47 The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling

those who use their cards to support a gambling addic- tion. In addition, the money that gamblers use to support their habit could have been put to better use on food, clothing, or other goods for their family. When gamblers divorce, leaving spouses and their children on public assistance, those consequences are an external cost of gambling. Left unregulated or untaxed, any such market that produces external costs will produce too much.

Sports Gambling and Daily Fantasy

In traditional sports gambling, you place a wager on which team is going to win. In most sports where there are more people who think that one team will beat an- other, a point spread is offered whereby the expected winner has to win by more than the spread in order for the person betting on that team to win the bet. So when the undefeated 2007 Patriots entered that year’s Super Bowl as 13-point favorites, the bet was over long before the game was. The Patriots not only lost the game, even if they had mounted a game-winning drive at the end, they would have lost against the spread. There are very limited locations in the United States (Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana) in which it is legal to bet on the outcome of a game; however, illegal betting reaches into nearly every place of work during the NCAA men’s basketball championship. It is estimated that $9 billion is wagered (almost entirely illegally) on March Madness.

One relatively new entrant into the world of sports gambling is the business of “daily fantasy.” It attempts to classify itself as a game of skill (legal everywhere) in- stead of as a game of chance (legal in only a few places). To understand how daily fantasy makes that argument, you have to understand its history. Daily fantasy is a spi- noff on fantasy sports, which itself is a spinoff of the very old rotisserie baseball. In the latter two, two or more people would create a league and draft players. The per- formance of those players over the course of a season would determine the winner of the league. Instead of a team scoring traditional runs, goals, or points, the indi- vidual players’ statistics would be converted into points using an agreed-upon standard. In football, touchdowns, yards rushing or passing, defensive points allowed would be converted into league points. In baseball, runs batted in, runs scored, earned run average, etc., would be converted into league points for each game played. In some leagues you would have an opponent each day or each week, and if you scored more points than they did, you won, and if not, you lost. In other leagues, it

Gambling addicts will run up credit card debt, mortgage their homes, and put their families in terrible financial condition before seeking help. This leads to another prob-

lem: Gambling is associated with costs borne by someone other than the gambler or the casino. In the presence of externalities, free markets produce more of the

good or service (including gambling entertainment) than is consistent with economic efficiency.

Psychologists who study gambling addicts contend that most inveterate gamblers became attracted to it because they won significant sums of money their first time. This creates an emotional high in the same cen- ters of the brain that drug addiction affects and, like drug addicts, gamblers continually try to repeat that high. Of course, they can’t win over the long run. Casinos make money, money that used to belong to gamblers. To a stat- istician, gambling has a negative “expected value.” That means that the average person who brings in $100 to a casino will leave with less than $100. This is because the

gambles themselves are never “fair.” Whether it’s craps, poker, blackjack, or any other game, the “house” has a “vig,” or percent- age of the average gamble that is

its take. The “vig” is what pays for the employees, the fa- cility, and the profits to the casino company. This is why there are few gamblers who make their money gambling.

This, of course, is no different from any other form of entertainment. You never leave a movie theater with more money than you went in with. Assuming the movie was good, you do not complain because you got to see the movie. The allure of gambling is that you will win. When your first experience with gambling is like mine (I fed $40 in quarters into a slot machine in 20 minutes and won nothing), casino gambling has no appeal. On the other hand, psychologists insist that when you win big your first time out, there is a “high.” It is a high that could potentially lead to addiction. As a result, you can make an economic argument against casinos on the same grounds you argue that cocaine or methamphetamine should be illegal.

That addiction can also create other negative behav- iors by the gambler, and those behaviors can affect in- nocent third parties. When gamblers borrow extensively to support their addiction to gambling, the result can be high rates of bankruptcy. Higher bankruptcy rates lead to higher interest rates for the rest of us because credit card companies cannot distinguish people using their credit cards to buy food, clothing, or pay hotel bills from

externalities Effects of a transaction that hurts or helps people who are not part of that transaction.

vig The expected percent- age of any gamble that a casino will keep.

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Summary 497

was simply a running total of your league points against others’ league points.

That was all fine for people who were content play- ing for nothing of real value. Gamblers want instant results. A season-long league doesn’t suit their tastes. Instead, the daily fantasy business created one-day leagues. You draft before games start, and when the day is over you know the statistics, the league points, and the winners. Unlike traditional season-long fantasy leagues where a group of friends would gather around a table at one time and draft players, in daily fantasy you log into a website and have to buy players using a credit card. The price on any particular player is a function of their expected performance. The price on a superstar is much higher than the price on an unheralded nobody. It is this aspect on which backers of the assertion that daily fantasy is a game of skill make their case. A well- informed, statistically savvy analyst can choose cheaper players and beat the stars. They can get more points and a higher net payout if they buy the right players, not just the popularly chosen ones. Though there are more than 30 fantasy sports sites, between DraftKings and Fan Duel they controlled 95 percent of the market in 2016.

The vig for each is similar, between 6 percent and 15 percent, and depends on the sport.

The legal distinctions that enabled daily fantasy to exist began to unravel in 2016 as several states began to outlaw participation by their residents. Some states cre- ated a distinction between legal residents physically in the state and those outside the state; others did not.

It is worth noting that sports gambling in the rest of the world is largely legal. Eight of 20 Premier League teams sport gambling sites on their jerseys, and all 20 have some associate sponsor. BWIN.com sponsors LaLiga’s Real Madrid but only after it had previously sponsored Barcelona.

While some may believe that there is or is not a legal distinction between casino gambling, traditional sports gambling, and daily fantasy, there is clearly no economic distinction and no distinction regarding the negative ex- ternalities associated with gambling. Whatever side you are on with regard to the balance between the individu- al’s right to participate in these forms of entertainment and society’s concern for the impact of gamblers’ behav- ior on others, should probably be the same regardless of the type of gamble.

Summary You now understand that it is easy to overstate the im- pact of a new casino on the economy of a community. The impact is “modest” because of the degree of local substitution. There is no panacea of better jobs, higher incomes, and greater tax revenues. You also understand

that gambling is addictive and that economists consider addictive goods worthy of regulation. Finally, you under- stand that a casino produces external costs, and like any good where that happens, an unregulated, untaxed mar- ket will produce too much gambling.

Key Terms externalities vig

1. The argument that casinos have little economic impact on a community is based on the notion of a. supply. b. demand. c. opportunity cost. d. local substitution.

2. Economists generally believe that a new casino in a city that already has them would likely have —————— economic impact. a. an enormously negative b. a modestly negative

Quiz Yourself c. an enormously positive d. a modestly positive

3. Which one of the following communities would likely see the greatest economic impact from a new casino? a. Plainfield, IN (just outside Indianapolis) b. Gary, IN (outside Chicago and already has one) c. Terre Haute, IN (Indianapolis is 70 miles

away; no other population center is closer than 180 miles)

d. Las Vegas, NV

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498 Chapter 47 The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling

4. The percentage that casinos make on the average bet is called the a. vig. b. rip. c. take. d. rob.

5. The argument that increasing the number of casinos in a state will increase overall tax revenue in the state is a. substantially correct, because they pay substan-

tial taxes. b. overstated but still partially correct, because

there is tax substitution, but gambling profits are taxed more heavily than other profits.

c. understated because they pay more taxes than is generally known.

d. wrong because casino profits are not taxed. 6. The concern that gambling affects not only the

gambler and casino but also others is called a ————— and suggests that there would be too —————— production in an unregulated or un- taxed market. a. positive externality; much b. negative externality; much c. positive externality; little d. negative externality; little

Short Answer Questions 1. If you were in a political argument with some-

one taking the side of the casino industry and she pointed out that casinos pay significant taxes, how would you (being on the other side) respond?

2. Suppose you were in a political argument with someone who wanted to locate a casino in your city (supposing that it had none), because there was a large city across the river in another state (also with- out one), and he pointed out that you could lure all those people in that large city to spend their money in your city. Supposing that you were against it, how would you counter that particular point?

3. What externalities exist when there is a casino, and how might those externalities be dealt with in a way that would allow a casino while also mitigating the externalities?

Think about This Casino companies, Walmart, and sports teams make the same case with regard to economic development, and they are mostly wrong for the same reasons: local sub- stitution. Why do they still succeed in overstating their economic impact?

Talk about This The effect of gambling addiction is similar to the effect of other addictions, though it is less apparent to others. Alcoholics, drug addicts, and so on, are easier to spot. Part of the problem is that inveterate gamblers can be successful at their addiction (winning a televised poker championship) or unsuccessful (and losing everything), while no one becomes a successful meth addict. Is gam- bling a problem only for the losers? Should casinos allow people to lose only a particular amount of money?

For More Insight See Evans, W. N., and J. Topoleski, “The Social and Economic

Impact of Native American Casinos,” NBER Working Paper No. 9198: http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9198

Garrett, Thomas A., Casino Gambling in America and Its Economic Impacts, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org

Garrett, Thomas A., and Mark W. Nichols, Do Casinos Export Bankruptcy? Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2005/2005 -019.pdf

Behind the Numbers Taxes, wages, revenue, and visitations. American Gaming Association— www.americangaming.org; Center for Gaming

Research—http://archgaming.unlv.edu

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C H A P T E R F O R T Y - E I G H T

499

The Economics of Terrorism Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

LO1 Describe the economic impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

LO2 Apply the aggregate supply–aggregate demand model to show the impact of the attacks.

LO3 Describe how insurance works and why the increased uncertainty after the attacks affected insurance markets.

LO4 Explain the concept of the “rational” terrorist.

Chapter Outline

The Economic Impact of September 11th and of Terrorism  in General

Modeling the Economic Impact of the Attacks

Terrorism from the Perspective of the Terrorist

Summary

This chapter explores the impact of terrorism and its con- tinuing threat on the U.S. and world economy, as well as why economists look upon the terrorist as we would look upon any “rational” economic actor. In doing so, we will review the economic impact of September 11th. As we progress, you will understand how economists apply the notions of uncertainty, risk, and insurance when exploring the economic impact of terrorism and why self-protection against terrorism negatively affects those that do not protect themselves. Further, you will see why economists look upon the terrorist in the same way we look upon the drug dealer or the Mafia hit man: as a ratio- nal economic actor seeking to maximize benefits to him- self at a minimum of costs.

The Economic Impact of September 11th and of Terrorism in General

Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda operatives claim that the damage inflicted by their attacks on the United States to- tals more than $1 trillion. While that figure was hard to justify at the time, true damage estimates are, nonetheless, difficult to construct. In order to tally up the damage, you have to begin with the costs associated with the demoli- tion and the ensuing cleanup of World Trade Center and

Pentagon debris. Then you have to add the costs of rebuild- ing the affected portion of the Pentagon and replacing the WTC commercial and transportation facilities.1 You must also include the lost earning potential of the more than 3,000 victims. You cannot stop there. The war on terrorism, and the ancillary increases approved in defense spending because of that war, have added $100 billion annually to the federal budget. Adding the cost of the war and occupation of Iraq2 and Afghanistan and the subse- quent overt and covert wars against ISIS to the mix sends the total much higher, and begins to make the $1 trillion claim of Bin Laden seem not so implausible.

There are other costs you must include as well: any and all other money you have to spend because of the attacks that you would not have had to spend had the attacks not occurred. When that is complete, you have to add the money that could have been earned that might not now be earned. Thus when survivors seek counsel- ing because of their trauma; when we all demand greater security at airports, large sporting events, and other

1The Institute for Analysis of Global Security estimates these costs at between $10 billion and $13 billion. 2Setting aside whether the war in Iraq was really about terrorism, it is unlikely Iraq would have been invaded had there not been the terrorism argument in the background.

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connections, and regain electric power. This includes the inhabitants of the World Trade Center itself as well as the people who worked in surrounding buildings that had to be evacuated because of the damage done to them.

Now consider the losses outside of New York and Washington that must be associated with the attacks. Airlines in particular were hard hit. The resulting drop in  passenger flights led them to lay off more than 100,000  employees. Nationwide, in all sectors of the economy from mid-September through the end of 2001, new filings for unemployment insurance increased from just over 300,000 per week to nearly 650,000 per week. Although these numbers diminished to between 400,000 and 450,000 for most of 2002 and 2003, the employment outlook remained weak during this period. The Institute for Analysis of Global Security placed the total cost of the attacks at $2 trillion.

All of the preceding examples are clearly costs to soci- ety, but in what will appear to be quite contradictory, GDP accounting will score some of these losses as economic positives. The money it cost to tear down the damaged buildings and begin rebuilding the New York WTC site and Washington’s Pentagon came from two main sources. The federal government put forward $40 billion for this ef- fort, and insurance companies were responsible for another $25 billion. The resulting increase in government spend- ing will likely have a positive impact on GDP in the future, and because the insurance companies footing the bill were mostly foreign rather than domestic—while the demolition and rebuilding efforts occurred in the United States—this, too, had the effect of boost ing GDP.

Increases in military spending, government spending on internal security, and spending on airport security have led and will also continue to lead to increases in GDP. Of course, none of this is likely to make us better off than we were on September 10th. We only hope that by spending this extra money we will be as secure today as we thought we were on September 10th. Spending more to accomplish the same thing boosts reported GDP but does not make us better off.

Modeling the Economic Impact of the Attacks

If you have studied Chapter 9, “Fiscal Policy,” you are familiar with what economists call aggregate-demand shocks. Let me remind you that aggregate-demand shocks are unexpected events that change aggregate demand. Clearly, the attacks of September 11th qualified

potential targets; or, whenever we forgo an opportunity to travel because of the risk that we feel is present, these expenses must be included among all the other economic impacts of the attacks.

Starting at the top, the World Trade Center and the adjacent buildings were insured for $4 billion. The dam- age to the Pentagon cost another billion to repair. Next, the four planes were worth between $50 million and $100  million each. These are costs related to the direct damages that resulted from the attacks, but they are by no means either the only costs or the only damages.

There was income lost as a result of these buildings being attacked. Those in the WTC and surrounding buildings who did not perish did not produce goods and services for several days as their employers sought new facilities in which to operate. Many of the people and companies housed in the WTC towers were engaged in offering financial services, and they had purchased in- surance against loss of income. Estimates of these losses suggest that upward of $10 billion was paid to these companies to compensate them for that lost income. Total insurance estimates of the cost of the New York attacks total between $25 billion and $30 billion. As a result, many of the victims of the attacks received some form of monetary compensation, either from employers or from organizations like the Red Cross.

In economic terms, accounting for the loss of those who died is somewhat more difficult, depending as it does on estimating the value in money that a victim would have been worth over his or her entire projected lifetime. Economists have little trouble coming up with a dollar figure that we can justify, but it is clear that saying that the life of Mary the secretary was worth $750,000 and that of Sally the investment banker was worth $3.6 million raises controversy.

A first pass at estimating what was lost to the economy as a result of the deaths of 3,000 people is to establish the present value of their future earnings. These were highly trained and highly paid people. If you assume that the average person killed earned $75,000 in salary and ben- efits, was 40 years old, and had a life expectancy of 35 more years, then such a calculation would have each per- son worth approximately $1.7 million. With 3,000 dead that comes to a little over $5 billion.

In addition to what we have presented so far, there is the lost production of those 100,000 or more New York residents who would have been producing goods and services in the weeks following the attacks but were not able to because their bosses were still attempting to find new office space, reestablish phone and computer

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Modeling the Economic Impact of the Attacks 501

as “shocks” under any definition. Retail sales during the week of September 11th were dramatically lower than they otherwise would have been. This, and a variety of other indices of consumer confidence, all took very serious hits in the fall of 2001. Complicating things further, busi- ness confidence, which is typically measured by looking at businesses’ hiring, layoff, and investment plans, was also adversely affected by the aftermath of the attacks. These effects in combination created the clearest example of an aggregate-demand shock in decades. Figure 48.1 shows the impact of these shocks on the aggregate demand–aggregate supply model. Lower aggregate demand reduces equilib- rium, real gross domestic product, and overall prices.

As we will see in the section on insurance later, premi- ums paid by businesses in high-risk areas rose substan- tially as well. That would lead to an aggregate-supply shock. Though this effect was likely less than the relative importance of the aggregate-demand shock, it is impor- tant to note, and Figure 48.2 depicts that aspect.

Insurance Aspects of Terrorism When dealing with a world of uncertainty, rational people can seek out insurance because they view themselves as better off if they can pay something upfront to minimize the financial consequences of a foreseeable, but not nec- essarily predictable, problem. We insure our cars and our homes because, although the likelihood of a financially catastrophic incident is low, the consequences of a prob- lem could be so severe that we are better off avoiding it by paying an insurance company to take the risk for us. The insurance company is only too happy to sell us the insurance because they get more money than they expect

to have to pay out, and the uncertainty in their payouts is relatively low because they are spread out over so many people. They have actuaries who tell them how many homes are likely to be damaged in fires or how many automobiles they are likely to have to repair or replace.

Terrorism insurance in a place where terrorist acts are somewhat predictable (like Israel) is likely to be very ex- pensive but also likely to be available because insurance companies can anticipate the number of buses and restau- rants that will be destroyed. These many small-scale attacks are insurable because no single one of them jeopardizes the long-term survival of the insurance company. September 11th changed much of that thinking. It was the worst insur- ance outcome in American history, easily surpassing the previous record set by Hurricane Andrew.3

In the post–September 11th world, insurance compa- nies have become leery of insuring major commercial landmarks. A major attack of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nature, or even another airliner hijacking di- rected at a major population center, is enough to cause insurance companies to fear for their own survival. For a while they refused to offer insurance on major new con- struction projects, did not renew policies on major com- mercial landmarks, and insisted that acts of terrorism be excluded from the policies’ payout provisions.

This is not without precedent. After Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo in the late 1980s and early 1990s, insurance companies began pulling out of the Gulf Coast region of the United States for fear that they could not survive an- other hurricane. They stayed because they were able to buy

FIGURE 48.1 The post-9/11 aggregate-demand shock.

AD9/10

ADpost-9/11

AS PI

PI*

RGDP* RGDP

AD Shock

AD

ASpost-9/11

AS9/10 PI

PI*

RGDP* RGDP

AS Shock

FIGURE 48.2 The post-9/11 aggregate-supply shock.

3The monetary damage from Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy both subsequently surpassed this record.

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502 Chapter 48 The Economics of Terrorism

reinsurance and pass the cost on to their customers. Reinsurance is like insurance itself except it is bought by insurance compa- nies from other larger insurance companies (or from consortiums of insurance companies). The provisions of these reinsurance

policies state that if a loss exceeds a certain level (usually in the multiple millions of dollars) for any one major event (such as a hurricane or terrorist attack), then the reinsur- ance company pays the insurance company and they, in turn, pay the claims of the victims of the incident.4

September 11th was so big that the reinsurance com- panies were concerned for their own financial survival. Of course, at the time they did not know whether Sep- tember 11th would be followed by several more attacks or not. The anthrax scare of late 2001 and early 2002 only added to the uncertainty. Insurance works well when the level of uncertainty to the party doing the insuring is somewhat low. Reinsurance works well when the uncer- tainty to the insurance company is large but is manage- able to a reinsurance company. Nothing works when no one has any level of confidence in the risks involved.

The solution was re-reinsurance, where the U.S. fed- eral government became the insurer of last resort. No one buys terrorism insurance from the government; there are no re-reinsurance agents selling to homeowners or busi- nesses. The government will sell reinsurance to insurance companies and re-reinsurance to reinsurance companies. Few pieces of legislation initiated by the George W. Bush administration passed with as much support as the bill au- thorizing the government’s involvement in the reinsurance market. This was partly because much of the financial com- munity and labor unions were on the same side of the issue.

Buy Insurance or Self-Protect or Both When faced with any uncertainty, a rational economic actor can do one or both of the following: protect himself or buy insurance against the loss. We have already exten- sively discussed the latter, so let’s talk a bit about self- protection. Suppose you live in a community in which automobile theft is rampant. You can buy a car with an electronic alarm, an ignition that will start only with a special key (such that the car cannot be “hot-wired”), or

a tracking system like “Lo-Jack” that allows a stolen car to be located from a satellite. You can also buy a product like “The Club” that prevents a car from being driven when it is attached to the steering wheel.

If you protect yourself against such a loss, you are simultaneously making your car less attractive to a thief and your neighbor’s car relatively more attractive. This, like the problem of pollution or secondhand smoke, is a negative externality. Your actions hurt someone else who was not part of your decision to take action. With terror- ism, if one business were to install devices or employ personnel to deter terrorist acts against it, a neighboring business becomes a relatively more attractive target. If you have flown since September 11, 2001, especially if you have flown during a code “Orange” elevated state of alert, you know that U.S. airports are substantially more secure than they were prior to that time. In the aftermath of the heightened security at airports and the USA Pa- triot Act, which allowed substantially more intrusive surveillance of foreigners in the United States, a terrorist is unlikely to attempt an attack on a target in the United States, let alone a U.S. airport, and far more likely to target Americans or American interests in other, less se- cure locations. That puts Americans in those locations in more danger than they would have been had these secu- rity measures not taken place in the United States.

Terrorism from the Perspective of the Terrorist

Economists who study terrorism look upon these folks in the same manner as economists who study crime look upon hit men: as rational people behaving in their own self-interest. You can quarrel with this interpretation if you like, and many people have a hard time calling a sui- cide bomber “rational” in this sense, but terrorists are in it for something. That “something” is usually political. Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists wanted Northern Ireland returned to Irish control or at least wanted the English out. Palestinian terrorists want some, most, or all of what is now Israel as a Palestinian state. Sudanese, Filipino, and antiabortion terrorists have political goals. ISIS seeks a global Islamic State. Whether you are a ter- rorist or a freedom fighter often depends on which side of the power structure you are on.

This “rational terrorist hypothesis,” like the “rational criminal hypothesis,” suggests that terrorists have a goal, that they devote resources to achieve that goal, that they weigh benefits and costs, and that the best way of reaching

reinsurance The form of insurance where one insurance company promises to pay another if the first company has a large (usually multiple mil- lion dollar) loss from a single event.

4Hurricane Katrina challenged the ability of insurance companies to buy reinsurance for hurricanes because the fear was that global warming had so changed the probability of major hurricane damage occurring in an area that State Farm and others refused to write new policies in states susceptible to hurricanes.

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Summary 503

the goal is to take all such actions where the marginal ben- efit equals or exceeds the marginal cost. Since the goals are political, the actions must have a political impact, which means they must garner media attention. They garner the most media attention when attacks are gruesome, affect innocent people, and occur where the media exist. They are the least costly to the terrorist when the targets are rel- atively unguarded and easy to get to. That means that from the perspective of Al-Qaeda, the September 11th attacks were nearly perfect. The lax security at U.S. airports; the high-profile nature of the World Trade Center, the Penta- gon, and the Capitol Building or White House (whichever building Flight 93 was destined to attack) in the media meccas of New York and Washington; and the obvious innocence of the people on the planes and in the buildings made them the perfect targets for terrorism.

The worldwide reaction, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the public’s willingness to give up some degree of its freedoms and privacy combined to make the costs of ter- rorism to the terrorist substantially greater. The substantial increase in the counterterrorism budget of the CIA and the FBI and the new powers granted to these organizations make a terrorist act in the United States far more expensive to pull off. The lack of any attack in the United States between September 11th and the writing of this edition suggests that

terrorists may have weighed the costs and benefits and taken the stance that attacks on U.S. interests in the United States are not worth it. On the other hand, terrorists have clearly not given up. Attacks around the globe, embassy bomb- ings, assassinations of U.S. diplomats, and attacks on places where Americans congregate overseas suggest terrorists are targeting easier locations using smaller groups or indi- viduals. Economists refer to this, and any other occurrence where one alternative gets more expensive so that the other is chosen, as the substitution effect.

The Madrid train bombing in 2004 and the London subway bombings in 2005 illustrate this substitution ef- fect very well. Because terrorists apparently thought it was easier to get into Spain and the United Kingdom than it was to get into the United States, they chose tar- gets that were “less expensive.” Though in the U.S., the 2013 Boston bombing also fits this pattern.

Unprecedented expenditures on increased security generally have motivated terrorists to find the softest, most high-profile targets. The attacks in 2016 in France and Belgium were examples of this. Clearly the United States is not immune from attack, but so far, at least, it has been limited to lone wolf attacks. The incidents such as the ones in Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Ohio State are likely to be what we face.

Summary In this chapter, you have seen that economists’ estimates of the damage inflicted by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, encompass a wide variety of issues, from the loss of the buildings, to the loss of economic output, to the economic consequences of the loss of lives. You have also seen that insurance issues become more complicated as the level of uncertainty rises but that reinsurance

helps to resolve those issues. Finally, you now see that economists view terrorists as rational economic actors attempting to get the biggest result for the least expense in the same way that any other goal- oriented person would. As a result, we can predict that as we tighten security in one area in response to an attack, they will seek other targets.

Key Term reinsurance

1. This chapter suggests that many economists generally a. accept the notion that a human life is worth the

value of the chemicals that can be extracted from it. b. argue that a human life is worth the sum of the

person’s future income.

Quiz Yourself c. argue that the loss to society resulting from

“wrongful death” is the present value of the person’s income.

d. reject the notion that any dollar value can be used to estimate the value of a human life.

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504 Chapter 48 The Economics of Terrorism

2. The destruction of the World Trade Center and dam- age to the Pentagon and the accompanying work to rebuild and repair led to ___________ to the insur- ance companies and ___________ in GDP. a. gains; gains b. losses; losses c. losses; gains d. gains; losses

3. Economists call the reduction in consumer confi- dence that resulted from the September 11th attacks an ___________ shock which leads to the ___________. a. aggregate demand; aggregate demand curve

shifting left b. aggregate demand; aggregate demand curve

shifting right c. aggregate supply; aggregate supply curve

shifting left d. aggregate supply; aggregate supply curve

shifting right 4. Economists call the increase in insurance costs

that resulted from the September 11th attacks an ___________ shock, which leads to the ___________. a. aggregate demand; aggregate demand curve

shifting left b. aggregate demand; aggregate demand curve

shifting right c. aggregate supply; aggregate supply curve

shifting left d. aggregate supply; aggregate supply curve

shifting right 5. The chief effect of reinsurance is that

a. insurance premiums are higher. b. insurance companies are prevented from engag-

ing in fraud. c. insurance companies can offer insurance with-

out fear of a major event causing them to go out of business.

d. consumers are protected against easily antici- pated occurrences.

6. The government’s role in terrorism insurance is that of a. a primary provider. b. a reinsurance provider of last resort/re-reinsurer. c. innocent bystander. d. disinterested observer.

7. The negative externality associated with self- protection from terrorism suggests that a. terrorists cause more damage than they think

they will. b. people engage in less self-protection than they

should. c. people engage in the right amount of self-

protection. d. a person who self-protects makes someone else

relatively more vulnerable. 8. Under many economic models of terrorism, the ter-

rorist is assumed to act a. without regard for incentives, costs, or benefits. b. in a predictable way, since they maximize costs

subject to minimizing benefits. c. in a predictable way, since they maximize ben-

efits subject to minimizing costs. d. with no predictable nature.

9. Substitution in the context of the “rational terrorist model” suggests that a clampdown at airports will a. end terrorism. b. cause terrorists to target airports even more as

they attempt to show their strength. c. cause terrorists to seek alternative targets. d. foment even more terrorism around the globe

because it will show them they have succeeded.

Think about This One of the things that counterterrorist intelligence agents must do is put themselves in the position of the terrorist. Take 10 minutes and think about your hometown. What action could terrorists take that would have the maxi- mum impact for the least cost to themselves? Would that action necessarily be suicidal?

Talk about This Do you agree with the contention that terrorist actions can be viewed as “coldly rational”? Would you char- acterize the actions of terrorists who kill themselves in conducting their operations as rational?

For More Insight See Brauer, Jurgen, “On the Economics of Terrorism,” Phi

Kappa Phi Forum 82, no. 2 (Spring 2002).

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505

I N D E X

A Aaron, Henry, 428 Abortions, under Medicaid, 284 Absolute advantage (trade), 204–205 Acceptable deaths, 253 Accounting, generational, 161 Accounting costs, 56, 307 Accounting scandals (2001–2002), 472–475 Acid rain, 258, 261, 263, 264 AD (see Aggregate demand) Adams, Scott, 365 Addictions:

to gambling, 495–496 to substances, 249–250

Adelman, Morris, 454 Adjusted gross income (AGI), 430, 435 Administrative lag (fiscal policy), 123–124 Advances (to authors), 305, 394 Adverse impact discrimination, 330 Adverse selection, 277–278 Advertising:

for prescription drugs, 297 for tobacco and alcohol, 249–250

AFC (see Average fixed cost) AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children), 405–408 Affirmative action, 334–336 AFL-CIO, 485 Africa:

and AIDS medications, 306 as crude oil supplier, 449 trade with, 203 wages, 345

African Americans: and crime statistics, 310–311 discrimination against, 327–336 Head Start, 415–416 high school graduation by, 383 poverty among, 401

Aggregate demand (AD), 108–109 and austerity, 228 determinants of, 112 growth through, 190 increases in, 231–232 and interest rates, 134 shifts in, 110–114 unexpected movement in, 121–122

Aggregate demand shocks, 121–122, 500–501 Aggregate supply (AS), 109–110

classical and Keynesian views of, 109–110 determinants of, 113

and economic growth, 232 growth through, 190 increases in, 231–232 shifts in, 113–114

Aggregate supply shocks, 122–123, 128, 501 AGI (adjusted gross income), 430–431, 435 Ahold, 488–489 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),

406–408 AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency syndrome), 236,

275, 300 AIDS drugs, 297, 300, 302, 306 AIG, 173–174, 182, 476 AIME (average index of monthly earnings), 419 Air pollution, 263–268 Air Tran, 72 Albertsons, 490 Alcohol, 249–250, 253–254 Alesina, Alberto, 130 Allied Chemical, 264 Al-Qaeda, 166, 499, 503 (see also Terrorism) Alternative minimum tax (AMT), 433 American Bar Association, 480 American Civil War, 138, 156, 187, 190, 482 American Federation of State, County, and Municipal

Employees Union, 484 American Federation of Teachers, 386 American Medical Association, 480 American Revolutionary War, 156, 187, 482 Americans with Disabilities Act, 384 Amoco, 323 Amortization of mortgages, 170–172 AMT (alternative minimum tax), 433 Anderson, Richard, 257 Anheuser-Busch, 250 Anti-dumping, 208 Antitrust, 319–325 AOL Time-Warner, 325 Apple Inc., 72, 213, 215–216, 322–325 Arab–Israeli wars (1967 and 1973), 122, 441 Arrow, Kenneth J., 338 Arthur Andersen, 475 Articles of Confederation, 156 Artz, Georgeanne, 493 AS (see Aggregate supply) Asian financial crisis, 139 Asset substitution effect, 421 Assets, value of, 471 ATC (average total cost), 59–61 AT&T, 71, 469n, 473 Attainable production level, 5 Auditors approach, in measuring discrimination, 332

Page numbers followed by n indicate material found in notes.

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506 Index

Auerbach, Alan, 130, 161, 167 Austerity, 228 Austin, Texas, 458 Automobile sales, discrimination in, 334 Automobiles, fuel efficiency of, 448–449 AVC (average variable cost), 59–62 Average fixed cost (AFC), 59–62 Average index of monthly earnings (AIME), 419 Average total cost (ATC), 59–62 Average variable cost (AVC), 59–62

B Bailey, Elizabeth M., 270 Bakija, Jon, 422, 428 Balance of payments, 214 Balanced-budget amendment, 162–165 Bank of England, 142 Bank of Japan, 142 Banking, 133, 183, 188, 229, 234, 235–236 Bankruptcy, 306, 472–475

among gamblers, 496 among restaurants, 362 and farmers, 349 gender differences in, 328 and housing bubble, 174 Lehman Brothers, 182 and Medicare, 284, 289, 292–293 and Sirius/XM, 322–323 of Social Security, potential, 424–425 types of, 473

Barriers to entry, 70–71, 449 Base year, 82 Baseball teams, 457, 458, 459, 461, 462 Baseline budgeting, 152 Basketball teams, 368, 457, 461 Baywatch, 241 Becker, Gary, 310, 311, 332 Bequest effect, 421–422 Bernanke, Ben, 132, 138, 182 Bernheim, Douglas, 167 Bertrand, Marianne, 332, 337 Best Buy, 491 “Big-box” stores, 491 Bin Laden, Osama, 499 (see also Terrorism) Bird, Larry, 462, 494 Black Lives Matter, 315 Blank, Rebecca, 408, 410 Blau, Francine, 338, 389 Blockbuster, 305 Blood, sale of, 279 BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 82–85, 88, 89, 91, 182, 183, 328,

350, 351, 391, 483, 484 Boeger, Leesa, 389 Bonds, 111, 132–134, 161–162, 197, 223, 226, 311, 425–426 Boskin, Michael, 435, 439 Boyina, Manjula, 493 Bracket creep, 157n Brennan Center for Justice, 314

Brokering tickets, 367, 368 Brown, Charles, 365 Brown, Gardner M., Jr., 270 Brue, Stanley L., 482, 487 Bubbles, 172–173, 223, 355, 470–472 (see also Housing bubble) Buchanan, James, 124 Budget:

and elasticity, 44 federal (see Federal budget)

Buffett, Warren, 166 Buildable land, 169 Built-in stabilizers, 120, 123, 163–164 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 82–85, 88, 89, 91, 182,

183, 328, 350, 351, 391, 483, 484 Burger King, 71 Bush, George H. W. and administration, 139, 164, 241, 413 Bush, George W. and administration:

congressional disagreements with, 147 energy strategy of, 350 and Kyoto Protocol, 267–268 and oil prices, 442 and recession of 2007–2009, 180–181 and Social Security reform, 426 tax cuts by, 116, 124, 166, 180, 437 and tax incentives, 435 trade agreements, 241 and war in Iraq, 158–159

Business confidence, 112, 501 Business cycles, 92–94, 123, 125, 164, 180 Buying power, 25, 229

C CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement), 238, 241,

244, 245 California, 69, 92, 169, 174, 197, 267, 321, 325, 336,

353, 360, 373, 384, 403, 448, 449, 456 California Motor Speedway, 465 Calpine Corp., 474 Canada:

central bank independence in, 138 cigarette tax in, 255 debt-to-GDP ratio for, 160, 161 drug prices in, 301 economic freedom in, 21 economic growth in, 186 economic indicators for, 234 energy production in, 452 grain exporting for, 352 health care system in, 279–280 higher education attainment in, 398 and NAFTA, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245 productivity in, 233 and the TPP, 238–239 trade with, 203

CandyCrush, 188 Cap and trade, 266–267 Capital account, 213–215 Capital budget, 159

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Index 507

Capital gains, 158, 166, 430 Capital gains taxes, 341–342, 345, 434 Capital market, 233, 345 Capitalism, 207, 319, 473–474 Card, David, 363–364 CART, 464 Cartels, 440–441, 445–446, 452–453 Cartesian coordinates, 15 Case-Shiller home price index, 169, 178, 179 Cash benefit poverty programs, 404–406 Casino gambling, 494–497 Castro, Fidel, 209 Caterpillar, 485 Causation, 10 Cell phone, economic growth and, 188 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 189 Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 238, 241,

244, 245 Central banks, 137–138, 235 (see also Federal Reserve) CEO salaries, 474 CEOs (chief executive officers), 474 Ceteris paribus, 22 Chain-based index, 85 Chapter 11 bankruptcy, 473 Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 473 Charter schools, 387 Chicago, Illinois, 70, 197–198, 266, 456, 458, 495 Chichilinsky, Gacielka, 270 Chief executive officers (CEOs), 474 Child (and elder) care tax credit, 433 Child credit (income tax), 433 Children’s Health Insurance Program, 283–284, 293, 414 Child labor, 187, 207, 208, 244 China:

copyright infringement in, 241 currency manipulation by, 220 economic freedom in, 21 economic growth in, 222, 236 foreign exchange markets, 215, 217, 219 and Kyoto Protocol, 268 manufacturing in, 492–493 petroleum demand in, 442, 448 policy disputes with, 167 trade deficit with, 219, 490 trade with, 202–203 and Donald Trump, 244 U.S. debt to, 162–163 wages in, 245

Chrysler, 175, 308 CIA Factbook, 237 Circular flow model, 7–8 Cities:

minimum wages set by, 360 sports teams based in, 455–458

Civil liability, 306–308 Civil War era, economic growth and, 187 Clark, Robert, 428 Class action lawsuits, 308 Classical economics, 109 Clayton Act, 482, 483

Clean Air Act (1970), 263 Clean Air Act (1990), 264, 266 Clean Water Act (1972), 263, 265 Clemens, Jeffrey, 364 Climate change, 264–265 Clinton, Bill and administration:

congressional disagreements with, 147 discretionary fiscal policy of, 125 and EITC, 362 federal deficit under, 164 health care plan of, 271–272 and Kyoto Protocol, 267–268 on mandatory spending, 149 and Medicare cuts, 152 and student loans, 397 and tax credits for college, 435 tax-related social engineering by, 435 trade agreements, 240–241 welfare reforms by, 408

The Club, 502 Coal, 187, 202, 259, 261, 264, 266, 335, 449, 450 Coase, Ronald, 262–263, 265–266 Cogan, John F., 125, 428 Cohen, Mark, 318 COLA (cost-of-living adjustment), 83 Colander, David, 144 Cold War, 158, 207 Collective bargaining, 244, 462, 463 (see also Unions)

and public school reform, 387–388 CollegeBoard, 396 College education, 390–398 College tax credits, 435 College textbooks market, 393–395 Commercial banks, 135 Common property, 262 Commonwealth Edison, 70 Communism, 21 Company towns, 479, 480, 482 Comparative advantage (trade), 204, 205, 207–208, 244 Competition, 69–72

monopolistic, 70–72, 479, 481–482, 489 perfect, 64, 69–76, 301, 478–481 and profit maximization, 64–65 and unions/professional organizations,

480–481 Complements, 27–28 Concentration ratio, 72 Confidence:

business/consumer, 111 and recession of 2007–2009, 181

Congestible public goods, 51 Congress, federal spending and, 146–147 Congressional Budget Office, 165, 291 Conservatives/Republicans, 191 Consolidated Edison, 70 Constant opportunity cost, 6, 11 Constitution:

balanced-budget amendment to, 164 government spending under, 146–147

Consumer confidence, 111

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508 Index

Consumer price index (CPI), 82–84, 243 adjustments using, 267, 311, 349–350, 391, 441 core, 85 degree of error in, 86 and inflation, 81–83 for medical care, 274–275 and poverty line, 403–404

Consumer surplus, 48–50, 51–52 and environment, 260 and farm price floors, 352–353, 356 with illegal goods/services, 249 and labor, 479, 481–482, 486 and market failure, 320 and minimum wage, 359–361, 364 and prescription drugs, 298 and trade, 206, 210

Consumers, 20 Consumption, discrimination in, 333–334 Contestable markets hypothesis, 323 Contingency attorneys, 308 Continuing resolutions, 147 Contractionary fiscal policy, 120–121 Contracts, 305–306, 462, 463 Co-payment (insurance), 273 Copyrights, 70, 297, 305, 321–322, 393, 395 Copyright infringement, 241 Core CPI, 85 Core PCE, 85 Corn prices, 350–351 Corporate paper, 135 Correlation, 10 Corruption, in developing countries, 235 Cost(s), 56, 59–61

of crime, 312–313 of education, 381–385, 390–398 of government health insurance programs, 288–289

(see also specific programs) Head Start program, 416 rental property, 374 of research, 391

Cost function, 57 Cost of living, 403–404 Cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), 83 Cost-push inflation, 114 Covered bond, 223 CPI (see Consumer price index) Creative destruction, 245 Credit card debt, 139, 174, 179, 496 Credit default swaps, 173 Creditors, 109, 473 Credits (income tax), 9, 115, 126, 340, 362, 405, 430–433, 435–437 Crime, 310–316

and abortion, 314 and atmospheric lead, 314 avoidance of, 313 and COMPSTAT, 314 costs of, 312–313 and diminishing returns, 314 and educational level, 381 and illegal drugs, 248, 250–251

Head Start families, 414–415 optimal sentencing for, 316 optimal spending on control of, 314–316 perpetrators of, 310–311 racial differences in, 310–311, 330 rational criminal model, 311–312 (see also Illegal goods

and services) who commits, 310–311

Cross-price elasticity of demand, 41 Crowding out, 148 Cuba, 21, 209 Currencies:

foreign exchange markets, 8, 215–217 international financial transactions, 213–215 and shift in aggregate demand, 111–112 (see also Exchange rates)

Current account, 214–215 Current-services budgeting, 151–152 Currie, Janet, 415, 417 Curry, George E., 338 Cyclical deficit, 159 Cyclical unemployment, 90, 109

D Darity, William A., Jr., 338 Day-care service, 331, 380, 403, 408, 413, 414, 415, 416 (see also

Head Start program) Deadweight loss, 51–52, 277, 298, 306, 319–320, 353, 356, 361–364 Death penalty, 314, 316 Deaths, acceptable, 253 Debt:

economists’ view of, 159–161, 424 European, crisis of, 111, 220, 226 national, 10, 132, 148, 156, 159–162, 195, 198

Deductible, insurance, 272–273 Deductions (income tax), 9, 115, 157, 397, 430–433, 435, 437 Default risk, 104 Defense spending, 146, 148–151, 157, 158 Deficit:

budget, 156 (see also Federal budget) economists’ view of, 159–161

Deflation, 93, 94, 140, 231–232 Delta (airline), 72 Demand, 22–23

aggregate (see Aggregate demand) cross-price elasticity of, 41 determinants of, 27–31 elasticity of, 41–45 excess, 25 income elasticity of, 41 law of, 25–26 price elasticity of, 41–45 quantity demanded vs., 20–21

Demand curve, 20, 22–23 and decriminalization, 254–255 and elasticity, 44–45 for health care services, 285–286 and law of demand, 25–26

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Index 509

movements in, 29–30 with private health insurance, 276–277

Demand schedule, 23 Demand-pull inflation, 114 Demand-side macroeconomics, 115 Dependency ratio, 195–196 Depression, 94, 120, 123, 134, 159, 163 Descartes, René, 15 Desertification, 265 Developed countries, 231–234 Developing countries, 233–236 DFP (see Discretionary fiscal policy) Diamond, Peter, 425, 428 DiIulio, John J., 318 DiMaggio, Joe, 462 Diminishing marginal utility, law of, 26 Diminishing returns, 58, 61, 314 Direct correlation, 10 Disability insurance (Social Security), 420 Discount rate, 133, 133n, 469 Discount window, 135, 136 Discouraged-worker effect, 89 Discretionary fiscal policy (DFP), 119, 125–126, 128

and aggregate supply and aggregate demand model, 120–121 in counteracting shocks, 121–123 history of, 123–124 mistiming of, 123–124 in Obama stimulus plan, 126–127 political use of, 124–125

Discretionary spending (federal), 148–149 Discrimination, 327–336

and affirmative action, 334–336 in consumption and lending markets, 332–334 definitions related to, 330–331 detection and measurement of, 331–332 economic status of minorities, 328–330 economic status of women, 327–328 in housing, 377 in labor market, 332–333

Disparate treatment discrimination, 330 Division of labor, 58 DJIA (Dow Jones Industrial Average), 468, 471, 476 Dole, 241 Dollar, U.S., 111–112, 215–220 “Domestic content” rules, 241 Dot-com bubble, 471–472 Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), 468, 471, 476 Draft (sports), 461 DraftKings, 497 Drug companies, 297–302 Drug price indexes, 300 Drugs:

illegal (see Illegal goods and services) over-the-counter, 253, 302, 307 prescription, 296–302

Drunk driving, 252, 253 Du, Jiangtao, 389 Duke Energy North American, 474 Dumping, 208

Durable goods, 109, 112, 134 Dynegy Inc., 474

E Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 340, 340n, 362, 405, 430,

433, 436n Eau Claire Rule, 353 Ecclestone, Bernie, 464–465 Economic costs, defined, 56 (see also Cost[s]) Economic Freedom, Index of, 21, 233 Economic growth and development, 6–7, 231–237

in already developed countries, 231–233 with casino gambling, 495 causes of slowing growth, 187–188 with city sports franchises, 456–457 consequences of slowing growth, 188–189 in developed vs. developing countries,

233–234 fostering/inhibiting development, 234–236 “new normal,” 186, 189–191 periods of robust growth, 187 sources of growth, 7, 187 stagnation, 186–191

Economic Policy Institute (EPI), 243, 490 Economic profit, 73–75, 299, 333, 445, 453, 474 Economic Recovery Act (2009), 435 Economic stagnation, 186–191 Economics, defined, 1, 2 Economy, measuring, 80–86 Education, 250, 379–399

and affirmative action, 336 college and university, 244, 390–399 and crime, 311–312 as investment in human capital, 379–381 Head Start, 411–416 and poverty, 402, 408 racial inequalities in, 330, 333 school reform issues, 385–388 as source of economic growth, 7, 184, 232–233, 235–236 spending on, 148, 149, 184, 379–385 tax credits for, 9, 340n, 437

Efficient markets, 470 Effluent permits, 266, 266n Ehrlich, Isaac, 318 EITC (Earned Income Tax Credit), 340, 340n, 362, 405, 430,

433, 436n El Paso Energy, 474 Elastic demand, 42, 45 Elastic supply, 46–48 Elasticity, 40–48

of demand, 41–45 and demand curve, 44–45 determinants of (for demand), 44 determinants of (for supply), 47 formula for, 41 graphical explanation of, 42–43 health, 276–277 and minimum wage, 361, 363

Demand curve (continued )

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510 Index

of supply, 46–48, 376, 422n, 443, 446–447 and taxes on tobacco/alcohol, 254 and total expenditure rule, 44 unitary, 42 verbal explanation of, 43

Electric lighting, 187 Electric utilities, 449–451 Electronic cigarettes, 254 Ellerman, A. Denny, 270 Elmendorf, Douglas, 130 Employment:

and aggregate supply, 109 in alcohol industry, 248 in casinos, 495 classical and Keynesian views of, 109–110 in recession of 2007–2009, 182 in tobacco industry, 248 by Wal-Mart, 491

Encouraged-worker effect, 89 Endangered Species Act (1973), 264 Energy prices, 440–453

electric utilities, 449–451 future of, 451–452 historical view of, 440–445 and OPEC, 445–446 reasons for rapid changes in, 446–449

Enron Corporation, 472, 474–475 Entitlements, 148–151, 161, 165, 194 Entry barriers, 69–70, 321 Environmental problems, 258–268

economic solutions to, 263–268 and Kyoto GHG reduction process, 267–268 with lower production costs, 208 property rights approach to, 265–267

Environmental Protection Agency, 263 Environmental quality of life, 87 EPI (Economic Policy Institute), 243, 490 Equilibrium, 24, 35–36 Equilibrium price, 20 Equilibrium quantity, 20 Equilibrium wage, 361, 479 Ethanol, corn-based, 350–351 Ethics, 306 (see also Morality issues) Euro, 111, 142, 216–217, 220, 223–229 Europe:

antipoverty programs in, 406 health care system in, 279–280 poverty in, 404 trade with, 203

European Central Bank, 132, 142, 223, 227, 229 European Economic Community, 223 European Union, 203, 222–229, 325

and Article 123, 223, 227, 228 and Article 125, 223, 228 and Article 126, 223 and the Maastricht Treaty, 223 and the United Kingdom, 223, 344

Excess demand, 25 Excess supply, 25

Exchange rates: determinants of, 219–220 and international trade, 215–220 and shift in aggregate demand, 111–112 and strong dollar, 111 (see also Foreign exchange markets)

Excise taxes, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33 Excludable public goods, 51 Exclusivity, 50 Exemptions (income tax), 430–431 Expansion (business cycle), 92 Expansionary fiscal policy, 120–121 Expected future price, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32–33 Expenditures approach (GDP computation), 81 External benefits, 380, 391–392 External costs, 250–253 Externalities, 260–261

with casino gambling, 495 for city sports teams, 458 and corrective taxes, 253–255 with environmental problems, 260–261 positive, 380, 386, 391–392, 412 and Social Security, 420

Exxon, 69, 323 Exxon Valdez disaster, 261

F Facebook, 2, 51, 188, 260 Factor markets, 8 Fallacy of composition, 9 Fan Duel, 374 Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association), 170, 173, 174,

182, 223 Farm policy, 349–356 FDA (Food and Drug Administration), 301–302, 307 Fed (see Federal Reserve) Federal budget, 155–166

and balanced-budget amendment, 162–165 deficits, 156 economists’ view of deficit and debt, 159–161 history of, 156–159 owners of federal debt, 161–162 projections of surplus/deficit, 165–166 surpluses, 156

Federal debt (see National debt) Federal funds rate, 132, 179, 180 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 172, 173,

174, 182, 223 Federal justice system, 149, 318 Federal National Mortgage Association(Fannie Mae),

170, 173, 174, 182, 223 Federal Reserve (Fed):

chairs of, 131–132, 144 goals of, 132 inflation regulated by, 85, 132 ownership of national debt by, 161 policies of (see Monetary policy) in recession of 2007–2009, 179–180

Elasticity (continued )

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Index 511

Federal revenue, 430 Federal spending, 145–163, 499, 500

and aggregate demand, 112 budgeting for, 151–152 constitutional provisions for, 146–147 disagreements over, 147 distribution of, 148 on education, 148–149, 381, 397 Head Start, 413–414 on health care, 271–272 and inflation, 115 marginal analysis of, 151 in Obama stimulus plan, 183, 184 shenanigans with, 146–147 and shift in aggregate demand, 115–116 on welfare, 404–408, 490

Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 322 Fee-for-service health care plans, 273 Feenberg, Daniel, 130 Feenstra, Robert C., 212 Feiner, Susan F., 338 Feldstein, Martin, 422, 428 Ferber, Marianne, 338 FICA withholding, 273, 419 Filing status (income tax), 431 Financial crisis of 2008, 164

and budget deficit, 158–159 and housing bubble, 174 monetary policy tools created for, 135–137

Financial transactions, international, 213–215 Fiscal policy, 119–130

aggregate supply and aggregate demand model of, 120–121 to counteract shocks, 121–123 discretionary, 119–126, 182–183 evaluating, 123–126 nondiscretionary, 119–123, 182–183 Obama stimulus plan, 126–127

Fixed costs, 59 Fixed exchange rate system, 218 Fixed inputs, 57 Floating exchange rate system, 217–219 Flood, Robert P., 477 Florida:

affirmative action in, 336 foreclosures in, 174 oil off the coast of, 87 pension liabilities, 197 prisons in, 315 spring training in, 457

Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 301–302, 307 Food Lion, 490 Food stamps, 149, 182, 403, 405, 406, 407, 414, 490

(see also SNAP) Football teams, 456–457, 459 Ford, Gerald, 120 Ford Motor Company, 207, 308 Foreclosures, home, 93, 111, 168–175, 181 Foreign aid, spending on, 149 Foreign exchange markets, 8, 215–217 Foreign exchange rates (see Exchange rates)

Foreign purchases effect, 108 Formula 1, 464–465 Fort, Rodney D., 461 Fortin, Nicole, 410 Fossil fuels, 261, 265, 451 Foxconn, 215 Fracking, 48, 87, 452 France:

assistance to Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 228 and the European Central Bank, 227 franc, 222 and GDP growth, 224 and long term interest rates, 225 and per capita GDP, 224

France family, 465 Franchises, sports, 456, 457 Franklin, Andrew W., 493 Frazier, Curtis L., 389 Freddie Mac (see Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation) Free agents (sports), 461 Free markets, 21, 373–374 Freeman, Richard B., 318 Free trade, benefits of, 204–207, 210, 239 (see also Trade

agreements) Frictional unemployment, 90 Fryer, Roland, 336, 338 FTC (Federal Trade Commission), 322 Full employment, 109–110 Fully funded pensions, 419 Functional finance, 160 Fundamentals (stock price), 469 Future value, 102–104

G Gambling, 494–498 GAO (General Accounting Office), 415 Garber, Peter M., 477 Gardner, Bruce L., 357 Garrett, Major, 295 Garrett, Thomas A., 495, 498 Gasoline prices (see Energy prices) Gasoline–corn price relationship, 350–351 Gates, Bill, 323, 410 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade),

238, 241, 242, 244, 245 GDP (see Gross domestic product) GDP deflator (GDPDEF), 86 GEDs (General Equivalency Degrees), 330, 383, 384 Geithner, Timothy, 138 General Accounting Office (GAO), 415 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),

238, 241, 242, 244, 245 General Equivalency Degrees (GEDs), 330, 383, 384 General Motors, 308, 475 Generational accounting, 161 Germany, 21, 151, 223, 228, 233, 234, 280, 347

assistance to Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 228 and debt–to–GDP ratio of, 160–161, 226

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512 Index

and deficits, 227 and the European Central Bank, 138, 227 and GDP growth, 186, 224 and long–term interest rates, 225 mark, 222 and per capita GDP, 223–224

GI Bill, 397 Gilroy, Curtis, 365 Gini index, 233 GlaxoSmithKline, 301 Global Crossing, 472, 473–474 Global warming, 263, 265, 267 Globalization, 92–94, 187, 215 GNI (gross national income), 233–234 Gold standard, 218 Goldman Sachs, 135 Goods, 5, 50–51, 239 Goods and services markets, 8, 333–334 (see also Illegal goods

and services) Goodstein, Eban, 270 Google, 72, 325 Google-Earth, 444 Gordon, Robert, 190, 192 Gottschalk, Peter, 410 Government:

accounting used by, 156 farm policy of, 351–352 justifications for interventions by, 351–352 as owner of national debt, 161–162 size of, 151 subsidies from, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33 (see also specific topics, e.g.: Monetary policy)

Government regulation: of environmental problems, 266 of illegal or addictive goods/services, 249–252 and shift in aggregate supply, 113 and supply–side economics, 115

Gramlich, Edward M., 428 Graphing, 15–18 Great Britain, 151, 228, 234, 240, 347, 460

and debt–to–GDP ratio of, 160 and deficits, 227 energy prices and, 441, 446 EU and, 223, 229 and GDP growth, 187, 224 health care, 279, 280 and long–term interest rates, 225 as owner of U.S. debt, 163 terrorism in, 503

Great Depression, 120, 123, 134, 156, 157, 187 Great Recession, 91, 127, 146, 187–188, 215, 222, 227–228,

402 (see also Recession of 2007–2009) Greece:

drachma, 222, 229 and the euro, 223, 226 GDP growth, 224 and long term interest rates, 225 per capita GDP, 224 and tax evasion, 226

Grexit, 229 Greene, P., 389 Greenhouse gases, 261, 266–268 Greenspan, Alan, 139, 140 Grocery stores, 360, 407, 489, 490, 491 Gross domestic product (GDP), 80

computation of, 81, 94–95 federal spending as percentage of, 146 and foreign trade, 213, 214 national debt as percentage of, 160 and official poverty numbers, 404 post–World War II, 86 problems with, 86–87 and recognition lag, 123 Walmart’s contribution to, 488

Gross national income (GNI), 233–234 Grossman, Michael, 257 Groundwater contamination, 264 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, 261, 443, 448, 449 Gulf War, 209, 446

H Hanushek, Eric, 385, 389 Harvoni, 300 Happel, Stephen, 372 Hausman, Jerry, 97 Head Start program:

as an investment, 411–413 critics, 412–413 current evidence, 414–416 opportunity cost of, 416 overview, 411 spending on, 405, 411, 412–414

Heal, Geoffrey, 270 Health care, 271–302

as an atypical good, 274–275 Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 151, 273, 274, 293 economic models of, 275–279 federal spending on, 150, 151, 152, 271–272 government–provided, 150–151, 273–274, 283 insurance for, 272–274, 276–279, 287 Medicaid, 275–276, 285–288, 293, 294 Medicare, 194, 199, 287–293 money spent on, 250, 271–272 in Obama stimulus plan, 184, 273 in U.S. vs. other countries, 279–281

Health insurance, 272–274, 276–279, 287 Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 273, 274, 287–288,

289, 291 Heckman, James J., 338 Hedonic price, 82n Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), 72 Heritage Foundation, 21, 233, 403 Higher education, 390–397 High-tech (HT) goods, 239 Highway construction, 124, 146–147, 159 Hijacking, 501 Hirschman, Ira, 55

Germany (continued )

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Index 513

Hispanic Americans, 383, 401 and discrimination, 330–333, 464 graduation rates, 383, 397 and the minimum wage, 361 as a percentage of poor population, 285, 401, 414

HMOs (health maintenance organizations), 273, 274, 287–288, 289, 291

Hockey teams, 463–464 Hodrick, Robert J., 477 Home building, 178–179 Home Depot, 491 Home equity lines of credit, 178–179 Home ownership, poverty and, 403 Home prices, 168–170, 225–226 Honda, 308 Honda Odyssey, 308 Horizontal equity (income taxes), 434 Housing Authority Apartments, 405 Housing bubble, 168–175

creation of, 173–174 economic effects of, 174–175 European, 223–226 and factors in home prices, 168–169 and financial crisis of 2008, 475–476 and recession of 2007–2009, 89, 154–155 and short sale, 175 and types of mortgages, 170–172

Hoxby, Caroline, 386, 389 HT (high-tech goods), 239 Hufbauer, Gary, 210, 243, 247 Hulman-George family, 444, 464 Human capital, 379, 380 Human life, value of, 313 Hurricanes, 265, 449, 501 Hydroelectric power, 261, 268, 449–450 Hyman, David, 428, 439

I IBM (International Business Machines), 70,

72, 324 IBM Selectric, 324 Icons, 324 IGA affiliates, 486, 488–491 Illegal goods and services, 248–255

and computation of GDP, 87 ticket scalping, 370

Incentives, 9, 306, 320 and bankruptcy, 306 to control health care costs, 288–289, 291 and environmental policy, 265 and supply–side economics, 115–116 and tax code, 434–435 of welfare programs, 406–410

Income: and college education, 396 and crime rates, 310–312, 314 as determinant of demand, 27–31 inequalities of, 328–332, 339–346

in means tested entitlements, 274–275, 284–285, 290–293, 400–408

middle class, 188–199, 343–344 mobility, 345–346 and poverty line, 401, 406, 407 (see also Poverty) security, 148, 194, 244, 274, 400–408 taxes (see Personal income taxes) unreported, 87

Income approach (GDP computation), 81, 94–95 Income effect, 434 Income elasticity of demand, 41 Income inequality, 339–347

causes of, 344–345 costs and benefits of, 345–347 international comparisons of, 347 measurements of, 339–341

Income taxes (see Personal income taxes) Increasing opportunity cost, 5, 6, 10 Index of Economic Freedom, 21, 233, 268 India, 21, 217, 345, 442, 448 Indiana, 197, 350, 380n, 387, 494–497 Indiana State University, 444 Indianapolis Motor Speedway, 466 Induced retirement effect, 421 Industrial Revolution, 187 Indy Racing League (IRL), 464 Inelastic demand, 42, 44, 45 Inelastic supply, 47 Inelasticity, 42, 43, 45 Inferior goods, 27, 28 Inflation:

causes of, 114–115 controlling, 137–138, 139, 161, 179, 227, 235–236, 272n cost-push, 114–115 demand-pull, 114–115 and deflation, 93, 140 in developing countries, 235–236 and expansionary fiscal policy, 121, 128 and expansionary monetary policy, 132 expected, 84, 99–100, 219–220 and federal funds rate, 132 historic, 93 indexing for, 157, 199, 360, 419, 425, 426, 433, 463 interest rate effect on, 101 during last 30 years, 138–141 measuring, 81–86 mismeasurement in, 83–86 and monetary policy, 114–115, 138, 139 and real interest rate, 99–100 winners and losers from, 84

Inflation rate, 83–84 Inflation targeting, 132 Infrastructure:

in developing countries, 235 politically motivated projects, 124–125 trust funds for, 162

Initial public offerings (IPOs), 469–470 In-kind subsidies, 404–406 Innes, Robert, 270 Input costs, 115

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514 Index

Inputs, 31, 33, 34, 57 Insurance, 272–274

health, 372–379 reinsurance, 173, 501–502 retirement annuities, 334 social, 423 terrorism, 501–502

Intangible losses (crime), 313 Intellectual property, 305, 395 Interest rate effect, 108 Interest rates, 98–104

and federal borrowing, 164 and inflation, 137–139 in monetary policy, 134 real, 99–100, 218–219, 292, 396, 422–423 and recessions, 137–140 and shift in aggregate demand, 111–114 and shift in aggregate supply, 114

Interest–only mortgages, 171–172 Interfaces, 325 Intergenerational Income Elasticity, 347 Internal rate of return, 101–102 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Statistics of Income:

Individual Income Tax, 339 International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, 480 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 481n International Business Machines (IBM), 70, 324 International financial transactions, 213–215 International Grocers Association, 488 International policy, federal spending and, 146 International Speedway Corporation (ISC), 465 International trade, 201–210

agreements, 238–245 barriers to, 207–209 benefits of, 204–209 demonstrating gains from, 205–206 as diplomatic weapon, 209 economists favoring, reasons, 205–206, 245 and exchange rates, 214–220 financial transactions in, 213–215 foreign exchange markets, 215–216 limiting, 207–209 and outsourcing, 207, 489 terms of, 205 and U.S. as debtor nation, 213

Internet Explorer, 325 Inverse correlation, 10 Inversion, 191 Investment banks, 135 Investments

Head Start as, 411–413 risk and reward with, 104

iPhone, 325 iPods, 325 IPOs (initial public offerings), 469–470 IRA (Irish Republican Army), 502 Iran, 21, 122, 209, 217, 442, 444, 445, 448

Iraq, 92, 122, 139, 146, 149, 157, 158, 166, 209, 306, 442, 445, 446, 448, 449, 499, 503

Ireland: and debt to GDP, 226 and economic freedom index, 21 and the euro, 220, 223, 228 GDP growth, 224 and housing bubble, 223–228 and long term interest rates, 225 per capita GDP, 226

Irish Republican Army (IRA), 502 IRL (Indy Racing League), 464 ISC (International Speedway Corporation), 465 Italy, 21, 138, 160–161, 186, 222, 223n, 226–230, 233 Itemized deduction (income tax), 432

J Jackson, Andrew, 156 Jackson, Thomas Penfield, 325 Japan, 233, 234, 236

central bank independence, 138 debt–to–GDP ratio for, 160–161 defense spending in, 151 deflation in, 93, 140 exchange rates with, 216, 217, 220 and health care, 280 and nuclear power, 261 prolonged stagnation in, 93, 140, 142, 186, 471 rice industry in, 207 trade with, 203, 209 U.S. debt to, 160, 162–163

Java, 324, 325 Jennings, Marianne, 372 Johnson, George, 410 Johnson, Lyndon and administration,

114, 120n, 402 Jordan, Michael, 366 Jorgenson, Dale, 410 Joskow, Paul L., 270 Justice Department, 324, 325

K Kahn, Lawrence M., 466 Kaufman, Ewing, 459 Kennedy, John F., 402, 483 Kentucky Motor Speedway, 465 Keynes, John Maynard, 109 Keynesian economics, 109–110, 126, 228 KFC, 71 Kmart, 472, 473–475, 488 Kohen, Andrew, 365 Kotlikoff, Laurence, 161 Kroger, 488, 490 Krueger, Alan, 365 Krueger, Andrew, 363–364

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Index 515

Krugman, Paul, 125, 165, 212, 247 Kuwait, 139, 236, 442 Kyoto Protocol, 267–268

L Labor, marginal revenue product of, 461, 463, 479–480, 481 Labor costs, 299 Labor Force Participation Rate, 88–89, 187–188, 327–328 Labor markets:

discrimination in, 332–333 and minimum wage, 359, 360 under perfect competition, 478–479 for sports, 461

Labor rights, 482–483 Labor unions (see Unions) Ladd, Helen F., 338 Landfills, 264 Larry Bird exemption, 462 Laser imaging, 188 Law(s), 304–308

bankruptcy, 306, 472–475 civil liability, 306–308 government’s role, in enforcing, 304 private property, 304–306 property rights, 306–308 rent control, 373, 376–377 unions’ rights under, 482–483

Lawsuits: for civil liability, 306–308 class action, 308

Lebow, David, 86, 97 Lee, Ronald, 154, 167, 295 Lehman Brothers, 135, 182 Leigh, Andrew, 386, 389 Leimer, Dean, 422, 428 Lemieux, Thomas, 410 Lending discrimination, 334 Lesnoy, Selig, 422, 428 Levitt, Steven, 318 Liability, civil, 306–308 Liar loans, 173 Libya, 114, 122, 209, 217, 445 Licensing, 354, 480–481 Lincoln, Abraham, 240 Lines, graphing, 15–18 Linux, 70 Liquidity trap, 135, 137 Literacy, 235 Living wage, 358 Loans:

car, 101–102 liar, 173 money created by, 133 student, 106, 148, 149, 306, 346, 396–397

Local substitution, 457, 494 Lochner, Lance, 381, 389 Lockouts, 463, 464, 484

Logrolling, 147 “Lo-Jack,” 502 Long run, 74, 75, 137, 376 Los Angeles, California, 168–170, 174, 198, 456, 458n, 459, 460 Loury, Glenn, 336, 338 Low-tech (LT) goods, 239 Luxury box revenue (sports), 459 Lynch, Thomas, 154

M M1, 132–133 M2, 132–133 M3, 132n Maastricht Treaty, 223 Macintosh, 324 MacPherson, David A., 482n, 487 Macroeconomics, 79–95

aggregate demand and aggregate supply model, 107–116 business cycles, 92–94 demand-side, 115–116 and fiscal policy, 119–128 measuring the economy, 80–86 and minimum wage, 362 modeling, 107–116 and monetary policy, 131–143 real gross domestic product, 86–87 supply-side, 115 unemployment, 87–91

Major League Baseball (MLB), 371, 457, 459–461 Managed float exchange system, 218–219 Mandation, 277, 278 Mandatory spending (federal), 148–149, 284 Marginal analysis, 8

of costs of crime, 315 of drug approval process, 302 of federal spending, 151

Marginal benefit, 8, 49, 151, 252–253, 259–261, 265, 302, 315, 503

Marginal cost (MC), 8, 59–61 of cleaner environment, 259–261 and crime control, 315–316 of government spending, 151 in modeling illegal goods, 252–253 under natural monopoly, 320–321, 450–451 of prescription drug testing stringency, 302 as Supply under perfect competition, 74 and terrorism prevention, 502–503 of tickets, 367–368

Marginal resource cost (MRC), 480 Marginal revenue (MR), 62–63

and monopoly, 62–63, 298, 319–320, 368, 445, 452 and perfect competition, 62–63, 75–76, 452 and profit maximization, 64–65

Marginal revenue curve, 63, 69 Marginal revenue product of labor, 461, 463, 479–480, 481 Marginal tax rate, 115, 233, 433, 437 Marginal utility, 26

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516 Index

Market(s), 8, 20 efficient, 470 for money, 99 rental apartments without rent control, 374 (see also Stock market)

Market basket, 82 Market failure, 50, 268, 304, 335 Market forms, 71–72, 76, 366–367, 395, 488–490 Market power, 325, 345, 371, 458, 465, 481 Market risk, 104 Marketing, 20 Mason, Patrick L., 338 Maximizing profit, 64–65 Maximum out of pocket expense, 273 Maximum taxable earnings, 419 MC (see Marginal cost) McCain, John, 116, 437 McConnell, Campbell R., 487 McDonald’s, 69–71 McGraw–Hill, 395 McGwire, Mark, 366 McKnight, Claire, 55 McVeigh, Timothy, 494 Means testing:

in anti-poverty programs, 400–408 in Medicare, 274–275, 284–285, 290–293 in Social Security, 426

Measuring the economy, 80–86 Medicaid, 150, 151, 272–275, 278,

283–293 costs for elderly under, 286–287 costs of, 285–287 cost-saving measures in, 287 eligibility for, 284–285 for foster families, 407 and Head Start, 414–415 as an in-kind transfer, 400–408 and Obama stimulus, 120, 126–127, 159, 182–183 and the PPACA, 120, 275, 278, 284 and prescription drugs, 300 provisions of, 275, 285 recipients of, 284–285 relationship of Medicare and, 293 smokers on, 251, 254, 280 spending on, 146, 148–150, 286–289, 404–406

Medicare, 272, 273–274, 284 cost control provisions in, 291 and current-services budgeting, 151–152 diagnosis-related groups under, 290 enrollment, 272 origin of, 419–420 Part A, 284, 289–290 Part B, 284, 290 prescription drug coverage (Part D), 154, 290–291 and private insurance for the elderly, 287–288 relationship of Medicaid and, 286–287, 293 smokers vs. nonsmokers on, 252 spending on, 146, 148–150, 151, 158, 165, 193–196, 288–289 tax rate for, 420 trust fund for, 156, 161, 193–196, 199, 284, 289, 292–293

Medicare Trust Fund, 156, 161, 193–196, 284, 289, 292–294 Medications (see Prescription drugs) Merit pay, for teachers, 386 Metrick, Andrew, 270 Mexico, 21, 203, 207, 208, 239, 240–242, 244, 301, 442, 446 Michelin, 466 Microeconomics, 80 Microsoft, 69, 70, 103, 322, 324–325, 479 Middle class, shrinking, 188–189, 343–344 Middle East revolutions, impact of, 114, 122, 441 Miller, Matthew, 295 Milwaukee school voucher program, 387 Minimum wage, 311, 358–364

alternatives to, 362 in cities and states, 360 economic analysis of, 359–362 elasticity argument, 363 macroeconomics argument, 362 as price floor, 353 real-world implications, 361–362 for sports players, 462 work effort argument against, 363

Minorities: economic status of, 328–330 high school graduation rates for, 383 (see also Racial inequalities)

Mitchell, Olivia S., 428 MLB (Major League Baseball), 371, 457, 459, 460, 461 Model, 2, 3 (see also specific models) Monetary aggregate, 132 Monetary authority, 138 Monetary policy, 131–142

and central bank independence, 137–138 European, 223 goals of, 132 and inflation, 114 during last 30 years, 138–141 modeling, 133–134 and monetary transmission mechanism, 134–135 tools created in 2008 for, 135–137, 183–184, 220, 227 traditional and ordinary tools of, 132–133 (see also

Recession of 2007–2009) Monetary transmission, 134–135 Money, 133, 135 (see also Currencies) Money creation, 133 Monopolistic competition, 70–71

by grocery stores, 490–491 other market forms vs., 71 in textbook market, 393–395

Monopoly(-ies), 70 Apple, 325 cartels as, 445 contestable markets hypothesis, 323 deadweight loss, 320 drug industry as, 297–298 electric utilities as, 450–451 Google, 325 grocery stores as, 490–491 high price, 319–320 IBM, 324 low output, 319–320

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Index 517

and maximization of profit, 64 Microsoft, 324–325 natural, 320–321, 450–451 necessary, 321–322 other market forms vs., 71–72 perfect competition vs., 320 public schools as, 385–386 reduced innovation, 320 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 322–323 simple, 450–451 Standard Oil, 323–324 unions as, 481–482

Monopsonies, 479–480, 482, 486 Montero, Juan Pablo, 270 Moody’s, 476 Moral hazard, 277 Morality issues:

with blood and organ sales, 279 for government regulation, 252

Moretti, E., 381, 389 Morgan Stanley, 135 Mortgage lending discrimination, 333–334 Mortgage-backed securities, 115, 135–137, 142, 172, 184, 223 Mortgages, 101–104, 170–172

deductibility of interest, 430–431 discrimination in, 334 selling of, 172 30-percent guideline for, 174 traditional, 170–171, 172 types of, 172

Mouse, 324 MR (marginal revenue), 62 MRC (marginal resource cost), 480 Mullahy, John, 257 Mullainathan, Sendhil, 332, 337 Munnell, Alicia, 422 Multitasking, 324 Myles, Albert, 493

N NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 238, 241,

242–243, 244, 245 NASCAR teams, 370, 460, 464–465 NASDAQ bubble, 172–173 NASDAQ Composite Index, 469, 471–472 Nashville, Tennessee, 198, 456, 459 National Basketball Association (NBA), 371, 456, 459, 462–463 National Center for Education Statistics, 389, 392–393 National (federal) debt, 156, 159–162 National Education Association, 386 National Football League (NFL), 330, 371, 456, 459, 460, 461, 463 National Hockey League, 371, 463 National Income, 81, 94, 160 National Industrial Recovery Act, 482–483 Natural gas, 87, 187, 235, 259, 261, 266–267, 319, 320, 321,

449–450, 452, 474 Natural monopolies, 320–321, 450–451

Natural resources, 258–268 limited, 259 renewable, 259 sustainablility of, 259 stewardship of, 259

NBA (National Basketball Association), 371, 456, 459, 462–463 NDFP (see Nondiscretionary fiscal policy) Neal, Derek, 387, 389 Necessary monopolies, 321–322 Negative-amortization mortgages, 172 Net benefit, 8 Netflix, 2, 188 Net interest, federal spending on, 149 Net present value, 380 Netscape, 324, 325 Net tax rate, 161 Neumark, David, 365 Neutral tax code, 434 “New normal,” 186, 189–191 Newhouse, Joseph, 295 NFL (National Football League), 330, 371, 456, 459, 460, 461, 463 NFL ticket exchange, 371 Nigeria, 235, 442, 445, 448 Nikkei Index, 93, 471 9/11 attacks (see September 11, 2001 attacks) Nominal interest rate, 99–100 Nominal output, 80–81 Nondiscretionary fiscal policy (NDFP), 119

and aggregate supply and aggregate demand model, 120–122 as built-in stabilizer, 120 in counteracting shocks, 122–123 evaluating, 123 and Obama stimulus plan, 126

Nontariff trade barriers, 209 Nordhaus, William D., 270 Normal goods, 27, 30 Normal profit, 73 Normative analysis, 9 Norris–La Guardia Act, 482–483 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 238, 241,

242–243, 244, 245 Novy-Marx, Robert, 197–198, 200 Nuclear power, 261, 449–450 Number of sellers, 31, 32, 33 Nursing home care, 286–287, 289

O Oates, Wallace E., 270 Obama, Barack and administration, 125

and alternative minimum tax, 433 energy strategy of, 267, 350 and greenhouse emissions, 266, 268 initial budget of, 165 and Keystone pipeline, 87 and Social Security reform, 426 stimulus plan, 10, 115, 116, 120, 124–127, 175, 182–184, 227 and student loans, 397

Monopoly(-ies) (continued )

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518 Index

and tax cuts, 116, 120, 435, 437 and tax increases, 433 and tax incentives, 435 and trade, 241

Obama stimulus plan, 10, 115, 116, 120, 124–127, 175, 182–184 and budget deficits, 159, 165 congressional votes for, 147–148 criticism’s of, 125 federal spending under, 146, 165 infrastructure projects in, 124 and recession of 2007–2009, 124 tax cuts in, 116, 120, 435, 437 tax incentives in, 435

Obamacare (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), 199, 273, 275, 277–279, 284, 285, 290, 291, 293, 397

Obstfeld, Maurice, 212, 247 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), 186 Off-budget, 156–157 Office of Management and Budget, 165 Office Suite, 325 Off-shoring, 207 Oil prices (see Energy prices) Oil reserves, 440, 441, 442, 451–452 Oligopolies, 71

gasoline industry as, 447 other market forms vs., 71–72 and textbook market, 393

Oligopolistic markets, 71 On-budget, 156 OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), 73, 163,

441, 442, 443, 445–446, 449 Open-market operations, 132, 161 Operating budget, 159 Operating system market, 324 Operational lag (fiscal policy), 123 Opportunity cost, 2

and absolute advantage, 204 of cleaner environment, 260 constant, 5–6, 11 and federal spending, 149 Head Start program, 416 increasing, 5–6, 11 made in developing countries, 236 production possibilities frontier model of, 5, 6, 11 and retirement savings, 421

Optimization assumption, 8 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 186 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 73, 163,

441, 442, 443, 445–446, 449 Organs, sale of, 279 Origin, 15 Orphan drugs, 297 Output, 20

and diminishing returns, 58 measuring, 80–81 monopoly and, 320 potential, price of, 31, 32, 34

Outsourcing, 207, 489

P Palmer, Karen, 270 Palm Pilot, 324 Panama Canal treaty, 245 PATCO (Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization), 484 Patents, 70, 241, 297, 299n, 305 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 199, 273, 275,

277–279, 284, 285, 290, 291, 293, 397 Paulson, Henry, 138, 182 Pay option adjustable rate mortgages, 172 Pay-as-you-go pensions, 419 Payroll taxes, 193, 195, 293, 419, 425 PCPs (primary care physicians), 273 Peace dividend, 158 Peak (business cycle), 92 Penn State University, 479 Pensions:

Chicago, 198 county and municipal liabilities, 196–198 defined benefit, 194 defined contributions, 194 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 194

Pension Guaranty Trust Corporation, 194 state and local government, 193–199 state liabilities, 196–199

Pentagon, damages, 499–500 Pepsi, 28, 71, 233 Per capita real GDP, 87, 187, 226, 232–234 Perfect competition, 68–69, 252, 464

in labor market, 478–479, 480, 486 markets meeting criteria for, 71–72 and maximization of profit, 64 monopoly vs., 319–321, 323, 367, 385, 445, 452–453 other market forms vs., 71–72 supply under, 73–76

Perfectly elastic demand, 45 Perfectly elastic supply, 47 Perfectly inelastic demand, 45 Perfectly inelastic supply, 47 Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator, 85, 140,

168–169 Personal income taxes, 429–437

calculating, 430–434 debates over, 436–437 distribution of, 435–436 issues with, 434 payers of, 152, 435–436 surtax, 120n and willingness to work and save, 434–435 withholding of, 429–430 United States, 191

Peterson, Paul E., 389 Pew Charitable Trust, 189, 343 Pew Research Center, 416 Phelps, Charles, 282, 295 Philip Morris, 72 Pick-a-pay mortgages, 172

Obama, Barack and administration (continued )

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Index 519

Pinterest, 188 Pippen, 461 Plants, extinction of, 263–264 Plumbers and steamfitters, 480 Points, graphing, 15 Polasky, Stephen, 270 Political business cycle, 125 Political instability, 235 Politics:

in federal spending, 147 and fiscal policy, 124–125 of income taxes, 434

Pollution, 51, 208, 258–268, 335, 420, 502 Population, home prices and, 169 Population of potential buyers, 27, 29 Porter, Michael E., 270 Portney, Paul R., 270 Positive analysis, 9 Positive externalities, 412, 458 Poteba, James M., 270 Poverty, 208, 400–404

as “bad,” 408 causes of, 346 and crime, 312–313 gender differences in, 328 Head Start and, 411–412, 414 through history, 402–403 and living wage, 358 measuring, 400–404 and minimum wage, 358–359, 362 programs related to, 275, 284–285, 287, 293, 404–406, 411–416

(see also Welfare) in the U.S. vs. Europe, 404 and Walmart, 491 wealth vs., 403

Poverty gap, 401, 406 Poverty line, 275, 284–285, 287, 293, 401 Poverty rate, 245, 328, 401–402, 411 Pozen, Robert, 426, 428 PPACA (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), 284, 285,

291, 293, 397, 425 Pre-Civil War era, economic growth, 187 Preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 273 Prescription drugs, 296–302

and drug industry as monopoly, 297–298 FDA approval of, 301–302 liability for ill effects linked to, 307–308 under Medicare, 290–291 and perceptions of drug companies, 297 prices of, 299–301

Present value, 100–104, 161, 168, 170, 194–195, 197n, 198, 259, 262–263, 299, 307, 316, 380, 395–396, 422–423, 468–469, 471, 500

Head Start, 412 Price(s), 20

classical and Keynesian views of, 109–110 of college textbooks, 393–395 and elasticity, 42–43 energy, 34, 122, 440–445, 447

farm, 349–351 of gasoline, 178, 259, 267–268, 446–447 of inputs, 31 measuring, 81–83 monopoly and, 319–320 of potential outputs, 31, 32 of prescription drugs, 299–301 setting, 63 stock, 468–470 of substitute/complement goods, 27, 28

Price ceiling, 36, 375 Price elasticity of demand, 41 Price elasticity of supply, 41, 46–47 Price expectations:

changes in, 35 as determinant of demand, 29 as determinant of supply, 31, 32–33

Price floors, 36, 352–355 Price fixing, 322 Price gouging, 36 Price indexes, 82–85

chain-based index, 85 consumer price index, 80 core, 85 GDP deflator, 86 Producer Price Index, 85

Price of inputs, 31 Price of other potential output, 31, 32 Price of the market basket in the base year, 82 Price supports, for farm products, 351–355 Primary care physicians (PCPs), 273 Primary credit rate or discount rate, 133 Principal–agent problem, 474–475 Prison costs, 314 Private property, 304–305 Private schools, 387 Private-sector unions, 485 Procyclical (budget amendment), 164 Producer Price Index, 85 Producer surplus, 48–50, 51–52

and environment, 260 and farm price floors, 352–353, 356 with illegal goods/services, 249 and labor, 479, 481–482, 486 and market failure, 320 and minimum wage, 359–361, 364 and prescription drugs, 298 and trade, 206, 210

Producers, 20 Product Accounts, 81, 94–95 Production, 57–59 Production costs, 59–62 Production function, 57 Production possibilities frontier, 2–4

for international trade, 205–206 opportunity cost on, 11

Production rules, 64 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization

(PATCO), 484

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520 Index

Profit, 56 maximizing, 57, 64–65, 74, 311, 314, 368–369, 447 normal vs. economic, 73–75, 299, 333, 445, 453, 474

Progressive taxation, 123, 433 Property rights:

enforcing, 305–306 and environmental problems, 262–263 intellectual property, 241, 305, 395 and natural resources, 262–263 negative consequences of, 306 to solve environmental problems, 265–266

Prospective payments, 289, 290 Prostitution, 250, 252, 254–255, 312, 420, 495

and sexual slavery, 250 Public employees, unionization of, 484, 485 Public goods, 51 Public schools, 385–386 Pucher, John, 55 Pull factor, Walmart and, 491 Purchasing power parity, 233 Purely private goods, 50 Purely public goods, 51

Q Quantitative easing (QE2), 93, 136, 355 Quantity demanded, 20–21, 22, 23, 24, 41, 376 Quantity supplied, 20–21, 22, 23, 24, 41, 376 Quotas, 240

for affirmative action, 335–336 cartel, 442, 445–446, 452–453 trade, 208–210, 240, 241

R R. J. Reynolds, 249–250 Racial inequalities:

and affirmative action, 335–336 in automobile sales, 334 in crime statistics, 310–311, 330 in default on home loans, 331 in education, 330 in high school graduation rates, 383 in income, 328–329 in labor market, 330, 332–333 in poverty, 401–402 in real estate market, 333–334 in wages, 332–333

Ramo, Joshua Cooper, 144 Rational or statistical criminal model, 311–312, 502 Rational discrimination, 331 Rational terrorist hypothesis, 502–503 Rauh, Joshua, 197, 198 Reagan, Ronald and administration:

and agriculture subsidies, 355 and deficits of 1980s, 157–158 EITC during, 362 federal spending during, 145

and Iran-contra, 442n and labor unions, 484 real growth rates under, 125 and student loans, 397 supply-side actions of, 115 trade agreements, 241

Real estate market, discrimination in, 333–334 Real gross domestic product (RGDP), 86

and aggregate demand, 108–109, 113, 120–122, 123, 128, 190, 232

and aggregate supply, 109–110, 114, 115, 120–122, 123, 128, 190, 232

in business cycle, 92, 178, 181 declining, 188 in depression, 94 growth in, 187, 199, 231 impact of interest rate effect on, 108 and monetary policy, 132–133, 139 and Obama stimulus plan, 127 problems with, 86–87, 307 as a result of austerity, 228 after September 11, 2001, 501 United States, 186, 188

Real-balances effect, 25–26, 108 Real interest rate, 99–100, 219, 292 Recession(s):

defined, 92 fiscal policy counteracting, 120, 121, 122–124, 312 historic, 92–94, 123, 125, 126, 355, 428, 472, 475, 494 and monetary policy, 137–140

Recession of 2007–2009, 89, 91, 111, 123, 127, 132, 137, 146, 157, 166, 177–184, 187–188, 215, 220, 227–228, 243, 268, 329–330, 339, 364, 381–382, 402, 425, 441, 442 (see also Great Recession)

beginning of, 87 crisis of confidence in, 181–182 Fed’s role in, 131 and housing bubble, 177–180 (see also Housing bubble) initial policy reactions to, 180–181 monetary stimulus, 183–184 and Obama stimulus plan, 127, 182–183 role of Federal Reserve in, 131

Recognition lag (fiscal policy), 123 Recovery (business cycle), 92 Rector, Robert, 403 Redmond, Washington, 479 Refiner Acquisition Cost of Imported Oil, 447–448 Refundable tax credits, 340 Regressions, in measuring discrimination, 331, 332, 333 Regulated monopolies, 321, 450–451 Reinsurance, 173, 502 Reliant Energy, 474 Renminbi (or yuan), 213, 215–220 Rent control, 373–377

consequences of, 375–377 in a free market, 373–374 reasons for, 374–375

Reservation wages, 461 Reserve clause (sports contracts), 462 Reserve ratio, 133

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Index 521

Resources, 2 Restless legs syndrome, 301 Retirement, 418–426 Retirement age (Social Security), 419–420 Retirement annuities, 334 Retrospective payment, 289 Revenue, 56, 62–63

from casino gambling, 495 marginal, 62–63

Revenue sharing, 462 Revolutionary War, economic growth and, 187 Revolving credit, 180 Reyes, Jessica, 318 RGDP (see Real gross domestic product) Richardson, J. David, 212 The Rise and Fall of American Growth, 190 Risk, 104 Risk aversion, 104, 272 Risk neutrality, 272 Risk premium, 104 Rivalry, 50 Robotic spot welders, 188 Rockefeller, John D., 323, 325 Rodrik, Dani, 212 Roosevelt, Franklin, 418, 482 Rosen, Harvey, 428 Royalties (to authors), 394 Rudd, Jeremy, 86, 97 Rule of 72, 104 Rules of thumb, in hiring, 330 Russia, 21, 93, 209, 217, 362 Ruth, Babe, 463

S Safeway, 488, 490 Salary cap (sports), 462, 463 Sales taxes, 81, 490, 491 Sampson, Ralph, 462 SAT scores, 336, 383–384 Saudi Arabia, 21, 236, 345, 442, 445 Saving:

and economic growth, 232 in monetary aggregates, 132 for retirement, 420–422 and tax rates, 435

Scalping tickets, 36, 366–371 Scarce resources, 1, 2, 3 Schaller, Bruce, 55 Scherer, F. M., 303 Schieber, Sylvester J., 426 Schiller, Robert J., 477 Schliefer, Andrei, 477 Schmalensee, Richard, 270, 326 School Lunch program, 380n, 405 School reform issues, 385–388 School vouchers, 387 Scientific method, 22 S-corporations, 469n

Schott, Jeffery, 243 Schumpeter, Joseph, 245 Screen Actors’ Guild, 484 Seasonal unemployment, 90 Section 8 apartments, 405 Securitization, 170, 173, 175 Sellers, number of, 31, 32, 33–34, 73, 75, 353 September 11, 2001 attacks, 126, 135, 140, 146, 147, 157, 325,

472, 499–503 aggregate-demand shock, 500–501 economic impact of, 499–500 modeling economic impact of, 500–502 oil price swings following, 446 and spending increases, 158

Sex discrimination, 327–328, 330–336 Sexual slavery, 250 Sheehan, Richard, 466 Sheiner, Louise, 130 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 322–323, 465 Shocks, 121

aggregate demand, 121–122, 183, 500–501 aggregate supply, 122–123, 128, 501

Shogren, Jason F., 270 Short run, 74

barriers to entry, 71 consequences of rent control, 375–376 economic growth, 232 economic profit, 73–74, 75 elasticity of demand, 268, 363 elasticity of supply, 46

Short sale, 175 Shortages, 24–25, 35–36, 359, 370, 371, 442, 446 Shoven, John, 426 Siegfried, John, 466 Simple monopolies, 450–451 Simplifying assumption, 3, 71, 82, 260 Sindelar, Jody, 257 Single-payer system, 279–281 Sirius, 322–323 Skinner, Jonathan, 154, 167, 295 Slave labor, 208 Slemrod, Joel, 439 Slope, 16, 42–43, 60 Smartphone, economic growth and, 188 Smeeding, Timothy, 404, 406 Smoot-Hawley tariff law, 240 Soccer, 456–458 Social cost, 252–253, 261, 265 Social engineering, taxes for, 435, 437 Social insurance, 146, 423 Social Security, 418–426

benefits under, 283, 419 cost of living adjustment (COLA), 83 economic effects of, 421–422 fixing, 425–426 funding for, 193–199, 424–426 generational accounting of, 161 history of, 283–284, 418–419 need for, 420–421 spending on, 148, 149, 150, 151, 158, 160

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522 Index

sustainability, 165 taxes for, 156–157, 273, 419, 437 temporary tax cut for, 419 and tobacco, 252 value of, 422–423

Social Security Trust Fund, 161, 195, 292, 424–426

Social welfare: deadweight loss as a measure of, 51, 298, 370 nonequivalence to RGDP, 86–87, 307

Socialist, 21–22 Software development, 244 Solar power, 261, 268, 449, 451 Solow Growth Model, 234 Somalia, lawlessness in, 306 South Korea, 21, 139, 236, 241 Sovaldi, 300 Southwest Airlines, 323 Sowell, Thomas, 338 Soybean prices, 350, 355 S&P 500, 468, 475 Spain:

and central bank independence, 138 and debt to GDP, 220, 226, 227 and the euro, 223, 229 GDP growth, 223–224 and housing bubble, 223, 225 and long term interest rates, 225 per capita GDP, 223–224, 234 and soccer, 457, 464, 497 terrorism in, 503 and unemployment, 228

Spending: on crime control, 311–316 on education, 236, 381–385, 390–398 by federal government (see Federal spending) government, 81, 83–84, 87, 94, 108, 112, 114, 115, 120–128, 190,

228, 232, 355 on health care, 286, 288–289, 291, 301 on sports stadiums, 458 on welfare, 244, 404–408, 412

Sports, 455–465 city-based teams, 455–458 economics of, 461–465 labor market for, 461 relocation of NCAA, 457 relocation of teams, 455–457 return on investment in, 459–461 and sex discrimination, 330–331 spending on stadiums, 458 winning vs. profiting of teams, 459–460

SSI (Supplemental Security Income), 274, 284, 405, 408 St. Louis, Missouri, 456, 459, 460 St. Petersburg, Florida, 456 Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500), 468, 475 Standard deduction (income tax), 430, 431, 433 Standard Oil, 322, 323–324 Staples, 491 State budgets, 164, 275, 381

State College, Pennsylvania, 479 State Farm, 474, 502n States:

budgets of, 125, 126, 164, 175 civil liability, 306–307 collective bargaining of public employees in,

387–388 education spending by, 149, 379–385, 392–395 and the environment, 264, 267 gambling in, 494–497 Medicaid programs of, 272, 275, 284–287, 293, 300 minimum wages set by, 360, 363–364 Obama stimulus plan aid from, 126–127, 183–184 pension issues of, 193–199 refinery locations by, 450 ticket scalping laws in, 370–371 taxes of, 253 tobacco settlement with, 254 welfare spending by, 404–408

Statistical discrimination, 331 Steiger, Douglas, 144 Steuerle, C. Eugene, 422 Stevens, Ted, 147 Stiglitz, Joseph, 477 Stock, James H., 144 Stock indexes, 470 Stock market, 467–476

in 1990s, 158, 342–343 in 2006–2007, 475–476 in 2008–2009, 475–476 and accounting scandals, 472–475 crashes of, 139–140, 470–472 efficient, 470 function of, 469–470 stock price determination, 468–469

Stock options, 474 Stock prices, 139, 468–469, 470, 471, 474, 475 Stone, Kenneth E., 493 Strategic trade policies, 240 Strikes:

in history of unions, 483–485 in sports, 463–464

“Strong dollar,” 111–112 Structural deficit, 159–160 Structural unemployment, 90 Stubhub, 371 Student loans, 148, 149, 151, 306, 346, 396, 397 Subsidies:

agricultural, 353–355 corrective, 50, 435 as determinant of demand, 29–31 as determinant of supply, 31–34 educational, 380 government, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 126–127, 240, 276 Medicare, 291, 293 in-kind, 404 of nonsmokers by smokers, 251n, 252 in PPACA, 275 for public universities, 391–392, 397 (see also Price supports) renewable energy, 350

Social Security (continued )

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Index 523

Substitutes, 27, 28, 30 and elasticity, 44, 46, 363, 370, 375, 395, 451 and market form, 70–72 number and closeness of, 41, 43, 44 and price changes, 25, 81–82, 84, 351

Substitution effect, 25, 434–435 terrorism, 503

Summers, Lawrence H., 477 Sun Microsystems, 324, 325 “Super” stores, 489, 490, 491 Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 274, 284,

405, 408 Supply, 20–34

aggregate (see Aggregate supply) determinants of, 31–34 elasticity of, 46–48 excess, 25 law of, 26–27 under perfect competition, 73–76 price elasticity of (see Elasticity of supply) quantity supplied vs., 20–21, 22

Supply and demand model, 19, 22–25 and ceteris paribus, 22 and changes in oil prices, 446–447 and changes in price expectations, 35 demand schedule, 22–23 determinants of demand, 27–31 determinants of supply, 31–34 and education, 380, 392 equilibrium, 24 and equilibrium changes, 35–36 and farm products, 349–355 and foreign exchange markets, 213–219 for health care, 274–275, 285–286 for illegal goods and services, 249–255 for international trade, 206 law of demand, 25–26 law of supply, 26–27 markets, 20 and labor, 359–364, 479–481 for prescription drugs, 297–301 quantity demanded and quantity supplied, 20–21 shortages and surpluses, 25, 36 supply schedule, 23–24

Supply curve, 20, 26–27, 29–31 decriminalization of illegal goods/services, 254–255 and law of supply, 26 movements in, 33–34 for ticket scalping, 370

Supply schedule, 23–24 Supply-side economics, 115 Supply-side macroeconomics, 115–116 Surpluses, 24, 25, 35–36

budget, 149, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 (see also Federal budget)

consumer (see Consumer surplus) producer (see Producer surplus) trade, 203

Survivor benefits (Social Security), 419–420 Swartz, Katherine, 274

T Taco Bell, 71 Taft-Hartley Act, 483 Takata, 308 Tampa Bay area, Florida, 456 TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), 149, 284, 285,

405, 406, 408, 414 Target, 473, 475, 488, 490 Tariffs, 208–209, 210, 240, 241, 244 TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program), 10, 124, 146, 159, 160, 164,

174, 175, 182, 227, 241 Taste, 27, 28, 30 Tax cuts, 119–120

by Bush, 115–116, 126, 157, 158, 162, 166, 180, 437 impacts of, 124 in Obama stimulus plan, 126, 159, 182–184, 437 political debates on, 151–152, 190, 433, 436–437 sources of money for, 124 by Reagan, 115

Tax tables, 430, 431–432 Taxable income, 158, 430, 431, 432, 433, 436 Taxes

capital gains, 340–341, 345 and casino gambling, 494–495 and circular flow diagram, 7,8 corrective, 50, 249, 253–255, 265 and discretionary fiscal policy, 122–125, 128 as an economic incentive, 9, 190, 191, 232–233, 408 for education, 380, 385–388, 392, 397 EITC, 362, 405 and elasticity, 46 on emissions, 267–268 excise, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34 federal revenue from, 151, 158–159, 162–163, 165, 189, 340,

430, 431 foreign, 214 and fiscal policy lags, 123–124 on gasoline, 448, 449 and GDP accounting, 81, 94–95 and generational accounting, 161 and Greece, 226, 228, 229 income, 86, 87, 111, 120, 157n, 158, 429–437 and inflation, 114, 115 inheritance, 342, 345 Medicare/Medicaid, 272–274, 283–293 and nondiscretionary fiscal policy, 121–122, 128 in Obama stimulus plan, 115, 120, 126 under PPACA, 275, 277–278 and purely public goods, 51 property, 170, 174, 431 under Reagan, 157, 158 during Revolutionary War, 156 sales, 81, 490–491 and shift in aggregate demand, 112–114 for Social Security, 156–157, 193, 195, 199, 419–420, 422,

423–426 under socialism, 21 supply-side impact of, 114

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524 Index

tariffs, 208, 209, 240 on tobacco and alcohol, 253–254

Taylor, John B., 125, 127, 165 Teachers:

Head Start, 413–414 K–12, 194, 198, 199, 328, 331, 379–388 university, 198, 390–398

Teaching, 379–388, 390–398, 479 Teamsters, 243, 484, 485 Technology:

as determinant of supply, 313 economic output and, 187–188 and used textbook sales, 396

“Techno-optimists,” 190 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), 149, 284, 285,

405, 406, 408, 414 Tenure, for teachers, 386 Term papers, sale of, 32 Terms of trade, 205, 206, 207 Terre Haute, Indiana, 494, 495 Terrorism:

aggregate-demand shock, 500–501 economic impact of September 11 attacks, 499–502

(see also September 11, 2001 attacks) insurance aspects of, 500, 501–502 from the perspective of terrorist, 502–503 reinsurance, 502 substitution effect, 503

Texas, 197 and affirmative action, 336 housing in, 168–169 prisons in, 315 oil in, 203, 443, 447 TANF standards, 285

Texas Motor Speedway, 465 Texas Rangers, 459 Textbooks:

cost of, 391, 393–395 electronic, 395–396 market of, 393–395 renting, 393–395, 396

Third-party payers, 276–277, 288 Thomas, Duncan, 415 Thorton, Mark, 257 Ticket brokers/scalping, 366–371 Ticket master, 371 Time, elasticity and, 44 Tobacco, 72, 248–254, 278–279, 354 Topel, Robert, 410 Total cost, 59–62, 480 Total cost function, 60, 61 Total expenditure rule, 44 Total revenue (TR), 60, 63, 65, 74

to universities, 392–393 Toxic substances, 244 Toyota, 308 TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), 238, 244 TR (total revenue), 60, 63, 65, 74

to universities, 392–393

Trade (see International trade) Trade agreements

benefits of, 239 economic and political impacts, 243–244 economists favoring, reasons, 245 Mexico, 239, 241–243, 244 need of, 239–241 quota, 240 special interests, 240 strategic trade policies, 240 tariff, 240 United States, 238–241, 243, 244

Trade barriers, 207–208, 240, 241, 243, 344 Trade protection, 208, 210 Trademarks, 305 Traditional mortgages, 170–172 Training, federal spending on, 148–149 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 238, 244 Triest, Robert, 410 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 10, 124, 146, 159, 160, 164,

174, 175, 182, 227, 241 Trough (business cycle), 92, 94 Truman, Harry, 125, 483 Trump, Donald, 244, 344 Trust, 323 Trust funds, 156, 162

Medicare, 161, 195, 284, 292–293 Social Security, 161, 195, 424–426

Tschirhart, John, 270 Tuition tax credit, 433 Twitter, 51, 188

U Unattainable production level, 4–5 Underemployment, 89–90, 335 Underground economy, 233, 376 Unemployment, 89–90

and aggregate supply, 109–110 benefits under the Obama stimulus plan, 120, 126, 127 and the business cycle, 92, 163 classical and Keynesian views of, 109–110, 228 and crime, 314 during depressions, 94 effects of trade on, 245 in European countries, 228 insurance, 31, 500 measuring, 87–90 and the minimum wage, 361, 363 and monetary policy, 134 and production possibilities frontier, 4–5 and racial disparities, 330 in recession of 2001, 158 in recession of 2007–2009, 89, 158–159, 164, 182–183 seasonal adjustment of, 91–92 types of, 90

Unemployment rates, 87, 89–92, 94, 139, 182, 228, 312, 330, 361, 418

Uninsured persons, 274, 278, 300

Taxes (continued )

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Index 525

Unions, 478–486, 502 future of, 485–486 history of, 345, 482–485 as monopolies, 481–482 public vs. private employees in, 483, 484 reasons for, 478–481 in sports, 463–464 for teachers, 386, 387, 388 and trade, 207, 240, 245

Unitary elastic, 42, 45 United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the

Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, 480n

United Auto Workers, 48, 481, 484 United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Workers of

America, 481n United Kingdom (see Great Britain) United Mine Workers of America, 481n United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 261 United Parcel Service (UPS), 320, 484–485 United States:

antipoverty spending in, 404–406 and Arab–Israeli wars, 441 balance of payments for, 214 business cycle of, 94, 111, 119, 177–184 crime in, 310–311, 314 as debtor nation, 215 debt-to-GDP ratio for, 160 deficits and debt of, 155–166 drug prices in, 301 economic freedom, 21 economic stagnation and, 186 entertainment industry, 241–242 exchange rates of, 216–218 federal spending in, 145–152 fiscal policy in, 123–128 free trade, 238–239 gross domestic product, 80 health care compared to other countries, 279–280 health care system of, 271–293 housing bubble of, 168–175 income and wealth inequality in, 339–347 income taxes in (see personal income taxes) monetary policy in, 132–142 poverty in, 403–405 production of workers, 239 real GDP growth, 186 trade of, 201–203, 238–245

United Steelworkers of America, 484 University education, 390–398 UPS (see United Parcel Service) Uruguay Round, 241, 242 USA Patriot Act, 502 U.S. Department of Labor, 243

V Van der Linde, Claas, 270 Variable costs, 50, 52, 59, 62, 64, 260, 352, 356, 393, 394, 450

Variable inputs, 57, 449–450 Verizon Wireless, 71 Vermont, 147, 197, 353 Vertical equity (income taxes), 434 Veterans’ benefits, federal spending on, 148–149, 272, 397 Vig, 496–497 Vivitrol, 300

W Wachovia, 182 Wages:

and circular flow diagram, 7, 8 and deflation, 93 in developed vs. developing countries, 235 and economic growth, 187 gender differences in, 328 impact on Medicare Trust Fund, 292 impact of trade on, 207, 243–245 inflation indexing, 425–426 Medicare tax on, 273 minimum wage, 36, 51, 88, 155, 311–312, 346, 353, 359–364,

408, 463 under monopsony, 480 and perfect competition, 479, 481 racial inequalities in, 332–333 reservation, 461–462 for sports players, 463–464 and taxes, 430, 434–435 technology and trade impact on, 344–345 and unemployment, 90 union control of, 481–483, 485 at Walmart, 489, 491 and World War II controls on, 272n

Wagner Act, 482–483 Waldfogel, Jane, 338 The Wall Street Journal, 21 Walmart Supercenters, 48, 488, 490 War, costs of veteran’s benefits, 149 Wastewater treatment, 244, 264 Water pollution, 244, 264 Watson, Mark W., 144 Wealth:

and deflation, 93 gender differences in, 328, 334 Greek taxes on, 229 and home ownership, 173, 403 means testing using, 284–285, 293, 426 and Medicaid rules, 287 mobility of, 346 and poverty, 403, 405 and real-balances effect, 108 and self-employment, 478 socialism’s counter to, 21

Wealth inequality, 244, 306, 323 causes of, 344–345 measurements of, 342–343

Weather, changes in, 264–265 Wegmans, 489

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526 Index

Weitzman, Martin, 270 Welfare, 400, 404–408

education’s impact on, 380 federal spending on, 122, 148–151, 159, 163 and Head Start, 412, 414 and incentives, 9 and nondiscretionary fiscal policy, 120, 123, 128 in Obama stimulus plan, 126, 182–184 reform of, 287, 407–408 results of, 406–408 social safety net, 94 spending on, 406 types of programs, 274, 404–405

Welfare dependency, 407, 408 Wells Fargo, 182 Wendy’s, 71 Weyant, John P., 270 White, Eugene N., 477 WIC (Women, Infants and Children), 405–406, 414, 490 Wildlife, extinction of, 263, 264, 265 Williamson, Jeffrey G., 212 Wilson, Woodrow, 482 Windows, 70, 241, 324–325 Windows 95, 241, 324 Windows Office Suite, 325 Wind power, 261, 268, 449, 451 Winkler, Anne, 338 Wisconsin, 69, 196–197, 285, 353, 387–388, 403 Withholding, tax, 120, 124, 340–341, 429–431 Wolff, Edward, 410 Women:

and affirmative action, 335–336 and athletics, 368, 457, 462 and crime, 312 economic status of, 327–328 fertility rate of, 195, 424 and Head Start families, 414 health care for, 278 Labor Force Participation Rate, 7, 88–89, 187–188,

190, 345

life expectancy of, 425 and Medicaid, 284 poverty among, 402–403, 405–407 sex discrimination, 330–331, 333–335 in teaching, 386

Women, Infants and Children (WIC), 405–406, 414, 490 Wood, Adrian, 212 WordPerfect Suite, 325 Work effort:

effect of Social Security on, 421 and minimum wage, 363 tax incentives for, 435

Workforce, 89, 188, 190, 233, 244, 478, 491 Work stoppages, 484 Worker productivity, economic growth and, 232–233 WorldCom, 475 World Trade Center (WTC), 472, 499–500, 503 World Trade Organization (WTO), 238, 242 WTC (World Trade Center), 499–500 WTO (World Trade Organization), 238, 242

X X-axis, 15–16, 18 Xerox, 475 X-intercept, 16 XM radio, 322–323

Y Y-axis, 15–16, 18 Yield curve, 104, 141 Yinger, John, 338 Y-intercept, 16

Z Zimbalist, Andrew, 466

gue46399_index_505-528.indd 526 16/03/17 2:43 PM

  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Table of Contents
  • Preface
  • Issues for Different Course Themes
  • Required Theory Table
  • Chapter 1 Economics: The Study of Opportunity Cost
    • Economics and Opportunity Cost
      • Economics Defined
      • Choices Have Consequences
    • Modeling Opportunity Cost Using the Production Possibilities Frontier
      • The Intuition behind Our First Graph
      • The Starting Point for a Production Possibilities Frontier
      • Points between the Extremes of a Production Possibilities Frontier
    • Attributes of the Production Possibilities Frontier
      • Increasing and Constant Opportunity Cost
    • Economic Growth
      • How Is Growth Modeled?
      • Sources of Economic Growth
    • The Big Picture
      • Circular Flow Model: A Model That Shows the Interactions of All Economic Actors
    • Thinking Economically
      • Marginal Analysis
      • Positive and Normative Analysis
      • Economic Incentives
      • Fallacy of Composition
      • Correlation &#8800; Causation
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Demonstrating Constant and Increasing Opportunity Cost on a Production Possibilities Frontier
      • Demonstrating Increasing Opportunity Cost
      • Demonstrating Constant Opportunity Cost
    • Summary
    • Appendix 1A: Graphing: Yes, You Can.
    • Cartesian Coordinates
    • Please! Not Y = MX + B … Sorry.
    • What on God's Green Earth Does This Have to Do with Economics?
  • Chapter 2 Supply and Demand
    • Supply and Demand Defined
      • Markets
      • Quantity Demanded and Quantity Supplied
      • Ceteris Paribus
      • Demand and Supply
    • The Supply and Demand Model
      • Demand
      • Supply
      • Equilibrium
      • Shortages and Surpluses
    • All about Demand
      • The Law of Demand
      • Why Does the Law of Demand Make Sense?
    • All about Supply
      • The Law of Supply
      • Why Does the Law of Supply Make Sense?
    • Determinants of Demand
      • Taste
      • Income
      • Price of Other Goods
      • Population of Potential Buyers
      • Expected Price
      • Excise Taxes
      • Subsidies
      • The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of Demand on the Supply and Demand Model
    • Determinants of Supply
      • Price of Inputs
      • Technology
      • Price of Other Potential Outputs
      • Number of Sellers
      • Expected Price
      • Excise Taxes
      • Subsidies
      • The Effect of Changes in the Determinants of Supply on the Supply and Demand Model
    • The Effect of Changes in Price Expectations on the Supply and Demand Model
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Why the New Equilibrium?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 3 The Concept of Elasticity and Consumer and Producer Surplus
    • Elasticity of Demand
      • Intuition
      • Definition of Elasticity and Its Formula
      • Elasticity Labels
    • Alternative Ways to Understand Elasticity
      • The Graphical Explanation
      • The Verbal Explanation
      • Seeing Elasticity through Total Expenditures
    • More on Elasticity
      • Determinants of Elasticity of Demand
      • Elasticity and the Demand Curve
      • Elasticity of Supply
      • Determinants of the Elasticity of Supply
    • Consumer and Producer Surplus
      • Consumer Surplus
      • Producer Surplus
      • Market Failure
      • Categorizing Goods
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Deadweight Loss
    • Summary
  • Chapter 4 Firm Production, Cost, and Revenue
    • Production
      • Just Words
      • Graphical Explanation
      • Numerical Example
    • Costs
      • Just Words
      • Numerical Example
    • Revenue
      • Just Words
      • Numerical Example
    • Maximizing Profit
      • Graphical Explanation
      • Numerical Example
    • Summary
  • Chapter 5 Perfect Competition, Monopoly, and Economic versus Normal Profit
    • From Perfect Competition to Monopoly
      • Perfect Competition
      • Monopoly
      • Monopolistic Competition
      • Oligopoly
      • Which Model Fits Reality
    • Supply under Perfect Competition
      • Normal versus Economic Profit
      • When and Why Economic Profits Go to Zero
      • Why Supply Is Marginal Cost under Perfect Competition
      • Just Words
      • Numerical Example
      • Graphical Explanation
    • Summary
  • Chapter 6 Every Macroeconomic Word You Ever Heard: Gross Domestic Product, Inflation, Unemployment, Recession, and Depression
    • Measuring the Economy
      • Measuring Nominal Output
      • Measuring Prices and Inflation
      • Problems Measuring Inflation
    • Real Gross Domestic Product and Why It Is Not Synonymous with Social Welfare
      • Real Gross Domestic Product
      • Problems with Real GDP
    • Measuring and Describing Unemployment
      • Measuring Unemployment
      • Problems Measuring Unemployment
      • Types of Unemployment
    • Productivity
      • Measuring and Describing Productivity
    • Seasonal Adjustment
    • Business Cycles
    • Kick It Up a Notch: National Income and Product Accounting
    • Summary
  • Chapter 7 Interest Rates and Present Value
    • Interest Rates
      • The Market for Money
      • Nominal Interest Rates versus Real Interest Rates
    • Present Value
      • Simple Calculations
      • Mortgages, Car Payments, and Other Multipayment Examples
    • Future Value
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Risk and Reward
    • Summary
  • Chapter 8 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
    • Aggregate Demand
      • Definition
      • Why Aggregate Demand Is Downward Sloping
    • Aggregate Supply
      • Definition
      • Competing Views of the Shape of Aggregate Supply
    • Shifts in Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
      • Variables That Shift Aggregate Demand
      • Variables That Shift Aggregate Supply
    • Causes of Inflation
    • How the Government Can Influence (but Probably Not Control) the Economy
      • Demand-Side Macroeconomics
      • Supply-Side Macroeconomics
    • Summary
  • Chapter 9 Fiscal Policy
    • Nondiscretionary and Discretionary Fiscal Policy
      • How They Work
      • Using Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand to Model Fiscal Policy
    • Using Fiscal Policy to Counteract "Shocks"
      • Aggregate Demand Shocks
      • Aggregate Supply Shocks
    • Evaluating Fiscal Policy
      • Nondiscretionary Fiscal Policy
      • Discretionary Fiscal Policy
      • The Political Problems with Fiscal Policy
      • Criticism from the Right and Left
      • The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Discretionary Fiscal Policy
    • The Obama Stimulus Plan
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Aggregate Supply Shocks
    • Summary
  • Chapter 10 Monetary Policy
    • Goals, Tools, and a Model of Monetary Policy
      • Goals of Monetary Policy
      • Traditional and Ordinary Tools of Monetary Policy
      • Modeling Monetary Policy
      • The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
      • The Additional Tools of Monetary Policy Created in 2008
    • Central Bank Independence
    • Modern Monetary Policy
      • The Last 30 Years
    • Summary
  • Chapter 11 Federal Spending
    • A Primer on the Constitution and Spending Money
      • What the Constitution Says
      • Shenanigans
      • Dealing with Disagreements
    • Using Our Understanding of Opportunity Cost
      • Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending
      • Where the Money Goes
    • Using Our Understanding of Marginal Analysis
      • The Size of the Federal Government
      • The Distribution of Federal Spending
    • Budgeting for the Future
      • Baseline versus Current-Services Budgeting
    • Summary
  • Chapter 12 Federal Deficits, Surpluses, and the National Debt
    • Surpluses, Deficits, and the Debt: Definitions and History
      • Definitions
      • History
    • How Economists See the Deficit and the Debt
      • Operating and Capital Budgets
      • Cyclical and Structural Deficits
      • The Debt as a Percentage of GDP
      • International Comparisons
      • Generational Accounting
    • Who Owns the Debt?
      • Externally Held Debt
    • A Balanced-Budget Amendment
    • Projections
    • Summary
  • Chapter 13 The Housing Bubble
    • How Much Is a House Really Worth?
    • Mortgages
    • How to Make a Bubble
    • Pop Goes the Bubble!
    • The Effect on the Overall Economy
    • Summary
  • Chapter 14 The Recession of 2007–2009: Causes and Policy Responses
    • Before It Began
    • Late 2007: The Recession Begins as Do the Initial Policy Reactions
    • The Bottom Falls Out in Fall 2008
    • The Obama Stimulus Package
    • Extraordinary Monetary Stimulus
    • Summary
  • Chapter 15 Is Economic Stagnation the New Normal?
    • Periods of Robust Economic Growth
    • Sources of Growth
    • Causes and Consequences of Slowing Growth
      • Causes
      • Consequences
    • What Can Be Done to Jump-Start Growth, or Is This the New Normal?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 16 Is the (Fiscal) Sky Falling?: An Examination of Unfunded Social Security, Medicare, and State and Local Pension Liabilities
    • What Is the Source of the Problem?
    • How Big Is the Social Security and Medicare Problem?
    • How Big Is the State and Local Pension Problem?
    • Is It Possible That the Fiscal Sky Isn't About to Fall?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 17 International Trade: Does It Jeopardize American Jobs?
    • What We Trade and with Whom
    • The Benefits of International Trade
      • Comparative and Absolute Advantage
      • Demonstrating the Gains from Trade
      • Production Possibilities Frontier Analysis
      • Supply and Demand Analysis
      • Whom Does Trade Harm?
    • Trade Barriers
      • Reasons for Limiting Trade
      • Methods of Limiting Trade
    • Trade as a Diplomatic Weapon
    • Kick It Up a Notch: Costs of Protectionism
    • Summary
  • Chapter 18 International Finance and Exchange Rates
    • International Financial Transactions
    • Foreign Exchange Markets
    • Alternative Foreign Exchange Systems
    • Determinants of Exchange Rates
    • Summary
  • Chapter 19 European Debt Crisis
    • In the Beginning There Were 17 Currencies in 17 Countries
    • The Effect of the Euro
    • Why Couldn't They Pull Themselves Out? The United States Did
    • Is It Too Late to Leave the Euro?
    • Where Should Europe Go from Here?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 20 Economic Growth and Development
    • Growth in Already Developed Countries
    • Comparing Developed Countries and Developing Countries
    • Fostering (and Inhibiting) Development
      • The Challenges Facing Developing Countries
      • What Works
    • Summary
  • Chapter 21 NAFTA, CAFTA, GATT, TPP, WTO: Are Trade Agreements Good for Us?
    • The Benefits of Free Trade
    • Why Do We Need Trade Agreements?
      • Strategic Trade
      • Special Interests
      • What Trade Agreements Prevent
    • Trade Agreements and Institutions
      • Alphabet Soup
      • Are They Working?
    • Economic and Political Impacts of Trade
    • The Bottom Line
    • Summary
  • Chapter 22 The Line between Legal and Illegal Goods
    • An Economic Model of Tobacco, Alcohol, and Illegal Goods and Services
    • Why Is Regulation Warranted?
      • The Information Problem
      • External Costs
      • Morality Issues
    • Taxes on Tobacco and Alcohol
      • Modeling Taxes
      • The Tobacco Settlement and Why Elasticity Matters
    • Why Are Certain Goods and Services Illegal?
      • The Impact of Decriminalization on the Market for the Goods
      • The External Costs of Decriminalization
    • Summary
  • Chapter 23 Natural Resources, the Environment, and Climate Change
    • Using Natural Resources
    • How Clean Is Clean Enough?
    • The Externalities Approach
      • When the Market Works for Everyone
      • When the Market Does Not Work for Everyone
    • The Property Rights Approach to the Environment and Natural Resources
      • Why You Do Not Mess Up Your Own Property
      • Why You Do Mess Up Common Property
      • Natural Resources and the Importance of Property Rights
    • Environmental Problems and Their Economic Solutions
      • Environmental Problems
      • Economic Solutions: Using Taxes to Solve Environmental Problems
      • Economic Solutions: Using Property Rights to Solve Environmental Problems
      • No Solution: When There Is No Government to Tax or Regulate
    • Summary
  • Chapter 24 Health Care
    • Where the Money Goes and Where It Comes From
    • Insurance in the United States
      • How Insurance Works
      • Varieties of Private Insurance
      • Public Insurance
    • Economic Models of Health Care
      • Why Health Care Is Not Just Another Good
      • Implications of Public Insurance
      • Efficiency Problems with Private Insurance
      • Major Changes to Insurance Resulting from PPACA
      • The Blood and Organ Problem
    • Comparing the United States with the Rest of the World
    • Summary
  • Chapter 25 Government-Provided Health Insurance: Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children's Health Insurance Program
    • Medicaid: What, Who, and How Much
    • Why Medicaid Costs So Much
      • Why Spending Is Greater on the Elderly
      • Cost-Saving Measures in Medicaid
    • Medicare: Public Insurance and the Elderly
      • Why Private Insurance May Not Work
      • Why Medicare's Costs Are High
    • Medicare's Nuts and Bolts
      • Provider Types
      • Part A
      • Part B
      • Prescription Drug Coverage (Part D)
      • Cost Control Provisions in Medicare
    • The Medicare Trust Fund
      • The Relationship between Medicaid and Medicare
    • Children's Health Insurance Program
    • Summary
  • Chapter 26 The Economics of Prescription Drugs
    • Profiteers or Benevolent Scientists?
    • Monopoly Power Applied to Drugs
    • Important Questions
      • Expensive Necessities or Relatively Inexpensive Godsends?
      • Price Controls: Are They the Answer?
      • FDA Approval: Too Stringent or Too Lax?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 27 So You Want to Be a Lawyer: Economics and the Law
    • Private Property
      • Intellectual Property
      • Contracts
      • Enforcing Various Property Rights and Contracts
      • Negative Consequences of Private Property Rights
    • Bankruptcy
    • Civil Liability
    • Summary
  • Chapter 28 The Economics of Crime
    • Who Commits Crimes and Why
    • The Rational Criminal Model
      • Crime Falls When Legal Income Rises
      • Crime Falls When the Likelihood and Consequences of Getting Caught Rise
      • Problems with the Rationality Assumption
    • The Costs of Crime
      • How Much Does an Average Crime Cost?
      • How Much Crime Does an Average Criminal Commit?
    • Optimal Spending on Crime Control
      • What Is the Optimal Amount to Spend?
      • Is the Money Spent in the Right Way?
      • Are the Right People in Jail?
      • What Laws Should We Rigorously Enforce?
      • What Is the Optimal Sentence?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 29 Antitrust
    • What's Wrong with Monopoly?
      • High Prices, Low Output, and Deadweight Loss
      • Reduced Innovation
    • Natural Monopolies and Necessary Monopolies
      • Natural Monopoly
      • Patents, Copyrights, and Other Necessary Monopolies
    • Monopolies and the Law
      • The Sherman Anti-Trust Act
      • What Constitutes a Monopoly?
    • Examples of Antitrust Action
      • Standard Oil
      • IBM
      • Microsoft
      • Apple, Google, and the European Union
    • Summary
  • Chapter 30 The Economics of Race and Sex Discrimination
    • The Economic Status of Women and Minorities
      • Women
      • Minorities
    • Definitions and Detection of Discrimination
      • Discrimination, Definitions, and the Law
      • Detecting and Measuring Discrimination
    • Discrimination in Labor, Consumption, and Lending
      • Labor Market Discrimination
      • Consumption Market and Lending Market Discrimination
    • Affirmative Action
      • The Economics of Affirmative Action
      • What Is Affirmative Action?
      • Gradations of Affirmative Action
    • Summary
  • Chapter 31 Income and Wealth Inequality: What's Fair?
    • Measurement of Inequality
      • Income Inequality
      • Wealth Inequality
    • The Shrinking Middle Class
    • Causes of Household Income and Wealth Inequality
    • Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality
    • Summary
  • Chapter 32 Farm Policy
    • Farm Prices Since 1950
      • Corn and Gasoline
    • Price Variation as a Justification for Government Intervention
      • The Case for Price Supports
      • The Case against Price Supports
    • Consumer and Producer Surplus Analysis of Price Floors
      • One Floor in One Market
      • Variable Floors in Multiple Markets
      • What Would Happen without Price Supports?
    • Price Support Mechanisms and Their History
      • Price Support Mechanisms
      • History of Price Supports
    • Is There a Bubble on the Farm?
    • Kick It Up a Notch
    • Summary
  • Chapter 33 Minimum Wage
    • Traditional Economic Analysis of a Minimum Wage
      • Labor Markets and Consumer and Producer Surplus
      • A Relevant versus an Irrelevant Minimum Wage
      • What Is Wrong with a Minimum Wage?
      • Real-World Implications of the Minimum Wage
      • Alternatives to the Minimum Wage
    • Rebuttals to the Traditional Analysis
      • The Macroeconomics Argument
      • The Work Effort Argument
      • The Elasticity Argument
    • Where Are Economists Now?
    • Kick It Up a Notch
    • Summary
  • Chapter 34 Ticket Brokers and Ticket Scalping
    • Defining Brokering and Scalping
    • An Economic Model of Ticket Sales
      • Marginal Cost
      • The Promoter as Monopolist
      • The Perfect Arena
    • Why Promoters Charge Less Than They Could
    • An Economic Model of Scalping
    • Legitimate Scalpers
    • Summary
  • Chapter 35 Rent Control
    • Rents in a Free Market
    • Reasons for Controlling Rents
    • Consequences of Rent Control
    • Why Does Rent Control Survive?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 36 The Economics of K–12 Education
    • Investments in Human Capital
      • Present Value Analysis
      • External Benefits
    • Should We Spend More?
      • The Basic Data
      • Cautions about Quick Conclusions
      • Literature on Whether More Money Will Improve Educational Outcomes
    • School Reform Issues
      • The Public School Monopoly
      • Merit Pay and Tenure
      • Private versus Public Education
      • School Vouchers
      • Collective Bargaining
    • Summary
  • Chapter 37 College and University Education: Why Is It So Expensive?
    • Why Are the Costs So High?
    • Why Are College Costs Rising So Fast?
    • Why Have Textbook Costs Risen So Rapidly?
    • What a College Degree Is Worth
    • How Do People Pay for College?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 38 Poverty and Welfare
    • Measuring Poverty
      • The Poverty Line
      • Who's Poor?
      • Poverty through History
      • Problems with Our Measure of Poverty
      • Poverty in the United States versus Europe
    • Programs for the Poor
      • In Kind versus In Cash
      • Why Spend $789 Billion on a $96 Billion Problem?
      • Is $789 Billion Even a Lot Compared to Other Countries?
    • Incentives, Disincentives, Myths, and Truths
    • Welfare Reform
      • Is There a Solution?
      • Welfare as We Now Know It
      • Is Poverty Necessarily Bad?
    • Summary
  • Chapter 39 Head Start
    • Head Start as an Investment
      • The Early Intervention Premise
      • Present Value Analysis
      • External Benefits
      • The Early Evidence
      • The Remaining Doubts
    • The Head Start Program
    • The Current Evidence
      • Evidence that Head Start Works
      • Evidence that Head Start Does Not Work
      • More Evidence Is Coming and Some Is In
    • The Opportunity Cost of Fully Funding Head Start
    • Summary
  • Chapter 40 Social Security
    • The Basics
      • The Beginning
      • Taxes
      • Benefits
      • Changes over Time
    • Why Do We Need Social Security?
    • Social Security's Effect on the Economy
      • Effect on Work
      • Effect on Saving
    • Whom Is the Program Good For?
    • Will the System Be There for Me?
      • Why Social Security Is in Trouble
      • The Social Security Trust Fund
      • Options for Fixing Social Security
    • Summary
  • Chapter 41 Personal Income Taxes
    • How Income Taxes Work
    • Issues in Income Taxation
      • Horizontal and Vertical Equity
      • Equity versus Simplicity
    • Incentives and the Tax Code
      • Do Taxes Alter Work Decisions?
      • Do Taxes Alter Savings Decisions?
      • Taxes for Social Engineering
    • Who Pays Income Taxes?
    • The Tax Debates of the Last Two Decades
    • Summary
  • Chapter 42 Energy Prices
    • The Historical View
      • Oil and Gasoline Price History
      • Geopolitical History
      • A Return to Irrelevancy
    • OPEC
      • What OPEC Tries to Do
      • How Cartels Work
      • Why Cartels Are Not Stable
      • Back from the Dead
    • Why Do Prices Change So Fast?
      • Is It All a Conspiracy?
      • From $1 to $4 per Gallon in 10 Years?
    • Electric Utilities
      • Electricity Production
      • Why Are Electric Utilities a Regulated Monopoly?
    • What Will the Future Hold?
    • Kick It Up a Notch
    • Summary
  • Chapter 43 If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Sports Questions
    • The Problem for Cities
      • Expansion versus Luring a Team
      • Does a Team Enhance the Local Economy?
      • Why Are Stadiums Publicly Funded?
    • The Problem for Owners
      • To Move or to Stay
      • To Win or to Profit
      • Don't Feel Sorry for Them Just Yet
    • The Sports Labor Market
      • What Owners Will Pay
      • What Players Will Accept
    • The Vocabulary of Sports Economics
      • What a Monopoly Will Do for You
    • Summary
  • Chapter 44 The Stock Market and Crashes
    • Stock Prices
      • How Stock Prices Are Determined
      • What Stock Markets Do
    • Efficient Markets
    • Stock Market Crashes
      • Bubbles
      • Example of a Crash: NASDAQ 2000
    • The Accounting Scandals of 2001 and 2002
      • Bankruptcy
      • Why Capitalism Needs Bankruptcy Laws
      • The Kmart and Global Crossing Cases
      • What Happened in the Enron Case
      • Why the Enron Case Matters More Than the Others
    • Rebound of 2006–2007 and the Drop of 2008–2009
    • Summary
  • Chapter 45 Unions
    • Why Unions Exist
      • The Perfectly Competitive Labor Market
      • A Reaction to Monopsony
      • A Way to Restrict Competition and Improve Quality
      • A Reaction to Information Issues
    • A Union as a Monopolist
    • The History of Labor Unions
    • Where Unions Go from Here
    • Kick It Up a Notch
    • Summary
  • Chapter 46 Walmart: Always Low Prices (and Low Wages)—Always
    • The Market Form
    • Who Is Affected?
      • Most Consumers Stand to Gain—Some Lose Options
      • Workers Probably Lose
      • Sales Tax Revenues Won't Be Affected Much
      • Some Businesses Will Get Hurt; Others Will Be Helped
      • Community Effects
    • Summary
  • Chapter 47 The Economic Impact of Casino and Sports Gambling
    • The Perceived Impact of Casino Gambling
    • Local Substitution
    • The "Modest" Upside of Casino Gambling
    • The Economic Reasons for Opposing Casino Gambling
    • Sports Gambling and Daily Fantasy
    • Summary
  • Chapter 48 The Economics of Terrorism
    • The Economic Impact of September 11th and of Terrorism in General
    • Modeling the Economic Impact of the Attacks
      • Insurance Aspects of Terrorism
      • Buy Insurance or Self-Protect or Both
    • Terrorism from the Perspective of the Terrorist
    • Summary
  • Index
    • A
    • B
    • C
    • D
    • E
    • F
    • G
    • H
    • I
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    • L
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    • N
    • O
    • P
    • Q
    • R
    • S
    • T
    • U
    • V
    • W
    • X
    • Y
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    2. Preflight Ticket Signature