Paper edited

14 June 2020

Iraq War is a historical event that took place in 2003 and ended in 2011. It was a conflict in Iraq with two phases, with the first phase occurring between March and April 2003 whereby combined armed forces from Great Britain and the United States pervaded Iraq and quickly conquered Iraqi military and paramilitary armies. A prolonged second phase followed the invasion, in which the United States' decision to occupy Iraq suffered a blow from an insurgency. In 2007, the war started to decline, and the U.S. began to call back its military in Iraq until the end of 2011 when it completely withdrew its forces in Iraq. The operational art and design in Iraq War comprise progressing through tactical, operational, and strategic transitions, meaning that military leaders are artists responsible for combat operations.

The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by Iraq came under significant defeat by a U.S.-led alliance in the Persian Gulf War. Despite the defeat, the Bath Party, a branch of Iraqi led by Saddam Hussein, successfully retained power by severely suppressing the minority group, Kurds, and the majority Shiite Arabs. Hussein concentrated on his command capabilities of power to defeat other forces on the way (Echevarria II, 2016). Kurds' allies created a "safe haven" in northern predominantly Kurdish parts of Iraq, where allied warplanes safeguarded "no-fly" zones in the north and south Iraq, which were out of bounds to aircraft belonging to Iraq.

The United Nations (U.N.) enforced economic sanctions against Iraq to disable latter’s aggression for making lethal firearms such as nuclear and chemical arms. The United States, under President Bill Clinton in 1998, gave a military directive of bombing various Iraqi military installations to undermine countries' development of chemical weapons. In contrast, the British military got involved in helping train local security troops, assisted with reconstruction, and provided humanitarian aid (Godfroy & Collins, 2019). Through this counterinsurgency by the British soldiers, British forces could easily stabilize and secure the country after they successfully deposed Saddam Hussein. The British "soft posture" technique to counterinsurgency became less viable, and was opposed to the excessive use of force by U.S. troops. Winning over the "heart and minds" of the Iraqi populace was challenging as British troops in Basra and Maysan faced increased attacks.

The United President, George W. Bush, had many times attempted to link the regime of Iraq ruler, Saddam Hussein, with Al Qaeda to justify the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. military. In Autumn 2006, the British increased its withdrawal rate of troops from military bases in Basra under Major-General Jonathan Shaw, who was a new commander. At this surge time, the United States, under the military leadership of General David Petraeus, launched a new technique that included increased troops in Iraq and retaking major towns and cities (Mhamdi, 2017). General David designed this "surge" strategy to improve the stabilization of Iraq and withdraw of troops that were perceived as a military defeat for the United States.

The pre-surge tactic in Iraq depended on soldiers operating from forwarding Operating Bases (FOBs), carrying out strikes and raids, and devolving control of the battlespace to Iraqi units. The United States had its troops focusing on "transitioning more responsibility to the people of Iraq, minimizing Iraqi troops footprint, lowering the number of headquarters that Iraqi soldiers had, and returning the responsibility for the mission to the Iraqi forces." In Iraq, the United States, the military did not embark on counterinsurgency operations, and their engagement approach failed to minimize or curb the insurgent activity (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). The number of soldiers guarding and making patrols from FOBs was unable to reduce insurgent activity, and the number of American soldiers to neutralize insurgent-infested regions was not enough.

The tactics and location of the United States military enabled enemy combatants to ensure operations in a region and wooed the local population to offer tactics, if not direct, support. This operational environment fostered insurgent groups because, "when the community lacked security, the fear worsened, and that was the time when Al-Qaeda came to power." The United States troops lacked in the area, an incidence that forced the population to change to other groups for security, specifically in communities where sectarian purges prevailed. The emergency of Al-Qaeda marked a significant shift in counterinsurgency tactics and operations for clearing regions and interfering combatant operations (Schuldenrein, Trimble, Malin‐Boyce, & Smith, 2017). The U.S. General David Petraeus, employed multinational planning and coordination strategy to command a Multinational Force-Iraq in 2007 to defeat insurgents.

Commanders of the United States military continued to focus on collaborations with local people to attain their participation and involvement in the new political order. The U.S. military new surge strategies became effective as local tribes in the area realized that the U.S. military was to camp in their region for some time, and they can control their territory through alignment with the troops. The residents where the U.S. troops had set base, viewed that by not participating in the political process or security process, the troops would leave them behind immediately the situation normalizes, security improves (Schuldenrein et al., 2017). As a result of this perception, local tribes advocated for reconciliation and sacrificed young men to join the military to help the U.S. troops in bringing peace. These commanders' shift in tactics (collaboration and building operations), the situation on the operating environment improved, and tactics proved effective by winning the support of local tribes in the fight against the enemy in Iraq.

Further, the U.S. military under General David Petraeus used holding military techniques in its operating environment to carry out its operations successfully. When the war started to decline in 2007, the military altered its operation from being clearing areas of insurgents to holding secured region and developing upon security improvements through economic and political commitments. The U.S. troops assisted Iraq is transforming its military as well as rebuilding capabilities for area secured from militants (Mhamdi, 2017). The U.S. military played a critical role in helping the establishment of local government to ensure long-term stability in the region in which the newly reformed Iraqi military could deal with al-Qaeda.

A decision to change the focus of the military from internal security to external defense was a strategy by the United States. What the United States the United States military to overcome insurgency becomes less needed. The military realized the conditions started to become right; the hence small military force required. This change in composition and size changed the military type of training and equipment required (Echevarria II, 2016). The United States military experienced growth to satisfy the counterinsurgency campaign's needs by building military capabilities such as up-armored support war vehicles, protected mobility military tanks, and infantry carriers, which are required in counterinsurgency and to establish a base for military self-defense force.

The sending of more soldiers in Iraq in 2007 and the formation of military collaborations were a strategy to avoid defeat and establish conditions for potential success in the war. The United States tried intellectual surge between 2003 and 2006, whereby this intellectual change would result in physical change. The published military counterinsurgency field manual and phased detailed conversation and learning revealed a strategy for countering surge in the way (Godfroy & Collins, 2019). The manual, together with the rethinking of the United States and collaboration strategy, led to a properly designed counterinsurgency strategy that aligns with the situations or circumstances in Iraq. The counteroffensive pushed al-Qaeda among other insurgents from their safe havens "operating environment" while exposing their networks of operations and leaders, allowing them to experience risks of being attacked under the set conditions favorable to the Coalition and Iraq military.

Through the established U.S.-Iraq military Coalition, the U.S. commander easily evaluated military protection, risks, casualties, nature of the operational environment, and chances of defeating an enemy. This evaluation of the war got a boost from the U.S. military capabilities such as increased robotics and automation of the war equipment since the new technology minimized human skills in tactical interactions (Godfroy & Collins, 2019). The U.S. military competency above combat tactics, especially among ground Army is well prepared to deal with the insurgency and sectarian conflicts emerging in Iraq after regime change.

Conclusively, the United States military proved its operational art and design in the Iraq War by using different operational tactics to defeat the enemy. Iraq War provided an opportunity for combat training and strategic competency of troops through insurgent and counterinsurgency experiences as well as social details of Iraq as the host country. The execution of various complex civil and military operations attributed to operational, tactical, and strategic transmissions in the operating environment. The surge period in Iraq gave a situation of capability testing for the military and its alignment to the tactics and strategies in operating environment based on operational art and design concepts.

References

Echevarria II, A. J. (2016). Rediscovering US military strategy: A role for doctrine. Journal of Strategic Studies, 39(2), 231-245.

Godfroy, J., & Collins, L. (2019). Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 30(1), 140-175.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint publication 5-0: Joint planning.

Mhamdi, C. (2017). Framing “the Other” in Times of Conflicts: CNN’s Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 8(2), 147-153.

Schuldenrein, J., Trimble, M. K., Malin‐Boyce, S., & Smith, M. (2017). Geoarchaeology, forensics, and the prosecution of Saddam Hussein: a case study from the Iraq War (2003–2011). Geoarchaeology, 32(1), 130-156.