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Acclaim for Brian Orend’s Introduction to International Studies

“Th ere are several reasons why this book is badly needed and so well conceived. First, it is clearly written, and its arguments, while based upon a solid understanding of the most sophisticated of recent scholarship, will be well understood by undergraduates. Second, the approach is genuinely interdisciplinary. Dr Orend has an impressive command of the central debates not only in philosophy, his own discipline, but also in economics, international relations, political science, and history. Th ird, Introduction to International Studies incorporates Canada within the discussion of international policy. Th e inclusion of Canada refl ects not nationalism but rather a recognition that a focus on great powers alone can distort a broader understanding of relations between states.

“I am sure that undergraduates and others within and beyond the university will enjoy and greatly profi t from Brian Orend’s extraordinary Introduction to International Studies.”

— John English, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Waterloo

“Brian Orend’s book does justice to the daunting scope and complexity of international studies without compromising substance and critical refl ection. Th ough billed as an introduction, his work presents the fascinating features and amazing transformations of our globalized world with mastery and clarity so as to inspire genuine interest and active engagement. Adeptly weaving historical and conceptual backgrounds with contemporary debates and current events, Orend off ers novices and experts alike a treasure trove of refreshing insights.”

—Th omas Pogge, Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Aff airs, Yale University

“No other book on the market addresses international studies this way. . . . It has a very clear format and brings the interdisciplinary element of international studies to the forefront.”

—Logan Masilamani, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University

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For Jenny,

with love and joy!

1

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Orend, Brian, 1971– Introduction to international studies / Brian Orend.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–19–543938–0

1. World politics. 2. World history. 3. Civilization. 4. War. 5. Globalization. 6. Competition, International.

7. World health. I. Title.

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Contents

Acknowledgements xii

Introduction xiii Interdisciplinarity xiii Chapter Structure xiv Literacy in International Studies xv Chapter Ordering and Rationale xvi Conclusion xviii Notes xviii

Part I Setting the World Stage

1 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts 2 Learning Objectives 2 Introduction 2 Countries 2 State Formation 7 End of European Imperialism 14 North versus South 16 Th e West versus “Th e Rest” 19 Case Study: Th e American Empire? 23 Conclusion 30 Review Questions 31 Websites for Further Research 32 Notes 32

2 Population and Environment 34 Learning Objectives 34 Introduction 34 Population 35 Case Study: Th e French Ban on Muslim Head Scarves 39 Case Study: Th e Darfur Region of Sudan 41 Transition from Human Population to Natural Environment 46 Environment and Resources 46 Optimism versus Pessimism 60 Conclusion 63 Review Questions 63 Websites for Further Research 64 Notes 64

viii Contents

3 Comparative Culture 67 Learning Objectives 67 Introduction 67 Th e Structure and Ideology of the State 68 Case Study: Iran’s Religious Regime 69 Case Study: Classical Liberalism in the United States 72 Case Study: Socialist Societies, both Moderate and Democratic, and Extreme and Communist 73 Religion 76 Case Study: Th e Arab–Israeli Confl ict 84 Case Study: Tibet and China 91 Conclusion 94 Review Questions 94 Websites for Further Research 95 Notes 95

Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

4 Foreign Policy and International Politics 98 Learning Objectives 98 Introduction 98 Th e Powers 99 Emerging Powers 102 Declining Powers 105 Th e Goals of Foreign Policy in General 106 Th e Tools of Foreign Policy 111 Case Study: Can–Am Relations 115 Conclusion 121 Review Questions 122 Websites for Further Research 123 Notes 123

5 International Law and Organization 125 Learning Objectives 125 Introduction 125 International Law 126 Th e Process of Treaty-Making 128 International Organization 133 Case Study: Th e Birth of an International Institution 142 Review Questions 149 Websites for Further Research 150 Notes 150

ixContents

Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

6 International Trade and Business 154 Learning Objectives 154 Introduction 154 Summarizing the Drivers of Economic Growth 155 International Trade 160 Case Study: Asia and Export-Led Development 168 International Business 177 Conclusion 182 Review Questions 183 Websites for Further Research 184 Notes 184

7 Armed Confl ict, Part 1: Causes and Outbreak 186 Learning Objectives 186 Introduction 186 War Defi ned 187 War’s Costs and Casualties 188 What Causes War, and Is Th ere a Solution? 189 Regulating the Outbreak of War 195 Case Study: A Tale of Two Recent Wars: Afghanistan and Iraq 200 Conclusion 209 Review Questions 209 Websites for Further Research 210 Notes 210

8 Armed Confl ict, Part 2: Methods and Aft ermaths 213 Learning Objectives 213 Introduction 213 Defi ning Some Military Terms 213 Fighting a War 219 Case Study: Th e My Lai Massacre 221 Case Study: Child Soldiers 223 Jus Post Bellum: Aft ermath 228 Case Study: Two Examples of the Retribution Model 231 Case Study: Reconstructing Germany and Japan 233 Case Study: Reconstruction Models Applied to Afghanistan and Iraq 238 Conclusion 241 Review Questions 242 Websites for Further Research 243 Notes 243

x Contents

Part IV Newer Issues of Soft Power: Improving Well-Being

9 Human Rights 248 Learning Objectives 248 Introduction 248 Recent Human Rights History 248 Completing the Values Picture: Th e Point of Human Rights 251 Realizing Human Rights 253 International Human Rights Law 256 Case Study: Th e European Human Rights System 262 Other Tools for Human Rights 262 Case Study: Th e Arab Spring 265 Human Rights NGOs 267 Women’s Human Rights 268 Conclusion 273 Review Questions 273 Websites for Further Research 274 Notes 275

10 Global Public Health 277 Learning Objectives 277 Introduction 277 Health and History 278 Global Public Health and Other Fields of International Studies 279 What is Health? 281 What is Public Health? 282 Case Study: John Snow and the Tracing of a Cholera Outbreak 283 A Tale of Two Cities: North versus South 287 Case Study: Th e Global Tobacco Epidemic 290 A Tale of Two Neighbourhoods: North versus North 294 Global Poverty and Health Inequality 297 Case Study: Maternal Health 298 Th e Other Side of Darkness 299 Case Study: Smallpox 299 Conclusion 301 Review Questions 303 Websites for Further Research 304 Notes 304

11 International Aid and Development 307 Learning Objectives 307 Introduction 307 Why Should the Developed World Care? 308

xiContents

Aid versus Development 308 Rival Concepts of Development 310 Sources of Development Assistance 312 Th e Th ree Waves of Development 318 Case Study: Micro-Finance 326 Conclusion 330 Review Questions 330 Websites for Further Research 331 Notes 331

12 Conclusion 333 Could World Government Be the Solution? 334 Kant’s Cosmopolitan Federation 341 Conclusion: Bottom-Up Pluralism, Revisited 343 Notes 344

Glossary 345

Index 353

Acknowledgements

I’d like to thank Oxford University Press for its commitment to this book. Th e idea for such a volume came to me long ago. Oxford, happily, saw its promise immediately, and proceeded to sign me up. Th en they waited for me to deliver. Th ey waited too long, and I thank them, with great appreciation, for their patience.

Special thanks are due to Patti Sayle and Eric Sinkins, my talented and gracious edi- tors. Th anks, too, to all the great production and design team, the permissions department, and the anonymous reviewers who saw a really rough draft , and whose constructive criti- cism improved the whole work substantially.

Above all, I am deeply grateful to my acquisitions editor, Katherine Skene, whose original enthusiasm for the book never faltered, and without whom, there would simply be no book at all. Th anks so much, Kate!

I wrote this book on a big black desk, bought for me as a gift by my grandmother, Alvena Schuett. She died recently, and I’m grateful for her memory, and for her love and support, together with that of my grandfather, Dr Leo Schuett.

Th anks, as always, to my family, for all their love and support: my mom, Mary Lou Orend; my father-in-law, Barry Turk; and my sister, Krista Vines. Particular thanks must go to my super-special son, Sam. It has been a total blast watching you grow into such an incredible young man. Our shared times—and Superbowls—are a ton of fun (especially when the G-men keep beating Brady!) Being your dad is the best.

More than anyone, Jennifer McWhirter deserves my deepest thanks and gratitude. She’s my talented co-author on the global public health chapter—one of the book’s most important—and has aided the whole book’s development in countless wonderful ways. I can hardly express how amazing our journey together has been. Jenny, this book is dedi- cated to you with abundant joy and abiding love.

Brian Orend April 2012

It is a joy to teach international studies. And I mean international studies, and not inter- national relations. Th e latter is the standard way of approaching the subject, emphasizing the foreign policies of nation-states, and how they each strive—on the global stage—to get what they want. While that is very important, and while it certainly is a part of interna- tional studies, the plural term “studies” implies something larger than a focused analysis of foreign aff airs.

Interdisciplinarity

It is oft en said that international studies, or global studies, is “interdisciplinary.” What does this much-used—even trendy—term mean? Th e pursuit of knowledge, historically, has involved the creation of diff erent disciplines. A discipline is a unique way of approaching, and achieving, the advance of human knowledge, and it comes with its own particular set of theories and methods. Mathematicians, for example, use number theory; psychologists use various experiments to study human behaviour; and lawyers read legal rules and past cases—and learn how to follow court procedure—in an eff ort to construct the strongest case for their client. Until recently, colleges and universities have been organized along disciplin- ary lines: there are various “faculties”—of arts, science, engineering, law, medicine, and so on. And within each of these faculties there are various “departments”: biology versus chem- istry versus physics in any faculty of science; history versus English versus philosophy in arts; psychology versus economics in social science; and civil versus electrical engineering.

Th ere is much to be said in favour of the discipline of a discipline. Th e focused and rigorous training that a discipline provides is good exercise for the mind, and off ers many valuable skills and tools. Potential problems arise, though, when—as is quite common— people come over time to see every issue solely through the one lens of their own pet discipline. Further problems arise when the subject matter itself proves so complex and multifaceted that it cannot be fully captured or understood through the perspective of one discipline. To counteract these problems, the idea of interdisciplinarity was devised.

Being interdisciplinary means using the tools and insights of various disciplines, both (a) to eliminate narrow-mindedness, and (b) to arrive at a more thorough appreciation of the subject matter. For instance, in recent years, economists who study the spending behaviour of consumers—like you and me—have benefi tted from using the insights and experiments of psychologists regarding why people make the choices they do; and moral philosophers, wrestling with abstract questions of right and wrong, have benefi tted from studying detailed legal decisions about such tricky ethical dilemmas as abortion, online privacy, and the rights of minority groups.

Since the subject matter of international, or global, studies is the world as a whole, the complexity of it demands that we use the tools of various disciplines. Th e whole world sim- ply cannot be reduced to the methods or conclusions of any one discipline. To borrow (with

Introduction

“Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.” –Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), British biologist and political essayist

xiv Introduction

reluctance) a much-used analogy, knowing the world is somewhat like trying to know an elephant. And to know an elephant, you cannot merely examine its trunk, or just the huge legs and fl oppy ears, or only the tiny tail, or simply the sharp tusks. You must, to the contrary, try to examine all the parts, and how they come together to form a unique whole.

I cannot pretend—in this one, introductory-level, book—to have delivered the whole world on a platter. But I can say that many diff erent disciplines are here represented, and strongly so, in a quest to arrive at a fuller and better basic understanding of our increasingly complicated, multi-layered, fast-changing, and interconnected world. And the goal here is not complete knowledge or mastery but merely a useful and clear introductory understand- ing of major features of our world, from various valuable viewpoints. So, for example:

• in the chapter on population and resources, we shall use facts and theories from demography and “environment and resource studies;”

• in the chapter on comparative culture, we will look at education, political theory, new media, and religion;

• in the foreign policy chapter, we shall apply the tools of political science and interna- tional relations theory;

• in the chapter on international law, we will discern both the law itself and how inter- national lawyers think through various global problems;

• in the international trade and business chapter, we will use the tools of economics; • in the chapters on armed confl ict, we will witness what military science, just war

theory, international law, and “peace and confl ict studies” have to off er; • in the human rights chapter, we will rely not only on international law once more but

also on the emerging fi elds of human rights studies and women’s studies; • in the global public health chapter, we will explore the tools of health science and

public health policy; • in the chapter on foreign aid and international development, we shall become

acquainted with development economics; • throughout, maps and photos will supplement our account, thus drawing on geogra-

phy and, I suppose, a bit of psychology as well. Finally, some tables and conceptual fi gures will be presented, as visual aids to understanding.

I ought to confess that my own academic training is in history, philosophy, economics, and the law; and so I suppose these ways of understanding may—perhaps inescapably—be more prominently featured here than others. Happily, though, history is hugely relevant for each of these subjects, and international law and economics are not too far behind. Philosophy, presumably, helps with clarifying the concepts and theories, and for explaining how they all might hang together.

Chapter Structure

All of the chapters, in spite of their diff erent content and the diff erent disciplines they draw on, sport the same structure. Th at structure comprises the following parts, in order:

xvIntroduction

• an opening, pithy quote that captures a crucial aspect of the chapter’s subject matter • a bullet-form set of learning objectives outlining goals that the reader should attain by

the end of the chapter • a brief introduction, setting out what will be covered in the chapter • the body of the chapter • a succinct conclusion • a list of prominent websites that are useful for further research • ten questions for both summary and review (and potential testing purposes) • numbered endnotes, showing my own (and further recommended) sources of

research. (I should mention how my citation style is to keep noting to an uncluttered minimum: at the end of each section or paragraph, as merited, unless a direct quote is involved.)

Nested in the body of each chapter—set apart from the main content—are two highlighted feature boxes. One deals with new technology and how it relates to the subject matter of the chapter. For example, in the foreign policy chapter, this section examines the recent, high-profi le Wikileaks scandal. In the chapters on armed confl ict, the technology boxes deal with cyberwarfare. Th e box in Chapter 9, on human rights, deals with new proposals to make access to the Internet a worldwide human right. And so on.

Th e other feature box examines Canada and how it relates to the rest of the world. Th is is fi tting not only to serve the interests of Canadian students but also to ensure that the con- tribution of an active, productive, smaller country like Canada doesn’t get lost in the huge, swirling tides of global aff airs—tides that are oft en substantially determined by such great powers as the United States, China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, and Russia.

Literacy in International Studies

One of the more particular pleasures of teaching international studies comes from the feedback I get from my students. A common one runs something like this: “I am so glad I took this course. Th ere’s a ton of content, but it truly opened my eyes to a whole range of international issues about which I knew nothing. Th e world is a crazy place!”

Crazy, yes. Complex and fascinating, too. Plus, it’s our home. I think everyone needs to know the basic contours of our world, and this book tries to contribute to that task. I love the concept of literacy, and the goal of my own course, and this book, is precisely to provide for students a core literacy in international studies. I want students to come away from this knowing (a) the basic terms for and facts about these diff erent sub- jects, (b) the historical and contemporary context surrounding them, and (c) the leading theories about such, which shed light on the concepts and contexts. I err slightly on the side of the concepts and theories, as they endure longer while facts can change much more readily. Yet the book remains chock-a- block with facts and fi gures, and—as mentioned—maps and tables and photos.

I love the concept of literacy, and the goal of my own course, and this book, is precisely to provide for students a core literacy in international studies.

xvi Introduction

Above all, I want students to feel empowered about their knowledge of our compli- cated world, and to feel comfortable moving on to more advanced studies in each of these fi elds, should they wish to do so. I am also especially concerned, in each chapter, to stress and explain how all of these subjects interconnect and impact each other. I oft en fi nd this last point is something students fi nd interesting, unexpected, and useful: knowing, for instance, how culture aff ects the economy, how population relates to health, how war impacts the environment, how trade is related to aid, and how international law bears on human rights.

All together, it adds up—I hope—to a substantial, empowering tool for achieving basic literacy in international studies. Students can then, if they wish, embark on more intensive, advanced studies to further add to their fl uency and expertise.

Chapter Ordering and Rationale

Of course, professors are free—and encouraged—to assign whichever chapters in whatever order best suits their plans. Th at said, it seems appropriate to off er a word or two to explain my own ordering of the chapters here.

First, the (world) stage needs to be set—in a sweeping way—before we can move on to examine particular subjects. We need to know, straightaway, some core concepts that will be present throughout the book. And we need to appreciate some historical context: how have we come to be where we are? How has the so-called interstate system (i.e. today’s prevail- ing international order) come into being, and why? Whose interests does the system serve, and whose does it thwart? Such is the subject matter of Chapter 1, which concludes with a case study examination of whether we live in an Age of American Empire. Widely seen as the world’s most infl uential society—militarily, politically, culturally, and economically—to what extent does (and should) the United States set the tone for the rest of the world?

We move from there to consider basic facts, theories, and projections that aff ect us all as human beings, regardless of which country we happen to live in. So, we delve into popu- lation growth and the pressure this puts on natural resources, and we examine relentless urbanization—the growth of cities at the expense of the countryside—and its pros and cons. We consider, in detail, the clash between optimist and pessimist regarding the environment, and whether a growing human population can restrain itself—and “grow green” in a sustain- able way moving forward—or whether we shall poison ourselves with our own pollution.

Population and the interaction between humanity and Earth set the world stage. So, too, does comparative culture: how diff erent people (and groups of people) believe diff er- ent things, adopt diff erent values, and behave in various ways, according to local custom. Culture mediates all our international interactions—causing both confl ict and creativ- ity—and so we need to understand in detail such sources of culture as social institutions, political values, religion, education, and, increasingly, new media and technology.

Act Two of this book concerns a core dynamic—or fundamental tension—between nation and world (and, relatedly, between realism and idealism). Our world is composed of nations, many of which have their own state. A nation is a group of people that sees itself as being a people, in other words, as belonging together in some meaningful sense as a unit, and as having its own identity, and as being separate and distinct from other compa- rable groups. Th e basis of this national uniqueness is thought to include some, or all, of the following shared characteristics:

xviiIntroduction

• racial or ethnic background

• common language

• shared historical experiences

• religious beliefs and cultural practices

• diet/cuisine and fashion choices

• common ways of believing about, and behaving in, the world.

Th e idea of the nation has been historically very potent, and nationalism has been one of modern history’s biggest driving forces. Nationalism, generally, means recognition of, and attachment to, one’s nation. In its narrowest sense, however, nationalism implies an impulse of a nation, or a people, to get and form its own separate country, governed by a state of its own choosing. A state refers to the government of a country. Th is is the group of people responsible for making, and enforcing, the rules that regulate the collective life of a people and thereby make an orderly social life possible within a given territory. Every country has a government, and oft en it is the single most powerful association, or institu- tion, in that society.

Realism is the doctrine that says, fi rst and foremost, that one’s nation or country must look out for its own interests and advantages on the world stage. “Looking out for number one’ is a way of life for realists, and it expresses an ethos of national egoism. A very infl uential doctrine—especially among policy-makers—realism is opposed by idealism. Idealists believe that the most important thing for nations and countries to do is not to tend to their own self- interest but, rather, to contribute what they can towards the creation of a better world for all. Idealists believe in an ethos of universal improvements—of thinking globally, and acting globally, too, we might say—whereas, for the realist, it is all about one’s nation-state.

Th is clash between nation and world permeates every major international issue: global pollution, international trade, population growth, the generation and distribution of food and water, war and peace, the distribution of both wealth and health, and how to structure the world and whether to create new institutions. In chapters 4 and 5 we will examine this clash in detail, fi rst from the realist side, emphasizing power and self- serving foreign policy strategies, and then from the idealist side, stressing co-operation, the rule of international law, and the formation of global governance institutions.

Indeed, nations and states are very much concerned with power, which can be generally defi ned as the ability to get what you want. Recently thinkers such as Joseph Nye have carved a deep distinction between hard power and soft power.1 Hard power is thought to be the most reliable and eff ective—at least in the short term—and it boils down to wealth and strength. Th e richer you are, and the stronger you are, the more likely it is that you can use these tools to get what you want: either you just buy it, or you bribe others to get it, or you take it by force from others. In terms of international politics, hard power is “bullets and bucks,” economic wealth and military strength. So, in Act Th ree, we discuss in detail these topics, which are the traditional, classical subjects of global aff airs: international trade and business, armed confl ict, and the pursuit of national security by state governments.

The clash between nation and world permeates every major international issue, from pollution and trade to war and peace and how to structure the world.

xviii Introduction

Recently, the “hard power” paradigm has been challenged, both by experts and by ordinary people. Even Nye has said that—while, in the short term, “bullets and bucks” may be the most potent—over the long term it is culture (beliefs and values especially) that comes to determine things. Aft er all, there is no more thorough way to infl uence oth- ers than to have them agree with you, in other words, to think the way you do, share the same set of values as you, behave the way you do. And the various aspects of culture are known as soft power. (Some have said that while hard power is the use of “coercion and/ or payment” to get what one wants, soft power is the use of “attraction and/or co-option” to do the same.) A nice historical illustration of soft power would be the way the British have spread their language, literature, pop music, culture, and values throughout the world: fi rst directly, through the iron fi st of their Empire, and now indirectly, through the amaz- ing spread of the English language and such typically British values as the rule of law, free trade, individual liberty, intellectual invention and creativity, and democratic governance.2

Th ere’s another, emerging sense of “soft power,” and this has to do with the well-being of one’s people. Increasingly, ordinary people, social activists, and political thinkers (such as Mary Kaldor) have stressed—instead of the national security of a country—the human security of individual persons.3 Human security stresses that, above and beyond money and protection from violence, ordinary people also require education, healthcare, and basic regard from social institutions for their continued growth and development. Th is rising concern for human security goes hand in hand with another, clear, post–World War II trend in world aff airs: the growth in human rights awareness and the insistence on minimally decent standards of conduct that governments must observe, both regarding their own people and internationally.4

Putting these trends all together, one discovers the fi nal set of subjects in this book: the “soft power” focus on improving not just the wealth and strength of countries but, more- over, the well-being of individual persons worldwide. We shall thus close out this book with chapters on human rights, global public health, and poverty alleviation via foreign aid and international development programs.

Conclusion

And now, to end the beginning: Pierre Trudeau was a brilliant student, and a dashing fi gure, who went on to become one of Canada’s longest-serving and most successful prime ministers. When he was a Master’s student at Harvard University, he taped the following sign to the door of his dorm room: “Pierre Trudeau, Citizen of the World.”5 Th at was, perhaps, a bit ambitious for his time and place. But, nowadays, we are all—truly—world citizens. I wish you good reading, and good luck, on your journey across the globe.

Notes 1. J. Nye, Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, 1991). 2. J. Nye, Soft Power (New York: Public Aff airs, 2004). 3. M. Kaldor, Human Security (London: Polity, 2007). 4. B. Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2002). 5. J. English, Citizen of the World: Th e Life of Pierre Trudeau, 1919–1967 (Toronto: Knopf, 2008).

Setting the World StageI

Core Concepts and Historical Contexts1 “We fi nd ourselves thrown into the

world.”—Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), German philosopher

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all the bolded key terms and concepts

 understand and defi ne the core components of any country

 grasp how the modern nation-state constitutes a midpoint between the tiny city-state and the giant cosmopolitan empire

 discuss the essence of empire—the complex relationship between a metro- pole and its colonies—and explain how important European imperialism and colonization have been in shaping today’s world

 defi ne North versus South and the West versus the Rest, and be able to explain the signifi cance of these distinctions

 consider whether the United States is a present-day empire and, if so, whether this is good or bad for the world

 understand and explain, generally, how Canada fi ts into this historical context, regarding state-formation, European imperialism, and American hegemony.

Introduction

I love the opening, dramatic quote from Heidegger: of all of us being “thrown into the world.”1 And it’s true: no one asked whether we wanted to be born, or to which parents, or into which race, ethnicity, gender, epoch, or society. We just fi nd ourselves here—thrown, as it were, or catapulted into the world at this time and place—and eventually we wind up asking questions about what kind of world this is, and what we should do with our lives. Hence, we need some basic historical and conceptual orientation, in this subject and others.

Countries

International studies, by defi nition, involves studying things between nations, specifi cally by looking at how diff erent countries relate to, and deal with, each other, in all kinds of important ways: economically, politically, culturally, militarily, and so on. Th is raises an obvious, yet fundamental, question: what is a country? Th ere are over 200 countries in the world today, and every single part of planet Earth has been claimed by some country, or group of countries. Th ere are three general exceptions to this observation: (1) Antarctica;

31 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

(2) atmospheric near-space, on the edge between the atmosphere and outer space; and (3) the high seas, in the middle of the oceans. Th ese have been deemed international public spaces, like parks (as it were, unowned by any one person or nation), thereby allowing for any country to use them, theoretically for the general benefi t of humanity.

Territory and Resources

Countries have four basic elements, as diagrammed in Figure 1.1. First, there’s a physical envi- ronment, defi ned by borders (whether politically human-made or else naturally present, like a coast or river). Th is physical environment most importantly features ter- ritory (we all have to live somewhere) and all the natural resources on top of, or below, or surrounded by it. Th e most vital natural resources include:

• water • food crops • other plants • animals • timber • useful rocks and minerals, such as silver and gold, coal and oil.

Countries are considered to be the owners of their territories, and all the natural resources therein. Th e top 10 countries, by territorial size, are (in order from top to bottom, as of 2010):

1. Russia 2. Canada 3. United States

Countries are considered to be the owners of their territories, and all the natural resources therein.

COUNTRY

Territory (Natural Resources)

Population (People)

Culture (High & Low)

State (Government)

Figure 1.1 The Core Components of a Country

4 Part I Setting the World Stage

4. China 5. Brazil 6. Australia 7. India 8. Argentina 9. Kazakhstan 10. Sudan (before the partition, in 2011, into North and South Sudan).2

Population: People and Nations

On the territory, a country has a population, its people. A country’s population can be highly unifi ed and quite similar, in terms of its racial and ethnic background, cultural prac- tices, languages spoken, beliefs and behaviours, and so on. Iceland and Japan are frequently mentioned in this regard. Or, a country’s population might be a collection of highly diverse groups and individuals. Th is is especially true of the so-called immigrant societies, those countries populated—over the years—by waves of immigrants from many diff erent parts of the world. Th ese countries would include especially, Australia, Britain, Canada, Israel, and the US.

An important term here, stressed in the book’s introduction, is “nation.” Th is is oft en used interchangeably with “country” or “state,” but technically it’s diff erent—and impor- tantly so. A nation is a group of people that sees itself as being a people, that is, as belonging together in some meaningful sense as a unit, and as having its own identity, and as being separate and distinct from other comparable groups. Th e basis of this national uniqueness is thought to include some, or all, of the following shared characteristics:

• racial or ethnic background • common language • shared historical experiences and memories • religious beliefs and cultural practices • diet/cuisine and fashion choices • common ways of believing about, and behaving in, the world. Th e nation, and also the state (see below), of which we are members, has come to

shape us in many profound ways, and it’s safe to say that, among the many identities that each of us sports as individuals, our national membership would rank highly in the list of most consequential (alongside such other crucial aspects as, say, gender, age, career, and sexual orientation). Th e languages we speak, the food and drink of which we partake, the institutions we interact with, and the immediate social context of our daily lives have all been deeply contoured by the history of our country, by how it is governed, and by the kind of people who live there.

As noted in the book’s introduction, many historians assert that nationalism—the drive of a nation to get its own state—has been one of the most potent forces of modern history, emphatically since the American (1776–83) and French (1789–1800) revolutions.

51 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

Nationalism has inspired people, created deep senses of belonging and identity, but also caused numerous wars and armed confl icts, and has completely overhauled the political map of the world through time.3

Populations don’t just have ideals and identities: they also have practical needs and attributes. For example, a population is highly valuable to its country as a source of labour and talent; yet it also requires a vast infrastructure to feed it, water it, house it, transport it, clothe it, educate it, tend to its health, and so on. And so every country must concern itself with such core infrastructure needs, and some are better at this than others, and some face steeper obstacles to this than others. We shall see this in future chapters, such as those on aid and development and on global public health. For now, we note that the top 10 largest countries, by population, are (in order from top to bottom as of 2010):

1. China 6. Pakistan 2. India 7. Bangladesh 3. United States 8. Nigeria 4. Indonesia 9. Russia 5. Brazil 10. Japan.

Culture: High and Low

Peoples have cultures, or ways of life. Th ey also form many groupings, even within their own nation. Culture refers to how people live, think, and behave; it’s oft en split into “high” and “low” forms. High cul- ture is thought to be of especially good quality, or enduring merit, and is thought to represent, in some sense, the very best and most meaningful pieces of culture. High culture would include such things as groundbreaking works of art, housed in prestigious museums; Picasso’s paintings could be said to rep- resent an important part of Spanish high culture. It would also include music of great beauty and sophis- tication, such as Tchaikovsky’s for Russian culture. Brilliant and beautiful pieces of architecture would also count, like India’s Taj Mahal or France’s Eiff el Tower. Landmark works of poetry and literature are also forms of high culture, for instance the works of Shakespeare for the English-speaking countries. Th e top 10 languages spoken and used in the world today are (in order by number of speakers, from top to bot- tom as of 2010): Chinese Mandarin, Spanish, English, Hindi-Urdu, Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese, Russian, Japanese, and French.4

Low culture refers to more common or wide- spread forms of belief and behaviour, such as dietary

High culture is oft en associated with national identity, as it is with this performance by Korean dancers. How is the line between high and low culture drawn? Is it movable or fairly fi xed? (© Richard Lindie/iStockphoto)

6 Part I Setting the World Stage

(i.e. food and drink) practices, popular music and books, sports, TV and radio content, Internet and new media content, popular recreation and leisure activities, common ways of speaking and dressing, and so on. Religious practices would probably count here, on grounds of their widespread nature. Th e world’s top 10 religions, by number of believers, are (in order from top to bottom, as of 2010):

1. Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox counted together)

2. Islam

3. Hinduism

4. Chinese folk religion (or Confucianism)

5. Buddhism

6. Indigenous folk religions (such as Shintoism)

7. Judaism

8. Sikhism

9. Baha’i

10. Jainism.

Th e number of non-religious, or secular, belief-systems (like secular humanism) is esti- mated to be enough to be third on this list.

We will explore culture in much greater detail in Chapter 3, on comparative cul- ture. For now, we note how a culture defi nes what a country thinks and feels, and what it does and how it behaves. We recall from the book’s introduction the distinction between hard and soft power, and how the cultural infl uence of a country is defi ned as its soft power. We shall also see, further on in this chapter, how culture can come to defi ne a civilization and how it diff ers from other world civilizations. Th is means that culture can serve to unite like-minded countries (creating a civilization), but then it can also— depending on the diff erences—serve to divide countries, even causing wars and clashes of civilization.

Religious groups are only one kind of important grouping, or association, within a country. It is now common to distinguish between states (or governments), on the one hand, and, on the other, so-called “non-state actors.” Non-state actors are non-govern- mental groupings or institutions. Some of the most important and infl uential include businesses or corporations, churches or religious groups, charities, sports leagues, fan clubs, social movements, and interest groups. (Most of the charitable non-state actors get referred to collectively as non-governmental organizations, or NGOs.) Social movements are broad-based and widely dispersed groups of people devoted to a certain cause, like the environment. Interest groups share a similar shape, yet tend to be more highly organized and more politically involved, determined to get their particular interest onto the agenda of government and society, for the sake of change and securing some kind of benefi t. Interest groups include such bodies as the National Rifl e Association (NRA) in the United States and the Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO) in Canada. In terms of international stud- ies, the most infl uential and important of the non-state actors would be:

71 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

• multinational corporations (or MNCs—big businesses with multiple units in multiple countries)

• aid and development charities, or NGOs (sometimes religious in nature) • social movements or international interest groups (especially ones connected with

peace, health, human rights, and environmental issues) • terrorist groups, insurgent forces, and private militias.

A terrorist group is an armed group that deliberately uses violence against civilian popula- tions—as opposed to military targets—in hopes that the resulting spread of fear (or terror) amongst the people will further a narrow political agenda that the group has. Insurgent forces are revolutionary armed groups, committed to the violent overthrow of the gov- ernment of their society. And private militias are armed groups that are not part of any country’s offi cial military. Th ey may be either political or mercenary in nature; in other words, either they have a private political agenda of some kind, or they simply sell their military services to the highest bidder. Th e latter kind, the mercenary kind, get referred to today as PMCs, or private military companies.)5

The State: Government and Its Powers

Finally, a state refers to the government of a country. Th is is the group of people responsible for making and enforcing the rules that regulate the collective life of a people and thereby make an orderly social life possible on a given territory. Every country has a govern- ment, and oft en it is the single most powerful association or institution in that society. Governments make the rules and enforce them with police; they also arm and train national military forces, both to protect that society from external attack and to help keep the peace internally. Governments decide which kind of activity is legal or not, and with their powers of taxation, usually have massive fi nancial resources to realize their will. Governments patrol borders, and decide who gets in and who doesn’t by setting standards for immigration and membership. Governments negotiate trade deals with other countries, and decide such momentous issues as war and peace, and how to respond to public emergencies, such as an outbreak of disease, a storm, an earthquake/tsunami, or an environmental catastrophe. Th ough non-state actors are of increasing importance in international life, it seems fair to say that states remain the most infl uential agents. In many ways, and both for better and for worse, the world we have today is the world created by nation-states.

State Formation

But how did states come into being? How did Earth come to be divided up between 200 or more countries, each having these four diff erent parts as described above? Aft er all, in the beginning—as they say—there were no states and countries: only human beings and the planet itself. So, how from that original point did the current state of international aff airs—which some experts label the interstate system—come into existence? And who are the winners and losers in such a system?

Though non- state actors are of increasing importance, it is safe to say that states remain the most infl uential agents in international life today.

8 Part I Setting the World Stage

The Birth of the Internet

The Internet is, of course, closely tied with today’s culture. Most all of this book’s technology boxes will deal with new computer-based, and Internet- based, technologies, and so it seems appropriate to have this fi rst one offer a quick history of this amazing piece of technology.

As soon as computers were invented, in the 1940s and 1950s, engineers and computer scientists began working on how, and whether, point-to-point communication between different computers might happen. All the fund- ing for all this original research was given by the US federal government, and much of the initial concern was with potential military applications. The government was particularly interested in creating a system of basic com- munication between key institutions across the country, a system that might be able to withstand even a nuclear war and keep working. Hence, it funded DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DARPA created ARPANET, the world’s fi rst system of interconnected computer networks, featuring the world’s fi rst-ever e-mail. This was in the very late 1960s and early 1970s.

In 1982, the term “Internet” was coined to describe the dream of not just a nationwide, but a worldwide, network of fully interconnected “protocol suites”—sets of rules governing the exchange or transmission of data elec- tronically between computers. The Internet moved out of the purely military world into universities and research institutes, with help from the US National Science Foundation (NSF) and its own network, NSFNET. The Internet also moved overseas, when Tim Berners-Lee of Europe’s CERN agency (the European Organization for Nuclear Research) both coined the term “World Wide Web” and developed the most basic Internet language, HTML, in the late 1980s.

The Internet became commercialized and widely distributed when NSFNET was privatized (i.e. sold to for-profi t companies), and commercial Internet service providers (ISPs) came into being, in the mid-1990s. Since then, the Internet has exploded in growth, with wide-ranging impacts on human cul- ture. For example, in 1992, an estimated 1 million people worldwide had access to the Internet. In 2011, that number is now 2 billion.

The Internet’s impact on culture and on how we live our lives has been enormous, allowing for: near-instant communication between remote cor- respondents, worldwide; global information-sharing; social- and business networking; and online shopping, research, and entertainment. More on the fuller consequences of the Internet will be shared throughout this book. For now, consider the world’s top fi ve most-visited websites on the Internet, as of 2011:

1. Google 2. Facebook 3. YouTube 4. Yahoo 5. Wikipedia.

How many of these have you visited today?6

Studies in Technology

91 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

Th e contemporary interstate system has its origins in European history, and through European colonialism and imperialism, it spread to cover the whole world. So, we need fi rst to set the stage within Europe, and then to describe the ugly and problematic, yet historically crucial, phenomenon of European imperialism.

State Formation in Europe

Details on the ultimate origins of government are lost in the sands of time, but many argue that as soon as the very earliest humans stopped being nomadic hunter–gatherers and became settled agricultural people, the need for governments to organize communities and to protect the farms (and their produce and livestock) from foreign invaders, not to men- tion local thieves, was born. Hence, so was the need for government.7

It is thought that the earliest humans evolved over millennia from the ape family of mammals, with the fi rst known human—or Homo sapiens—appearing approximately 200,000 years ago. It is widely agreed that humanity fi rst evolved in Africa, in the temperate middle region comprising present-day Kenya and Ethiopia. From there, humans spread out in a vast migration across the world, to the east into the Near/Middle East and Asia, and then to the north and west into Europe. It is thought that our earliest ancestors lived as nomadic hunter–gatherers, never having one home base but, rather, moving from site to site in the pursuit of animals for food and the fl ight from predators and each other. Th is is what drove early humans—eventually—across the whole planet. But, around 10,000 years ago, the fi rst agricultural settlements were created, as people came to realize that they could eff ectively raise their own food instead of chasing it, and that coherent, permanent settlements off ered a range of social, cultural, and economic benefi ts besides. Th e oldest such settlements thus far found have been in the Middle East, in the Mesopotamia area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, in what is now Iraq.8

Even in Europe’s beginnings, there weren’t any countries or nation-states. Th ere were cities, and then there were empires. It’s commonly said that the origins of modern Europe are to be found in ancient Greece (starting around the eighth century BCE). But ancient Greece was a collection of so-called city-states: not big national communities governed by state structures but, rather, tiny cities—usually on coasts or waterways—ruled by local or municipal governments.

Th e most prominent of the ancient Greek city-states included Athens, Delphi, Knossos, Marathon, Olympia, Sparta, and Th ebes. Greek civilization is thought to have enjoyed its height of achievement between 600 and 400 BCE. It was oft en lamented—at that time and since—that in spite of their massive accomplishments, and all they did to advance human civilization, the ancient Greeks never were able to overcome their local loyalties and to create a national government uniting all the Greek-speaking people, with their common culture, religion, literature, and ways of living. Th is failure of unity left them wide open to military conquest, fi rst by the Macedonians under Alexander the Great, and then at the hands of another city—an ultra-ambitious and aggressive city—based not in Greece but in Italy: Rome. Rome’s conquest of Greece is usually dated around 146 BCE.9

With Rome we see the fi rst great European empire, succeeding that of Alexander’s (which broke apart almost as quickly as he had put it together, following his sudden death). Empire is as old as the hills, and can be seen throughout world history, in such far-fl ung places as ancient Egypt, the Middle East (especially Persia, centred around present-day

10 Part I Setting the World Stage

Iran), the Aztec, Incan, and Mayan civilizations of Latin America, the Mongolian empire of the Khans, and, of course, in ancient China and India. What do we mean by empire?10

Empire

Empire is a system of governance forged in military conquest (as opposed to, say, the freely given consent of people). In an empire, there is an imperial core, sometimes known as a “hub of empire” or metropole (i.e. “mother city” or “mother country”—literally the pole around which the rest of the empire revolves). And then there are the colonies, which are the conquered and subjected lands, “the dependencies” on the periphery of the empire. Substantial inequality between metropole and colony, and the domination and subjugation of the latter by the former, are of the essence of empire. Consider the conceptual Figure 1.2, illustrating the basic relationship in this regard.

Th e metropole conquers the colony by force. It subjects the colony to its rule and sends leaders from the core to govern the periphery in a way that pleases the metropole (and oft en is, in fact, a pale imitation of the method of governance within the metropole itself ). Th e metropole also off ers military protection, of a kind, to the colony, at least from conquest by other, would-be imperial powers. Oft en, the metropole must invest to some extent in the colony, particularly in terms of such physical infrastructure as roads. However, this invest- ment tends to be highly selective and mainly designed to maximize the extractive agenda of

Relationship entails (concretely): –Military force –Political leadership –Investment –Some citizenship rights

Relationship represents (abstractly): –Defeat –Subjection –Extraction –Obedience

Relationship entails (concretely): –Political Allegiance –Taxes –“Brain Drain” of Best & Brightest –Natural Resources

METROPOLE (“Mother City,”

“Mother Country,” “Core” or “Hub”

of Empire)

COLONIES (“Dependencies,” “Hinterland,”

“Periphery of Empire”)

COLONIES

Relationship represents (abstractly): –Conquest –Domination –“Protection” –Exploitation

Figure 1.2 The Essence of Empire

111 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

the metropole. At times, metropoles (such as Rome) have off ered citizenship rights, of vari- ous degrees, to the people within their colonies as an eff ective way of cementing obedience and as of attracting some of the “best and brightest” from the colonies to the metropole.

At the heart of the logic of empire is the growth and success of the metropole. Th us, in exchange for the benefi ts of military protection and being part of the empire (with potential citizenship rights), the conquered people within the colonies commonly must off er the following back to the metropole: political allegiance (especially vis-à-vis any rival empires); taxes and other fi nancial tributes; local troops to help out with the protection and defence of the colony; and, perhaps above all, a steady and large fl ow of natural resources that meets the metropole’s extractive agenda. Indirectly, as mentioned above, the colony usually also winds up suff ering a brain drain, as its best and brightest people seek better opportunities for themselves within the heart of the metropole.11

Th e Roman Empire was one of, if not the, most successful in the history of the world. At its peak, it stretched from Britain in the north to Egypt in the south, and from Spain in the west to Syria in the east, controlling for over 1,000 years the fates of hundreds of millions of people. It brought peace and stability, legal coherence, cultural advance, and technological innovation to the entire Mediterranean world. Rome began as an imperial power around the year 500 BCE and ended, in western Europe, in 476 CE. But, in eastern Europe and the Near East, it went on to last 1,000 more years as the remodelled Byzantine Empire (which fell in 1453 CE).

Both the rise of the Roman Empire and its collapse contributed substantially to state formation in Europe. On the one hand, the Romans showed how it could be done, govern- ing vast stretches of territory in an eff ective, prosperous, and stable way. Th eir ruthless skill at military conquest, their genius for engineering public infrastructure, their enthusiasm for trade both by land and by sea, and their legal capacities for organizing and controlling populations would all prove very instructive to later powers. On the other hand, we might term the governance of the Roman Empire a form of cosmopolitan governance, at odds with that of the modern nation-state. For the Roman Empire featured one city governing an enormous, far-fl ung, non-contiguous territory containing a vast multitude of diff erent cultures and peoples. We might say then that, between the Greek way (of the tiny city- state) and the Roman way (of the vast cosmopolitan empire) lies the middle way of the European nation-state. And it is with the collapse of Rome in the West that we begin to see how this form of governance comes into being.12

After Rome

Th e Roman Empire collapsed in western Europe in the late 400s CE, fragmenting in the face of repeated barbarian invasions, especially from what is now Germany. Th e Roman Empire had grown too large to govern effi ciently, and too oft en its governors were corrupt and incompetent. It managed to endure in the Near East, as mentioned, for over a thousand years more (in remodelled form), but in the West the only institution to survive the collapse of Roman civilization was the Roman Catholic Church (Christianity having been made the state religion by the emperors Constantine and Th eodosius). Th e Western empire other- wise dissolved into a series of small ethnic groups and tribe-like families, and many wars between them ensued. Not much information survives from this period, and so we call it the Dark Ages. What little does survive tells us, sporadically, of an anarchical and bloody

12 Part I Setting the World Stage

existence, a dirty and decrepit life. Europe took major steps backward during the Dark Ages, which lasted anywhere from 500 to 1000 CE. At the same time, Islamic civilization in Persia and North Africa, and Far Eastern civilizations in China and India, fl ourished.13

During the Dark Ages’ later years, starting around the year 800, ambitious local war- lords made bold attempts to consolidate their control over larger pieces of territory. Alfred “the Great” (849–899) did this in Britain, and Charlemagne (742–814) on the Continent. While not immediately successful, these eff orts pointed the way towards the future: local tribal heads gradually winning control over larger and larger pieces of territory, declaring themselves “champions of the people” in the process. Th ey re-established law and order, by force of arms, farm-by-farm and forest-by-forest. A handful of these warlords eventu- ally became self-styled kings, monarchs of their realms. Latin, the offi cial language of the Roman Empire, fell into disuse and there arose in its place numerous national languages, some of which (such as French, Italian, and Spanish) were clear derivatives from the origi- nal Latin. In short, we see over centuries (during the Middle Ages, circa 1000–1500 CE) the rise of the European nation-state, with:

• its own territory, mid-size between city-state and empire; • its own national language and literature; • its own kings, queens, and system of governance; • its own customs and cuisines; and • its own religion, as we will see.14

For a thousand years, the Roman Catholic Church had been the only religious organization in Europe. It was immensely powerful, surviving the collapse of the Roman Empire and entrenching its infl uence—economically, politically, culturally—for centuries. But in 1517, German priest Martin Luther (and others) demanded changes in the structure, teachings, and practices of the Church; they “protested,” hence came to be called Protestants, and the Protestant Reformation began. When the Church refused their demands, the reformers broke away and formed rival Christian churches (e.g. Lutheran, Anglican). Needless to say, bad feelings were created, and violence eventually erupted. National political leaders— kings and queens, barons and earls—chose sides, and soon full-scale battles and even wars broke out, as Europe split religiously into a mainly Protestant north and a mainly Catholic south. Th e worst of these religious wars was the Th irty Years War (1618–48), which, for instance, resulted in the death of one-third of the population of Germany.15

Westphalia

Aft er three decades of such savagery, the national leaders of Europe got together to make a deal for peace. Th is deal has come to be known as the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and many credit Westphalia as forming the real and true birth of the modern interstate system we know, and must live with, today.16 Th e essence of the deal struck at Westphalia was this: “Let’s stop trying to kill each other over our religious diff erences. We—Catholics and Protestants—both admit that we cannot fully kill off the other side; each is here to stay. So, you decide which religion will prevail in your country, and we’ll decide which will prevail in ours. We won’t try to convert each other by force of arms.” It was an agreement to lay

131 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

down arms, to live and let live, and it represents a kind of deal known as a modus vivendi (i.e. a way to live), meaning something we can all live with, even if it’s not our preference.

Th e Treaty of Westphalia is one of the earliest expressions of some kind of tolerance for diff erence found in any legal system. Th e major importance for modern international aff airs, though, has to do with the fact that Westphalia affi rms the core “state-centric” values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Th ese values are state-centric in that they place countries, or the nation-state, at the very heart of international aff airs and at the centre of the global system of power and order. Th ese values thus privilege the nation-state over such other entities as NGOs, MNCs, international institutions like the United Nations (UN), and perhaps—some fear—even individual human persons.17

Sovereignty and Territory Political sovereignty refers to the right of a group of people to rule themselves. “Political” refers to power, or polis, an ancient Greek term for a group of people living together as an ongoing community, whereas “sovereignty” means the entitlement to rule (literally the power of a sovereign, or king). To be sovereign is to be self-ruling, acknowledging no higher authority over oneself. More fully, then, political sovereignty is the most basic right of a country in modern international law and global aff airs: the right of a country to make its own laws and to govern itself, provided—crucially—that it respects the right of all other countries to do the same. Every country on Earth thus jealously guards, and is proud of, its national or state sovereignty.

But this sovereignty must be exercised somewhere. To be real, the abstract right of political sovereignty must imply some secure space on which to live, and in which to enjoy self-rule. Hence, the right to territorial integrity: a community or country has a right to some livable territory and is considered—as mentioned above—to be the general owner of all the natural resources on, under, or above its land. Th at’s the “territorial” part; the “integrity” part refers to that group’s right not to have other countries invade its territory or attempt to seize its resources. A community needs not only, or merely, to have territory and resources; it needs to be able to count on having such resources moving forward, if it is to remain—as Aristotle said—an ongoing partnership formed for the general good of its members.18

Spread of State Formation from Europe throughout the World

Th us, with Westphalia, the European interstate system was formed: nation-states had fi nally gelled, and they agreed (at least in theory) to deal with each other in terms of the values of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. How did the rest of the world come to share the same structure and (eventually) to be brought into the same system (the so- called Westphalian system) that remains in force today? Th e answer, as noted, is through the experience of European colonialism and imperialism, one of the major drivers of mod- ern world history, lasting from about 1500 until 1975.

While empire, as we’ve mentioned, is as old as the hills, European imperialism became reborn once Columbus “discovered” (more accurately “made contact with”) the New World in 1492. While there were, of course, Native or Aboriginal peoples who had been in the Americas for centuries, these territories were brand-new to the Europeans, and their discov- ery sparked off a massive “land rush” to gain control of as much of the New World as possible. Th e kings and queens of Europe urged their citizens to settle abroad, seeing an opportunity to

14 Part I Setting the World Stage

grow the power, wealth, and prestige of their relatively young and still growing nation-states. Th e result was the rapid spread of empire—along the lines of the system described, and dia- grammed, above—throughout the Caribbean and North, Central, and South America. Later, as technology for longer travel and eff ective conquest improved, the Europeans were able to look farther afi eld into Southeast Asia, the South Pacifi c, Australia/New Zealand, and the heart of Africa. Th e original imperial powers were Portugal and Spain, but they were quickly followed by the Netherlands. Next came France, England, and Russia, and by the early 1900s, even Belgium, Italy, and Germany were trying to found colonies in Africa.19

Table 1.1 shows the most prominent colonial holdings of the European imperial pow- ers during this period. We can see that the table covers almost all the world, refl ecting the extent to which Europeans came to spread, by force, their own mode of governance across the planet. In so doing they established the interstate system we know today, according to which (a) countries are the major players in international aff airs, and (b) they must (at least try to) deal with each other on the basis of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

European imperialism had a profound eff ect on world history. Not only was the inter- state system created, but much of the world was used as a vast resource base for Europe, with people, money, and natural commodities fl owing from around the world into the heart of such European capitals as Madrid, Amsterdam, London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow. Th is was all for the good in Europe, of course, but much to the disadvantage of the rest of the world. Th e American colonists were among those who recognized this injustice and took steps to end it, overthrowing British rule and establishing their own republic during the American Revolution (1776–83). Most other countries weren’t so lucky, and they endured centuries of exploitation and resource extraction at the hands of the European empires. And it wasn’t just political and economic exploitation that occurred. In many instances European imperialism was founded on ferocious military violence, and it came to express deep cruelty and social dominance, and racial and other forms of bigotry and prejudice, which left massive scars on colonial societies.20

End of European Imperialism

How, then, did such a powerfully entrenched, worldwide, imperial system come to an end? Th e answer is that it was destroyed by the Europeans themselves . . . but, not intention- ally. During the entire period of colonization and imperialism, there were of course huge rivalries between the European empires. Even though, in theory aft er Westphalia, they were committed to dealing with each other as equals—each with sovereignty and terri- tory—in practice they engaged in fi erce competition with each other, to see who could have the biggest, richest, and most powerful empire. Th is process sparked many wars over the centuries, but none bigger than the two world wars. World War I (1914–18) really marks the high-water point for European imperialism around the world. Th e war—begun as a struggle of imperial rivalries between Germany, Austria–Hungary, and Turkey on the one side and Britain, France, and Russia on the other—degenerated into a long and tragic slaughterhouse of destruction. Th e war only halted when the United States intervened in 1917, on the side of Britain and France.21

But, in many ways, the First World War left things unsettled, and in rapid fashion war returned. Th e Treaty of Versailles (1919), which ended the Great War, broke up the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, as well as the Turkish (or Ottoman) empire. Th e

151 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

Table 1.1 European Nations and their Colonies, c. 1500–1950

European Nation-State Prominent Colonial Holdings

Portugal • Brazil • some cities in India (e.g. Goa)

Spain • Mexico • Central America • most of South America (excluding Brazil) • parts of the southwestern US (e.g. California, Texas) • the Philippines

the Netherlands • South Africa • some Caribbean islands (e.g. Aruba) • parts of Indonesia • early settlements in eastern North America (e.g. New York)

France • North America (Quebec & Middle America, from Detroit south to Louisiana)

• some Caribbean islands (e.g. Martinique) • cities on the coast of India • some South Pacifi c islands (e.g. French Polynesia) • West and North Africa (e.g. Ivory Coast, Algeria) • parts of the Middle East (e.g. Syria, Lebanon) • Vietnam

England • the United States (originally the “Thirteen Colonies”) • Canada • many Caribbean islands (e.g. Bahamas, Bermuda) • India • Burma • Hong Kong • Singapore • Australia/New Zealand • some South Pacifi c islands (e.g. Fiji) • parts of the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Palestine) • central and East Africa (e.g. Sudan, Kenya, South Africa,

Nigeria)

Russia • Alaska • large parts of Poland and Finland • Ukraine • some Baltic states (e.g. Latvia) • most of central Asia (e.g. Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan)

Italy • Ethiopia • Libya • Somalia

Germany • Cameroon • Namibia • Tanzania

16 Part I Setting the World Stage

British and French hungrily helped themselves to portions of their defeated rivals’ colonial holdings. Further, steep terms of punishment and reparations payments, were placed upon Germany, and this caused deep resentment and ultimately severe social dislocation. So desperate did the situation become in Germany that by the 1920s, German people were looking towards radical, extremist “solutions” to their many political and economic prob- lems. Th is provided oxygen, so to speak, for Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party. Hitler promised to tear up the Treaty of Versailles, re-conquer the lost lands of the German Empire, and grow the German economy through military buildup, modernization, and a renewed round of conquest within Europe. Aft er the Nazis won power in the 1930s, Hitler kept his word, and the world marched directly towards another massive war.22

World War II (1939–45) was the biggest war the world has ever seen. Over 50 mil- lion people died in fi ghting that raged all around the globe, pitting the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan against the Allies of Britain (including its huge list of colonies, like Canada), China, France, Russia, and (as of 1941) the United States; in fact, by 1945, 50 diff erent countries were part of the Allied cause. Th e two world wars had a tremendous signifi cance for European imperialism. For even though the Allies ultimately won World War II, the two wars had exacted such enormous damage and costs upon Europe that none of the European powers could aff ord to maintain their empires. Even Britain and France, though victorious, had to shed their colonies. Th us began the process of decolonization, which lasted from about 1945 until 1975. Old European colonies became newly liber- ated and independent nation-states, left to fend for themselves in the interstate system. Sometimes, this process occurred smoothly. More oft en than not, it was very diffi cult, complicated not merely by political confl ict but by all-out war (such as involved the French in Algeria and Vietnam, and the British in the Middle East).23

North versus South

Th us far, we have defi ned and explored countries, nations, states, and their various parts; these are truly the most basic units of global relations. Th en we enjoyed a sweeping, yet informative, history as to how such entities and forces have come into being: how they have set the stage for international studies today. Th ere remain, in this opening chapter, two large and truly vital concepts that need to be defi ned and explained. Th ese concepts relate to the distinctions between, fi rst, North and South, and second, Western civilization and non-Western civilizations.

In many ways, the distinction between North and South (see Figure 1.3) has replaced the older frameworks of “developed versus developing” and, certainly, “First World versus Th ird World.” Th e North refers generally to countries in the Northern hemisphere, above Earth’s equator, with the important exception of Australia and New Zealand. Th e South, then, refers generally to countries south of the equator. But here, too, the strict geography is misleading, as for example Afghanistan, North Korea, and Haiti are all north of the equator yet have many more of the characteristics of nation-states of the South. Th e North–South distinction is thus crude and sweeping, and in many ways “developed versus developing” is more accurate. Th e controversy with this latter distinction, though, is that it may seem to imply that some countries have “made it,” achieved full development (or some kind of social nirvana), whereas others race desperately to catch up. Yet it seems more correct to

171 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

say that all countries are, in an important sense, always developing further, always with room to improve. Th us, “more developed” versus “less developed” is probably best. In any event, Northern, or developed, or more developed countries tend to be wealthier, better educated, healthier, less populated, more technologically advanced, more urbanized, more infl uential internationally, and more attractive to immigrants. Th ey have lower rates of crime, poverty, and unemployment; they have more stable governance and social peace; and they have longer life expectancies and even higher average rates of personal happiness and life satisfaction. By contrast, Southern, or developing, or less-developed countries are more populated, yet less wealthy, less educated, less technologically advanced, more rural, and with higher rates of emigration (i.e. people leaving) than immigration (i.e. people coming in). Southern countries have less power internationally and higher rates of crime, disease, poverty, and unemployment. Th ey have more political instability, greater instances of violence and warfare, and shorter life expectancies and lower rates of average personal happiness and life satisfaction.24

Why the world has become divided in this way is an interesting, important, and complex question. One big piece of the puzzle, though, is the recent 500-year history of European imperialism and colonialism. As we have seen, the process involved, among other things, draining very valuable resources—both material and human—from the South and into the North. We could say that the South today is playing catch-up in a rather grim

Figure 1.3 The North and the South

It is generally accepted that 25 per cent of the world’s population lives in the developed Global North, whereas 75 per cent resides in the developing Global South.

18 Part I Setting the World Stage

game in which Northerners have (a) had a 500-year head start, and (b) given themselves that head start, while putting the Southerners far behind. Now, it’s not quite so simple—as we’ll fi nd in the chapter on international aid and development—but it’s clear that imperial- ism and colonialism are major reasons why the North is so advantaged and, especially, why the South stands so disadvantaged. An important question, which we’ll put off for now but return to in that future chapter, is this: given the history of colonialism, what does the North owe to the South, by way of assisting their development?25

As noted earlier, generally, any country can be placed in either the Northern/devel- oped/more developed category or else the Southern/developing/less developed category. Yet notice that even this is not quite so straightforward, as there are regions within even very advanced countries where life seems to share more in common with the Global South. One thinks of the lives of some Aboriginal people in Canada (see the photo above) or Australia, or of some of the homeless people living in some of the biggest, richest cities of North America or Europe. And vice versa: there are pockets of amazingly advanced comfort and privilege in otherwise developing societies. Consider the rich suburbs of Rio or Buenos Aires, or those of Mumbai, Cairo, or Jakarta. Or, perhaps most graphically, note the glittering, air-conditioned, ultra-modern, “oil-money” skyscrapers of Dubai, set amidst the emptiness of the scorching Middle Eastern desert.26

Nycole Turmel steps out of a shelter being used as temporary lodging for Aboriginals in Attawapiskat, Ontario, during her time as interim leader of the federal New Democratic Party in November 2011. (© THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld)

191 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

The West versus “The Rest”

Th e Global South is, by now, a much-used term of art. It is much more common than “the North.” When speaking of northern, developed societies, the preferred phrase is generally “the West.” So, we have a rather funny situation (one that would no doubt cause a compass confusion!) wherein in international politics, the terms “North” and “West” refer, basically, to the same thing. And we need to focus on the West, at least for now, owing to its leading role in the development of the international system: through the experience of European imperi- alism, and later through the infl uence of powerful countries like the United States, Western civilization has had disproportionate impact on the current state of international society.

We need to consider civilization in general before we can talk about Western civiliza- tion and how it diff ers from others. “Civilization” can be a controversial term, as its deepest roots lie in a distinction between “civilized” and “uncivilized,” wherein the former refers generally to someone who is urban, wealthy, educated, law-abiding, sophisticated, pol- ished and well-mannered (there is, aft er all, an obvious connection between “civilization” and “civility”). “Uncivilized,” by contrast, would refer to someone who is rural, poorer, uneducated, crude, and unpolished. Scholars stress that the deepest connections between “civilization” and its root word, “civil,” relate to (a) the city (think citizen, civilian) and (b) the law (as in civic order, civil law).

Today, however, references to civilization have outgrown these older, sweeping associa- tions, and experts like David Wengrow generally use the term “civilization” as an equivalent to “culture” in its broadest sense, that is, as a way of life. So, there are no “civilized” versus “uncivilized” cultures (much less the older distinction between “civilized” and “barbarian”); rather, there are only diff erent kinds of civilization. It is this broader, non-judgmental sense of civilization that we are here interested in. In many ways, civilization means a pervasive culture (or way of life), shared by many countries, impacting a large region of the world over time. A civilization tends to have the same, or at least similar, systems of law and governance, economic organization, patterns of living and settlement, types of food and subsistence, and kinds of culture, both high and low (especially in terms of worldview, religion, and shared values). Figure 1.4 shows Samuel Huntingdon’s infl uential map of world civilizations.27

Loosely speaking, “Western civilization” has two meanings: (1) the simple geographi- cal reference to western Europe and the colonies it created, especially throughout the Americas and Australia/New Zealand; and (2) the much more important reference to shared values, especially regarding how, ideally, to run a society. Th e West, so to speak, is a state of mind. Th e core ideals—which, of course, don’t always get realized perfectly—of the West are commonly thought to include the following: 1. Individualism. Th ere is a commitment to every individual person’s human rights to

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Th is would be in contrast to civilizations in which the primary unit of concern might be the family, or the nation, and the job of the individual is to fi nd a way to fi t in and contribute.

2. Limited, democratic government. Government is seen as the servant of the people, kept under control by written constitutions, the rule of law, checks and balances, and democracy: free and fair regular public elections wherein there is one person, one vote, and the majority rules. Th is would be in contrast to civilizations in which

20 Part I Setting the World Stage

government might be seen as leading or controlling the people, and as having its authority coming not from elections but from, say, military power.

3. Free-market capitalism. Most generally, capitalism is a kind of economic system that: a) allows for the private-property ownership (i.e. the non-governmental owner-

ship) of the means of economic production (such as natural resources and one’s own labour power);

b) allows businesspeople the freedom to set up their own businesses and to keep some of the profi ts they earn for themselves and for their own private enjoyment;

c) encourages trading between buyer and seller as the means of distributing goods and services in the economy (this is the “free market” part, as opposed to, say, the government dictating who gets what);

d) uses money as the means of exchange, to facilitate the trading of goods and services (i.e. the buyer and seller in a transaction agree upon a price that is mutually acceptable); and

e) features a court system of public laws for the peaceful handling, and non- violent resolution, of economic disputes.

Free-market capitalism operates in contrast to economic systems such as commu- nism, wherein the state owns and controls everything, and/or where the private profi t motive is not so central, usually because the state taxes back all the gains for its own

Western Latin American Japanese Sinic Hindu Islamic Orthodox African Buddhist

Figure 1.4 Huntingdon’s Map of World Civilizations

Huntingdon hypothesized that there was a greater chance of war between civilizations whose core values were most dissimilar, as they would lack mutual respect for and understanding of each other.

211 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

public purposes. Capitalism is also in contrast to earlier, more primitive economic systems of barter exchange (i.e. good-for-good or favour-for-favour, non-money exchanges) or forced exchange (the use of violent coercion to conquer and control the means of economic production, notably including territory and resources).

4. A history of Christianity being the dominant religion. Note, however, that in Western civilization today there is a separation of church and state, wherein the government does not try to enforce any particular religious vision. Th is model would be in contrast to civilizations where the state may very well use its power to try to realize a religious vision, and force people’s beliefs and practices in this regard.

5. Commitment to science and technology to improve people’s lives. Th ough most civiliza- tions value technological improvements, this is not always so: some civilizations have rejected scientifi c breakthroughs—the birth control pill, for example—for reasons of religion or their views on gender roles.

6. Urbanization. Western civilization favours the growth and health of cities as the eco- nomic, cultural, and social engines of modern society.

7. Robust civil society activity. “Civil society” refers to all associations of people that are not offi cial government groupings or institutions; it includes everything from businesses to churches, and from sports teams and volunteer organizations to NGOs. Oft en, in non-democratic, un-elected authoritarian regimes, the state does not allow other institutions to rival its infl uence and prestige, and so it outlaws them, or keeps their resources very low, as a result shrinking the size of civil society.

Again, these are only general, idealized characteristics, and the West does not fulfi ll them perfectly. Nor are these seven things immune to criticism, even as ideals. Th ere are draw- backs to free-market capitalism, as we shall see later on in this book, and some societies disapprove of the West’s separation of church and state, and its growing secularization (i.e. lack of religious belief ). Perhaps above all, many other world civilizations fi nd the individualism of the West to be harmfully at odds with family attachment, social together- ness, and even the success of the nation. All that is being claimed here is that there are, as a matter of fact, these seven major tendencies in Western countries, and they shape the sorts of societies they are, in addition to the previous characteristics mentioned above regarding the developed North. Put them together, and you have quite a full picture of how Northern/Western developed countries diff er substantially from the other civilizations and countries of the still-developing Global South. (Much more will be said about the content of non-Western civilizations, in their own right, in the chapter on comparative culture.)28

Relevance of Civilizational Differences: Huntingdon’s “Clash of Civilizations”

It should be obvious that the diff erences between world civilizations are extremely relevant: aft er all, they concern the ways vast regions of the planet diff er from each other in terms of their core beliefs, their structures of governance, and how people lead their daily lives. A further—more recent and graphic—illustration of how important it is to pay attention to these diff erences comes from Huntingdon, who, in the early 1990s, wrote about a coming “clash of civilizations.”

22 Part I Setting the World Stage

Th e timing of Huntingdon’s work is important. For in the early 1990s, the major event of world historical importance was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of commu- nism around the world. Th e Cold War (1945–91) refers to the multi-generational global showdown between the United States and the USSR (i.e. the Soviet Union, which included Russia and several other republics, especially in central Asia, that are now independent). Th e US and Russia were the two biggest winners of the Second World War, yet they did not trust each other and championed completely diff erent social systems: the US, that of free-market, or capitalist, democracy, and Russia, that of police-state, planned- or com- mand-economy communism. Th e Cold War was a war, in that it was very much a struggle between these nations as to whose social system would triumph and survive, and whose would fail and collapse. But the war was cold, in that there never was a hot war exchange of live-fi re hostilities directly between the US and USSR. Th ey did clash indirectly, though, in so-called proxy wars, mainly in the developing world. Th ese wars involved “proxies,” or pawns, in the sense that the US would support one side and Russia would support the other, and those sides would themselves fi ght directly in a live-fi re exchange of hostilities. Vietnam (1954–74) and Afghanistan (1979–89) were Cold War proxy wars, and others were fought throughout Latin America and Southeast Asia. Th e US and Russia never fought directly because they were both nuclear powers, and each feared total destruction at the hands of the other’s nuclear arsenal. Th is was known, notoriously and widely, as MAD, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Nuclear terror deterred, or prevented, any kind of direct armed clash between them, lest things escalate and spiral out of control towards an apocalyptic exchange of nuclear weapons.29

Th e US eventually won the Cold War, for a variety of reasons. Many agree that a very important one was the fact that Russia’s not-for-profi t, command-and-control, state-owns- everything economy could not out-produce the American capitalist economy over the long term, and Russia fell broke trying to keep up with the US’s military spending. (It is some- times amusingly said that the Americans “drank the Russians under the table.”) Also, the non-democratic nature of communist countries could only alienate their citizens and make them feel detached from, and uncaring about, supporting such regimes; it really seems as if most people want the right to participate in their own governance. As a result, in the 1990s, the Soviet Union broke apart, and Russia’s political, economic, and social systems collapsed and had to be reconstructed completely along more Western, free-market, democratic lines, as described above.30

When Huntingdon saw that the US—as the latest champion of Western values—was going to win the Cold War, he asked himself, as a political scientist concerned with the future: who would be the next great enemy of Western civilization? Where would the next huge wars be fought, and over what? His answer: the Arab world and Islamic civilization.31 He wrote this thesis around the time of the outbreak of the fi rst war in Iraq, the Persian Gulf War of 1991, triggered when Iraq invaded Kuwait to take over the latter’s territory and gain control of its oil and gas resources. At the time, many people argued that the war was all about oil and who would control this valuable commodity moving forward.32 Huntingdon argued, by contrast, that economic resources (like oil) are merely fl ashpoints or sparks, and that what really sustains wars—and what would sustain this future clash between the West and the Arab world—is a clash over diff erent civilizational values. At the time, he was criticized as being an ignorant, provocative, pro-Western warmonger (and

231 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

worse),33 but many people have come to admit that his thesis really did seem to predict the next set of wars, and to be worthy of serious consideration in its own right.

Here’s Huntingdon’s view. Th ere are diff erent global civilizations, as noted above in his map. Each one has its own civilizational values and practices. Some civilizations have values and practices that overlap with those of other civilizations, but many are unique. Huntingdon conjectured that the farther apart two civilizations are in terms of their values, the more likely it is there will be wars between them, as they lack respect for each other and mutual understanding. And the closer two diff erent civilizations are geographically, the greater the odds of armed confl ict between them, as they share grinding fl ashpoints of contact, or fault lines of rupture.

For the Islamic world and the West, such fl ashpoints of contact include oil—the Arab world’s huge supply of it and the West’s enormous consumer and industrial demand for it. But the fl ashpoints extend beyond that to include the considerable numbers of events and territories in which the Islamic world and the Western world have previously come into contact, and confl ict, starting with the Crusades (of Christianity versus Islam, from 1000–1300 CE) and moving through the Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey, which touches both Europe and the Middle East), North Africa, southern Spain, and even central and eastern Europe (the former Yugoslavia especially). Add to that England’s and France’s recent imperial control over Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, and one begins to see the depth of fl ashpoint contact between these two massive world civilizations. To ice it off , consider that when Huntingdon looked around in the early 1990s and com- pared the above-listed Western values and practices to the ones prevailing in the Middle East, he saw minimal, if any, agreement. (Th e Islamic world at the time did not favour individualistic free-market capitalism, or democracy, or the equality of women, or the sepa- ration of church and state, or the full application of science and technology, or the prospect of having a robust civil society, and so on.) Th us, Huntingdon’s theory predicted that with lots of historical and geographical fl ashpoint contact but with maximal distance on values and practices, the next huge set of wars involving the Western powers would be in the Middle East, and against countries where the majorities are both Arab and Islamic. Once more, he wrote this in the early 1990s, before the September 11 (“9/11”) terrorist strikes in the US, the July 7 (“7/7”) terrorist strikes in Europe, the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the sharply rising tensions in Europe between native Europeans and Muslim immigrants, and the 2010 Arab Spring, with the related NATO invasion of Libya in 2011.34

Case Study: The American Empire?

Let’s try to draw some threads together in this fi nal section of the chapter. We have looked at countries and their components, the development of cities and empires, the growth of the nation-state and how it has come to dominate the contemporary interna- tional system, the history of European imperialism, and the resulting split of the world into North versus South, and the West versus the Rest. In order to help these themes gel, and then apply them to today, we will focus on one country: the United States. Th e US is a natural choice for this exercise because (a) it is a country, (b) it is currently the world’s most infl uential country, (c) it is both a Northern and Western country, and in

24 Part I Setting the World Stage

many ways is the fl ag-bearer of Western civilization in our time, and (d) sharp questions actually arise about whether it is an empire. Do we live in an Age of American Empire?

Many Americans, if you ask them, will deny quite strongly that they are, or have, an empire. Th ey will say that empire is a cynical, old-world game played by other peoples, especially Europeans, and it is all about power and status. But the US was formed on a non-cynical—indeed, optimistic—moral vision about what a political community could be like. It could be, and ought to be, about things more sublime than power, and who’s on top and who’s on bottom. Political society should be about securing individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. America, to that extent, was created in 1776 to be a new kind of society, and thus to tar it with the same old brush of European imperialism and colonialism just isn’t right. In other words, the accusation that America has an empire goes against everything that Americans have learned about their country in school, and so it meets with very strong resistance.

But these deniers—such as Patrick Buchanan—aren’t just in denial: they do have a point. Th ese American patriots argue that empire—as defi ned above—is about a for- mal relationship of dependency and exploitation between the metropole (the mother country, the locus of empire) and the periphery (the colonies, the dependencies, the hinterland). Th e peripheries were run by, and used for the benefi t of, the cores. Resources were sucked from the colonies into the capitals. People were sent out from the cores to claim the hinterland and to colonize it on behalf of the mother country, replicating and reproducing its way of life elsewhere. Th e peripheries were governed by state structures set up by the core and run by offi cials who came from the core. Such was European imperialism, from the dawn of time until about 1975 or so. But the US, these empire-deniers say, has no such formal relationship with countries outside its own borders (with a few, very small exceptions, like some islands in the Pacifi c taken over during the Pacifi c phase of World War II). Th e US might be incredibly powerful—the global hegemon, as they say (i.e. the world’s most powerful country)— but, technically, it’s not at all an empire. People who talk of “empire” in the American context do so because of the word’s negative connotations—they want to criticize the US because they are jealous of its power and wealth.35

For those who retain the idea that the United States has an empire, what reply can they make to this line of argument? Th eir reply focuses on making a distinction between formal and informal empire. Formal empire, as defi ned and illustrated above, is an old-style, European model of empire. Th e US may not exactly fi t that mould, admittedly. But there can be other modes of power and dependency that are just as rel- evant, the pro-empire people say. In an informal empire, there are no formal, legally declared links between core and periphery, nor formal, publicly declared relations of dependency. But the US today is, nevertheless, able to set up the basic ground rules of the world system in its favour. It chooses not to declare an empire formally, in other words, but that doesn’t mean that it’s not there. Th ese people, like Ivan Eland,36 say that America fulfi lls all the traditional criteria of an imperial core: it has the biggest economy (or very nearly so) and the biggest military (by far); it is politically the most infl uential; it has the biggest consumer base (in terms of per capita spending), and is a magnet for both foreign investment and immigration. Also, the US does have some of the more formal aspects of empire. Did you know, for instance, that the United States currently operates 700 military bases outside its own borders?37

251 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

Th ere are even revisionist historians, such as Sidney Lens and Don Meinig,38 who dispute the happy tale about America’s founding values, suggesting that that vision is pure myth-making, telling people what they want to believe. Th ey argue that we should re-examine the prevailing, conventional narrative of American history and see the US, instead, as an imperial project right from the start. From the very fi rst moment of its founding in 1620, by the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, the US has witnessed one steady outwards expansion, as its core communities sought to gain territory, subject peoples who stood in their way, and claim land and power for themselves, from east to west and down to Texas and Florida. Looking at a historical map of the growth of the United States (see Figure 1.5), one is struck by this clear, relentless, westward and

TEXAS ANNEXED 1845

OREGON TERRITORY ESTABLISHED 1846

LOUISIANA PURCHASE 1803

TERRITORY OF THE THIRTEEN ORIGINAL

STATES 1783

CEDED BY MEXICO 1848

CEDED BY SPAIN 1819

TITLE ESTABLISHED

1818

WA 1889

OR 1859

CA 1850 NV

1864

ID 1890

MT 1889

WY 1890

UT 1896

CO 1876 KS

1861

OK 1907

MO 1821

AR 1836

LA 1812

MS 1817

AL 1819

GA 1788

FL 1845

TN 1796

KY 1792

VA 1788

MD 1788 DE 1787WV

1863

NC 1789

SC 1788

TX 1845

NM 1912

AZ 1912

NE 1867

IA 1846

SD 1889

ND 1889

MN 1858

WI 1848

MI 1837

IL 1818

IN 1816

OH 1803

PA 1787 NJ 1787

NY 1788

ME 1820

MA 1788

CT 1788

VT 1791

NH 1788

RI 1790

GADSDEN PURCHASE

1853

PURCHASED FROM

RUSSIA 1867

AK 1959

ANNEXED 1898

HI 1959

Figure 1.5 Historical Growth of the United States

From the very fi rst moment of its founding in 1620, by the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock, the US has undertaken a steady outwards expansion—but does that mean that America has imperialism running in its veins?

Source: Adapted from “Admission of States and Territorial Acquisition”, US Bureau of the Census, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.

26 Part I Setting the World Stage

southward and northward expansion of territorial control; then, as the continent fi lled up, one starts to see American growth spreading over into Alaska and Hawaii and then, aft er World War II, into Germany and Japan. Now, today, the US has extensive entanglements all over the globe, especially in the Middle East (to secure the oil supply there, and provide protection for its ally Israel). America has imperialism running in its veins, the revisionists say—you better believe it’s an empire.39

Let’s leave, for now, the factual question of whether America has an empire and turn to the following, normative, issue: entertaining the notion that the US may have some kind of empire, is this good or bad? “Empire” is a bad word, generally, because we associate with it the infl iction of power, the assertion of dominance, and the absence of democracy and the self-rule of a people. But, need it be? Th ere is a group of people who actually say that, yes, America is an empire, but that this is a good thing for the world. What is their argument?

Th eir argument is that the US is the only country on Earth capable of bringing some order to the globe, and capable of preventing it from sliding back down into anarchy— that is, an ungoverned, chaotic condition of all-out fi ghting and confl ict between the various national groups and regions. So, American empire is good because it’s a source of security and stability that everyone benefi ts from. Th ese thinkers, like Paul Wolfowitz, also argue that American empire has been great for raising people’s standards of living. If we look at world GDP (gross domestic product, a measure of economic activity) since

Protesters in the Philippines hold a star-spangled banner that reads “IMPERIALISM— A PLAGUE TO THE WORLD.” Why do you think the US is such a fl ashpoint for protests around the world? (© CP/AP Photo/ Pat Roque)

271 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

the US established itself as the clearly dominant Western power (in 1945, aft er the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the British and French empires), and then since the US became the dominant world power (in 1991 or so, following the collapse of the Soviet empire), we see very steady and quite remarkable increase (even in spite of the latest recession). Th is, the fans of empire say, is a product of the values of capitalism and free trade, for which the United States stands so proudly. Americans know how to run profi table businesses and how to run a productive free-market economy, which increases everyone’s standard of living. So, American empire has generated more money, and a higher standard of living, for its subjects and beyond. Finally, the American empire pro- ponents say that the American empire stands for great values: human rights, individual freedom, free markets, democracy, free and fair elections, separation of church and state, and the growth of science and technology. To the extent that the US spreads these values, it does the world a favour. American empire is nothing to apologize for, these supporters say: it has generated very good consequences and has made the world a better place. We should all be happy with the dominance of the United States in the world today. What’s that famous phrase again? Oh yeah: God Bless America!40

Noam Chomsky—American himself, and a distinguished professor at MIT in Boston—has been one of the foremost critics of the American empire. He wants the USA, as the bumper sticker says, “Out of everywhere!” He believes that even if the United States started out nicely, it has since turned into a fat, corrupt society run mainly for the benefi t of the ultra-rich and powerful elites, “the masters of the uni- verse,” focused only on their own narrow self-interest. Th ese elites are essentially the East Coast power, fi nance, industry, and money barons of Washington, DC, and Wall Street in New York City. Th e US, in this sense, is an empire just like every other histori- cal one: the ultra-elite use their money and power to run the entire empire for their own benefi t, using the common people (whether in the US or elsewhere) to secure these benefi ts, and only doling out those rewards they must to keep the social peace and to let them keep their hold on society. Th ese money and power elites use the US military, based around the Pentagon, to protect themselves and their interests, and they off er lots of great entertainment out of Los Angeles to keep the powerless people happy, distracted, and stupefi ed. Chomsky’s is, in many ways, the ultimate con- spiracy theory. But the direct historical analogy here, Chomsky says, is to the Roman Empire: what may have started out nicely and with real benefi ts for its subjects grew increasingly corrupt and degenerated into a struggle for power and money between the ultra-elites, on the one hand, and a pointless existence—of rounds of work, food, booze, and cheap entertainment—for the masses, on the other. Chomsky views any form of empire as a violation of democracy and the rights of peoples around the world to choose their own forms of governance. But he also thinks that American empire is especially bad because Americans know so little, and care so little, about the world outside their borders. As a result of this ignorance, they are not likely to be good imperial masters; they will be apt to screw things up, like (Chomsky would say) they did in Vietnam or the Middle East: areas the US was very willing to intervene in, yet—incredibly!—with next to no knowledge of, or historical involvement with.41

Niall Ferguson, in his acclaimed books Empire and Colossus, argues that while the US could be a force for good in the world, presently it is not. He argues that, contrary to

28 Part I Setting the World Stage

popular belief, empires can be good. Th e ancient Roman Empire, for example, brought peace, prosperity, civilization, and technological advances to the entire Mediterranean world for hundreds of years. And the British Empire—Ferguson’s favourite example—

likewise generated remarkable prosperity, political stability, and cultural advance for its subjects. Indeed, some of the most developed and successful societies on Earth are former members: the US, Australia, Canada, and the UK itself. And the benefi ts of the British Empire weren’t measured simply in terms of wealth and security but also, Ferguson says, in terms of important moral and legal values, such as individual liberty, free trade, the impersonal rule of law, and parliamentary democracy. By population, the world’s two largest democracies are ex-Empire members: India and America. Th e record is marred by fl aws, of course: the British Empire, early on, was involved in African slavery; it lost the States to revolution; and there were sore spots of protracted violence, including Ireland and parts of the Middle East. And

the handling of both Indian and Israeli independence was a mess. Ferguson doesn’t deny such realities; he merely wishes to point out the other, positive side of the ledger. Th e words sound strange but, historically, empire has had some advantages.42

But Britain was a good imperial overlord because it cared about the societies it governed, and because it wasn’t afraid to admit that it had an empire. Indeed, it took great pride in that fact, with offi cials famously bragging that, owing to its far-fl ung, worldwide nature, “the sun never set on the British Empire.” But the United States, Ferguson asserts, is an empire-in-denial. It refuses to admit that it has an empire, much less does it fully live up to its potential for developing its dependencies into decent societies. Ferguson says that the US must stop “the half-assed job” it is currently doing as the global hegemon. It ought to be like Britain and train future leaders in its depen- dent societies, it ought to know more about those societies, it ought to invest in those societies, and it ought to develop the good institutions necessary for those societies to succeed over time. Th en, it will preside over a “Pax Americana,” modelled aft er the leg- endary Pax Romana, the peace established by the dominance of Rome for centuries.

Ferguson notes that, during the heyday of the British Empire, the young British elites would compete amongst each other for the plum imperial positions, and take pride in helping their colonies develop in a good, peaceful, prosperous way. But today’s young American elites, he notes, have no interest at all in living outside the United States, much less in being, say, president of Iraq. Young American elites want to make it in one of three cities, depending on their main career interest: New York (money), Washington (power), or Los Angeles (fame). Unless and until that changes, Ferguson concludes, the American empire will not be a successful venture for the world as a whole.

Whether the United States is in command of an empire or is merely a hegemon or great power, it clearly is the world’s most infl uential society. As such, every aspect of international studies—war, trade, development, pollution—is hugely infl uenced by American policy. Th e debate on American empire allows us to think through the pros and cons of this hegemony, as well as to see more clearly both the strengths and weaknesses of American society and the nature of its impact on the rest of the world.

Every aspect of international studies—war, trade, development, pollution—is hugely infl uenced by American policy.

291 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

Canada: Standing at the Crossroads of European Empire and American Hegemony

Where does Canada fi t into the themes of this chapter—state formation, European empires, American hegemony? Well, Canada’s founding was largely shaped by the imperial rivalry between Britain and France. Although there were Aboriginal people here fi rst, and though the Vikings (from Scandinavia) landed briefl y in Newfoundland around 1000 CE, the “discovery” of Canada is commonly credited to French explorer Jacques Cartier in 1534. Founding the colony of New France (now Quebec), Cartier and other hardy, enterprising immigrants from France were truly the fi rst canadiens. The basis of the fi rst colony was overwhelmingly agricultural, with the French colonists seeking arable land they could not attain in their native country. The early settlers forged surprisingly warm and co-operative relationships with the Aboriginal people, who helped them hunt animals for both food and fur.

As the English rose in global power, they came to challenge France’s claims to Canada repeatedly. This culminated in the Seven Years War (1754–63), which some historians label the fi rst true world war. Britain won, claiming Canada amongst its many prizes; however, as the Quebec prov- ince was already so fi rmly settled and established, the British promised accommodation (and not assimilation) of Quebec’s special French culture. Otherwise, English colonization spread out across the rest of the coun- try, marked generally by more hostile interactions with the country’s First Nations than the French had experienced. Economically, Canada started out—and remained until very recently—a gigantic natural resource base for export into the imperial hubs of Paris, London, and, even now, the US. What started out as the export of beaver pelts into fashion-conscious France grew into the enormous extraction of Canada’s rich natural bounty of timber, food, oil, gas, and countless minerals for export to the growing industrial empires of England and the US.

Canada was governed fi rmly as a colony, fi rst by France and then by England, in complete accord with the model illustrated in Figure 1.2 above. This was, in the fi rst instance, to protect the Europeans’ economic interests in Canada. But the model did have some benefi cial effects on the colony, as England brought over quite capable governors and, in fact, jealously pro- tected the independence of Canada from the rising superstar to the south. (In the War of 1812, Britain and the Canadian colonists fought off an American invasion, and Britain sided repeatedly with Canada, against the US, as the border between the latter two was negotiated and drawn, bit by bit, across the continent.) Political developments in England rippled over into Canada, including such virtues as the rule of law, the doctrine of “peace, order, and good government,” and, in time, democracy. Meanwhile, Canada stood as one of the fi rmest, and most useful, allies of both England and France

Canadian Insights

30 Part I Setting the World Stage

Conclusion

Countries are the basic units of international studies. So we began this chapter, and this textbook, by looking at countries and their parts: population, territory, culture, and gov- ernment. We came to understand the growth of nations and states, and how they constitute

throughout the many devastating wars fought in Europe from 1789 to 1945. Though Canada remains today, technically, a constitutional monarchy—with Britain’s monarch as its head of state—everyone knows this is both a for- mality and a deliberate Canadian choice; and that, certainly since the end of the Second World War, Canada has become a completely independent and developed democracy. (Three legal events tend to highlight Canada’s growing independence from England: the British North America Act of 1867, whose passage brought about Confederation, which we celebrate every year on the fi rst day of July; the Statute of Westminster of 1931, wherein Britain allowed its colonies to have independent foreign policies; and the Canada Act of 1982, when Canada patriated the Constitution, gaining the right to amend it without British consent—the fi rst of these amendments came with the passage of the Constitution Act of 1982, which added the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.)

So, Canada was a colony for most of its existence. And, depending on your views regarding American empire, you might even be tempted to opine that Canada remains a colony today: a chilly yet peaceful outpost on the northern fringe of the enormous American empire, eager to sell its wares into the United States in exchange for the lucrative benefi ts of doing so. Never content to simply remain a bed of resources for others to exploit, Canada struggled over time to develop homegrown advanced industries, fi rst through the railroads, then the factories, and today with such high- tech products as automobiles, high-speed trains, and the famous BlackBerry smartphone and related products. But Canada is massively infl uenced by American pop culture, and its economic links with the US account for about 30 per cent of its national wealth. Moreover, Canada generally supports the US in most of its foreign policy decisions. Yet, Canada retains its European heritage and its robust links with both Britain and France. It is a bilingual country, and one with a much stronger welfare state than exists in the US, with particular strengths in quality public education and universal healthcare coverage. Canada (population now 33 million) is one of the world’s biggest immigrant societies, receiving people from all over the world, and is much more conscious than the US of the founding role of its Aboriginal peoples, a point exemplifi ed by the fact that Inuit leaders democratically control the two legislatures of Northwest Territories and Nunavut. So, for all the cynical talk of Canada’s still being a colony, the country boasts many salient and admirable qualities that set it apart from the US.43

(For more on Canada–US relations and how the two countries differ and yet co-operate substantially in foreign affairs, see the extended case study in Chapter 4, on foreign policy.)

311 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

a middle way between the tiny city-state and the massive, far-fl ung, cosmopolitan empire. To chart the growth of the nation-state, we needed to consider the history of state forma- tion, fi rst in Europe and then—through European imperialism and colonialism—across the globe. In so doing, we took note of how deeply European imperialism has shaped our world, in terms of both North versus South and the spread of the interstate system. We also witnessed how civilizations diff er from each other, and how these diff erences can result not just in friction but in sustained, and world-changing, armed confl ict. We spent some time looking at the essential elements of Western civilization, and how it diff ers from others, on grounds that it has, through European colonialism and the strength of the US, come to be the leading civilization of our times. Strengths and weaknesses of the West were noted, and then extended case study consideration was given to whether the United States, as the lead- ing Western nation, is in fact an empire, a revival of old-style imperialism and colonialism. Given the pervasive impact of the US on international society and international studies, this focus was a helpful fi rst case study, as we start to think through more deeply the scope and limits of our world.

Review Questions

1. How has your national membership shaped your personal identity? How mean- ingful is it to you, and how has it aff ected your view of the rest of the world?

2. In what ways are non-state actors (MNCs, NGOs) becoming more important in international life? In what ways might the roles of national governments be decreasing? Some experts have even written of “the death of the state” in this regard: do you agree?

3. Reading the various “top 10” lists (i.e. of territory, population, languages, economies, etc.) did anything surprise you, and/or concern you? How do you think these lists might change over the course of your lifetime?

4. Even though everyone agrees that Europe begins in ancient Greece, revi- sionist historians have recently argued that ancient Greece was, in turn, heavily infl uenced by ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia/Persia. Research and comment on the debate raging around M. Bernal’s provocative work Black Athena: Th e Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, vols 1–3 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1991).

5. Explain how state formation happened in Europe, and how the state-centric model of international relations spread from there throughout the whole world.

6. What’s the signifi cance of both the Treaty of Westphalia and the Treaty of Versailles to our world today?

7. How was decolonization triggered? Pick a former European colony and research (a) how it was impacted by imperialism, and (b) how it handled decolonization.

8. What do you think are the pros and cons of Western civilization?

32 Part I Setting the World Stage

Notes 1. M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper, 2009). 2. Material for this and all subsequent “top 10” factual lists in this chapter comes from (a) the

United Nations Statistics Division, www.unstats.un.org/unsd, and (b) the CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook

3. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2nd edn, 2009). 4. Some experts consider English to be the world’s most prevalent language, as it’s thought to be,

by far, the most common second language learned around the world. Th us, combining mother- tongue with second-language would result in a diff erent ordering, with English on top.

5. W. Wallace & D. Josselin, Non-State Actors in World Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 6. M. Campbell & W. Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic

Books, 1996); J. Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); R. Stross, Planet Google (New York: Free Press, 2008).

7. F. Fukuyama, Th e Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2011). 8. A. Gibbons, Th e First Human (New York: Anchor, 2007); R. Chadwock, First Civilizations:

Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt (London: Equinox, 2006). 9. C. Freeman, Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2004). 10. T. Harrison, Th e Great Empires of the Ancient World (Los Angeles: Getty Museum Publications,

2010). 11. M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 12. J. Burbank & F. Cooper, Empires in World History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

2011).

9. Do you agree with Huntingdon’s thesis about “Th e Clash of Civilizations”? Why or why not? In general, what’s the value of comparing diff erent world civilizations for international studies?

10. In your view, does America have an empire? If not, why not? If so, what kind, and is this good or bad for the world?

Websites for Further Research

Th e American Empire Project www.americanempireproject.com − critical of US foreign policy Project for the New American Century www.newamericancentury.org – supportive of US foreign policy Th e Nationalism Project www.nationalismproject.org – advanced research about nationalism’s historical impact Th e North–South Institute www.nsi-ins.ca – advanced research about the diff erences, and relations, between North and South Th e Dominion Institute www.dominion.ca – information on Canadian history and heritage

331 Core Concepts and Historical Contexts

13. C. Wickham, Th e Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages, 400–1000 (New York: Viking, 2009).

14. W. Duiker & J. Spielvogel, Th e Essential World History: To 1500 (London: Wadsworth, 3rd edn, 2006). 15. D. MacCulloch, Th e Reformation: A History (New York: Penguin, 2005); P. Wilson, Th e Th irty

Years’ War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 16. I. Wallerstein, Th e Modern World-System, Vol. 1 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011). 17. C.V. Wedgewood, Th e Th irty Years’ War (New York: NYRB Classics, 2005); J.L. Brierly, Th e Law

of Nations (New York: Waldock, 6th edn, 1963). 18. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966);

Aristotle, Th e Politics, trans. C. Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 19. D. Abernathy, Th e Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980

(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 20. J. Hart, Comparing Empires (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); P. Curtin, Th e World and Th e

West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 21. J. Keegan, Th e First World War (New York: Vintage, 2000). 22. M. MacMillan, Paris 1919 (Toronto: Random House, 2003); H. Arendt, The Origins of

Totalitarianism (New York: Schocken, 1951). 23. J. Keegan, Th e Second World War (New York: Vintage, 1990); M. Chamberlain, Decolonization:

Th e Fall of the European Empires (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edn, 1999); D. Rothermund, Th e Routledge Companion to Decolonization (London: Routledge, 2000).

24. A World Bank Report, Atlas of Global Development (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2nd edn, 2009).

25. S.A. Marston, et al., World Regions in Global Context (New York: Prentice Hall, 4th edn, 2010). 26. J. Rigg, An Everyday Geography of Th e Global South (London: Routledge, 2007). 27. D. Wengrow, What Makes Civilization? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 28. J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization (London: Wadsworth, 2003); S. Huntingdon, Th e Clash of

Civilizations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 29. M. Walker, Th e Cold War: A History (New York: Henry Holt, 1995). 30. S.R. Dockrill, Th e End of Th e Cold War Era (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2005). 31. S. Huntingdon, Th e Clash of Civilizations and Th e Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon

and Schuster, 1996). 32. I. Eland, No War For Oil: U.S. Dependency and Th e Middle East (San Francisco: Th e Independent

Institute, 2011). 33. G.E. Perry, “Huntingdon and His Critics,” Arab Studies Quarterly (2002), pp. 1–12. 34. J. Sacks, Th e Dignity of Diff erence: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations (London: Continuum,

2002). 35. P. Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire (New York: Regnery, 2002). 36. I. Eland, Th e Empire Has No Clothes: US Foreign Policy Exposed (Stanford, CA: Th e Independent

Institute, 2008). 37. A.J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Foreign Policy

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 38. S. Lens, Th e Forging of Th e American Empire (London: Haymarket, 2003); D.W. Meinig, Th e

Shaping of America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). 39. E. Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008). 40. See the “Project for the New American Century” at www.newamericancentury.org 41. N. Chomsky, Making the Future: Th e Unipolar Imperial Moment (San Francisco: City Lights, 2010). 42. N. Ferguson, Empire (New York; Basic, 2004); N. Ferguson, Colossus: Th e Rise and Fall of

American Empire (New York: Penguin, 2005). 43. R. Bothwell, Th e Penguin History of Canada (Toronto: Penguin Global, 2008); Statistics Canada,

www.statcan.gc.ca

Population and Environment2 “Those who contemplate the beauty of Earth fi nd

reserves of strength that will endure as long as life lasts.” –Rachel Carson (1907–1964), author of Silent Spring

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all the bolded key terms and concepts

 understand and explain population-related contrasts, such as (a) big versus small, (b) fast-growing versus slow-growing, (c) immigrant versus native-born, (d) migrant worker versus refugee, and (e) urban versus rural populations

 grasp the pros and cons of urbanization, and how industrialization—as begun during the Industrial Revolution—has played a crucial role not only in urban- ization but regarding pollution, too

 apprehend the arguments of both environmental optimists and neo- Malthusian environmental pessimists, and be able to speak intelligently on the pros and cons of both

 defi ne “the tragedy of the commons,” and evaluate the two most common solutions to this tragedy: national enclosure and international public park protection

 refl ect on whether resource management is enough, or whether sustainable development demands deeper changes to contemporary capitalism

 enjoy expanded literacy about key environmental problems like deforestation and climate change, as well as crucial resource issues like energy and oil, and having enough food and water for the world’s population.

Introduction

Th e chapter-opening epigraph comes from American conservationist Rachel Carson. Her 1962 book, Silent Spring, is oft en credited with sparking the modern environmental move- ment. In it, she drew on her training as a biologist to explore why, in some parts of the US, the migrating songbirds of spring had gone missing (hence, silent). Her fi nding: uncon- trolled pollution, especially of pesticides, was to blame. In particular, the chemical DDT was destroying the eggs of the songbirds before they could hatch. Th e reaction of the American people to this discovery helped spur the banning of DDT, and the social movement that grew out of her book helped develop political support for creating the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the main government department in charge of natural resource stewardship in the US. Aft er death, Carson was awarded the President’s Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honour in America.1

352 Population and Environment

In this chapter, we will explore the issue of environment and resources. Related to this, of course, is the topic of human population. How many people there are and how they live impact the planet enormously; Silent Spring details just one tiny example. Few things could be more foundational to global studies than the issue of how humans interact with the planet. First up: population.

Population

On the last day of October 2011, Earth reached a milestone, welcoming its 7 billionth human to the planet. Th is is up, very sharply, from 1 billion in the early 1800s. (It took humanity nearly 10,000 years to hit the fi rst billion, and then not even 200 years to add six billion more!) Most experts say that population growth will continue until it approaches the 10 billion mark, perhaps around 2100, at which point it is expected to level off . Still, note the dramatic degree of increase, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.2

According to demographers, like Massimo Livi-Bacci, almost all future population growth is expected to occur in the Global South, and the number is supposed to level off as the developing world becomes richer and more developed. For, one of the clearest statisti- cal associations is this: the wealthier people become, the fewer children they have. Kids, aft er all, cost money, and gone are the days when the family farm dominated the economy and you needed as many young helpers as you could get. Advances in healthcare have substantially increased the survival rate for children in the West; so gone, too, are the days

250 million 500 million 750 million

1 billion

2 billion

3 billion

4 billion

5 billion

6 billion

7 billion

8 billion

9 billion

10 billion

1000 AD 1250 1500 1625

1800

1750 1850

1900

1950

2000

2100 AD Projection

Figure 2.1 The Growth of the World Population: Real and Estimated Future Growth

Source: Data from J.R. Weeks, Population: Concepts and Issues (London: Wadsworth, 11th ed., 2011); and the United Nations, www.un.org/esa/population.

36 Part I Setting the World Stage

when it was thought you needed to have many kids in order to ensure that enough survived to take care of you, as you became elderly and infi rm. Finally, increased career opportuni-

ties, access to birth control, legal rights, and socioeconomic resources for women have translated, on average, into their having fewer children than previous generations did.3

Table 2.1 lists the world’s 10 largest countries by population; Table 2.2 lists the countries with the fastest and slowest rates of population growth, as of 2010. Note, in Table 2.2, that nearly all of the fastest-growing popula- tions are in the developing world—almost all in Africa—and that they have had consistent annual population growth of at least 3 per cent over the

past few years. By contrast, the 10 countries with the slowest-growing populations have actually had negative population growth in recent years (i.e. their population is shrinking, not growing), and they tend to be either tiny islands—with people leaving for better work opportunities elsewhere—or else situated, disproportionately, in central and eastern Europe.4

The Problem with People

Fast-growing populations have a greater number of younger, than older, people; as a result, they have big demand for the services young families with children require, such as schools and physical infrastructure, like roads and the kind of aff ordable housing that is oft en found in suburban subdivisions, outside the city core. Th ere is also a need to create jobs to keep those children occupied once they reach working age. Th ese requirements put large pressures on governments, and the poorer governments of the Global South are among the least capable of delivering in this regard.

Almost all future population growth is expected to occur in the Global South.

Table 2.1 The 10 Biggest Countries, by Estimated Population (2010)

Country Estimated Population (millions)

1. China 1,300

2. India 1,200

3. America 311

4. Indonesia 238

5. Brazil 195

6. Pakistan 175

7. Bangladesh 164

8. Nigeria 158

9. Russia 141

10. Japan 127

Source: Data from The CIA World Factbook, 2010 edition.

372 Population and Environment

Slow-growing, or negative-growth, populations have—by contrast—a greater number of older, than younger, people, and so they have big demand for the services that older people require, such as healthcare and old age or retirement pension payments. Th is puts its own considerable pressures on governments, which oft en must tax a smaller base of younger workers to aff ord these kinds of social programs. But oft en in these countries, younger workers are leaving to secure better opportunities in larger, faster-growing economies.5

So, regardless of growth status, population brings challenges to any kind of country and to any kind of government. Diff erent governments deal with these challenges dif- ferently. For instance, faced with its enormous population pressures, the government of China in 1979 instituted its one child policy, a set of regulations governing family size and the spacing of children in cases where a second child is permitted. To the upside, this does seem to have had a positive eff ect on containing that nation’s enormous population growth (much of it occurring along the coast—China’s population is not evenly distributed, geographically); the country’s rate of natural increase—its growth rate based on births and deaths—fell from 1.7 per cent in 1975 to 0.6 per cent in 2006.6 To the downside, though, there is evidence that this policy has increased abortions and the abandonment of baby girls, as some parents seem to value a boy more highly. Over the long term, there are fears such actions will skew China’s demographics (i.e. the composition of population), resulting in an unhealthy disproportion of boys to girls. Th ere are, moreover, indications of unfairness to this policy, as some wealthier couples can bribe offi cials to look the other way, and of course, there’s the fundamental issue of the huge restriction on personal freedom to begin with. On the one hand, we can appreciate the enormous practical problems such a

Table 2.2 Countries with the Fastest-Growing and Slowest-Growing Populations (2010)

Fastest-Growing Populations Slowest-Growing Populations

1. Zimbabwe 1. Mariana Islands

2. Niger 2. Cook Islands

3. Uganda 3. Bulgaria

4. Turks and Caicos Islands 4. Montenegro

5. Burundi 5. Estonia

6. United Arab Emirates (UAE) 6. Ukraine

7. Ethiopia 7. Latvia

8. Burkina Faso 8. Russia

9. Yemen 9. Serbia

10. Zambia 10. Guyana

Source: United Nations, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs: www.un.org/esa/population.

38 Part I Setting the World Stage

giant population would put on everyone, government planners especially; we can see why they’d want some population control. On the other hand, I doubt many of us want to be told by our governments how many children we can have: it’s one of life’s biggest, and most personal, decisions. Th e government of India has gone another way in its pursuit of popu- lation control: aggressively distributing birth control pills and aggressively disseminating information on sexual health and reproductive technologies, among the young female population in particular.7

Th ere are a handful of pronatalist governments around the world. (“Pronatalist” describes governments that want to promote birth and population growth, as opposed to restricting birth and curbing population growth, as in the case of China and India.) Pronatalist governments—such as those in the slow-growth countries of eastern Europe, and even here in Canada, in Quebec—take measures to increase population, such as off ering tax breaks, or baby-bonus cash payments, to new parents. More extreme pronatalist policies can be found in cultures where religious law proscribes the use of birth control. Th is accounts, in part, for the high population growth rates in some Muslim countries in the Middle East.

The Distribution of Population

Th e world’s population is not distributed equally, of course. We saw, last chapter, how humans fi rst evolved in Africa and migrated from there to the east and south through the Middle East and into Asia, and also to the north and west into Europe. Historically, the world’s largest voluntary migration was the movement of Europeans into the Americas, from about 1500 to 1975; the world’s largest involuntary migration was the coercive move- ment of Africans—as slaves—into the Americas (especially the Caribbean and the United States), from about 1500 to 1865.

Asia, with more than 4 billion people, contains fully 60 per cent of the entire world’s population. (Indeed, the two giant neighbours, China and India, contain over one-third of all humanity within their borders!) Africa has about 15 per cent of the world’s population, with roughly 1 billion people calling that continent home. Next comes Europe, with just over 10 per cent of the world’s population, or about 725 million inhabitants. Th en fol- lows North America, with approximately 8 per cent (525 million people) and South and Central America, at 5 per cent (385 million). Rounding things off is Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, and other islands of the South Pacifi c), with under 1 per cent of the world’s population (38 million).8

Another important measure is population density, which tracks how many people there are in a given mile or kilometre. Asia is the most densely populated continent by far, followed by Europe. Trailing those two rather distantly are, in order, Africa, North America, South and Central America, and Oceania.

Immigrants

Typical in the developed world—especially Canada and Europe—is a phenomenon whereby, without immigration, the population would actually decrease. Th is is to say that, among the native-born population, the growth rate is slow or negative. To keep popula- tion—and the size of the economy and tax-base—up, governments in this position can aggressively encourage immigration from around the world, inviting foreigners to leave

392 Population and Environment

their home countries to establish a new life and a new membership status in the receiving country. Th e top 10 immigrant-receiving societies are, in order:

1. United States 2. Russia 3. Germany 4. Ukraine 5. France 6. Saudi Arabia 7. Canada 8. India 9. Britain 10. Spain (with Australia nearly tied with Spain).9

Th e three biggest immigration corridors in the world today are from Mexico into America, from Ukraine into Russia, and from Bangladesh into India.10 (An immigration corridor is a heavily travelled route taken by people immigrating to one country from another.)

Immigrants bring many benefi ts to the receiving country, including diversity, new ways of life, new skills, and reinforcements for the workforce. Immigrants, typically, are younger, too, and so they bring youthful energy and may choose to start a family in the new country, further bolstering the host country’s population. But immigrant-receiving societies also face challenges helping new members adjust to, and integrate in, their new home countries. Th is is a challenge for every society, but recently the issue has received high-profi le atten- tion throughout Europe, where some minorities—especially those of Arab ethnic descent and Muslim religious belief—are growing much more quickly than the native populations. (For more on precise meanings of “Arab” and “Muslim,” please see the next chapter, on cul- ture.) Th ese minorities are sometimes much more religious than the native population, and some are requesting that aspects of their traditional social and legal understandings, such as those pertaining to the division of assets upon divorce, be incorporated into European laws. Moreover, these immigrant communities oft en live together in closely connected and densely populated pockets within the receiving population, arguably forming societ- ies within societies, or nations within nations. Th ese realities are strongly challenging the identities of some European countries, and raising issues about the coherence and integrity of a national culture, on the one hand, versus the need, on the other, to be multicultural (i.e. to respect cultural diversity while still maintaining social peace and political unity).11

Case Study: The French Ban on Muslim Head Scarves A recent example of the clash between immigrant and receiving cultures occurred in France. Aft er many years of tension, the French National Assembly passed a law in 2004. Th is law prohibits the wearing of any conspicuous (i.e. prominent and vis- ible) religious symbols while attending publicly funded elementary and secondary

40 Part I Setting the World Stage

schools. Th ough the ban applies to the symbols of all religions, many consider the law to be targeting the Muslim minority, specifi cally the practice of its young girls wearing headscarves (khimar) as part of traditional female modesty (hijab). Th e law is com- monly referred to as the “French head scarf ban.”

In practice, this is how this law has been applied. Th ough the legislation was initially greeted by substantial protests by the Muslim community throughout France, the law today remains on the books, and is enforced by the government of France as a commitment to equality and secularity (i.e. non-religiousness) in its public schools.

Migrant Workers

In a number of countries, there is a large population of migrant workers. Th ese are people who have citizenship and a permanent home in one country but live temporarily, for work purposes, in another. Th ey tend to work in industries that pay very little and that are very labour-intensive (i.e. they are not heavily mechanized and require a lot of “people power,” such as picking delicate fruit when ripe, or washing dishes in a restaurant, or cleaning people’s houses, or gardening). Agriculture is perhaps the largest example. In Canada, for example, there are large numbers of seasonal migrant workers who enter the country, especially from the Caribbean and Mexico, during harvest time. It is hard to tally precisely the population of migrant workers in any given country, as many of them are illegal immi- grants who have entered the “work country” without any passport, visa, or permission.

Th e issue of illegal migrant workers has been a contentious one in the United States, where the government has sometimes extended amnesties for illegal migrant work- ers. According to this policy, illegal immigrants who could prove they’ve worked for at least one full season in America’s migrant worker industry could sometimes qualify for legal immigrant status in the US. Recently, though, a number of states—Arizona leading among them—have resisted such measures, and have favoured cracking down on, and even deporting, people working in the US illegally. While no one wants to condone law- breaking, the other side of the equation is that the vast majority of the jobs “taken away” by migrant workers seem to be jobs that native-born Americans show absolutely no interest in performing, given their demanding physical nature and the substandard wages and ben- efi ts. Some scholars, such as Daniel Rothenberg, have even argued that cracking down on illegal migrant workers could actually do much damage to the economies of states such as California, where the cheap labour performed by illegal workers helps to keep agricultural prices low. Th e fi gure of the migrant worker thus seems something of a murky shadow, given how much associated with it exists across national borders, under the radar of the legal system, and below the poverty line.12

Refugees

Th ere is an important diff erence between being an immigrant and being a refugee. Immigrants leave their home country voluntarily, seeking to make a new and better life for themselves and their children. Th is is to say that the motives of an immigrant, or a migrant worker, are usually economic. A refugee, by contrast, is a person who has been forced to leave his or her home country involuntarily, usually for reasons of war or persecution. Th e

412 Population and Environment

United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, lobbies United Nations member countries on behalf of refugees to ensure that refugees receive decent treatment from receiving countries until they manage to fi nd a new home. (For more on the UN in general, see Chapter 5.) A refugee being off ered admission into a new home country is said to be granted asylum. Th e UNHCR estimates that as of 2009 there were between 8 million and 10 million refugees worldwide; however, there were about 36 million people forming the worldwide population of concern, which includes both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), who are like refugees but in their own country: they have been forced out of their home region into a diff erent region of the same country. Sudan is home to a number of IDPs.

Case Study: The Darfur Region of Sudan Sudan contains a northern, mainly Arab and Muslim, population, and a southern, mainly black and Christian, population. The central government is controlled by the Arabs, and it has been—for at least the last 10 years—permit- ting radical Arab groups, or militias, to push the black Christians out of the Darfur province. Th is practice of trying to drive out a whole, distinct people from a certain territory where they’ve been clearly established and living as a com- munity is known as ethnic cleansing. Fighting has erupted between the groups, with casualties pegged at 300,000 and climbing. Following a ref- erendum in January 2011, the southern region seceded and, in July of the same year, established a separate independent state, called South Sudan. (Th e northern region has since adopted the name North Sudan.) However, if history is any guide, there will likely continue to be disputes over such matters as control of the lucrative oil fi elds and details concerning where the border between the two new countries ought to go.13

Refugees and IDPs are very vulnerable populations, since they lack a home and the protec- tion of a national government. Th eir human rights and quality of life are tenuous and uncertain. Organizations like the UNHCR try to urge national governments to grant them asylum and to put them on track for immigration and new citizenship. But the process is a diffi cult one, for a couple of reasons. First, the process of being awarded citizenship takes a long time, and the population of concern needs resources and protection in the interim.

A mother and her children at the UN’s Zam Zam Camp for internally displaced persons in Darfur, Sudan. Such camps are very much needed on a temporary basis, but what’s a more promising, more permanent solution to refugee fl ows? (UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe)

42 Part I Setting the World Stage

Second, the countries into which the refugees have fl ed are oft en themselves impoverished and lacking resources. For example, wars, dire poverty, ethnic cleansing, and disease in sub-Saharan Africa have recently generated millions of refugees, who are oft en forced to rotate between countries, as governments agree to take them in for short periods only— and then they must move on. Wealthy countries, for their part, fear being swamped by the world’s refugees if they were simply to open their borders and welcome anyone: 36 million, aft er all, is not a small number.14

Urbanization

A fi nal, vital population diff erence—alongside big versus small, fast- versus slow-grow- ing, immigrant versus native-born, and migrant worker versus refugee—is the diff erence between urban and rural populations. Urbanization—the growth of the population of cit- ies at the expense of rural or countryside areas—has been a relentless population trend in recent world history, in both the developed and the developing worlds. Consider Table 2.3 and note how the 10 largest cities are split between the North and the South.

To make sense of urbanization, we need to consider the Industrial Revolution. In the early 1700s, enormous changes began to be made regarding the production of goods. Sparked by new inventions, such as the steam engine and the cotton gin, machine-driven production of goods became possible, replacing the piece-by-piece, handcraft ed produc- tion of goods. In England notably, the fi rst factories were built to take advantage of this and to mass-produce as many goods as possible, eventually leading to such innovations as the assembly line. Th e Industrial Revolution had enormous impact on society: people became much wealthier, goods were being created much more quickly and cheaply, and the nature

Table 2.3 The 10 Biggest Urban Areas, by Estimated Population (2011)

City Population (millions)

1. Tokyo, Japan 32.5

2. Seoul, South Korea 20.5

3. Mexico City, Mexico 20.4

4. New York City, USA 19.8

5. Mumbai, India 19.2

6. Jakarta, Indonesia 18.9

7. Sao Paulo, Brazil 18.8

8. Delhi, India 18.6

9. Osaka/Kobe, Japan 17.3

10. Shanghai, China 16.7

Source: Data from The CIA World Factbook, 2010 edition.

432 Population and Environment

of work and the economy was utterly transformed. More about the consequences of the Industrial Revolution will be discussed later this chapter. For our purposes here, we need to note how the Industrial Revolution spurred urbanization: farm workers fl ooded the cit- ies, leaving agriculture behind to participate in the newly developing industrial economy, headquartered in the factories.15

When the Industrial Revolution began, only 3 per cent of the world’s population lived in cities. Recently the world reached the landmark threshold of 51 per cent: in other words, for the fi rst time in all of human history, the majority of the world’s population is now urban.16 (Th ere remain, however, stark and signifi cant regional diff erences: in the US, for instance, 80 per cent of the population is urban, whereas throughout the Global South, 70 per cent of the population is still rural.) A striking illustration of the growth of urban- ization: in 1850, London and Paris were the only cities in the world with populations over 1 million; today over 600 cities around the world have hit that milestone mark.17

Urbanization has its pros and cons. In terms of cons, the growth of cities has, historically and currently, come at the expense of rural areas. Th is is known as rural fl ight: people leave the country in the hope of fi nding better opportunities in the city. Th ose who view the rural way of life positively, as being more traditional, will regret what they might perceive to be an erosion of traditional values. (For example, it’s oft en said that the family farm is now dead, having been replaced with a handful of giant agricultural companies that mass-produce food products for hungry urban centres.) As cities grow and sprawl, they also take over farmland and formerly wild spaces, threatening several animal and plant species by eliminating their habitat. Cities con- centrate people, and so they also produce a concentration of the bad things people cause—crime, traffi c, lack of civility, gridlock, overcrowding and sprawl, pollution (water, air, noise, smell), and so on. Cities bring with them enormous problems of management—in terms of housing, transportation, garbage collection, infrastructure renewal—on a scale and complexity much greater than rural areas. Th is is one reason why, for example, the mayors of big cities are oft en major political fi gures in their own right, and why the municipal budgets of some city-centres can dwarf those of full-blown nation-states. (Indeed, note that the population of the world’s biggest city, Tokyo, is equal to the entire national population of Canada.)

But urbanization does have its benefi ts. Historically urbanization has been deeply intertwined with both modernization and industrialization. It will be considered good insofar as one favours wealth creation over pollution and modern values over traditional ones. For instance, city-centres have oft en been sources of secularization, diversifi cation, and female liberation. Polls and studies confi rm that rural populations are much more reli- gious than urban centres, and are much less racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse than cities. Cities have thus been seen as centres of liberation for those who, historically, have felt stultifi ed by more traditional ways of life, such as racial and ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, and women. Cities also tend to off er much better quality of social services, in terms of education, entertainment, healthcare, and poverty management in particular. (People oft en wonder why there are so many more poor and homeless people in cities; the answer is that there are so many more services that cater to their needs and problems.) Cities also, with their concentration of wealth and population, tend to off er much greater socioeconomic opportunities—and more upward, merit-based mobility—than the rural

For the fi rst time in all of human history, the majority of the world’s population is now urban.

44 Part I Setting the World Stage

regions can. Some experts even argue that cities—or, certain kinds of cities—don’t neces- sarily have to be bad for the environment, for the greater concentration of humanity in cities leaves more of nature to Mother Nature (as long as the cities are built more up than out). Moreover, urban dwellers have, on average, fewer children than rural people do, and so urbanization decreases the population pressure on natural resources.20

Referring to the above “Insights box”, one can certainly appreciate the formation, and growing infl uence, of these “CSRs.” In Canada, one thinks not only of Toronto but also of Montreal, Ottawa, Halifax, Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton. In the US the list expands to include New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles especially, but also Boston, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Miami, Seattle, and Washington, DC. Every country in the world has at least one CSR, and possibly several, and they tend to set the tone and pace regarding both culture and standard of living. Paris may well be the boldest international example of this, as without question it dominates the tone of life in France. Increasingly, to borrow and revise a famous Latin phrase, urbi est orbi: the city is the world.

CSRs and the GTA

Urbanization has led some experts, such as Canadian economist Tom Courchene, to consider some cities as city-state regions (or CSRs). We saw last chapter that, before the Treaty of Westphalia and the formation of the great nation-states, urban centres dominated, and “countries” counted for little. For example, there was no Italy, but there were the great cities of Florence, Milan, Venice, and Rome itself—the “Eternal City.” Some futur- ists (experts at predicting the future) are suggesting that, with increasing globalization, we may well see that same trend occur again, that nations will become less important, and cities much more so. Some experts have even predicted the death of the nation-state, at least economically.18 These experts say that, if you look around, everywhere you see the formation of CSRs: areas that are almost self-contained, with all of life in the region cen- tred around that municipality. For example, in southern Ontario, the CSR would of course be Toronto. Toronto proper, and the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), together account for fully half of Ontario’s population as well as half its total economic activity. (Indeed, the GTA accounts for almost 25 per cent of Canada’s national economy.) The area around the GTA grows food to feed the GTA, manufactures goods used in the GTA, cheers for Toronto sports teams, fl ies into and out of Pearson International Airport, sends local politicians to Toronto to represent them, sends tons of commuters to work every day in the GTA, and, ultimately, raises its kids to grow up and begin their careers in the GTA, so that the cycle can repeat. So dominant is Toronto, in the context of Ontario, that it’s almost tempting to note recurrent themes of “metropole and periphery,” as learned last chapter.19

Canadian Insights

452 Population and Environment

Creative Cities

We do not, of course, mean to imply that all cities are equal. Each has its own unique composition, its own particular strengths and weaknesses. Some cities—think of Detroit—seem to be struggling, whereas others, such as Shanghai, are booming. More commonly, cities endure through good times and bad. Of recent interest, though, is the new theory of “the creative city.” This is thought to be of special relevance to the developed world. For as the manufacture of goods increasingly moves offshore to low-cost labour countries like China, it becomes important for developed societies to provide highly value-added services if they are to remain competitive in the global economy. (Value-added here means that people take rather routine inputs and, through invention and ingenuity, transform them into outputs, or goods and services, that are much more useful, valuable, and expensive.)

So what is a creative city? Urban experts like John Howkins and Richard Florida defi ne it as a dynamic, growing city wherein there is (1) a substantial creative class, (2) a creative economy, and (3) creative, pleasing city condi- tions. The creative class is that segment of the workforce that gets paid to think. This would include not only people in such obviously “creative” industries as entertainment, fi ne arts, culture, publishing, and fashion, but also engineers, scientists, professors, lawyers, doctors, accountants, soft- ware designers, high-tech people in general, and so on. A creative city has at least 30 per cent of its workforce labouring in such activities that together constitute the creative economy: inventive “white-collar” work that provides services that improve quality of life (like education or medical advice) and/or diffi cult-to-design, value-added goods (such as software, TV programs, and Internet applications).

Pleasing city conditions might be more vague, but the general idea is that the city is not primarily industrial, nor is its layout routine, nor is its physical infrastructure drab and/or decrepit. The layout, rather, is inter- esting and inventive, with lots of green space and an intriguing blend of human spaces (like houses and buildings) with natural spaces (like parks and waterfront). There is some effort to make the city-space pleasing, peo- ple-friendly, and imbued with the promise of a high quality of life: it’s not endless, “cookie-cutter” suburbia, nor is it a rusting old town whose manu- facturing heyday is done and gone. And the “pleasing conditions” aren’t just physical; they are social, too, with a stress above all on tolerance and a lack of tension and bitterness between the city’s various groups. Florida has popularized this slogan, summarizing the essence of a creative city: “Talent, Technology, and Tolerance.” Cities scoring highly on the various “creative city indexes” include Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco, Seattle, Boston, Austin, Washington, DC, and New York. Internationally, cities like London, Paris, Hong Kong, and Sydney do well.21

Studies in Technology

46 Part I Setting the World Stage

Transition from Human Population to Natural Environment

It’s easy to make the transition from issues concerning human population to issues concern- ing the natural environment. Perhaps the most evocative way to do this is to cite English economist Th omas Malthus and the social demographers infl uenced by his work, the so- called neo-Malthusians. Malthus back in 1798 wrote a famous essay in which he warned that the explosive growth in human population would soon exceed the ability of Earth to sustain such numbers, resulting in gruesome eventualities like mass starvation. Th is theme, or concern, comes up again and again in more recent writings, such as Paul Ehrlich’s alarm- ingly titled book Th e Population Bomb (1970) and the Club of Rome’s infl uential report Th e Limits to Growth (1972). Neo-Malthusians believe that the incredible growth of the human population—illustrated above in Figure 2.1—simply cannot be sustained, and that soon enough (though the neo-Malthusians never seem to agree on when exactly) humans will be too many in number for the planet to feed, water, clothe, and house us all.22

Environment and Resources

Th e environment refers, very broadly, to the natural setting in which human beings exist. Humans live in a complex environment composed of both artifi cial (i.e. human-made) and natural (i.e. non–human-made) settings and systems. When we talk of the environment we mean chiefl y the latter—the natural context—and how both natural and human-made elements interact, and how this interaction impacts the future well-being of both. Th us, the environment, for our purposes, refers to Earth’s various, and most vital, natural cycles and systems, which we depend upon for life and well-being: the atmosphere, the land, resources under the land, the water, sea life, the plant world, and the animal kingdom. To humans, all of these things are resources—inputs used to produce something, such as food, whether it is for one person or for the population of a metropolis that is home to tens of millions of people.

But humanity also deposits the waste, or by-products, of its activities into Earth’s vari- ous natural systems, and this is called pollution. Every single human activity creates some waste—just drinking water will, eventually, produce urine, and even the simple, automatic act of breathing produces carbon dioxide (CO2) as a by-product. Th ere is thus no possibil- ity of humans creating zero pollution, much as that might sound appealing as an ideal. Th e inescapable fact is this: we need the natural environment, yet we pollute it, too.

Pessimists Open the Argument

Th is complex fact of our existence has led many to speak of a massive, ever-worsening environmental crisis. Let’s call these people environmental pessimists, or just “pessimists” for short. (Some are neo-Malthusians, but they don’t all have to be.) Th ey tend to focus on two facts above all: 1. the enormous and very rapid growth in human population (as discussed above) 2. the rise of industrialization—mechanized mass-production using large-scale advanced

machinery and artifi cial measures—since the Industrial Revolution fi rst began around 250 years ago.

472 Population and Environment

Pessimists such as James Lovelock fear our enormous, and omnivorous, population will soon exceed what they call Earth’s carrying capacity.23 Th is refers to the idea that Earth and its resources are fi nite, not infi nite, and that there is a limit of population growth, and resource use, that the Earth can sustain, which we must eventually reach. Simply put, there are only so many people the Earth can carry without becoming completely used up, exhausted, lifeless, and useless—like a giant garbage dump. In terms of the second item— industrialization—the pessimists fear not only that our population is sucking too much out of the Earth, but that—with mechanized mass production for a global marketplace—we are putting far too much pollution back into Earth’s various systems, those of air, land, sea, and water. We are thus poisoning the plant and animal kingdoms, hence undermining our own ability to survive and thrive as a species moving forward. Lovelock goes so far as to liken Earth to a living organism (“Gaia,” he calls it), and to liken the human population to a deadly, cancerous tumour within it.24

The Example of Easter Island

Th e future most feared by environmental pessimists is something very much like what happened on Easter Island. Easter Island (a.k.a. Rapa Nui) is a remote South Pacifi c island. In ancient times, there grew a venomous rivalry between the diff erent tribal groups who lived there. Th is spilled over into a vicious, multi-generational war. So possessed did they become by the war and by the goal of victory for their tribe that the island’s inhabitants relentlessly, irrationally made as rapid use as they could of every natural resource they could get their hands on: crops, livestock, drinkable water, nearby fi sh, trees and timber, and so on. Th ey couldn’t stop themselves, and they ended up exceeding the carrying capac- ity of the island, and everyone died either from violence or starvation.25

Th e fate of humanity? (© Ralf Hettler/iStockphoto)

48 Part I Setting the World Stage

For all practical purposes, no one lives anymore on Easter Island, and nothing grows there except some wild grass. All that remains are the enormous, eerie stone heads that were erected as monuments to the ancestors of the various groups. Environmental pes- simists fear that if we are not careful—if we fail to curb irrational human impulses like rage or, in this case, greed and gluttony—the fate of our civilization might wind up like that of Easter Island. If it happened before, it can happen again. But this time the stakes involve the whole world and not merely one island. Perhaps one day the giant skyscrapers of our great cities—New York and Dubai, Paris and Shanghai—will one day be empty towering husks, just like the giant stone heads of Easter Island.26

Challenges

Now, there are environmental optimists—like Julian Simon—who doubt these grim fears will come true. Th ey give a number of compelling reasons why the Earth is not Easter Island. What I would like to do, however, is to come back to this all-important clash between pessimist and optimist at the conclusion of our discussion of the environment. For it seems fair to say that much of the discourse and research surrounding the modern environmental movement leans towards the pessimist side. Th is side has set the agenda, as they say. So let us follow that agenda, for now, and consider the many challenges that the environment poses to us (or vice versa) in the contemporary world. Once we discern the full range and scope of environmental problems, we can more plausibly judge whether these challenges can fi nally be overcome.27

Environmental Management and Sustainable Development

With regards to managing the environment, the modern nation-state is like a person on a diet, who is trying to exercise the will-power to eat less, and better. On the one hand, countries and the people who live in them want to take advantage of their natural resources in order to become wealthy; on the other, they don’t want to deplete natural resources so completely that they can no longer use them. And yet that happens all the time. Th e world’s fi sheries, for example, are nowhere near the levels they used to be, as consumers’ huge demand for seafood outpaces the ability of the fi sh to replenish their numbers suf- fi ciently. During the 1990s, Canada had to shut down its East Coast cod fi shery almost completely lest the resource become completely captured and destroyed. Th e key, then, is environmental management: fi nding a smart balance between using enough resources to satisfy present demands and yet not using all the resources, so that there will be—as John Locke famously said—“enough and as good” for future generations. Th is idea has been captured in the concept of sustainability: not using resources to exhaustion, not pollut- ing the environment to the point of its being poisoned, but rather managing growth and consumption so that future generations will continue to enjoy the resources we benefi t from today. Devising a long-term plan to replenish, on an ongoing basis, the resources we consume—as opposed to exhausting and destroying key resources with short-term “gold rushes”—is of the very essence of sustainability.28

Some environmental critics, like Lovelock, argue that environmental “management” is not enough. Th ey feel that the problem is deeper, and may well lie in the very makeup of industrial capitalism (whose components were described last chapter). Committed to

492 Population and Environment

relentless growth, and to plying consumers with every imaginable product or service, capitalism is practically designed to be the sort of economic system that could cause people to exceed Earth’s carrying capacity.29

Moreover, with its focus on private profi ts and rewarding individual greed, capitalism, in the eyes of some, is seen to be at odds with the kind of social, public co-operation and solidarity that is going to be needed to (a) curb pollution, (b) clean our air, land, and water, and (c) transform our economy into one that operates on a smaller scale and is more local, more clean, and above all, more green. In fact, environmentalists, economists, and policy-makers—most famously in the so-called Brundtland Commission Report of 1987—have created the concept of sustainable development. Th is refers to economic progress that is based not on growth for its own sake but rather on growth that is measured, paced, reasonable, and consistent with Earth’s carrying capacity. It is growing an economy—i.e. making people richer and better off —in a way that can be continued or sustained in the future. Many in the modern environmental movement would like to see the paradigm of sustainable development replace that of industrial capitalism. Some even see this para- digm as part of what they call a post-industrial green economy.30

The Tragedy of the Commons

Countries not only face environmental problems within their own borders; they also face challenges with pollution and resources that cross borders or that exist in common, unowned areas between them. We noted, last chapter, three examples of unowned areas: the high seas, near-space, and Antarctica. Th e problem with these common spaces, captured by economists in the phrase “the tragedy of the commons,” has been well documented in hundreds of historical cases. Th e tragedy is this: when things are owned in common, or are unowned, the result tends to be a decline in both the quality and quantity of the thing. When there is no one specifi cally to care for, and to pay the price for the decline of, an asset, that asset tends to fall apart or get completely used up. A famous case of this occurred in England, where during medieval times, grazing areas for herds were public and com- mon. Th e result was that these areas were completely chewed up and left useless: eventually, everyone lost. Th e enclosure movement was a response to, and attempt to remedy, this situation: the common areas were divided up and sold to individual farmers, who then “enclosed” their areas with fences and shrubs to prevent nomadic grazing herds. Th ese owner–farmers then planted grass and crops, and the lands sprung back into fertile life.31

To an extent, we can see that this way of thinking was behind the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS, an international treaty draft ed in 1982, took 10 years just to negotiate. It deals with the regulation of the oceans, which exist as public, unowned, common space. Th e high seas are thus vulnerable to a range of envi- ronmentally destructive practices, as states and non-state actors (especially corporations) exploit the unregulated domain. Garbage gets dumped there (including toxic, and even nuclear, waste); oil gets spilled there; and unrestricted fi shing and piracy occurs there. (For example, did you know that, in the Pacifi c Ocean, there is a fl oating island of human-made garbage that is twice the size of France?32 Google this: “Great Pacifi c Garbage Patch.”) To try to contain such problems, UNCLOS sets out clear rules as to who is responsible for what

Many in the modern environmental movement would like to see the paradigm of sustainable development replace the old model based on industrial capitalism.

50 Part I Setting the World Stage

on the high seas. It establishes that states may consider water adjacent to their territory to be their own sovereign territory, out to a distance of 12 miles (22.2 km) from shore. Th is is for purposes mainly of shipping and of sovereign entitlement and responsibility. But for economic activities like fi shing, deep-sea mining, and oil/gas/mineral rights, UNCLOS gives states rights out to 200 miles (322 km) from their shores. Beyond the limits of these exclu- sive economic zones (EEZs), the high seas remain common, public, and unregulated.33

Some people don’t like national enclosure as a solution to the tragedy of the commons, and their preferred international treaty deals with Antarctica. Th ey point to it as an entirely diff erent (i.e. public and co-operative) model of how to achieve global environmental care. Th e Antarctica Treaty (1959) essentially turned that entire continent into a kind of inter- national ecological “park”: it was agreed that no country owned any part of Antarctica, that no military activity would occur there, that neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear waste would be stored or dumped there, and that the main purpose of human activity in

South Pole

Norwegian Claim

Australian Claim

New Zealand Claim

French Claim

British Claim Argentine Claim

Chilean Claim

Brazilian Zone of Interest

Figure 2.2 Antarctica, an International Public Park

As the map shows, several countries have established claims to parts of Antarctica for the purpose of scientifi c research. Compare this with the Arctic (Figure 2.3), where the competing national claims surround the lucrative untapped oil and gas reserves.

512 Population and Environment

Antarctica would be scientifi c research. Almost all countries with the capability of estab- lishing a presence in Antarctica have signed, ratifi ed, and—moreover—largely observed the terms of this treaty.34

Supporters of national enclosure fi nd these “public people” too idealistic, and they suggest (with realist savvy) that the only reason the Antarctica Treaty works is that the

Internal waters

Canada territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ)

Potential Canada continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Denmark territorial sea, EEZ, and claimed continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Potential Denmark continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Iceland EEZ and claimed continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Norway territorial sea, EEZ, and claimed continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Russia territorial sea, EEZ, and claimed continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Overlapping Norway/Russia EEZ and claimed continental shelf beyond 200 nm

USA territorial sea and EEZ

Potential USA continental shelf beyond 200 nm

Overlapping Canada/USA EEZ

Unclaimed or unclaimable continental shelf

Agreed boundary

Main “Northwest Passage” shipping routes through Canada claimed internal waters

G reenland

(D ENM

ARK)

U S A

180°E/W Arctic Circle (66°33’N)

135°E R U

S S

I A

90°E

ICELAND

45

°E

13

5° W

90°W

C

A

N

A

D

A

0°E/W

RUSSIA NORWAY

FINLAND

SWEDEN

L O

M O

N

O S

O V

R

I D G

E

L O

M O

N

O S

O V

R

I D G

E

North Pole North Pole

45°W

Figure 2.3 Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic: Competing National Claims

Source: International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University at www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/ resources/arctic.

52 Part I Setting the World Stage

continent is simply too remote, too hostile for human habitation, and too lacking in any valuable resource. Th ese realists note that the other pole—the Arctic—has not been set up as a public commons but, rather, is carved up into competing territorial claims by the circumpolar powers—Canada, the US, Denmark, England, Norway, and Russia. Th at’s because the Arctic is much closer and more hospitable, and has resources (some speculate there may be huge oil and gas reserves under the Arctic ice). And so, realists suggest, either the Antarctica agreement will stay the way it is—because the facts about its forbidding nature will stay the same—or, as soon as a valuable resource is discovered down there, then all bets will be off , and the treaty will fall apart in a “gold rush.” In short, idealists tend to favour the international public park solution—the Antarctica answer, as it were—to the tragedy of the commons, whereas realists favour national enclosure.35 (We shall return, in detail, to the clash between realist and idealist in Chapter 4.)

Deforestation

A similar problem concerns areas that are of truly global environmental concern yet are entirely within the borders of a handful of nations. Th e Amazon rainforest, situated primarily in Brazil, is an example. Forests are crucial as cleansers of air—carbon sinks, some say—as they soak up carbon dioxide and release oxygen. And some forests are especially good at this, like the Amazon rainforest, which is also a cornucopia of plant and animal life (i.e. biodiver- sity), and which has been proven instrumental in the creation of many benefi cial medicines and pharmaceutical treatments. Th e problem, in the case of Brazil, is that until recently the government of that country saw the rainforest purely as an economic resource to be logged, cleared away, and sold. Th is grew the Brazilian economy, and the Brazilian government viewed with suspicion any suggestion from outside—from the developed world especially— that it shouldn’t develop its society at the expense of this resource. Abstract claims about “a global carbon sink” just couldn’t compare with cash in hand gained by selling all that lumber. Over time, though, Brazil came to see that non-stop cutting and clearing would only generate short-term sales and could not be sustained forever. Recognizing that preserving the rainfor- est had become a global priority, the Brazilian government put a proposal to the international community, challenging its trading partners to put their money where their environmental mouth is by paying Brazil not to overuse this resource. And so, the international commu- nity—through complex agreements with lumber and pharmaceutical companies—has done exactly this: it has paid Brazil to preserve a globally valuable environmental asset. Logging still happens, of course, but with careful planning and aggressive re-planting.36

Creative deals like this give heart to environmental optimists. Similar deals have been done between the rich, developed nations and such forest-rich yet economically strug- gling states as Indonesia, Malaysia, Madagascar, and Russia. A variation of this idea is a debt-for-nature swap, where a country’s international trade partners off er national debt forgiveness, in lieu of direct payment, in exchange for environmental preservation.

Food

Experts agree that around 1 billion people in the world today lack the minimum calo- rie intake needed for their stage of growth.37 Moreover, there is a gross distortion in the distribution of food globally, with so much excess in the Global North and shockingly

532 Population and Environment

insuffi cient food quantities in the South. Evidence of the North’s excess: the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) says that the average person in North America throws away 253 pounds of food a year! Obviously, with the greater part of projected population growth expected to occur in the starving South, this maldistribution of food resources needs to be rectifi ed.

Th ings would be even worse today without the Green Revolution. Between 1940 and 1980, the movement helped to export the North’s latest know-how in agricultural production to the Global South. (Increasingly, international aid and development involve this kind of technology transfer, designed to give not just goods or cash but also—indeed, preferably— technology and expertise to help the South develop more rapidly.) Specifi cally, the Green Revolution brought to the South new methods of planting and irrigation (i.e. watering crops), better fertilizers and harvesting techniques, and genetically modifi ed (GM) crops and foods, whose genes have been artifi cially manipulated so that they are more resistant to disease, giving them superior durability and freshness. As a result of the Green Revolution, world grain production has tripled over the last 50 years, yielding enough basic foodstuff s— including the world’s top three crops: wheat, rice, and corn—to feed all of humankind, if only distribution were better. Th is sort of technological innovation, in the face of serious challenge and apparent scarcity, also gives huge hope to environmental optimists. Some pessimists—while of course applauding the increase in food for needy humans—point out that the Green Revolution nevertheless has had some negative environmental consequences, such as pollution into groundwater from the new chemical fertilizers.38

Another thing that pessimists emphasize, and rightly so, is food prices. Applying the kinds of advanced new methods just described costs money, and so in order to make a profi t, farmers must increase prices they charge for the crops they produce. Bad weather— on its own, and as predicted to increase owing to global warming—can destroy crops, cutting supply and thus raising prices. Finally, it requires a lot of energy, especially in the form of oil and gas, to power agricultural machinery and to transport food from rural farms to urban kitchens. When energy prices go up—as they have recently—food prices follow. Th is aff ects us all, but it hurts the global poor most. It is estimated that some people living in the developing world already spend about two-thirds of their income on food;39 any substantial increase in food prices means even less money for other essentials, like shelter, or else more hunger. Either seems unacceptable. And increases in food prices don’t merely have these moral or health consequences to them. History shows that few things are more politically destabilizing than food shortages or big increases in the price of food staples like bread, rice, and corn.40 Many a major revolution has been sparked by food shortages as much as by radical ideas: this is true of revolutions ranging from the French Revolution of 1789 all the way to the Arab Spring of 2011 (which we’ll examine in detail in Chapter 9). Environmental pessimists believe that, owing to all these pressures—popula- tion crush, maldistribution, climate change, rising energy prices—there will not be enough food in the future, causing serious political disruption and human suff ering worldwide.41

Water

Water is a vital human need. We need it not only to drink and to clean with, but also to water our crops and to give to animals. Water is also used in many industrial processes. It is absolutely essential to modern civilization, in hundreds of ways. Th e problem is that, even

54 Part I Setting the World Stage

though 70 per cent of Earth’s surface is water, the vast majority of that is saltwater. While it is possible to remove the salt from water so that it is fresh, usable, and drinkable, desalination is expensive and time- consuming on a mass scale. As a result, nearly all the water we use comes from freshwater rivers, lakes, and streams, and from groundwater and rainwater. Th ese freshwater sources represent only a tiny portion of Earth’s seemingly huge supply of H2O.

Experts worry whether there will be enough water in the future. Indeed, they point out that there’s not enough water now: between 1.1 and 1.2 billion people—almost all in the Global South—lack reliable daily access to potable (i.e. drinkable) water. Growth in population will only make this worse. Water also gets polluted and wasted. It gets polluted with garbage, sewage, oil spills, fertilizer runoff from farmers’ fi elds, salt runoff from streets and sidewalks in the winter, and industrial pollution from factories. It gets wasted especially in developed countries of the North, where people are used to bounteous, seemingly endless quantities of fresh water spilling out of their taps and faucets. Th e two biggest water-consuming nations—by

far—are Canada and the US. Per capita, Americans use about 350 litres—and Canadians, 335 litres—of fresh water every single day! Th ese amounts are double even the western European average. Consider, for a moment, how these amounts compare to the water use of those 1.1 to 1.2 billion people who, some days, consume zero litres, and once more the depth of the diff erence between the top and the bottom in world consumption reveals its enormous mag- nitude. Th e water-poor are defi ned as those who live on fi ve litres (or less) of potable water a day: the very amount used by most North Americans in a single fl ush of one solitary toilet.42

Oil

Energy is one of the most important environmental issues. Along with food and water, we require energy for everything we do, whether in the form of the calories and muscle energy we need to walk and talk, or the gasoline to power our vehicles, or the enormous amount of electricity required to light up a city. Th e top fi ve sources of energy in the developed world are, in order:

1. oil 2. coal 3. natural gas 4. nuclear energy 5. hydroelectricity.

Human development can have adverse eff ects on water sources. Can you think of some? Consider everything from delicate ecosystems to municipal water supplies. (© Bart Coenders/iStockphoto)

552 Population and Environment

Compare these with the top three sources in the developing world: 1. coal 2. oil 3. biomass (i.e. wood, charcoal, and animal waste, all burned to make heat).

Total world energy consumption per year is the equivalent of burning 10 to 12 billion tons of oil. Th is has increased twenty-fold since 1850, owing to the rise in both population and industrialization over that period. We are only going to need more energy in the future, as both these trends continue worldwide.43

Th e problem is that each major source of energy listed above generates signifi cant pol- lution and other problems. With oil—source of 40 per cent of the world’s current energy supply—there are oil spills, particulate air pollution and greenhouse gases from burning it, and political diffi culties, as we will see below. Natural gas also creates greenhouse emis- sions and local air pollution, and it brings some safety concerns with the possibility of pipeline explosions. Coal causes substantial smog-creating particulate air pollution that contributes to acid rain, which, when it falls, can burn the leaves and even the bark off trees and can actually kill fi sh species living in rivers and lakes. Th e drawbacks of nuclear energy include the cost (it is very expensive to build nuclear reactors), concerns about radioactivity, and fears about potential disasters (heightened since Japan’s 2011 nuclear crisis). Hydroelectric power can cause fl ooding in vast areas—as with China’s Th ree Gorges Dam—and is, besides, heavily dependent on fi nding the right location. Each of these forms of power production requires massive outlays of money, manufacturing, and elaborate and enormous distribution networks, be they pipelines or electricity cables. (Even smaller-scale biomass requires whole forests of trees, produces a lot of acrid smoke, and is responsible for many property-destroying fi res.)44

Oil is worth added focus, as it is the world’s leading energy source (and, not coinciden- tally, its most valuable commodity by price). Mechanized, industrial economies are driven by oil: factories require oil to power and lubricate machinery; consumers need fuel for their cars and trucks; and many homes are heated by oil and natural gas. Such is the enormous demand that the developed world is a net importer of oil and gas, while the developing world is a net exporter of oil and gas. (Crudely and cynically—and echoing last chapter’s discussion of colonialism—one might say that the North uses the energy resources of the South to power its advanced industrial society.) Consider the North–South distribution of the countries boasting the world’s top 10 oil reserves:

1. Saudi Arabia 6. Iran 2. Canada 7. Venezuela 3. Iraq 8. Russia 4. United Arab Emirates 9. Libya 5. Kuwait 10. Nigeria.45

Two comments related to this list of countries are crucial. Th e fi rst has to do with OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. OPEC was founded in 1973, and is

56 Part I Setting the World Stage

one of the most important cartels in the world. (A cartel is a small group of suppliers that controls the majority of the supply of a good.) When its members co-operate, a cartel can infl uence heavily the price of the good in question. By cutting back supply, for instance, it can increase the good’s price. OPEC, whose leading members include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Libya, Algeria, and Qatar, was founded by Arab states of the Persian Gulf region mainly for two reasons: fi rst, to increase the price of oil, thus generating more money for themselves; and second, to punish the West—especially the US—for its ongoing support of Israel. (For more on the Arab–Israeli confl ict, see the next chapter.)

When it was fi rst formed, OPEC immediately cut the supply of oil, substantially driv- ing up its price (as demand only continued to increase). Th is caused the fi rst big oil crisis in Western society, which brought gas shortages, huge lineups at gas stations, and, as the price of oil aff ects the price of everything else (via transportation costs), sustained price increases (i.e. infl ation) throughout all of Western society. A second, much smaller oil crisis followed in 1979. Th ese “oil shocks” created stagfl ation—infl ation and stagnant (or slow) economic growth together—as the higher cost of oil and gas cut into the bud- gets of businesses and consumers alike, leading to decreases in spending and investment. Decreased consumer spending and business investment generated fewer tax revenues, and so even big Western governments had less to spend. It took over a decade for the stagfl a- tion and “malaise” of the 1970s to wear off and give way to a period of low-infl ation growth and optimism. On the other side of the coin, the formation of the oil cartel generated almost unheard-of wealth for OPEC’s member states, who learned just how much political and economic power they could wield.46

Th e oil crises ended for several reasons. First, the West increased other sources of energy, notably nuclear. Th e crises also pushed Western countries to devise and introduce measures to conserve oil, such as new mileage requirements on gasoline tanks in vehicles. But perhaps the greatest factor in ending the oil crises was the fact that OPEC (especially Saudi Arabia) decided—of its own accord—to relax the price of oil, realizing that it was in its own long-term self-interest not to turn the West off oil completely, but, rather, to keep it coming back for more. OPEC survives today, and counts among its member several non-Arab members countries, including Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia. Th ere are also major oil- and gas-producing nations that are not OPEC members, notably Canada, Britain, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, and Russia.

Th e second important thing to note about the top 10 oil-producing countries is that not all oil is created the same. Simply speaking, there’s easy oil and diffi cult oil. Easy oil is oil that is readily available, cheap to extract and purify, and ready to go. To put it crudely, you just have to stick a straw in the oil fi eld and suck it out. Th e oil of the Arabian pen- insula and Persian Gulf region is easy oil. Diffi cult oil is oil that is remotely located (e.g. off shore), expensive to bring out, laborious to purify, and not at all ready to go. It needs to be processed. An example of this is Alberta’s enormous stock of oil sands. Th ese reserves are huge—almost rivalling those of Saudi Arabia—but, as the name indicates, they are made up of oil mixed together with sand. It takes a lot of time and treasure to extract the oil from the sand, and then to purify it enough to substitute for easy oil. (You can’t have sand in your gas tank, aft er all.)47

Environmental pessimists have enormous problems with our addiction to oil. First, oil (and all fossil fuels) create pollution when burned for energy. (Fossil fuels include coal,

572 Population and Environment

oil, and natural gas, which together account for nearly 90 per cent of current world energy consumption.) Th is fossil fuel pollution is of three main kinds: spills; smog and particulate in the present; and contribution to greenhouse gases and climate change in the future. Second, because oil is so central to the energy requirements of the world economy, oil-rich areas are prone to confl ict and even war, as major powers seek to secure suffi cient oil supplies for their massive requirements. Th e history of the Persian Gulf region since oil was fi rst discovered there in the late 1800s bears witness to this. Th ird, oil is a fi nite resource. Mother Nature isn’t making new oil, and so all we can do is extract and use it. Fossil fuels in general are thus non-renewable resources, unlike solar, wind, and water power, all renewable resources. In spite of enormous oil reserves, we will one day run out (in, perhaps, a century or so).48

Peak oil theory is based on speculation about when oil production will reach its peak (or maximum output), beyond which there will be less and less oil to extract, yet more and more demand for it (owing to population growth and industrialization). Most peak oil theorists, such as Kenneth Deff eyes,49 suggest that we are, worldwide, at that peak point right now. Interestingly, when peak oil experts—like M.K. Hubbard—have applied their global theories to national cases, they have had a very strong track record of predictive success. For example, the United States used to be a net exporter of oil, with big reserves in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Alaska. Today, however, the US is by far the world’s biggest importer of oil, a fact that many people believe has been crucial in draw- ing the US into various Middle Eastern wars.50 So, peak production of oil in America was correctly predicted to have been around 1970, and indeed since then, the US has had to chase oil reserves elsewhere, with unhappy consequences both politically and envi- ronmentally. Worldwide, according to the peak oil people, what will happen once the easy oil is tapped out and we increasingly turn to diffi cult oil is that oil’s price will sky- rocket, hurting everyone and turning the entire world economy into one suff ering from 1970s-style stagfl ation: low growth, low employment, reduced incomes, yet higher prices for everything.

Global Warming and Climate Change

Th e authoritative source on climate change and global warming is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Its 2007 report, reviewed by 2,500 expert scientists, concluded that global warming is happening, and that it is being caused by human activity, especially ongoing industrialization and the burning of fossil fuels used in the process.51 Th e causal linkages, described eff ectively by Al Gore in his 2005 documentary An Inconvenient Truth, are supposed to work like this: 1. Th e burning of fossil fuels releases enormous amounts of carbon dioxide (CO2) into

the atmosphere. 2. Carbon dioxide acts as a greenhouse gas, trapping sunlight in and below the atmo-

sphere, causing Earth’s temperature to rise. 3. Th e result, since industrialization began, has been a steady increase in average global

temperatures.

In spite of enormous oil reserves, we will one day run out.

58 Part I Setting the World Stage

Th e consequences of global warming will be severe: • Polar ice will melt into the oceans, reducing freshwater stores and creating rising

sea levels, fl ooding low-lying countries like the Netherlands and the South Pacifi c islands, as well as coastal cities like New York and Shanghai.

• Inland desertifi cation (i.e. the spread of deserts) and water scarcity will intensify. • Extremes of weather—especially wind- and rainstorms—will grow. • Diseases will increase as tropical diseases like malaria spread north. • Plagues of insects and mould will occur, as warmer temperatures allow these organ-

isms to thrive more readily. • Some animals, such as polar bears, will become extinct with the fl ooding of their

habitat. • Ditto for some ecosystems, such as coral reefs, that cannot support higher temperatures.

And there will be further consequences not yet known, as climate change kicks off a cas- cade of feedback loops throughout the world’s ecosystems, with each change producing another that, in turn, reinforces the fi rst.

Th ere is strong evidence that the average global temperature has increased since 1700, and that the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from historical norms of 280 parts per million (ppm) to 380 ppm today. Roughly 12 of the past 15 years have seen the highest global surface temperatures since 1850, a statistic that is illustrated in the famous “hockey stick” chart of rising average temperatures (see Figure 2.4). Note how similar this diagram is to the one in Figure 2.1, on population growth. For the environmen- tal pessimist, this striking sameness is, of course, no mere coincidence: more people must equal more pollution.52

–0.5

0

+0.5

1600 1700 19001800 2000 2010

A ve

ra g

e G

lo b

al

Te m

p er

at u

re C

h an

g e

(° C

)

Year

Figure 2.4 The “Hockey Stick” Chart of Rising Global Temperature

Note the similar shape of the previous chart showing the growth of the human population (Figure 2.1) and this chart showing the rise in global temperature.

592 Population and Environment

As a result of concern regarding global warming, there have been various attempts at regulating and cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Most famous is the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. Th is international treaty stands as a failure, much to the lament of environmental- ists. Why has it failed? Th ere is a very sharp North–South split on the issue. Developing nations of the Global South—especially India, China, and numerous African coun- tries—want to use cheap fossil fuels to industrialize and grow their economies. And OPEC countries—obviously—want to keep selling oil. Only societies that have already become industrialized—especially in Europe—seem committed to cutting greenhouse gas emis- sions and reducing their dependency on oil and coal. Developing societies like China, India, and Brazil were thus excluded from the strictest terms of Kyoto, as an incentive to get their general support; these countries have agreed to take voluntary, non-binding steps to curb emissions. But countries such as the US have asked, why should we commit to cutting our oil and coal use, if China—the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases today—is not obliged to meet similar targets? Since the US recognizes that China might become a global rival—economically, politically—it has decided to say no to Kyoto, too.53

Th ere have been a number of attempts to revive negotiations surrounding climate change, including the 2007 “Bali Roadmap” and the 2011 UN conference on climate change in Durban, South Africa, where the Kyoto Protocol was extended. But these attempts have, by and large, achieved small, if any, success. In fact, immediately following the Durban conference, Canada offi cially withdrew from Kyoto, claiming the protocol’s targets are impossible to achieve (especially for a country that plans to continue extracting oil from Alberta’s tar sands). Th e point remains that if the world’s most powerful and most pollut- ing economies—notably the US and China, not to mention Canada—refuse to sign on to Kyoto’s legally binding measures, then any deal is going to be very limited, in terms of the progressive environmental impact it can make.

A quick word about scientifi c controversy is in order. Most everyone agrees on the temperature record, and thus that global warming is occurring to some degree. Th e debate is over whether industrialization is chiefl y to blame.

Doubters say that carbon dioxide is much too small a component of atmospheric gases to have the eff ect imagined by “global warmers.” Th e same skeptics point out that the main drivers of Earth’s climate have always been the sun and its eff ect on Earth’s oceans. A longer look at historical temperature records will show that temperatures move up and down in long waves. In fact, they argue, the “hockey stick” graph is a misleading, sensationalist snapshot of just a small part of the historical record; take a longer view, and the upward-curving stick becomes but a hill or a wave in a long series of such. Moreover, these long waves of temperature movement are most closely associated with changes in solar activity. When the sun heats up and produces solar fl ares, there’s global warming; when the reverse hap- pens, we experience cooler temperatures, even an ice age. In conclusion, these doubters assert that if there’s global warming, then it’s because of the sun and its impact on ocean temperature and current; it is not a result of human-made CO2 emissions. And so, to call for restrictions on economic activity or a cutting back on industrialization is completely unfounded, and with severe consequences to the world’s economy and especially to the development aspirations of the Global South.

Most everyone agrees that global warming is occurring to some degree. The debate is over whether industrialization is chiefl y to blame.

60 Part I Setting the World Stage

Th is latter argument is the climate change doubter’s standard reply to the supporters’ use of the so-called precautionary principle. A much-cited tenet of environmentalism, the precautionary principle stipulates that if you’re unsure of whether a practice is safe—or, if you think it might be dangerous or polluting—then, as a matter of prudence, you ought not to continue it. Th us, even if we are unsure about the eff ects of carbon emissions on Earth’s temperature, we should cut back on burning fossil fuels in case this is contributing signifi cantly to global warming. Th e skeptic replies by urging us to consider the clearly negative consequences of requiring big cut-backs in greenhouse gas emissions: economic damage for the North and dashed development hopes for the South. It is thus, for them, not prudent at all to adopt the precautionary principle in this case.54

Optimism versus Pessimism

We return, then, aft er our survey of pressing environmental problems, to the clash between optimists and pessimists. Let’s summarize the case of the optimists before letting the pes- simists have the fi nal say.

The Case for Environmental Optimism

We can summarize the optimist’s arguments thus: • For many environmental problems, solutions are known, and in a number of respects,

things are getting better. Acid rain and smog, for example, used to be much worse in the developed world, before eff ective treaties and air quality laws came into being. Even with trickier global issues, the Montreal Protocol on ozone shows that strength- ening environmental laws, and improving our actions, can make a diff erence. Th e Montreal Protocol was draft ed, signed, and ratifi ed in response to concerns about the ozone layer, that part of Earth’s atmosphere responsible for fi ltering out some of the most harmful (i.e. skin cancer–causing) ultraviolet rays from the sun. By the mid- 1980s, there was expert consensus that (a) the ozone layer was thinning, and even had holes at both of Earth’s poles; and (b) industrial chemicals used in refrigeration, known as chlorofl uorocarbons (or CFCs), were largely responsible. Th e Montreal Protocol set guidelines for restricting and then eliminating the use of CFCs. In the developed world, CFCs stopped being made in 1996, and this is almost true today for the developing world, too. Happily, there is evidence that the ozone layer is now recovering as a result, with global public health gains for all, especially for those in the southern hemisphere, where ozone thinning was at its worst.55

• For optimists such as Bjorn Lomborg, the pessimists grossly underestimate (a) our ability to adapt, (b) nature’s enormity and resiliency, and (c) our talents at techno- logical innovation.56 In the face of many resource pressures before, humans have been able to apply their brilliance and determination to come up with new, more productive ways of doing things, such as refrigeration without CFCs. But the best example here, by far, is the Green Revolution. So much of the pessimist’s case is built around the growth of human population and the pressure this puts on fi nite natural resources. But if we can—through technology—fi nd ways to make those resources go farther (like tripling staple grain yield in the last 50 years), then this pressure becomes

612 Population and Environment

substantially reduced. We see this also in the energy fi eld, and in the development of alternative, renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind power, geothermal and tidal energy, nuclear power, and alternative fuels like ethanol, and in alternative modes of transport, like electric cars and better-quality public transportation.

• Th ere are so many reasons for so many diff erent stakeholders to care about the environment, and to move towards a more sustainable, less wasteful society. Corporations, for example, want to cultivate a positive public image by developing a green reputation; they also want to avoid polluting fi nes, reduce the inputs needed to make their goods, and render their profi ts sustainable moving forward. Governments care about the environment because (in democratic societies anyway) the voters force them to. Governments don’t want to pay clean-up costs for pollution, either, and they are increasingly moving towards laws, and urban planning schemes, that aid the environment, such as higher-density development (“building up, not out”), combined with public transportation, instead of car-dependent suburban sprawl. Consumers, for their part, want to live and eat better; they don’t want to pay astronomical oil and gas bills; they support local reduce, reuse, recycle programs; they celebrate Earth Day on 22 April; they love national parks and believe in wildlife and biodiversity preservation; they now vote for various Green parties; and, above all, they don’t want to leave to their children a shabbier world than the one they were born into.

• Most countries have domestic government agencies devoted to environmental stew- ardship: in the US, it’s the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Canada has a federal (and several provincial) Ministry of the Environment. Internationally, there are scores of agencies, the most infl uential of them probably the United Nations’ Environmental Program (UNEP), headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, and with a variety of regional offi ces. Also important is the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), founded at the 1992 Earth Summit in Brazil to monitor state compliance with environmental promises. Th ere are also many non-governmental organizations with global impact, including Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, and the Sierra Legal Defence Fund. All of these agencies and organizations exist to help protect the environment.

• And so we are not Chicken Little and the sky is not falling. Earth is not Easter Island—those people were ignorant of the concept of sustainability, and today we know much better. We have the reasons, the laws, the organizations, and the technol- ogy to develop a truly sustainable society; it’s just a matter of fi nding the money, ingenuity, and political will to bring it into being. Th is will be a diffi cult and ongo- ing—yet totally achievable—process.57

The Case for Environmental Pessimism

Th e above is a hopeful set of considerations, backed by some solid facts. And yet, while pessi- mists might want the optimists to be correct, on the whole many of them remain unpersuaded:

• Against the handful of successful environmental regulations and treaties, like the Montreal Protocol, pessimists can point out scores or even hundreds of failed resolu- tions, such as the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, even when environmental laws do get

62 Part I Setting the World Stage

passed, oft en they are merely trophy laws—laws passed for reasons of public dis- play—that remain unenforced. Th e resources for realizing environmental regulations are, worldwide, very modest. Th e same may be said for all the agencies listed above as “eff ective protectors” of the environment. Even in wealthy, developed countries, many pollution inspection systems are years behind, underfunded, and—worse— reliant on data provided by corporate polluters themselves.

• Th e magnitude of existing limits on resources diminishes the pessimist’s enthusiasm for what technology can do. If technology is such a promising way out of these prob- lems of scarcity, then why do about 1 billion people currently lack secure access to both potable water and suffi cient food? Th e breadth and depth of today’s problems should give serious pause to those believing that, if only we can hit upon the right new inventions, we can readily solve tomorrow’s.

• While diff erent stakeholders do have very good reasons to care about the environment, this doesn’t mean they are always guided by them. Some companies, for instance, con- tinue to pollute in spite of the reasons listed above, and governments continue to fail to enforce environmental laws, in spite of their good reasons not to. And, while consum- ers may like to think of themselves as environmentally conscious, the reality (especially in North America) is that they also like cheap gas and huge SUVs, big houses (with well-watered lawns) in the suburbs, and the convenience of living in a “disposable soci- ety” that caters to Th e Consumer as King. We waste food and water in unconscionable quantities, and come election time, we tend not to vote for “green” candidates (witness the poor showing of the Green Party in the 2011 Canadian federal election). Moreover, there is some disturbing evidence that we only care about the environment when the economy is up and we feel fi nancially secure. Opinion polls confi rm this: interest in, and support for, environmental measures tracks the business cycle—in other words, it goes up when the economy goes up, and it goes down when a recession hits. (For more on the business cycle, see Chapter 6.) Th is fact seems to suggest that, when push comes to shove, people prefer economic growth over environmental protection. People have to pay the rent and feed themselves, and thus seem unwilling to sacrifi ce growth in the name of sustainability. And this is, for pessimists, the deeper, remaining truth about Easter Island: people can become obsessed with, indeed consumed by, their short-term drives and needs, and can, in pursuing them, undermine their long-term interests and goals. Are we really so sure we won’t wind up like Easter Island?

• Th e salient fact remains regarding the severe split between North and South. Most pol- lution comes from the industrial North; most population growth occurs in the poorer South. Interest in environmental protection is much higher in the North, whereas the South fears that any such measures will hamper its ability to develop and grow richer. How to square that circle? How to harmonize such divergent perspectives and inter- ests to forge a unifi ed and eff ective environmental policy worldwide? Pessimists fear that it simply can’t be done, and that in the future, we will be confronted with a long list of ferocious diffi culties, including a skyrocketing population, global warming, peak oil, stagfl ation, pollution, species extinction, resource scarcities (especially food and water), and the dire misery and violent confl ict that oft en go with these.58

632 Population and Environment

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have surveyed humankind’s interaction with the natural environment. First, we examined our fast-growing population and how it is being distributed in inter- esting, important, and challenging ways across the globe, and within societies. We paid special attention to the rise of urbanization, and its pros and cons, as the majority of people on Earth now live in cities. We then turned our attention to the natural environment, and focused on the clash between optimist and pessimist regarding humans’ future relationship with the natural world.

Review Questions

1. Does Earth have too many people? Who gets to declare such things? Consider how both China and India have adopted quite diff erent methods for controlling their giant populations: which of their policies do you con- sider better, and why?

2. Nearly every society has issues when it comes to immigration and how to assimilate immigrants into the existing, native-born population. What has immigration added to your country? What challenges has it created?

3. Do you believe Lovelock’s idea that Earth, as a whole, is like a huge living organism? And do you believe that humanity exists as a kind of cancer within that organism, or do you fi nd this latter claim dubious and hostile to human- ity? How would you characterize our relationship with the environment?

4. Defi ne more fully the concept of sustainable development. How would an economy built on such a principle be diff erent from the current one?

5. What are the top three environmental problems in your country? Your city? (Consult relevant government websites to get a sense of these.) What, if any- thing, can be done about them?

6. When it comes to solving “the tragedy of the commons,” which solution do you prefer and why: national enclosure (as in UNCLOS) or international public park protection (as in Antarctica)?

7. Research the Green Revolution—its causes, consequences, and particular country case studies. Detail the pros and cons of this movement and how it has changed the world. Is it over? Or is this an ongoing thing now, with technology transfer? Can we expect similar progress in the future, or have the big gains already been made?

8. Consider global warming, and the clash between climate scientists. Watch the excellent, rival documentaries An Inconvenient Truth and Th e Great Global Warming Swindle. Who has you most persuaded, and why? What, if anything, should we be doing about climate change?

64 Part I Setting the World Stage

Notes 1. R. Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Houghton Miffl in, 1962); L. Lear, Rachel Carson (Seattle:

Mariner, 2009). 2. UN News Centre, “As World Passes 7 Billion Milestone, UN Urges Action to Meet Key

Challenges,” www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40257&Cr=population&Cr1=; J.R. Weeks, Population: Concepts and Issues (London: Wadsworth, 11th edn, 2011).

3. M. Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006). 4. United Nations, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Aff airs:

www.un.org/esa/population 5. J. Goldstein & S. Whitworth, International Relations (Toronto: Pearson Longman, 2005), pp.

515–30. 6. Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheets (Washington, DC: Population

Reference Bureau, 1975, 2006). 7. Geoff rey York, “Baby Boom a Perk that Only Elite Can Aff ord,” Th e Globe and Mail (8 May

2007); M. Connelly, Fatal Misconception: Th e Struggle to Control the World’s Population (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

8. Weeks, Population (op. cit., note 2).

Websites for Further Research

Environment Canada www.ec.gc.ca – Canada’s federal ministry for environmental protection Th e US Environmental Protection Agency www.epa.gov – America’s federal agency responsible for environmental protection Greenpeace www.greenpeace.org – world’s fi rst, and perhaps still most aggressive and controversial,

environmental NGO Th e United Nations Environment Program www.unep.org – global IGO mandated to advance the cause of environmental protection,

interestingly headquartered in Global South Th e United Nations Population Program www.un.org/esa/population – for any of the latest international population statistics

9. Do you really care about the environment? Why, or why not? What do you actually do in your life to prove that you do care? What more could, or should, you be doing?

10. All things considered, do you agree more with the optimist or the pessimist regarding humankind’s future and the fate of our environment? Explain fully, appealing to your own subjective values as well as to the objective evidence.

652 Population and Environment

9. United Nations, Migration Division of the Department of Economic and Social Aff airs: www.unmigration.org

10. UN, ibid. 11. R.M. Dancygier, Immigration and Confl ict in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2010); C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and Th e Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

12. D. Rothenberg, With Th ese Hands (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). 13. M. Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and The War on Terror (London:

Pantheon, 2009). 14. G. Prunier, Africa’s World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 15. E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: Th e Birth of the Industrial Revolution (London: Th e New

Press, 1999). 16. UN Population Division (op. cit., note 4). 17. Weeks, Population (op. cit., note 2). 18. W. Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (London: Zone, 2010). 19. R. Grant, “Drowning in Plastic,” Th e Telegraph (2008). Available at: www.telgraph.co.uk/earth/

environment/52 20. E. Birch & S. Wachter, eds, Global Urbanization (Philadelphia, PA: Penn State University Press,

2010). 21. T. Courchene, Rearrangements (Toronto: Mosaic Press, 1992); D. MacFarlane, ed., Toronto: A

City Becoming (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2008). 22. J. Howkins, Th e Creative Economy (London: Penguin, 2001); R. Florida, Th e Rise of the Creative

Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 23. T. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2008); P.

Ehrlich, Th e Population Bomb (Los Angeles, CA: Sierra Club, 1970); Th e Club of Rome, Th e Limits to Growth (Rome: Club of Rome, 1972).

24. J. Lovelock, Gaia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). 25. Lovelock, ibid. 26. J. Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Viking, 1993). 27. Keegan, ibid. 28. J. Simon, Th e State of Humanity (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008). 29. B. Norton, Sustainability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 30. Lovelock, Gaia (op. cit., note 24). 31. P. Rogers, et al., An Introduction to Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 2008); G.H.

Brundtland, et al., Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 32. G. Hardin, Living within Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 33. T. Mensah, ed., Sustainable Development and Th e Oceans (Washington, DC: Law of the Sea

Institute, 1995). 34. G. Triggs & A. Riddell, eds, Antarctica (London: British Institute of International and

Comparative Law, 2007). 35. M. Byers, Who Owns the Arctic? (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 2010). 36. M. Williams, Deforesting the Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 37. R. Parker & M. Sommer, Routledge Handbook of Global Public Health (London: Routledge,

2011). 38. J. Perkins, Geopolitics and Th e Green Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 39. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO): www.fao.org/corp/statistics/en 40. J. Von Braum, Globalization of Food and Agriculture, and Th e Poor (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2008). 41. J. Clapp & M. Cohen, eds, Th e Global Food Crisis (Waterloo, ON: CIGI, 2008).

66 Part I Setting the World Stage

42. S. Solomon, Water (New York: Harper Perennial, 2011); C. Fishman, Th e Big Th irst (New York: Th e Free Press, 2011).

43. V. Smil, Energy: A Beginner’s Guide (London: OneWorld, 2006). 44. D. Yergin, Th e Quest: Energy, Security and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Penguin,

2011). 45. M. Downey, Oil 101 (London: Wooden Table, 2009). 46. T. Falola & A. Genova, Th e Politics of the Global Oil Industry (New York: Praeger, 2008). 47. D. Yergin, Th e Prize: Th e Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York: Free Press, 2008). 48. D. Seifried & W. Witsil, Renewable Energy: Th e Facts (London: Routledge, 2010). 49. K. Deff eyes, Hubbert’s Peak (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 50. Yergin, Th e Prize (op. cit., note 47). 51. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Report on Climate Change (New York:

United Nations, 2007). 52. IPCC, ibid.; M. Mann & L. Kung, Dire Predictions: Understanding Global Warming (Berlin: DK

Publishing, 2008). 53. D. Archer & S. Rahmstorff , Th e Climate Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 54. M. Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2009); J. Porritt, Playing Safe (New York: Th ames and Hudson, 2000. 55. IPCC, Safeguarding the Ozone Layer (New York: United Nations, 2005). 56. B. Lomborg, Th e Skeptical Environmentalist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 57. Julian Simon, Th e Ultimate Resource 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 58. T. Easton, Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Environmental Issues (New York: McGraw Hill, 12th

edn, 2008).

Comparative Culture3 “Without culture, and the relative freedom it

implies, society, even when perfect, is but a jungle. This is why any authentic creation is a gift to the future.”1 –Albert Camus (1913–1960), French author and Nobel Prize Laureate

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all the bolded key terms and concepts

 know the tenets of, and explain the differences among, the three big ideolo- gies of conservatism, liberalism, and socialism

 explain the rise of welfare liberalism in the West, and contemplate possible future challenges to it, such as from environmentalism or from immigration

 grasp the role religion plays in contemporary culture

 appreciate the differences between the major world religions, both Abrahamic/ monotheistic and Eastern/polytheistic

 refl ect on the complex case studies on the Arab–Israeli confl ict and the con- fl ict between Tibet and China, and be able to comment on the degree to which they involve political ideology, nationhood, religion, and culture

 ponder the role of advanced technology in your own life and culture, and the meaning of the global “digital divide” for international affairs.

Introduction

We have already discussed many things about culture. In Chapter 1, we defi ned culture as a way of life, as the way that people think, speak, behave, and spend their time, and we noted the distinction between high and low culture. We also spent time defi ning civilization, comparing Western civilization to others around the globe, and discussing Huntingdon’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and the role that cultural diff erence plays therein. In Chapter 2, we considered tensions between immigrants and native-born populations, and the role that policies of multiculturalism can play in easing them. We also examined how urban life diff ers from rural life, noting the worldwide trend toward urbanization. Finally, we raised deep questions about the developed world’s way of life, in terms of food and water consumption, energy use, pollution, and capitalism (versus alternatives such as sustainable development) as the engine driving its economic system. We need not repeat such things here. Instead, this chapter will thus focus on three major drivers of contemporary culture that we’ve yet to examine: politics, religion, and new media. (A fourth, education, will be discussed in Chapter 11, on international aid and development.)

68 Part I Setting the World Stage

The Structure and Ideology of the State

We saw, in both the introduction and Chapter 1, that national governments have an enor- mous impact on international aff airs and global studies. Th is is because of the sheer degree of power they have relative to that of other international organizations, such as corpora- tions and NGOs. Th ough these latter organizations are increasingly important, by and large state governments remain the most infl uential players in both national and international

life. How state governments are shaped and run therefore winds up hav- ing a huge impact on the culture of the societies they govern. So, let’s examine the values and principles that contour these political structures.

Admittedly, not all state governments are run on the basis of values and principles. An unprincipled state would be one that is controlled, for instance, by a very small, elite group whose only agenda is to use the power of government to serve itself (in terms of money, infl uence, and prestige). Another example of an unprincipled state would be a military dictatorship, wherein a strongman commands the government, and his power rests on his control of the military; the military’s power, in turn, rests on the coercive (i.e. violent and unelected) force it exerts over soci-

ety in general. Recent examples of unprincipled states would include Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979–2003) and Libya under Mu’ammar Gaddafi (1969–2011).2

A principled state, by contrast, is one in which the government tries to realize a set of ideals (even if it can do so only imperfectly, given real-world constraints of cost, imperfect knowledge, and, sometimes, fl at-out mistakes). Th is set of ideals constitutes the political ideology of the state or government—in other words, the ideals and values surrounding how best to run a country, and how to organize its people and shape their way of life. It seems fair to say that for every unprincipled state out there, there’s a principled one trying to give it a go in running society according to some ideals. Let us, therefore, consider the

How state governments are shaped and run winds up having a huge impact on the culture of the societies they govern.

Socialist

Left-of-Centre “Left-Wing”

Centre “Centrist;

Moderate”

Right-of-Centre “Right-Wing”

LiberalWelfare Liberal

Conservative

Communist

Democratic Socialist

Figure 3.1 The Spectrum of Today’s Mainstream Political Ideologies

Th e terms “left ,” “centre,” and “right” all originated during the French Revolution, when they were used to refer to where diff erent groups would sit in the French National Assembly.

693 Comparative Culture

most prominent competing political ideologies in the modern world, and how they give rise to very diff erent societies. We’ll proceed in order of the chronological appearance of these ideas, and then we’ll note which countries best illustrate these diff erent ideas in action, and their importance to international studies. Figure 3.1 off ers an overview.3

Conservatism

Conservatism—the traditional doctrine of medieval Europe before the liberal revolutions in the United States and France in the 1770s and 1780s—is still the dominant ideology in a number of societies around the world. Conservatism literally implies an aversion to change and a desire to conserve the heritage that has been handed down from previous genera- tions. Conservatives view the past fondly and appreciatively, and wish to transmit the best of the past to future generations. Conservatives have an organic view of society: they view society as greater than the sum of the individuals who compose it. Th ey see society itself as a kind of living, organic creature, a thing with an internal character or personality, possess- ing a past, present, and future. Th e role of government, for conservatives, is to do what it can to further the thriving of this unifi ed, organic thing.4

Conservatives see a positive role for the state: government should be actively involved—in culture, in the economy, in education—directing the society over which it governs. Th e view is very much “top-down.” Conservatives tend to be very patriotic and nationalistic, feeling a deep attachment to their country and its culture. Th e old-style ele- ment to conservatism, beyond this, is twofold: (1) oft en religious, conservatives tend to believe in a clear and objective moral order; and (2) conservatives maintain an acceptance of inequality. Th ey believe that some people simply know better how to run a society, and should therefore be given the preponderance of power. Th ey shouldn’t use all that power to benefi t themselves, however (as in an unprincipled state); rather, they ought to use their talents on behalf of all, for the public good of this greater, organic community in which everyone fi nds their proper place. Th is is what the French, during the pre-Revolution ancien regime, used to call noblesse oblige: the other-serving obligation of the elites towards all of society.5

Case Study: Iran’s Religious Regime Th ere are elements of conservatism in all societies. And it’s very important to distin- guish between the values of the governing regime and the values of the ordinary people, as these don’t always go together. Th at said, the government of Iran provides one of the clearest examples of conservative ideology in the contemporary world. In 1979, there was a violent revolution in Iran, which resulted in the forceful overthrow of the shah (or “king”) of Iran, who had been supported internationally by the Americans and British (in exchange for favourable access to Iran’s large oil supply).6 Th e new govern- ment of Iran was a religious government, committed to an extreme version of Islam. In fact, Iran became a kind of theocracy: a country in which there is no separation between church and state (as described in Chapter 1), and which is characterized by a deliberate, extensive use of government power to realize a religious vision.

70 Part I Setting the World Stage

Since then, Iran has been governed by a small, elite group of religious fi gures, who take it as their duty to govern the country in accordance with their own strict interpre- tation of the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam. Th is group exemplifi es all the values of conservatism mentioned above:

• wanting to conserve their heritage (i.e. the religious vision of life, according to Islam);

• having the government intervene extensively in the economy, education, and culture (the Internet, for instance, is heavily censored in Iran); and

• showing a strong sense of patriotism/nationalism (for example, Iran under this regime has gone to war several times, has used force to intervene in other societ- ies like Lebanon and Syria, and is aggressively pursuing the development of nuclear weapons).

A prominent aspect of Iran’s conservatism, and one that has become a topic of com- ment and even debate in the West, is the use of sharia law—the offi cial state law, informed by a strict, conservative reading of the Qur’an—and the impact of this law on the rights of the country’s citizens. Th e law is seen as being unequally harsh on women, not just with its stipulation of mandatory, modest public fashion for women but, moreover, with a raft of substantial legal restrictions that add up to a clearly unequal life for the women of that country.7

In August 2011, a group of Iranian youths were arrested for taking part in a water fi ght in the capital’s Tehran Square. Th e arrests were justifi ed on the grounds that the youths involved were disobeying Islamic principles, given that the young men and women involved were not related by blood or marriage. What does the incident tell you about the values of the people versus the values of the state? (© Amir/Demotix/Demotix/Corbis)

713 Comparative Culture

Liberalism

Liberalism began as a reaction against conservatism and, as mentioned, fi nds its real-world roots in the American (1776–83) and French (1789–1800) revolutions. Th e core concept of liberalism, clearly, is liberty: the freedom of the individual. Liberals view the conserva- tive doctrine as oppressive, and at odds with the personal freedom of people to govern themselves, and to live as they please. Th ere are two kinds of liberalism: classical liberal- ism and welfare liberalism. Classical liberalism—also known as neo-liberalism—is the earlier, purer, kind and, as such, must be discussed fi rst. Welfare liberalism, the dominant ideology of the developed West nowadays, can be described fully only aft er discussing socialism, as we’ll see below.

Liberals have an atomistic view of society, according to which they reject the notion that society is a kind of living organism, insisting instead that society is, indeed, noth- ing more than the individuals it comprises (like a bunch of atoms, or a collection of marbles in a bucket). And liberals see a negative role for the state, which is to say that they view government dimly, and minimally. Generally, liberals argue that if one looks at the historical record, one sees that governments oft en violate personal freedom, and can serve as dangerous threats to civil society. Th us, liberals are keen on keeping govern- ment intervention in our lives to an absolute minimum. It is sometimes said they have a “night-watchman” view of the state: the state should keep the peace, protect us against thieves and foreign invaders, and uphold our property rights, but otherwise stay out of our lives and, as the saying goes, “let a thousand fl owers bloom.”8 Th at’s how liberty will be maximized.

So, a classical liberal would be opposed to government funding for healthcare, educa- tion, and culture; state intervention in the economy; and, generally, using tax revenues to provide any services beyond the minimal list just mentioned. Critics of this ideology sometimes speak of it conspiratorially as “the neo-liberal agenda.” It’s important to stress that the terms “conservative” and “liberal” here are being used in their classical, con- ceptual senses. Th ese terms are oft en used diff erently—opportunistically—by political parties. Th us, the Liberal Party of Canada need not be liberal in the classical sense, nor are Canada’s big-C Conservatives entirely “conservative” in the classical interpretation of the term.

Th e one thing liberals do share with conservatives is an acceptance of inequality. Aft er all, if you let people be free, there’s going to be inequality in society, as diff erent people have diff erent interests, talents, work capacities, and competencies. In fact, liberals are more tolerant than conservatives regarding social diff erence of all kinds, including, especially, moral, sexual, and religious diff erence. Liberals prefer to speak of diff erent defensible ways of life than to insist on the supremacy (or moral truth) of one. It follows that liberals are less attached to their own society, and tend to be less patriotic and more cosmopolitan (or global) in their outlook and interests—because it’s all about them and their personal freedom, their pursuit of happiness and well-being, and where they fi t in best in the world. Th ese attitudes mean that liberals look less towards the past and its preservation and more towards the future and the opportunities it may hold for them.9

72 Part I Setting the World Stage

Case Study: Classical Liberalism in the United States In terms of examples of classical liberal societies, there really aren’t many good ones anymore. Welfare liberalism, and not classical liberalism, is the norm today. Still, clas- sical liberal societies did exist, with nineteenth-century America being perhaps one of the clearest examples. Before the Great Depression (1929–39)—which brought an enormous slowdown in the economy worldwide, creating vast unemployment and poverty—the US government meddled little in the national economy, allowing maxi- mum economic freedom to small and big businesses alike. Th ere was no state-run education or healthcare, or government support of culture, and the frontier experience of settling the Wild West only contributed to the sense of personal freedom and lack of government control.10

Today when we speak of classical liberalism, or neo-liberalism, it is much more in terms of political parties (or ideological movements) within certain countries, which demand a return to the values of classical liberalism (low taxes, free-market capitalism, strong military and police, and minimal government presence otherwise). Ironically, these parties prefer to label themselves as “Conservative,” because of the underlying desire to return to the “good old days” of classical liberalism. Recent world leaders who subscribe to this ideology include British Conservative prime minister Margaret Th atcher (1979–90); American Republican president Ronald Reagan (1981–9); and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Canadian Conservative prime ministers Brian Mulroney (1984–93) and Stephen Harper (2006–present).

When we think today of the US Republican Party—one of that country’s big two parties—we note that it is an uneasy mixture of classical liberals (especially on economic issues like taxation and business regulation) and religious conservatives (especially on social issues like education, family, child, and marriage policies). Sometimes, these two groups are at odds with each other, especially over American foreign policy, wherein the classical liberal side of the party wants to stress non-inter- vention elsewhere and the pursuit of US business and trade opportunities everywhere, whereas the conservative side tends to favour a much more hawkish projection of US power around the globe—backed by military strength if need be—with a heavy emphasis on rewarding allies and punishing enemies.11

Socialism

Socialism began as a reaction against both classical liberalism and the Industrial Revolution. We saw in Chapter 2 that industrialization, beginning around 1750, sparked urbanization and mass-market manufacturing in factories, using mechanized methods and processes like the steam engine and the assembly line. Th e Industrial Revolution also generated enormous inequalities, especially in standards of living: factory-owners became as rich as royalty, while their workers laboured all day, in unsafe conditions, for meager wages. But those wages still beat the profi ts of working on the farm (especially out of season), and so labourers fl ooded the cities in search of work. Cities exploded in population, and struggled to handle the surge: vast slums developed, where living conditions—and public health conditions—were

733 Comparative Culture

appalling. Socialists arose together, starting in the 1800s, to resist such realities. Among them were Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who noted the growing disparity between those who owned the means of production and those who owned only their ability to work, and foresaw the day when the workers would rise up to protest these realities.12

Socialism is, at its core, a rejection of the kind of inequality that conservatives and liberals feel comfortable with. Th e root of socialism is not just “society”—socialists have an organic view of society—but a fi rm conviction that too much inequality is both wrong in itself and harmful in its consequences. Socialists favour more political and economic equal- ity, in particular. Th ey think that “mere” liberal equality—that is, non-discrimination and equality of legal rights—is not enough: a wider and deeper sharing of resources must hap- pen. And socialists view government as exactly the proper agent for bringing that greater equality about. So, while they have a positive view of the state, they certainly don’t favour an entrenched elite class (the way conservatives do). And the liberal view strikes socialists as unacceptably selfi sh: resources and opportunities ought to be shared, and government is just the institution to oversee and enforce their equal distribution. But socialists share with liberals an orientation towards the future. Whereas the conservatives look upon the past with appreciation, socialists look upon it as a place where there was brutality, exclusion, discrimination, lack of opportunity, lack of sharing, and—as a result of these—considerable confl ict. Th e past, for them, is something to be overcome, not cherished and preserved.13

Case Study: Socialist Societies, both Moderate and Democratic, and Extreme and Communist Th ere are two kinds of socialism: democratic socialism and “scientifi c socialism” (a.k.a. communism). In a system of democratic socialism, moderate socialist goals are pursued through democratic means, i.e. by winning free elections and thus a man- date from the people to, for example, raise taxes to pay for publicly funded programs of universal education and healthcare. Democratic socialist leaders prefer to persuade the public of the value of socialist policies, and to demonstrate the benefi ts of the pursuit of a more equal society, in which there is a broader sharing of resources and a citizenry more committed both to protecting the least well-off and to engaging actively, as a nation, in a robust political partnership. Democratic socialism has had its day in some English-speaking countries, like the UK, where it was the prevailing ideology between the Second World War and the rise of Th atcher’s Conservatives. It still exists quite robustly in many parts of the world today (e.g. Scandinavia).14

Scientifi c socialism, by contrast, preferred not to wait, and instead to engage in direct, violent revolution to overthrow existing governments and implement very aggressive socialist measures, such as the abolition of privately owned property and the creation of publicly owned, state-run factories and farms. We saw in Chapter 1 that the communist ideology (with the USSR as its leading world model and champion) was defeated in the Cold War (1945–91) by the forces of liberal capitalism (as led by the US). Almost no countries are truly communist anymore, except perhaps Cuba and North Korea. All other one-time communist states—throughout central and eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia—have fallen, replaced over the last 20 years with

74 Part I Setting the World Stage

moderate regimes committed to an ordinary blend of conservative, liberal, and socialist elements. Even though the ruling party of China still calls itself “communist,” it does not represent a pure form of the doctrine, as it has, for instance, robustly embraced for- profi t business growth. China’s is a non-democratic, authoritarian government—and one still heavily dependent on control of the military—but it’s not a communist one.15

Welfare Liberalism

Th is brings us to the dominant political ideology in the developed world—indeed, probably the whole world—today: welfare liberalism. Essentially, welfare liberalism is the attempt to combine liberalism with socialism. So, on the liberalism side, there is political commit- ment to democracy, so that people are free to choose their leaders. Th ere is also an economic commitment to capitalism and the free market, as defi ned in Chapter 1. Finally, there is a legal and broader social commitment to everyone’s human rights, especially the full set of per- sonal freedoms. Yet, on the socialist side, there is real concern about inequality, and a serious attempt to soft en the edges of the worst socio-economic inequalities. Th is is done through the establishment of a welfare state: a government with a positive, robust, and intervening role to play, especially with regard to constructing a social safety net for the worst off in society. Th e social safety net is created (at least ideally) by taxing the wealthy and using their resources to provide welfare payments to the very poor and unemployed; the taxation system is also used to create publicly funded infrastructure, such as education and healthcare systems. Th e welfare state also typically boasts robust anti-discrimination laws as further evidence of the commitment to greater equality, alongside special provisions for such historically disadvan- taged groups as women, indigenous populations, and other visible minorities.16

Welfare liberalism wasn’t merely a response to the socialist critique of classical liberal society and its hands-off , laissez-faire (i.e. “let it be” or “leave it alone”) approach to gover- nance. It was also a practical, political response to three major historical events:

1. the Great Depression of the 1930s, mentioned above; 2. World War II (1939–45), discussed in Chapter 1; and 3. the return of a huge wave of veteran soldiers aft er World War II.

In terms of the fi rst, many argued that the economic collapse of the 1930s could have been avoided with the right kind of government intervention. Indeed, Western economies started to grow again only aft er governments decided to start spending (e.g. on infrastruc- ture projects, such as roads, railways, and electricity grids). In the United States, president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal was one such program, and its perceived success paved the way for positive state intervention in the economy worldwide. (Roosevelt was a Democrat, and since his time in offi ce, the US Democratic Party—the other of the coun- try’s big two parties—has been committed to welfare liberalism.)17

Th e second major event, World War II, brought a dramatic increase in state interven- tion throughout society, by sheer dint of necessity: the need to organize society’s diverse resources and direct them eff ectively towards the one overriding objective of winning the war. When this (eventually) worked (at least for the West), it was only natural to ask, why not apply such powers and energies to other problems, for the sake of creating a better life

753 Comparative Culture

Canada as a Welfare Liberal Society

Even though Canada has political parties representing every value in the spectrum (Conservatives, Liberals, New Democrats, Greens), it is apparent that, overall, Canada is a welfare liberal society, as defi ned above. It is a democracy, and its economic system is free-market capitalism. Moreover, there is a clear commitment to securing everyone’s human rights, as legally guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Every Canadian is entitled to the basic set of human rights, to:

• personal security • private property ownership • non-discrimination • political participation • a range of due process protections in the event of one’s arrest and trial

(e.g. the right to consult a lawyer) • recognition as a rights-bearing person before the law.

This is in addition to the many personal liberties Canadians are entitled to, such as freedom of speech, religion, association, conscience, peaceful assembly, movement, occupational choice, whom or whether to marry, and so on. Canada, clearly, is a liberal society, where personal freedom is a cherished value.

But Canada also has clear elements of socialism. There is a robust welfare state—much larger and more intrusive than, say, the American one. Indeed, this is one of the clearest differences between the two North American neighbours: Canada’s welfare state is much closer to the European model than to the American. Canada has publicly funded, high- quality universal education at both the primary and the secondary levels. Post-secondary education, and advanced university research, is also sub- sidized heavily by the government. There is universal, publicly funded healthcare coverage—something noticeably lacking in the United States. The third major social welfare program is unemployment insurance, which is an income safety net for those who lose their jobs and/or are permanently unemployable (e.g. owing to a severe medical condition). Finally, almost all physical infrastructure works are done, or funded, by government.

Government intervention in Canada is not limited to these four pillars of the welfare state: it stretches well beyond and includes such things as gov- ernment support for the arts and culture, government ownership of media (the CBC on radio, television, and the Internet, for example), government-run transportation systems (e.g. VIA Rail and Ontario’s GO Transit), government funding for a whole range of civil society and NGO activities, and government subsidies for corporations, technologies, and industries deemed vital to the Canadian economy and its future.18

Canadian Insights

76 Part I Setting the World Stage

for us all? Indeed, the soldiers, upon returning in their millions from the battlefi elds—the third major event—voted overwhelmingly in favour of the welfare state. Having made huge sacrifi ces in Europe, or in the Far East, they felt they were owed something by the countries they’d fought for—job training, economic security, education for their children, and a better way of life in general. Th is is important to note, for the development of the welfare state is oft en portrayed—by classical liberals—as the result of “far-left union activism,” or “socialist fans of big government”; in truth—at least in the Western democracies—it was the soldiers and their families who voted it in, and repeatedly so, in the post-war years.19

Ideology and National Culture

Let’s close this section by restating the importance of political structures and ideologies to culture in general, and to global studies in particular. Th is importance can be summarized as follows:

• Political structures shape many aspects of life inside a national culture. • Countries bring their ideologies with them into the global arena, when they interact

with other countries. For instance, the socialist countries of Scandinavia are the world’s most generous givers of aid to the poor countries of the Global South, which is totally consistent with their values. (More on aid and development in the forthcoming chapter.)

• Generally, we can predict close and friendly relations between countries with similar ideologies (like Canada and the US), and more diffi cult (or even confl icted) relations between countries with very diff erent political values (like the US and Iran).

Religion

By estimated number of adherents, here are the world’s top 10 major religious beliefs, in order from top to bottom:20

1. Christianity 2. Islam 3. secular/non-religious (atheism, agnosticism, humanism, etc.) 4. Hinduism 5. Chinese folk religion/Confucianism 6. Buddhism 7. indigenous/folk/tribal religions 8. Japanese Shintoism 9. Sikhism 10. Judaism

Figure 3.2 is a map of the general geographical distribution of these religions. (Note how similar this map is to last chapter’s map of Huntingdon’s world civilizations, illustrating religion’s potent historical impact on global culture.)

773 Comparative Culture

A TL

A N

TI C

O C

E A

N

A TL

A N

TI C

O C

E A

N

IN D

IA N

O C

E A

N

P A

C IF

IC O

C E

A N EQ

U A

TO R

C H

R IS

TI A

N IT

Y M

o st

ly R

o m

an C

at h

o li

c M

o st

ly P

ro te

st an

t M

o st

ly E

as te

rn R

it es

IS LA

M S

u n

n i

S h

i’ a

H IN

D U

IS M

B U

D D

H IS

M Th

er av

ad a,

M ah

ay an

a, a

n d

V aj

ra ya

n a

C H

IN E

S E

R E

LI G

IO N

S

S H

IN TO

a n

d B

U D

D H

IS M

JU D

A IS

M

TR A

D IT

IO N

A L

an d

S H

A M

A N

IC R

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N S

0 3

,0 0

0 k

m

Fi g

u r

e 3

.2 G

en er

al G

eo g

ra p

h ic

al D

is tr

ib u

ti o

n o

f th

e M

aj o

r W

o rl

d R

el ig

io n

s

S o

u rc

e : R

.C . B

u sh

e t

a l. , e d

s. , T

h e R

e li g

io u

s W

o rl

d : C

o m

m u

n it

ie s

o f

F a it

h (

N e w

Y o

rk : M

a cm

il la

n ; L o

n d

o n

: C

o ll ie

r M

a cm

il la

n , 1 9 8 8 ).

78 Part I Setting the World Stage

Basic Distinctions

Religious versus Secular

Th e most basic distinction among systems of belief is between religious and non-religious (or secular). Th e word religion derives from the Latin religio, literally a “re-linking” or “linking back.” Th is refers to the link between humans and the divine being (or beings) who created humankind—and the universe as a whole—in the fi rst place. Diff erent reli- gions, as we’ll see below, have quite diff erent views about the nature of the divine, how the universe came to be, and how humans ought to relate to the divine (and among them- selves). Non-religious, or secular, people tend to come in three sorts:

• atheists are people who believe that there are no gods

• agnostics are people who don’t take a fi rm stand on whether any gods exist, and who are simply not motivated by, or interested in, religious concerns at all

• secular humanists prefer to substitute for a religious code their own systematic code of beliefs, a code that refers not to the divine but only to humanity, and to the need for human beings to treat each other decently, at minimum by respecting universal human rights.

Th ese three sorts of non-religious people are, when combined, thought to compose the world’s third-largest belief system (or attitude towards these kinds of issues). And secular- ism, while spread worldwide, is represented most strongly in the developed West—in Europe especially—and is seen to be gaining ground, as formerly Christian societies turn increasingly secular. In general, statistics confi rm that poor nations tend to be much more religious than rich ones, with the large and important exception of the United States.21

Indeed, for all their similarities and connections, one of the sharpest diff erences between the United States and Canada is how much more religious America is, and how much more like Europe Canada is, in terms of Canadians’ attitudes toward religion. Th ere is also statistical evidence that, for whatever reason, Northern peoples tend to be less reli- gious than Southern peoples.22 Th is principle applies to comparisons of Canada and the US, of the developed and developing worlds, and even of northern and southern Europe. Some experts, like Charles Taylor, even describe contemporary Europe as a post-religious society—perhaps the world’s fi rst ever—although some Australians might want to claim that title for their country.23 Now offi cially, the erstwhile communist regimes of the for- mer USSR and central and eastern Europe, and even the current communist regime of present-day China, were (or are) atheist. But this was more a refl ection of offi cial party policy than actual, widespread belief amongst the people. Today, on the other hand, when people speak of countries in Europe—and Australia/New Zealand—being secular, they mean that the majority of people truly are non-religious in at least one of the three ways mentioned above.24

793 Comparative Culture

Monotheistic versus Polytheistic

Th e second core distinction among belief systems is between monotheistic and polytheistic religions. Monotheistic religions believe in one God (mono = “one”), whereas polythe- istic religions believe in many (poly = “many”). Th e three largest monotheistic religions, by population, are Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Indeed, these three religions—all of which originated in the Middle East—are oft en categorized as being “Abrahamic,” since they all share the prophet Abraham as a common fi gure of both religious and ethnic sig- nifi cance. Abraham, reputed to have lived around 1800 BCE, is thought to have been a descendant of Noah—of Ark and Flood fame—and to have had seven sons. Th ese sons went on to establish a number of family bloodlines crucial to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic communities. Abraham is thought to be the “one common ancestor,” distantly related to each of Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed. Historically, Judaism came fi rst, and its origins are recounted in the Hebrew Bible (known to Christians as the Old Testament). Next came Christianity, with its belief in Jesus Christ as the son of God and in the New Testament as further revelation from God. Finally, Islam acknowledges not only Jewish prophets but Jesus, too (yet only as one in a line of respected prophets and teachers). Th e prophet for Muslims (i.e. those who believe in Islam) is Mohammed, who lived about 600 years aft er Jesus is thought to have died.

Th is interwoven history, shared by the Abrahamic and monotheistic religions, is an important factor not only in the lives of all these people but also in their politics. For example, when international peace talks are held in a Middle Eastern country, and local countries are represented there, alongside US and sometimes European offi cials, almost everyone in their speeches will make surprisingly robust reference to “the one true God, uniting us all,” in an eff ort to use cultural similarities as leverage to solve political diff erences.25

Polytheistic religions include Hinduism and the various folk or indigenous religions of various peoples, be they North American or Australian Aboriginal peoples, Chinese, Japanese, or the various peoples of the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. Polytheistic religions recognize many gods or divinities, and typically prefer to talk of an underlying cosmic order, or force, as the all-pervasive context in which all of us—including the vari- ous gods—exist. To this extent, a number of polytheistic religions are termed Dharmic or Taoistic. Th ese terms are in contrast to “Abrahamic.” Whereas the Abrahamic religions are monotheistic and stress a personal connection, or covenant, between God and His people, the Dharmic/Taoistic religions do not highlight a personal connection between humanity and divinity. Th ere is, rather, an underlying cosmic force or fate—a dharma, kharma, or Tao—that is highly impersonal and absolutely binding on us all—even the lesser gods within the belief system. It is almost like gravity: impersonal and ruling the fate of everything. Th e aim, then, for adherents of Dharmic or Taoistic religions is to adjust themselves to this underlying, all-pervasive order or structure. Th is is the route to security and serenity, being utterly aligned with the very cosmos.26

80 Part I Setting the World Stage

Folk versus Non-Folk Religions

Another way of approaching diff erent belief systems is to distinguish between indigenous (or folk) religions and non-folk religions. Essentially, folk religions are systems of belief and ritual that are unique to a people—in other words, to a coherent nationality or ethnic grouping. Judaism and Hinduism are folk religions in this sense, with the fi rst being the preserve of the Jewish people, both inside Israel and in the Jewish diaspora scattered around the world (but especially in Europe and North America). And Hinduism is the preserve of East Indian peoples, both inside India and in the Indian diaspora scattered around the world (but especially in the old British Empire countries of America, Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the UK itself ). Shintosim, in Japan, also counts as a folk reli- gion, alongside indigenous faiths like the so-called “tribal” religions of various Aboriginal and African peoples.

Non-folk religions, by contrast, are religions not limited to one group, ethnicity, or nationality. Christianity is the clearest example—the world’s most diversely spread religion—alongside secular humanism and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Buddhism and Islam. (While Islam is quite concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa, the larg- est Islamic nation by population is actually Indonesia, which is quite far afi eld from the Arabian peninsula.)27

Fast-Growing versus Slow-Growing

A topical and hotly disputed question among religion researchers concerns which are the fastest-growing religions and which are growing more slowly (or even losing ground). For a while, it was commonly assumed that Islam was the fastest-growing religion, given robust rates of population growth in traditionally Muslim countries. However, recent research, for instance by the PEW Research Center,28 suggests that Christianity instead merits this title, even in spite of clear trends to the contrary in the developed world, including a decline in church attendance, a decrease in religious school enrolment, and a big rise in secularization. Th is research suggests that Christianity is spreading rapidly in Russia and former Communist Bloc countries of central and eastern Europe, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa and, especially, China. Some experts have even declared that the fastest-growing religious group in the world—by population over the past several years—is actually Spanish-speaking Catholics throughout Latin America. It needs to be stressed, however, that there are substantial diffi culties involved with estimating the numbers of “believers” of any given religion.29

Key Elements of the Three Biggest Abrahamic/ Monotheistic Religions30

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main features of the three biggest monotheistic, or Abrahamic, religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

813 Comparative Culture

Ta b

le 3

.1 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f C h ri st

ia n it y, J u d ai

sm , an

d I sl

am

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

J u

d a is

m O

rt h

o d

o x v

s C

o n

se rv

a ti

v e v

s R

e fo

rm ; O

rt h

o d

o x

J u

d a is

m t

e a ch

e s

st ri

ct a

d h

e re

n ce

to

J e w

is h

l a w

a n

d i ts

t ra

d it

io n

a l

o b

se rv

a n

ce s,

in

cl u

d in

g

n u

m e ro

u s

la w

s g

o v e rn

in g

re

li g

io u

s a n

d

e v e ry

d a y l if

e ;

R e fo

rm J

u d

a is

m

b e g

a n

a s

a n

a tt

e m

p t

to a

d a p

t to

m o

d e rn

ch

a n

g e s

in

so ci

a l, p

o li ti

ca l,

a n

d c

u lt

u ra

l li fe

; C

o n

se rv

a ti

v e

J u

d a is

m ,

p re

v a le

n t

e sp

. in

N

o rt

h A

m e ri

ca ,

a tt

e m

p ts

t o

p

re se

rv e J

e w

is h

tr

a d

it io

n a

n d

r it

u a l

b u

t w

it h

a m

o re

fl

e x ib

le a

p p

ro a ch

th

a n

t h

a t

fa v o

u re

d

b y O

rt h

o d

o x

J u

d a is

m .

• B

o o

k: t

h e

H e b

re w

B ib

le

(k n

o w

n t

o

C h

ri st

ia n

s a s

th e

O ld

T e st

a m

e n

t) ,

co m

p ri

si n

g t

h e

L a w

( “ To

ra h

” ),

th

e P

ro p

h e ts

, a n

d t

h e

H a g

io g

ra p

h a

(“ W

ri ti

n g

s” );

t h

e

Ta lm

u d

a n

d t

h e

M id

ra sh

• G

o d

: O

n e G

o d

, ca

ll e d

“ L o

rd ”

o r

“ G

o d

”

in E

n g

li sh

(h

is n

a m

e i

s n

e v e r

sp o

ke n

in

H e b

re w

);

J u

d a is

m

is s

tr ic

tl y

m o

n o

th e is

ti c

• F ig

u re

s: t

h e

p a tr

ia rc

h s

a n

d

m a tr

ia rc

h s

A b

ra h

a m

a n

d

S a ra

h ,

Is a a c

a n

d

R e b

e cc

a ,

a n

d

J a co

b a

n d

L e a h

a n

d R

a ch

e l;

t h

e

p ro

p h

e t

a n

d

la w

g iv

e r

M o

se s;

o

th e r

p ro

p h

e ts

, in

cl u

d in

g

S a m

u e l,

I sa

ia h

, a n

d E

ze ki

e l;

t h

e

ki n

g s

S o

lo m

o n

a n

d D

a v id

• S

y m

b o

ls :

th e

S ta

r o

f D

a v id

; th

e fl

a g

o f

Is ra

e l;

th

e m

e n

o ra

h ;

th e k

ip p

a

(s ku

ll ca

p );

t h

e

ta ll

it h

( p

ra y e r

sh a w

l) ;

th e

sh o

fa r

(r a m

’s

h o

rn )

• Te

m p

le :

S y n

a g

o g

u e

• O

b se

rv a n

ce s:

w

e e kl

y S

a b

b a th

; R

o sh

H a sh

a n

a h

(N

e w

Y e a r)

; Y

o m

K

ip p

u r

(D a y o

f A

to n

e m

e n

t) ;

H a n

u kk

a h

(F

e st

iv a l

o f

L ig

h ts

); P

a ss

o v e r

(l ib

e ra

ti o

n )

• T

h e re

i s

a

co v e n

a n

t, o

r co

n tr

a ct

, b

e tw

e e

n

G o

d a

n d

t h

e

J e w

s, w

h o

a re

h is

“ ch

o se

n p

e o

p le

” .

T h

o se

w h

o h

a v

e

fa it

h i

n G

o d

w il l

b e r

e w

a rd

e d

; th

e P

ro m

is e d

L a n

d —

t h

e

la n

d o

f C

a n

a a

n ,

p ro

m is

e d

t o

A

b ra

h a m

a n

d h

is

d e sc

e n

d a n

ts —

is p

a rt

o f

th is

re

w a rd

. •

T h

e p

ri n

ci p

a l l

a w

s a re

e x p

re ss

e d

a s

th e T

e n

C

o m

m a n

d m

e n

ts ;

J e w

s m

u st

o b

e y

th

e se

a n

d o

th e

r o

f G

o d

’s l

a w

s a n

d f

o ll

o w

a ll t

h e

o

b se

rv a n

ce s.

• A

g o

a l o

f J u

d a

is m

is

t o

k e e p

t h

e

fa it

h a

li v e a

m o

n g

th

e J

e w

is h

p

e o

p le

; J u

d a

is m

is

a “

n o

n -

p ro

se ly

ti zi

n g

”

fa it

h ,

i. e .

it d

o e

s n

o t

a sp

ir e t

o g

a in

co

n v e rt

s.

J e

w s

b e

li e

v e

i n

a

m e

ss ia

h w

h o

w

il l co

m e

a n

d

le a

d t

h e

m t

o t

h e

p

ro m

is e

d l a

n d

, si

tu a

te d

i n

t h

is

li fe

ti m

e a

n d

t h

is

w o

rl d

; J

u d

a is

m

d o

e s

n o

t a

d o

p t

a n

in

st it

u ti

o n

a l b

e li e

f in

t h

e a

ft e

rl if

e (

i. e

. H

e a

v e

n )

th e

w a

y

th a

t C

h ri

st ia

n it

y

d o

e s.

co n

ti n

u e d

82 Part I Setting the World Stage

Ta b

le 3

.1 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f C h ri st

ia n it y, J u d ai

sm , an

d I sl

am (

co n

ti n

u ed

)

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

C h

ri st

ia n

it y

C a th

o li c

v s

P ro

te st

a n

t v s

E a st

e rn

O rt

h o

d o

x ;

th e R

o m

a n

C

a th

o li c

C h

u rc

h

a ck

n o

w le

d g

e s

th e p

o p

e a

s it

s h

e a d

; P

ro te

st a n

ts

a n

d O

rt h

o d

o x

C h

ri st

ia n

s d

o

n o

t a cc

e p

t th

e

a u

th o

ri ty

o f

th e

p a p

a cy

.

• B

o o

k: t

h e B

ib le

(c

o m

p ri

si n

g t

h e

O ld

T e st

a m

e n

t a n

d N

e w

Te

st a m

e n

t) •

G o

d : th

e

Tr in

it y —

G o

d ,

th e F

a th

e r;

C

h ri

st ,

th e S

o n

; th

e H

o ly

S p

ir it

— re

p re

se n

ti n

g

a n

u a n

ce d

m

o n

o th

e is

m

• F ig

u re

s: t

h e

p a tr

ia rc

h s,

p

ro p

h e ts

, a n

d

ki n

g s

o f

th e O

ld

Te st

a m

e n

t (a

s id

e n

ti fi

e d

a b

o v e

w it

h J

u d

a is

m );

J e su

s C

h ri

st ;

th e V

ir g

in M

a ry

; J e w

is h

p re

a ch

e r

a n

d p

ro p

h e t

J o

h n

t h

e B

a p

ti st

; th

e G

o sp

e l

w ri

te rs

M a tt

h e w

, M

a rk

, L u

ke ,

a n

d J

o h

n ;

th e

a p

o st

le s,

e sp

. P

e te

r a n

d P

a u

l •

S y m

b o

ls :

th e

cr o

ss o

r cr

u ci

fi x ;

a d

o v e i

n fl

i g

h t;

a fi

s h

• Te

m p

le :

C h

u rc

h •

O b

se rv

a n

ce s:

w

e e kl

y s

a b

b a th

; C

h ri

st m

a s

(b ir

th o

f J e su

s) ;

G o

o d

F ri

d a y

(c ru

ci fi

x io

n

o f

J e su

s) ;

E a st

e r

S u

n d

a y

(r e su

rr e ct

io n

o f

J e su

s)

• G

o d

b e ca

m e

h

u m

a n

— a s

J e su

s— to

s h

o w

h

u m

a n

s th

e

tr u

e p

a th

o f

ri g

h te

o u

sn e

ss .

• J e su

s w

a s

cr u

ci fi

e d

, d

ie d

, a n

d r

o se

f ro

m

th e d

e a d

, p

ro v

in g

h

is d

iv in

it y.

J e su

s’ s

li fe

i s

th e

m

o d

e l

to f

o ll o

w ,

e m

b o

d y in

g t

h e

q

u a li

ti e s

o f

p e

a ce

, lo

v e ,

fo rg

iv e n

e ss

, a n

d r

e d

e m

p ti

o n

. •

C h

ri st

ia n

s o

u g

h t

to o

b e y n

o t

ju st

th

e O

ld T

e st

a m

e n

t te

a ch

in g

s b

u t

th e

N

e w

T e st

a m

e n

t,

to o

, in

cl u

d in

g ,

e sp

e ci

a ll

y, t

h e

“ g

o ld

e n

r u

le ”

( i. e

. d

o u

n to

o th

e rs

a s

y o

u w

o u

ld h

a v

e

o th

e rs

d o

u n

to

y o

u ).

• A

f a it

h o

p e n

to

a n

y o

n e ,

C h

ri st

ia n

it y i s

a p

ro se

ly ti

zi n

g

fa it

h ,

m a n

d a ti

n g

b

e li

e v e rs

to

c o

n v e rt

n

o n

-b e li

e v e rs

.

T h

e s

o u

l su

rv iv

e s

d e

a th

a n

d (

in

th e

v ie

w o

f m

o st

C

h ri

st ia

n s)

o n

e ’s

co

n d

u ct

i n

l if

e

d e

te rm

in e

s it

s fa

te : g

o o

d n

e ss

is

t h

e p

a th

t o

H

e a

v e

n ; e

v il i s

th e

r o

a d

t o

H e

ll .

S o

m e

P ro

te st

a n

t fa

it h

s b

e li e

v e

i n

p

re d

e st

in a

ti o

n , t

h e

d

o ct

ri n

e t

h a

t a

ll

e v

e n

ts —

in cl

u d

in g

sa

lv a

ti o

n —

a re

fo

re o

rd a

in e

d b

y

G o

d .

co n

ti n

u e d

833 Comparative Culture

Ta b

le 3

.1 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f C h ri st

ia n it y, J u d ai

sm , an

d I sl

am (

co n

ti n

u ed

)

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

Is la

m S

u n

n i v s

S h

i’ a ;

S u

n n

is m

a ke

u

p t

h e m

a jo

ri ty

o

f M

u sl

im s

a n

d d

if fe

r fr

o m

S

h i’ a s

in t

h e ir

a cc

e p

ta n

ce o

f th

e

fi rs

t th

re e c

a li p

h s

(l e a d

e rs

) fo

ll o

w in

g

th e d

e a th

o f

th e p

ro p

h e t

M o

h a m

m e d

; S

h i’ a s

re je

ct t

h e

fi rs

t th

re e S

u n

n i

ca li p

h s.

• B

o o

k: t

h e Q

u r’

a n

• G

o d

: A

ll a h

; Is

la m

i s

st ri

ct ly

m

o n

o th

e is

ti c.

M

u sl

im s

b e li

e v e

A ll a h

t o

b e

th e s

a m

e G

o d

w

o rs

h ip

p e d

b y

J e w

s, C

h ri

st ia

n s,

a n

d o

th e r

m o

n o

th e is

ts .

• F ig

u re

s:

th e p

ro p

h e t

M o

h a m

m e d

; h

is f

a m

il y.

I sl

a m

re

co g

n iz

e s

m a n

y

o f

th e p

ro p

h e ts

o

f J u

d a is

m a

n d

C

h ri

st ia

n it

y

(A b

ra h

a m

, M

o se

s, J

e su

s,

e tc

.) b

u t

o n

ly

a s

p ro

p h

e ts

le

ss e r

th a n

M

o h

a m

m e d

. •

S y m

b o

ls :

th e

cr e sc

e n

t m

o o

n

(o ft

e n

w it

h

st a r)

; th

e c

o lo

u r

g re

e n

; th

e k

a fi

(s

ku ll

ca p

); t

h e

h ij

a b

( h

e a d

sc a rf

)

• Te

m p

le :

M o

sq u

e •

O b

se rv

a n

ce s:

th

e “

fi v e p

il la

rs ”

o f

th e Q

u r’

a n

: th

e p

ro fe

ss io

n o

f fa

it h

( sh

a h

a d

a h

),

p ra

y e r,

a lm

sg iv

in g

, th

e

a n

n u

a l

ri tu

a l

o f

fa st

in g

d u

ri n

g

R a m

a d

a n

, a n

d

p il

g ri

m a g

e t

o

M e cc

a (

th e h

a jj

) a t

le a st

o n

ce i

n

o n

e ’s

l if

e ti

m e ;

p ra

y e r

ri tu

a ls

, fi

v e t

im e s

d a il

y

• G

o d

r e v e a le

d

th e Q

u r’

a n

t o

th

e p

ro p

h e t

M o

h a m

m e d

, w

h o

s p

e n

t h

is l if

e

co n

v e rt

in g

h is

re

g io

n t

o I sl

a m

b

y m

e a n

s o

f a

m il it

a ry

c o

n q

u e st

; th

e u

n it

y o

f p

o li ti

ca l p

o w

e r

a n

d r

e li g

io u

s d

o ct

ri n

e i s

a n

e n

d u

ri n

g t

h e m

e .

• “ Is

la m

” m

e a n

s “ su

rr e n

d e r

to

G o

d ” . T

h e w

il l

o f

A ll a h

a n

d

th e c

o m

m a n

d

to f

o ll o

w i t

a re

co

m m

o n

ly

re fe

re n

ce d

i n

Is

la m

, w

h ic

h

e m

p h

a si

ze s,

g

e n

e ra

ll y,

t h

e

n e e d

t o

m a st

e r

o n

e ’s

b a se

r d

e si

re s

a n

d p

u t

o n

e se

lf i n

to p

u re

o

b e d

ie n

ce t

o G

o d

. •

T h

e “

F iv

e P

il la

rs ”

o f

th e Q

u r’

a n

st

re ss

f a it

h , th

e

o b

se rv

a n

ce s,

a n

d

ch a ri

ty t

o t

h e p

o o

r. •

Is la

m , li ke

C

h ri

st ia

n it

y, i s

a

p ro

se ly

ti zi

n g

f a it

h .

A s

in C

h ri

st ia

n

b e

li e

f, t

h e

s o

u l

su rv

iv e

s d

e a

th

a n

d i s

ca st

b y

A

ll a

h i n

to e

it h

e r

H e

a v

e n

o r

H e

ll . H

e a

v e

n i s

P a

ra d

is e

, a

p la

ce

o f

a b

u n

d a

n ce

, g

re e

n f

e rt

il e

lu

sh n

e ss

, a

n d

d

e li g

h t.

S o

u rc

e : S

e e n

o te

3 0 .

84 Part I Setting the World Stage

Case Study: The Arab–Israeli Confl ict It is a mistake to think of the Arab–Israeli confl ict as primarily one of religion, espe- cially since (as noted in Table 3.1) Judaism is a non-proselytizing faith, meaning that it does not actively seek out converts. Nevertheless, this is a convenient moment to mention this struggle, a very important and enduring one in modern international politics. And religion is not irrelevant, as we’ll see. But, as we’ll also see—and as I here stress—this confl ict is complex and multifaceted, and has as much to do with territory and the desire of nations for security as it does with spirituality. I should also stress that this is a very controversial subject, about which even the most basic concepts and terms are contested. Still, the subject cannot be ignored.31

Th e Jews originated in the Middle East, probably around Palestine. Th ey grew to have prosperous kingdoms in the area, for instance as governed by King David, succeeded by his son Solomon (both of whom are thought to be ancestors of Jesus through Jesus’s earthly father, Joseph). But territorial control became an issue, with the Egyptians and the Romans contesting it, and the Jews lost control over their home- land, beginning between the eighth and sixth centuries BCE and culminating with the sack of Jerusalem in 70 CE. While a number of Jews stayed in the Middle East, many more left for Europe and, later, North America. Th is is known as the Jewish diaspora.

It remained, for centuries, an object of Jewish yearning to re-establish a self-gov- erning Jewish community in Palestine. Th is yearning came to be called Zionism (aft er Mount Zion, a hill in Palestine, near Jerusalem, where once stood a fortress conquered by King David). At the end of the First World War, in 1918, Palestine was governed by the Turkish, or Ottoman, Empire. Th is empire—centred around Constantinople (present-day Istanbul)—was Muslim. Palestine itself was inhabited by Arabs (an eth- nic term referring to those whose ancestors came from the Arabian peninsula, who share certain physical commonalities amongst them, as well as the Arabic language). Th e Ottoman Empire was on the losing side of World War I, and had only weak control over Palestine to begin with. Jewish leaders lobbied the heads of the victorious Allied nations (notably Britain, the US, and the USSR) to support Zionism, which would punish the Ottomans and reward the Jews. Th e Western powers were willing to do the fi rst but not quite (yet) the second. Britain took over the administration of Palestine but did not cede control of it to the Jewish people. It did, however, vaguely commit in principle to eventual Jewish self-governance via the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

At the end of World War II (1945), with the horrors of the Holocaust seem- ingly providing ample evidence of the need for a self-governed, self-protected Jewish homeland, Jewish leaders demanded a follow-through on the promise of the Balfour Declaration. According to their argument, the war had proven that Jews couldn’t count on the protection of any nation-state, and thus they needed their own. What better place, then, than the ancient biblical homeland in Palestine? Th e Allies, espe- cially Britain and the United States, agreed, and they took measures to pave the way for the foundation of the new Jewish state, Israel. Th e substantial problem, though, was that there were many hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs living on that land. Moreover, these Palestinians, quite plausibly, replied: “Look, we’re not the Nazis;

853 Comparative Culture

we had nothing to do with the Holocaust. And yet, because of it, we are going to lose our land?” Th e Palestinians had, aft er all, been living there for centuries.

Th e formation of Israel went ahead in 1948, to the great joy of many Jews and to the great despair of many Palestinian Arabs, who were coerced by the Allies into vacating their former homes to make way for the Jews (some 700,000 Palestinians were deemed “refugees” by the United Nations, in a 1950 census). Th us began the Arab–Israeli confl ict, which endures to this day. Th e Jews view the creation of Israel as both a necessity for their survival—especially in view of what occurred during the Holocaust—and, perhaps, one step closer to achieving the Jewish Promised Land. But Arabs worldwide view it as the displacement and disenfranchisement of Palestinian Arabs at the hands of both the Israelis and their Western supporters, especially the US. Few things unite the Arab street—i.e. public opinion among the majority in the Muslim world—more than sympathy for the Palestinians and anger towards Israel.

When Israel’s existence was formally announced, on 14 May 1948, its Arab neighbours immediately declared war: they attacked, trying to strangle the new nation in its infancy. But Israel—with Allied help—fought back, and had actually gained territory by the time a ceasefi re was reached in 1949. Since then, Israel has, at one time or another, been at war with every one of its Arab neighbours. It has won every time, and has even expanded its original 1948 territory through some of these wars, especially the Six Days War of 1967. Moreover, it has carved out for itself a decent democracy amidst what was—until very recently—a sea of poor and unstable authoritarian regimes (i.e. undemocratic governments, ruling by virtue of military force and police control and not by virtue of the consent of the people, as determined by free and fair public elections).

Th is much is to Israel’s credit. To the downside, however, Israel must maintain enormous vigilance, and massive military expenditures. (It is helped very substantially, in this regard, by the US in particular, year in and year out.) Every adult Israeli—man or woman—must serve a conscripted term in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and everyone knows that Israel has nuclear weapons, even though it has never publicly acknowledged this. Israel’s relations with its neighbours are strained at best, ranging from liveable agreements with Egypt and Jordan to outright hostility with Syria and, especially, Iran, whose government is still offi cially committed to Israel’s destruction. Israel’s location, hostile neighbours, and small size (population: 7 million) make grow- ing its economy diffi cult. And then there’s the huge remaining issue of the Palestinians.

Displaced in their own land, the Palestinian Arabs have endured a long and varied journey with Israel, starting out as powerless victims and transforming angrily over time—via the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)—into an organized politi- cal and military movement determined to secure an independent state of Palestine, and fully prepared to use violent force against both Israeli citizens and the IDF in order to achieve it. Recently and thankfully, however, the PLO has laid down its weapons and

Jews view the creation of Israel as both a necessity for their survival and, perhaps, one step closer to achieving the Jewish Promised Land. Arabs worldwide view it as the displacement and disenfranchisement of Palestinian Arabs at the hands of both the Israelis and their Western supporters, especially the US.

86 Part I Setting the World Stage

Galilee

LEBANON

J O R D A N

E G Y P T

Negev

Jerusalem

West Bank*

Gaza Strip*

SYRIA

Figure 3.3 Israel and the Palestinian Territories

*Denotes Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories whose current status is subject to the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement; the permanent status of these territories will be determined through further negotiation.

Source: worldatlas.com

873 Comparative Culture

entered the democratic political process. Th e PLO-led Fatah party currently governs jointly with Hamas, winners of the 2006 parliamentary election but considered by some countries to be a terrorist organization. Together, Fatah and Hamas represent the Palestinian people both within Israel proper and in some of the disputed territo- ries captured by Israel through war, notably the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank. Th e once daily violence between Israel and Palestine has now abated, and movement toward a more enduring solution has been made, focusing on improving, in a concrete way, the daily lives of both Israelis and Palestinians. What this solution will look like is not exactly clear, though oft en mentioned is the so-called two-state solution, wherein there will be separate nation-states, Israel and Palestine, each gov- erning its own people and territory. But drawing the exact lines of that territory, and ensuring for each community security from violence, suffi cient water, and a shot at prosperity, is proving extremely complex.

One fi nal word about this issue, and it applies equally to every other religion, too: there are diff erent kinds of believers for each religion and, indeed, for almost every kind of belief, especially moral and political opinion. Th e Arab–Israeli confl ict has never been a simple, two-sided confl ict. All along, there have been those, in both camps, who have sought peace and accommodation with the other side, just as there have been those of extreme, radical belief, unwilling to compromise at all. For example, in 1995, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated—not by a Palestinian, but by an Israeli extremist who thought Rabin was giving too much away to the Palestinians during peace talks. In general, there is a division within Judaism between Reform and Orthodox Jews, with the former being more moderate and the latter more strict regarding both the interpretation and the application of God’s laws. In Israel, some ultra-orthodox Jews have been fi rmly opposed to the peace process, and they have taken to becoming settlers in some of the disputed territories, forming residential religious communities on them and standing their ground (which, they are convinced, has been gift ed to them by God). On the Palestinian side, there are moderates— indeed, statistics show that the majority, in almost any given religious or political population, are moderates—and extremists, too. For a long time, the extremists in the PLO had the upper hand, and they confronted Israel with indiscriminate armed resistance. Eventually, the moderates prevailed; violence was renounced; the peace process entered; and clear progress was made on making life better. Whenever we dis- cuss these confl icts, and these religions, we must always be mindful of the spectrum of beliefs, and especially the omnipresent diff erence between compromising moderates (who reach out to others, and hold their own beliefs more lightly) and uncompromis- ing extremists (who turn away from others, and hold their own beliefs more tightly, and who are, generally, willing to act much more radically).

Key Elements of the Three Biggest Eastern/Polytheistic Religions 32

Table 3.2 provides an overview of the main features of the three biggest Eastern religious traditions: Hinduism, Chinese religions, and Buddhism.

Statistics show that the majority, in almost any given religious or political population, are moderates.

88 Part I Setting the World Stage

Ta b

le 3

.2 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f H in

d u is

m , C h in

es e

Fo lk

R el

ig io

n s,

a n d B

u d d h is

m

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

H in

d u

is m

T h

e re

a re

n o

fo

rm a l d

iv is

io n

s,

th o

u g

h f

o ll o

w e rs

o

ft e n

p ra

y m

o re

to

o n

e g

o d

o v e r

o th

e rs

.

• B

o o

ks : T

h e

V e d

a s—

4

co ll e ct

io n

s o

f h

y m

n s

a n

d

ri tu

a l te

x ts

— a re

t h

e m

o st

a u

th o

ri ta

ti v e

te x ts

; th

e e

p ic

s (t

h e R

a m

a y a n

a

a n

d t

h e

M a h

a b

h a ra

ta ,

w h

ic h

i n

cl u

d e s

th e B

h a

g a v a d

G

it a ),

t h

e

P u

ra n

a s

(“ O

ld

Ta le

s” ),

a n

d

U p

a n

is h

a d

s (p

h il o

so p

h ic

a l

te x ts

o n

t h

e

n a tu

re o

f kn

o w

le d

g e )

a re

a ls

o i m

p o

rt a n

t. •

G o

d : H

in d

u is

m

is p

o ly

th e is

ti c,

w

it h

m a

n y g

o d

s;

a m

o n

g t

h e m

o st

w

o rs

h ip

p e d

a re

t h

e t

ri a d

o f

B ra

h m

a (

th e

cr e a to

r) ,

V is

h n

u

(t h

e s

u st

a in

e r)

, a n

d S

h iv

a (

th e

d e st

ro y

e r)

.

• F ig

u re

s: A

ll

th e g

o d

s a n

d

g o

d d

e ss

e s

(B ra

h m

a ,

V is

h n

u ,

S h

iv a ,

D e v i,

G a n

e sh

, e tc

.) ;

g u

ru s

a n

d

sa g

e s,

i n

cl u

d in

g

A d

i S

h a n

ka ra

, R

a m

u n

ja ,

a n

d

R a m

a n

a n

d a

• S

y m

b o

ls :

st a tu

e s

o f

th e

g o

d s;

t h

e l

o tu

s fl

o w

e r;

t h

e b

in d

i (d

e co

ra ti

v e

m a rk

w o

rn i

n

th e m

id d

le o

f th

e f

o re

h e a d

b y

H in

d u

w o

m e n

)

• v a ri

o u

s te

m p

le s

a n

d o

b se

rv a n

ce s

d e v o

te d

t o

v a ri

o u

s g

o d

s •

M a jo

r fe

st iv

a ls

in

cl u

d e H

o li

(i

n s

p ri

n g

) a n

d

M a h

a S

h iv

a ra

tr i

(i n

w in

te r)

, a n

d D

iv a li

, th

e

fe st

iv a l

o f

li g

h t.

• A

f o

lk r

e li

g io

n

a m

o n

g I

n d

ia n

p

e o

p le

, “ H

in d

u ”

d

e ri

v e s

fr o

m

“ In

d ia

” a

n d

t h

e

ri v e r

“ In

d u

s” .

• T

h e re

a re

m a

n y

g

o d

s, b

u t

th e

y

a n

d w

e e

x is

t in

a

u n

iv e rs

e b

o u

n d

to

g e th

e r

b y a

co

sm ic

f o

rc e

(d h

a rm

a )

th a t

is

im p

e rs

o n

a l a

n d

a ll

-p e rv

a si

v e .

• O

n e m

u st

a li g

n

o n

e se

lf w

it h

th

is f

o rc

e i

n

b o

th m

in d

a n

d

co n

d u

ct ;

th e

“ Te

n

C o

m m

it m

e n

ts ”

a re

a id

s in

t h

is

re g

a rd

: th

e y

in cl

u d

e n

o n

- h

a rm

in g

, n

o t

ly in

g o

r st

e a li n

g ,

b e in

g c

le a n

a n

d

se lf

-d is

ci p

li n

e d

, b

e in

g s

tu d

io u

s,

a n

d o

b e d

ie n

ce t

o

th e g

o d

s. •

A c

o m

p re

h e n

si v

e

p h

il o

so p

h ic

a l

sy st

e m

t h

a t

b le

n d

s b

e li

e f

w it

h

p h

y si

ca l

p ra

ct ic

e s

(e .g

. y o

g a ).

M o

st H

in d

u s

b e

li e

v e

t h

e h

u m

a n

so

u l is

i m

m o

rt a

l.

K a

rm a

— o

n e

’s

g o

o d

a n

d

b a

d a

ct io

n s—

d e

te rm

in e

s th

e

q u

a li ty

o f

th e

so

u l’s

r e

b ir

th

in f

u tu

re l iv

e s.

E

v e

n tu

a ll y

t h

e

so u

l w

il l a

ch ie

v e

li b

e ra

ti o

n f

ro m

t h

e

sh a

ck le

s o

f ka

rm a

a

n d

t h

e c

y cl

e o

f re

in ca

rn a

ti o

n .

co n

ti n

u e d

893 Comparative Culture

Ta b

le 3

.2 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f H in

d u is

m , C h in

es e

Fo lk

R el

ig io

n s,

a n d B

u d d h is

m (

co n

ti n

u ed

)

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

C o

n fu

ci a n

is m

/ D

a o

is m

/ C

h in

e se

f o

lk

re li g

io n

T h

e re

a re

n o

fo

rm a l d

iv is

io n

s,

th o

u g

h f

o ll o

w e rs

o

ft e n

b le

n d

d

if fe

re n

t e le

m e n

ts

(t a i-

ch i, a

n ce

st o

r w

o rs

h ip

) in

d

if fe

re n

t w

a y s.

• B

o o

k: T

h e

A n

a le

ct s,

C

o n

fu ci

u s’

s id

e a s

a b

o u

t th

e

im p

o rt

a n

ce o

f p

ra ct

ic a

l m

o ra

l v a lu

e s,

c o

ll e ct

e d

b

y h

is d

is ci

p le

s;

C o

n fu

ci a n

is m

is

p e rh

a p

s th

e

le a st

b o

o k-

b o

u n

d o

f a ll

m

a jo

r re

li g

io n

s.

D a o

D e J

in g

i s

fu n

d a m

e n

ta l

to

D a o

is m

. •

G o

d : T

h e re

i s

a n

a ll -p

e rv

a si

v e

Ta o

, o

r co

sm ic

o

rd e r;

w it

h in

it

, o

p p

o si

n g

fo

rc e s—

li ke

y in

a n

d y

a n

g —

e x is

t a n

d c

o m

p e te

.

• F ig

u re

s:

C o

n fu

ci u

s,

M e n

ci u

s, a

n d

X

u n

zi ;

L a o

zi ,

th e f

o u

n d

e r

o f

D a o

is m

; o

n e ’s

o

w n

a n

ce st

o rs

— C

h in

e se

r e li

g io

n

is m

o re

a b

o u

t sh

a re

d r

it u

a l

p ra

ct ic

e t

h a n

a n

y k

e y fi

g u

re s.

• S

y m

b o

ls :

th e

y in

/y a n

g s

y m

b o

l [

; v a ri

o u

s fo

o d

s (e

.g .

th e m

a n

d a ri

n

o ra

n g

e )

a n

d

co lo

u rs

( e .g

. re

d ,

g o

ld )

• C

h in

e se

re

li g

io n

s a re

t h

e

le a st

t e m

p le

- b

o u

n d

o f

a ll

. •

O b

se rv

a n

ce s:

C

o n

fu ci

u s’

s b

ir th

d a y ;

C h

in e se

N e w

Y

e a r;

A u

tu m

n

M o

o n

F e st

iv a l

• A

f o

lk r

e li

g io

n

a m

o n

g C

h in

e se

p

e o

p le

, it

b le

n d

s v a ri

o u

s b

e li

e fs

a n

d p

ra ct

ic e

s su

ch

a s

C o

n fu

ci a n

is m

, a n

ce st

o r

w o

rs h

ip ,

C h

in e se

m e d

ic in

e ,

a n

d r

it u

a l

p h

y si

ca l

p ra

ct ic

e s

li ke

t a

i- ch

i a n

d e

v e n

m

a rt

ia l

a rt

s. •

T h

er e

is D

ao , “

th e

W ay

”, a

n a

ll- p

er va

si ve

c o

sm ic

o

rd er

, w it

h in

w h

ic h

o

p p

o si

n g

e le

m en

ts —

yi n

a n

d y

an g

— ex

is t.

B

ri n

g in

g o

n es

el f

in to

h

ar m

o n

y w

it h

D ao

is

th e

m o

st im

p o

rt an

t th

in g

. •

C o

n fu

ci u

s w

a s

d e e p

ly o

p ti

m is

ti c

a n

d u

rg e d

e x ce

ll e n

ce b

o th

i n

kn

o w

le d

g e /c

a re

e r

a n

d m

o ra

ll y

/s o

ci a

ll y.

• Q

i (o

r ch

i) i

s th

e

li fe

f o

rc e o

f th

e

u n

iv e rs

e :

o n

e m

u st

h

a v e i

t fl

o w

in g

th

ro u

g h

o n

e se

lf

a p

p ro

p ri

a te

ly .

• In

d iv

id u

a l

e x ce

ll e n

ce a

n d

so

ci a l

h a rm

o n

y

a re

k e y v

a lu

e s.

T h

o u

g h

t h

e re

is

a c

o n

ce p

t o

f H

e a

v e

n (

“ T

’i e

n ”

),

m o

st o

f th

is b

e li e

f sy

st e

m i s

fo cu

se d

o

n l iv

in g

w e

ll a

n d

su

cc e

ss fu

ll y

i n

th

is l if

e a

n d

t h

is

w o

rl d

.

co n

ti n

u e d

90 Part I Setting the World Stage

Ta b

le 3

.2 K ey

E le

m en

ts o

f H in

d u is

m , C h in

es e

Fo lk

R el

ig io

n s,

a n d B

u d d h is

m (

co n

ti n

u ed

)

R el

ig io

n In

te rn

al

D iv

is io

ns Sa

cr ed

B oo

k &

C

on ce

pt o

f G od

K ey

F ig

ur es

&

Sy m

bo ls

R el

ig io

us T

em pl

es

& O

bs er

va nc

es C

or e

C on

ce pt

s &

B as

ic D

ut ie

s A

ft er

lif e?

B u

d d

h is

m T

h e ra

v a d

a

v s

M a h

a y a n

a

v s

V a jr

a y a n

a .

T h

e ra

v a d

a

B u

d d

h is

m i s

co n

se rv

a ti

v e ,

a n

d i s

d o

m in

a n

t in

S ri

L a n

ka

a n

d S

o u

th e a st

A

si a ; M

a h

a y a n

a

B u

d d

h is

m (

o r

“ Z

e n

” B

u d

d h

is m

) is

t y p

ic a ll y

co n

ce rn

e d

w it

h

sp ir

it u

a l p

ra ct

ic e

a n

d i s

d o

m in

a n

t in

E a st

A si

a

a n

d V

ie tn

a m

; V

a jr

a y a n

a

B u

d d

h is

m ,

d o

m in

a n

t in

Ti

b e t

a n

d t

h e

H im

a la

y a s,

e m

p h

a si

ze s

ri tu

a l.

• B

o o

k: Z

e n

h

a s

n o

b o

o k;

h

o w

e v e r,

T

h e ra

v a

d a

d o

e s

h a v e t

h e

Tr ip

it a ka

( “ T

h re

e

B a sk

e ts

” ):

v in

a y a ( m

o n

a st

ic

ru le

s) , su

tr a s

(d is

co u

rs e s)

, a n

d a

b h

id h

a rm

a

(t re

a ti

se s)

. V

a jr

a y a

n a h

a s

th e K

a n

ju r

(t a n

tr ic

t e x ts

) a n

d T

a n

ju r

(c o

m m

e n

ta ri

e s)

. •

G o

d : Z

e n

i s

o ft

e n

c a

ll e d

“ a th

e is

ti c”

. T

h e ra

v a

d a

b e li e v e

s in

a n

u

n d

e rl

y in

g

im p

e rs

o n

a l

co sm

ic o

rd e r.

• F ig

u re

s:

th e B

u d

d h

a

(S id

d h

a rt

a

G a u

ta m

a );

m

o n

ks a

n d

la

m a s,

e sp

. th

e

D a la

i L a m

a •

S y m

b o

ls :

S ta

tu e s

o f

th e

B u

d d

h a ;

th e

lo tu

s fl

o w

e r;

th

e B

o d

h i

Tr e e ;

“ Z

e n

g a rd

e n

s, ”

d is

ti n

ct iv

e r

o ck

g

a rd

e n

s fo

u n

d

a t

B u

d d

h is

t te

m p

le s;

t h

e

m a n

d a la

; th

e

d is

ti n

ct iv

e

sa ff

ro n

r o

b e s

w o

rn b

y

B u

d d

h is

t m

o n

ks .

• Te

m p

le s:

m a n

y

m o

n a st

e ri

e s

a n

d

te m

p le

s •

O b

se rv

a n

ce s:

B

u d

d h

a ’s

b

ir th

d a y ;

th e

d a y B

u d

d h

a

a ch

ie v e d

e n

li g

h te

n m

e n

t;

so m

e ti

m e s

b le

n d

e d

i n

w it

h

a b

o v e C

h in

e se

o

r H

in d

u

fe st

iv a ls

.

• A

r e li

g io

n o

p e

n

to a

ll ,

B u

d d

h is

m

b e g

a n

w it

h t

h e

B

u d

d h

a a

ch ie

v in

g

e n

li g

h te

n m

e n

t.

F o

rm e rl

y a

r ic

h

p ri

n ce

, th

e B

u d

d h

a

g a v e u

p h

is

p ri

v il

e g

e s

to h

e lp

th

e n

e e d

y, f

o u

n d

m

o n

a st

e ri

e s,

a n

d

a ll

e v ia

te s

u ff

e ri

n g

. H

e i

s n

o t

v e n

e ra

te d

a s

a g

o d

b u

t a

s a

fu

ll y e

n li

g h

te n

e d

h

u m

a n

. •

T h

e “

T h

re e

C h

a ra

ct e ri

st ic

s o

f E

x is

te n

ce ”

a re

s u

ff e ri

n g

, im

p e rm

a n

e n

ce , a

n d

n

o -s

e lf

. •

T h

e p

a th

t o

e n

li g

h te

n m

e n

t is

to

u n

d e rs

ta n

d a

n d

a ll

e v ia

te s

u ff

e ri

n g

, th

ro u

g h

w is

d o

m ,

co m

p a ss

io n

, a ss

is ta

n ce

, a

n d

m

e d

it a ti

o n

. E

m p

h a si

s o

n

co n

tr o

l o

f th

e s

e lf

, le

tt in

g g

o o

f o

n e

’s

e g

o ,

a n

d e

v e

n (

w it

h

Z e n

) e li

m in

a ti

n g

th

e s

e lf

, a s

it m

e lt

s in

to o

n e n

e ss

w it

h

th e u

n iv

e rs

e .

A s

in H

in d

u is

m , a

fa

il u

re t

o a

ch ie

v e

e

n li g

h te

n m

e n

t re

su lt

s in

r e

b ir

th

u n

ti l o

n e

d o

e s

a ch

ie v

e t

h is

. N

ir v

a n

a i s

th e

st

a te

o f

b li ss

a

ss o

ci a

te d

w

it h

fi n

a l

e n

li g

h te

n m

e n

t.

S o

u rc

e : S

e e n

o te

3 2 .

913 Comparative Culture

Case Study: Tibet and China In the late 1950s, the government of Tibet was overthrown, in war, by the government of China. Tibet was incorporated into China and is now administered as the Tibetan Autonomous Region. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, China experienced a period of political upheaval known as the Cultural Revolution. Th is entailed the sys- tematic killing, exiling, and imprisoning of thousands—perhaps millions—of people, especially intellectuals and cultural and religious fi gures who did not perfectly fall in line with the atheist ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. As part of this process, nearly all of Tibet’s Buddhist monasteries were destroyed, its monks killed or impris- oned. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, some monks have returned (though the overall number of monks remains strictly controlled), and Buddhist monasteries have begun to resume some of the central cultural functions they used to perform, such as ensuring the protection and survival of the Tibetan language.33

Tibet’s political status—its very future, in fact—remains controversial. Th e gov- ernment position in China may be summarized as follows:

• Tibet is a part of China. • A number of Tibetan fi gures are separatists who seek to destabilize China and

achieve independence for Tibet. (A separatist aspires to have his or her nation released from its existing political arrangements so that it may become an inde- pendent nation-state.)

A Chinese tourist takes a photo of Tibetan monks prostrating in front of the Potala palace in Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China. Most jurisdictions welcome tourism for its benefi ts to the local economy. Is tourism good for Lhasa? (© GYI NSEA/iStockphoto)

92 Part I Setting the World Stage

• Tibet enjoys considerable autonomy (i.e. political self-rule) already. • Th e harsh measures of the Cultural Revolution are long over—Tibetans have

nothing to fear from China. • China has brought much development assistance into the poor, mountainous

area of Tibet. Th e counter-perspective, of some Tibetans, is that the so-called “autonomy” is merely a title and not a reality; the clampdown on Tibetan Buddhism and broader Tibetan culture (in favour of Chinese culture) remains, and there are allegations that China has encouraged the settlement of non-Tibetans inside Tibet in order to dilute the pop- ulation of Tibetans and strengthen China’s hold on the region. Plus, many Tibetans dispute China’s claims over Tibetan territory to begin with. Th ird-party observers, like the international human rights NGO Amnesty International, note that it is very diffi cult for outsiders to get into Tibet to verify any of these perspectives, and perhaps that fact alone reveals lingering controversies and diffi culties. All sides do admit that there was a major uprising in 2008, followed by a violent government crackdown. For its part, the government of China is very thin-skinned when foreign countries, such as Canada and the US, welcome the Dalai Lama—the head of Tibetan Buddhism and, prior to the establishment of Chinese rule, Tibet’s ruler—into their nations, and extend him high-level meetings with senior government offi cials.34

New Media and the Global “Digital Divide”

I don’t need to tell you the importance of new media in our lives nowadays. We get up in the morning and, almost immediately, check our cellphone or smartphone for messages. We turn on the computer to scan the latest news headlines and celebrity gossip, access our multiple e-mail accounts, and check up on both friends and “frenemies” on Facebook. We send out texts and tweets, and most of us have our own blogs and/or websites to maintain. Texting is actually changing the way we talk and spell, and even adding new vocabulary to our languages. We rely on these devices and technologies in so many ways throughout our day: GPS for driving to work or to school; iPod for music, to kill the boredom while doing so; laptop with WiFi, just to be able to function at school or work at all; Internet for shopping and research of all kinds, not to mention music, TV, YouTube, and other forms of entertain- ment; social media for our social lives; and the alarm on the smartphone to wake us up in the morning, to start the cycle over again.

Yet the reality is that this speaks to life only in the developed world. It is estimated that 88 per cent of all Internet users reside in the developed Western world, or Global North, which, you’ll recall from Chapter 1, is home to just a quarter of the world’s total population. The latest statistics put

Studies in Technology

933 Comparative Culture

global Internet access at around 2 billion people.35 While this is up (dramati- cally) from only 1 million Internet users as recently as 1992, that 2 billion fi gure nevertheless amounts to less than one-third of the world’s popula- tion. Putting these facts together, we arrive at the harsh conclusion that somewhere between 66 and 75 per cent of all of humans—and maybe more—do not have access to the Internet and all the latest devices that rely on it.36 Can you imagine how much their lives differ from yours on a daily basis, and could you imagine your own life bereft of the benefi ts of such technologies?

The world of Internet-driven gadgets and media is, overwhelmingly, the preserve of upper-income, highly educated, and urban citizens of the demo- cratic countries of the developed West. Some experts, such as Pippa Norris, have thus concluded that there’s an emerging global “digital divide” that mirrors, and adds yet another dimension to, the North–South divide that we examined in Chapter 1. The global digital divide, Norris writes, refers to “rapidly growing disparities in the utilization, expenditure, and availability of technology between the developed and developing worlds.”37 And yet the potential for the Internet to aid the Global South is immense, through:

• online training and education programs • e-medicine (where people use the Internet to access health information

and to consult directly with medical professionals from remote locales) • e-government (where people can access government data needed to

apply for government jobs, report crimes, search land ownership titles, etc.)

• international trade, by helping buyers and sellers fi nd each other much more easily and cheaply than through face-to-face interactions

• accessible fi nancial information, on daily banking for instance, to help people earn more and gain wealth

• weather information, which is vital for agriculture • greater communication in general, to help coordinate behaviour and

solve common problems • all the potential daily lifestyle benefi ts mentioned above, which we

now take for granted.38

But there are very substantial obstacles to narrowing the digital divide:

• the costs of building infrastructure, especially in those parts of the developing world that lack basic electrical service

• educational and literacy realities: to benefi t from these technologies, one needs to be able to read and type, and yet illiteracy is a major educational challenge in the Global South

• political and cultural realities: some countries—China, Iran, North Korea, Syria—block the Internet, preventing the free fl ow of information.

There have been serious attempts at bridging this gap. For example, an NGO called One Laptop Per Child is devoted to recycling older computers from the developed world and supplying them to users in the developing world

94 Part I Setting the World Stage

Conclusion

Culture—as a way of life—permeates all aspects of international aff airs and global studies. We’ve examined culture already, in chapters 1 and 2, and so here in Chapter 3 it fell to us to examine some drivers of culture we had not yet explored. Th ese included political ideology and the structure of the state, religion, and the advent and impact of new media technologies. We looked at case studies, from all around the world, to see how ideologies, religions, and technologies can—in action—produce both progress and regress, both creativity and confl ict.

to ease electronic access for the global poor. Norris suggests—vividly—that, at minimum, we now need to think about remote, underdeveloped villages requiring a village computer to serve the needs of the local people just as readily, and vitally, as the village water well. (Much more on helping the Global South will said in Chapter 11, on aid and development.)39

Review Questions

1. Our opening epigraph came from Camus. Another deep thought he has about culture is this: “Culture: Th e cry of men in the face of their destiny.” Explain what he means by this.

2. In terms of political ideology, if you were forced to choose only one, would you say you were more of a conservative, liberal, or socialist in orientation? Why? (Base your answer on the classical defi nitions of these terms, not on your preference for any political party that might bear one of these terms in its name.) How does your political ideology aff ect your attitudes towards other people, and other countries, that have diff erent ideologies? Is it truly possible for us all to get along, in spite of our cultural diff erences?

3. Off er explanations as to why and how welfare liberalism has come to be the dominant doctrine in the developed West. Can you see any serious chal- lenges to it in the foreseeable future? For example, some think that sizable immigration to the West of people from other cultures will undermine and harm the West’s welfare liberal values. Do you agree, or do you think that such arguments are instances of fear-mongering and scapegoating?

4. Off er explanations for why poorer, more southern countries tend to be much more religious than richer, more northern ones. How is this fact of signifi - cance to international relations? Why is the US such an exception to this rule?

5. Are you religious? Why, or why not? What role, if any, do you think religion should play in culture in general, and in international aff airs in particular? Has religion, historically, been more positive or negative in its eff ects?

6. If you had to choose to be a member of a world religion other than your own, which one would you choose and why? Refer to tables 3.1 and 3.2 as needed.

953 Comparative Culture

Notes 1. A. Camus, Th e Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage, 1991), p. 42. 2. T. Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq (Toronto: Pearson, 2003); D. Vandewalle, A History of

Modern Libya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 3. L. Baradat, Political Ideologies: Th eir Origins and Impact (New York: Prentice Hall, 10th edn, 2008). 4. J. Muller, Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 5. Muller, ibid. 6. W.R. Polk, Understanding Iran (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

7. What impact does the Arab–Israeli confl ict have on the lives of the people who live in the region? And the rest of the world, more broadly? (Consider, for example, Canadian and American foreign policy decisions, and the West’s oil interests in the region.) Do you think a solution is possible?

8. Find out what you can about the confl ict between Tibet and China. Chart the extent to which this is (a) a political confl ict, between nations; (b) a reli- gious confl ict, between Buddhists and atheists; and (c) a cultural confl ict, between Tibetan culture and Chinese culture.

9. Can you imagine your life without new media devices? What do they add to your life? Do they detract from your life, as well? Would you choose to be free of them, if you could? How much of your personal culture, and the culture of your friends and family, relies on new technology?

10. Read the benefi ts of trying to extend technology to the Global South, and the challenges of trying to do so at the same time. Can you think of oth- ers, pro or con, not listed? Research “technology transfer” NGOs, like One Laptop Per Child, and read about innovative and inspiring ways people are trying to make a positive diff erence in the world.

Websites for Further Research

Oxford University’s Centre for Political Ideologies http://cpi.politics.ox.ac.uk – about political ideas Religion Facts www.religionfacts.com – especially for factual questions Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance www.religioustolerance.org – on the tenets of diff erent religions Council for Secular Humanism www.secularhumanism.org – on the tenets of secular humanism Davis Fougler’s “Seven Bridges Over the Global Digital Divide” http://evolutionarymedia.com/papers/digitalDivide.htm

96 Part I Setting the World Stage

7. Polk, ibid. 8. Th is quote is a famous one from Mao Zedong’s “Little Red Book.” Mao was not a classical liberal

but, rather, the brutal communist dictator of China from 1949 until 1976. Still, the quote as stated captures the liberal spirit.

9. J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford World Classics, 2006); R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

10. W. Barney, A Companion to 19th Century America (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 11. L. Gould, Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans (New York: Random House, 2003). 12. K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Classics, 1993). 13. M. Newman, Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 14. M. Harrington, Socialism: Past and Future (London: Arcade, 2011). 15. R. Pipes, Communism: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2003). 16. J. Rawls, A Th eory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 17. J. Witcover, Party of the People: A History of Th e Democrats (New York: Random House, 2003). 18. R. Bothwell, Th e Penguin History of Canada (Toronto: Penguin, 2006). 19. K. McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State (New York: Praeger, 2nd edn, 1988); D. Gladstone, Th e

20th Century Welfare State (London: Palgrave, 1999). 20. H. Smith, Th e World’s Religions (New York: Harper, 2009). 21. M. Warner, et al., eds, Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 2010). 22. L. Cody & E. Hurd, eds, Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (London: Palgrave Macmillan,

2010). 23. R.W. Hood, Th e Psychology of Religion (London: Th e Guilford Press, 4th edn, 2009). 24. C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 25. M. Osborne, One World, Many Religions (Berlin: DK, 2006). 26. A. Sharma, Our Religions (New York: Harper, 1994). 27. M. Coogan, Th e Illustrated Guide to the World’s Religions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 28. Pew Research Center: www.PewResearch.org (see especially the Pew Forum on Religion and

Public Life, and the Pew Global Attitudes Survey). 29. Smith, Th e World’s Religions (op. cit., note 20). 30. Content for this chart has been drawn from the sources listed in notes 20–22 and 25–27 above,

as well as W.G Oxtoby & A. Hussain, eds, World Religions: Western Traditions (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2011).

31. Sources for this case study are: J. Gelvin, Th e Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2011); K. Schulze, Th e Arab–Israeli Confl ict (London: Longman, 2nd edn, 2008); J. Gelvin, Th e Israel–Palestinian Confl ict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and W. Laqueur & B. Rubin, eds, Th e Israel–Arab Reader (New York, 7th edn: Penguin, 2008).

32. Content for this chart has been drawn from the sources listed in Notes 20–22 and 25–27 above, as well as W.G. Oxtoby & R.C. Amore, eds, World Religions: Eastern Traditions (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2010).

33. P. Clark, Th e Chinese Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 34. S. van Schaik, Tibet: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011). 35. J. Margolis, Stuck in the Shallow End (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010). 36. J. Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); R. Stross, Planet Google

(New York: Free Press, 2008). 37. P. Norris, Digital Divide? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 11. 38. M. Al-Fahad, Bridging the Global Digital Divide (Berlin: VDM Verlag, 2008). 39. Norris, Digital Divide? (op. cit., note 37), p. 34; J. James, Informational Technology and

Development (New York: Routledge, 2004).

Core Dynamics: Nation versus WorldII

Foreign Policy and International Politics4 “Politics is the art of the possible.” –Otto von Bismarck, (1815–1898)

First Chancellor of Germany1

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all the bolded key terms and concepts

 know how foreign policy experts see power, in both its hard and soft forms

 explain how countries differ based on the kinds of international power they have, and offer contemporary examples of each different kind

 discuss whether the US is a rising or a declining power, and offer views on what counts as evidence for such a debate, and what consequences there are for the rest of the world

 grasp thoroughly the difference between realism and idealism in foreign policy, and the potential for a middle-road, blended approach that balances the two

 understand the four fundamental tools of foreign policy, and offer examples of each

 refl ect on the accuracy of conventional wisdom regarding Canadian and US foreign policy

 come to see how “Can–Am relations” are so successful, and what each country aims for, and offers, regarding the so-called “best foreign policy relationship in the world.”

Introduction

“Policy,” generally speaking, comes from the ancient Greek word polis, meaning “commu- nity.” Policy can thus be understood as how a community should be run, and why. Th ere’s a diff erence between domestic policy and foreign policy. Domestic policy concerns the way one’s national community is or should be governed, whereas foreign policy concerns the way one’s country does or should relate to other countries, and their national governments, around the world. Of special concern in foreign policy, of course, is how one should best relate to one’s neighbouring countries, as well as, more generally, to one’s friends (allies) and enemies (opponents) around the world.

In this chapter, we will defi ne power, understand diff erent kinds of power, and then consider both the general goals and specifi c tools of foreign policy. We’ll fi nish by examin- ing in detail the foreign policy relationship between Canada and the United States.

994 Foreign Policy and International Politics

The Powers

Countries are oft en categorized on the basis of power, which is in general terms the ability of a country to get what it wants. As noted in this book’s introduction, a distinction is made between “hard” and “soft ” power.2 Hard power boils down to “bucks and bullets”—in other words, economic wealth and military capability. According to the UN Statistics Division, the 10 largest national economies in the world, as of 2010, are thought to be:

1. United States 6. Britain 2. China 7. Russia 3. Japan 8. France 4. India 9. Brazil 5. Germany 10. Italy.

Note that these are national rankings. Excluded here is the size of the economy of the European Union, or EU, as a whole, which is thought to be either equal to or larger than that of the US. More on the EU below, and in the next chapter. Also note that fi gures for China are somewhat speculative, as the Chinese government is the sole source for them, and (a) this government is neither public nor democratic in how it handles informa- tion, and (b) it may have a vested interest in exaggerating these fi gures. Clearly, China is a major, and growing, economic power but to which exact degree is another question.3

We’ll give military capability a closer look in chapters 7 and 8, which deal with war. Military strength is based on a complex set of factors, including war-readiness, military spending, and both the quality and quantity of weaponry and soldiery. It is commonly understood that the United States is the world’s dominant military power, but then consen- sus breaks down aft er that. Th e other countries most frequently mentioned (in alphabetical order) include Britain, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.4

Soft power, in contrast to hard power, refers to one’s ability to get others to think the way one does. So, cultural infl uence and the impact of one’s culture and values around the world are crucial here. Th ink, for example, of the power of Hollywood, or American televi- sion, news, and Internet content generally. Th ink also of the spread of the English, French, and Spanish languages well beyond the borders of their comparatively small home coun- tries, and so on. Now, it is quite controversial to rank countries based on their imagined degree of soft power, but the ones just mentioned now would, I think, rank on anyone’s top 10 list. Figure 4.1 represents the continuum of power in international life.

Great Powers

Middle Powers

Small Powers

Rogue Regimes

Failed States

Figure 4.1 The Continuum of International Power

100 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

Great Powers

Th e great powers are those countries with the richest economies and the largest armed forces. Th eir decisions oft en have a global impact. Th e great powers would include the US, Britain, China, France, and Russia, which happen to be the fi ve permanent members of the UN Security Council, tasked with maintaining peace and stability around the globe. (More on the UN next chapter.) Other countries may come close, too, such as Germany and Japan. Increasingly, in certain respects, even countries like India and Saudi Arabia may factor in: the latter for its massive oil wealth, the former for its rapid development, huge population size (including diaspora), popular Bollywood culture, and considerable military strength. But, in terms of both hard and soft power, and both military and economic capability, the fi rst fi ve are the most frequently mentioned as the truly great powers. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 1, it is an open question whether the United States deserves to be lumped into the same category here with, say, France. Many believe that the US deserves its own special category, above and beyond even the other great powers. Whether this special “category of one” should be called a worldwide empire or merely the global hegemon is, of course, something we’ve seen up for debate.5

Middle Powers

Middle powers, obviously, have a level of infl uence and capability in between that of the great and small powers. Typically, they are Northern/Western, developed, and quite wealthy societies, but they lack the population size, military force, cultural impact, and ambition to become great powers. Examples include Canada, Australia, and Sweden. (Some experts place Germany and Japan in this category, too, since these nations have deliberately restricted their use of military power abroad; others, however, argue that the sheer size of their economies renders them great powers.) Th e middle powers try to be active and good “international citizens,” picking and choosing projects and missions in which they can play a globally constructive role. Th ey tend to be like-minded and mutually supportive, unlike the great powers, which are oft en rivals and tend to butt heads on a range of issues. Th e middle powers are among the strongest and most enthusiastic supporters of global co-operation and such international institutions as the United Nations.6

Small Powers

Small powers can be either developed or developing, in either the North or the South, and they have only a small degree of impact on international decision-making and global life. Typically, their population, economies, and militaries are simply too tiny for them to exert much infl uence globally. Examples range from the Czech Republic in Europe to Chile in South America, and from the Caribbean islands to the various island nations in the South Pacifi c.

Rogue Regimes

Recently, some countries have come to be branded—controversially—as “rogue states” (or “outlaw nations”) by political scientists, government foreign ministers, and even the media. Rogue is an old-fashioned term for “scoundrel” or “rascal,” and it’s now sometimes used to characterize undisciplined, irresponsible, or unpredictable actions or actors. Th e

1014 Foreign Policy and International Politics

idea here is of a country that is a bad international citizen. It refuses to play well with its neighbours, and actively creates trouble and instability on an international scale. It breaks the rules, goes its own way, makes the world worse, and is diffi cult to rein in. Most simply, rogue regimes are trouble-makers. But note that the “trouble” can actually be very serious and dangerous. For example, some state governments support terrorist groups, either by giving them weapons or safe haven. Th at is considered rogue state activity and, obviously, makes the world worse off .

Th e states most frequently mentioned as rogues today include Iran and North Korea. Iran, currently, has a government committed to a quite extreme version of Islam; it sup- ports some terrorist groups, and it is openly pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. North Korea, which already has nuclear weapons, is seen as a rogue because its leadership is very insecure and unpredictable. Two days following the death of its long-time leader Kim Jong-il in December 2011, North Korea set off some of its short-range missiles in a planned test that set anxious neighbours in the region on edge. It also sells weapons to anyone willing to pay, including terrorist groups. From time to time, North Korea will take part in provocative actions, like testing a nuclear bomb or sinking a South Korean ship as it passes, supposedly, in North Korean waters. Th e international community then has to intercede in an eff ort to minimize the negative consequences. Oft en, the North Koreans have been satisfi ed with the added attention—making them feel like powerful players on the world stage—or else with cash (as North Korea is generally very poor, in spite of its advanced weaponry).7

Th e existence of rogue regimes presents the international community with the chal- lenge of how best to deal with these unpredictable states. Th e options typically come down to a choice between containment and confrontation. A containment strategy is an attempt to handle and control an outlaw country by fencing them in, to minimize the damage they can do. Th e containment strategy is used either as a fi rst attempt or else if the country in question is simply too strong or too dangerous to confront directly. In the case of North Korea, for example, the US has banded together with the countries neighbouring this rogue regime—South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia—and each of the partners takes its turn to negotiate with, pay off , and otherwise encircle the North Koreans with a set of mea- sures—economic, political—designed to keep the North Koreans under control. A number of classic positive incentives are used, including more power, more recognition, and more cash; the classic negative incentives include threats to withhold cash or to use military force. If and when these containment measures fail, then—depending on the danger in question—a strategy of direct confrontation can be considered. More will be said about such a forceful strategy towards the end of this chapter.

Failed States

Completing our continuum of kinds of country, consider at the end of the spectrum far- thest away from a great power the fi gure of a failed state. A failed state is one in which a government exists, but it can no longer eff ectively govern its people or provide for their basic needs. Th e state is imploding under its own weight. It fails to do the most basic things people expect from their state: keep the peace, protect them from foreign invasion, enforce law and order, and ensure the most basic social services are provided to the people. Based

102 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

on these criteria, Somalia is a failed state, and, in fact, many of the states in sub-Saharan Africa are on the verge of earning this designation.8

Failed states are oft en produced by wars, and they oft en cause wars, too, as groups fi ght over the state collapsing before their eyes. Th ey can also be caused by desperate poverty, by internal corruption, or, some fear increasingly, by widespread diseases and outbreaks of famine or illness. Th ey are a massive source of international concern and instability. For, failed states produce refugee fl ows across borders, as people, struggling to escape famine, poverty, or bloodshed, fl ee the failed state for other, safer countries. Failed states can create civil wars, as just noted, or they can become havens for terrorists and criminals (consider the waters off the Somali coast, notoriously aswarm with pirates eager to hijack and loot foreign vessels). Th e lack of social services in failed states engenders terrible poverty and disease that cry out for international aid and development assistance. More will be said about failed states in Chapter 11, on international development.9

Emerging Powers

China

Although it does not appear on our continuum of power, another state model is worth men- tioning before progressing: the emerging power. An emerging power is a country whose

economic and/or military stature is increasing, perhaps even to the point of rising from one category on our fi gure to the next. China is clearly the emerging power of the moment, not so much in terms of its military strength but certainly in terms of its spectacular economic growth over the past 25 years. China’s massive, and cheap, labour market is increasingly rendering it the hub of global manufacturing. Moreover, as the Chinese economy grows, the average Chinese consumer has more money to spend, with the result that sellers of goods are looking increasingly to sell into the vast Chinese market- place, the most populous in the world. China is also one of the world’s few saver–surplus countries. By contrast, almost all Western countries (notably

the US) have borrowed, owe money elsewhere, and are debtor nations. Historically, saver–sur- plus nations tend to go up in power whereas spender–debtor nations go down.10

Despite the country’s improving fi nancial situation, China has experienced the depar- ture of vast numbers of emigrants to other countries (representing a diaspora of Chinese). Th ese emigrants tend to retain close and favourable ties with their families in China. In many cases, Chinese emigrants will send a portion of the wages they earn abroad to par- ents, spouses, children, and other family members back home. Th is helps to strengthens China’s overall economic position.11

Some wonder, though, whether China’s economic strength will translate into either global military clout or international soft power. China is an interesting, inward-looking culture that has, historically, lacked the ambition to spread its values elsewhere, much less engage in conquest or multiple military engagements. With the important exceptions of operations in Nepal, Taiwan, and Tibet, China’s military experience tends to revolve around domestic confl icts, internal revolutions, and civil wars rather than wars with foreign powers. Th e last time China was involved in a war of the latter kind was during World War

Historically, saver– surplus nations tend to go up in power whereas spender– debtor nations go down.

1034 Foreign Policy and International Politics

II, aft er Japan had invaded the Chinese province of Manchuria in the early 1930s. Contrast this record with that of the other great powers—the US, Britain, France, and Russia—each of which has been involved in numerous large-scale military confl icts all around the globe since 1945. Other commentators argue that China’s non-democratic nature undermines its ability to spread its culture and values globally, as Western countries in particular tend to feel that undemocratic countries lack the moral authority and political legitimacy to teach the rest of the world much about anything, at least in the political realm.12

India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan are also emerging powers. Th ey were administered together as a single unit as part of the British Empire until 1947, when they were partitioned and made sepa- rate countries by the British as the Empire collapsed following the Second World War. Th e partition of the two countries was done largely on the basis of religion, as Pakistan is over- whelmingly Muslim whereas India has many religious traditions, the most prevalent of which is Hindu. India and Pakistan have been suspicious, and sometimes bitter, rivals ever since, owing both to religious tensions and to border disputes, especially in the territory of Kashmir, and this accounts, in part, for the fact that over the past 30 years, both countries have become nuclear powers and have grown large military forces. And they both rank among the world’s 10 most populous countries.

Pakistan has emerged as a country of real concern to the US in its so-called war on terror. Not only does Pakistan lack political stability, it is also home to many radical Islamic groups (including some that support terrorism), and the border it shares with Afghanistan is one of the world’s most dangerous places. Indeed, it was in Pakistan that Osama bin Laden was hiding at the time of his discovery and execution by American forces in 2011. (Sometimes, the “emerging power” designation is a dubious distinction.)13

India’s population is second only to China’s, but unlike China, India is a democracy, making it the world’s largest democracy by population. India’s economy is starting to grow substantially, and a large middle class of consumers is emerging. It is, as noted earlier, a nuclear power, and like China, it enjoys the fi nancial benefi ts of having a large diaspora of ethnic Indians around the world who have done well for themselves and are favourably disposed towards “the home country.” With nearly one-sixth the world’s population, India is clearly a country destined to rise in international importance. To the downside, though, India still suff ers from pockets of severe poverty, and it does not have a large territory (relative to its population). Its democracy can become quite chaotic, given its diversity and size. Extremist groups also exist in India, and the country is somewhat “hemmed in and surrounded” by such other major powers as Pakistan to the east, China to the west, and, to the far north, Russia (see Figure 4.2).14

Germany

Germany is also an emerging power. Th e largest nation, by both territory and population, in Europe, it also has Europe’s largest national economy, and the fourth-largest economy in the world (behind the US, China, and Japan) based on gross domestic product (GDP). Germany is also increasingly at the heart of decision-making in the European Union. Much more will be said about the EU—its history, function, and eff ects—in the next chapter. For

104 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

now, we note how the EU grew from early post-war economic agreements between France and Germany in the 1950s to its position today as a political and economic association of European states, from Portugal to Romania and from Sweden to Greece, whose com- bined population and overall economic size are by most measures comparable to (in fact, slightly greater than) those of the US. Th ere is a common currency (the euro), a central bank, a common passport, a shared legislature, and labour mobility rights throughout the eurozone. Germany’s central role in this relatively new, quite successful creation—both politically and economically—render it one of the powers to watch moving forward.15

Limits to Germany’s growing infl uence include: • its lack of military strength (which is deliberate, based on its history); • its relatively small territory compared with that of great powers like Russia, China,

and the US; • the continued heavy costs of reintegrating and rebuilding the former East Germany; • the new costs of helping pay down the debts of other EU partners (like Greece); and • the fact that it must contend with other EU members—notably Britain, France, and

Italy—who do not always see things the same way that Germany does.

RUSSIA

Turkey

Ukraine

Armenia Azerbaijan

Georgia

Kyrgyzstan

Tajikistan

Kuwait

Qatar

Bahrain

U. A. E.

Iraq

IRAN

Oman

Saudi Arabia

Afghanistan

PAKISTAN

INDIA

CHINA

Kazakhstan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Burma (Myanmar)

Thailand

Cambodia

Nepal Bhutan

Vietnam

Sri Lanka

Laos

Bangladesh

Brunei

Philippines

JAPAN

Mongolia South Korea

North Korea

Hong Kong

Taiwan

Figure 4.2 The Arc of Asia: A Major Emerging Power Bloc

1054 Foreign Policy and International Politics

Th ere is also, and always, Russia to contend with: bad blood has tainted their relationship since the two countries’ many gruesome wartime entanglements, especially those fought along the Eastern Front during World War II.16

Declining Powers

Russia

Speaking of Russia, if there is a category for emerging powers, we might also recognize a category of falling, or declining, powers. Th is would include nations whose impact and stature on the world stage are diminishing. Th e historical reality is that great powers rise and fall: the Egyptians rose and fell, and so did the Vikings; the Greeks and Romans rose and fell; the Portuguese and Spanish rose and fell; the Dutch and Belgians rose and fell; and even the British and French rose and fell (though they do still retain much power and infl uence). Russia, clearly, is not as infl uential and dominant as it was during the Cold War (1945–91).17

As we saw in Chapter 1, the Cold War was the multi-generational global showdown between the US and the USSR (i.e. the Soviet Union, which included Russia and several central Asian republics that are now independent). Th e United States and Russia were the two biggest winners of the Second World War (1939–45). However, they did not trust each other, and cham- pioned completely diff erent social systems: the US, that of free-market, or capitalist, democracy; and Russia, that of police-state, planned- or command-economy communism. Th e Cold War was a war, in that it was very much a struggle between these nations to see whose social system would triumph and survive, and whose would fail and collapse. But the war was cold, in that there never was a hot war exchange of live-fi re hostilities directly between the two powers.18

Th e US eventually won the Cold War, as Russia’s command economy could not out- produce America’s capitalist one, and Russia went broke trying to keep up with US military spending. As a result, in the 1990s, the Soviet Union broke apart, and Russia’s political, economic, and social systems collapsed and had to be reconstructed completely along more Western, free-market, democratic lines. Only recently has Russia achieved political and eco- nomic stability, but clearly it has nowhere near the international strength and infl uence it held when it rivalled the US as the other superpower during the Cold War.

Yet Russia cannot be counted out, by any means. It has almost the same population as the US and possesses the largest national territory in the world. With such a territory comes a massive wealth of natural resources, including oil and natural gas. Russia is still infl uential in central and eastern European politics and has one of the largest military forces in the world. Moreover, it retains the second-largest nuclear weapons arsenal, aft er the US. Russia will always have its sphere of infl uence, which stretches from Poland to China, and from the Arctic Ocean down towards Iran and India. It has clearly fallen from the loft y position it once held, but if it manages to grow its economy sustainably and to address some of its domestic social problems (such as crime), Russia will continue to be a world power for some time.19

America?

What about the Cold War’s other superpower? Is the United States, too, a declining power? Have its best days gone by already? Or is it, rather, an emerging power, now that its Cold War rival has been defeated?

The historical reality is that great powers rise and fall.

106 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

During the Cold War, it was said that the world was bipolar, with two powerful coun- tries, each dominating its separate sphere of infl uence, one in the West and one in the East. When the USSR collapsed in the 1990s, there was talk of a unipolar moment, a period where there was just one polar power, one centre of global political gravity, so to speak: the US. Where America had once been one of two superpowers, it had now become the one- and-only hyperpower, striding the planet like a global colossus, and you will recall, from Chapter 1, our debate regarding “American Empire.”

But there are those who think that the only direction for the US to go from here is . . . down. As rich and powerful as America is, it’s clear that countries like China, India, and Germany are getting richer, whereas it’s unclear whether the same can be said for the US, especially in light of the lingering eff ects of the global economic meltdown that began in 2008. America is one of the world’s biggest spender–debtor countries, and it gets away with this heavy habit of huge spending because countries like China and Japan are willing to lend it plenty of money by buying US government bonds and the like. Th e United States is also massively reliant on imports of foreign oil, especially from the Middle East, to fuel its economy and consumer lifestyle; indeed, the US now depends on these other countries and regions in ways that it never did before. Similarly, there’s no way that the US has the same degree of infl uence in Europe that it had aft er World War II and during the Cold War; the success of the European Union has largely driven out American infl uence in that region. Finally, some argue that American infrastructure, and its education and healthcare systems, are falling behind the average performance levels achieved elsewhere around the world, boding ill for its future achievement. Critics like Morris Berman have taken up the argument in bestselling books with titles like Why America Failed: Th e Roots of Imperial Decline and Dark Ages America: Th e Final Phase of Empire. Even more restrained experts, like Paul Kennedy, have stated that the long view of world history tells us that, just as America rose as a great power, so, too, it must eventually fall.20

The Goals of Foreign Policy in General

Any country’s foreign policy must address two fundamental issues: 1. What is the goal of its relations with each and any other country? 2. What are the means it should use to achieve that goal?

In terms of the basic goals of foreign policy, there is a classic, time-honoured split between realism and idealism.

Realism

Realism is the view that the objective of a country’s foreign policy should be to advance its own national interests. National interests are those things that benefi t or enhance the posi- tion of a country; they boil down to the ingredients of hard and soft power. Realism is like a form of national egoism or selfi shness: when it comes to dealing with the outside world, or the international community, the motto is, “look out for number one.” Do the best you can for your own society, especially in terms of national security and defence; growing the economy, population, and access to natural resources; and augmenting cultural and

1074 Foreign Policy and International Politics

political infl uence around the world. Political realism insists that, at minimum, a country must protect what it’s already got, and at most, a country should get as much as it can and, in fact (if it’s possible), try to re-make the world in its own image. Prominent realist thinkers include the Italian statesman Machiavelli and German-born international rela- tions theorist Hans Morgenthau. Prominent realist politicians include American diplomat Henry Kissinger and former US president Richard Nixon.21

Constrained versus Unconstrained Selfi shness

Realists don’t have to be as crude as they are, at times, made out to be. It all depends how you defi ne “egoistic” or “selfi sh.” Th ere is a diff erence between what David Gauthier calls “constrained maximization” and “unconstrained maximization.” To be an unconstrained maximizer (of your own pleasure, benefi t, and interest), you must always put your own interests at the forefront in a very obvious, unconcealed, aggressive way. Th ere’s no art to it at all: you just demand your way, again and again and again. But others are oft en turned off by unconstrained maximizers, and they retaliate with selfi sh, or uncooperative, behaviour of their own. Th is can actually decrease the ability of unconstrained maximizers to get what they want. So, clever realists oft en suggest—especially when it comes to foreign policy—that the best policy is that of constrained maximization, wherein one’s motives are still fundamentally selfi sh, but one hides one’s selfi shness behind a policy of negotia- tion, compromise, and reasonableness. One is more artful and tactful about the pursuit of one’s self-interest, on the grounds that “honey attracts more fl ies than vinegar.”22

The Assurance Problem

One of the most important concepts within the realist worldview is the “assurance prob- lem.” Th e assurance problem is this: fundamentally, countries cannot trust each other. Th ere are just too many diff erences between them, in terms of their worldviews, their interests and strategies, and their histories, experiences, and cultures. And there’s no eff ec- tive world government to help them align their policies. In the end, countries have no one to rely upon except themselves.

In this sense, the international arena is completely, and importantly, diff erent from the arena in well-ordered national societies like those of Canada or the US. Here in North America, we can (more or less) count on peace and order, civility and good government, on a mostly law-abiding populace, and maybe even a shared, roughly defi ned worldview. But, internationally, there just isn’t that kind of peace and order—much less a good, eff ec- tive, overarching global government—and there is no guarantee of good behaviour from others. Th us, there’s a huge trust (or assurance) problem in international life. Th e interna- tional world is just far more dangerous and unpredictable than life in the developed society we know.

So it is that realists conclude that the only smart foreign policy is a selfi sh foreign policy. Look out for yourself, since no one else will. Whether that selfi shness gets expressed in a constrained or unconstrained way will depend on one’s own power and the nature of the situation one is in. Typically, more powerful countries (like the US) are able to be more unconstrained in their foreign policy, whereas less powerful countries (like Canada) need to be more restrained in the pursuit of their national interests.23

108 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

Idealism

Idealism, by contrast, is the view that your goal as a country, when dealing with others, ought to be to do your part to make the world a better place. It’s like a form of national altruism or unselfi shness. When dealing with the outside world, use your resources and infl uence to improve the world: make it richer, happier, more secure, and so on. Be a good international citizen. Give a damn, so to speak, and act accordingly. Commonly, idealists tend to divide into those favouring small-scale, concrete, and gradual improvements and those attracted to larger-scale, sweeping, and more sudden shift s in international politics. Prominent idealist thinkers include German philosopher Immanuel Kant, while promi- nent idealist politicians include former US president Woodrow Wilson.24

National Security versus Human Security

A useful illustration of the contrast between realism and idealism is seen in the diff erence between the time-honoured concept of national security and the more recent concern with human security. Note, fi rst, the diff erence between “national” and “human.” Th e for- mer refers only to one country and group, and the self-centredness of it is clear. Th e latter has a totally universal, transnational implication: the concern is for all of humanity and not merely one subgroup within it. You can guess which is of greater interest to the realist and which falls within the purview of the idealist.

Moreover, how the realist and the idealist each perceives the important concept of “secu- rity” diff ers. For realists, national security is about strengthening the nation and providing

New screening measures implemented at airports since 9/11 have put personal security at odds with national security. When national security and human security confl ict, which should take precedence? Can you think of other cases where the two are not compatible? (© Richard Lautens /GetStock.com)

1094 Foreign Policy and International Politics

protection for it, and this is done mainly with a strong and capable military force. In fact, realists will oft en use the terms “national security” and “national defence” interchangeably. (Note, too, the revealing name of the huge domestic law enforcement and anti-terrorist agency in America, created aft er September 11: Th e Department of Homeland Security.) But, to have a strong military, you need a strong economy to pay for it, and this requires:

• a huge and smart, healthy, and productive population; • a pro-business culture; and • increasing opportunities for your companies to grow and trade abroad.

And so, national security boils down to having hard power: the ultimate sense of protec- tion and well-being for your country comes with being both rich and powerful. On a much smaller scale, national security is very much like the security of well-off North American neighbourhoods: those that are home to the city’s wealthier citizens tend to be well taken care of and protected from vandals and burglars, with alarm systems, security cameras, and even private guards standing sentinel at the entrance to gated communities.25

Th e concept of human security not only applies to a diff erent, or much broader and more inclusive, group of people; it also features a diff erent notion of security. Defenders of human security challenge the military implications of national security in particular. Th ey argue that having an abundance of well-armed police and soldiers, supported by high levels of “defence” spending, doesn’t really make people secure in their lives. What makes people secure, rather, is having the resources and opportunities to pursue the things they want. With human security, the focus is on things like:

• healthcare spending (hard to feel secure when you’re sick); • education spending (hard to feel secure when you’re illiterate, ignorant, or lacking in

promising career options); and • growing a healthy economy to provide for and support these programs.

Importantly, prosperity and economic strength are values shared by both realists and ide- alists—there is some common ground—but the diff erences, in terms of national versus international, and defence/security versus health/education/well-being, are clear. For the idealist, we all ought to do whatever we can to play our part in augmenting human security around the world, and not retreat—in a sad, even paranoid way—to our posh and pro- tected, gated communities, letting the others to fend for themselves as best they can.26

Idealist Multilateralism

Th e idealist’s response to the realist’s assurance problem is this: countries should take multilateral (“many-sided”), not unilateral (“one-sided”), approaches to international problems. In other words, instead of going it on your own, join in with others so that everyone can help each other. Support the UN and international law instead of taking mat- ters into your own hands. Th is co-operative approach, the idealist argues, is much better than constantly looking over your shoulder to see if anyone is about to undermine your interests and stick it to you. Th e point here is this: without some idealism, the world would never become a better place. Th at’s actually a nice, sober, realistic thought to keep in mind. Th e hope that idealists have to off er can generate the energy to improve things, whereas

110 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

the mistrust and cynicism of the realist can lead to apathy, an acceptance of a sub-optimal status quo, or even a paralyzing and defeatist sense that improvements will be impossible— why even bother trying?27

Common Ground Between the Caricatures

Th is big distinction between realism and idealism is oft en overplayed and exaggerated, with the two sides becoming caricatures of their actual positions. Idealists tend to portray realists as completely unprincipled, selfi sh, ruthless, jaded, and cynical. Machiavelli, for instance, was condemned as evil in his day and time (Renaissance Italy). Idealists oft en argue that if everyone were a realist, the world would be a dreadful place indeed. Realists, for their part, characterize idealists as utterly unrealistic, utopian do-gooders, even to the point of being naive and out of touch with the way the world really is. Realists oft en view themselves as having superior factual knowledge of the many issues in international life, and they view idealists as trying to impose simple, sweeping, theoretical beliefs onto a dif- fi cult and complex world. Th e mutual accusations essentially boil down to excess pessimism on the part of the realists and excess optimism on the part of the idealists.28

Th e good news is that there is, or can be, considerable common ground between the two doctrines:

• As noted, both respect the need for sustained and reliable economic growth as a fore- most value.

• Oft en, ideals and interests can run together. In other words, following ideals can oft en be in one’s best interests. Consider, as an example, occasions in your personal life when it is in your best interests to treat others in accord with the ideals of honesty and respect.

• For some peoples and nations, advancing their ideals is a fulfi llment of self-interested aims. In other words, they defi ne the realization of their ideals as part of their national interest. Th is has clearly been a theme of American history, to cite just one example.

• Th at some idealism is necessary for the world to improve at all is a neat, and quite possibly true, empirical claim. And, presumably, it is in one’s own selfi sh interests to live in a better world over time; no one, aft er all, wants to live and attempt to thrive in a dump. (Th is may seem obvious, but many realists—and I have known many—really seem so pessimistic as to shoot down any reform proposal as being impossible. At their worst, realists can seem more concerned with displaying their own understand- ing of the world than with actually improving it.)

• Enough common ground exists that, over the years, several experts, such as James Baker, have argued for a blended approach between these two clashing, classical doc- trines. Th ey have spoken of a “pragmatic idealism,” or even of a “visionary realism.” Th e idea is to take the best of both worlds and use it to better both oneself (or one’s nation) and the world at large. Keep the idealist’s hope and optimism, and the vision, energy, and willingness to co-operate, but blend it with the realist’s emphasis on factual knowledge and the prudent use of money and power (as necessary tools). In other words, in international life or foreign policy, be willing to co-operate and to draw on everyone’s best capacities, but also be aware that there can be some bad

1114 Foreign Policy and International Politics

apples and one must always be willing and able to protect oneself, and one’s people, from harm at the hands of these unscrupulous others.29

Th ese are fi ve solid points of compromise and wisdom. But a few quick, cautionary points must be made:

• States oft en pay far more lip service to their ideals than their interests. • As a result, hard-power interests tend to be a much better indicator of, and predictor

for, actual behaviour than spoken ideals. • Hypocrisy and weakness are very real. Oft en, peoples and states fail to live up to

their own ideals. Or, they say they believe in something, but they actually behave in a way that is inconsistent with those beliefs. We are rarely surprised when we predict people’s, and countries’, behaviour on the basis of what would best serve their selfi sh interests rather than their stated ideals.

The Tools of Foreign Policy

We’ve seen that a country can choose either realism or idealism—or a blended approach— as its overall foreign policy goal (Table 4.1 provides a summary of these goals). To achieve that goal, you need some tools, or means. Every traditional foreign policy textbook will tell you that there are three basic tools to use: diplomacy; sanctions; and force.30 I would add a fourth leg to the complete the table, as it were: economic incentives.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the attempt to persuade another country to adopt your view and act accordingly. Th is persuasion might involve talking, negotiating, lobbying, dealing, ratio- nal argument, or positive political incentives. Former British prime minister Winston Churchill once memorably summarized this approach as “jaw jaw” (as opposed to “war

Table 4.1 The Goals of Foreign Policy

REALISM IDEALISM MIXED/BLENDED

Unconstrained Constrained Small-scale (Gradual)

Large-scale (Sweeping)

Visionary realism

Pragmatic idealism

• selfi sh motives are pursued openly

• a strategy typical of a great power

• selfi sh motives are hidden behind negotiation, compromise, and reason- ableness

• a strategy typical of a small or middle power

• favours the pursuit of small, concrete changes in international politics (e.g. increasing amounts of foreign aid)

• favours large, sudden shifts in international politics (e.g. the formation of the UN)

• as defi ned on page 110, combining the best of both realism and idealism

112 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

war”). Talk it up, and talk it out. US president Barack Obama recently chimed in on the issue of diplomacy, off ering that “Not talking does not work.”31

Diplomacy goes on every day, and is one of the main functions of consulates and embassies around the world. (An embassy is the offi cial residence of a country’s ambas- sador, who is in charge of representing the interests of his or her home country in the host country. Technically, a foreign embassy is considered part of the soil of that country, and not the country in which it is located.) For example, Canada has a massive diplomatic presence in the United States, which is Canada’s largest trading partner and, as such, has the greatest eff ect of any country on the standard of living in Canada. So, the Canadian government has invested massively in a huge diplomatic staff , and not just at the main embassy in Washington. Canada has smaller diplomatic offi ces (called consulates) all around the United States, essentially in every city over a population of 500,000: this adds up to quite a few! Th e job of Canadian diplomats is to use persuasion, lobbying, and deal-making in representing Canada’s national interests to decision-makers in the United States, trying to persuade Americans to adopt Canada’s views on certain issues. Th ey also help Canadian businesses that are trying to negotiate deals with American businesses, and they assist Canadians in the US who run into problems—like an expired passport—and need help.32

But note, and realize, that diplomacy isn’t always positive and glowing in its nature, even though it’s considered a compliment when we call someone “diplomatic.” Diplomacy can involve behind-the-scenes threats or coercion, or even in-front-of-the-camera public criticism. Th ese things are quite common in international relations. Th e point is that it remains diplomacy as long as it is just words. When hostile actions start taking place, then we are moving out of the realm of diplomacy and towards the other tools of foreign policy.

Economic Incentives

Economic incentives involve the use of money as either a carrot (positive incentive) or a stick (negative incentive) in an eff ort to gain leverage on another country and infl uence them to do what you want. A “carrot” may be a thinly disguised bribe or a more indirect promise of fi nancial gain—for instance, by allowing a country to be able to sell its goods into your country when previously you had forbidden it to do so. Deals to allow for, or to increase, mutually profi table trade between countries are at the very top of the carrot pile. (Trade deals, especially free trade, will be discussed in depth in Chapter 6, on international trade and business.) “Sticks” may be wielded by imposing fi nes on a country, withholding a historically ongoing payment to that country (e.g. development assistance), refusing to trade with the country, or, in the biggest extreme, imposing economic sanctions.33

Sanctions

Imposing sanctions is a way of “stepping it up a notch” in terms of the hostility and dis- pleasure you are willing to show in your relations with another country. It shows that you are prepared to move away from positive incentives and mutually benefi cial deal-making towards negative incentives: threats, non-cooperation, punishment—deliberate actions that you believe will thwart the interests of the other country. Sanctions can vary in level, inten- sity, and eff ect. Small sanctions include mostly symbolic actions like withdrawing your ambassador from the other country (the “target country”), or even closing your embassy

1134 Foreign Policy and International Politics

entirely. Or you may expel the target country’s diplomats from your own country. You are clearly conveying your displeasure, and punishing that society, but only to a small, mainly symbolic extent and in a way that is very targeted towards the government of that society.

What about economic sanctions? Here we must distinguish between targeted and sweeping sanctions. Targeted sanctions are measures of punishment, non-cooperation, and interest-thwarting that are aimed at hurting only the elite decision-makers in the tar- get country. A recent example occurred in 1994, when the US slapped targeted sanctions on the leaders (and their families) of a military coup in Haiti. Th e coup leaders had their American bank accounts and assets frozen, which is to say that the leaders could not access or sell them—the US government made it illegal for any institution in the United States to let them do that. Th e coup leaders, and their families, were forbidden from entering the US, and in one case a daughter of one of the coup leaders, attending a US college, had her American visa revoked and was forcibly deported back to Haiti. Th e goal of such measures is clearly to punish, but to be discriminate in whom one is punishing. Th e punishing country is leaving the common people out of it, concentrating instead on sticking it to the elites (to the extent it can peaceably). Other subjects of targeted sanctions today include Iran and North Korea, who are being punished for their refusal to abandon programs to develop specialized and advanced nuclear weapons.34

Sweeping sanctions are measures of punishment and non-cooperation that either deliberately target or at least directly aff ect the majority of citizens in the target country. Classic examples include complete embargos on trade: the refusal to trade at all with any part or person of the target country. Th is tactic was fi rst used during the Napoleonic Wars of the very early 1800s, when England and France each prohibited any economic trade with the other country. Th ese embargos caused more harm to the punishing countries than to the target countries, by preventing much trade and thus decreasing wealth and income in both England and France. Th ey also created huge problems for third countries—notably the newly independent US—who were oft en, as a matter of practice, forced to trade either with England or with France, and who resented being pressured in that way. A more recent example is the United States’ longstanding embargo on trade with Cuba, to oppose Cuban communism and the regime of Fidel Castro. It began in 1962 and continues to this day, although there have been recent relaxations.35

Th e most recent example of such sweeping sanctions deals with those levelled by the international community—particularly the US and the UK—at Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Th ese sanctions were largely maintained aft er the end of the war in 1991, on grounds they were needed to ensure Iraq’s full and continuing compliance with the peace terms of that fi rst war, notably the weapons inspection process. During the 1990s they caused the erosion of many macroeconomic factors: the economy shrank; infant mortality substantially increased; illiteracy increased; rates of easily preventable illness substantially increased; life expectancy decreased; unemployment rates shot up; opportu- nity went down; and so on. As a result of the severe and sweeping eff ects of these sanctions, the US lost much international goodwill and co-operation in its dealings with Iraq, notably in 2003, when the US decided to invade the Middle Eastern country. Arab countries espe- cially refused to go along, even though a number of them—Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for instance—had strongly supported America’s fi rst war on Iraq in 1991.36

Th ere seems to be a pendulum when it comes to sweeping sanctions. Countries some- times view sanctions quite favourably, usually when relations with the target country are

114 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

quite hostile and sanctions seem like a better, more moderate alternative to war. But there is little historical evidence that sanctions work in changing the policy of the target country. For example, the sanctions on Iraq did not aff ect president Saddam Hussein’s grip on power or his attitude towards international weapons inspection. And they oft en dispropor- tionately hurt innocent civilians—a fact that is largely responsible for the negative attitude

The Wikileaks Scandal

Wikileaks was founded in 2006 as an international, not-for-profi t, new media organization. Its mission, as stated on its website, is to “assist people of all regions who wish to reveal unethical behaviour in their governments and corporations.” It does this by receiving and then publicly posting on the Internet original documents and videos showing questionable conduct by various people and institutions who, presumably, would not want their conduct publicized. One (in)famous video, now better known as “Collateral Murder,” shows gripping, controversial, real-time footage of a US attack heli- copter fi ring at Iraqi civilians in a van in 2007. More recently, between June and December 2010, Wikileaks made public over 100,000 offi cial, classifi ed documents pertaining to the US military and American diplomatic commu- nications around the world. These documents, apparently, were copied by a low-level US soldier, who had downloaded them onto his personal com- puter by deceptively labelling them as “Lady Gaga Videos.” He forwarded the documents to Wikileaks, which then published them. They contain very frank assessments of foreign leaders (and their policies) by US diplomats and ambassadors, as well as confi dential discussions of broader US foreign policy strategy. All together, these documents provide a very “warts-and- all,” behind-the-scenes look at how diplomats gather information, and how generals plot military strategy, and how both groups send their ideas back to their ruling governments to await debate and further instruction.

The leaks became a major international news story and caused a public sensation, prompting American secretary of state Hillary Clinton to warn that publicizing this classifi ed government material “put people’s lives in danger” and even “threatens national security.” Robert Gates, former US defence secretary, instead concluded pithily: “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Awkward? Yes. Consequences for US foreign policy? I think fairly modest.” (Apparently, a number of governments have responded to the leaks by pri- vately chiding the Americans, and saying: “You should see what we say about you, behind your back!”38)

Wikileaks originally swore to continue its unique publishing program, in spite of recent legal troubles for its Australian spokesman, Julian Assange, arising from events in his personal life. Recently, however, Wikileaks has found that lack of money will probably force it to shut down for good.39

Studies in Technology

1154 Foreign Policy and International Politics

towards them. As a result of the sad Iraq experience in the 1990s, it seems safe to say that, today, the international community defi nitely frowns upon the use of sweeping sanctions.37

Armed Force

When things have completely gotten out of hand, and perhaps when the other three tools of foreign policy have failed, countries sometimes resort to violent force in their relations with each other. Th is can be small-scale or pinpoint force (or even just “show of force,” like a military drill or exercise), or it can be a classic, out-and-out, direct, “hot,” shooting war. I shall leave everything about this complex, controversial option for the two forthcoming chapters on war and peace. Table 4.2 provides a summary of the tools of foreign policy we have examined.

Case Study: Can–Am Relations Th e following case study examines a unique foreign policy relationship. It is oft en said that, in terms of foreign policy, Canada and the United States enjoy the very best relationship: a model for the rest of the world to follow. How does this relationship work? Why does it work so well? Before examining the intricate workings of Can–Am relations, we’ll take a look at the overall foreign policy strategies of the two countries.

The Goals of the Neighbours: Overturning Conventional Wisdom

Th e conventional wisdom—the clichéd understanding—is that the United States has a realist foreign policy (of unconstrained maximization, no less), whereas Canada has an idealist foreign policy (of trying to be “a helpful fi xer,” striving to do what it can to improve the world). Th e US loves to fl ex its huge imperial muscles and to bully others into giving it what it wants, which oft en involves oil or access to new markets for American companies. For the US, it truly is all about maximizing its own hard and soft power. By contrast, Canada, according to common belief, invented peacekeeping and likes to help broker compromises between warring parties. Canada supports the UN vigorously and is a major cheerleader for international law (peacekeeping and

Table 4.2 The Tools of Foreign Policy

DIPLOMACY ECONOMIC

INCENTIVES SANCTIONS FORCE

Positive Negative Positive Negative Targeted Sweeping Pinpoint War

• praise • negotia-

tion

• threats • criticism

• cash • trade

opportu- nities

• withhold- ing cash

• cancel- ling trade

• affects the elites only

• affects the whole society

• targeted force

• wide- spread, direct, “hot” armed confl ict

116 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

international law are taken up next chapter). Canada strives to make positive con- tributions around the globe, providing international aid and assistance when called upon. In annual polls carried out by the BBC, Th e Economist, and other media agen- cies, Canada typically ranks near, or at, the very top of lists of countries with the best global reputation.40

All of this amounts to the common perception of the two countries’ foreign policy aims. It seems, though, that this conventional wisdom is overblown, and perhaps even quite mistaken. For the United States has been known to have deeply idealistic moments in its foreign policy history, moments in which it has tried very hard to improve the world and to bring better values to an oft en cynical, power-obsessed international arena. Woodrow Wilson, for example, brought America into the First World War with a promise that this was “a war on behalf of democracy,” indeed “the war to end all wars.” Th e US also created the League of Nations and the United Nations, the fi rst ever institutions of global governance (as we’ll see in greater detail next chapter). Th rough a program of fi nancial aid known as the Marshall Plan, the US single-handedly sponsored the redevelopment of Europe—including its arch- enemy Germany—aft er World War II, and extended additional grants and loans to several Asian countries, including Japan. Th is is the same approach the US has taken more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq (see Chapter 8 for a discussion of post-war reconstruction). Th e US gives more than any other country to international aid and development and has done more to promote the ideal of respecting human rights than any other major power.41

What is the signifi cance of having the world’s “longest undefended border”? (© Francis Vachon/Alamy)

1174 Foreign Policy and International Politics

Canada, for its part, is not quite so “lily white” as its idealistic foreign policy image would have us believe. As mentioned above, by far the greatest portion of its foreign pol- icy resources—actual cash and personnel—is spent not, say, on development funds for the Global South but, rather, on enhancing Canada’s power and infl uence with the United States, its main trading partner and source of an estimated 30 per cent of Canada’s annual GDP (gross domestic product, a measure of the size of a country’s national econ- omy). Th is is a selfi sh, realistic motive if ever there was one. Also, as oft en as Canada has been involved as a peacekeeper, it has been involved as a belligerent in war, aligning itself with one side (almost always the US, the UK, or France) aiming at military vic- tory, not just a compromise between the warring parties. For example, Canada fought both in Afghanistan and in Libya, as recently as late 2011, and not as a peacekeeper but as part of an alliance seeking to overthrow the ruling political regimes.42 And while Canada does donate to international aid and development, it is not an especially gener- ous donor, contributing nowhere close to the percentage of national wealth donated by, for example, the Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, Canada’s oil and gas resources, and its desire to sell these to anyone, has led it both to run afoul of international envi- ronmental and climate change treaties (e.g. Kyoto, which it has recently backed out of ) and to mute its criticism of China’s very fl awed human rights record, lest China back off buying not only the oil and gas but other valuable commodities that Canada has for sale and that China requires in huge quantities; examples include such natural resource inputs as nickel, coal, potash, platinum, silver, and wheat.43

Th e point is that in judging their respective foreign policy objectives, critics may rush to place the two countries at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. Closer inspection shows realistic aims behind apparently idealistic motives and vice versa. Th e discernment of motivations is diffi cult, and we should, in particular, beware of conventional understandings.

Dealing with Each Other

With some balance now restored to the clichéd views of the foreign policy goals of the North American neighbours, let’s now turn to consider how the two nations relate to each other and why they get along so well. We know already that some of this has to do with shared values, as both countries are welfare liberal societies belonging to Western civilization more broadly (as discussed in chapters 1 and 3). But what about the more narrow, neighbourly reasons for the good relations?

Canada’s Perspectives and Interests

Th e United States, as its biggest trading partner, is a massive source of Canada’s con- siderable wealth. As we’ve already noted, economists suggest that up to 30 per cent of Canada’s national wealth is directly tied to trade with America, and indirectly, of course, the number would be higher. Th e US is Canada’s only geographical neighbour, and it is far more powerful than Canada in terms of its military strength. So, a smart Canada wants an America that is friendly towards it, does not desire to conquer it, and will trade openly with it—and very regularly and profi tably. A huge amount of Canada’s behind- the-scenes diplomacy goes towards this goal, which some experts argue is actually the

118 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

largest, and most sensible, goal of Canadian foreign policy. To put it boldly and baldly: Canada’s true number one foreign policy goal is not being a co-operative idealist; it is, rather, having a close and profi table relationship with the United States. And note how Canada’s public preference for multilateralism and international co-operation actually

plays into its relations with the United States: aft er all, Canada wants its southern neighbour to behave in a predictable way, and not throw its enor- mous weight around unexpectedly or capriciously. It is in Canada’s interest that the US engage with multilateral institutions like the UN and behave in a clear, law-governed way. Th e last thing Canada wants is to wake up one morning to discover that its biggest trading partner has suddenly closed shop, sending its business elsewhere. Th us, whenever it can, Canada urges the US to engage in multilateral, co-operative, outward-looking diplomacy.

Canada’s fundamental foreign policy orientation can thus be seen, arguably, as one of pleasing and supporting the United States. But Canada doesn’t want to seem, to the rest of the world, like an American colony or the fi ft y-fi rst state, so Canada asserts its independence in ways that don’t

aff ect relations with America. For instance, it retains its membership in the British Commonwealth and joins La Francophonie (an international organization of French- speaking governments)—groups of which the US is not a member. Canada keeps up its historical and cultural links with the UK and France to give its society a diff erent fl avour and reputation. And Canada even asserts its independence in ways that might slightly irritate the US (such as by recognizing and dealing with Cuba), but not so much

Stephen Harper and Barack Obama, with few problems, lots of smiles, and mutual interests satisfi ed at the 2010 G20 conference in Toronto. (Offi cial White House Photo by Pete Souza)

Canada’s true number one foreign policy goal is not being a co-operative idealist but having a close and profi table relationship with the United States.

1194 Foreign Policy and International Politics

Greenland (Denmark)

Russia

U n i t e d S t a t e s

C a n a d a

M e x i c o The Bahamas

Cuba

Panama

El Salvador Guatemala

Belize

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Jamaica Haiti

Dom. Rep.

Puerto Rico

Venezuela

Colombia

Iceland

Alaska (US)

Figure 4.3 North America

North America features two very diff erent borders: the US–Canada border, celebrated as the world’s longest undefended border, and the US–Mexico border, criticized (mainly by Americans) for its lack of security and frequent breaches by illegal immigrants and drug smugglers, among others.

120 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

that the US would be moved to retaliate. Indeed, the US might see it as being in its own national self-interest to have Canada appear to be more independent than it really is, as the Canadian Insights box on page 121 explains. Ultimately, it’s all about Canada get- ting what it wants out of its closest—really, its only—neighbour. It all fi ts together, and points to a rather smart, yet utterly self-serving, policy of constrained maximization.44

America’s Perspectives and Interests

Th e US also has Canada as its largest trading partner, but this is not widely known in the US. Yet, while Canada is America’s largest trading partner in terms of total cash value, only 5 per cent of American wealth comes directly from Canada–US trade, and maybe not even quite that.45 So the United States is not as dependent on Canada as Canada is on the US. What America wants from Canada is, fi rst and foremost, free access to its (small) market and especially to its abundant natural resources, like food, water, oil, natural gas, timber, and metals and minerals. Th e 1989 Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was in both countries’ interests (more on this next chapter).

Americans also want co-operation, help, and support from Canada (small as it is), especially on international issues like the post-9/11 war on terror—issues where Americans feel their vital interests are at stake. (Canada’s vintage reply: “We’ll help you in Afghanistan [declaration of support] but not in Iraq [assertion of independence].”) In the wake of 9/11, the US also very much wants Canada to take action against ter- rorists and to take greater steps to secure the border so that terrorists cannot have easy access to the US homeland. And that is exactly what Canada has delivered.

So Canada gives Americans what they want: a nice, friendly, co-operative, peaceful, unproblematic neighbour with free markets, who is willing to sell its natu- ral resources in exchange for lots of money. To put it frankly, the United States has much bigger fi sh to fry than Canada; it is very happy to have such a “boring,” secure, peaceful, happy neighbour (unlike Mexico, with the big problems along that border regarding illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and the violence, corruption, poverty, and instability of Mexican society).46

Summary, and Looking Forward

So you can see why the foreign policy relations between Canada and America are the way they are today. Each country’s foreign policy is guided by its own self-interest. In the case of Can–Am relations, foreign policy is not merely what Bismarck called “the art of the possible” but the true satisfaction of mutual desires. Th is is not to deny that sometimes problems and frictions come up in the relationship: Canada’s refusal to go to war in Iraq was briefl y one, for example, and disputes over trade issues like soft - wood lumber arise from time to time (more on this last point in Chapter 6, on trade). But the problems tend not to be big, and oft en they just focus on individual issues that can be solved through negotiation. Larger issues might happen in the future—espe- cially over vital commodities like oil and water, and delineating Arctic sovereignty and who exactly owns what way up there in the Far North—but, for now, that remains somewhat speculative.

1214 Foreign Policy and International Politics

Conclusion

Foreign policy concerns how countries relate to each other. Th is chapter has surveyed both the goals and the tools of foreign policy, which countries use to try to advance their power and interests on the international stage. We have looked at the diff erent kinds of power, and how diff erent countries exemplify them and try to use them to gain leverage for themselves and over others. Finally, we took, as an extended case study, the foreign policy relationship between the United States and Canada, in all its forms, to see how the two countries relate, why they relate so well, and what each one is looking for and has to off er.

Do the Americans Want Canada To Be More Like Them?

We should elaborate on the observation that the United States actually wants Canada to seem independent to the international community.

American leaders know how much Canada has at stake in the “Can– Am” relationship, and they also know that (partly because of this) Canada tends to see the world, and shares many of the same values, as Americans do. The US knows that when push comes to shove, it can almost always count on Canada to be one of—if not the—strongest and closest allies to which to turn.

But the US also realizes that Canada’s support will mean much more to the rest of the world if Canada is seen as an independent nation with its own perspective and interests—that is, with close ties to Europe and a history of multilateral idealism, and with a more robust welfare state, higher secular- ism, and so on. For this reason, the Americans are quite comfortable with Canada’s taking a whole range of foreign policy decisions that publicly go against the views of the USA.

A small example of this phenomenon at play concerns the G8, the Group of Eight largest economies in the world. The G8 holds a diplomatic meeting every year to talk about common economic problems and possible solutions. The group once numbered less than eight, and was essentially the US surrounded by the wealthiest European states (namely, Britain, France and Germany). The Americans got sick of being criticized and told what to do—outnumbered, basically—by the Europeans, particularly the French. So the US insisted on expanding the group to include Canada, which is a coun- try that can speak to the French in their own language, has close historical ties to France, and yet sees things more from the American perspective. The expansion happened, much to Canada’s benefi t—to get to be part of such an exclusive club—but also, as here noted, to America’s as well.47

Canadian Insights

122 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

Review Questions

1. Explain the full meaning of Bismarck’s quote at chapter’s start. 2. A big issue right now in American foreign policy is how to contain, or

confront, Iran. Research (a) why this is so, and (b) which options you think are the best for the US at this point. What contributions can the US expect from other nations?

3. History shows that great powers rise and fall. Th ere has been some talk that the United States is declining as a great power, whereas both China and India are emerging. Do you think this is true? Why or why not? How might changes in global wealth and power over the next 50 years personally aff ect your life?

4. Consider all the countries mentioned in the section on “the powers.” Pick three of them, each from a diff erent category of power (e.g. one great power, one middle power, one rogue regime). Research what each one’s current major foreign policy goals are. Why do they have these goals, and are they likely to achieve them?

5. Referring to Table 4.1, are you more of a realist or an idealist? Why, and of what kind? What’s the importance of this distinction not only to foreign policy but to international studies more broadly?

6. Explain the diff erence between the concepts of national security and human security. Which do you think is most important to achieve, and why? What actually does make people feel secure? (Further, research why Canada has been one of the main promoters of the idea of human security around the world.)

7. Although there are only four foreign policy tools in general—outlined in Table 4.2—they can be used in a complex combination of ways. Refer back to question 2, and now refi ne your answer: what is America’s best combination of tools for dealing with Iran? Which set of tools is Iran likely to use in reply?

8. Research the Wikileaks scandal. Do you think publicizing the material was a valuable service in the name of democracy and challenging government secrecy? Or, rather, was it reckless, dangerous, even treasonous self-promo- tion at the expense of national security?

9. Do you agree that the conventional wisdom regarding US and Canadian foreign policy is oft en mistaken? Or do you think the clichés exist because they are, generally speaking, true? What consequences do such common beliefs (or self-identities) have for the formation of foreign policy itself, and for how citizens push their governments to act on the world stage?

10. It’s not all “sunshine and light” between America and Canada. Research some of the enduring, and likely future, problems and irritants in “the world’s best relationship.” How did, or will, they be solved? Or will they?

1234 Foreign Policy and International Politics

Notes 1. J. Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4. Th e quote was

uttered by Bismarck in 1867. 2. J. Nye, “Smart Power: In Search of the Balance between Hard and Soft Power,” Democracy (Fall

2006), pp. 21–46. 3. Material for this, and all subsequent “top 10” factual lists in this chapter, comes from the

United Nations Statistics Division, www.unstats.un.org/unsd, and the CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.

4. For all the very latest military rankings—e.g. weapons holdings—the most authoritative primary source is generally considered to be Jane’s Defence Weekly: www.janes-defence-weekly.com.

5. P. Kennedy, Th e Rise and Fall of Th e Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1989). 6. C. Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1984). 7. R. Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation (New York: St Martin’s, 1999). 8. A. Ghani & C. Lockhardt, Fixing Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 9. M. Bukovac, Failed States: Unstable Countries in the 21st Century (New York: Th e Rosen Group,

2011). 10. P. Khanna, Th e Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefi ning Global Competition in the

21st Century (New York: Random House, 2008). 11. C-B Tan, Routledge Handbook of Th e Chinese Diaspora (London: Routledge, 2012). 12. E. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and Th e Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 2011); H. Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011); M. Jaques, When China Rules the World (New York: Penguin, 2nd edn, 2009).

13. Y. Khan, Th e Great Partition: Th e Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); O. Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 3rd edn, 2009).

14. J. Keay, India: A History (London: Grove, 2011); E. Luce, In Spite of the Gods: Th e Rise of Modern India (London: Anchor, 2008).

15. P. Zelikow & C. Rice, Germany Unifi ed and Europe Transformed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

16. P. Wende, A History of Germany (London: Palgrave, 2006). 17. P. Kennedy, Th e Rise and Fall of Th e Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1989). 18. M. Walker, Th e Cold War: A History (New York: Henry Holt, 1995).

Websites for Further Research

Canada’s Department of Foreign Aff airs and International Trade www.international.gc.ca Th e US Department of State www.state.gov Th e US-based Council on Foreign Relations www.cfr.org – a think-tank on international issues Foreign Aff airs www.foreignaff airs.com – the CFR’s online journal Th e Canadian International Council www.onlinecic.org – a Canadian think-tank on foreign policy

124 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

19. M. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); P. Longworth, Russia: Th e Once and Future Empire (New York: St Martin’s, 2006).

20. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, passim; M. Berman, Dark Ages America: Th e Final Phase of Empire (New York: Norton, 2007); M. Berman, Why America Failed: Th e Roots of Imperial Decline (London: Wiley, 2011).

21. N. Machiavelli, Th e Prince (New York: Penguin Classics, 1998); H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 5th edn, 1970); H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Harper Collins, 1995).

22. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 23. K. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008). 24. I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. T. Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983); M.

Price, Th e Wilsonian Persuasion in American Foreign Policy (New York: Cambria, 2007). 25. J. Richards, A Guide to National Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 26. M. Kaldor, Human Security (London: Polity, 2007). 27. J. Muldoon, Th e New Dynamics of Multilateralism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2010). 28. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 29. James Baker, Th e Case for Pragmatic Idealism (Washington: US Library of Congress, 2008). 30. J. Goldstein & S. Whitworth, International Relations (Toronto: Pearson, Cdn edn, 2005). 31. W. Churchill, “Remarks,” during White House luncheon, 26 June 1954, from www.bartleby.com

& www.brainyquote.com; B. Obama, Dreams from My Father (New York: Crown, 2007), p. 40. 32. H. Waller, Ambassadors and Embassies (London: Siddharta, 2009). 33. R. Haas & M. O’Sullivan, eds, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2000). 34. G.C. Hufb auer, et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (London: PIIE, 3rd edn, 2009). 35. D. Drezner, Th e Sanctions Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 36. G. Simons, Th e Scourging of Iraq (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1996). 37. A. Pierce, “Just War Principles and Economic Sanctions”, Ethics and International Aff airs (1996),

99-113.3 38. M. Calabrei, “Wikileaks’ War on Secrecy,” Time (2 Dec. 2010), pp. 18–21. 39. Ibid. 40. See, for example, the CBC report on one of the more recent polls of this kind: www.cbc.ca/

news/canada/story/2011/03/06/globescan-canada-poll.html. Th e BBC, the CBC, Th e Economist magazine, and GlobeScan research partners are among the agencies that carry out such polls.

41. J. Granatstein & D. Oliver, Th e Oxford Companion to Canadian Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

42. D. Callahan, Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism and American Foreign Policy Aft er the Cold War (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

43. D. Bratt & C. Kukucha, eds, Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011); Y. Engler, Th e Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Fernwood, 2010).

44. C. Melakopides, Pragmatic Idealism: Canadian Foreign Policy 1945–1995 (Montreal: McGill– Queen’s University Press, 1998).

45. D. Morales & L. Medina, eds., U.S. Economic and Trade Relationships with Canada and Mexico (New York: Nova Science, 2011).

46. P. Lennox, At Home and Abroad: Th e Canada–US Relationship and Canada’s Place in the World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).

47. J.H. Th ompson & S.J. Randall, Canada and the United States (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008).

International Law and Organization5 “The security of which we speak is to be attained by

the development of international law through an international organization based on the principles of law and justice.”1 –Ludwig Quidde (1858–1941), winner of the 1927 Nobel Peace Prize

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all bolded key terms and concepts

 understand the general goal and function of international law, and its two core principles

 grasp the process whereby an international treaty becomes law, and know the different kinds of treaty, the pros and cons of each, and real-world exam- ples of each

 discuss the diffi culties involved in actually enforcing international law

 understand the United Nations—its history, purpose, parts, and functions, its strengths and weaknesses, and its overall role in global governance

 appreciate Canada’s role inventing UN peacekeeping, and the circumstances of the Suez crisis that led to this

 understand the European Union—its history, purpose, parts, and functions, its strengths and weaknesses, and its overall role in furthering international organization

 refl ect on how the Internet impacts international law and organization, both strengthening and subverting it.

Introduction

Nation-states, we saw last chapter, are at the core of global aff airs and are generally the most powerful actors in the international system. Realists view the international system as an ungoverned anarchy wherein nation-states struggle among themselves for both hard and soft power, whereas idealists urge nation-states to pour their energies instead into a co-operative commitment to improving everyone’s lot. We saw possible opportunities for the integration of these theories, and another—very important—one is the subject of this chapter: international law and organization. For even the most hardened realist can admit that nation-states can selfi shly benefi t from rules and institutions designed to make life easier, more regular, and more profi table for everyone; and idealists in international aff airs oft en have it as a major goal to create and/or grow global organizations that can help solve such common human problems as poverty, disease, and pollution. In this chapter, we will

126 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

come to understand what international law is, what international institutions do, and how they get made. We will examine their pros and cons, and consider many concrete examples of each, focussing on the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).

Quick Defi nitions

Th e goal of international law is to order relations between nation-states through rational, predictable, and mutually benefi cial rules of conduct (rather than through the dominance of a hegemon, the chaos of confl ict, or the lawlessness of anarchy). Indeed, we might say that (a) the goal of international law is international organization, and (b) specifi c international institutions get created by countries to help bring this abstract goal into concrete reality.

Th e institutions created to uphold international law are referred to generally as international organizations, or IOs. But it’s important to distinguish between IGOs, or inter-governmental organizations, and NGOs, or non-governmental organizations. Th e former are the creations of national governments, designed to help coordinate behaviour and solve common problems facing modern governments (from trade disputes to cross- border organized crime). Th e United Nations (UN) is an example of an IO—indeed, an IGO—and much more will be said about it below. International NGOs, by contrast, are not created by national governments but, rather, by private individuals or interest groups try- ing to improve international life in some specifi c way. Among the most prominent are the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (providing humanitarian relief eff orts, especially in war), Amnesty International (promoting human rights), Greenpeace (championing envi- ronmental causes), and Doctors without Borders (or Médecins Sans Frontières, concerned with global public health). In this chapter, we are concerned with IGOs, as they are the cre- ations of international law and are specifi cally designed to serve international organization.

International Law

Origins of International Law

As we saw briefl y in Chapter 1, most experts claim that international law has a specifi c birth date: 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed. Th is treaty, we know, was the peace treaty that brought to an end the Th irty Years War (1618–48), a battle over religion between European Catholics and Protestants. Aft er three decades of savage violence, the European leaders got together to make a deal for peace. Th e deal came with the mutual acknowledgement that neither side in the religious confl ict could fully “kill off ” the other, and an agreement that it should be left up to the government of each country to decide which religion would prevail in its own state. No one would again try to convert the people of another country by force of arms. It was an agreement to lay down arms, and to live and let live. It was also the earliest expression and affi rmation of the two most important and foundational principles of international law: political sovereignty and territorial integrity.2

The Two Core Principles of International Law

Political sovereignty is the right of a group of people to rule themselves. “Political” refers to power or to polis—the ancient Greek term for a group of people living together as an

1275 International Law and Organization

ongoing community. “Sovereignty” means the authority of a sovereign, such as a king or queen—in other words, the entitlement to rule. To be sovereign is to be self-ruling, acknowl- edging no higher authority over oneself. More fully, then, political sovereignty is the most basic right of a country in modern international law: the right of a country to make its own laws and to govern itself, provided—crucially—that it respects the right of all other countries to do the same. Every country on Earth jealously guards, and is proud of, its national or state sovereignty.

But this sovereignty must be exercised somewhere. To be real, the abstract right of political sovereignty must imply some secure space in which to live, and in which to enjoy self-rule. Hence, the right to ter- ritorial integrity. A country has a right to some liveable territory and is considered to be the general “owner” of all the natural resources on, under, or above its land. Th at’s the “territorial” part; the “integrity” part refers to that group’s right not to have other countries invade its territory and try to take its resources. A community not only needs to have terri- tory and resources; it needs to be able to count on having such resources moving forward, if it is to remain—as Aristotle said in Th e Politics—an ongoing partnership formed for the general good of its members. Th us, the most basic and central value—the primordial premise—of interna- tional law is this: within a clearly defi ned territory, with resources seen as its own, a people or nation ought to be able to govern itself as it best sees fi t, provided that it respects the rights of all other peoples and nations to do the same.3

International Law, Defi ned

International law comprises all the agreements and undertakings that diff erent peoples or nations make between themselves, presumably for mutual benefi t. International law is, essentially, the sum of all treaties between countries. A treaty is a contractual deal between countries. It’s a promise to do something, and countries make such promises with the expectation of benefi t. So, international law is made by national governments seeking to make their lives easier: once more, we see how so much of everything in international life has its origins within the borders of the nation-state.4

Technically, there are some sources of international law other than treaties. However, experts concur that the vast majority of the pieces that make up international law are trea- ties, and that treaties form the strongest and clearest expression of international law. Th e other sources are:

• custom • general principles of law • international legal decisions • international law scholarship.

Custom refers to habitual practice. If countries have behaved in a certain way X for a long time, it’s considered reasonable to conclude that they are accepting a law-like rule to adhere to X. Custom has been important in a body of international law known as the laws of the sea, which regulate shipping across oceans and such.

Within a clearly defi ned territory, with resources seen as its own, a people or nation ought to be able to govern itself as it sees fi t, provided that it respects the rights of all other peoples and nations to do the same.

128 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

General principles of law refer to the most elemental rules contained in national or domestic legal systems the world over. Such principles would include, for example, rules against theft and murder. Since these principles are present everywhere nationally, it’s thought reasonable to infer they must be present internationally, too. So, for instance, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to steal the latter’s land and oil, everyone agreed that it was a violation of international law. Th ere are also international courts (more below) that make decisions on international cases brought before them. Th ese decisions become part of international law and help shape future decisions, ensuring consistency and predictability in the rules.

Finally, learned lawyers, judges, and professors of international law write expert, peer-approved articles and books on various aspects of international law. With enough reference and infl uence, these, too, can be thought of as forming, or at least informing, part of international law.5

Treaties, though, remain the gold standard of international law, as they are self-made and self-affi rmed agreements as to how sovereign states promise to behave. Countries themselves freely pledge to adhere to certain rules, and thus holding them accountable to those rules seems completely reasonable. Th ere are tens of thousands of treaties, on tens of hundreds of subjects. Before we mention some of the most prominent kinds, further explanation of how international law gets made will be of interest.

The Process of Treaty-Making

Like most laws, a treaty tends to fi nd its origin in a problem. Th ere’s a dispute between two or more countries, and they are looking for a solution. But it’s not a small or one-time dispute; at the least, it promises to be an ongoing issue, thus requiring an enduring solution or framework of understanding. Say, for example, that there is a lake between countries A and B (much like the Great Lakes between the United States and Canada). Th e lakes aren’t going anywhere, and neither are all the people living around them, and together they cre- ate all kinds of problems and opportunities between the neighbouring countries, such as:

• Where exactly is the border between the two countries on the surface of the lakes? • How much drinking water should each country be allowed to take out, and why? • How much pollution should each country be allowed to put in, and why? Who’s

responsible for cleaning up excessive pollution? And who’s going to be responsible for monitoring these matters?

• How should boaters on the lakes be monitored and policed? • Who “owns” the natural resources in, or under, the lakes, especially when they—like

fi sh—might move (i.e. swim) back and forth across the border? Th e list, obviously, goes on and on. And it cries out for a detailed deal, some sort of con- tractual arrangement, between Canada and the US. Th is deal becomes a clearly worded treaty (and in this particular case, there is Th e Boundary Waters Treaty of 19096). It is usually produced aft er years of negotiation, fact-fi nding, deal-making, and treaty-draft ing back and forth between lower-level offi cials, civil servants, and experts from both coun- tries. Th ere can be guidance from more powerful offi cials, and sometimes the top-most offi cials—senior cabinet secretaries and ministers, or even presidents and prime minis- ters—are required to step in to break an impasse or re-energize a negotiation.

1295 International Law and Organization

Once a deal has been made and agreed upon behind the scenes by the countries involved, the treaty is draft ed and approved by international lawyers from both societies. Th ere is then oft en a formal signing ceremony, especially if the treaty is on an important topic. Th is ceremony is a public, political event—great photo opportunity, with everyone smiling and shaking hands—highlighted by the moment when the heads of state put their signatures on the treaty. Th e signature represents the head of state’s promise to take this treaty back to his or her country and then either treat it like law straight away or, more commonly in a democracy, introduce that treaty as a bill that needs to be turned into a law under the country’s national or domestic constitutional procedure for turning a bill into a law. Once that long process has been completed, the international treaty has been turned into a law in that society, the same as (and just as real as) any other piece of legislation in that country, and just as enforceable by the police and the civil service.

Generally, then, that’s how a treaty gets made and then becomes law, both nationally and internationally. When a treaty has been turned into a law in country A, we say that A has ratifi ed the treaty. Once the treaty has been ratifi ed by the signatories (i.e. the countries that have signed the treaty), there is usually a grace period to allow the various societies to make whatever changes they need to make in order to bring their countries in line with the promises sworn to in the treaty. Th ese may include budgetary changes, creating a new government department to monitor or enforce something, and so on. Aft er that grace period ends, though, the treaty is now said to be in force, i.e. full-blown, actual, enforceable law, the violation of which can result in penalties, sanctions, and lawsuits. Th e process is summarized in Figure 5.1.7

Th e leaders of Abkhazia, Russia, and South Ossetia shake hands aft er signing a Friendship Treaty in Moscow’s Kremlin. Why is this kind of ceremony—essentially a photo op— important? (© ITAR-TASS Photo Agency /Alamy)

130 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

PROBLEM/OPPORTUNITY A problem or opportunity affecting two or more countries is identified.

SEARCH FOR SOLUTION Low-level officials and civil servants conduct fact-finding, proposals, and counter-proposals.

DEAL After a deal has been negotiated and approved, a treaty is drafted.

SIGNING Heads of state sign the treaty at a public signing ceremony.

RETURN TO THE HOME COUNTRY The signed treaty is brought back to home countries of the signing heads of state.

INTRODUCTION AS BILL The treaty is introduced at home as a bill as part of the domestic law-making process.

LEGISLATION If passed, the treaty becomes law.

RATIFICATION The treaty is thus officially ratified.

GRACE PERIOD Sometimes a grace period exists before the treaty is enforced, giving countries time to make necessary adjustments.

ENFORCEMENT The treaty, now a full-blown law, both nationally and internationally, is in force, subject to penalties if violated.

Figure 5.1 Summary of the Treaty-Making Process

1315 International Law and Organization

Kinds of Treaty

Th ere are two kinds of treaty: bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral means “two-sided,” and it denotes a treaty between two countries. Multilateral means “many-sided” and refers to any agreement between three or more countries. Multilateral treaties, in turn, are of two kinds: regional or global. A regional multilateral treaty has been negotiated by at least three countries in a close, coherent, geographical region, whereas a global multilateral treaty has been negotiated by all, or almost all, countries in the world. Examples?

• Th e Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (or FTA) of 1989 is an example of a bilateral treaty, dealing with the trade of goods and services across the Canada–US border. (More about the FTA in the chapter that follows, on international trade.) Another bilateral treaty between these same countries, in 1958, created NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (designed to monitor North American airspace and defend it from foreign invasion). Th e United States has many bilat- eral treaties with Russia, most aimed at arms control and limiting the number of (especially nuclear) weapons each country has. Some of the most important of these treaties are the Anti-Ballistic Missile (or ABM) treaty of 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (or SALT) treaty of 1972, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (or START) treaty of 1991, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996.8

• Signed in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (or NAFTA) is an example of a regional multilateral treaty between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, again on the fl ow of goods and services between these three countries. (NAFTA grew out of, and extended, the FTA.) Th e 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, mentioned above, would also fall into this category, as would the many treaties founding, creating, and extending the European Union (EU)—such as the Treaty of Maastricht, 1991—signed by most of the countries of Europe but no countries outside of that region. Also relevant here is the 1949 treaty that created NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is probably the most important military alliance of our time. Composed of the US, Canada, and the nations fi rst of western Europe and now of central and eastern Europe, too, NATO is an alliance dedicated to mutual defence, or collective security, in the event any one of its members is attacked. It was founded especially with an eye to protecting western Europe from a ground invasion by the Soviet Union (Russia) during the Cold War but has since survived the end of that confl ict. Currently, NATO forces have been, since the September 11 attacks, in action in Afghanistan.9

• Global multilateral treaties are harder to come by, as there are more diff erences of opinion and varied circumstances across the planet. But the Charter of the United Nations (1945)—the deal founding the United Nations and detailing its branches and how they should work—is one such example. (Th e UN’s structure and function will be detailed below.) Some of the human rights treaties also belong here, and they will be discussed in Chapter 9, on human rights.

Technical versus Economic versus Political Treaties

In spite of this reference to diffi culty, there actually are a number of global treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, that have enjoyed great success. But many of them are known as

132 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

“technical treaties.” Technical treaties are those that deal with practical issues of very little political controversy. Technical treaties address such things as how mail gets transported across borders, how luggage is handled on international fl ights, how radio waves should be distributed, how telephone (or, in the past, telegraph) lines ought to be laid across the ocean fl oor, and so on. You can see how it would be pretty easy to get strong, even worldwide, consensus on such targeted, precise, and practical issues, because (1) they are very detailed, (2) they are of little political controversy, and (3) they pertain to matters that everyone has a clear interest in seeing run smoothly and effi ciently.

Political treaties are much more controversial, since they have deeper implications for how a society runs itself. So, for example, the international human rights treaties are much more contentious and hard to negotiate successfully than, say, the postal or telephone treaties because the human rights treaties are promises by governments about how they are going to treat their own people. Governments, especially non-democratic ones, can be prickly about the subject of the rights of their citizens, viewing the matter as their sover- eign privilege—and none of the rest of the world’s business. Th ere are some global human rights treaties, as stated above, but they were much harder to come by than the radio wave treaties, and they are not, to say the least, perfectly realized in the actual world.

Economic treaties, such as trade agreements, are in between, in terms of controversy. On the one hand, they are contentious because they can have implications for how a gov- ernment collects taxes, and what kinds of goods can be sold to its people. (For example, initially, the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement was controversial, as people in certain industries on both sides of the border feared they would be put out of business by competi- tors in the other country.) On the other hand, if every country can come to see that they will benefi t in some concrete way from a deal, common sense and rationality will typically win the day; and so there are thousands of commercial treaties in place around the world. It’s easier to show countries that they stand to make some money, whereas it’s much harder to show countries that they should change the way they run their society, which is why political treaties are the most diffi cult, rare, and contentious of the three types presented here (and summarized in Table 5.1).10

Table 5.1 Typical Subject Matter of Three Kinds of Treaty

Technical Economic/Commercial Political

• international mail • organized crime • telephone/telegraph/

radio waves • international fl ights and

luggage

• natural resources (e.g. air, water)

• trade, free trade • intellectual property

(e.g. inventions, copyright law)

• international taxation (e.g. when resident of country A earns income in country B)

• regulation of multinational corporations

• regional governance (e.g. EU)

• global governance (e.g. UN)

• war and peace • borders • human rights • refugees • climate change

1335 International Law and Organization

Enforcement of Treaties

Enforcing international law can be problematic. Some scholars actually think that inter- national law doesn’t even deserve the term “law,” as there is no eff ective world government to back it up and enforce it, the way there is in a developed national society.11 While this is true, and while there have been shocking, saddening cases of non-enforcement of interna- tional law, as happened during the Rwandan genocide in 1994,12 by and large international law does go observed. In fact, the regard for and observance of international law is getting stronger over time. Why?

• Countries have a substantial self-interest in keeping the promises they make. If they don’t, they get a reputation for defaulting on their commitments, and other countries refuse to deal with them, limiting the power and benefi ts accessible to them.

• Generally, countries want to deal with each other in rational, predictable ways. Th is requires less eff ort overall and allows them to focus on more profi table or urgent matters. International law creates this kind of stable order, and most countries see the benefi t in that.

• When confronted with a law-breaker, countries oft en join together to issue a collec- tive response that penalizes the law-breaker. Th ese responses, we’ve seen last chapter, include criticism, refusal to engage, sanctions, and armed force.

• Increasingly, international institutions are being created by treaties to monitor, police, and enforce the terms of a treaty. IOs make co-operation easier, ongoing, and more concrete, and thus make non-compliance harder to achieve and benefi t from.

International law is not perfect, though. Particular problems come, on the one hand, from determined rogue regimes and, on the other, from great powers who do not wish to sign on to, or agree with, a treaty the rest of the world wants. As we saw in the discussion of the environment in Chapter 2, the recent eff orts to forge an eff ective global treaty on climate change—one that would have signatories commit to reducing the carbon emis- sions thought to cause global warming—have run afoul of countries like China, the US, and (with its recent withdrawal from the Kyoto agreement) Canada. Th e result has been a standstill—perhaps even a step back—in this regard.13

International Organization

The League of Nations

In 1919, following World War I, the League of Nations—one of the very fi rst IOs, and IGOs—was founded. It was the fi rst serious attempt at true global governance, and was the pet project of the American president Woodrow Wilson (who is, as we saw last chapter, one of history’s biggest international idealists). Wilson hoped the League of Nations would move humanity towards coordinated, worldwide solutions to international problems. But the League was seriously hampered right from the start, when (ironically) the US refused to join. (Republican Party senators refused to ratify the treaty craft ed by Wilson, who was a Democrat.) Th en, when the League publicly condemned fascist Germany and imperial Japan for their various aggressive invasions throughout the 1930s, those countries withdrew

134 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

from the League. We now know, partly from this experience, that interna- tional institutions do not work well without the support of great powers. And so, once the Second World War started in 1939, the League collapsed and the world’s fi rst attempt at global governance ended in failure.14

The United Nations

After the Second World War, US Democratic presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman tried again to create an international body charged with global governance: the result was the United Nations. Founded in San Francisco in 1945, the UN was headquartered in New

York, where, it was thought, it stood the best chance of securing the continuing support and interest of the American people. Th is worked, and the UN offi cially came into being the following year. Th e UN Charter, which details the aims and structure of the organization, is one of the most successful global multilateral treaties, and almost every country in the world is a UN member. (Only national governments may become UN members: no indi- viduals, NGOs, corporations, or any other kind of organization may join the UN.)15

While the UN does advance global governance in a range of meaningful ways, it is cru- cial to note that it is not a world government. Th e United Nations—as the name shows—is an international organization created by nation-states to help them solve problems and to realize mutual gains. Th e UN does not rule over the countries of the world, the way the

Canadian federal government rules over the various provincial governments. Th e UN, rather, is a creature of sovereign states—a worldwide volunteer club of national governments—and thus can be and is lim- ited by those states in a range of ways. Th e entire UN budget, for example, comes from the donations (or “contributions”) of national governments. (And to put the size of the UN’s budget in perspective, con- sider that it is only about one-one hundredth of what gets spent, every year, by the world’s national govern- ments on their militaries alone.) Furthermore, all UN peacekeepers are supplied on a temporary basis as a loan, so to speak, from various national armed forces. In short, everything the UN has is supplied to it by national governments. Th is reveals the true realities of power internationally, and sometimes the UN suf- fers from the wrath of disapproving governments. For instance, the United States owes the UN a bunch of money (though not as much as it used to). Th e US is thus in arrears on its UN contributions—and deliber- ately so, to show occasional displeasure and perhaps just generally to keep the UN in its place. But it must be noted, to be fair, that even in spite of this fact, the US is by far the UN’s single largest contributor coun- try, and always has been.16

We know, from experience, that international institutions do not work well without the support of great powers.

New York City was chosen as the site for the UN’s headquarters in part to get greater support from the American people. Do you think it’s still the most appropriate site? (© Jeremy Edwards/iStockphoto)

1355 International Law and Organization

Goals of the UN

Th e aims and functions of the UN range from the sublimely ideal to the tangibly practical. Th e most important include the following:

• to prevent war and secure peace • to help realize everyone’s human rights • to serve as a symbol of our common and evolving humanity • to aid in the development of the Global South • to serve as a forum where the world’s nations can share their views and seek to coor-

dinate behaviour that can solve shared problems • to gather, and make available, information about international life and global aff airs

(e.g. data about worldwide economic growth or the cross-border spread of a disease).

The UN’s Parts and Functions

Th e General Assembly (GA) Th e General Assembly (GA) is the heart of the UN. Every member nation (all 192, as of writing) is a GA member. Every one gets exactly one vote; majority rules on votes taken, and no one gets a veto. Th e GA is thus a very inclusive club, and equality here shines forth, as the smallest country’s vote counts the same as that of a great power. While it is true that resolutions passed by the GA are generally non-binding (i.e. not mandatory) on member-states, the General Assembly does (a) raise and allocate the UN’s budget, and (b) remain broadly accountable for the overall aim and direction of the UN. Th e General Assembly may thus be seen as something like the legislative branch of the UN. It meets regularly—with the heaviest schedule usually being in late fall every year—and is oft en

UNITED NATIONS

Security Council

World Court

Secretariat

Autonomous Agencies

General Assembly

Economic and Social Council

Figure 5.2 The Structure of the UN

136 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

Canada and Peacekeeping

Canada is widely credited with creating the UN peacekeeping role during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Cutting across the Sinai Peninsula between Egypt and Israel, the Suez Canal is a vital shipping route linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf (see Figure 5.3). It was under British control when the Egyptian government of the day, headed by Gamal Abdal Nasser, “nationalized” (effectively took over) the strategically and commer- cially important waterway. The governments of Britain, France, and Israel responded by going to war with Egypt in an effort to keep the canal as an international waterway. The three countries wanted to preserve quick and easy shipping access to the huge Middle Eastern oil fi elds, whereas Nasser wanted a cut of the profi ts from all that oil fl owing through the Suez.

When the war broke out, everyone around the world wanted the fi ghting to stop immediately. The country of Israel had been founded only recently— in 1948, as we saw in Chapter 3, on comparative culture—and the wounds from that event were still raw. Furthermore, it was a tense time during the

Canadian Insights

J O R D A N

Gulf of Suez

E G Y P T

I S R A E L Suez Canal

S I N A I P E N I N S U L A

Port Said

Ismalia

Cairo

Gulf of Aqaba

Eilat

Al Tor

Sharm al-Sheikh

Troop Movements

British paratroops

French paratroops

Israeli paratroops

Suez Canal Zone

Egyptian blockade

Israeli troop movements

Figure 5.3 The Suez Crisis

Source: Based on http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5195068.stm

1375 International Law and Organization

formally addressed by the world’s leaders. Th e GA is one of a very few international institu- tions wherein the countries of the Global South have the majority say.

Th e Security Council (UNSC) In contrast to the General Assembly stands the UN Security Council (UNSC), which—as the name shows—is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. Resolutions passed by the UNSC are generally binding (i.e. mandatory) on all member-states, and the UNSC has the power to both (a) declare a threat to international peace and security, and (b) structure a response to it. A possible response would be to mandate that all UN members impose sanctions on the threatening country (this was done with Iraq, following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990). Another would be to authorize a peace-making mission, designed to impose a peace on a warring nation (as the UN tried to do in the early 1990s during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia—see Chapter 7 for more on this). Finally, the response might involve authorizing a peacekeeping mission, wherein the opposing sides have already halted hostilities but require a neutral body to separate their forces and keep the peace while they negotiate the terms of a fi nal ceasefi re and broader peace agreement.

UN peacekeeping has been much more successful than UN peace-making over the years, which is no surprise when one considers that the diff erence between them is that, in the fi rst instance, a peace of sorts has already been achieved by the sides in question, whereas in the second, the UN must intervene in a hot war and try to force a settlement to which at least one side—or possibly all—disagrees. When the UN failed to make peace in Yugoslavia, NATO took over, imposing a peace on the warring sides via the Dayton Accords of 1995. But the UN has succeeded in some peacekeeping missions, notably in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. UN peacekeepers collectively won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.18

As noted, the UN has no permanent military force of its own: the UN asks member countries to make armed forces available to it, and it either clothes them in distinctive

Cold War, and no one wanted either the US or the USSR to get involved in the fi ghting. The UN demanded the belligerents declare an immediate ceasefi re and withdraw their forces. The governments of the invading armies com- plied and agreed to talk peace, but they needed a neutral force to separate their armies and ensure that fi ghting would not re-erupt during negotiations. Canada, forgoing its traditional support for Britain and allying itself with one of the war’s most outspoken critics, the US, had denounced the confl ict, and it was Canada’s Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, who lobbied for the creation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to keep the combatants at arm’s length from each other. Because Canada was viewed as an accept- able neutral party, the international peacekeeping contingent was made up largely of Canadians and was led by a Canadian general.

And so the UNEF kept the peace while the belligerents agreed to a deal: the Suez would be kept international and open, but the government of Egypt would now receive some royalties from each ship passing through. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 and went on, six years later, to become prime minister of Canada.17

138 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

powder-blue UN helmets or else leaves them under national command but tasks them with achieving UNSC resolutions. Th e UN has authorized scores of peacekeeping and peace- making missions, all around the world, since the start of the concept at Suez. Th e UN’s record, as noted, has been mixed. Success has depended on the quality and funding of UN forces but, above all, on the local situation and whether the belligerent sides could them- selves agree on a peace. As of writing, there are 16 ongoing UN military missions, with over 102,000 uniformed personnel, contributed by over 115 countries.19

Th e UNSC meets only when there seems to be a threat to international peace and security. It has 15 members, and 9 votes are needed for a resolution to pass. Plus, there must be no vetoes. Only the fi ve permanent members of the UNSC hold vetoes, and they form perhaps the world’s most exclusive political club. Th ey are (1) Britain, (2) China, (3) France, (4) Russia, and (5) the United States (i.e. the major winning powers of the Second World War). Nothing gets passed by the UNSC without all fi ve essentially giving their support. (Sometimes, instead of vetoing a resolution, a permanent member will instead indicate its displeasure by abstaining, i.e. by refusing either to vote or to veto. China does this somewhat oft en.) Th e other 10, non-permanent members of the UNSC hold two-year terms, and they run for election within the General Assembly. (Canada has held six terms since the UNSC was founded, one of the best records in this regard.)

Th e severe exclusivity of the UNSC has made it the subject of regular calls for reform. Germany and Japan, for example, are near-great powers and generous UN funders, yet have been denied permanent seats. (As a result, Japan in the early 2000s cut its annual contribution to the UN by 25 per cent.) India, an emerging power, a nuclear power, and the world’s second-most populous country, is a developing society, and some experts fi nd it a scandal that, amongst current UNSC permanent members, only China is a developing nation; all the rest are developed, Northern, Western, Caucasian, Christian, and European (or European-derived) societies. Other critics feel at least one Islamic country should be a permanent member, whereas others have proposed that the UNSC be expanded so that every continent have at least one country as a permanent UNSC member (the Australians, in particular, love this idea). During the 1990s there was a concerted Brazilian eff ort to pass a reform measure that would have seen the following countries become new, permanent UNSC members with vetoes: Brazil, Germany, Egypt, Japan, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Th e proposal got some support but then ultimately failed.

Th e huge problem with reforming the UNSC is that any of the fi ve permanent members are entitled to veto any proposed changes, and, usually, one or all have serious problems with reform proposals, not the least of which being that expanding the UNSC means dimin- ishing their own power. Why should they agree to that? Th us, realism tells us not to expect UNSC reform any time soon, regardless of our idealistic hopes.20

Th e Secretariat If there is an “executive branch” of the UN, it is a combination of the UNSC and the Secretariat. Th e UNSC, as we have seen, is the branch of the UN that can deploy armed force, and its resolutions are mandatory. But the Secretariat has executive functions, too. Th e Secretariat comprises all the employees and civil servants in the UN system, which totals over 63,000 worldwide. (Th eir salaries are paid in tax-free US dollars, so it’s nice work if you can get it!) UN offi ces are spread out globally, but there are denser concentra- tions of UN staff in New York, Geneva, and Paris.

1395 International Law and Organization

At the head of the UN organization is the secretary-general (SG). Th e SG is the chief executive offi cer of the UN system, responsible for running the UN on a daily basis and for personnel and bureaucratic decisions. Sometimes known as “the world’s top diplomat,” the SG is frequently called upon to help nations use the UN system to help solve their problems. Th e SG is nominated by the UNSC, and thus the “permanent fi ve” must all support him (and so far, historically, all SGs have been “hims”). Once he is approved by majority vote in the General Assembly, he holds offi ce for fi ve years, a term that may be renewed (and oft en is). As of writing, the secretary-general is Ban Ki-Moon, of South Korea. He took over from Ghana’s Kofi Annan, who had held the offi ce from 1997 until 2007.

When it comes to international crises, there is little the SG can do if nations are not willing to submit their disputes to the UN. But the SG does occupy a high-profi le position, which allows him to publicize problems and use moral suasion to try and persuade leaders to be constructive. Failing that, the SG does have the legal power to force the UNSC to meet to discuss a problem—but he cannot force the UNSC even to vote on a resolution, much less to act in a substantive way.21

Th e World Court Th e judicial branch of the UN is the world court, better known as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), located in the Dutch city Th e Hague (long a site of importance to inter- national law). Th e ICJ is composed of 15 judges, who serve nine-year terms and must be approved by both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. By tradition, fi ve of these judges are from the fi ve permanent member countries of the UNSC. Th e ICJ hears cases brought to it voluntarily by member states, which typically come to it looking for a neutral expert opinion on a complex issue contested between two states. (And only state governments—not individuals, groups, or corporations—can bring suits to the ICJ.) For example, in 1992, the ICJ settled a longstanding border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, drawing the border defi nitively and thereby settling a bitter division that had lasted for over a hundred years (and had even triggered war in 1969).

Th e ICJ lacks any enforcement power, and can only issue decisions. Th e decisions do have some moral authority—especially since the countries that are parties in the lawsuit voluntarily agreed to submit the dispute to the court in the fi rst place—but no eff ectual authority beyond that. In 2004, for instance, the ICJ ruled that Israel’s security wall in the West Bank—constructed to keep terrorists out of Israel—violated international law. But Israel immediately announced it would ignore the ruling and maintain the wall, which it argues has been successful in achieving its purpose, greatly reducing the number of ter- rorist suicide bombings since its construction. Or consider the 1986 decision in the case of Nicaragua v. Th e United States, wherein Nicaragua argued that the US government—via the CIA—had blown up the harbours of its capital city, Managua. Th is would be seen as a very serious act of war, one the Americans might have engaged in as part of the Cold War fi ght against communism, since Nicaragua’s government of the day was quite left -leaning— almost Cuba-esque. Th e ICJ found in favour of Nicaragua, but the US suff ered nothing more than public embarrassment for its actions.

Th e ICJ is not oft en used. Countries, aft er all, prefer to negotiate their problems directly between themselves, and so, on average, only a dozen cases are heard per year. Th is may increase with the new branch of the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (ICC), founded in 1998 via the Treaty of Rome to try individuals accused of war crimes and

140 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

other crimes against humanity. (More will be said about the ICC in Chapter 8, on post-war reconstruction.)22

Th e Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Th is branch of the UN is in charge of helping to co-ordinate economic and social policies among the member countries of the UN, to the benefi t of all. Th ere are 54 members of the Economic and Social Council, and each one has a vote but no veto. Th e members of ECOSOC serve three-year terms and are elected for membership within the General Assembly.

ECOSOC is actually a very eff ective and powerful part of the UN system, and the UN has seen some of its greatest successes come out of this branch. Why? Th ink back to the whole issue of “technical versus political versus economic” treaties. Many of the issues that ECOSOC deals with are focused, concrete, practical, and technical—involving such matters as trade disputes, child welfare, access to food, narcotics control, the plight of refu- gees—and these issues tend to get greater co-operation than, say, war and peace or border disputes. We must be mindful of the fact that for every high-profi le failure of the UN, there are many small-scale successes that it has had through ECOSOC, improving the lives of some of the world’s most vulnerable people.23

Th e Autonomous Agencies The autonomous agencies ultimately report, through ECOSOC, back to the General Assembly. But conceptually, it makes sense to consider them separately, as there are so many of them, and, on a daily basis, they are expert organizations with highly specifi c mandates. Th ey, too, focus on achieving concrete progress, in measurable ways, on issues of little political controversy and with clear practical relevance. Th ere are scores of these agencies, and they range from perhaps the world’s two oldest IOs, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), to such powerful and successful agencies as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More will be said about these latter agencies in chapters to follow.

Th e Trusteeship Council Th is last branch of the UN has now closed shop. It was set up in 1946 to aid European de- colonization throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It became defunct in 1994, aft er Namibia became independent. Namibia was called “the world’s last colony.”24

UN: Pros and Cons

Before moving on, we need to review the strengths and weaknesses of the UN in general. To the plus side, the UN has had some amazing practical and technical success sto-

ries, especially through ECOSOC and the autonomous agencies. Because of them, children have become literate and educated, refugees saved from starvation, people inoculated against terrible diseases, and international trade has increased and grown wealth world- wide. Also, the UN is as close to genuinely global governance as we currently have and can expect—thus it seems to fi ll a needed niche. On the other hand, the UN is a slave to the sovereign states which compose it, and generally it only works well when the great powers—especially America—want it to work. Th ere are also controversies about exclu- sivity, big power dominance, and the need for structural reform. And, on the big-ticket,

1415 International Law and Organization

big-picture, blue-sky political goals—of the realization of human rights, and the prevention of armed confl ict—the UN’s record of achievement is, shall we say, far from fl awless.

The European Union (EU)

An international institution with a clearer record of success is the European Union: a regional, multilateral organization centred in Europe and held together with an amazing array of treaties, organizations, and, increasingly, shared beliefs and practices. Because of the breadth, depth, and overall success of the integration it has brought about between the

Finland

Austria

ItalySpain

Sweden

Germany

France

Portugal

Hungary

Romania

Bulgaria

Turkey

Denmark

Poland

Czech Rep. Slovakia

Greece

Cyprus

Neth.

Belgium

Ireland Lithuania

Latvia

Estonia

Croatia Slovenia

Macedonia

Iceland

United Kingdom

Malta

Lux.

Montenegro

Member

Candidate

Figure 5.4 EU Member States and Current Candidates

Source: US Central Intelligence Agency, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

142 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

nations of Europe, the EU is sometimes called a trans-national or even supra-national institution. In other words, although it began as a voluntary club of nations (like the UN), the EU now has, in many ways, transcended its member nations and rules over them from an eff ective and substantial—not merely symbolic—new and higher level of governance.

EU member states have a combined population of over 500 million, who make up the largest or second-largest economy in the world (depending on the source and how it com- pares the EU to the United States), and the largest trading partner of both China and India. Th e EU is made up of 27 countries speaking 23 languages. Sixteen of the countries use one common currency (the euro) and share a common central bank, based in Frankfurt, Germany, which sets interest rates (the cost of borrowing money) throughout the “euro- zone.” Th ough there is a common monetary policy in this sense, the nations of Europe retain large-scale autonomy over fi scal policy (i.e. how government revenues are raised and spent within their borders), so there is still considerable nation-state sovereignty, even within the integrative structures of Europe. National governments contribute huge sums to the headquarters of the EU—located in Brussels, Belgium—to enable EU-wide programs, yet they retain budgetary control over their domestic political agenda, for instance, whether to raise taxes or cut government spending. Th is produces some tensions, or competing forces, between sovereign nationalism and integrative supra-nationalism in Europe.25

Th e other major fi eld where this tension is obvious is that of national security, defence, and foreign policy. Even though recent treaties have committed EU members to greater co- operation in these areas, in practice, members—especially strong military powers like Britain and France—can, and do, go their own way. Witness, for example, Britain’s decision to sup- port America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq versus France’s strong criticism of the same. Recent treaties commit EU members to creating some kind of common military force, yet it will be very small, and NATO—which unites western Europe with the US and Canada—has a much larger, longer, and more eff ective military presence in Europe. So, no one knows exactly how the move towards more common security structures and foreign policies will work in the EU. And this should not surprise us, as we now know that it is political co-operation that is the most diffi cult to achieve, whereas co-operation in technical and economic fi elds is easier and more reliable. Indeed, this truth is driven home by the history of the EU itself.

Case Study: The Birth of an International Institution Aft er World War II ended in 1945, Europe stood in ruin. Th e moment presented the leaders of Europe with a stark, clear choice: continue with things as usual—a situation that had produced two devastating global wars—or change things completely, so new wars would not erupt. Europe was split into western and eastern halves, and the Cold War began between the US and Russia. European leaders at the time could only focus on re-building the western part, with generous funding help from America’s Marshall Plan. Of special concern to these leaders was the need to forestall any new wars between France and Germany, following the sad record of the Franco–Prussian War (1870–1), the First World War (1914–18) and the Second World War (1939–45). Th ey did not want yet another generation to suff er the terrible eff ects of this bitter and bloody rivalry in the heart of Europe, especially now that atomic weapons had been invented. But

1435 International Law and Organization

the leaders of these European nations—like French diplomat Jean Monnet and French prime minister Robert Schuman—were smart enough to know that in the immediate post-war environment, the people of France and Germany would be hostile to plans for robust co-operation with each other, much less integration. Yet Monnet and Schuman dreamed of tying the economies of France and Germany so closely together that for either country to go to war against the other would result in economic suicide—and so no rational future leader would ever again go down that path.26

Th e solution to the problem—the practical way to try to achieve this ideal—was to take baby steps. More precisely, it was to focus on small, concrete, technical issues,

Table 5.2 Members of the European Union

Country Year of Admission Euro Currency? (Yes/No)

Austria 1995 Yes

Belgium 1951 Yes

Bulgaria 2007 No

Cyprus 2004 Yes

Czech Republic 2004 No

Denmark 1973 No

Estonia 2004 No

Finland 1995 Yes

France 1951 Yes

Germany 1951 Yes

Greece 1981 Yes

Hungary 2004 No

Ireland 1973 Yes

Italy 1951 Yes

Latvia 2004 No

Lithuania 2004 No

Luxembourg 1951 Yes

Malta 2004 Yes

Netherlands 1951 Yes

Poland 2004 No

Portugal 1986 Yes

Romania 2007 No

Slovakia 2004 Yes

Slovenia 2004 Yes

Spain 1986 Yes

Sweden 1995 No

United Kingdom 1973 No

Source: www.europa.eu

144 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

and then, aft er seeing successes there, to build momentum toward pursuing bigger, bolder forms of economic and political co-operation. So the EU found its birth in one tiny treaty in 1950, committing France and Germany to co-operation in the steel and coal industries. Monnet and Schuman knew this would work—a common, mutually advantageous industrial policy—and that it would be more important than people realized, as steel and coal were vital to the enormous post-war rebuilding task. In 1951 the two countries were joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg as the founding nations of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Th e plan worked: fi rst, focus on targeted, technical, non-controversial issues and opportunities; then, forge co-operation and integration, yielding tangible benefi ts. Ensure, and wait for, success, and then move forward more ambitiously to deeper and wider political and economic integration. Don’t push too fast: letting the successes speak for themselves will enhance the benefi ts of European integration in the minds of the people, and ease the minds of national leaders fearful both of both losing sover- eignty and of backing an ambitious, untried, grand schema for integration. Th e Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, moving the process forward, followed by the Merger Treaty of 1967, which renamed the project the European Community (to show things had advanced beyond mere coal and steel).

Th e fi rst wave of growth came in 1973, when Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined, and there have been several waves of growth since then—in the 1980s, and then again especially in 2004, when a large number of formerly communist countries of central and eastern Europe joined, following the end of the Cold War and their own internal reform (see Table 5.2). No one has ever dropped out of the EU, and perhaps that is the simplest and strongest indicator of success.27

Membership Criteria and “The Five Pillars”

It is important and revealing to consider the Copenhagen criteria for becoming a member of the EU. To become eligible, a country must be European, and have a free-market economy (i.e. one that allows for entrepreneurship, the ownership of private property, and open business competition). Th e candidate country must also, politically, be a stable democracy, with regular, free, fair, and public elections of the government. Th e country’s legal system must be committed to the rule of law and respecting and realizing everyone’s basic human rights (to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as well as to security, equality, political participation, and due process). Th e country must also, of course, be willing to accept all the obligations that becoming an EU member entails—agreeing to obey all EU laws—and, moreover, must meet technical criteria (e.g. about the size of its national debt), showing that it has the fi nancial fi tness and general potential to participate in, and compete within, the EU. Th e most recent members are Bulgaria and Romania, admitted in 2007. Several countries are up for membership or are about to apply; these include, perhaps most contro- versially, Serbia and Turkey.28

Probably the most important treaties in the European integration process are the Single Europe Act (1985) and the seminal Treaty of Maastricht (1991), and yet the process of treaty-making continues apace, most recently with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Th e vari- ous treaties have helped to create a Europe that looks like this:

1455 International Law and Organization

• In the fi rst instance, the EU is an economic system designed to generate, through co-operation and integration, wealth far beyond what each country could achieve on its own via competition. Th e EU does this through a free-trade area, which allows for the tariff -free (or tax-free) exchange of goods and services across the national borders of all member-states.

• Second, the EU is a customs union: while there is free trade internally within the EU, all EU members agree to keep identical tariff s or taxes on goods and services traded with non-member countries, like Canada and China.

• Th ird, the EU is a common market, allowing both labour (i.e. workers) and capital (i.e. cash for investment) to fl ow freely within the Union. For example, a person born in England can get a job in Italy and move there without any special visa; and an investor in Germany wanting to build a tourist hotel in Greece can likewise do so with ease, just as if the hotel were being built in Germany itself.

• Finally, there is both a currency and a central bank shared by most EU members. Th e one currency eliminates the ineffi ciency of working with multiple currencies, and the one central bank keeps borrowing costs level and predictable across the whole zone. Businesses in particular love both measures.

As a result of these “fi ve pillars of Europe,” the EU has essentially become a single market, functioning as a cohesive economic entity, and a very successful one, too—either fi rst or second in the world, with the US and China rounding out the top three.29

But the EU has moved beyond economic, towards political, integration. Th ere is a common passport issued to all EU citizens, and passport controls have been abolished

Th e headquarters of the EU in Brussels. (© Ziutograf/iStockphoto)

146 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

within the Union, easing the fl ow of people around the continent. In other words, once you pass one passport entry point in the EU, you’re in, and you don’t have to keep lining up every time you pass an international border. (Th is is totally unlike how it used to be.) EU members also commit to common policies on such issues as environmental protection, trade with non-members, fi sheries and energy, and criminal justice. Two issues in particu- lar are worth highlighting: agriculture and regional development.

Th e EU is committed to a kind of equalization formula regarding standard of living and quality of life across the Union. Th is means that poorer member states, and poorer regions within member states, receive funds from the centre to invest in projects that will promote prosperity and trade. Th ese projects tend to focus on physical infrastruc- ture—roads, bridges, railways—and on so-called human infrastructure, like education and healthcare. But other projects that might qualify for funding include modernizing a tourist site to make it more attractive for, say, North American and Japanese tourists. Th e policy has already provided huge benefi ts to many poorer regions of Europe, but it is also one reason why considerable care is taken with allowing new member countries into the EU, lest the demands of the poorer regions swamp the centre.

Meanwhile, the Union’s Common Agriculture Policy (or CAP) provides subsidies and other fi nancial support to farmers. Th e CAP says that, whatever subsidy one government off ers to its farmers must be matched by all other countries (but with EU money). So EU farmers enjoy EU-wide support and protection in terms of loans, tax benefi ts, price sup- ports, and protection from cheap competing imports. Th is last issue has caused a substantial problem in international trade, angering both the US (which sees the CAP as socialist-style protectionism) and the Global South (who wish to sell their lower-cost produce into Europe but get prevented from doing so by the tariff s on non-members imposed by the CAP). More will be said on this important issue in Chapter 6, on international trade.30

Structure of the EU

A bit on the complex political structuring of the EU is in order (see Figure 5.5). Th ere is a European Parliament, which sits in Strasbourg, France (right on the border with Germany). European parliamentarians are elected by the people every fi ve years, and they are typically affi liated with Europe-wide parties (such as the Christian Democrats); they do not sit as representatives of countries. Th e parliament is weak, though, and mainly acts as a kind of democratic watch-dog overseeing the other institutions within the EU. Th ere is a European Court of Justice, in Luxembourg, which is the judicial arm of Europe and is much stronger than the parliament in terms of its function. Th e ECJ has real teeth, inter- preting and enforcing EU law, and it has declared null and void national laws of member states that confl ict with EU law.

Th e body tasked principally with governance of the EU is the European Commission, in Brussels. It both proposes new laws and measures, and executes them. It has been the active, daily hub of the growth and success of Europe from the get-go. Th e Commission has had the reputation for being somewhat remote, bureaucratic, and technocratic (i.e. operating within a demanding environment of technological skill and expertise). But it does report both to parliament and to the European Council, another oversight body composed of a president and one person (usually the head of state or head of government) from each member country.31

1475 International Law and Organization

Summary Refl ections

Europe has been an amazing success story, especially given the continent’s war-soaked history. It just keeps growing and growing, with no one quitting, and with more and more countries clamouring for entry into the club. It is, indeed, a model for modern international governance and for innovative political problem-solving and the creation of institutions. Th e EU has improved national economies, and millions of individual lives, across the whole of Europe. To that extent, idealists dream of the day when the successful model designed for the EU can be implemented in other regions of the world, or even in the UN itself. If there is ever to be an eff ective world government, it would seem as though the EU provides the framework for one that is effi cient, rational, democratic, prosperous, and rights-respecting. Hard to beat that.

At the same time, Europe is small geographically and sports among its people many shared values that unite the continent and make international governance there possible; the world, by contrast, is far bigger, with sharper and more serious problems and with deeper divisions on things like beliefs and values. (Th e issue of world government will be rejoined in this book’s conclusion.) Europe is not perfect, having its substantial share of problems. Th ese include tensions between national sovereignty and supra-nationalism; between local democracy and remote, expert, un-elected bureaucracy; and between the older and more core members of the Union and the newer, less involved, “fringe” mem- bers. Finally, there is real tension between the richer members, such as Germany, and the poorer members, such as Greece—tension that has been heightened in recent years as Greece has taken on more and more national debt, violating the EU’s technical rules for what is allowed (noted above) and forcing wealthier countries like Germany to bail it out by paying off Greece’s debt. Th is creates bad feelings and certainly can’t be sustained indefi nitely: if every EU country were like Greece, then the EU would go bankrupt. Th ese sovereign debt problems aren’t limited to Greece: other EU countries, such as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, are facing them, too. Even Italy is thought to be on the verge of real trouble. As of writing, the solution to this problem remains unclear and elusive.32

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

European Council

European Court of Justice

Member Countries

European Parliament

Figure 5.5 Structure of the European Union

148 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

The Internet and International Distance

International institutions like the UN and EU face political and economic problems as a result of their substantial distance from ordinary citizens and taxpayers. It’s safe to say, for example, that the average American or Canadian does not feel close to the UN, would not agree with the statement: “The UN is my government, too.” And this is true even though (a) the United States has always been the UN’s biggest funder, by far, and (b) Canada is widely seen, around the world, as one of the UN’s strongest and most consistent supporters. (Many UN staffers, incidentally, are Canadian: that kind of support, together with Canadians’ bilingualism and typically decent education and awareness of the outside world, pays dividends in this regard.) And we’ve seen, in the case of the EU, that this tension between local government and national identities, on the one hand, and the supra-national needs of Europe as a whole has been a big issue. (Governing 500 million people does, after all, demand some imper- sonal administration, and considerable technical expertise.) The international institutions can thus suffer from legitimacy issues: are these organizations worthy of the average citizen’s support and tax dollars? By what right do these organizations regulate international issues that affect individual citizens?

To try to combat this distance—or democratic defi cit—between citizen and international institution, many of these organizations have developed robust websites and online services, providing a clear rationale for why they exist and how they benefi t millions of people, as well as an easy route to practical, and sometimes quite valuable, information on how ordinary people can access data and knowledge that can empower them, services that can ease their lives, and even employment and funding opportunities.

Global governance institutions aren’t alone in this regard, of course. It’s still a brave new world for us all, in terms of communications tech- nology. The pace and depth of change over the past 25 years has been mind-boggling. Experts are not quite sure how these new technologies will affect international law and global governance, but it’s clear that they can be used either (a) to support status quo institutions (usually by those very institutions themselves, as just explained), or (b) to challenge those institu- tions (as witnessed last chapter, regarding Wikileaks). The spread of these technologies makes it much harder for governments to control the fl ow of information, and that can be good when, say, an undemocratic government is using violence against its own people and trying to hide the fact. People, via their cellphone cameras and postings on websites, let the world know the truth. Yet such technologies can also be used to aid bad causes, such as when terrorist groups or drug- and people-smugglers use quick codeword tweets on Twitter to plot more effi ciently their brutal attacks or illicit trans- actions. The global communications revolution both serves and subverts ongoing processes of national and international governance.33

Studies in Technology

1495 International Law and Organization

Review Questions

1. Defi ne international law, its two core principles, and its goal or function in international life.

2. Research a prominent recent treaty between your country and another. What’s it about? Why did your country sign it? What changes will the treaty bring about in your country?

3. People oft en proclaim frustration that the political treaties—for instance, the human rights treaties—are neither as many nor as successful as the technical or economic treaties. My reply to them is that the facts show that the political treaties should be made as much like the technical treaties as possible in order to succeed. What do I mean by this, and do you think this would be a good strategy? Why or why not?

4. Would you—and how would you—reform the UN Security Council? 5. Reading the section on the structure and function of the UN, did anything

surprise or inform you? How is the reality of the UN diff erent from what you expected or previously believed? Is the UN a worthwhile institution? How might it be improved?

6. Consider the EU membership criteria. What do you think of them? Are they too demanding, or not demanding enough? Some have suggested establishing more rigorous criteria for membership in the UN: what might be the pros and cons? Indeed, to what extent can the EU serve as a model for the UN, or for such other regions of the world as Africa, Asia, or Latin America?

7. Why would the admission of Serbia and Turkey into the EU be contro- versial? Research this, and opine whether these two countries will ever, or should ever, be admitted.

8. Th ere are many, many other international organizations—e.g. the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of American States, Th e Asia– Pacifi c Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC), and so on. Quickly research these to get a fl avour of what they try to do, and how successful they are.

9. George Orwell, in his classic novel 1984, wrote of a world divided into three massive, fi ercely competitive, social, political, and economic blocs. Some have felt that this is exactly what is now happening in the real world, with the rise and congealing of Europe, China, and North America. Does this picture seem true? In what sense? What about the Islamic world, or Africa, or India? Any chance of real co-operation, or even integration, between “Th e Big Th ree” of North America, China, and Europe?

10. Research the very recent sovereign debt problems, both in the EU and in the US, and explain how they could have serious consequences, both internally and around the world.

150 Part II Core Dynamics: Nation versus World

Notes 1. K. Holl, Ludwig Quidde (Frankfurt: Doste Verlag, 2007), p. 625. 2. J.L. Brierly, Th e Law of Nations (New York: Waldock, 6th edn, 1963); P. Wilson, Th e Th irty Years’

War: Europe’s Tragedy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd edn, 1979).

3. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966); Aristotle, Th e Politics, trans. C. Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

4. H.C. Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (St Paul’s, MN: West Legal Press, 6th edn, 1990). 5. T. Buergenthal & H. Maier, Public International Law (St Paul, MN: West Legal Press, 1990). 6. International Joint Commission, Th e International Joint Commission and Th e Boundary Waters

Treaty of 1909 (Washington, DC: IJC, 1998); see also www.oursharedwaters.com. 7. A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005); M. Shaw,

International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 8. J. Schott & M. Smiths, eds, Th e Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (Washington, DC: Institute

for International Economics, 1988); J. Larsen & J. Smith, Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2005).

9. G. Hufb auer & J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2005); P. Duignan, NATO: Its Past, Present and Future (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 2000).

10. Shaw, International Law (op. cit., note 7), passim. 11. J. Goldsmith & E. Posner, Th e Limits of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 12. B. Orend, Th e Morality of War (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2006); 68–105; G. Prunier,

Rwanda: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 13. M. Noortman, Enforcing International Law (London: Routledge, 2005). 14. M. Housden, Th e League of Nations and Th e Organization of Peace (London: Longmans, 2011). 15. S. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: Th e Founding of the United Nations (New York: Basic, 2004). 16. J. Goldstein & S. Whitworth, International Relations (Toronto: Pearson, Cdn edn, 2005). 17. A. Gorst & L. Johnman, Th e Suez Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997); M. Carroll & R. Bothwell,

Pearson’s Peace-keepers (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009); J. English, Th e Worldly Years: Th e Life of Lester B. Pearson, 1949–72 (Toronto: Knopf, 1992).

18. W. Durch, Th e Evolution of UN Peace-keeping (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993). 19. Th e United Nations Today (New York: UN Publications Offi ce, 2008). For this, and the entire

“UN Parts and Structure” section, see also www.un.org 20. E. Luck, United Nations Security Council: Practice and Promise (London: Routledge, 2006);

B. Cronin, Th e United Nations Security Council and Th e Politics of International Authority (London: Routledge, 2008).

Websites for Further Research

American Society of International Law www.asil.org United Nations www.un.org International Court of Justice www.icj-cij.org International Criminal Court www.icc-cpi.int European Union www.europa.eu

1515 International Law and Organization

21. S. Chesterman, Secretary or General? Th e United Nations’ Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

22. H. Meyer, Th e World Court in Action: Judging Among the Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefi eld, 2001).

23. United Nations, Basic Facts About the UN (New York: United Nations Press, 2011). 24. T.G. Weiss & S. Daws, eds, Th e Oxford Handbook on the UN (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2009). 25. A.M. El-Agraa, Th e European Union: Economics and Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 8th edn, 2007). 26. M. Dedman, Th e Origins and Development of the European Union, 1945–2008 (London:

Routledge, 2nd edn, 2009). Th e EU’s offi cial website, which provides a wonder of information about the organization’s history, structure, and function, is www.europa.eu

27. A. Warliegh, European Union: Th e Basics (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008). 28. J. Pinder, Th e European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2008). 29. C. Archer, Th e European Union (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008). 30. D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (London: Lynne Rienner,

4th edn, 2010). 31. Archer, Th e European Union (op. cit., note 29), passim. 32. S.P. McGiff en, Th e European Union: A Critical Guide (London: Pluto, 2005). 33. M. Franda, Launching into Cyberspace: Internet Development and Politics in Five World Regions

(London: Lynne Rienner, 2002); J. Erikksson & G. Giacomello, International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (London: Routledge, 2007); J. Gainous, Rebooting American Politics: Th e Internet Revolution (New York: Rowman Littlefi eld, 2011); E. Morozov, Th e Net Delusion: Th e Dark Side of Internet Freedom (Washington, DC: Public Aff airs, 2012).

Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and BulletsIII

International Trade and Business6 “It’s The Economy, Stupid!” 1 –Slogan from the 1992 election campaign

of Bill Clinton (b. 1946), US president 1993–2001

Learning Objectives

After studying this chapter, you will be able to:

 defi ne all the bolded key terms and concepts

 understand the “big picture basics” of how a national economy works, including the GDP equation, the business cycle, and the foundations for eco- nomic growth

 explain why countries trade at all, and what the doctrine of comparative advantage entails

 be aware of the world’s most valued traded goods, the most active trading nations, and Canada’s particular interests and status in international trade

 grasp the three basic policy options countries have when it comes to interna- tional trade—offering examples of each—and understand how each option employs protectionist tools to some extent

 refl ect on the nature of globalization, and understand the many obstacles that stand in the way both of its further development and of heightened volumes of international trade

 appreciate the differences regarding cross-cultural business conventions and practices

 know the pros and cons of MNC activity, especially in the developing world

 become familiar with the emerging industry practice of fair trade, and how it links into global aid and development.

Introduction

Th e previous two chapters examined the complex, inescapable, enormously important interaction between nation and world—specifi cally, between the realism of a self-con- cerned state and the idealism of an international order concerned for all. Th is chapter sets us out on a new section, one concerned with examining in detail the two pillars of hard power: (1) military strength, and (2) fi nancial wealth. Our focus this chapter is on trade, the economy, and international business.

Now, we’ve already discussed a great number of things about economics, that is, how goods and services are produced, distributed, and used. In Chapter 1, for instance, we defi ned the essential features of free-market capitalism, the prevailing economic system of our time. In Chapter 2, we discussed natural resources—a prime component of national wealth—alongside resource-related problems, such as food and water scarcity, peak oil

1556 International Trade and Business

theory, and the sometimes uncertain supply of energy. In Chapter 3, we explained the rise of the welfare state in the West, and how welfare liberalism has now become the international norm, blending for-profi t, free-market capitalism with not-for-profi t govern- ment intervention designed to protect and provide for the least well-off . In Chapter 4, we examined the two major economic tools of foreign policy: positive incentives (including cash and aid) and negative sanctions (whether targeted or sweeping). We also saw, gener- ally, how support for increasing national wealth, and growing economic resources, united both realists and idealists. Finally, in Chapter 5, we looked at international commercial laws, including, especially, various free trade treaties, as well as the details of the dynamic economic structures of the European Union (EU). All of this demonstrates the extent to which economics play an integral role in many aspects of international relations.

Th roughout the fi rst two parts of this book, we’ve touched on and explained such history-changing economic events as the Industrial Revolution, the Great Depression, the rise of the welfare state, the Green Revolution, and the OPEC oil shocks. We’ve even peered into the future to consider the claims of those neo-Malthusians who predict economic ruin, in contrast to the views of those optimists confi dent of technological salvation. And, on that note, our recurring feature Studies in Technology has highlighted the impact of technological change on our lives, and on how we organize our economies. So, we need not repeat such things here. Th en what’s left , you might ask? Two big things: 1. a sustained look at international trade 2. a glimpse into international business practice, fi rst as carried out by multinational

corporations (MNCs), and then as evident in diff erent forms of international business dealings, which will also serve as a further study in comparative culture.

Summarizing the Drivers of Economic Growth

Fundamentals

Th ere are many factors that drive the growth of a national economy. We’ve already men- tioned natural resource endowments. But human resource endowments are just as critical, perhaps even more so. Th e size and quality of labour power obviously aff ects what one can do with the territory and natural resource endowments at one’s disposal. By quality of labour power we mean the extent to which one’s workforce is hard-working and well educated. Th ese two qualities help to maximize productivity, which is defi ned as eco- nomic output per worker. Another huge factor aff ecting productivity and the potential for economic growth is technological development and innovation. Machines help us save our time for critical “human-only” tasks, like strategy and invention, and make repetitive tasks—like calculations or assembly-line manufacture—so much easier and, generally, of much higher quality.

But these ingredients aren’t enough to guarantee the economic well-being of a coun- try. As we’ll see further in Chapter 11, on aid and development, we now know that the set of basic social institutions that a society establishes has a huge impact on the level of wealth that it can generate. If a nation opts for political and economic systems rooted in communism rather than capitalism, for example, we can safely predict that this will drag down the nation’s economic growth and potential, as the absence of a profi t motive

156 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

will dampen productivity. (Economists are fond of touting the need for “the right incen- tives” to encourage the right kind—the productive kind—of behavior; few things motivate productive activity more than money.) So, certain abstract items provided by a nation’s institutions—like freedom, a well-functioning legal system, decent and widely available education, and general social peace—matter importantly to the economy, too. So does the health status of the population, as we’ll understand further in our chapter on global public health. (Sick people, aft er all, can’t work and contribute to the economy.)2

The GDP Equation

In addition to depending on the prerequisites for a strong economy (summarized in Figure 6.1), it is oft en said that at any given time, the state of an economy is determined by the following simple equation:

C + I + G + (X − M) = GDP

where: • GDP is the gross domestic product, the total value of goods produced and services

provided in a country in one year (used as a measure of the strength of a nation’s economy).

• C stands for consumer spending. Consumer spending is thought to make up between one-half and two-thirds of most national economies. Of particular inter- est to experts are (a) the amount of spending on durables (long-lasting, expensive goods, like houses and cars), and (b) the level of consumer confi dence, taken as an

FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Productivity

Human Resources

Social Institutions (that protect, enable,

and ‘incentivize’)

Natural Resources

Research & Knowledge

Technology & Inventions

Figure 6.1 The Foundations of Economic Growth

1576 International Trade and Business

indication of how fi nancially secure and optimistic consumers are feeling, based on the degree to which they’re willing to spend.

• I stands for business investment. Businesses spend on all kinds of things, nota- bly land/offi ce space, natural resources (or other inputs required for production), technology, research and development (or R&D, an investment in future products), and employee wages. Business confi dence, like consumer confi dence, is viewed by economists as a valuable indicator of the health of the economy.

• G stands for government spending. Governments spend on physical infrastruc- ture (e.g. roads and sewers), the military, education and healthcare systems, social programs (e.g. employment insurance), and wages for their own workforce of civil servants.

• X stands for exports, goods produced for sale to another country. Exports increase economic growth because when a foreign customer buys your good, his or her money comes into your pocket, adding to your own national economy.

• M stands for imports, goods produced in another country and purchased in your country. Imports decrease economic growth, because when you buy the foreign- made good, your money leaves your national economy and goes into the pockets of the foreign producer. Th is is the lone variable in the equation that has a nega- tive relationship with GDP: a rise in imports contributes negatively to your GDP. Everything else above is in a positive relationship with GDP, meaning that as they go up, GDP goes up as well; when they go down, GDP follows.

When GDP goes up, the economy is in an expansion phase, i.e. a growing phase; when GDP goes down, the economy is in a contraction phase: a period of recession or shrinking economic growth. Almost all economies experience this so-called business cycle, char- acterized by alternating periods of economic expansion and contraction (or “boom and bust”), as depicted in Figure 6.2.

Our focus in this chapter is on exports and imports, together known as the foreign trade sector of a national economy. But before turning to them, we must explore two other major factors aff ecting economic growth: (1) interest rates, and (2) the value of a national currency.3

Interest Rates

Interest rates represent the price of money. Th ey are what banks, or other lenders, charge when they lend you money, such as to buy a house or a car. When interest rates go up, money becomes more expensive. Th is eff ectively decreases demand for it, which translates into decreased spending in the economy by consumers and businesses, and a shrinking of the economy. Conversely, when interest rates go down, the price of money falls, and so more people “buy” more of it (i.e. they take out more loans), thereby growing the economy. If you want to stimulate the economy, lower interest rates so that people will be more inclined to borrow money to spend on new cars, condos, home renovations, and so on.

Who controls interest rates? Th e answer is complicated. All we need to know here is that nearly every country has a central bank. Th is is a public institution—like the Federal Reserve of the United States, or the Bank of Canada—that is in charge of (a) printing the

158 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

national currency, and (b) managing interest rates. Together, these two things determine the money supply in a given country. (Central banks manage just the leading national interest rate—oft en called the overnight rate—which sets the tone for all other lending institutions inside that country.)

Th e central bank is usually semi-autonomous, meaning that it is set at arm’s length from the (elected) national government, so that the passions of party politics don’t inter- fere with the serious, sober, diffi cult, technical business of setting interest rates, which in many ways set the tone for the whole economy. Th e diff erence between fi scal and monetary policy is vital here. Monetary policy is as just described: control of the money supply by a semi-autonomous central bank, aloof from party politics. Fiscal policy, by contrast, refers to how governments spend money; it is refl ected in the offi cial budget, the rate of taxa- tion, new spending measures, and so on. Fiscal policy is in the direct daily control of the (elected) government; monetary policy is not.4

When a central bank sets its interest rate, what does it take into account? What’s the main objective? Overall, it’s to help ensure the long-term health of the national economy. In the shorter term, though, it’s the rate of infl ation that is the central concern. Infl ation is the overall increase in the price of goods and services in an economy over time. If, for example, the annual rate of infl ation is 5 per cent, then a loaf of bread that cost $2.00 last year now costs $2.10. Most central banks aim for a very modest and controlled rate of infl ation, roughly between 1 per cent and 3 per cent per year. Th e average annual rate of infl ation in the US between 2005 and 2010 was 2.87 per cent; in Canada it was 1.78 per cent.

E co

n o

m ic

A ct

iv it

y

‘Expansion Phase’ ‘Contraction Phase’

Depth of Bust

Peak of Boom

Time

Cycle Repeats . . .

Figure 6.2 The Business Cycle

Th e welfare state is expected to engage in “counter-cyclical activity” to smooth out the business cycle. For example, the government is supposed to increase spending during a contraction to hasten an expansion.

1596 International Trade and Business

High infl ation, above the desirable target band, is thought to be destabilizing, perhaps leading to hyperinfl ation—very rapid and unpredictable price increases. High infl ation is bad for the economy because it prevents consumers from planning their purchases, and the con- stant rise of prices means they can aff ord less and less as time goes on (unless their incomes rise very rapidly, too, which usually doesn’t happen). Generally, infl ation rates are much higher in developing societies than in developed ones. For instance, the average annual rate of infl ation in India, 2005–10, was 10.35 per cent; in Russia, 12.54 per cent. In Africa, they don’t have reliable fi gures, but the rate can rise by hundreds of percentage points per year (!).

Th e converse problem is that of defl ation, which is a downward spiral of falling prices and falling asset values, which encourages saving instead of spending (as people wait for prices to fall even further). Defl ation causes the economy to shrink. (Japan has had recent problems with defl ation, with its average annual infl ation rate, 2005–10, being −0.39 per cent.) Ideally, as a central bank, you want your country’s asset values (such as real estate) to increase, and the economy to grow; at the same time, you do not want prices to skyrocket, especially on consumer staples like bread, clothing, and gasoline. Hence, the ideal 1–3 per cent infl ation target band.5

Currency

Now, who or what determines the relative value of a nation’s currency? As with interest rates, the answer is complex, but the big, sweeping answer is that the world demand for your currency, by and large, determines its value. When the world wants to invest in your country, when it wants to buy your goods and services, it must buy your national currency in quantities suffi cient to pay for those things; this drives the value of your currency up (your currency thus appreciates). When the reverse things are true, your currency falls (or depreciates). Much has to do with (a) the way the world sees your economy in the future, and (b) the value of the things your country produces and trades. For example, over the past 20 years, the Canadian dollar has gone from being worth about 75 cents US to being about equal in value to one US dollar. Th is is so because international investors have confi dence in Canada’s future (i.e. they believe that it has a well-managed national economy) and because the demand for the natural resource commodities that Canada has in abundance—oil and gas, potash, coal, steel, nickel, silver, and wheat—is skyrocketing, especially from such newly industrializing giants as China and India.

Th e world’s most important, and frequently traded, currencies are: • the US dollar • the EU’s euro • China’s yuan • Japan’s yen • the British pound • India’s rupee • Russia’s ruble • the Swiss franc • the Canadian and Australian dollars.6

160 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

Since World War II, the US dollar has been far and away the biggest and strongest national currency, the benchmark against which all other currencies are measured, and the prin- cipal reserve currency (a currency that central banks of other countries are comfortable holding as part of their foreign exchange reserves). Under the terms of the Bretton Woods agreement, signed in 1944, the value of the US dollar became fi xed—tied to the price of gold. Th is meant that other countries holding reserves of US dollars in their central banks could convert their American currency to gold at a fi xed rate (of 35 US dollars per ounce of gold). In the early 1970s, when American gold reserves were running low, US president Richard Nixon put an end to the gold standard. Since then, all major currencies have been fl oating—based on their value relative to other world currencies and to world demand, not on the possession of any kind of hard asset, such as gold.

When the value of one country’s currency drops relative to the value of another country’s currency, the fi rst country’s goods and services become cheaper, and the second country becomes tempted to buy more of them. Consider an example: when the value of the Canadian

dollar falls, Americans buy more Canadian products (like lumber, salmon, wheat, and oil and gas) because now the US dollar buys more Canadian goods. (When Americans—be they large retailers or individual consumers— buy Canadian goods for import, they must pay in Canadian dollars, and vice versa.) Conversely, when the Canadian dollar goes up vis-à-vis the US dollar, Canadian goods become more expensive, and Americans buy less of them: they don’t take summer vacations in Canada, and they switch to buying their apples from Washington State and not from BC. And Canadians, for their part, take advantage of their own rising currency to import American goods, or to go on cross-border shopping trips to Bellingham, Grand Forks, Buff alo and other American cities along the border, because now those things are cheaper for them. Th e key fact is this: when your nation’s currency falls in value, this actually stimulates export growth and thus expands your economy, whereas when your nation’s currency rises in value, this stimulates import growth and shrinks your economy.7

International Trade

Why Trade at All?

International trade is the movement of goods and services across national borders in exchange for money. Why trade at all? Several reasons:

• Some goods and services just can’t be produced at home, for instance, because of climate. If you live in Iceland and you love oranges, the only way your love can be satisfi ed is by shipping in some citrus from, say, Spain or Florida. Th at’s importing.

• You might want to expand the market for your product. Let’s say you make an excel- lent product, but you want to make more money than you’re currently making selling it at home. In that case, you might want to consider selling not just to customers in your own country but to paying customers in other countries, too. Th at’s exporting.

When your nation’s currency falls in value, it stimulates export growth and expands your economy; when your nation’s currency rises, it stimulates import growth and shrinks your economy.

1616 International Trade and Business

• Th e theory, and reality, of comparative advantage, the idea that when we trade, we benefi t. Th ink of an analogy to personal life. Imagine if all of us, as individuals, had to produce everything we needed and wanted for ourselves: we had to grow our own crops, milk our own cows, sew our own clothes, build our own cellphones, manufacture our own cars, and so on. We couldn’t do it, of course, and it would be exhausting and impoverishing merely to try. Indeed, our ancient ancestors had to do just that (minus the cars and cellphones, of course!), and it was a very tough life, until someone clever said: “I’m only really good at growing corn, so I’m going to grow a ton of it—way more than I need. Th en I’ll take some of the surplus to Sam, who’ll give me surplus milk from his cows. And I’ll take some more surplus corn and give it to Jenny, who in exchange will make some clothes for me—she’s good at that. I’ll special- ize in what I do best, produce a surplus, and trade that surplus for all the other things I want and need.” Th is principle is known as the division of labour, and it amounts to specializing in one’s comparative advantage (i.e. do what you do best) and then trad- ing one’s surplus for the surplus of others who’ve done the same thing. On the basis of this principle the modern global economy was built, with all its dazzling variety, complexity, and wealth-generating capacity.

• Countries are like the individuals described above: some are better suited to doing, producing, or providing some things than others are (thanks either to natural endowments or to how history has situated them). Want a sunny, beachfront vaca- tion in January? Th en head for the Caribbean, and not the shores of, say, Churchill, Manitoba. But, want to see polar bears, beluga whales, and northern lights? Reverse the order. Or, want a huge supply of oil? Th en head to Saudi Arabia—and not Japan. But if you’re looking for the glitziest electronics and some of the best-produced cars in the world, reverse the order. Finally, want the latest and greatest soft ware, military technology, or Hollywood blockbuster? Go to the States—and not Africa. But if you want to see the Pyramids or Victoria Falls, or go on a wild animal safari . . . you get the idea. Countries have comparative advantages, and the prevailing theory is that they, like people, ought to stick to what they do best, produce it in abundance, and trade the surplus to other countries with something diff erent to off er. Th e net result is that we all save time and eff ort, we all get to experience a greater diversity of things, we can access some of the world’s (and not merely just our nation’s) best products and services, and our lives will be improved as a result. International trade makes for better lives and higher average standards of living. Indeed, trade is a signifi cant and growing contributor to global wealth, accounting for between 16 and 22 per cent of overall global economic activity. Th is is to say, loosely, that without international trade, we’d all be nearly 20 per cent poorer than we are. Th at, in a nutshell, is the value of engaging in international trade.8

Fun Facts: Trading Nations, Traded Goods

An important concept for any country it its current account balance. Th is is, roughly, a country’s exports minus its imports. A country that exports more than it imports has a trade surplus, which we know grows its economy; a country that imports more than

162 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

it exports has a trade defi cit, which drags down its economy. Th e top 10 trade surplus countries, as of 2009, are:

1. China 6. Iran 2. Japan 7. Norway 3. Germany 8. the Netherlands 4. Saudi Arabia 9. Kuwait 5. Russia 10. Singapore.

Canada ranks number 22 on this list, while the USA sits at number . . . 181. Indeed, the United States has the world’s largest trade defi cit. With a population of over 310 million, the US has the biggest trade defi cit because it must import so many things, worth so much money, from other countries to meet its enormous domestic demand for consumer goods, for oil and gas, and for the supplies—natural and human-made—that American businesses need to manufacture their own products. (Some people cite this fact when arguing that America is a declining power rather than a rising one.)9

Some nations are much more active traders than others. By US dollar value of trade, the world’s top 10 trading economies—i.e. those most actively involved in international trade—are:

1. the European Union (considered as a whole) 2. the United States 3. China 4. Germany 5. Japan 6. France 7. the United Kingdom 8. the Netherlands 9. Italy 10. South Korea and Canada (tied).

And some economies are, of course, much more dependent on international trade for their national wealth. (Th is can be either good or bad, depending on the circumstances: good insofar as it helps that economy grow way beyond its borders, but potentially bad in that it also introduces clear aspects of dependence on other countries.) By percentage of their national GDP, the 10 most trade-reliant nations are:

1. Belgium 6. Switzerland 2. Taiwan 7. Sweden 3. the Netherlands 8. Poland 4. South Korea 9. Austria 5. Saudi Arabia 10. Germany.

1636 International Trade and Business

On this list, Canada is thirteenth; the US, thirtieth.10 Finally, it may be of interest to note that the world’s 10 most actively traded goods, by

dollar value, are: 1. oil and gas 2. electrical/electronic equipment (e.g. switches, wiring, lights, consumer electronics) 3. heavy machinery (e.g. for factories and construction) 4. vehicles (i.e., cars and trucks) 5. medicines and pharmaceuticals 6. optical aids and apparatuses (i.e. contact lenses and glasses) 7. plastics 8. precious metals (gold, silver, etc.) 9. chemicals 10. iron, coal, and steel.

You may fi nd it surprising that consumer staples—food, beverages, clothing, and so on— are not on this list. Th ey are in the top 20, though, and surely the volume of trade in such goods is enormous. However, (1) many of these necessities are produced locally rather than imported, and (2) they are clearly not worth as much, in terms of dollar value, as cars, heavy machinery, or precious metals. Note, too, the world’s most valuable traded good and consider how much it helps many of the countries on the list of those with the biggest trade surpluses. It’s amazing how vital oil is to so many countries, and to the world economy generally.11

Trade Policies

Th ere are three basic policy orientations that countries can take towards international trade: autarchy, free trade, and export-led development. Let’s consider each in turn.

Autarchy/Mercantilism

Autarchy is a policy of determined self-suffi ciency in economic matters. An eff ort at being “beholden to none,” autarchy is the drive for a nation to provide as much as it can for itself, and to minimize any dependency on foreign relations or trade. Th e related doctrine of mercantilism sees the national government playing the leading role in economic policy, trying to do the absolute best it can for its country and its people by maximizing their resources and using them to further develop and strengthen the nation.

As economic policies, autarchy and mercantilism are viewed today as dated doctrines that are not good for the wealth of the people. First, think of the 20 per cent pay cut men- tioned above: opting out of trade is costly. Second, consider how countries that try to follow this policy—like Albania and North Korea—are very much impoverished outsiders on the margins of the world economy. Th ink, too, of what such policies condemn their citizens to: poverty, invasive government control, lack of diversity, and shoddy products manufactured by local businesses that know their goods don’t have to compete with foreign ones. Finally,

164 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

Canada’s Vital Economic & Trade Statistics

Population: 34 million (81 per cent urban; 19 per cent rural)

Total GDP: US$1.5 trillion/year (10th–15th largest economy in world, depend- ing on the measuring tool used)

GDP per capita: US$40,000/per person/year (again, 10th–15th highest)

Composition of Economy (by labour force, estimated): 70 per cent services; 25 per cent industry (manufacturing/construction); 5 per cent primary sector (i.e. agriculture & natural resource extraction)

Economic Growth (2005–10 average): 1 per cent/year (lower than the histori- cal, post–World War II norm of 3 per cent/year, owing largely to the recent recession of 2008–9)

Currency: Canadian dollar (“the Loonie”) (currently around par [+/− 3 cents] with the US dollar)

Infl ation Rate (2005–10 average): 1.78 per cent/year

Unemployment Rate (2005–10 average): 7.75 per cent/year

Trade Surplus/Defi cit: Consistently a trade surplus country (currently num- ber 22 in world)

Trade Dependency: Canada ranks number 13 among the most trade-depen- dent nations in the world: an estimated 36–42 per cent of Canada’s GDP comes from its very active involvement in international trade.

American Dependency: the US takes 75 per cent of all Canada’s exports, and is the source of 50 per cent of all Canada’s imports.

Top Five Trading Partners (as of 2010):

1. USA 2. EU 3. China 4. Japan 5. Mexico.

(To illustrate Canada’s dependency on the US, note that the US is the des- tination for 75 per cent of Canada’s exports; the EU, second on the list, receives just 10.5 per cent of Canada’s exports. The US is the source of 50 per cent of Canada’s imports; number 2 on that list is China, which provides Canada with just 11 per cent of its total imports.)

Free Trade Treaties: (1) with the United States, the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 1989; (2) with the US and Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 2004. Lesser, more limited agreements exist with Israel, various Caribbean and Latin American countries, and, in 2010, the EU.

Canadian Insights

1656 International Trade and Business

when you think about it, you can see how, historically, mercantilism was a recipe for war. All the European empires used to be run on mercantilist lines: maximize self-suffi ciency and minimize dependency and connections with other empires. Such an attitude fuelled imperial drives towards colonialism—since the more land, resources, and people you had under your imperial roof, the more self-reliant you could be, right? But that brought empires into direct competition and confl ict for those resources, causing many a horrible war. And that, we saw in Chapter 5, is why the founders of the EU in 1950 went the other way: away from autarchy, mercantilism, colonialism, and imperial rivalry, towards linking economies together, forging robust trading relations, and creating many, and deep, social interconnections.12

Free Trade/Internationalism

With the demise of historical mercantilism, the tide has turned towards the second kind of trade policy: free trade and internationalism (i.e. being a fully interconnected participant in the global economy). Most countries now realize the benefi ts to be had from trade—the 20 per cent pay raise, as it were—and have gladly shrugged off the silly and ineffi cient bur- dens of trying to produce everything for themselves. Th ey have embraced the “trade” part, but what about the “free” part?

Free trade refers to the exchange of goods and services between countries that elect not to use any protectionist measures (defi ned below) against each other. Free trade is international commerce that is tariff -free, quota-free, ban-free, and subsidy-free: what gets traded—and at what price and quantity—is determined solely by the market forces of sup- ply and demand, not by any government regulation or intervention.

Top Traded Goods:

A. Exports

• oil and gas • uranium and aluminum • timber and wood pulp • electric power • cars and parts • industrial machinery • telecommunications equipment • chemicals and plastics

B. Imports

• industrial machinery • vehicles • electronics • consumer durables and retail goods.

Source: Statistics Canada, www.statscan.gc.ca; United Nations Statistics Division, www.unstats.un.org/unsd; CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook.

166 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

Th e facts show that, historically, the freer the trade, the greater the wealth that is cre- ated. Today it is all the rage for countries to enter into either bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements, and there are now hundreds of these agreements in place around the world. We saw in Chapter 5 how the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement was created in 1989 as a bilateral (i.e. two-sided) free trade agreement between the two countries. Th e signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 brought Mexico into the treaty, making it a multilateral (i.e. many-sided) deal. Other important free trade deals and regions include:

• the EU (western and central Europe) • APEC (the Asia–Pacifi c region) • CARICOM (the Caribbean islands) • MERCOSUR (South America) • CAFTA (Central America).

Currently Russia is trying to negotiate such a deal with its ex–Soviet Union partners in cen- tral Asia and eastern Europe. Th ere is even talk of some deal between the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), who have recently begun to meet annually to (a) draw world attention to their emerging status as major economic and political powers, and (b) advance their claims for “a multi-polar world order” to replace the two-dimensional view that considers only the developed West, on the one hand, and the Global South on the other.13

Th at said, it must be admitted—and stressed—that nowhere does pure free trade exist. It is an ideal that exists to varying degrees in various places, but even countries that are clearly committed to the ideal of free trade have been known to take protectionist measures. Th ese are hurdles or obstacles imposed by national governments on certain imported goods in order to protect domestic goods or industries. Th e most common protectionist measure is the tariff , a tax on foreign, imported goods, which increases the price of these goods, mak- ing them more unattractive to consumers (relative to competing local or domestic goods). Th e US, for example, levies tariff s on Canadian soft wood lumber to protect American lumber companies that would otherwise lose out on sales to customers at home in the US.

Other protectionist measures include quotas, product bans, and government subsi- dies. Quotas are limits a country places on the number of foreign-produced goods that it’s willing to allow to be imported for sale into its country. Japan, for instance, limits the number of North American–made cars it’s willing to allow for sale in Japan. Outright product bans are used to totally prohibit certain goods from entering a country; product bans usually exist in connection with agricultural goods. Th e US bans citrus fruit imports from any other country, and Canada bans the import of fresh milk from any non-Canadian source. Th is protects both the orange groves of Florida and the dairy farmers of Canada. Government subsidies are investments made by national governments (using domes- tic taxpayer dollars) into a domestic company or industry, with the goal of giving it a “leg up” on foreign competitors and create jobs at home. Almost every government does this in some way: Canada gives government subsidies to the transport supply company Bombardier, which manufactures planes, subways, and other large transportation vehicles. Th e US subsidizes almost its entire weapons industry. (Cynics note that Bombardier is located in vote-rich Montreal; and many defence industry companies are in vote-rich California. Should we consider these subsidies genuinely economic or, rather, political?)14

1676 International Trade and Business

MERCOSUR • Argentina • Brazil • Paraguay • Uruguay

DAFTA • US • Costa Rica • Dominican Republic • El Salvador • Guatemala • Honduras • Nicaragua

CARICOM • Antigua and Barbuda • Bahamas • Barbados • Belize • Dominica • Grenada • Guyana • Haiti • Jamaica • Montserrat • St Lucia • St Kitts and Nevis • St Vincent and the Grenadines • Suriname • Trinidad and Tobago

(ASSOCIATE MEMBERS) • Anguilla • Bermuda • British Virgin Islands • Cayman Islands • Turks & Caicos Islands

Bermuda (U.K.) United States

Mexico

Belize

Brazil

Cuba Bahamas

Jamaica Haïti

Dominican Republic

Guatemala

El Salvador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Panama

Venezuela Guyana

Suriname French Guiana (Fr)

Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

Bolivia

Chile

Argentina

Paraguay

Uruguay

Peurto Rico (US)

Trinidad and Tobago

Turks and Caicos Islands

Guadeloupe (Fr) Martinique (Fr)

Dominica St Lucia

Barbados

St Vincent and the GrenadinesGrenada

Antigua and Barbuda St Kitts and Nevis

Cayman Islands British Virgin Islands Anguilla

Montserrat

Figure 6.3 Free Trade Regions in Central and South America

Not to be outdone by the EU, China, and North America, such regions as the Caribbean and Latin America have recently developed a taste for free trade deals.

Source: US Central Intelligence Agency, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

168 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

Export-Led Development

Th is third policy represents something of a blended approach between autarchy and inter- nationalism. Th e goal of export-led development is to use the tools of mercantilism and protectionism to grow select local industries until they are strong enough to compete on the world stage. At that point, you can aggressively engage in free trade and earn lots of money off your exports, and then use that money to develop your society further, making it richer and more sophisticated.

Case Study: Asia and Export-Led Development Th e most successful model of export-led development in modern history is post–World War II Japan, and now many other nations throughout Asia are trying to copy that suc- cess. When South Korea decided to jump-start its economic development during the

J A PA N

Russia

North Korea

S O U T H

KO R E A

C H I N A

TA I W A N

Philippines

Papua New Guinea

Indonesia

Brunei Malaysia

SINGAPORE

Timor

Thailand Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Burma (Myanmar)

India

Mongolia

H O N G

KO N G

Figure 6.4 Free Trade Regions in Asia

Th e “Asian Tigers/Dragons”: China, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, all following in the footsteps of Japan.

Source: www.taiwandocuments.org/map01.htm

1696 International Trade and Business

1960s and 1970s, it did so by trying to grow a local car and electronics manufactur- ing industry (modelled aft er Japan’s). To nurture these industries, the government gave Korean auto-makers and electronics-makers taxpayer dollars (subsidies) and placed quotas on imported foreign cars and electronics equipment so as to build local Korean demand for both. Aft er a couple of decades, once quality had substantially improved, the South Koreans were confi dent that their cars and electronics could compete on the world market. As a result, both the subsidies and the quotas were substantially relaxed, and South Korean cars like Hyundai and Kia and electronics like Samsung and LG are now sold very successfully around the world. Th is success allowed South Korea, in 2009–10, to sign free trade deals both with the European Union and the United States, and the coun- try, as we saw above, is now one of the most actively engaged trading nations on Earth.

Adopting a policy of export-led development—beginning with mercantilism, then free trade, and then using the profi ts to grow richer—has allowed South Korea to substantially increase its GDP, and it has worked very well for the other so-called Asian Dragons, or Asian Tigers: China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan. Whether it can work elsewhere, like the Global South, is something we’ll address in Chapter 11, on aid and development.15

Globalization and International Trade Institutions

International trade has skyrocketed since the mid-twentieth century. Both Th e Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II in the 1940s were blamed on autarchy, mer- cantilism, and the lack of trade and economic co-operation between countries. Following the war, the EU countries, as we’ve seen, sought to grow trade and interconnection among themselves on a regional, multilateral basis. But the Americans went one step further, pushing the cause of free trade on a truly global, multilateral basis. Th ey did this by using their position as a superpower (in the wake of the war) to create some global economic institutions. We shall consider the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in future chapters, as their mandate is to aid the development of the Global South. Here, we will discuss the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade (GATT) and its successor institution, the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Founded in 1947, GATT was the focal point for several huge—i.e. truly global—rounds of multilateral negotiations on reducing tariff s (on manufactured goods, in particular). Th ese negotiations were very successful, resulting in a substantial, mutual lowering of tariff s around the world. Th e results were exactly as economists predicted—much more trade, and much richer economies. Contemporary globalization, with the United States as its driving force, had begun.16

In 1995, the GATT became the WTO, headquartered in Geneva. It is a permanent institution, a watchdog of sorts, with powers of oversight, mediation, and enforcement in particular. Th e oversight is needed to ensure that countries keep their promises about reducing tariff s. Mediation has to be available so that if two countries are having a trade dispute (these tend to focus on whether government subsidies are unfair and violate free trade), they can appeal their case to the WTO, which investigates, hears both sides, and then issues a neutral, third-party ruling. Canada and the US, for example, have had to do this with the issue of Canada’s export of soft wood lumber into the United States. Th e US

170 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

alleges that this industry is indirectly and unfairly subsidized by the Canadian govern- ment; Canada denies the claim, counter-arguing that American tariff s on Canadian lumber violate free trade and are simply America’s way of protecting its own domestic lumber industry. Th e WTO has issued a number of rulings in the ongoing trade dispute, most of them in Canada’s favour. Which brings us to enforcement. Th e WTO is empowered to levy fi nes when it determines that a trade deal has been violated or that unfair subsidization has occurred. Alternatively, the WTO allows the victimized countries to retaliate with tariff s or subsidies of their own. In 2000, the WTO allowed Canada to slap $345 million worth of tar- iff s and sanctions on Brazil, as a result of the latter’s heavily subsidizing its aircraft industry, which has caused Canadian companies like Bombardier to lose valuable contracts. Such “tit-for-tat” measures, when authorized globally by the WTO, are accepted by the interna- tional community as a legitimate way to (a) level the playing fi eld, ensuring fairness and reciprocity, and (b) avoid trade wars between countries. A trade war is characterized by a downward spiral of mutual tariff s, quotas, non-engagement, and even sanctions between the disputing countries; it can create much ill will, cost the people of the two countries sub- stantially, and lead to further bad feelings that, at worst, might spark an armed confl ict.17

So the recent expansion of international trade has brought about new levels of eco- nomic development and created considerable wealth. And the institutions are now in place to drive and enforce the continued growth of trade on both a regional and global basis. Does it follow that, as they say, we are now on “auto-pilot to the moon”? Have we reached the nirvana of globalization, or is it, at least, just around the corner?

Globalization has begun, and it is a clear trend (there’s no denying it), evident perhaps more clearly in the realm of trade than in any other. Th ere are now wide and deep inter- connections between economies that a few decades ago had nothing to do with each other. More production is global in scale; more sales and marketing are global; the horizons of businesspeople are global; communications technology has allowed for unprecedented global information-sharing and increasingly tight cultural interconnectivity; and there is a global hegemon (i.e. the US) that is generally supportive of free—or, at least, freer—trade in respects of most goods. In spite of all this, the answer must be that there are potential problems with the status quo of trade and globalization moving forward.18

Problems with the Status Quo

A Cautionary Reminder from History

Free trade, internationalism, and globalization clearly are trends, and vital features, of the era in which we live. However, history tells us that there’s nothing guaranteed about the continu-

ance of these trends. Th ere have been previous eras of relative globalization and freer trade—going all the way back to the Roman Empire—and they all, eventually, came to an end. It’s important to keep perspective and appreciate historical cycles. Th e most relevant historical epoch, for our purposes here, was from about 1850 to 1914, when there was another global hegemon— Great Britain—that favoured the free trade of British goods throughout not just its worldwide empire but the rest of the world as well. It supported trade vigorously with its Royal Navy and its excellent system of railroads. Moreover, its hegemony secured stability and relative peace while deterring

There have been previous eras of relative globalization and freer trade, and they all, eventually, came to an end.

1716 International Trade and Business

major wars. It was also a time of amazing new inventions—railways, electricity, automo- biles—as well as a revolution in communications technology, with the introduction of mass newspapers and radio, and the fi rst experiments with television. Sound familiar? Change the hegemon from the UK to the USA and the technology innovations from the list above to today’s high-tech gadgets, and you have something a lot like our time. But that era came to an end once Germany decided to challenge Britain (and France) for supremacy. Th ese poisonous national rivalries kicked off a series of events that eventually sparked the two big- gest wars the world has yet seen. People, and nations, don’t always make choices based on the ideals of pure economic rationality—and sobering facts like that undermine our confi dence in predicting the ever-upward progress of free trade and globalization.19

Trade Rivalries between Big Regional Blocs?

Some experts, like Harold James, see the unfolding facts of free trade and globalization more gloomily still.20 Instead of a relentless, American-led march to global free trade, these observers see the creation of several huge trading blocs: grouped countries that practise free trade internally with each other but that are fi ercely protectionist externally towards non-members and other blocs. Th e blocs most frequently identifi ed are Europe, North America, and the Pacifi c Rim with China at its centre. While these are the “big three” eco- nomic units right now, and while they do have many trade disagreements between them, and while such a dystopian future may unfold, for now we should note—to balance the led- ger—the many interconnections that nevertheless exist between these huge groupings. Th e EU, for instance, is both China’s and India’s largest trading partner. North America has many historical ties of immigration with all these regions, and the US, moreover, has a complex interdependence—not just a rivalry—with China. China very much wants to sell its goods into the vast and wealthy US marketplace, and the American consumer certainly wants China’s inexpensive goods. China is a saver–surplus nation that likes to invest in American real estate and American companies that, in turn, are grateful for the cash (the US being the top spender–debtor nation). So, in spite of grim, Orwellian predictions about huge rival trading blocs going to war against each other—a situation akin to a return to mercantilism, on a much larger scale—we must note the existence of other, more peaceful possibilities.21

Winners and Losers

Even when trade is mutually benefi cial, which it very oft en is, it does not follow that all parties benefi t to the same degree. Th is has to do with the distribution of benefi ts, and it creates a divide between (relative) winners and losers. Consider the following example. A company in China and another in the US strike a deal: the Chinese company makes chairs, and the American company imports them into the States for sale to American furniture retailers. Th e deal might create profi t for both companies, yet the US company might enjoy $12 million worth of profi ts from the deal, whereas the Chinese company may only profi t to the tune of $5 million.

Much worse than that is a case of outright loss from trade. For example, the United States used to have its own fl ourishing sector of furniture manufacturing. Today, many of the country’s furniture manufacturers have gone bankrupt, unable to compete with the incredibly low costs of production—especially labour costs—enjoyed by their global

172 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

The Pains of Global Interconnection

This criticism of the status quo in international trade hinges on the question of whether globalized interconnections—technological and otherwise— really bring unqualifi ed benefi ts to all parties involved.

On the one hand, globalization has brought such undeniable rewards as the enrichment that comes with experiencing the cuisine, entertainment, and other cultural contributions of societies very distant and different from our own. Advances in global technology and new media facilitate this sharing and mean that we can communicate with almost anyone almost anywhere in the world.

On the other hand, interconnectedness means that when problems hit one part of the world, we can no longer isolate ourselves from it, or protect ourselves from its negative consequences. This has been made most appar- ent over the last 20 years in the case of fi nancial markets, which have become almost totally global and totally high-tech. Like never before, the banking and fi nancial sector, alongside the insurance industry and the stock, bond, and currency markets, is global in nature. Huge banks in America and Europe have massive fi nancial interests around the globe, as do the governments of China, Japan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. Behemoth insurance companies in New York and London provide insurance to homeowners, vehicle owners, and businesses all over the world, exposing them to worldwide risk.

Studies in Technology

Th is Indian man might be going online to see how his Apple stock is doing today. How has technology united world fi nancial markets like never before? (© nullplus/iStockphoto)

1736 International Trade and Business

Everyone seems to have their hands in everyone else’s pockets, so to speak. This might be fi ne when things are going well: “a rising tide lifts all ships,” as they say. But it can become a big problem when someone goes under, and suddenly everyone is at risk of drowning. Given the rapid speed of worldwide information-sharing via the Internet, combined with these many and deep fi nancial interconnections, it’s nearly automatic that when problems hit one region, the rest of the world suffers, perhaps quite needlessly. And the effects are immediate, given instantaneous high-tech trading.22 There are two recent examples worth considering.

The fi rst is the 2006–8 US mortgage crisis, which threatened almost the entire banking system in the developed world and is widely credited with creating the most recent, nearly worldwide recession. The mortgage crisis began when bankers in the US loaned too much money to people who used it to buy expensive homes they couldn’t really afford. The bankers did this because (a) it was legal, and (b) the bankers themselves got paid on the basis of how many mortgage deals they signed, and not on whether those signing customers could keep making their mortgage payments into the future. It was a case of a short-term obsession trumping sound long- term planning. So, when interest rates went up, raising mortgage rates with them, many homeowners couldn’t afford their mortgage payments any- more, which meant they had to give up, and move out of, their homes. With a glut of homes lost to foreclosure suddenly on the market, house prices

Problems with American real estate fi nancing rippled all over our globalized world, causing recession nearly everywhere in 2007–9. (© GYI NSEA/iStockphoto)

174 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

competitors, China in particular. When trade with China opened up, the American labour- ers who used to work in that industry lost their jobs, and the business owners lost their businesses. So, American consumers in general did gain, as did Chinese factory owners and workers, but specifi c American owners and workers in the same fi eld lost when the recent wave of US–China trade took off . Trade can create both mutual benefi ts and win- ners and losers, owing to the number of people—and the diff erent groups of people—who are aff ected.25

Examples like the one above help to explain why there are groups of people out there who resist international trade and the growth of trade organizations like the WTO. Recently, whenever there has been a meeting of the World Trade Organization or the G8/G20 (i.e. either the eight or the twenty countries with the largest economies), there have been large groups of protesters—in fact, since the early 1990s, these groups have been fi xtures at such events. Oft en, these protesters, who typically come from labour, environmental, human rights, and anti-poverty groups, claim to be acting in the interests of the global poor and unskilled—those most vulnerable to outright losses from international trade. Trade deals oft en include an agreement on certain standards that all signing parties must observe, such as specifi c labour laws and practices. Th is is an attempt to “level the playing fi eld” and make the trading fair. Th ere is a fear, though, that in deals of this kind, the lower, less demanding standard will prevail, as it is likely to be the least costly to business interests. Protesters fear that labour arrangements signed as part of trade deals will always be maximally advanta- geous to for-profi t businesses and very disadvantageous to the average working person, bringing lower wages, reduced benefi ts, longer working hours, fewer safety standards, and fewer pollution controls—all in the name of competing with countries like China (where, incidentally, workers work for peanuts in oft en unhealthy and unsafe conditions, where pollution is a terrible problem, and where striking for better conditions is not an option).

crashed, saddling banks with a lot of properties they couldn’t sell and debts they couldn’t collect, causing them huge losses. Banks became much pickier when it came to deciding to whom they were willing to lend money. Result: US banks lending much less; much less money going around; much less consumer spending; recession. And almost worldwide, too, for—as they say—when the US consumer substantially cuts back, everyone around the world (trying to sell to them) substantially feels it.23

The second example of the pains of global interconnection, still ongo- ing, is the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. As we saw last chapter, debtor countries like Greece and Italy have enormous public debts, and surplus countries like the Netherlands and Germany are sick of bailing them out. The rich EU members are pushing the have-nots to get their fi nancial houses in order, darkly suggesting the country’s EU membership is at stake (though revoking EU membership is an untested process that might not be possible). This serious instability within the world’s largest (or second-largest) eco- nomic unit has caused stock markets around the world to draw back and lose much value, uncertain of how this will affect the entire world economy and its prospects for growth moving forward.24

1756 International Trade and Business

Th ankfully, these fears haven’t been realized on a mass scale. For example, NAFTA has been in place since 1994, and wages and working conditions in the US and Canada haven’t collapsed to Mexican levels. As it turns out, there are other factors that businesses care about, such as the education and skill level of their workers—fi elds where the developed world scores very highly. Transportation costs are relevant, too, as is the existence of a stable and eff ective legal and political framework within which to conduct business. But it does seem, generally, true to say that the rise of free trade and globalization has acceler- ated the trend of developing countries getting more and more low-cost, labour-intensive, goods-producing employment while developed societies are growing more and more in terms of highly skilled, service-based employment (like research, education, law, fi nance, accounting, engineering, management, design, and civil service). Th us, low-skilled, goods- producing workers in developed societies—think of workers on the assembly line at an American furniture company—are facing an increasingly bleak future in a globalized, free trade world. Even in a globalized Utopia, there will still be winners and losers.26

Participants versus Non-participants

It can be argued that not everyone benefi ts enough from the rise in trade and the growth of globalization. Certainly there are countries like North Korea, wilful non-participants in the global economy, who miss out on some of the benefi ts of globalization. But there is also the more disturbing problem of those who wish to participate in global trade but can’t, owing to their poverty or lack of tradeable goods, or to other barriers. Th e clear majority—about

A sign in St James Park, the main site of Toronto’s Occupy movement. Globalization certainly brought about the interconnection of the world’s fi nancial systems, but it also enabled this protest movement—one hatched in Vancouver and begun in New York—to spread globally with unprecedented speed and eff ectiveness. (© Jen Grantham/iStockphoto)

176 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

two-thirds—of all international trade is conducted either within the developed Northern economies or between the Northern economies and (a) the powerhouse emerging economies of China and India, or (b) the oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Other econo- mies in the Global South simply aren’t players in international trade—and they suff er from it.27

North versus South

How to explain such a discrepancy in trade activity between North and South? Several reasons come to mind. First, there is the issue of quality of goods. Many facilities in the South simply aren’t advanced enough to produce the kind and quality of good—especially manufactured good—to compete in the global marketplace. Second, trying to overcome that quality gap takes an investment of time and considerable resources: think back to the decades it took South Korea to build globally competitive automotive and electronics sec- tors. Many countries, especially in Africa, simply do not have the capital savings to invest in such an intensive program of manufacturing-based, export-led development, owing to their poverty. Th ird, in many developing societies—following the end of European colo- nialism—there has, until very recently, been a general bias away from international trade and towards nationalist ideals of self-suffi ciency. Th is created a governance style closer to mercantilist strategies, as opposed to aggressive international trading.

Finally, it’s not just internal reasons that explain why the South lags behind in inter- national trade. Th e most recent round of global, multilateral tariff negotiations ended in failure over fundamental disagreements between North and South. Agriculture was, and remains, a big sticking point. Th e North—Europe in particular—heavily subsidizes its farmers and protects their wares from the global competition of fully free trade. Th is is so because farmers are well-organized politically and simply demand the subsidies, but also because there exist legitimate raisons d’état (i.e., “reasons of state”): food and agriculture are vital for any society, and retaining some self-suffi ciency in this fi eld is sensible. It’s too risky for America, say, to start importing all its wheat from Russia, lest one day the Cold War return and thus expose the US to hostility, and leverage, from the Russians on something so central as a major food staple.

Th e Global South, for its part, views this as unprincipled, self-regarding behaviour by the North. Th e South’s argument would run along these lines: “Look, here is one area where we can truly compete on a global basis: we have tons of fertile land, an abundance of cheap labour, and a warm climate fi t to grow lots of high-quality agricultural products. Give us free trade here, and you will truly help us trade and develop. Plus, your own con- sumers back home will enjoy better selection at lower prices. But you refuse to do this out of hypocrisy: you favour free trade only when you know you’ll win. If it looks as though we might win, then you retreat—in a completely unprincipled way—behind the wall of protectionism.” Until this huge issue of trade in agricultural goods is settled, it’s hard to see the South making signifi cant gains in global trade.

And the North has issues of its own with the South. Th e North wants freer trade in such services as insurance and banking, so that its huge fi nancial companies can have access to new markets. Th e North also wants Southern governments to better protect intel- lectual property, that is, ownership rights, held by creators and inventors, to the products of intellectual creativity, such as books, soft ware, music, TV programs, video games, and Hollywood movies. Right now, these products get copied illegally and sold with abandon, especially in such huge markets as China and India, robbing their creators of any profi t

1776 International Trade and Business

from their own creation. A related point, relevant to global public health, is that Northern pharmaceutical companies want similar protections, and assurances of profi t before making their drugs and medicines widely available throughout the Global South (which very much needs them). Th e South, for its part, has little appetite for making any such reforms, linking progress here to reductions in Northern agricultural barriers. And the North, of course, prefers the deal the other way around: no reduction in agricultural barriers until there’s progress on IP protection and freer trade in fi nancial services. Th is has created a stalemate, and it’s unclear how things will move, regarding North–South trade, in the future.28

International Business

Th is section, on international business, consists of three parts, dealing with three impor- tant subjects:

• a generalized, cross-cultural look at how standard business practices and conventions diff er across major world regions (Table 6.1)

• a critical examination of the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in interna- tional trade and business

• a closing look at the new industry of fair trade and its connection to international development.

MNCs: Pros and Cons

Th e principal players in international trade are multinational corporations, or MNCs: large, for-profi t business enterprises with offi ces, branches, or outlets in many countries. Th e list of largest MNCs changes from year to year, but the following are regularly counted among the top 20:

• Wal-Mart (retailer) • HSBC (bank) • Exxon (oil producer) • General Electric (conglomerate [i.e. combined business] of manufacturing and fi nance) • Shell (oil producer) • Bank of America (bank) • British Petroleum (oil producer) • J.P. Morgan Chase (bank) • Apple (soft ware, computers, and telecommunications equipment) • Saudi Aramco (oil producer) • Toyota (auto maker) • ING (bank) • Sinopec (oil producer).

Note that the world’s very top MNCs specialize in only four areas: oil, money, manufactur- ing, and consumer retailing.29

178 Part III Traditional Issues of Hard Power: Bucks and Bullets

Ta b

le 6

.1 C ro

ss -c

u lt u ra

l B u si

n es

s P ra

ct ic

es

C ul

tu ra

l R eg

io n

B us

in es

s C

on ve

nt io

n

En gl

is h/

G er

m an

ic

So ci

et ie

s Ea

st A

si a

R om

an ce

- sp

ea ki

ng

Eu ro

pe &

La

ti n

A m

er ic

a So

ut he

as t A

si a

Ea st

er n

Eu ro

pe

M id

dl e

Ea st

P h

y si

ca l &

E y e

C o

n ta

ct B

o d

y

co n

ta ct

( e .g

. h

a n

d sh

a ke

s,

h u

g s)

a n

d e

y e

co n

ta ct

a re

w

e lc

o m

e .

B o

d y c

o n

ta ct

a n

d e

y e c

o n

ta ct

a re

a v o

id e d

a s

si g

n o

f re

sp e ct

.

B o

d y c

o n

ta ct

(e

.g . h

u g

, ch

e e k

ki ss

)i s

e x p

e c te

d .

E y e c

o n

ta ct

i s

a v o

id e d

a s

a

si g

n o

f re

sp e ct

.

B o

d y c

o n

ta ct

i s

a v o

id e d

u n

le ss

it

i s

in it

ia te

d b

y

a n

o th

e r.

E y e

co n

ta ct

i s

fi n

e .

H a n

d sh

a ke

s a n

d e

y e c

o n

ta ct

a re

e x p

e c te

d .

H a n

d sh

a ke

s a n

d

e y e c

o n

ta ct

a re

e x p

e c te

d . B

o d

y

co n

ta ct

w it

h

m e m

b e rs

o f

th e

o p

p o

si te

s e x a

re

a v o

id e d

u n

le ss

it

i s

in it

ia te

d b

y

a n

o th

e r.

A tt

it u

d e T

o w

a rd

In

n o

v a ti

o n

in

B u

si n

e ss

P

ra ct

ic e s

M o

d e ra

te ly

st

ro n

g t

e n

d e n

cy

to w

e lc

o m

e

n e w

i d

e a s

a n

d

ch a n

g e .

S tr

o n

g

te n

d e n

cy t

o

re s is

t ch

a n

g e

a n

d h

o ld

o n

t o

o

ld t

ra d

it io

n s.

S tr

o n

g

te n

d e n

cy t

o

w e lc

o m

e n

e w

id

e a s

a n

d

ch a n

g e

S tr

o n

g

te n

d e n

cy t

o

w e lc

o m

e n

e w

id

e a s

w h

il e

b e in

g s

ke p

ti ca

l o

f th

e ir

b e n

e fi

ts .

S tr

o n

g

te n

d e n

cy t

o

re s is

t n

e w

i d

e a s

a n

d c

h a n

g e .

M o

d e ra

te ly

st

ro n

g t

e n

d e n

cy

to r

e s is

t n

e w

id

e a s

a n

d

ch a n

g e .

P re

v a il in

g

L e a d

e rs

h ip

S

ty le

*

• P

e rf

o rm

a n

ce -

o ri

e n

te d

•

A u

to n

o m

o u

s

• Te

a m

-o ri

e n

te d

•

G ro

u p

- p

ro te

ct iv

e

• A

u to

n o

m o

u s

• P

e rf

o rm

a n

ce -

o ri

e n

te d

•

G ro

u p

- p

ro te

ct iv

e

• Te

a m

-o ri

e n

te d

•

G ro

u p

- p

ro te

ct iv

e

• A

u to

n o

m o

u s

• Te

a m

-O ri

e n

te d

• Te

a m

-o ri

e n

te d

•

G ro

u p

- p

ro te

ct iv

e

D e ci

si o

n -M

a ki

n g

H ig

h t

o le

ra n

c e

fo r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

f e w

e r

ru le

s a n

d l a w

s e x is

t to

c o

n tr

o l

o u

tc o

m e s.

M e d

iu m

to le

ra n

c e f

o r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

a

m o

d e ra

te

n u

m b

e r

o f

e n

a ct

e d

l a w

s a n

d

re g

u la

ti o

n s

e x is

t.

L o

w t

o le

ra n

c e

fo r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

st

ri n

g e n

t la

w s,

p

o li ci

e s,

a n

d

re g

u la

ti o

n s

e x is

t.

H ig

h t

o le

ra n

c e

fo r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

f e w

e r

ru le

s a n

d l a w

s e x is

t to

c o

n tr

o l

o u

tc o

m e s.

L o

w t

o le

ra n

c e

fo r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

st

ri n

g e n

t la

w s,

p

o li ci

e s,

a n

d

re g

u la

ti o

n s

e x is

t.

L o

w t

o le

ra n

c e

fo r

u n

ce rt

a in

ty ,

m e a n

in g

st

ri n

g e n

t la

w s,

p

o li ci

e s,

a n

d

re g

u la

ti o

n s

e x is

t.

co n

ti n

u e d

1796 International Trade and Business

Ta b

le 6

.1 C ro

ss -c

u lt u ra

l B u si

n es

s P ra

ct ic

es (

co n

ti n

u ed

)

C ul

tu ra

l R eg

io n

B us

in es

s C

on ve

nt io

n

En gl

is h/

G er

m an

ic

So ci

et ie

s Ea

st A

si a

R om

an ce

- sp

ea ki

ng

Eu ro

pe &

La

ti n

A m

er ic

a So

ut he

as t A

si a

Ea st

er n

Eu ro

pe

M id

dl e

Ea st

L e g

a l/ C

o n

tr a ct

u a l

(i .e

. To

w h

a t

e x te

n t

d o

e s

b u

si n

e ss

d

e p

e n

d o

n l e g

a l

co n

tr a ct

s? )

B u

si n

e ss

re

la ti

o n

sh ip

s a re

h e a v il y

d e p

e n

d e n

t o

n e

x te

n si

v e

co n

tr a ct

c la

u se

s.

L e g

a l d

o cu

m e n

ts

in b

u si

n e ss

a re

v ie

w e d

a s

p e ri

p h

e ra

l to

th

e r

e la

ti o

n sh

ip

it se

lf .

L e g

a l d

o cu

m e n

ts

in b

u si

n e ss

a re

v ie

w e d

a s

p e ri

p h

e ra

l to

th

e r

e la

ti o

n sh

ip

it se

lf .

L e g

a l d

o cu

m e n

ts

in b

u si

n e ss

a re

v ie

w e d

a s

p e ri

p h

e ra

l to

th

e r

e la

ti o

n sh

ip

it se

lf .

L e g

a l d

o cu

m e n

ts

in b

u si

n e ss

a re

v ie

w e d

a s

p e ri

p h

e ra

l to

th

e r

e la

ti o

n sh

ip

it se

lf .

L e g

a l d

o cu

m e n

ts

in b

u si

n e ss

a re

v ie

w e d

a s

p e ri

p h

e ra

l to

th

e r

e la

ti o

n sh

ip

it se

lf .

S o

ci a l In

e q

u a li ty

(i .e

. To

w h

a t

e x

te n

t d

o

p o

li ti

ca l,

s o

ci a

l,

a n

d e

co n

o m

ic

in e

q u

a li

ti e

s e

x is

t? )

M o

d e ra

te

p o

w e r

a n

d

w e a lt

h d

is p

a ri

ty

in s

o ci

e ty

.

L a rg

e p

o w

e r

a n

d w

e a lt

h

d is

p a ri

ty i n

so

ci e ty

, w

h ic

h

is t

h e a

cc e p

te d

n

o rm

.

M o

d e ra

te p

o w

e r

a n

d w

e a lt

h

d is

p a ri

ty i n

R

o m

a n

ce E

u ro

p e .

L a rg

e d

is p

a ri

ty i n

L a ti

n A

m e ri

ca .

L a rg

e p

o w

e r

a n

d w

e a lt

h

d is

p a ri

ty i n

so

ci e ty

, w

h ic

h

is t

h e a

cc e p

te d

n

o rm

.

L a rg

e p

o w

e r

a n

d w

e a lt

h

d is

p a ri

ty i n

so

ci e ty

, b

u t

it

is n

o t

w id

e ly

a cc

e p

te d

.

L a rg

e p

o w

e r

a n

d w

e a lt

h

d is

p a ri

ty i n

so

ci e ty

, w

h ic

h

is t

h e a

cc e p

te d

n

o rm

.

N o

te s:

“ E

n g

li sh

/G e rm

a n

ic S

o ci

e ti

e s”

i n

cl u

d e s

A u

st ra

li a , C

a n

a d

a , G

e rm

a n

y, S

ca n

d in

a v ia

, th

e U

K , a n

d t

h e U

S .

“ R

o m

a n

ce E

u ro

p e ” i n

cl u

d e s

e sp

. F ra

n ce

, It

a ly

, P

o rt

u g

a l, M

o ld

o v a , a n

d S

p a in

.

S o

u rc

e : M

a te

ri a l fo

r th

is t

a b

le c

o m

e s

fr o

m t

h e f

o ll o

w in

g s

o u

rc e s:

w w

w .e

x e cu

ti v e p

la n

e t.

co m

; N

. D

re ss

e r,

M u

lt ic

u lt

u ra

l M

a n

n e rs

( To

ro n

to :

W il e y &

S o

n s,

2 0 0 5 );

R .J

. H

o u

se , e t

a l. , e d

s, C

u lt

u re

, L e a d

e rs

h ip

a n

d O

rg a n

iz a ti

o n

s (N

e w

Y o

rk : S

a g

e , 2 0 0 4 );

G . H

o fs

te d

e , C

u lt

u re

’s

C o

n se

q u

e n

ce s

(N e w

Y o

rk : S

a g

e , 2 0 0 1 ).

T a b

le c

o -a

u th

o re

d w

it h

D e a n

n a Q

i, w

h o

s e r

e s e a rc

h w

a s f

u n

d e d

p a rt

ia ll y b

y t

h e U

n iv

e rs

it y

o f

W a te

rl o

o ’s

A c c o

u n

ti n

g a

n d

F in

a n

c ia

l M

a n

a g

e m

e n

t P

ro g

ra m

.

Le ad

er sh

ip S

ty le

s

• A

ut on

om ou

s: ch

ar ac

te ri

ze d

by a

n in

de pe

nd en

t, in

di vi

du al

is ti

c, s

el f-

ce nt

re d

ap pr

oa ch

to b

us in

es s l

ea de

rs hi

p. •

G ro

up -p

ro te

ct iv

e: e

m ph

as iz

in g

pr oc

ed ur

al , s

ta tu

s- co

ns ci

ou s,

an d

‘fa ce

-s av

in g’

b eh

av io

ur s;

fo cu

si ng

o n

th e

sa fe

ty a

nd se

cu ri

ty o

f t he

g ro

up a

nd it

s m em

be rs

. •

Pe rf

or m

an ce

-o ri

en te

d: st

re ss

in g

hi gh

st an

da rd

s, d

ec is

iv en

es s,

a nd

in no

va ti

on ; s

ee ki

ng to

in sp

ir e

pe op

le a

ro un

d a

vi si

on w

hi le

in st

ill in

g in

th em

a

pa ss

io n

to p

er fo

rm .

• Te

am -o

ri en

te d:

fo st

er in

g pr

id e,

lo ya

lty , a

nd c

ol la

bo ra

ti on

a m

on g

or ga

ni za

ti on

m em

be rs

; p la

ci ng

v al

ue o

n te

am c

oh es

iv en

es s a

nd a

c om

m on

p ur

po se

.

In cr

ea si

ng ly

, t he

re is

ta lk

o f o

th er

le ad

er sh

ip st

yl es

, e sp

ec ia

lly a

m on

g hi

gh -t

ec h

co m

pa ni

es o

f t he

‘n ew

e co

no m

y’ a

nd n

ot -f

or -p

ro fi t

o rg

an iz

at io

ns . Th

e se

in

cl ud

e pa

rt ic

ip at

iv e

le ad

er sh

ip , w

hi ch

e m

ph as

iz es

e qu

al it

y, su

pp or

ts d

el eg

at io

n of

r es

po ns

ib ili

ti es

, a nd

e nc

ou ra

ge s i

np ut

fr om

o th

er s i

n de

ci si

on -m

ak in

g an

d im

pl em

en ta

ti on

; a nd

h um

an e

le ad

er sh

ip , w

hi ch

st re

ss es

c om

pa ss

io n,

g en

er os

it y,

a nd

p at

ie nc

e, su

pp or

t f or

o th

er s,

a nd

c on

ce rn

w it

h th

ei r

w el

l- be

in g.